

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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year 125 installations were served through Women's Division projects. These included Serve-A Camp, Serve-A Chaplain (overseas) and Serve-A Hospitality Center (overseas). Highlighting the 1945-1946 program was the "adoption" of hospitality centers by local committees.

The zeal and devotion which characterized this over-all Jewish record of war service, in which 38 national Jewish organizations contributed unstintingly, is one to which every Jew may point with justifiable pride.

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

By ELLEN H. POSNER¹

While responsible polls have intimated that the rise of anti-Semitic feeling in the United States, as differentiated from anti-Jewish agitation, has halted in the last two years, the professional purveyors of hate have brought about a strong revival of overt anti-Semitism. Largely of American stock and financed by Americans, as compared with the foreign agents and Nazi propagandists before Pearl Harbor, these "nationalists," have been busily promoting bigotry, distrust, dissension and discord throughout the nation. They have also attempted, in the period under review, to coordinate and centralize their forces. They were prepared at the end of the Japanese war to take advantage of the predicted chaotic economic conditions, and to exploit the returning servicemen, the unemployed and all other individuals who felt insecure.

With the termination of war-time restrictions, the number of disruptionists have increased by the addition of new recruits and the formation of new organizations. Their activities have been characterized by a freedom of movement,

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which was in part the result of the government's seeming inability to prosecute and, at the same time, reluctance to terminate the sedition conspiracy trial, or to dismiss the previous indictments. The boldness of these "nationalists" can best be characterized by a statement by the chief rabble-rouser of them all, Gerald L. K. Smith, in his newsletter of September 1945: "*I remind you again: The war is over. Censorship is removed. You can say anything you please which is true, and do anything you please which is right, without violating any rule or law.*"

Early in 1946, Attorney General Tom C. Clark, recognizing the increasing symptoms of intolerance, issued a directive to all United States Attorneys to protect the civil rights of minorities "to the full extent and intent of the Constitution and of statutory provisions." He instructed them to "devote special attention and investigation to protection of all Americans in their civil liberties, regardless of race or color." "Civil rights of minorities in this country were never under greater threat than at this time," the Attorney General warned.

"Nationalist" Groups

American Nationalist Party

The organization of the American Nationalist Party by former Senator Robert R. Reynolds, with the assistance of Gerald L. K. Smith and the late Carl H. Mote, and the backing of many subversive groups, proved abortive. Officially launched in January 1945, Reynolds' group invaded such cities as Cleveland, Detroit, Pittsburgh and Boston in the Spring of 1945. Its fund-raisers, who included J. Victor Malone and Joseph E. McWilliams, anti-Semitic rabble-rouser indicted for alleged seditious conspiracy, were able to collect money from businessmen by promising to wage a battle against Communists and foreigners, the New Deal, government regulation of business, and to promote anti-labor propaganda. Hand in hand with its campaign for money, the Party, and "nationalists" in general, with an eye to the post-war period of economic and moral adjustment, attempted to infiltrate into and affiliate with labor

unions, veterans organizations, youth movements, women's groups, farm organizations and church groups, and to bid for the support of small businessmen. Where the field was particularly lucrative, as in the case of returning servicemen, they formed new organizations set up to attract and exploit these groups in order to create dissension and dissatisfaction in their ranks. In addition, the "nationalists" exploited the various grievances of foreign language groups in the United States.

The Party came to an abrupt halt largely because of an exposé given nation-wide circulation by the Scripps-Howard press. Consisting of a series of articles in July 1945 by Eugene Segal, the exposé tore away the screen of respectability which hid the Party's true objectives and disclosed its alliance with such well-known bigots as Smith, Mote and other similar characters. At about the same time, the New York Better Business Bureau advised its affiliated bureaus in the principal cities of the nation to warn industrialists against contributing to the Party. Chambers of Commerce in large industrial centers took up the warning and gave it more publicity. Reynolds dismissed his twenty solicitors and ceased publication of his organ, *The National Record*, with the October 1945 issue.

Gerald L. K. Smith

G. L. K. Smith, however, was not deterred by the adverse publicity. On the contrary, operating as a one-man enterprise, he thrives on any and all public notice. In the Summer and Fall of 1945 he planned to move his national headquarters to Los Angeles where he spent some time. But large counter-demonstrations, in which 200 community organizations participated, interfered with his plans. His activities in California were promoted by Lawrence and Willis Allen, leaders of the Ham 'N' Eggers, otherwise known as the Payroll Guarantee Association, and a specially created California Pastors' Committee. Speaker at, and sponsor of, the meetings in Los Angeles was City Councilman Meade McClanahan. Subsequently, as a result of a strong campaign based on his record of supporting Smith, he was decisively

recalled from office by his constituents in a special election held on March 19, 1946.

Smith undertook an extensive speaking tour of the nation. In September 1945 he addressed meetings in Buffalo, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Celina, Ohio, and Detroit, in the order given. In Cleveland before a large turnout of the United Mothers of America whose chairman is Mrs. David K. Stanley, he introduced his Post-War Recovery Plan which was officially launched at the annual meeting of the America First Party held in Celina, Ohio, on September 23, 1945.

The Plan, according to Smith, combined the best features of the Townsend movement, Coughlin's money reform, Huey Long's "share the wealth" and the Payroll Guarantee Association. Included in the fantastically generous benefits were wounded veterans, unemployed veterans, all unemployed, and citizens over 60. An average family, for example, was to receive \$8,000 a year. The cell system, which was adopted from the faltering American Nationalist Party, was to be an integral part of the Post-War Recovery Plan. Under it key Smith men would form small groups and hold meetings in private homes.

In the Fall and Winter of 1945, he toured the West and South, "laying a foundation for a national crusade." The bulk of his meetings were held in California. A marked pattern began to characterize Smith's meetings: very little free publicity in the newspapers heralding his appearance, organized civic protests and picketing of his meetings necessitating strong police protection, and marked and studied emphasis by him and his cohorts on the "persecution" of themselves and other "patriots" by "communists" and Jews.

On January 30, 1946 Smith was called to testify before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, particularly about his financial affairs. According to Smith he had urged the Committee to call him and cross-examine him "without mercy concerning the false accusations brought against me by Communist elements." Nevertheless, not only was Smith allowed to use the Committee as a sounding board, his financial affairs not questioned, nor his heated denial of being a fascist, anti-Semite or bigot challenged, but he was permitted, in the congenial atmosphere which prevailed, to call for the investigation by the Committee of

three reputable organizations engaged in combatting anti-Semitism.

Smith was arrested in Chicago on February 7, 1946 as the result of events which took place at his meeting there. Arrested with him on charges of "creating a diversion tending to breach the peace," were his fellow-speakers, the Rev. Arthur W. Terminiello, who had accompanied Smith on part of his tour, and Frederick Kister, who leads the Christian Veterans of America. All three were booked on charges of disorderly conduct; Terminiello and Kister were also under charges of inciting a riot. During Terminiello's trial, Smith and his lieutenant, Don Lohbeck, were cited for contempt of court for distributing derogatory statements to reporters in the courtroom; in April 1946 Smith was sentenced to a jail term of sixty days and Lohbeck to thirty days. Terminiello was convicted of disorderly conduct and sentenced to a fine of \$100. All three are appealing their cases. Smith and Kister have not yet been tried on the original charges of disorderly conduct.

Using his conviction as an additional reason for raising more money, Smith exhorted his followers to contribute larger sums to meet the expense of the court proceedings. He called a congress of "68 nationalist groups" for May 28th and 29th in St. Louis. Barred at first by the St. Louis police because of strong public protest, the meeting began sessions on May 29th. The speakers also included Larry Asman of the Christian Veterans Intelligence Bureau in Chicago; Kister; Kirk Dilling, substituting for his mother, Elizabeth Dilling; Kenneth Goff, chairman of the Christian Youth for America; Rev. L. L. Marion, a candidate for governor of Michigan on the America First Party ticket in 1944; Mrs. L. E. Bengé, head of the Mothers of Sons Forum of Cincinnati; Mrs. Stanley; Jeremiah Stokes of the Pro-American Vigilantes of Salt Lake City, Utah; and Harry Romer, St. Henry, Ohio, associate of Carl H. Mote in the National Farmers' Guild and the America First Party's candidate for vice-president in 1944. Present in the audience were the Rev. Gerald B. Winrod, Wichita, Kansas, a defendant in the Federal sedition-conspiracy trial and publisher of *The Defender*, and the Rev. Harvey H. Springer, Englewood, Colorado, an old associate of Smith and co-founder with

Goff of the Christian Youth for America. Smith, considering St. Louis as the location of his national headquarters, intends to return to that city at the end of June.

Not content alone with the drawing power of the America First Party, Smith, in order to attract various groups, has set up a number of other fronts, under whose "sponsorship" he arranged meetings: the Midwestern Political Survey Institute; the Nationalist Veterans of World War II, formed late in 1943 under the leadership of George Vose, who was court-martialed for selling Army goods and passes to soldiers and sentenced to hard labor for six months; the Christian Veterans of America in Chicago, which organized branches in Denver and Philadelphia, led by Frederick Kister who was associated with Ralph Townsend, convicted Japanese agent; and the Midwestern Pastors' Committee Against Communism, whose chairman is the Rev. L. L. Marion.

In addition to his speaking activities and administration of his many "fronts," Smith continues to publish his strongly anti-Semitic and disruptive *The Cross and the Flag* and to furnish to kindred publications a "news" column under the auspices of the Nationalist News Service. Together with Terminiello and others, he has been circulating petition blanks calling for the lifting of restrictions placed on Charles E. Coughlin's extra-religious activities.

Arthur W. Terminiello

The Rev. Arthur W. Terminiello was suspended by his bishop, the Rt. Rev. Thomas J. Toolen, Bishop of the Diocese of Mobile. In a public statement, on November 16, 1945, the Bishop charged him with refusing to obey his orders to cease sending out literature "detrimental to the Church and to the unity of the country." Henceforth, the Bishop ruled, he was no "longer considered a priest in good standing," nor did he have the "right to use his facilities as a priest."

Terminiello's statements had demanded the punishment of those guilty of promoting the sedition trial and restitution to those who suffered "persecution in this travesty on justice," and the amendment of the Constitution of the

United States to declare Zionism treason. Relieved of his religious duties, Terminiello turned his full attention to the promotion of bigotry. In February 1946 the first issue of Terminiello's *The Crusader* was published as a regular monthly publication. He claimed about 40,000 membership in his Union of Christian Crusaders, which sponsored a meeting at which he and Smith spoke in Detroit on February 6th.

In July 1945 he was honored at a testimonial meeting in Boston held under the auspices of the "Boston Friends of Father Arthur W. Terminiello." The local Christian Front leader, William B. Gallagher, presided. Terminiello has also issued a call to his followers to organize a "March of Death on Washington," to demand the punishment of those guilty of the Pearl Harbor debacle.

Widely quoted by and in constant contact with subversive elements, Terminiello spoke at a meeting of the Current Events Club in Philadelphia on January 18, 1946 with Dan Kurts and Kurt Mertig, who were speakers at a Christian Front meeting in Queens, New York City, in October 1945.

He officially aligned himself with Gerald L. K. Smith, accompanying him early in 1946 on a two month speaking tour. In February 1946, Terminiello spoke in Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, and Buffalo. His arrest along with Smith, in Chicago on February 7th, has already been referred to.

Carl H. Mote

"Nationalist" infiltration into the National Farmers' Guild became a certainty in December 1944 with the election of Carl H. Mote as president. Before a year had passed, he was removed from office in October 1945, by the directors of the Guild. He was charged with misconduct in office and insubordination; accused of making un-American statements and of advocating that the Guild seize government trucks for farm use as a sort of "domestic lend-lease." Specifically, his removal was based on a statement in the May 1945 issue of his *America Preferred* which had found the Germans superior to Americans and the English "physically, intellectually, aesthetically, and morally."

Mote, taking with him a sizable segment of midwest

farmers, retained control of the National Farmers' Guild's records and its publication the *Farmers' Guild News*, another outlet for his anti-Semitic libels. In December the two factions of the Guild elected presidents at separate conventions in Ohio. Mote retained the presidency of his group until his death on April 29, 1946. Kenneth C. Weber, former member of the anti-democratic National Workers' League in Detroit, was elected president of the remnant of the original Guild. Early in April 1946 Mote's faction changed its name to the United Farmers of America.

Eugene Flitcraft

The Illinois Supreme Court in January 1946 reversed the ruling, on technical grounds, of a lower court on the revocation of the charter of the Gentile Co-operative Association. Founded and led by Eugene Flitcraft, the Association had continued as an unincorporated group since the corporation was ordered dissolved early in 1945 by an Illinois Superior Court. Through his organ the *Gentile News*, Flitcraft echoes the whole "nationalist" line, in addition to reprinting the *Protocols* serially. As part of an effort to organize a boycott against Jewish business and professional men, Flitcraft published a *Gentile Business Directory*. It was a 152 page volume which listed some 10,000 firms described as Gentile owned. It was sold as a "handy shopping guide for Gentiles who prefer to do business with other Gentiles." The Chicago Better Business Bureau denounced the Directory and Flitcraft and disclosed that many of the listings were unauthorized and inaccurate.

Christian Front

The Christian Front put forth feelers in October 1945 in New York City to determine if the time was ripe for a revival of overt action. An open air meeting was arranged by C. Daniel Kurts, Christian Front leader in Queens, on October 6, 1945. Speakers were: Ernest F. Elmhurst, defendant in the Federal sedition indictment; Kurt Mertig, pro-German leader of the Citizens' Protective League;

Homer Gustav Maertz, owner of the Pioneer News Service, Chicago, which was specially devoted to the publication of vicious anti-Semitic tracts, and publisher of *Dispatch*; Mrs. Catherine Brown and Mrs. Lillian Parks, "mothers" of Philadelphia; and Frederick Kister. Eugene Flitcraft, of the Gentile Cooperative Association, Chicago, was in the audience. Elmhurst, Mertig and Maertz were arrested and held on charges of unlawful assembly. In addition, Maertz was charged with disorderly conduct. They are accused of selling an obnoxious pamphlet on Jewish "ritual murder," by a leading British fascist, which Maertz had reprinted for distribution in America. The pamphlet contained the charge that the child of Col. Charles E. Lindbergh might have been kidnapped for Jewish "ritual purposes."

The three defendants were found guilty and sentenced late in February 1946. Mertig and Elmhurst received terms of six months each in the work house and Maertz, one year in the city prison. The convictions were upheld on appeal in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.

Meetings sponsored in Brooklyn by the Rev. E. L. Curran, appeared to attract Christian Fronters and anti-Semites. The Save America Committee, founded by Curran in 1945, held a meeting in behalf of Tyler Kent, whom Curran, as well as Smith, Terminiello, Flitcraft, the "mothers," Upton Close and others, has sought to build up into a nationalist martyr, a sort of American Horst Wessel. Kent, a clerk in the American Embassy in London, was convicted in 1940 for betraying diplomatic secrets of his government to persons who were in league with the Nazis. Released from prison in Britain late in 1945, he returned to this country.

"Mothers' " Organizations

"Mothers' " organizations are still part of the subversive picture of the nation. In Cincinnati the Mothers of Sons Forum, led by Mrs. Lucinda Bengé, came out of hiding in July 1945 to demand an immediate negotiated peace with Japan. Mrs. Bengé testified before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee against the ratification of the United Nations Charter. We, the Mothers held its annual conven-

tion in Chicago on June 14 and 15, 1945. Thomas van Hyn-
ing, son of its president, told the assembled We, the Mothers
in Chicago on February 12th that refugees should be sent
back to Europe to make room for the returning veterans.
Women's Voice, enlarged and more vicious, continues to be
the organ of We, the Mothers.

In Philadelphia, at scurrilously anti-Semitic meetings, the
Blue Star Mothers, otherwise known as the Current Events
Club, led by Catherine Brown and Lillian Parks, have en-
tertained such speakers as Terminiello, Mertig, Elmhurst,
George Vose, Paul Meinhardt, secretary of the Christian
Veterans of America, and W. Henry MacFarland, aspiring
nationalist leader in Philadelphia. The United Mothers of
America, Mrs. David K. Stanley, president, has sponsored
meetings of Smith and his lieutenants in Cleveland. Mrs.
Beatrice Knowles, leader of the Detroit "mothers" became
the chairman of the Farmers' Guild Textbook Commission.

Ku Klux Klan

The Ku Klux Klan, revived within the past year, is now
on an offensive against labor's concerted efforts to organize
the South, against Negro voting in the primaries, a Con-
stitutional right recently affirmed by the Supreme Court,
against Catholics and Jews, and against "communists" or
anyone dissatisfied with the *status quo*. The Klan is also
making a strong bid for the support of veterans. The great-
est centers of its numerical strength are California, Indiana,
Florida, Georgia, Tennessee and Alabama, in the order given.
Klan units are also active in Texas, Kansas, Ohio, Michigan,
Kentucky and New Jersey.

Open Klan activity resumed throughout the nation with
the burning of a fiery cross on Georgia's Stone Mountain,
near Atlanta, on October 13, 1945. Associated with the
revival of the Klan, are: J. B. Colescott, former Imperial
Wizard, who in the past year visited southern cities and
the Midwest; J. B. Stoner of Chattanooga, Tennessee, who
was reported devoting full time to Klan organization in
Tennessee; and Dr. Samuel Green, Grand Dragon in Georgia.

The Klan has paid its registration fee in Georgia since

1940 in compliance with state laws. The registration papers listed James A. Colescott as president, and Morgan Belser, secretary. On May 8, 1946 the Klan held a Klonklave (convention) on Stone Mountain, Georgia. Chartered buses brought Klansmen from surrounding states to attend the initiation ceremonies.

Closely associated with the Klan through membership and similar aims are such organizations as the United Sons of America in Detroit, Michigan, which is one of the foremost groups active on the labor front, with branches in Pontiac and Flint, Michigan, centers of United Automobile Workers union strength; the Commonor Party in Georgia, led by James L. Shipp, president, and Charles H. Emmons, secretary-treasurer. An avowed purpose of this "party" is the organization of a "gentile political party bloc to control the Jew and Negro racial blocs. . . ." Shipp is in contact with some of the leading nationalists. The Sons of Dixie, in Tennessee, an anti-Negro group, is making a particular appeal to union members. The Mason-Dixon Society, Inc., Kentucky, bears the subtitle "National Association for the Advancement of White People." Beecher Hess, Norwood, Ohio, is the president; J. Lawrence Dooley, Covington, Kentucky, is the vice-president and founder. Another group, active in Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas and Tennessee, is the Old Glory Club.

A vigorous fight throughout the nation against the Klan has been participated in by newspapers, religious and civic groups, and by law-enforcement agencies of both the states and the Federal government. The Klan charter was revoked in California on May 2, 1946. In New York on April 29, 1946 and in Georgia on May 30th, proceedings were instituted to revoke the charter of the Klan. Governor Ellis Arnall of Georgia directed State Attorney General Eugene Cook to start *quo warranto* proceedings against the Klan. The subsequent suit, filed on June 21st, charged particularly that the Klan has violated certain civil liberties guaranteed by Georgia's constitution.

The Federal government, through the Treasury Department, filed a Federal tax lien against the Klan in Georgia for the sum of \$685,305, for income taxes allegedly due the government for 1921 through 1924 and for 1946. The gov-

ernment is ready to seize Klan property to satisfy its claim. United States Attorney General Tom C. Clark was reported to be studying the entire Klan situation, intending to take proper measure to curb it in any state where manifestations of Klan terrorism and other forms of intimidation exist.

Many Congressmen, since an initial request by Representative Thomas D'Alesandro, Jr., (D., Md.) on November 16, 1945, have urged the House Un-American Activities Committee to investigate the Klan. The Committee recently tabled a motion to do so. Representative John E. Rankin (D., Miss.), guiding spirit of the Committee, was reported to have stated at the time: "After all, the Klan is an American institution, its members are Americans. Our job is to investigate foreign issues and alien organizations." Rankin continues to make anti-Semitic allusions on the floor of the House of Representatives.

Political Candidates

Chicago led the rest of the country in the number of anti-Semites who filed candidacy for political office in the primary contests. Candidates for Congress in Chicago included: Frederick Kister, Florence H. Griesel, Charles J. Anderson, Theodore Katzman, former German-American Bund leader, Patrick T. Vincent, son of Charles Vincent, Thomas C. Van Hyning, and Harold J. Dale, son of an active member of We, the Mothers. William J. Grace of the Citizens U.S.A. Committee ran for county judge; Eugene Flitcraft filed for county commissioner. All were defeated in the primary vote. In California, Adele Cox, an active "mother," and leader of the Los Angeles unit of the Women's League for Political Education, and Meade McClanahan, recalled city councilman, announced their candidacy for Congress. Former Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota was defeated in his attempt to regain his Senate seat.

Sedition Trial Defendants

Since the death of Judge Eicher in December 1944 the Department of Justice has been reconsidering its sedition case, but has resisted all attempts made by the defendants

to gain court dismissal of the case, based on the government's failure to prosecute.

Reconsideration of the sedition case was made more difficult by a 5-4 decision by the Supreme Court on June 12, 1945, ordering the acquittal for lack of evidence of twenty-four Bundists who had been convicted in lower courts of counseling members to evade the draft. Among those freed were Gerhart Wilhelm Kunze and August Klaprott, defendants in the sedition-conspiracy trial, who were then interned. John O. Rogge, Federal prosecutor, flew to Germany in April 1946 to unearth new evidence based on new leads uncovered earlier. In December 1945 the Department of Justice had disclosed that the late Edward H. Hunter of Boston was the source of continuous financial aid, for at least three years prior to his death in June 1945, to such accused seditionists as Elizabeth Dilling, who still publishes her *Patriotic Research Bulletin* and has not abated her venom; Robert Edward Edmunson; James True; Charles B. Hudson, who continues his cryptic anti-Semitic publication *America in Danger*; E. J. Garner and Ralph Townsend. After his death, his secretary, Evelyn Tankard, dispensed the money. Hunter, obviously a middleman, maintained a front, Independent Defense Association, Inc., which was dissolved by the Massachusetts legislature in 1941. An outspoken admirer of Hitler, he was one of the pioneers of organized anti-Semitism in the United States and a correspondent of fascist leaders throughout the world.

Rogge also revealed that Lawrence Dennis, another sedition trial defendant, who began publication of a weekly, *Appeal to Reason*, from Becket, Massachusetts, on March 30, 1946, is believed to have received about \$12,000 from Herbert von Strempel, first secretary of the German Embassy; and that George Sylvester Vierick, now serving a sentence as an unregistered German agent, had received \$270,000 from the same Nazi source.

Other defendants of the sedition trial are still active, for example: Joe E. McWilliams, whose connection with the American Nationalist Party has been mentioned, is "lecturing" in Chicago; and Ellis O. Jones, who was convicted for sedition in California early in the war and sentenced to a ten years prison term, was conditionally released from prison

in August 1945, after serving four years. He has been ordered by the Washington, D. C., probation officer to leave the home of Mrs. Dilling, where he is assisting her in writing a book, and make other arrangements for his "maintenance."

In conjunction with other "nationalists," the alleged seditionists have attempted to exonerate Tyler Kent; have fulsomely praised Representative Rankin and his House Un-American Activities Committee; have vilified the F.E.P.C. and its proponents and glorified its chief opponent in the Senate, Theodore G. Bilbo (D., Miss.), who as a result of the Senate filibuster during the debate on the F.E.P.C. resorted to anti-Semitic statements; have urged the adoption of legislation cutting off immigration for ten years or more; and have opposed the Allied treatment of Germany, favoring relief for German nationalists, and ridiculing the Nuremberg trial of war criminals.

Anti-Semitic Publications

All the old canards have been taken out, dusted off and put in circulation again. There has been a renewed spurt in the publication and distribution of the *Protocols*; a few publications, such as Flitcraft's *Gentile News*, have published them serially or devoted space to extracts from them.

In addition to the publications which are sowing seeds of hate, mentioned so far, there are many more flooding the country, distributed through the mails. From California come *America Speaks*, Atascadero, William Kullgren's anti-Semitic sheet; *National Defense*, Arcadia, dedicated for and to veterans in a viciously anti-Semitic vein; the *Methodist Challenge* by the fundamentalist preacher, Rev. Robert Shuler; *Kingdom Digest*, published by the Rev. J. A. Lovell, Los Angeles, an adherent of the British-Israelite sect; and *The Leader*, official organ of the United Irish Societies of San Francisco, which has drawn closer to the "nationalist" movement. G. Allison Phelps, Los Angeles, recently published the *American Voice*, a violently anti-Jewish pamphlet, in his attempt to arise from the obscurity to which he had

been reduced during the war. *Imps*, an Independent Music Publishers' Service Bulletin, edited by Victor Lindstrom, in Aberdeen, Washington, finds its main interest in the Jewish "control" of music and entertainment.

From the Midwest come such bitterly anti-Semitic publications as *The Eleventh Hour* by Lawrence Reilly in Detroit; *Militant Truth* published by Sherman Patterson in Chattanooga, Tennessee; Court Asher's *X-Ray* from Muncie, Indiana; and *Showers of Blessing*, Denver, Colorado, by former Klansman Rev. William L. Blessing.

German "Relief" Societies

Nazi elements have bestirred themselves from retirement and have organized German "relief" societies which are serving as pivots for the emergence of pro-Nazi sympathizers and propagandists. They are champions of "good Germans," expressing deep sympathy for the suffering of the German people, venom for the Soviet Union, distrust of Britain, and sharp criticism of America's "inhuman" occupation policy. Thus, the *Chicago Abendpost*, a large German language newspaper, stated that the Germans were merely carrying out orders from above and that the procedure of the Nuremberg trials is "in contradiction to the fundamental principles of justice."

Although unable to administer relief, until the military authorities allow such activities in Germany, these German societies were ostensibly collecting money for relief purposes. In October 1945 the American Relief for Germany, Inc., was incorporated in Chicago. Some of its incorporators were former members of the German-American National Alliance, whose membership contained many pro-Nazis. Its leaders included A. F. W. Siebel, former president of the Germania Club, and F. Werk, who became active in the efforts to consolidate all German relief societies. Theodore H. Hoffman, chairman of the Steuben Society of America, which publishes the *Steuben News*, is also an active participant. The Greater Cleveland Relief Committee for Central Europe was formed a few weeks later. Refused permission by the President's War Relief Board to send funds to Germany, its abolition

was announced shortly afterwards and other channels were sought for its relief activities. One of its leaders was Otto L. Fricke, who was head of the Cleveland branch of the American Fellowship Forum under the national directorship of Friederich E. Auhagen, convicted in 1941 for failing to register as a German agent. At about the same time, the Southern California Committee for the Relief of the German People was organized in Los Angeles.

Soon after V-E day, Kurt Mertig, now serving a sentence in connection with the Christian Front meeting in October 1945, began agitation for relief of Germany. Chairman of the Citizens' Protective League, which has sought to stay deportation proceedings against undesirable German Americans and to restore United States citizenship to former Bundists, he was an employee of the German American Line and was ordered during wartime by the U. S. Army Exclusion Board to move inland. He is the authorized business and eastern agent of C. Leon de Aryan's *The Broom*, San Diego, and a frequent contributor to it. Founder and acting chairman of the German American Republican League, Mertig has delved into politics, urging the formation of an association of independent voters "to protect the 30,000,000 Americans of Aryan stock" and threatening an organized German-American vote in the coming elections.

A review of anti-Jewish agitation in the United States would not be complete without the news of the death of former Representative Jacob Thorkelson of Montana on November 20, 1945. He was associated with isolationist groups and made anti-Jewish remarks on the floor of Congress. He was among the witnesses subpoenaed in the trial of William Dudley Pelley, leader of the Silver Shirts. Also, one of the most active liaison agents among anti-Semitic leaders throughout the world, Anastase Andreivitch Vonsiatsky, was released from prison in February 1946. He was convicted in June 1942 for espionage and served approximately three years of his five year sentence.

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trated when Ralph Bunche declined an invitation to become Assistant Secretary of State, the highest government post ever offered to a Negro. Although the ostensible reason for refusing the position was his inability to take a pay cut, Bunche let it be known that he had no desire to submit to the indignities which he had previously experienced in Washington. "Frankly," he said, "it's a Jim Crow town and I wouldn't relish exposing my family to it again."

ARNOLD ARONSON

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

ORGANIZED anti-Semitic activity, which began to decline after the war, continued at a low ebb during the year under review. Anti-Semites, however, were far from dormant. There was a greater tendency of individual agitators to combine operations, as well as increasing stress on the distribution of inflammatory literature as the principal form of overt activity, in preference to the holding of meetings and demonstrations.

Propaganda Line

The principal theme exploited by anti-Semitic agitators was the identification of Jews as Communists and as conspirators for world control. Topical subjects and issues, such as the United Nations, atomic bomb control, the Presidential campaign, the DP problem, and the events in Palestine, were labeled as instances of "Jewish communism and conspiracy." At the same time, the pleas of the anti-Semites for more tender treatment of the Germans, and their denunciations of the alleged brutality of the Western powers were more frequent and vehement than at any other period since the war's end.

Gerald L. K. Smith

The most active campaign was conducted by Gerald L. K. Smith under the name of the Christian Nationalist Crusade (or party). Although he maintained headquarters at St. Louis, Mo., Smith resided at Tulsa, Okla., and after October, 1948, made most of his rabble-rousing appearances at Los Angeles, Cal., where his many meetings were bolstered by the following of Wesley T. Swift. Also assisting Smith as members of his staff were Jonathan E. Perkins of Los Angeles, preacher of "Anglo-Saxon" race-supremacy doctrines, Emory C. Burke, convicted leader of the defunct Columbians of Atlanta, Georgia, and John W. Hamilton, of Boston, Mass. In December, 1948, Perkins broke with Smith, and in February, 1949, published a book "unmasking" Smith as "America's No. 1 Hypocrite." During Smith's demagogic excursions, the staff at St. Louis held periodic CNC meetings. Attendances, however, seldom exceeded fifty. Besides the conduct of Smith's publishing activities,¹ the St. Louis staff busied itself with the widespread distribution of petitions for a city ordinance segregating Negroes at all places of public

¹ *The Cross and the Flag*, monthly (circ. approx. 20,000); more than forty pamphlets, leaflets, brochures.

accommodation and amusement. In February, 1949, the St. Louis Board of Elections denied an application of the Christian Nationalist party to be placed on the ballot for municipal elections.

In an attempt to capitalize on the Presidential campaign, Smith on August 21 to 23, 1948, staged a "national convention" of the Christian Nationalist party at St. Louis, Mo., where he had himself nominated for the presidency. The attendance at the various sessions consisted mainly of the local lunatic fringe. Among the score of anti-Semitic "delegates" who addressed the sessions were keynote speaker General George Van Horn Moseley (ret.), manager of George W. Armstrong's propaganda ventures at Fort Worth, Tex.; Wesley T. Swift; Catherine V. Brown, Philadelphia, Pa., leader of an anti-Semitic "mothers' " group; Joseph Stoeffel, Buffalo, N. Y., Coughlinite and money-reform propagandist; Stephen Nenoff, Denver, Colo., "anti-Communist" publisher; Harry A. Romer, of St. Henry, Ohio, leader of the United Farmers of America, and Ernest Elmhurst, pamphleteer and international liaison for many anti-Semites. Newspapers, and civic and other pro-democratic groups and leaders applied the "quarantine" (silent) treatment to the convention; the event received a minimum of publicity, and was poorly attended. During the Democratic national convention at Philadelphia, Smith attempted to exploit the civil rights issue. His lieutenant, Donald Lohbeck, set up headquarters of the CNC in that city in the hope of attracting dissident Southern delegates. Though some of these delegates attended a small CNC meeting on July 13, 1949, none accepted the invitation to align themselves with Smith. At the same time, Smith was in Birmingham, Ala., in advance of the rump Dixiecrat convention, hawking his support among the leaders with the assistance of Jonathan E. Perkins. On July 19, 1948, South Carolina's Governor J. Strom Thurmond, Dixiecrat presidential nominee, publicly stated: "We do not invite and do not need the support of Gerald L. K. Smith or any other rabble-rousers who use race prejudice and class hatred to inflame the emotions of the people." At the close of the period under review, Smith was conducting a series of "rallies" at Los Angeles, and on June 1, 1949, had announced another "national convention" to be held at St. Louis September 28 through 30, 1949.

Religious Area

In the religious sphere, there was a large exploitation of the Anglo-Saxon cult as a springboard for anti-Semitic propaganda. The extremist wing of this movement held that only the "Aryan" English-speaking peoples were the true Israelites, and not the Jews. Most vitriolic and effective in injecting anti-Semitism into his sermons was Wesley T. Swift, leader of the Anglo-Saxon Christian Congregation of Los Angeles, who held many meetings and "conventions" in that city and in other cities along the West Coast. Swift, whose collaboration with Gerald L. K. Smith has been discussed, and who delivered hate-inciting sermons in dynamic fashion, was head of the bigoted Great Pyramid Club in Los Angeles, and an apologist for the Ku Klux Klan. Others active in the dissemination of hatred within the movement were Millard Flenner of Dayton, Ohio; J. A. Lovell, of Fort Worth, Texas, publisher of

The Kingdom Digest; William L. Blessing of Denver, Colo., publisher of the monthly *Showers of Blessing*, and Howard Rand of Haverhill, Mass., Eastern leader of the movement, whose magazine, *Destiny*, increased in venom as the Israeli army won victories in Palestine.

Gerald Winrod of Wichita, Kan., Harvey Springer of Denver, Colo., and Lawrence Reilly of Detroit, Mich., and Del Rio, Tex., continued to mingle bigotry with their evangelism. Winrod's monthly magazine *The Defender* devoted to religious topics as well as race hatred, was widely distributed. Harvey Springer continued publication of his *Western Voice*. Reilly's organization "front," The Lutheran Research Society, was disavowed on June 10, 1949, by The National Lutheran Council, official church body, in a statement which pointed out that Reilly "was not a member of the ministerium of any of the Lutheran bodies in America." During the period under review, Reilly published a pamphlet, *Moscow's Master Plan*, attacking Jewish organizations as Communist because of their support of civil rights legislation.

Mothers' Groups

Of the groups exploiting the theme of motherhood for anti-Semitic ends, the National Blue Star Mothers in Philadelphia, Pa., led by Catherine V. Brown, was the most active. It met regularly during the period reviewed, distributed literature, and achieved notoriety by picketing the conventions of both major political parties at Philadelphia. The United States Attorney General on April 27, 1949, officially listed the group as Fascist and subversive. We, The Mothers, of Chicago, headed by Lyril Van Hynning, confined its activities to the publication of its monthly paper, *Women's Voice*, and did not hold meetings. Agnes Waters of Washington, D. C., a lone agitator in the women's sphere, picketed the Republican convention, and walked down the aisle while the Democratic convention was in session, shrieking anti-Semitic slogans until escorted to an exit.

"Patriotic" Groups

The Loyal American Group of Union, N. J., headed by Conde McGinley, and the Nationalist Action League of Philadelphia, headed by W. Henry MacFarland, Jr., merged forces on June 1, 1949. McGinley's semi-monthly *Common Sense* became the official publication of the Nationalist Action League, while steps were reported to have been taken for that organization to absorb the Loyal American Group. The Nationalist Action League, which was named as subversive by the United States Attorney General on April 27, 1949, discontinued publication of its monthly, *National Progress*. Up to June 1, the Loyal American Group held meetings in northern New Jersey, its principal function having been the support and distribution of *Common Sense*, which, in addition to publishing anti-Semitic and pro-German material, also defended Robert H. Best, later convicted of treason. While the circulation of *Common Sense* was between 2,000 and 7,000, its issues of October 3 and 31, 1948, were distributed through the mails in large quantities. These two issues were exclusively devoted to attacks on Zionism with anti-Semitic overtones,

and were subsidized by a wealthy pro-Arab supporter of McGinley. W. Henry MacFarland, Jr., self-styled "nationalist coordinator," worked closely with the National Blue Star Mothers and other minor groups, such as the National Renaissance Party, operational front of James Madole, of Beacon, N. Y.

The Nationalist Unity Congress was formed at a "Nationalist Convention" convoked by Andrew B. McAllister at Hinckley, Ill., where he conducted the Pro-American Information Bureau. The event, held June 15 to 17, 1949, was poorly attended, drew no bigots of consequence other than Salem Bader, pro-Arab propagandist; Kenneth Goff, Nationalist "youth leader"; and Lyrl Van Hyning, Chicago "mothers' " leader, who was elected chairman. The Nationalist Unity Congress, despite its ambitious program for effecting a coalition of anti-Semitic forces in the United States, gave no indication of having such strength.

German Groups

German agitators in the United States pressed their campaign for a "soft" peace for Germany mainly by distributing literature, an endeavor in which they received substantial cooperation from the anti-Semitic press. The principal themes exploited were "Allied brutality" and "the Morgenthau Plan." Such pamphlets as *Ravishing the Women of Conquered Europe*, by Austin App; A. O. Tittman's *Planned Famine*; and *Gruesome Harvest*, by Ralph Keeling were among the materials widely distributed.

Few active German groups remained, however. In New York, Kurt Mertig's Citizens' Protective League, which was declared subversive in 1948 by the United States Attorney General, was moribund, while A. O. Tittman's Voters' Alliance for Americans of German Ancestry held small meetings in a restaurant. Leonard Enders' Organized Americans of German Ancestry in Chicago met regularly and issued a monthly bulletin. A segment of the German-language press carried anti-Semitic material, especially in comments on DP's, Jewish American Military Government officials, the German black market, and related topics. Articles by Otto Strasser, notorious former Hitlerite, appeared in several papers.

Judge Armstrong Foundation

George W. Armstrong, 84-year-old millionaire of Fort Worth, continued the operation of his Judge Armstrong Foundation with the aid of George Van Horn Moseley. Incorporated in 1945 for charitable purposes, Armstrong announced two years later that it had been established for the purpose of publishing his anti-Semitic pamphlets. During the period reviewed, two pamphlets, *Traitors* and *Zionist Wall Street*, appeared under the Foundation's imprint. During the Presidential campaign, Armstrong inserted many bigoted political advertisements in southwestern newspapers.

Ku Klux Klan

The bitter controversy over the issue of civil rights legislation during the national political campaign provided much impetus for the growth of the Ku

Klux Klan. More than fifty instances of terror and violence in the South during 1948 were attributed to increased Klan activity, as localities throughout the region, especially in Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, and Florida, were visited with Klan parades, initiations, and cross-burnings. Floggings, kidnappings, shootings, threats, and other forms of terror and violence were perpetrated on both Negroes and whites by white-robed hoodlums. On April 27, 1949, the United States Attorney General officially listed and declared the Association of Georgia Klans and the Original Southern Klans, Inc. (a schismatic offshoot) to be organizations which have "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States." The principal organizational structure of Klanism continued to be Grand Dragon Samuel Green's Association of Georgia Klans, with headquarters at Atlanta, Ga. While accurate estimates of Klan strength were unobtainable, Green publicly boasted that there were 140 Klaverns (units) in Georgia, 20 in South Carolina, and 15 each in Tennessee, Alabama, and Florida, no unit with less than 100 members. While Klansmen were chiefly motivated by race-hatred, an increasing tendency toward violence against whites for alleged moral lapses became apparent. At the close of the period under review, no abatement of Klanism was discernible. In sharp contrast to the apathy displayed by Klan-infested regions in the 1920's, however, the press, church, chambers of commerce, civic, veterans', and other community groups, legislative bodies, and law-enforcement agencies in the states affected, vigorously combated the Klan, and the vast preponderance of Southern public sentiment was vehemently opposed to it. Statutes and ordinances prohibiting the wearing of masks or other forms of Klan conduct were enacted in Atlanta, Augusta, Macon, Columbus, and Wrightsville, Ga.; in Chattanooga, Tenn.; in Tallahassee, Miami, and Coral Gables, Fla.; other state and local legislation was pending at the close of the period under review. The governors of South Carolina, Alabama, and Florida ordered enforcement agencies into action. On January 22, 1949, an official of the Southern Baptist Social Service Commission was reported to have warned churches against accepting Klan donations, which he termed "bribe-money." In Chattanooga, important church members resigned over the election of a Klansman pastor. The mayor of Soperton, Ga., on May 21, 1949, ripped the masks off three Klansmen and arrested them, receiving President Truman's congratulations for this action. At Gainesville, Ga., Negroes openly jeered a Klan procession, without incident. As this report was written, Alabama's Klan leader, William Hugh Morris, was jailed for his failure to deliver membership records to a grand jury at Birmingham, while at Rome, Ga., a federal grand jury began a probe of Klan activities there.

Legal Proceedings

The Reverend Arthur W. Terminiello, Catholic priest who retired from anti-Semitic activity in 1947 and was later reinstated by his bishop, attained nation-wide notice on May 16, 1949, when the United States Supreme Court reversed his conviction for inducing a breach of the peace. The conviction was the result of disturbances at a meeting jointly held by Terminiello and

Gerald L. K. Smith. Based on a highly technical interpretation of the local ordinance, the decision did not affect the basic principles of law involved. Also on May 16, 1949, the Federal Parole Board at Washington, D. C., denied parole to William Dudley Pelley, Silver Shirt leader, who was convicted of sedition in 1942 and was serving a fifteen-year sentence. Homer Loomis, Jr., Columbian leader convicted of inciting a riot, was denied a new trial by a Georgia court on June 25, 1949. Both Loomis and his colleague, Emory C. Burke, who was convicted of usurping police power, were at large pending appeal. August Klapprott, former Bund leader of New Jersey, was denied reinstatement to United States citizenship by a Newark Federal Court on June 23, 1949. Also on June 23, 1949, at Muncie, Ind., Court Asher, publisher of the weekly, *X-Ray*, was sentenced to ninety days and fined \$100 for assault and battery.

Reappearances and Departures

Long inactive in the organizational field, Allen Zoll was revealed in July, 1948, to be the moving spirit behind the National Council for American Education in New York, which had been formed with the stated objective of combating subversive influences in the schools. A decade before, Zoll had headed the American Patriots, Inc., which was listed as subversive by the United States Attorney General. On learning of Zoll's connection with the National Council for American Education, several prominent citizens withdrew from that organization.

Formerly active as Father Coughlin's representative, Leo F. Reardon attracted attention as director of the American Education Association of Detroit, which had patriotic objectives similar to the National Council for American Education, and published a semi-monthly newsletter, *Crossroads*. The early March, 1949, issue of *Crossroads* attacked Brotherhood Week as sentimental and Red-inspired, and boasted that "... the native energy and dishonesty [sic] of the people always pulled the Nation through to greater prosperity."

Eugene Flitcraft abandoned his Chicago anti-Semitic boycott organization, the Gentile Cooperative League, and discontinued publication of its organ, *The Anti-Communist*.

International Collaboration

An increase in the collaboration between agitators in the United States and those abroad was noted. Communication was maintained largely through liaison agents in the various countries who provided an international anti-Semitic network for the purpose of facilitating literature distribution, exchange of information, and editorial, and other forms of mutual assistance. The anti-Semitic leaflets of Einar Aberg of Sweden continued to be widely distributed in United States. The writings of Arnold Leese, G. F. Green, and Oswald Mosley of England were quoted by the anti-Semitic press of the United States. A pamphlet by Adrien Arcand, Canadian Fascist leader, *The Key to the Mystery*, was distributed by Russell Roberts of Detroit. Ray K. Rudman, a South African Nazi publisher, projected an international anti-

Semitic organization, "nominating" many of the United States' agitators as directors or officials. The plan was, however, abortive. According to G. F. Green, an international anti-Semitic conference was planned for 1949, but this meeting had not materialized at the time of the preparation of this report.

Publications

The publications of the anti-Semitic press ranged in style from the mimeographed hate-sheet to the intellectual newsletter and the well-printed magazine. New publications were: *Williams' Intelligence Summary*, a monthly newsletter issued by Robert H. Williams, anti-Semitic pamphleteer, in Hollywood, Cal.; *The National Renaissance Bulletin*, monthly newsletter published by James A. Madole, at Beacon, N. Y.; *Dan Gilbert's Washington Letter*, a monthly newsletter, whose first issue, attacking socialized medicine, bore the salutation "Dear Christian American."

GEORGE KEELMAN

INTERGROUP AND INTERFAITH ACTIVITIES

THE OUTSTANDING development of the year under review was the emergence of the local community as the focal point for intergroup relations. In the wake of the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights issued in October, 1947, there was increased interest on the part of the American public in the problems of group prejudice and discrimination and a greater professionalization of community relations work. Accompanying an emphasis on community organization for civil rights, there was less generalized mass education for democracy and more specialized education in human relations, carried on through civic and special interest groups and through community-centered programs of adult education.

Community Planning for Intergroup Relations

Beginning in 1943, government assumed more responsibility for local intergroup relations. Interracial commissions on a state-wide basis came into existence in Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. In addition, state commissions to deal with problems of discriminatory employment were operating in Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.¹ Of these, the Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin commissions lacked enforcement powers; the other commissions could enforce their orders through the courts. On June 9-10, 1949, a four-state conference of anti-discrimination administrators in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York was held in New York City. The purpose of the conference was to provide an opportunity for an interchange of experience and to consider methods for improving the administration of the respective laws against discrimination. State commissions

¹ See also p. 104.

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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mated that in the "reasonably near future" there would be genuine equality of opportunity for all men and women.

Navy

In the Navy, the Committee reported, segregation and discrimination had been completely eliminated. Whereas 95 per cent of the Navy's Negroes were in the steward's branch in 1945, over 40 per cent of the Negroes were in general service in 1950. Moreover, they were fully integrated with whites in training, jobs, messes, and sleeping arrangements, both at sea and ashore. In the Marine Corps, training was said to be nonsegregated, but some Negroes were still assigned to segregated units after training.

Air Force

In the Air Force, too, all assignments and schools were available to Negroes without restriction as to work, messes, and barracks. About 75 per cent of the 25,000 Negroes in this branch were serving in nonsegregated units, and integration was still going on.

Army

In the Army, whose plan for eliminating discrimination was the last to be accepted by the Secretary of Defense in 1949, progress was slower. Racial quotas for schools were abandoned in 1949, and in January, 1950, an Army directive stated that all men and women would be assigned to units without regard to race or color. In March, 1950, the Army dropped its long-standing 10 per cent Negro enlistment quota.

The director of the Selective Service System announced in June, 1950, that new registrants under the draft law would not be asked to state their race.

In the National Guard discrimination and segregation were likewise abandoned in several states. California, Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts and Wisconsin had taken such action during 1949, and these states were joined by Michigan, Oregon and Washington, by July, 1950.

MORROE BERGER

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

THE ORGANIZED anti-Semitic movement, though it had been on the decline since the end of World War II, was far from dormant during 1949-50. During the period from July 1, 1949, to July 31, 1950, there were approximately fifty anti-Semitic groups and fifty periodicals in existence in the United States. Anti-Jewish agitation, however, was not confined to the "old line" anti-Semitic groups. It also appeared within certain types of ultra-conservative groups, couched in subtler and more sophisticated terms, and in public disorders directed primarily at Communists and Negroes.

Peekskill

Peekskill, N. Y. (pop. 18,000, including 1,000 Jews), a summer-resort section forty miles from New York City, was the scene of two riots on August 27 and September 4, 1949. These disorders arose out of the scheduled open-air concert appearance of Paul Robeson, Negro singer whose pro-Soviet sympathies were well-known, at functions sponsored by the Civil Rights Congress, an organization listed by the United States Attorney General as a Communist front.

The concert was not held as scheduled on August 27, largely because a protest parade of veterans' groups (and townspeople attracted to it) blocked entry into the picnic grounds, site of the function, where some 200 people had assembled before the scheduled time. After the parade disbanded, fights ensued as those on the grounds began to leave. The violence included stone-throwing and the overturning of automobiles; order was restored by the arrival of a detachment of state troopers to augment the few local police on the scene. Robeson, apprised of the disorders, did not appear.

The sponsoring organization, declaring that it would not be deprived of the right of assembly, set the next concert for Labor Day (September 4). On the day of the concert, 15,000 visitors, most of whom came from New York City, arrived in cars and chartered buses at the abandoned golf-course near Peekskill where the event was to be held. Accompanying them was an organized uniformed group of 2,500 "guards" recruited from left-wing unions. Approximately 900 police (including 250 state troopers) were on hand. A protest parade of veterans' groups had again been organized. The concert was held and the veterans counter-demonstrated, without serious incident. However, when both parade and concert were over fights again ensued, and cars and buses were again stoned and overturned amid shouted anti-racial slurs. Approximately 150 persons sustained injuries during the course of the disorders.

On the day of the second riot (Labor Day), several anti-Semitic activists had arrived in Peekskill. Anti-Semitic stickers were found pasted on cars and leaflets were distributed, among them Einar Aberg's anti-Semitic tracts imported from Sweden.

INVESTIGATIONS

Amid widespread public concern over the civil liberty and other law-and-order aspects of the disturbances, Governor Thomas E. Dewey on September 14, 1949, ordered an exhaustive grand jury enquiry. Meanwhile, the American Civil Liberties Union conducted its own investigation, the results of which were made public in May, 1950. The report stated:

Behind the anti-Communist sentiment marshalled by organized veterans in a misguided expression of patriotism, lay prejudice against Negroes and Jews . . .

The authorities too, share responsibility for the outbreak. They did not respond with any but token police protection at the first concert on August 27 . . . At the second [concert] on September 4, which its sponsors said was

held to vindicate their right of assembly on private property, the authorities, though present with large police forces, permitted a provocative parade of veterans . . . which resulted in an assault on the concert-goers . . . as they left in small groups.

Joining in the ACLU report were the American Veterans' Committee, Americans for Democratic Action, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, American Jewish Congress, and Council Against Intolerance.

On June 12, 1950, the Grand Jury presented its findings which came to different conclusions from those reached by the ACLU. The Grand Jury stated that it was

. . . convinced that the violence which developed on both occasions . . . was basically neither anti-Semitic nor anti-Negro in character. Despite the surface indications of racial and religious prejudice in some of the epithets hurled at the concert-goers, it is clear from the evidence that the fundamental cause of resentment and the focus of hostility was Communism.

While condemning the acts of violence in unequivocal terms, the Grand Jury nevertheless placed the major part of the blame upon the Communists, describing the second concert as the Communist party's

. . . proving ground to test its machinery for mobilizing its forces, manipulating public opinion, and, more important, for rehearsing its strong-arm forces.

The Grand Jury criticized the ACLU report as being based, in part, on "gossip, rumors and unverified stories of prejudiced persons . . . accepted as evidence . . ."

BACKGROUND

The difficulty in determining the causes of the disorders appeared to lie in the complexity of the background. Factors not previously mentioned included the following: the population of the Peekskill area almost triples with the influx of summer residents, generating xenophobic attitudes on the part of the townspeople; the summer season, nearing its end, had been an unusually oppressive one, further taxing the strained relationships between permanent and summer residents; the area contained many Communist and radical camps and colonies; the disorders took place against a general background of increasing hostility toward Communism and Communists; Robeson had made widely publicized statements to the effect that it was "unthinkable" that American Negroes would take up arms against the Soviet Union; the town itself at the time of the disorders was suffering from an industrial slack; before the first concert a local newspaper had used language considered by some (including ACLU) to be provocative; and the presence of young hoodlum elements was an additional factor.

While the origins of the Peekskill disorders promised to remain a controversial subject, Peekskill's civic, trade, social, church, veterans', and other groups began a positive program to improve the intergroup relationships within the community.

Chicago Incident

Another serious incident with racist overtones occurred in Chicago between November 9 and 12, 1949. The number of participants swelled from 200 to an estimated 2,000. The vicinity of Fifty-sixth Street and Peoria Avenue was predominantly non-Jewish. Its residents had for some time previous to the disturbances heard rumors that Negroes were planning to move into the neighborhood. On November 9, Aaron Bindman, an official of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), entertained a group of delegates and shop-stewards, some of whom were nonwhite, at his recently purchased home in that section. Some of his neighbors immediately spread the word that Bindman had bought his house for resale to Negroes. A disorderly crowd soon gathered shouting anti-Negro and anti-Semitic threats which continued throughout the disturbances. Bindman came out to remonstrate, after which stones were thrown, followed by general violence. Young hoodlums soon grouped together and ranged the neighborhood, demanding that passers-by identify themselves; mobs degenerated into free-for-alls among their own members; cars were stoned, and in some instances their occupants were assaulted; police were attacked; and a half-mile area was eventually closed off to traffic. More than fifty persons were arrested, most of whom were almost immediately released.

In the wake of these disorders, the Chicago Police Department formulated a new set of procedural regulations to cope with incidents of this type, which were effectively applied.

Areas of Respectability

Illustrative of the extension of anti-Semitism into areas of respectability were the activities of Merwin K. Hart, director of the National Economic Council, which derived most of its support from firms and individuals interested in the propagation of the "free economy" concept. Hart, however, had converted NEC, especially its semi-monthly *Economic Council Letter*, into a medium for the expression of his violent prejudice not only against the New Deal but also against the United Nations, Zionism, socialized medicine, and Fair Employment Practices legislation. In addition to the frequent mention of Jews in unfavorable contexts, Hart often resorted to the equation of Zionism with Communism. Thus, the *Economic Council Letter* of June 15, 1949, asserted

The fact is that Zionist and Communist influence (at times the one is stronger, at times the other—frequently they work together) has dictated and controlled practically all moves of American foreign policy since 1933.

The same publication on December 1, 1949, warned Christians against supporting the United Jewish Appeal, charging that part of the money collected "would be used to help wipe out what remains of Christianity in Palestine."

During the first half of 1950, Hart's activities were investigated by the

House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities, whose proceedings were widely reported. Several contributors, claiming they were unaware of Hart's activities, announced withdrawal of further support.

Also under inquiry by the same Congressional committee during 1949-50 were the activities of Joseph P. Kamp, who directed the Constitutional Educational League. Kamp was a prolific pamphleteer whose output was designed to appeal to ultra-conservative elements in business and industrial circles. Repetitive uncomplimentary mention of Jews in attacks on Communism and liberal legislation or movements (usually characterized as "red") was a prominent theme in his propaganda. Among those who advertised and distributed Kamp's works were Gerald L. K. Smith and Gerald Winrod.

After exhausting all avenues of appeal, on June 9, 1950, Kamp began a four-month sentence for contempt of Congress arising out of his refusal in 1944 to furnish the Campaign Expenditures Committee with a list of contributors to the Constitutional Educational League.¹

Chicago Daily Tribune

The *Chicago Daily Tribune* of May 29, 1950, contained a front-page article by its Washington correspondent, Walter Trohan, which quoted an unnamed source to the effect that three prominent Americans of Jewish faith (all named) constituted "a secret government of the United States." The article contained other material highly susceptible of invidious interpretation. A committee of local Jewish community leaders, representing major national Jewish organizations, sharply protested. Conferences with the *Tribune's* management resulted in an exchange of letters in which the *Tribune* disavowed any anti-Semitic intent, stating that it "did not foresee the interpretations which . . . have been put upon it [the article] in Jewish circles." The *Tribune* gave further assurance that it would enforce its copyright in order to prevent the reprinting of this article. Nevertheless, shortly after its publication two anti-Semites reprinted the article without permission.

General Propaganda Line

Experience has shown that anti-Semitic agitators, in order to make an impression on the public, must tie in their propaganda with general exploitation of the hardships and discontent resulting from war, economic dislocations, and social tensions. Some burning public issue must be exploited. Before Pearl Harbor, one of the most effective vehicles of the movement was the issue of American neutrality.

The outstanding propaganda theme employed by the anti-Semites during 1949-50 was the identification of Jews with Communism and the Soviet Union. The exploitation of this theme kept pace with world events. Thus, the United Nations was depicted as a form of world-government controlled by Jews, who, in turn were charged with being the tools of Stalin; all Jews

¹ On August 31, 1950, Kamp was again cited by Congress for contempt for a similar reason, in connection with his appearance before the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities.

prominent in public life, in the United States and abroad, were similarly classified by anti-Semitic agitators as collaborators or compliant dupes of the Comintern; Zionism and the state of Israel were painted as products of the plan for world-domination by the Communists. Civil rights legislative campaigns and laws, notably those associated with Fair Employment Practices, were also interpreted in this way; nor was the issue of socialized medicine overlooked. In thus converting current public issues into anti-Semitic themes present-day anti-Semites differed from their predecessors of the thirties who had exploited what may be called "classical" themes of anti-Semitic propaganda, e.g., the infamous *Protocols of Zion* libel, the "international banker" canards, spurious "Talmud exposes," and the Franklin forgery.

Types of Anti-Semitic Organizations and Activities

Although organized along special-interest lines, each group appealing to a certain section of the population, the various anti-Semitic groups showed an increasing tendency to collaborate in order to broaden their appeal. Thus, W. Henry McFarland, Jr.'s, Nationalist Action League worked closely with Catherine V. Brown's National Blue Star Mothers. Wesley Swift's Anglo-Saxon Christian Congregation collaborated with Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist party. However, the merger of Conde McGinley's Loyal American Group with the Nationalist Action League in 1949 was short-lived. For several years McGinley had been one of the few agitators who had worked to secure concerted programs of action among anti-Semitic leaders.

GERMAN-LANGUAGE GROUPS

Keeping pace with events German groups in the United States replaced their appeals for a "soft peace" for the Fatherland with bolder demands for the rehabilitation and autonomy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The German language anti-Semitic groups centering in the Yorkville section of New York City met desultorily, their meetings poorly attended. During the early part of 1950, left-wing elements instituted a semi-weekly picket-line of a Yorkville store which sold *The Broom*, vitriolic anti-Semitic sheet published by Leon De Aryan in San Diego, Cal. With the abandonment of the picketing, sales of this periodical at the store dropped materially.

MOTHERS' GROUPS

"Mothers'" groups, except for the National Blue Star Mothers of Pennsylvania and We, The Mothers, Inc. of Chicago, were generally inactive. Agnes Waters of Washington, D. C. continued her agitation single-handed, mailing out vicious mimeographed screeds.

FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS

Anti-Semites continued their exploitation of religious themes, concentrating primarily on Fundamentalism and, secondarily, on the Anglo-Saxon movement which holds that the "Aryan" English-speaking peoples alone are true Israelites. Among the leading Fundamentalist agitators were Gerald Winrod, publisher of *The Defender* (Wichita, Kans.), William D. Herrstrom,

publisher of *Bible News Flashes* (Faribault, Minn.), and Lawrence Reilly, who operated the Lutheran Research Society (unaffiliated with the Lutheran church). The most virulent Anglo-Saxon anti-Semitic agitator was Wesley T. Swift, the movement's West Coast leader, who had considerable following in the Los Angeles area. Smith's meetings in that city owed whatever success they may have had to Swift's co-operation.

"NEWSLETTER" APPROACH

The "confidential newsletter" approach was used by Robert H. Williams, (Santa Ana, Cal.), publisher of the anti-Semitic newsletter, *Williams Intelligence Summary*. Allen Zoll of New York City, the pre-Pearl Harbor leader of the American Patriots (an organization listed as subversive by the United States Attorney General in 1947), started the American Intelligence Agency toward the end of 1949, issuing a periodic bulletin. Zoll continued his activities as one of the guiding spirits of the National Council on American Education, formed with the stated objective of purging schools and colleges of Communism. Another new venture of Zoll's was the American Liberty Press, which distributed reprints of a *Chicago Daily Tribune* article containing highly biased matter (*see above*).

VETERANS' GROUPS

In the veterans' area Gerald L. K. Smith reactivated his Nationalist Veterans of America (St. Louis), which was headed by Chris Schlather. In Arcadia, Cal., A. Hoeppel continued publication of *National Defense*, a monthly stressing veterans' problems which often contained anti-Semitic references.

GERALD L. K. SMITH

During 1949-50, Gerald L. K. Smith continued to lead the organized anti-Semitic movement both in the number of meetings held and in the output of anti-Semitic literature. Though Smith lived at Tulsa, Okla., the headquarters of his organization were housed in a small building in St. Louis, reportedly leased to him by one of his employees, Opal M. Tanner. The principal Smith front was the Christian Nationalist party (CNP) (or Crusade), which was officially declared to be a political party in Missouri on May 19, 1950. The CNP commanded few followers and posed no threat politically. CNP's regular meetings at St. Louis were sparsely attended by audiences ranging from thirty to seventy-five. Smith's perennial "national convention" was held twice during 1949-50: at St. Louis on September 28 to 30, 1949, and at Los Angeles on July 20 to 23, 1950.

Publication activity at Smith's headquarters in St. Louis was considerable. Circulation of *The Cross and The Flag*, CNP monthly, continued at an estimated 20,000 copies per issue, while a brisk mail-order trade in anti-Semitic literature was conducted. However, only a single trial issue of a new publication, *Attack*, had appeared by July, 1950. In addition to CNP, fronts used by Smith included the World News Service, the Anti-Communist League, the Nationalist Veterans of America, and the Patriotic Tract Society. Smith reported the receipt of \$90,000 in contributions during 1949.

F. C. SAMMONS

A new arrival upon the anti-Semitic scene was Forrest C. Sammons, well-to-do contractor of Huntington, W. Va., who early in 1950 formed the West Virginia Anti-Soviet League. Long an admirer of Gerald L. K. Smith, Sammons had previously confined his activities to writing letters to the local press. By the summer of 1950 Sammons was devoting much time to conferring with fellow agitators in various parts of the country. He had also branched out into the widespread distribution of their publications.

GEORGE W. ARMSTRONG

George W. Armstrong, octogenarian millionaire and pamphleteer of Fort Worth, Tex., and Natchez, Miss., received nationwide notoriety in October and November, 1949, when he offered a gift of oil-rights (reported as having a potential value of \$50,000,000) to a small school, Jefferson Military College in Mississippi. The condition of the gift was that the school devote itself to teaching Anglo-Saxon supremacy and other forms of racism, and exclude Jews and colored races from its student body. In the midst of the storm of publicity that ensued, the school rejected the gift, one of its officials declaring that "all the money in the world" could not induce the institution to accept Armstrong's conditions.

The following month, the United States Internal Revenue Bureau revoked the tax-exemption status of the Judge Armstrong Foundation. The foundation had been incorporated for charitable purposes, but by Armstrong's own public admissions, it was being used by him to subsidize and publish anti-Semitic literature. Armstrong's literary output during the period included four pamphlets, the last one of which was entitled "The Zionists."

Looked upon by other activists in 1947 as a potential Maecenas, Armstrong largely disappointed their expectations, preferring to spend his money on his own publications. He derived his chief assistance from General George Van Horne Moseley, one of the trustees of his foundation, who in 1937 had been regarded by anti-Semitic leaders as the man most likely to unify the movement.

Publications

The style, tone, and make-up of the anti-Semitic press ranged from the intellectual to the frenetic, from good printing and format to poorly mimeographed pages, from publications whose total content was anti-Semitic to those containing only a page or two of such material per issue. Gerald Winrod's *Defender* (estimated circulation 100,000) devoted the major portion of each issue to religion, while G. L. K. Smith's *The Cross and the Flag* (20,000), was almost entirely devoted to anti-Semitism. Conde McGinley's *Common Sense* occasionally included pro-German and pro-Arab material as well as reprints of articles, including some by Merwin K. Hart. Among those periodicals consistently replete with messages of hatred were Court Asher's poorly printed *X-Ray*, the better-printed *The Broom*, published by Leon De Aryan, and Lyril Van Hyning's *Women's Voice*. Arthur Koegel's German-

language *Buergerzeitung*, published in Chicago, was one of the most bigoted of the German-language publications,

Legal Proceedings

William Dudley Pelley, quondam leader of the Silver Shirt Storm Troops, was paroled on February 14, 1950, after having served half of a fifteen-year sentence for sedition imposed by a Federal Court in 1942.

After long appellate delays, on April 26, 1950, Emory Burke, former leader of the Columbians, the Atlanta, Ga., storm-troop, began serving a prison sentence he had received because of his organization's activities. In July, 1950, Homer Loomis, Jr., co-leader of the group, was still at large pending appeal procedure.²

Ku Klux Klan

Beset by schisms, tax-troubles, a Congressional committee investigation, vigorous opposition by Federal and state government authorities, the press, and public sentiment generally, the Klan appeared to have suffered a setback during 1949-50. Cross-burnings, parades, and incidents of violence characteristic of the Klan continued, but in the main they inspired public indignation and opposition, rather than fear. Anti-mask ordinances, coupled with Klan leaders' directives to their members to parade unhooded, dampened the enthusiasm of many would-be Klansmen. On March 18, 1950, an all-white Federal jury at Rome, Ga., reportedly for the first time in the history of the South, convicted a sheriff and his deputy for their part in a Klan flogging of seven Negroes. Others indicted were acquitted, however. On the negative side, there were instances of failure to prosecute admitted Klansmen for acts of violence, and instances of their acquittal.

The largest Klan group continued to be the Associated Klans of Georgia, headed by Sam Roper, former Atlanta policeman, who succeeded the late Dr. Samuel Green as Imperial Wizard in August, 1949. Despite public claims of membership in excess of 20,000, a reliable estimate of the Associated Klans' strength assessed the figure as nearer to 9,000. Early in 1950, in a complete upset of Roper's plans for unification, three Klans consolidated as an independent organization. These were the Federated Klans of Alabama, led by Hugh Morris, the Southern Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, directed by Bill Hendrix of Tallahassee, Fla., and the Association of Carolina Klans, of which Thomas L. Hamilton of Leesville, S. C., was the Grand Dragon. A lesser figure was Lycurgus Spinks, whose faction had an insignificant membership. Spinks threw in his lot with Roper.

Significantly, both divisions of the Klan embarked early in 1950 upon revised propaganda approaches, including greater emphasis on anti-Semitism and opposition to liberalism and civil rights. The anti-Negro aspects of the movement were de-emphasized or omitted. Thus, the July, 1950, issue of

² Loomis began serving his term on September 7, 1950.

The American Klansman, Roper's new monthly publication, prominently equated Communists with "international Zionists."

GEORGE KELLMAN

INTERGROUP AND INTERFAITH RELATIONS

THE PERIOD under review (July 1, 1949, to July 1, 1950) was marked by three significant developments in the area of intergroup relations. First, the sizeable network of mayor's committees, civic unity councils, neighborhood councils, and field offices of national group relations organizations (see AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1950, volume 51, p. 116-19) which had come into existence since 1943, was put to its first major test of strength in the postwar period, as equality of opportunity in education, employment, housing and public accommodations emerged as major issues in American communities. The problem of equal opportunity to decent non-segregated housing had a particularly important impact on group relations. Second, college campuses became centers for human relations training. Third, church groups, both Catholic and Protestant, embarked on action programs against segregation and discrimination, and racial barriers in voluntary associations were challenged with increasing success.

Essentially, the emphasis was placed on increased inter-racial understanding. Among religious groups, an increase in tension was observable. Issues such as federal aid to parochial education, released time practices, and religious holiday celebrations in the public schools, and church-state relations generally, as well as splits along religious lines on issues of civil liberties, contributed to this tension.

Community Planning for Intergroup Relations

In general, local agencies, both public and private, concerned themselves increasingly with problems of civil rights, equalization of opportunity and the impact of these problems on intergroup relations. Continuing the trend of postwar years, several additional communities created human relations commissions.¹ By authorization of state statute, civil rights and human relations commissions were established in Camden, Montclair, Newark, and Paterson, N. J. The city council of Portland, Ore., created a permanent commission on intergroup relations, giving official recognition to the advisory committee appointed by Mayor Dorothy M. Lee in August, 1949. Committees appointed by direct action of the mayor without benefit of local ordinance were set up in Bloomington, Ind., St. Louis, Mo., Passaic, N. J., Akron, Ohio, and Kenosha, Oshkosh, and Racine, Wis. The Akron and Wisconsin committees were created on the basis of facts revealed by community surveys. Governor Frank Carlson of Kansas appointed a five-member commission authorized by the legislature to survey the status of minorities in employment.

¹ AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, volume 51, p. 116-17, enumerates communities with such commissions as of July, 1949.

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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ment to S.716 except for minor details. The restrictive features of the bill were also strongly endorsed by the witness for the General Federation of Women's Clubs, as well as by representatives of several patriotic societies, such as the National Wheel of Progress, the Society of the War of 1812, the Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic, and the National Council of the Junior Order of the United American Mechanics.

SIDNEY LISKOFKY

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

IN THE atmosphere of mounting world tension that prevailed during the period under discussion (July 1, 1950, through June 30, 1951), anti-Semitic agitators intensified their topical attacks upon American Jews as Communists and Soviet agents. Of the veteran anti-Semitic groups, approximately fifty remained in operation. More important, however, than their static operations among the "lunatic fringe" were the more or less successful endeavors made by many anti-Semites to infiltrate their personalities and propaganda into the areas of respectability in American society. Most significant of all, perhaps, was the tendency of certain respectable elements in the United States to be more tolerant of patently anti-Semitic individuals and themes, because they were anti-Communist.

Attack on Jews as Communists

An outstanding example of this insinuation of anti-Semitic propaganda into respectable circles was the *Rosenberg* case. Shortly after the public announcement in November, 1950, that Anna M. Rosenberg had been appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense, Conde McGinley's *Common Sense*, Robert H. Williams' *Intelligence Summary*, Gerald L. K. Smith's *Bulletin*, and other anti-Semitic publications accused Mrs. Rosenberg of being a Communist fellow-traveler. There followed charges by Ralph de Sola, an admitted ex-Communist, supported by Benjamin Freedman (who had previously conferred with Representative John Rankin and Gerald L. K. Smith), which caused the Senate to hold up Mrs. Rosenberg's confirmation pending hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Mrs. Rosenberg's vindication came on December 19, 1950, only after this important committee had been tied up in hearings for almost three weeks. Shortly after Mrs. Rosenberg's confirmation by the Senate, a grand jury inquiry was begun which was still pending at the time of writing.

DOUSSINAGUE HOAX

In March, 1951, the Hearst newspaper chain featured what purported to be a letter written by the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the president of the National Council of Young Israel. In substance, the letter gratefully acknowledged the receipt of a gift of a Torah scroll, then went on to discuss the alleged activities of the Young Israel official as an intermediary in alleged secret dealings between Roosevelt and Stalin involving the

sovereignty of several countries. This letter, first published by a Spanish Falangist diplomat, José Doussinague, had previously been reprinted in the Paris *Figaro*, and denounced as a forgery by the United States State Department. The Hearst papers had printed the letter in pursuance of their anti-Roosevelt policy. On being advised of the facts, the Hearst papers denounced the letter as a forgery in April, 1951. Nevertheless, such bigots as Gerald L. K. Smith and Ron Gostick (of Canada) undertook to reprint, quote and give prominent mention to the original Hearst article.

Anti-Semites and Progressive Education

During the period under review, the National Council on American Education (NCAE), an organization begun in 1947 by the agitator Allen A. Zoll, was very active in the campaign against progressive education. Under the imprint of the NCAE, Zoll published a great variety of literature on this subject. He also traveled about the country organizing local groups to protest and to initiate action as Communists against those school superintendants and other officials who maintained or proposed such features as vocational training, child guidance clinics, intercultural education, and human relations workshops. The NCAE group in Pasadena was partly responsible for the forced resignation of Dr. Willard Goslin as superintendent of the school system of that city (November, 1950).

Pro-Arab Propaganda

Considerably accelerated during the period of this review, pro-Arab propaganda clearly indicated that a cardinal point of Arab strategy against Israel was to undermine the status of the American Jewish community. While some anti-Zionist material and speeches were on a high level, much of it inevitably criticized the attitude of the American Government on Arab-Israeli problems, inferring Jewish or Zionist "influence" or "the importance of the Jewish vote."

On a lower level, anti-Semitic publications increasingly adopted a pro-Arab line. Most notable example of this was McGinley's *Common Sense*, which, influenced by Benjamin Freedman, attacked Zionism as a super-government or world plot. Similar instances were the pamphlets by George W. Armstrong (the most recent titled *The Third Zionist War*, a description of the Korean conflict), and Robert H. Williams' pamphlet *Know Your Enemy*. Another springboard for an exploitation of anti-Semitic propaganda was the Palestinian Arab refugee problem. Thus, Yusif-el-Bandak, son of the mayor of Bethlehem, in the name of Arab relief, mingled heavy-handed references to Israel "cruelty" and Jewish "influence" with his many appeals before church groups. Bandak spoke as representative of the Holy Land Christian Committee, which was led by Admiral C. S. Freeman (ret.).

Many reputable Christian ministers inadvertently become retailers of Arab propaganda as the result of distorted presentations to them of Arab refugee conditions, coupled with the emotional appeal to their humanitarian impulses. Many other ministers and priests were similarly imposed upon by

lurid reports of alleged desecration by Israelis of Christian churches and other shrines in Palestine during the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Anti-Semites and Economic Conservatism

Merwin K. Hart's National Economic Council (NEC) continued to appeal to segments of industrial management which oppose such concepts as government controls, taxes and collective bargaining. The subject of investigation during 1950 by the House Select Lobbying Activities Committee, NEC's tactics were described by the Interim Report of that body (October 20, 1950) in the following terms:

... One of the National Economic Council's techniques, for example, is to disparage those who oppose its objectives by appeals to religious prejudice, often an ill-concealed anti-Semitism. While it might be argued that NEC's contributors share some responsibility for its activities, it is more likely that many of the corporate officials—and particularly the directors and stockholders of the corporate contributors—would be opposed to NEC's appeals to unreason if they were fully apprised of them.

Some substantial corporations and individuals withdrew their support of NEC, although many major donors continued to back it.

Radio and Television

Hearings were finally concluded on December 21, 1950 before the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) examiner in the matter of the radio licenses of Stations KMPC (Los Angeles), WJR (Detroit) and WGAR (Cleveland), all of which were principally owned by George A. Richards. The hearings, which consumed the greater part of the year, were based on a complaint filed in 1948 by the Radio News Club of Los Angeles, the local organization of newscasters. The complaint charged that Richards had issued oral and written instructions to the news staff and other personnel, directing that news concerning certain individuals, groups and events be "slanted, distorted, suppressed, altered or otherwise treated" so as to reflect Richards' personal point of view or bias. Thus slanted, it was alleged, the material was to be broadcast to the public as news, in violation of FCC regulations. In addition to furthering Richards' political opinions, it was alleged that some instructions were anti-Semitic. It was contended by FCC's counsel that radio licensees held their permits and wave length allocations as public stewards, and had no absolute right to exploit their licenses arbitrarily. Richards joined issue, raising the question of "freedom of speech." Before the presiding examiner made his findings, Richards died (May 28, 1951), after which, on June 14, 1951, the examiner made an initial decision dismissing the proceedings on the ground that Richards' death "... renders moot all the questions presented under the issues of this proceeding. . . ." FCC's counsel contested this ruling and appealed to the full commission to set it aside. The matter was pending as of the time of writing.

As the result of the vagueness of Missouri statute relating to political parties, Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist party (CNP) attained

a place on the state ballot in May, 1950. Thus recognized, it benefited from FCC regulations which required radio and television stations to grant time to opposing candidates for the same office, where one had already engaged such time. A further provision prohibited stations from exercising "the power of censorship over any material broadcast by such candidate." This situation gave KWK, KXOK, WIL and KSD-TV no alternative but to grant Lohbeck and Hamilton the use of airwaves for their racial demagoguery up to the time of election. Despite this, the Smith party fared badly at the hustings, Hamilton leading the CNP ticket with 610 out of 1,279,000 votes cast for senator.

PUBLICATIONS

Anti-Semitic publications continued to range in style and tone from the mimeographed hate-sheet and leaflet to the well-produced periodical or pamphlet. Representative of the latter category was *Common Sense*, vitriolic semi-monthly published by Conde McGinley at Union, N. J. Illuminating as to the type of support *Common Sense* received was a quotation from a one-issue publication, *know the truth* (sic), put out by Benjamin Freedman in January, 1951:

Since 1948 Freedman has given unsparingly of his time and efforts to increase the circulation of *Common Sense* and has advanced a small fortune for that purpose. Within the past two months alone [November and December, 1950] Freedman has advanced to and/or for *Common Sense* in excess of \$7,000 . . . Freedman advanced funds to McGinley to cover the cost of printing and mailing 50,000 copies of *Common Sense* (No. 126) [the issue attacking Mrs. Anna M. Rosenberg]. . . .

Another publication, *Williams' Intelligence Summary*, also attained considerable notoriety when its July-August, 1951 issue attacked Gen. Dwight W. Eisenhower. Williams, whose Air Force reserve commission was revoked December, 1950 for "the good of the service," published a pamphlet *Know Your Enemy*, which went into another edition during the period reviewed, whose fifty-five pages constituted one of the more ambitious essays in topical anti-Semitic scurrility. *Atom Treason*, a skilfully produced, well-illustrated twenty-four page pamphlet, smeared members of the Atomic Energy Commission, while at the same time exploiting the current spy trials as anti-Semitic propaganda. These were most representative of the tone and line of other anti-Semitic publications during the period under review.

Individual Agitators

Disseminators of anti-Semitism continued to use their organizations or periodicals as personal sounding boards. The activities of some of the agitators may be mentioned to illustrate the range of techniques employed.

GERALD L. K. SMITH

Gerald L. K. Smith's activities continued to center around the publication of his *The Cross and the Flag*, and the sale of other literature. He supplemented his income by rabble-rousing platform appearances in various cities,

none of which were productive, except for Los Angeles, where his colleague, Wesley T. Swift, "lent" his following to Smith's meetings. Still residing in Tulsa, Smith seldom appeared at the St. Louis headquarters of his Christian Nationalist party (CNP). This group continued to be run by Smith's staff consisting of Donald Lohbeck, Opal Tanner, Renata Legant, and John Hamilton. Meetings in St. Louis barely attracted attendances of fifty. In June, 1951, John Hamilton and a small group of members, discontented with Smith's tactics, broke away from CNP and formed the Citizens' Protective Association. The group, in its infancy at the time of writing, appeared to be formulating a line which veered away from the Smith brand of anti-Semitism, but instead concentrated on promoting the segregation of Negroes in St. Louis.

FATHER FEENEY

A springboard for indiscriminate religious bigotry was provided by the regular meetings held on Boston Common by Father Leonard Feeney and his small, but fanatical following. Father Feeney had been suspended from his sacramental privileges by the Catholic Church in 1949 for his insistence upon a literal interpretation of the doctrine that no one without the Church could attain salvation. Feeney's vituperative attacks were leveled in equal measure against the Catholic diocesan authorities, the Protestants, and the Jews, thereby attracting a highly varied audience of bigots of all persuasions. However, bigots who came to gratify their particular prejudice inevitably became aroused as their own religion or race was vilified.

JOSEPH P. KAMP

Joseph P. Kamp, who headed the Constitutional Educational League, completed service of his four-month sentence for a 1944 contempt of a congressional committee. He began serving this sentence June 9, 1950. Kamp was again convicted in Federal Court, Washington, D.C., on June 28, 1951, for contempt of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities (Buchanan Committee) for failing to obey that body's subpoena to produce the records of his organization during the course of the committee's hearing in 1950. As of the date of this article, Kamp was free on bail awaiting sentence and announced that he would appeal the verdict.

GEORGE W. ARMSTRONG

The Texas Educational League of George W. Armstrong, wealthy pamphleteer of Fort Worth, made a small annual grant early in 1951 to Piedmont College, Demorest, Ga. That institution's governing board accepted the grant over repeated and vehement protests by both faculty and student body, based upon Armstrong's background as a promoter of racism and other forms of bigotry.

Ku Klux Klan

The Ku Klux Klan made little progress during the period under review. Fragmentized into virtually autonomous groups, Klan activity centered in

Atlanta, Ga., where Samuel Roper presided as "Imperial Wizard"; Florida, where Bill Hendrix headed the Southern Klan; and the Carolinas, where activity was governed by Grand Dragon Thomas L. Hamilton. Other Klan circles elsewhere appeared to have temporarily subsided under the cloud of public revulsion and the anti-Klan legislation passed by various Southern states and municipalities. While reliable estimates placed the aggregate membership of the various Klans near the 20,000 mark, indications were that the membership turnover was great, and that the state of finances generally was poor in every segment of the hooded order. However, a shift in propaganda emphasis toward anti-Semitism became apparent, as Klan literature published during the period was virtually indistinguishable from the product of run-of-the-mill anti-Semitic publications. Coinciding with this shift, a revised Kloran (ritual) was printed which showed that the oath had been amended to include opposition to "the traitorous organization of minority groups." Bill Hendrix, speaking at a Klan rally at Georgetown, S.C. on August 5, 1951, viciously attacked Bernard M. Baruch as a "Zionist Jew" who was attempting to regiment the nation. On August 20, 1951, a widely heralded Klan rally at Whiteville, N.C., failed miserably when fewer than one hundred Klansmen appeared, many of them masked and astride dray horses. A crowd of 5,000 spectators, including many Negroes, turned the event into a carnival. Indicative of the general reaction of Southern officials and the citizenry at large were statements issued August 28, 1951 by the governors of both Carolinas. Governor Kerr Scott (N.C.) declared that he was "not going to take any foolishness from the Klan," intimating that several law enforcement agents had been ordered to investigate Klan activities in the state. Governor James F. Byrnes' office announced an investigation of recent Klan violence near Anderson in South Carolina. The masked meeting at Whiteville, N.C., held in a cornfield, pointed up the general difficulty encountered in certain types of anti-mask ordinances, since the statute exempted meetings on private property from its prohibition. Early in the summer of 1951, Hendrix announced his candidacy for governor of Florida. He opened his public campaign in Jacksonville on July 21, 1951, where he was introduced to the rally by Edgar W. Waybright, Sr., well-known local attorney and chairman of the Democratic County Committee.

Foreign Language Groups

Foreign-language elements in the United States in several instances manifested anti-Semitic sentiments.

A memorial meeting attended by 4,000 persons was held in New York City in June, 1951, by Ukrainian organizations to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of General Simon Petlura. Petlura in 1917-19 led Ukrainian Nationalist forces which perpetrated many excesses against Jews. He was shot in Paris by a Jewish youth whose family had been wiped out by Petlura's men. Speakers compared Petlura to Lincoln, calling him a martyr. Meetings were also held in Montreal and Philadelphia.

Reports from Cleveland were that Josef Tiso, Hitler's puppet premier

of Slovakia, received similar recognition as a martyr at a Slovak Day picnic on June 24, 1951.

A Democratic leadership contest in New York's predominantly Puerto Rican 14th District, in the summer of 1951, was marred by the widely circulated appeal of Enrique Calderon to the electorate to vote for him as against the incumbent because the latter "is a Jew, and the enemy of the Puerto Ricans and of all Christianity." Two leading Spanish language papers denounced these tactics, as did enlightened leaders of the Puerto Rican community. Calderon was defeated by the incumbent leader.

International Anti-Semitic Activity

Long contemplated by international anti-Semitic agitators, a World Convention of Neo-fascists was held in Malmoe, Sweden, during the week of May 14, 1951. Sponsored by Per Engdahl, Swedish fascist leader, the convention was attended by delegates from Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries. Prominent among generally uninfluential nonentities was Franz Richter of the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich party of Germany which had recently polled 400,000 votes in Lower Saxony. Generally, the convention outwardly avoided the topic of anti-Semitism, confining its deliberations to other aspects of totalitarianism, especially its political manifestations. It was decided to avoid the old designations of "Nazi" and "Fascist" and to stress the "newness" of the concepts to be advanced; the principal concept was of a "united" Europe with Germany as its core. Aside from designating the city of Trieste as the location of its secretariat (where the *Centro Studi* would provide facilities), the convention achieved little. In contrast to previous projects for similar conventions, investigation as of the time of writing showed that Fascists and anti-Semites in the United States had played little or no part in the Malmoe convention, though suggestions were made at the convention that American agitators be approached.

GEORGE KELLMAN

INTERGROUP ACTIVITIES

THE year under review was marked by an increase in the number and significance of activities and programs for the improvement of intergroup relations. Sponsoring these activities were many segments of American society, including the universities, the churches and synagogues, government, youth, labor, and business, as well as national and local agencies specializing in intergroup relations. In the furtherance of their programs these groups had to contend with animosities created by the controversies over church-state issues and censorship of motion pictures, as well as by the attacks on public education. War in Korea, moreover, was both an incentive to improved intergroup understanding and a deterrent to new legislation dealing with discrimination.

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

THE Presidential campaign of 1952 provided anti-Semitic agitators with an important opportunity to operate during the period under consideration (July 1, 1951, to October 1, 1952). Exploiting the canards that certain of the aspirants to the Presidency were Jewish-dominated, the agitators used various versions of the "Jewish world conspiracy" and "Jewish Communism" themes. Virtually every anti-Semitic propagandist employed this format, so consistently as to indicate a planned collaboration on their part. Though politically ineffectual, the active anti-Semites were able by these tactics to gain a warmer reception in respectable circles than they had in the preceding year. Impelled by bitter partisanship, many extreme conservatives deliberately or unwarily cooperated with and supported anti-Semites who appealed to their political bias.

There was a noticeable degree of anti-Semitism in the political atmosphere a full year before the 1952 conventions of the major parties. Sensing the possibility of an advantageous situation, anti-Semites adopted Gen. Douglas MacArthur as their hero (without his consent) shortly after President Harry S. Truman recalled him from his Korean command in April 1951.

Their deification of MacArthur was coupled with venomous abuse of General Dwight D. Eisenhower and President Truman. The latter, however, ceased to be a major target after announcing, in June 1952, that he would retire from office at the end of his present term. Attacks on Truman thenceforth merged into the standard anti-New Deal pattern, a staple of the anti-Semitic stock in trade over the years. The anti-Semites considered the Republican Presidential candidacy of Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio as suspect because of his support of Israel. However, they "supported" Taft in a negative way by promoting attacks on Eisenhower (which Taft denounced). Other potential Republican candidates labeled as "Jew stooge" or "Red dupe" were California's Governor Earl Warren and Harold Stassen, the president of the University of Pennsylvania.

By the middle of 1951, the pattern of using anti-Semitic scurrilities in a political context had been crystallized in anticipation of the possibility of Eisenhower's nomination. The canards contained in Conde McGinley's *Common Sense* and Robert H. Williams' *Williams Intelligence Summary* and similar publications were given such extensive distribution that Joseph and Stewart Alsop, in their syndicated column of political comment, were moved to observe: "The reason why it is prudent to have a look into the political sewers is, very bluntly, that the sewers are threatening to well up into our public life. . . . The disgusting nonsense contained in these poison-pen pamphlets is actually beginning to be accepted as sound political currency by outwardly respectable politicians" (New York *Herald Tribune*, August 31, 1951).

Primaries

Evidence of the impact of anti-Semitic activity appeared during the first preferential primary, held in New Hampshire in March 1952. That state was flooded with anti-Semitic literature attacking Eisenhower. Some of it was anonymous, but a substantial part of it was the product of such agitators as Robert H. Williams and Gerald L. K. Smith. Smith had organized a new front for the occasion, Independent Republicans for MacArthur, under whose auspices he distributed a leaflet depicting an anti-Semitic stereotype of a Jew pointing approvingly to a picture of Eisenhower. The reverse side of the leaflet set forth Smith's list of Eisenhower's "supporters," featuring Bernard Baruch, Senator Herbert Lehman, Henry Morgenthau, and Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.

The Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections took official cognizance of the situation. Its chairman, Senator Guy M. Gillette (Dem., Iowa), was quoted in *The New York Times* of March 12, 1952, as saying: "... If scurrilous smear-type literature has been used in this first Presidential primary campaign . . . it may be symptomatic of a trend that could reach terrifying proportions by next November. . . ."

Thereafter, whenever a bitterly contested Presidential primary was in the offing, anti-Semitic literature was widely distributed in the area prior to the event. In some localities, leaflets of as many as ten agitators from different parts of the country were assembled into kits, and distributed to passersby on main thoroughfares. Most anti-Semitic literature was distributed via the mails.

Propaganda

During the spring of 1952, an extensive mailing of anti-Semitic propaganda was undertaken by Gerald Winrod, evangelist of Wichita, and a defendant in the abortive Washington sedition conspiracy trial in 1944. Winrod used general mailing lists as well as lists in special categories, such as corporate directors. As a result, both Christians and Jews received his material. The principal item mailed by Winrod was a reprint of one of his articles, "Conspiracy, the Case of Philip Dru," which appeared in the April 1952 issue of his publication, *The Defender*. This was a fantastic distortion of a fictionalized political essay written in 1912. Attributed to President Wilson's confidant, the late Col. E. M. House, the book was "interpreted" by Winrod as another version of the infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Accompanying these scurrilous leaflets was pro-MacArthur literature.

Even more widely distributed was a sixteen-page issue of Joe Kamp's *Headlines* (March 15, 1952), entirely devoted to attacks on Eisenhower containing thinly veiled anti-Semitic implications. Many thousands of copies of this item were mailed and distributed in bulk lots.

Another widely circulated item was a reprint of a page from the 1915 *West*

Point yearbook, *The Howitzer*, bearing a picture of graduating cadet Eisenhower. Beneath his photo was a supposedly humorous "biography" written by a classmate, which began: "This is Señor Dwight David Eisenhower, gentlemen, the terrible Swedish Jew. . . ." Eisenhower is a Christian of Pennsylvania Dutch extraction. These leaflets were extensively distributed in states about to hold preferential primaries. The largest publisher of the reprint was Gerald L. K. Smith, who added his own caption, "Ike Eisenhower (Swedish Jew)."

In varying degrees, ranging from suave innuendo to coarse epithets, other activists adhered closely to the line. Thus, an anti-Semitic group in the Yorkville section of New York City attempted to form a "stop Eisenhower" movement, and distributed vilifying leaflets through that section. Another group, the neo-Nazi National Renaissance Party headed by James A. Madole, held weekly street meetings at which praises of Hitler were as vehement as denunciations of Eisenhower. Madole also published a monthly *National Renaissance Bulletin*, of the same character.

From West Virginia a retired contractor, F. C. Sammons, stressed the theme that "Zionists" were naming the country's Presidential candidates. Utterances in the same vein by George Armstrong, wealthy octogenarian of Forth Worth, Tex., were quoted or printed at length in many anti-Semitic publications, notably Conde McGinley's *Common Sense*, which also gave a great deal of space to Robert H. Williams. In Chicago, Lyril Van Hyning's *Women's Voice* called a Nationalist Convention in that city for the weekend preceding the Republican Convention.

The Nationalist Convention

Numerous agitators went to Chicago for the Republican Convention, many of them arriving three days in advance in order to attend the Nationalist Convention on July 4-6, 1952. Attendance at sessions ranged between 50 and 200; however, many of the participants were local residents. The convention early split into two groups. One was headed by Joseph Beauharnais, leader of the anti-Negro White Circle League; the other by Mrs. Van Hyning. The Beauharnais faction was in favor of minimizing anti-Semitism and concentrating the attack on the Negro, while the Van Hyning group espoused the tactic of all-out anti-Semitism. In effect, however, these conventions proved to be little more than forums for hysterical attacks on Eisenhower and occasions for the proposal and adoption of a series of resolutions in favor of money-reform schemes and against the United Nations, Zionism, etc.

Republican Convention

Anti-Semites endeavored in various ways to attach themselves to the proponents of the candidacies of Gen. MacArthur and Senator Taft at the Republican Convention. They distributed sizable quantities of literature, but not to the extent expected. Both the convention authorities and the Chicago

police, fully alerted, prevented the distribution of anti-Semitic literature or the holding of demonstrations of any type in and around the convention hall. This limited the area of anti-Semitic activity to the lobbies and assembly rooms of the numerous hotels, especially those where the various candidates' supporters were holding meetings. Agitators later claimed that they had contacted many delegates. Gerald L. K. Smith established headquarters at a hotel where he conferred with many bigots. His lieutenant, Donald Lohbeck, appeared most active, shuttling between hotels and even addressing some of the political meetings.

Constitution Party

The nomination of Dwight D. Eisenhower by the Republican Party left several diehard elements groping for some third or new party with which to continue their opposition to Eisenhower. Anti-Semites were alert to exploit this sentiment. The case of the Constitution Party is illustrative.

A meeting of representatives of eighty rightist groups was convened at Chicago on August 7 and 8, 1952. Its announced purpose was to explore the possibility of concerted action against "internationalism" in politics and government. Although many of the organizations represented were respectable in character, active participants included Kenneth Goff, former Gerald L. K. Smith follower; W. Henry MacFarland, Jr., former leader of the defunct Nationalist Action League (listed by the United States Attorney General as "fascist and subversive"); George T. Foster, former leader of the Constitutional Americans, which had served as a forum for anti-Semitism; and Upton Close, publisher of the bigoted newsletter, *Closer-Ups*.

The meeting soon got out of the hands of those who favored working within the framework of the major parties. Ignoring an attempt by the chairman to adjourn the session, the third party faction continued the meeting and named itself the Constitution Party. Percy L. Greaves, Jr., (who already headed a recently formed group known as the Constitution Party) was chosen co-chairman, along with Suzanne Silvercruys Stevenson, national head of the ultra-conservative Minute Women of America. Within a matter of weeks, however, control of the Constitution Party was wrested from them at a meeting held, allegedly without their consent, at Philadelphia on August 31. Upton Close was elected publicity director and W. H. MacFarland national secretary. General MacArthur and Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia were "nominated" as candidates for President and Vice-President, respectively. Senator Byrd requested removal of his name; MacArthur took no cognizance of the action. Mrs. Stevenson and Greaves resigned from the party, Mrs. Stevenson declaring:

The principles of the (Constitution) party as rewritten by an unauthorized meeting of a few of the National Committee in Philadelphia last week contain the phrase "We must preserve our Christian heritage, which has been the strength of this nation." Such a declaration sounds to me like anti-Semitism. I will have no part of any movement which seems to me so steeped in bigotry.

The Texas and Colorado units of the Constitution Party secured a place on the official ballot of those states.

The Christian Nationalist Party

Gerald L. K. Smith's political vehicle, the Christian Nationalist Party (CNP), held a "national convention" at Los Angeles on September 8 and 9, 1952, at which General MacArthur and California State Senator Jack B. Tenney were nominated as its candidates for President and Vice-President. Senator Tenney accepted the nomination the following week. The CNP was successful in obtaining positions on the state ballots of Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, North Dakota, and Washington, being relegated to "write-in" status in California and other States. CNP's list of proposed electors in Texas was headed by George W. Armstrong. The vote for MacArthur in Texas was: CNP, 679; Constitution Party, 765. Allocation of the national vote for MacArthur has not been finally determined at the time the YEAR BOOK goes to press (November 1952).

America First Party

The America First Party was a vehicle of Lar Daly, a Chicago manufacturer. The party's nominees were General MacArthur and Senator Byrd, for President and Vice-President, respectively. Daly's attempt to get his party a place on the Illinois ballot failed because consent of the nominees is required in that state. However, Daly was more successful in Missouri, where the election laws were less stringent.

The Tri-Faith Appeal

Alert to the attempts by bigots to exploit the elections for their own ends, clerical and lay representatives of the Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish faiths in July 1952, issued an appeal that "candidates . . . take all necessary measures to prevent any expression of racial or religious bias by their adherents and to condemn publicly and emphatically every occurrence thereof." Also suggested was the formation of local nonsectarian, nonpartisan committees to guard against such occurrences. Signers of the appeal were: Bishop Henry Knox Sherril, president of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA; Arthur S. Fleming, president of Ohio Wesleyan University; Bishop Edwin V. O'Hara of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Kansas City; George N. Shuster, president of Hunter College; Rabbi Simon G. Kramer, president of the Synagogue Council of America; and Jacob Blaustein, president of the American Jewish Committee. The appeal received the full endorsement of Republican National Chairman Arthur E. Summerfield and Democratic National Chairman Stephen A. Mitchell. It was widely publicized, and interfaith elements in many communities took steps to further its objectives.

Literature

Anti-Semitic literature appeared better gotten up typographically and more adroitly angled to current topics and trends. It was produced and mailed in such great volume as, in some instances, to give rise to the conclusion that substantial subsidies had been given by wealthy donors. One of the most scurrilous items to appear during the period under review was *Behind Communism*, a one-hundred-page, profusely illustrated book published in California by a young journalism student, Frank Britton. The book's text and pictures smear Jews as Communist conspirators. The book and its hate-inciting advertisement was widely distributed by anti-Semitic activists.

Iron Curtain Over America, a book which purported to be an attack upon the Truman administration and the New Deal, was published at the end of 1951. Its author, John O. Beaty, was a professor at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Tex. Beaty had previously achieved local notice because of his intensely pro-Arab views expressed from the lecture platform. The ills of the United States and of the world were traced by the author to the present-day descendants of the Khazars, a Tartar tribe of the Ukraine which had become converted to Judaism in the eighth century. Thus, "Khazars" are Communists, control the Soviet Union, start wars and revolutions, infiltrate and influence American political parties, the government, etc. The book, in its sixth printing in October 1952, appeared to have been given extensive free distribution to selected individuals.

Ku Klux Klan

Divided into a few autonomous regional groups, the Ku Klux Klan continued a decline which was accentuated by the vigorous action taken by state and Federal authorities in North Carolina. On October 1, 1952, Imperial Wizard Thomas L. Hamilton of the Carolina Klans began serving a four-year sentence, after pleading guilty to the specific charge of directing one of a series of nocturnal floggings and other brutalities that had terrorized the Columbus County (N.C.) area during 1951. Hamilton, the first high Klan official in a generation to be brought to book for his connection with terrorism, had been indicted with sixty-three of his henchmen for these outrages. One was convicted after trial; the others had pleaded guilty, or did not wish to stand trial (pleading *nolo contendere*). Sixteen received jail sentences ranging from eighteen months to six years; the others received fines and suspended sentences.

At Wilmington, N. C., a Federal jury found ten Klansmen guilty of violation of the "Lindbergh Law" for taking a man and woman across state lines into South Carolina and flogging them. In May 1952 six of the defendants received terms of two to five years, while the others were given suspended sentences.

Grand Dragon Bill Hendrix, Florida Klan leader, began revamping his

organization into what he named the American Confederate Army. Caps and neckties bearing the stars and bars were to replace traditional Klan regalia, while titles of general and colonel were to supersede the Klan nomenclature. In February 1952 Hendrix was placed under a three-year suspended sentence for abuse of the mails in sending out defamatory post cards.

At the close of the period there were indications that Klan organizers were planning to operate in Northern areas, but at the time of writing (October 1952), these plans had not materialized.

Miami Incidents

From April through December 1951 there were approximately sixteen bombings in the Miami area of Florida. Half of these were directed against Jewish centers and synagogues. Two were perpetrated against Carver Village, a recently completed housing development occupied by Negroes; the remainder of the incidents affected a variety of targets, such as a hotel, a high school, a court house, and a Catholic church. Fortunately, none of these incidents resulted in death or personal injury.

The two bombings of the Negro development appeared to have been expertly planned, and did considerable damage. The incidents affecting the synagogues and Jewish centers appeared either to have been perpetrated by amateurs, or to have been done for the purpose of terrorization rather than to cause extensive damage. The pattern appeared to be the throwing or placing of a stick of dynamite in front of, or into the premises. In some cases the fuse fizzled, or did not burn at all. In at least one instance the letters KKK were painted on the dynamite. In another, a fiery cross was placed near the premises. Sometimes the rabbi or other official of the synagogue would receive an anonymous phone call before the occurrence, a guttural voice warning that the incident would soon happen. The most serious of these incidents took place on December 2, 1951, when the Miami Hebrew School and Congregation was seriously damaged by dynamite. On the same day Carver Village was bombed for the second time. Substantial rewards were offered by the City of Miami and by Jewish community groups for the apprehension of the perpetrators. The Federal Bureau of Investigation sent agents to the area and United States Attorney General McGrath announced that the Justice Department would exert every effort to detect and apprehend the criminals.

On December 24, 1951, at Mims, Florida, Harry T. Moore, local leader of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, was killed by a bomb which had been placed under the bedroom of his small bungalow. Moore's wife died a few days later. Moore had been conducting a campaign for funds in support of Negro youths who were defendants in the Groveland (Fla.) rape case. Mims is approximately 200 miles from Miami, and the murder of the Moores seemed not to be directly connected with the Miami incidents, although many observers felt that the atmosphere of violence generated by the Miami incidents had encouraged the murderers.

As of the date of writing none of the criminals has been identified. Dur-

ing October 1952, the Federal Grand Jury began hearings on the entire situation.

Philadelphia Incidents

Sections of Philadelphia were visited with a series of anti-Semitic juvenile incidents during January and February 1952. Three youths threw a home-made bomb into the B'nai Israel Synagogue while services were in progress. Fortunately, there were no casualties among the sixty worshippers who fled. Another fire bomb was placed against a door of Beth Judah Temple, but was extinguished in time. Nine youngsters, aged seven to fourteen, vandalized the Benjamin F. Teller Synagogue, causing extensive damage. The perpetrators of these incidents were apprehended, the ringleaders committed to institutions, and their accomplices otherwise disciplined. At court hearings it developed that a number of youths had formed an imitation Hitler Youth group at Olney High School, and systematically intimidated Jewish fellow-students. The Jewish Community Council and several other community agencies and services collaborated in the promotion of a positive intergroup program. At the time of writing (October 1952), tensions in the areas affected had been greatly relieved.

GEORGE KELLMAN

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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TABLE 1
IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES
(Quota and Nonquota)

Quota	1952 ^a	1951 ^b
Ethnic Germans	42,786	
DP's	77,196	
Normal	74,265	
Total	194,247	156,547
Non Quota		
Natives of nonquota countries	48,418	
Spouses of U.S. citizens	16,851	
Others	6,004	
Total	71,273	49,170
Grand Total	265,520	205,717

^a Refers to the fiscal year July 1, 1951, through June 30, 1952.

^b Refers to the fiscal year July 1, 1950, through June 30, 1951.

SIDNEY LISKOFKY

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

THOUGH with less attendant publicity than during the early part of the Presidential campaign of 1952 (see *AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK*, 1953, [Vol 54], p. 90-91), anti-Semitic agitators in the United States continued their operations during the period under review (July 1, 1952, through June 30, 1953).

Third Party

Frustrated by the nomination of Dwight D. Eisenhower to run for President on the Republican ticket, the anti-Semites turned to the exploitation of the third party idea. Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist Party (CNP) and the Constitution Party both nominated General Douglas MacArthur for President, without his consent. The total national vote (ballot and write-in) for MacArthur did not exceed 20,000. Some tallies for the Constitution Party were: Colorado, 2,181; Texas, 730; North Dakota, 751. Significant tallies for Smith's CNP were: Washington State (where Smith supporters were particularly active), 7,290; California (long a chief local of Smith activity), 3,326; Missouri (Smith's headquarters were at St. Louis), 302; Texas, 833.

Attacks on Republican Administration

The aftermath of the election found anti-Semitic agitators changing their propaganda lines. To be sure, they retained their basic theme equating Jews with Communism. However, for the first time in twenty years, they were deprived of their familiar New Deal-Fair Deal target. Nevertheless,

within a few months after his election, attacks upon President Eisenhower and his administration bade fair to equal those against his predecessors in viciousness and volume. Thus, *The Cross and the Flag* (G. L. K. Smith) as early as January 1953 charged that "Behind the Truman machine and behind the Eisenhower machine stands a Baruch." Conde McGinley's *Common Sense*, September 1, 1953, issue, extended its vituperation to the President's family: "Milton and Arthur, like their brother Dwight, were veterans of political intrigue and confidential agents of the Jewish Gestapo in America for years." *Williams' Intelligence Summary* (October 1953) described the President's foreign policy as "get along with Communist governments—to build a world government." Lyrl Van Hynning's *Women's Voice* (September 24, 1953) inveighed against the President's "stupidity" because he "failed to recognize the sinister anti-Christian deeds" of Jewish organizations; inevitably, the bigots headlined all official appointments of persons of Jewish background, with accompanying items of anti-Semitic content.

Appeals to Xenophobia

During the period under review the anti-Semites continually appealed to crude xenophobia. This appeal took the form of attacks upon the United Nations (UN) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and of adroit "support" of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act. Anti-Jewish agitators depicted the UN as an attempt to subvert American sovereignty to the control of Communists, Zionists, and Jews; they distorted the findings of official investigative bodies into mass indictments; they listed UN employees of purported Jewish background as "proof" of Jewish domination of that body; the UN, Israel and Soviet flags and insignia were compared for their hidden significance. UNESCO was invariably portrayed as the Communistic, atheistic, propaganda arm of UN, whose aim was to corrupt American schools and school children. By avoiding racist statements, several of the rabble-rousers acquired a larger audience in respectable quarters. Notable among them was W. Henry MacFarland, Jr., who headed the American Flag Committee in Philadelphia. MacFarland's previous venture, the Nationalist Action League, had been listed by the United States Attorney General as "subversive" in 1949. MacFarland's "Report to the American People" attacking UNESCO as subversive, had found its way into the Congressional Record in 1951, and continued to be extensively circulated during the period reviewed. Others who launched similar attacks were Allen Zoll (National Council on American Education), Joseph Kamp (Constitutional Educational League), and Merwin K. Hart (National Economic Council).

Anti-Semitic "partisanship" for the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act took the form of attacks upon those who sought its repeal or revision. Anti-Semites played on popular fears lest the United States be flooded by worthless immigrants; they asserted that the Jews wished to secure the admission of millions of their co-religionists in order to acquire domination of the United

States. The fact that Christian church groups, both Catholic and Protestant, were also opposed to the new immigration law was made light of, if not completely ignored.

Reaction to Soviet Anti-Semitism

The Prague trials and the institution of a flagrantly anti-Semitic policy by the Soviet Union and her satellites during the latter half of 1953 (see p.) puzzled the agitators only temporarily. With typical irrationality they advanced many contradictory "explanations": the Prague trials were a "family quarrel between Reds and Zionists, built up into a massive fear campaign by Jew propagandists" (Frank Britton's *American Nationalist*, December 25, 1952); "The Jews had outlived their welcome in a revolutionary movement" (Leon DeAryan's *The Broom*, December 22, 1952); the Czech purge was "a Red smokescreen," and "a Jewish move to stampede us into World War as in 1939 . . ." (Conde McGinley's *Common Sense*, December 1, 1952); Lyrl Van Hyning's *Women's Voice* of December 25, 1952, held that the trials were "phony" and merely an effort by the Jews "to clear themselves of Communist crime. . . ."

Other Propaganda Themes

During the period reviewed, the word "Zionist" became more firmly entrenched in the anti-Semitic lexicon as a synonym for Jew. "Zionist" was joined by "Khazar," a relative newcomer, promoted by John Beaty, Conde McGinley, and others. The Khazars were a Tartaric tribe of the Ukraine, no longer existent, which embraced Judaism in the eighth century. Propagandists employing the word boldly asserted that the present-day descendants of the Khazars dominated Russia and most of Europe, coerced the United States government, and conspired for world control. The term appeared to be used in the hope of avoiding charges of anti-Semitism, since the Khazars were not Semites. Such expectations, however, were invariably vitiated by frequent references to prominent Jews within this context.

Noted, too, was an increased interest in such staples of the anti-Semitic trade as the infamous *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, and its equally discredited offshoot, *The International Jew*. A diabolical, if crude, adaptation of the Protocols theme was given wide currency. Up until the middle of 1953 charges of Jewish control of the atom for world domination were extensively exploited, then declined for the balance of the period.

Significant Activities

Representative of activities in the anti-Semitic and related movements during the period under review were the following:

GERALD L. K. SMITH

The Presidential elections over, Gerald L. K. Smith began to attack the UN with greater force. In February 1953 he called a two-day Conference to Abolish the United Nations, which was held at San Francisco, and was attended by 300 persons. The speakers at this event included Smith, Wesley T. Swift, a leading agitator from the Los Angeles area, and California State Senator Jack B. Tenney. This assemblage passed a resolution calling for a mass "pilgrimage to Washington" in June 1953 to propagandize against further American participation in the UN. This project was not carried out; Smith held a meeting at a Washington hotel on July 1 which was attended by fewer than seventy-five persons.

Another front of Smith's was the Save the McCarran Act Committee.

In May 1953, Smith transferred his headquarters from St. Louis, Mo., to Glendale, Calif., near Los Angeles. During this move he severed relations with his long-time associate Donald Lohbeck, who appeared to have taken over the printing plant for private business. Though former Smith headquarters had been located at New York and Detroit, his most effective rallies had always been held in Los Angeles. Undoubtedly, the fact that Senator Tenney joined his forces was another factor in this change of location. In addition, in 1953 Missouri enacted a more stringent election law that required a candidate to submit a larger number of petitions, and one with more state-wide representation, to secure a place on the ballot.

JACK B. TENNEY

Long a member of the California Legislature, and at one time head of its committee to investigate subversive activities, Senator Jack B. Tenney in September 1952 accepted the Vice Presidential nomination of the Christian Nationalist Party, Gerald L. K. Smith's personal enterprise. (Yet only five years before, in 1947, Tenney had asserted that Smith merited "the most severe public criticism and condemnation for his contribution to racial agitation.")

During 1951 Tenney had been chairman of America Plus, a movement formed to further the introduction of a "Freedom of Choice Amendment" to state constitutions. This amendment was calculated in effect to repeal all fair employment practices, equal public accommodations, and other laws designed to eradicate discrimination. Tenney resigned his leadership later that year to campaign unsuccessfully for a Republican Congressional nomination. During 1952 he began to publish attacks upon Jewish organizations, which he distributed widely in the form of leaflet reprints from a small weekly. Early in 1953 a pamphlet, *Zion's Fifth Column*, appeared; it consisted of citations from various items of literature put out by Jewish defense and communal agencies, accompanied by Tenney's "interpretations." In July 1953 Tenney published a sequel, *Zionist Network*. Sections of *Zion's Fifth Column* were reprinted and prominently featured in Gerald L. K. Smith's *The Cross and the Flag*.

ROBERT H. WILLIAMS

One of the more energetic of the agitators was Robert H. Williams of Santa Ana, Calif. In addition to his *Williams Intelligence Summary*, Williams published during the latter part of 1952, a pamphlet entitled *Can the Police Protect Us?* This publication expounded the thesis that important officials of the Federal Civil Defense Administration were under the influence of the UN, Jews, and Zionists. This pamphlet was widely mailed, many of the recipients being police and Civil Defense officials.

FRANK L. BRITTON

Frank L. Britton, Los Angeles publisher of slick-paper, multi-colored essays in anti-Semitism such as the pamphlet, *Behind Communism*, began publication in December 1952 of his semimonthly *American Nationalist*, which promoted anti-Semitic and anti-Negro canards. Most of its issues attacked opposition to the McCarran Act as paving the way for "a huge Jew invasion from [the] Iron Curtain." Its September 10, 1953, issue attempted to prove the pseudo-scientific thesis of the inferiority of the Negro.

Britton's anti-Semitic boycott movement, The New Confederates, made little or no headway, despite its extensive distribution of lurid, hate-inciting cartoons.

ELIZABETH DILLING

Elizabeth Dilling confined her output to distortions of Talmud passages and vicious "interpretations" of the Hebrew ritual. Her principal achievement during the period reviewed was a leaflet called *Brotherhood*, attacking the interfaith movement. Thousands of these pamphlets were mailed to general lists, timed to coincide with preparations for Brotherhood Week (February 15-22, 1953).

CONDE MCGINLEY

Conde McGinley's *Common Sense* (Union, N. J.) acquired its own building in March 1953, an event celebrated by a meeting on the premises attended by 125 of his supporters. Claiming over 20,000 subscribers, he shipped copies far in excess of that number in bulk. The publication during the period provided a forum for a variety of authors, including Merwin K. Hart, Kurt Mertig, Robert H. Williams, George W. Armstrong, Elizabeth Dilling, and Eustace Mullins. Equipped with its own press facilities, *Common Sense* published a large reprint edition of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in October 1953. Often using general mailing lists for extensive distribution of special topical issues, the publication's issue No. 191 (dated August 15, 1953) was received by many residents in the Cincinnati area during October.

The Neo-Nazis and Their Associates

Neo-Nazi and German anti-Semitic groups in the United States endeavored to fuse German-Americans into solid racial voting blocs. The remnants of the old German-American Bund, joined by younger bigots (often non-German in extraction), had formerly adopted a line of sympathy for the German people, with their anti-Semitism subdued. They had bewailed the "cruelty" of the Morgenthau Plan, the "ruthless bombing" of German cities, the "rapacity" of Allied troops (German soldiers were described as gallant). The German bigots had received considerable support from nativist elements and organizations, with which they were in close contact. With the economic recovery of Germany, several of these groups became boldly Nazi during the period reviewed.

NATIONAL RENAISSANCE PARTY

Headed by James Madole, the National Renaissance Party (NRP) staged weekly street meetings in the Yorkville section of New York during the spring and summer of 1953. Attendance at these meetings grew from 30 to between 75 and 100 persons; they were often accompanied by disturbances. Assisting Madole were Kurt Mertig, Dan Kurtz, H. Keith Thompson, and Eustace Mullins. Mertig's organization, the German-American Republican League, had been listed by the United States Attorney General as "subversive" in 1949; Kurtz was the self-styled Christian Front leader of Queens County (N. Y.); H. Keith Thompson was exposed in 1952 as a registered agent for the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich Party of West Germany (which later dissolved in the face of a government ban); the activities of Mullins are discussed below. Madole told his open-air audience on May 1, 1953:

I am proud of being a fascist and a Nazi. . . . They [the Jews] have got to get the same concentration camps as they got in Germany and Italy. . . . We've got to get rid of them, the sooner the better. . . .

NRP's monthly, *National Renaissance Bulletin*, in its issue for May 1953, declaimed:

Although Adolf Hitler is dead his philosophy lives again in the growing strength of Fascist forces in America, Europe, and the Middle East. What Hitler accomplished in Europe, the National Renaissance Party shall yet accomplish in America.

During September 1953 a squad of NRP members appeared at meetings in storm-troop attire. Despite NRP's viciousness, its membership did not exceed 200, although NRP's *Bulletin* often was distributed in the several thousands, most of it gratis.

EDWARD A. FLECKENSTEIN

Edward A. Fleckenstein, who headed the Voters' Alliance of Americans of German Ancestry (New York City), visited West Germany in the spring of

1953, and spent much of his sojourn there addressing extreme rightist elements. Before a national rally of delegates of thirty-two extremist groups, Fleckenstein declared, "Democracy is the glorification of mediocrity." In August 1953 Fleckenstein's passport was invalidated on the charges that he had interfered in the internal politics of a foreign nation. West German authorities then ousted him from the country.

EUSTACE MULLINS

Eustace Mullins early in 1952 announced his plans to have the Aryan League of America (ALA) function as "an underground organization to protect our families from the bloodbath of Jewish terrorists." Representative of his writings was an article, "Adolph Hitler: An Appreciation," that appeared in NRP's October 1952 *Bulletin*. Mullins' most significant activity during the period under review was his promotion of the infamous "Rabbi Rabinovich" canard. This purported to be the "text" of an address by a rabbi before an "Emergency Council of European Rabbis in Budapest, January 12, 1952," supposedly detailing plans for the subjection of the world through a third world war. Originally printed in *Common Sense*, the article was reproduced by Einar Aberg, anti-Semitic publicist of Norrviken, Sweden, and widely distributed through the mails.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WESTERN CULTURE (ACAWC)

The ACAWC was formed in the spring of 1953 by H. Keith Thompson, Madole, and F. C. F. Weiss. Pretentiously announced as "a dynamic pressure group," the group made little headway, and appeared to be moribund in August 1953.

Ku Klux Klan

Ku Klux Klan (KKK) activity throughout the South reached its lowest ebb since 1945, when the late Grand Dragon Samuel Green had revived the hooded order. This decline was largely attributable to the conviction, in 1952, of seventy-three KKK men on various charges of involvement in violence and terror, by Federal and state courts in North Carolina. Many received jail sentences, including Carolina KKK leader Thomas L. Hamilton, who was given four years at hard labor. Florida KKK leader Bill Hendrix all but abandoned his version of the Klan, the American Confederate Army. There was no evidence of KKK organizing activities in northern areas such as had been projected in 1952. While the Florida bombing outrages of 1951 (see AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1953 [Vol. 54], p. 96-97) still were unsolved, a Federal Grand Jury in Miami indicted three men (December 1952) for having denied KKK membership in their testimony; a prominent woman was also indicted for having denied that she had consulted Klansmen about barring Negroes from the Carver Village housing development. In June 1953, a Miami Federal Grand Jury indicted six persons for having committed perjury by denying KKK membership or participation in a series of violent incidents in central Florida during the period from 1949 to 1952.

The Courts

The plea of William Dudley Pelley, former Silver Shirt leader, to have his sedition conviction expunged was denied in Federal Court, Indianapolis, Ind., on September 1, 1953. Pelley, who had served eight years of a fifteen-year sentence, was then on parole.

A charge under Illinois' group libel statute lodged against Lyril Van Hynning, editor of *Women's Voice*, was dropped at the prosecutor's request, in November 1952, with leave to reinstate.

Other Literature

The general quality of printing, layout, and typography of anti-Semitic periodicals and publications continued good during the period reviewed, although mimeographed material ranged from clear to illegible. Distribution of John O. Beaty's *Iron Curtain Over America* appeared to have declined sharply, although many activists pushed its sale at reduced price. In September 1953 Kenneth Goff, a former member of G. L. K. Smith's group, published a sixty-four-page pamphlet, *One World a Red World*, attacking the UN. After a silence of more than a year, Lawrence L. Reilly, at Lowell, Ariz., in the fall of 1953 published a paper-bound book, *The Sedition Trial*. Long inactive, Robert P. Edmondson, pre-Pearl Harbor propagandist, recompiled some of his more vicious leaflets and published them as a cloth-bound book during the summer of 1953.

GEORGE KELLMAN

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

Author(s): George Kellman

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THEODORE LESKES

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

ORGANIZED ANTI-SEMITIC ACTIVITY increased perceptibly (though not considerably) during the period under review (July 1, 1953, through June 30, 1954) over the level of the preceding year.

Bigots continued to try to identify Jews as Communists, or as conspiratorial agents for the Soviet Union; a frequent variant of this canard was that the Soviet Union was merely the instrumentality of a "Zionist" clique. Agitators appealed to xenophobic, isolationist, and anti-United Nations (UN) sentiment by asserting their "partisanship" of the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act of 1952 (*see* AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1953 [Vol. 54], p. 77-85), and of the proposed Bricker amendment limiting Federal treaty-making powers. They continued to attack the UN and the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as being plots for "world sovereignty" and "atheistic brainwashing." Agitators wooed other ultra-conservative elements by combining their racist doctrines with advocacy of reactionary socio-economic measures, and by furthering movements seeking to abolish governmental controls. In addition, the anti-Semites exploited two areas with particular vigor: they made incursions into politics, and attempted to divert the tensions associated with public school desegregation into channels of organized anti-Negro, anti-Semitic sentiment.

Politics

In a manner reminiscent of their political activities during the 1952 Presidential campaign (*see* AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1954 [Vol. 55], p. 72-73), during the period under review anti-Semites intensively manipulated political issues and personalities for their own ends. This they did both in anticipation of the 1954 elections, and to provide a continuity between the 1952 and 1956 Presidential years. They continued to charge and "suggest" that President Dwight D. Eisenhower had "betrayed" the Republican Party and the ultra-conservative elements who (the anti-Semites claimed) had elected him. With varying degrees of viciousness, the President and his staff were portrayed as puppets of Communists and Jews. Bigots seized upon such incidents as the Army-McCarthy investigations (*see* p. 184) as a springboard for vituperation of the President and his administration. These tactics appeared to have made many bigots acceptable to certain discontented political elements.

Toward the close of the period (July 1954), anti-Semites had apparently abandoned "third party" possibilities, giving preference to the hope that ultra-conservatives might be able to win control of the major parties.

INSTANCES OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN POLITICS

California State Senator Jack B. Tenney ran for renomination in the California primaries after having been refused endorsement by the Republican organization. In 1952, Tenney (who had once headed the California Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities) had accepted the vice presidential nomination of Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist Party. From this point on, Tenney collaborated closely with Smith and his organization. During 1952 and 1953, Tenney had written and published a trilogy of anti-Semitic pamphlets, entitled *Zion's Fifth Column*, *Zionist Network*, and *Zion's Trojan Horse*. The last of these included an introduction by Professor John O. Beaty (see below), and stressed invidious interpretations of Talmudic passages.

Tenney campaigned in the Los Angeles, Cal., area on the issue of "The Jews in Politics," charging in *The Tenney Record* that:

Jews are highly organized in this country. They are organized . . . also for political reasons. . . . You can see evidence of this on every hand: in the daily press (which they strongly influence); in the radio and TV industry (which they control outright); in the motion picture industry (which they monopolize); in politics (where they exert a fearful force).

Tenney's venom received nation-wide publicity when a major network, for well-intended purposes, telecast one of his speaking appearances via kinescope recording. Though Tenney lost the nomination, he received almost 200,000 votes in both party primaries.

During the week preceding the Maine primaries of June 21, 1954, Conde McGinley, publisher at Union, N. J., of the anti-Semitic *Common Sense*, caused approximately 50,000 copies of the May 15, 1954, issue to be distributed on the streets of Bangor, Augusta, Portland, and Lewiston, Me. The issue, headed *McCarthy and His Enemies*, purported to show that Senator McCarthy was under attack by Jews, Communists, and "American newspapers" which were either "Marxist-owned or Marxist-controlled." The distribution of this issue was obviously intended in support of Edward L. Jones, who had been opposing Senator Margaret Chase Smith on a pro-McCarthy platform. There was no evidence that Jones knew or approved of this action, which resulted in a wave of protest and condemnation by religious and civic leaders throughout the state. Senator Smith won renomination.

In New Jersey, McGinley was reported by the *New York World-Telegram & Sun* of September 28, 1954, to have distributed "vituperative 'flyers'" attacking Republican Senatorial candidate Clifford Case as one who "would be Stalin's choice for Senator."

Georgia's long-time Commissioner of Agriculture, Tom Linder, ran in the Democratic primaries of that state (where nomination was equivalent to election) for the governorship. Years before Linder had converted an official state

publication, *The Georgia Farmers' Market Bulletin* (circulation 250,000), into an organ of bigotry and racism, which attacked, among other things, Negroes, Jews, the UN, and Federal aid to education. Linder ran a poor fourth in the primary to Lt. Gov. Marvin Griffin.

On March 19, 1954, in Oregon, Richard L. Neuberger, Democratic candidate for Senator, was slurred by a Sherman County journal, which observed that: "The well-known wisdom of his [Jewish] race in financial matters has been uppermost in his policy." A disclaimer of any bias or approval of the paper's statement was issued on June 3 by Senator Guy Cordon, Neuberger's opponent.

Six delegates of Atlanta's Christian Anti-Jewish Party (CAJP) picketed the White House on August 16 and 17, 1954, bearing racist placards. The CAJP was virtually an operational "front" for J. B. Stoner.

Desegregation of Education

The United States Supreme Court's historic decision of May 17, 1954, striking down segregation in United States public schools (*see* p. 195), was the occasion for an immediate rise in anti-Semitic and anti-Negro agitation. Representative of the appeal (chiefly aimed at "border" areas) were the following:

Frank L. Britton's fortnightly publication, *The American Nationalist* (Inglewood, Cal.) in its June 10 issue carried the headline: "South Indignant as Jew-Led NAACP Wins School Segregation Case." The accompanying article referred to an alleged awareness of Negro editors that "Zionists or Jewish nationalists are at the bottom of all the friction and intrusion and threats of intrusion among the races."

Large quantities of the July 1, 1954 issue of McGinley's *Common Sense* turned up in Southern localities and other potential trouble-spots, its heavy-typed headings proclaiming that "Communism Hits South With Non-Segregation. Jewish Marxists Threaten Negro Revolt in America! Communists Plan Black Republic In South!" The June 1954 issue of *The White Sentinel*, organ of the National Citizens Protective Association (NCPA), was converted into a racist symposium. There, Marilyn Allen, a pamphleteer who supported the Ku Klux Klan, characterized the President as a "pseudo-Republican race-mixer," while other contributors attacked the Supreme Court desegregation decision as being Communistic and Jewish-influenced. NCPA, formed in 1951 by John W. Hamilton, a former Gerald Smith staff-member, as an offshoot of Smith's organization, stepped up its membership drive at its St. Louis, Mo., headquarters, as well as in other trouble spots throughout the United States through the efforts of men like Bill Hendrix, former Grand Dragon of Florida's Klan.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WHITE PEOPLE

The most dynamic of the opponents of desegregation was the previously dormant National Association for the Advancement of White People, Inc. (NAAWP), a Delaware corporation organized December 1953 by Bryant W. Bowles of Arlington, Va. Bowles established offices in Washington, D.C., and

began publishing a bi-weekly, *The National Forum*, which borrowed heavily from Frank L. Britton's *American Nationalist*. *National Forum's* September 1954 issue recommended the works of such bigots as Lyril Van Hyning, Eustace Mullins, Gerald Winrod, and Professor John O. Beaty.

In September 1954 Bowles and several collaborators moved in on tense situations in the Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Md., and Milford, Del., areas, as schools opened under newly formulated policies of racial integration. NAAWP membership drives were initiated as important features of boycott and protest meetings. One such meeting at Milford was attended by 5,000 opponents of school integration. In the face of school-picketing and other forms of demonstration, segregation was reinstated in Milford on September 30, Bowles taking credit for this "victory." School-strikes and picketing in Baltimore and Washington, however, were vigorously combatted by local authorities. During October 1954 Delaware's Attorney General H. Albert Young moved to revoke NAAWP's corporate charter. Following this, Bowles was arrested (October 10) on charges of conspiracy to violate the state education law. At approximately the same time, Federal Internal Revenue authorities began an inquiry into Bowles's alleged failure to turn over withholding taxes while engaged in his previous occupation as a roofing contractor. Bailed out on the conspiracy charge, Bowles was hailed at a meeting in Milford at which anti-Semitic and other racist slurs were rife.

Use of the Conspiratorial Theme

The charge that Jews, individually and collectively, were Communist and Zionist agents, spies, operatives, and master-minds continued unabated during the period reviewed. A notorious (and composite) example of this type of propaganda was a newspaper-size sheet, published under the imprint of McGinley's *Common Sense*. Embellished with Communist symbols, the item was headed *The Coming Red Dictatorship*, contained photographs of thirty-six Americans of Jewish faith (e.g., Bernard Baruch, David Dubinsky, and Albert Einstein), and warned the reader that "Asiatic Marxist Jews control entire world as last world war commences—thousands of plotters placed in key positions."

This inflammatory sheet was mailed to specialized lists of the type obtainable from commercial mailing houses. The estimated volume of the mailing and other distribution (more than 1,000,000) and the expense entailed led to the assumption that it had been financed by one or several wealthy individuals.

Distribution of this item began in December 1953, and continued through June 1954. It was denounced by the New York State American Legion officials (January 24, 1954), while its appearance precipitated condemnation from legislators and officials of Rhode Island, Maine, and Massachusetts. The New Jersey State Assembly on February 1, 1954, went so far as to pass a resolution that:

The General Assembly of New Jersey make known its abhorrence of the organized campaign of prejudice and bigotry and of the author of that scurrilous literature, Conde McGinley.

Bearing even more sensational headlines (in red) was a four-page, newspaper format production largely distributed in the Northwest. Headed *The Secret Plot to Communize America*, this item was published by Samuel Evans Hayes, a wealthy man, who used the imprint of Learn & Live Publishers, Seattle. This lengthy "treatise" expounded at length on the theory and practice of banking and credit control, relying heavily on the "international banker" theme. It included revelations of "Zionist plots," and concluded with a plea for martial law "to remove the tremendous dangers that now threaten all Gentiles in our nation." Recommended reading included the works of Gerald L. K. Smith, John O. Beaty, and Ron Gostick, Canadian agitator.

ATTACKS ON KOSHER PRODUCTS

Mrs. Marion Strack, New Jersey anti-UN leader, in her speech at a meeting of the New Jersey Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR), disclosing that the symbols (U) and (K) were "clandestine" markings denoting kosher products, took this to be evidence of "how a bold minority can impose its will and even its religious observance upon an apathetic majority." The speech was promptly repudiated by DAR officials. However, the anti-Semitic press (e.g., *Women's Voice*, *Common Sense*, *American Nationalist*, and *Cross and the Flag*) immediately stepped up its exploitation of this theme. McGinley's *Common Sense* published facsimiles of food advertisements carrying kosher symbols (July 15), while Gerald L. K. Smith carried the attack on "Jewish dominance" to a ludicrous conclusion in the July 1954 issue of *Cross and the Flag*, revealing: "U in a small circle is the symbol of the Union of Orthodox Jews. C in a small circle is the Conservative Synagogue. R in a small circle is the Reformed Rabbis."

(C) and (R) are the official symbols for, respectively, "copyright" (pictures, music, etc., Library of Congress) and "registered" (trade-marks, trade-names, United States Patent Office).

Attacks on Brotherhood Movement

Anti-Semites continued to depict the brotherhood movement as part of an over-all conspiracy to render Gentiles submissive and tractable to the "Communist-Jewish plot." The severest attacks upon the movement were generally timed to anticipate or coincide with Brotherhood Week (February 21-28). Leslie Fry (Paquita de Shishmarova), West Coast agitator who had been comparatively silent since the United States's entry into World War II, issued a pamphlet, *Interfaith*, which berated Seton Hall University (Catholic) for its interfaith institute, warning that "the only obstacle remaining in the path of Zionist complete success for its infernal scheme is the purity of the Christian faith," and that "tolerance" was an "equivocal misnomer which covers a multitude of cowardly deeds and weakens the spirit of defense."

Frederick C. F. Weiss, patron of the neo-Nazi National Renaissance Party (New York) wrote a leaflet issued in that group's name, bearing the heading *Brotherhood*, with the subheading: "In Russia They Execute Them The

Prague and Beria Way. . . . In U. S. A. They Promote Them the Dexter White Way!"

The Christian Nationalist Protective Association (CNPA) issued a pamphlet urging that February be made a "Racial Integrity Month as an answer to Brotherhood Week." Robert A. Milner and Edward R. Fields, CNPA members, on February 21, 1954, allegedly plastered some fifty establishments in Davenport, Ia., and Rock Island and Moline, Ill., with large bold-typed stickers advising that *This Place Is Owned By Jews*; superimposed on the stickers was the rubber-stamped message, ANTI-JEWISH WEEK, FEBRUARY 21-28. Apprehended in Davenport, Milner and Fields confessed. Milner was ordered by Police Magistrate Edmund Carroll to apologize to the merchants and was placed on probation. No charges could be preferred against Fields in Iowa, since he admitted having pasted up the stickers only in Rock Island, Ill.

A booklet, *The Brotherhood Religion—Is It Anti-Christianism?* appeared in January 1954. Written by a former Christian Front mentor, Rev. Edward F. Brophy of New York, the booklet was published in Reseda, Cal., by C. J. Schreiber, a bigot-pamphleteer. Brophy attacked prominent persons, both Jewish and Christian, for their participation in the movement, whose purpose, he charged, was "to de-Christianize America."

Leonard E. Feeney continued to foment intergroup discord in the Boston, Mass., area as he and his small but fanatical following attacked Jews, Protestants, and the Catholic hierarchy at open-air meetings and by distribution of his publication, *The Point*. The Catholic Church in 1949 had suspended Feeney's priestly functions because of his insistence upon a literal interpretation of the doctrine that no one is saved outside the Church. During the period under review, Feeney appeared to have concentrated more of his attacks upon the Jews than on other groups or institutions.

Other Themes

Other themes in evidence during the period under review, and typical expressions of them, were:

Cancer It is easy to start cancer by over-exposing the body to radium or radio-active dust from the atomic energy plants (which are almost completely in the hands of Jews, many of them with long records of Zionist aiding and Communist-front activities).

(Robert H. Williams)

Oil This struggle for the off-shore oil-lands . . . is actually one step in the long-range campaign of Zionist leaders to wrest control of American oil from patriotic American businessmen.

(Eustace Mullins)

Coffee Jewish speculators have raised the price again, reaping more fantastic profits than ever before.

(Eustace Mullins)

Fluoridation *Red Plan of Poison Water Revealed.*

(Conde McGinley)

Attacks on UN and UNESCO

A typical expression of the agitators' antagonism to the UN was the two-day San Francisco Conference to Abolish the United Nations, held February 13-14, 1954, under the direction of Gerald L. K. Smith. Attendance at the several sessions ranged from 100 to 400. Interspersed with attacks upon the UN were many tangential references to virtually all of the other themes discussed in this article.

In the late summer of 1954 ultra-conservatives and bigots began promotion of a United States Day in opposition to United Nations Day (October 24).

The Neo-Nazis

The National Renaissance Party (NRP), centering its activities in New York City's Yorkville section, showed signs of confusion and deterioration during the period reviewed. The leadership of James A. Madole was all but superseded by Mana Truhill (also known as Manuel Trujillo), a former student at a Communist-front educational institution, who claimed to have been converted to the cause of Nazism. Under Truhill's regime, NRP's literature became more violently Hitlerite. Thus, the National Renaissance Bulletin for February 1954 contained a large portrait of Hitler, while other issues contained revolting caricatures of Jews which out-rivaled those of the Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher. Occasionally, however, Frederick C. F. Weiss (using the trade-name of LeBlanc Publishers) contributed pedantic, pseudo-intellectual leaflets, bearing NRP's imprint. One such was entitled, *Should the Nazi Spirit Die?* Toward the close of the period, NRP, its followers and associates, began meeting under the guise of a factional political group, devoted to the support of right-wing legislators.

Beaty Affair

Professor John O. Beaty's anti-Semitic book, *Iron Curtain Over America*, which had first appeared in December 1951 (see AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, 1953 [Vol. 54], p. 95), received considerably less distribution during 1953-54 than it had during the preceding period. Instead, however, it was more widely quoted and hailed in the anti-Semitic press. On January 20, 1954, Beaty, a faculty member of Southern Methodist University (SMU) at Dallas, Tex., published a pamphlet, *How to Capture a University*, in which he charged that SMU was under Communist and Jewish influence. These charges were denounced by Umphrey Lee, then SMU's president, the faculty almost unanimously concurring. Civic leaders and others of standing likewise deplored Beaty's attack. Subsequently, the charges were wholly rejected by SMU's governing board. In another Beaty pamphlet, *The Cry of "Anti-Semitic,"* which appeared on March 1, 1954, Beaty defended his book and attacked the Amer-

ican Jewish Committee. Beaty's many denials of anti-Semitism appeared fully controverted when Jack Tenney's openly anti-Semitic pamphlet, *Zion's Trojan Horse*, which appeared during April 1954, contained a laudatory introduction by Beaty (dated December 1953).

Pro-Arab Propaganda

Pro-Arab propaganda by agitators was sustained during the period reviewed; its most frequent manifestation was the substitution of the word "Zionist" for "Jew." Anti-Jewish output in the United States frequently contained direct exploitation of Arab-Israel tensions. The November 23, 1953, issue of Frank L. Britton's *American Nationalist* contained an inflammatory treatment of the Kibya incident (see p. 277), and appeared to have received considerable Arab support and distribution. *Common Sense* of August 15, 1954, appeared with a lengthy diatribe headed, *Arabs Victims of Zionism. World Jewry Destroys Nations With American Finance and Power*. This issue was widely distributed at the UN when the Assembly met in September 1954.

The Anti-Semitic Press

The following were the high lights of activity in the anti-Semitic publishing field not previously mentioned in this article.

A marked increase in the circulation of old pamphlets, leaflets, and similar items was noticeable during the period. New pamphlets included: *UN—World Dictatorship*, by Stephen Nenoff (Denton, Tex.), who had formerly published *Nenoff's American Commentator*; *Is There Still Time?*; Robert H. Williams's alarm that the Jews were about to seize the United States; *The Federal Reserve Conspiracy*, by Eustace Mullins, a 144-page modernization of the charge of the existence of international Jewish bankers' plots.

New periodicals were: *Grass Roots*, published by John Henry Monk (Portsmouth, Va.), whose occasional issues averaged twenty mimeographed pages. *Grass Roots* appeared to offer a literary platform to agitators like F. C. Sammons of the West Virginia Anti-Communist Education League. In makeup and venom, *Grass Roots* closely resembled another recent arrival, Harry William Pyle's *Political Reporter* (Memphis, Tenn.), whose August 1954 issue had an editorial staff which included Monk, F. C. Sammons, Marilyn R. Allen (Salt Lake City pamphleteer and Klan eulogist), and Lucille Miller, who put out the *Green Mountain Rifleman* at Bethel, Vt. Stephen Nenoff attempted a monthly, *Southern Patriotic Breeze*, which expired with the issue of December 1953.

Exports of hate-literature to the United States from abroad appeared to have increased, largely as the result of the efforts of Einar Aberg, who, from Norrviken, Sweden, utilized the international mails to disseminate his Nazi-like leaflets to mailing lists in the United States furnished by his friends and collaborators. Aberg's leaflets appeared, also, to have been shipped in bulk to such groups as the National Renaissance Party, which distributed them at the

UN. Other exports frequently circulated included Ron Gostick's *Canadian Intelligence Service* (Flesherton, Ont.); various publications from England, particularly Arnold Leese's *Gothic Ripples* and the Britons' Publishing Society's products; and the writings of Ray K. Rudman, leader of the Boernasie group in the Union of South Africa.

Examples of the informal international "syndication" among anti-Semites were an Aberg leaflet which reprinted excerpts from *The Cross and the Flag*, and Leon DeAryan's, *The Broom* (San Diego, Cal.). Early in 1954, the German-language Nazi magazine, *Der Weg* (Buenos Aires) printed a translation of McGinley's *Coming Red Dictatorship*, together with photographs from the original.

Investigations

Anti-Semitic activities were closely followed and investigated by government authorities. The House Committee on Un-American Activities, in its Annual Report, February 6, 1954, p. 5, stated:

There are presently at work within the United States various and sundry "hate" groups, the leaders of which, while masking their activities under the guise of patriotism and devotion to the republican form of government, are in fact spreading dissension, discord, bigotry, and intolerance. In many instances, these organizations select ultra-patriotic names and devices to conceal their true and dangerous purposes. The subjects of the "hate" attacks are individuals or groups of religious and racial minorities among American citizens. The Committee is by no means unaware of these activities, and investigation and documentation will proceed to the end that the individuals concerned may be disclosed for what they are. In the opinion of the Committee, there are no degrees to subversion. It is not sufficient to be simply anti-Communist if one is anti-American at the same time.

GEORGE KELLMAN

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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experience; effective cooperation among member agencies; joint action by those members who desired it; study of American immigration laws and their administration; an educational campaign on behalf of an immigration policy consistent with the objectives of the conference; representation in international conferences concerned with migration and population movements; and action in the best interest of the immigration field generally. "Active membership" was open to those agencies concerned with the subject of immigration as part of their permanent program. "Cooperating membership" was available to any agency or individual that agreed with the policies and purposes of the conference, but was ineligible for active membership.

THEODORE LESKES

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

ORGANIZED ANTI-SEMITIC activity in the United States showed no appreciable rise during the period under review (July 1, 1954, through June 30, 1955) as compared to the preceding year.

Themes

Subjects, persons, and institutions under attack during 1954-55, largely because their topicality might attract ultra-conservative extremists, were: the United Nations (UN) and the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the decisions of the United States Supreme Court ordering an end to segregation, and those who supported these decisions; mental health programs; the Salk polio vaccine; and the fluoridation of drinking water. On the other hand, cynical exploitation of propaganda against immigration, the President's treaty-making powers (Bricker Amendment), and modern education lessened during 1954-55. There were occasional pro-Arab anti-Semitic diatribes in the bigot press, while all anti-Semitic literature consistently substituted the word "Zionist" for "Jew."

Agitators continued effectively to appeal to right-wing extremists with proposals for the abolition of the income tax, labor unions and collective bargaining, "decentralization" of Federal and state government, and a return to nineteenth-century *laissez faire* economic practices. They moved about among reactionary and ultra-conservative groups at meetings, conventions, and other functions. All of the anti-Semitic propaganda was set against a background of anti-Communism of the irresponsible variety.

Politics

The anti-Semites manipulated politics and political issues to their own ends during 1954-55, exploiting opportunities offered by elections and important issues. Bigoted attacks upon Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower and his administration were unremitting. The President was attacked as being sur-

rounded and dominated by Communists and Jews, who had caused him to betray his party to "the New Dealers."

Anti-Semites were active during the primaries in November 1954. California State Sen. Jack B. Tenney, a supporter of Gerald L. K. Smith and quondam vice presidential nominee of the latter's Christian Nationalist Party, was the most successful of the anti-Semitic candidates. Campaigning for renomination on the "issue of Jews in politics," Tenney received 200,000 votes, approximately one-fifth of the total cast. Conde McGinley, publisher of *Common Sense*, at Union, N. J., sent flying squadrons of his followers to Maine, where they distributed anti-Semitic literature in principal cities in a futile attempt to defeat the renomination of Sen. Margaret Chase Smith. Lt. Gen. Pedro A. del Valle (ret.), seeking the Republican gubernatorial nomination in Maryland, made an insignificant showing. In New Jersey, campaigns in opposition to the nomination of Clifford Case for United States senator were aided by anti-Semites centering around the *Common Sense* group. Case won his senatorial seat by only 3,000 votes. In Georgia, Agriculture Commissioner Tom Linder, who had converted the official *Georgia Farmers' Market Bulletin* into an anti-Semitic organ, ran a poor fourth in seeking nomination for the governorship.

To a somewhat lessened degree, this activity carried over to the election campaigns themselves. A whispering campaign was rife in Connecticut against Democratic candidate for governor, Abraham J. Ribicoff, because of his Jewish background. The campaign was so intense that Vivien Kellems, controversial ultra-conservative leader, protested against it in a telecast made in October 1954. John F. McCoy of Milford, Conn., was fined \$150 and given a suspended sentence for having mailed anonymous circulars attacking some of Ribicoff's Christian supporters, notably New Haven's Mayor Richard C. Lee. In Oregon, Richard L. Neuberger was attacked in racial terms by an Oregon newspaper (the *Sherman County Journal*) during March 1954, but his opponent repudiated the slur. Neuberger was the victor by a narrow margin over Guy L. Cordon. Elsewhere, hatemongers attempted to exploit racial issues in their literature and activities, but without appreciable impact on the elections. The Colorado Anti-Communist League, an operational "front" of Kenneth Goff, smeared Democratic senatorial candidate John Carroll as sympathetic to Communists. Virtually all anti-Semitic literature exploited political election themes in a variety of ways, ranging from calumny of specific candidates to general smears of President Eisenhower and both the major political parties.

PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

Activity of ultra-conservative dissidents within both the Democratic and the Republican political parties aimed at the 1956 Presidential elections became apparent during 1955. Some of these dissidents sought to form a third party, others to effect a "political realignment" that would allow them to dominate one of the major parties. The willingness of anti-Semites to exploit ultra-conservative calculations was evident from two issues of Robert H. Williams' *Williams Intelligence Summary*. The July 1955 issue urged some Re-

publican "patriot" to enter the party's Presidential race without waiting for President Eisenhower's decision as to whether he would run for President again in 1956; the October 1955 issue, which appeared shortly after the President's heart attack of September 24, 1955, urged the readers of *Williams Intelligence Summary* to "take advantage of the break."

United Nations and UNESCO

The extent to which bigots had succeeded in influencing attitudes of opponents of the UN and UNESCO was attested to by the *Report* of the American Legion's Special Committee on the Covenant on Human Rights and the United Nations, dated May 5, 1955. After eighteen months of intensive study of charges leveled against UN and UNESCO, the Special Committee, headed by Past National Commander Ray Murphy, cleared UNESCO. While pointing out the sincerity of many who held opposing views, and stressing that UNESCO was not above criticism, the *Report* commented:

We have carefully read and considered every bit of testimony against UNESCO. . . . These records contain all the complaints against UNESCO by individuals and organizations that have been made in public hearings since 1951. All together, the testimony and supporting documents run into thousands of pages. . . . Running clearly through the maze of testimony against UNESCO, and as clearly through the mass of give-away material spread across the nation by various groups and individuals, is the thread that leads back to 876 Granite Street, Philadelphia, the office of the American Flag Committee, and the home of its guiding genius, W. Henry McFarland, Jr.¹ As we have said, that is where the American Flag Committee's Letter No. 13 came into being. With it, Mr. McFarland has been able to mislead a great many Americans and some American Legionnaires.²

Purporting to be an amalgam of over 100 rightist groups opposed to the UN, the Congress of Freedom held its annual convention in San Francisco during the week of April 25, 1955, with the avowed purpose of countering San Francisco's tenth anniversary celebration of the founding of the UN in that city. Objections to a resolution equating American principles with Christianity were shouted down, one speaker urging a "fight against the anti-Christ." A phrase referring to citizens of all faiths was later added, however. Merwin K. Hart, head of the National Economic Council, and publisher of the anti-Semitic *Economic Council Letter*, was principal speaker at the convention (the attendance at the largest session was 600). The Congress of Freedom espoused, *inter alia*, "a new political alignment" to represent conservative forces in the United States.

Desegregation

Desegregation of the public schools served as a pretext for agitation that was anti-Semitic as well as anti-Negro in the South, after the United States

¹ McFarland was a self-styled "nationalist coordinator" of Philadelphia, whose Nationalist Action League had been listed as "Fascist" by the United States attorney general.

² At the American Legion's National Convention in Miami on October 12, 1955, the special committee's report was rejected without debate. A resolution calling for United States withdrawal from the UN was, however, defeated.

Supreme Court's decision of May 31, 1955, decreeing that steps be taken to end segregation "within a reasonable time." While tensions subsided in border areas such as Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Md., and St. Louis, Mo., where desegregation programs had been started after the Supreme Court's decision of May 17, 1954, they increased in the deep South. There, by virtue of the 1955 decision directing the states concerned to submit plans for desegregation for adjudication by the Federal district courts, states were forced to face the fact of desegregation.

Groups such as the Citizens Councils of Mississippi aimed an economic boycott at Negroes and others supporting desegregation. The boycott appeared to have been stemmed to a large extent by the extension of credit by the Tri-State Bank of Memphis, Tenn., to all those affected, deposits to the bank coming from sympathetic persons in all parts of the country. The Citizens Councils claimed over eighty units in as many counties, some of them located in nearby Alabama, and, possibly, Louisiana. Leaders of the Citizens Councils recommended the reading of the anti-Semitic products of Frank L. Britton (*American Nationalist*), and of John W. Hamilton, head of the National Citizens' Protective Association of St. Louis, whose publication, *The White Sentinel*, set the pattern for anti-Semitic, anti-Negro propaganda. Other racist groups active during 1954-55 included: the American States Rights Association (Birmingham, Ala.), headed by William H. Hoover; the National Association for the Advancement and Protection of the White Race (Augusta, Ga.), headed by a former Klansman; and the National Association for the Advancement and Protection of the Majority of the White People (Griffin, Ga.).

The National Association for the Advancement of White People (Milford, Del.) headed by Bryant W. Bowles, a close collaborator of Conde McGinley and other leading anti-Semites, continued active. After school-opening disorders in September 1954 were firmly put down by authorities in Washington, D. C., and Baltimore, Md., Bowles, embroiled in a variety of legal proceedings arising out of his racist and his previous business activities, removed to his last stronghold—Milford, Del. In December 1955, apparently coming to the aid of Bowles, Conde McGinley flooded Delaware with a mass-mailing of a "desegregation issue" of his *Common Sense* which charged that "Communist Jews" were responsible for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and for desegregation. This mailing brought a storm of protest from press and public. On August 21, 1955, 3,000 people assembled at Milford's airport for a mass-meeting at which Kenneth Goff, former Gerald Smith henchman, was the principal speaker, sharing the platform with Bryant Bowles and Conde McGinley. Anti-Semitism appeared to be the principal topic. Literature sold and distributed included the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, John O. Beaty's *Iron Curtain Over America*, and Frank L. Britton's anti-Semitic booklet, *Behind Communism*.

Other groups formed in 1954-55 ostensibly to combat desegregation included: the Florida State Rights Association (Miami, Fla.); the White Brotherhood (Atlanta, Ga.); White America, Inc. (Little Rock, Ark.); the Southern Gentlemen and the Three-Quarter Century Club, both of New Orleans, La.; the Patriots of North Carolina; the Association for States' Rights and Segre-

gation (Kansas City, Mo.); the Pro-Segregation Texas Citizens Council (Dallas, Tex.); and the Christian Sentinels (Louisville, Ky.).

Some attempts to reactivate the Klan were made by several racists, notably by Imperial Wizard E. L. Edwards of Atlanta, Ga., who in mid-1955 addressed a meeting of 1,500 near Conway, S. C., in anti-Negro, anti-Semitic and anti-Catholic terms.

Government Report

In its *Preliminary Report on Neo-Fascist and Hate Groups*, issued December 17, 1954, the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), under the chairmanship of Rep. Harold H. Velde (Rep., Ill.), exposed in detail the activities of the Neo-Nazi National Renaissance Party, led by James A. Madole in New York City, and the operations of the *Common Sense* group of Union, N. J., headed by Conde McGinley, as representative of "the major methods of approach used today by the exploiters of racial and religious bigotry." The *Preliminary Report* pointed out that

At the time of the Prague trials in 1952 and other anti-Semitic purges behind the Iron Curtain, the NRP defended the action of Soviet leadership and implied that the example should be followed in Europe and America. . . .

NRP activities and propaganda are clearly subversive and un-American. The committee is further of the opinion that this neo-Fascist organization, by its advocacy of force and violence, contravenes the Smith Act.

After observing "a significant interchangeability of propagandists working for the allegedly patriotic *Common Sense* and the avowedly Fascist National Renaissance Party," the HUAC went on to analyze the various literary contributions of many activists to the respective publications of both organizations. It listed among the contributors to *Common Sense*: Gen. George Van Horn Moseley (ret.), Col. Eugene N. Sanctuary, Robert E. Edmundson, Charles B. Hudson, Eustace Mullins, and Elizabeth Dilling.

The report concluded that

It is regrettable that any American may have contributed to the perpetuation of a hate-factory such as that operated by the McGinleys. If loyal Americans seek to play an active part in protecting their country from subversion, they would do well to lend their support to legitimate patriotic organizations rather than to those whose real objective is another form of subversion.

HUAC's Preliminary Report received wide publicity and commendation.

Neo-Nazis

Following the publication of the HUAC report, the National Renaissance Party (NRP) and its collaborators in the New York area went through a period of complete disorganization. However, by the late spring of 1955, indoor meetings were resumed, though no street meetings were held as in previous years. Often, organizational pseudonyms (e.g., American Nationalist Coalition) were employed to conceal NRP's identity.

Pro-Arab Propaganda

Virtually all pro-Arab propaganda, as it affected Israel, was based upon the premise that the best way of attacking that country was by undermining the status of the American Jewish community. In March 1955 the Arab League's new propaganda office, the Arab Information Center (AIC), was opened in New York City, under the direction of Abdul Kamel Rahim, Arab League Representative at the UN. While AIC professedly avoided outright anti-Jewish propaganda (*see* p. 283), two brochures were issued shortly after AIC's establishment. One, *Jewish Atrocities in the Holy Land*, was a reissue of a pamphlet (bearing Arab League imprint) which had been circulated and distributed, and its contents otherwise quoted and exploited, by leading anti-Semites in America since 1948. The other brochure, *The Story of Zionist Espionage in Egypt*, charged that

Zionism and Communism are two distinctive forces with one political objective—world domination. Both powers cooperate secretly and in public without friction, since the power in the end will eventually go to Zionism.

Copies of this brochure bore the stamp of the National Renaissance Party. Anti-Semitic publicists continued to distribute propaganda emanating from Arab sources that stressed "Jewish influence" in American government circles and exploited the plight of the Arab displaced persons, as attributable entirely to "Zionist" callousness. Abdul Hassan, of the Egyptian delegation to the UN, spoke at a meeting of the American Nationalist Coalition, a pseudonym for the NRP, on June 3, 1955.

Mental Health

Agitators were alert to seize upon common fears and phobias for their own anti-Semitic ends.

Thus, Lucille Miller, Vermont publisher of the *Green Mountain Rifleman*, was convicted for counseling evasion of the draft, after having been remanded to two mental institutions, and eventually declared sane. Mrs. Miller was given concurrent suspended sentences on August 8, 1955, by the Federal court at Brattleboro, Vt. At the same time, her husband was fined and given a suspended sentence for forcibly resisting United States marshals who had come to take Mrs. Miller into custody. The anti-Semitic press depicted her as a "martyr" of the anti-Semitic movement, a victim of government persecution at the behest of Jews. More important, Mrs. Miller's detention in mental institutions served as a starting point for an attack on mental health programs, as devices of the "Jewish conspiracy" to control or do away with those who opposed it (e.g., *Williams Intelligencer*, June 1955).

Salk Polio Vaccine

Anti-Semites intruded themselves into the confusion attendant upon the introduction of the polio vaccine associated with Dr. Jonas Salk in the summer of 1955. A group of Gerald L. K. Smith's followers in Seattle, Wash.,

distributed pamphlets entitled, *Murder, Inc.*, and *Polio Gambling*, identifying the vaccine with "the forces of anti-Christ."

Fluoridation

Fluoridation of city drinking water, a health measure designed to preserve the teeth, continued to be the subject of debate in many communities throughout the United States. Anti-Semitic agitators, principally Conde McGinley, introduced a conspiratorial note, hinting or alleging Jewish and "Marxist" plots in the effort to introduce fluoridation.

Specific Agitators

A jury in the New Jersey Superior Court, on March 31, 1955, rendered a verdict against Conde McGinley in a libel suit brought against him by Rabbi Joachim Prinz, whom McGinley's publication had smeared as a "red rabbi." The award was \$5,000 compensatory and \$25,000 punitive damages. Attorneys for McGinley were Albert and Kirkpatrick Dilling, former husband and son, respectively, of Elizabeth Dilling, who was one of the witnesses.

Leonard E. Feeney, excommunicated Catholic priest of the Boston Archdiocese, extended his anti-Jewish statements in his publication, *The Point*. The publication appeared to receive greater national circulation, causing *The Michigan Catholic*, official organ of the Detroit Archdiocese, in its issue of February 17, 1955, to warn its readers that "the wild and irresponsible calumnies contained in *The Point* have no credence or support among Catholics." Responding to a diatribe against Brandeis University in the May 1955 issue of *The Point*, Feeney's fanatic disciples staged a series of demonstrations in Boston during September 1955 against the dedication of a Catholic chapel at that Jewish-sponsored institution. A police guard was placed about the chapel. It was dedicated by Archbishop Richard J. Cushing on September 9 without untoward incident.

During 1955 Gerald L. K. Smith introduced an innovation in anti-Semitic media—a forty-five minute long-play recording of his *Comprehensive Address*, which sold for \$5.00.

Gen. George Van Horn Mosley (ret.) on May 12, 1955, wrote a lengthy letter to Attorney General Herbert Brownell attesting to the patriotism of Conde McGinley, whom he deemed worthy of being "called before the assembled Congress and given a medal of honor." The HUAC in its report cited above had declared:

The Special Committee on Un-American Activities reported in 1940 that General Moseley was being seriously considered as a national leader of an attempted union of Fascist and hate groups until the plans were exposed and Moseley was called as a witness before the committee.

Literature

New anti-Semitic publications during the period of this review included: *Facts Are Facts*, a "Talmud exposé" by Benjamin H. Freedman, whom the

HUAC Preliminary Report described as the “financial ‘angel’ behind Conde McGinley”; the *First Nationalist Directory*, published by Liberty and Property, an ultra-conservative group active in the Congress of Freedom. Claiming to be a directory of rightist groups, publications and some individuals in the United States, the *Directory* listed many respectable groups and persons side-by-side with such avowed anti-Semitic individuals and groups as G. L. K. Smith’s Christian Nationalist Crusade, Elizabeth Dilling, William Kullgren’s *Beacon Light Herald*, Gerald Winrod’s *Defender*, and Kenneth Goff. Another new publication, the *Nationalist Party Bulletin*, heralded the formation of a new Nationalist Party organized by West Hooker, whose diatribes had appeared in Lyril Van Hynning’s *Women’s Voice* and similar publications. Other Nationalist Party national committeemen listed in the *Nationalist Party Bulletin* were such well-known agitators as Bryant Bowles, Gen. Moseley, and anti-Semitic authors Eustace Mullins, Peter Xavier, and Marilyn Allen.

Generally, during 1954–55 older items of anti-Semitic literature were re-printed or reissued in preference to newer ones.

GEORGE KELLMAN

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

Author(s): George Kellman

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administration's liberalizing proposals to the bill. On the last day of the Congress the Senate leadership proposed some thirteen amendments which it felt could receive general support in both chambers. Parliamentary maneuvers preserved these provisions, while preventing either Senator Lehman or Senator Watkins from adding their more general revision proposals. Although the Senate passed the bill in its amended form, the Congress adjourned on July 27, 1956, before the amended bill could be considered by the House.

MISCELLANEOUS

In the first such action taken by any state south of the Mason-Dixon line, the Maryland National Guard was ordered desegregated on November 20, 1955, Governor Theodore R. McKeldin issued the directive in a letter to Adjutant General Milton A. Reckord, who said the necessary implementing instructions would go out the following day.

On November 7, 1955, Governor Averell Harriman ordered the deletion of the word "color" from New York State driver's licenses. The governor said that the requirement was "offensive," and that the decision to remove it was made after consultation with police and public officials. The item was blotted out on the 1956 license forms which had already been printed.

On July 21, 1955, the United States Court of Appeals ruled that an Oklahoma statute that required candidates who were Negroes to be described as such on state election ballots was unconstitutional, because it involved discriminatory state action prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. The appellate court rejected the reasoning of the Federal district judge that the designation was "merely descriptive" and did not deny the Negro candidate the "equal protection of the laws." The United States Supreme Court refused to review the decision on November 14, 1955.⁷⁹

THEODORE LESKES

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

THE ANTI-SEMITIC movement continued its activities during the period under review (July 1, 1955, through November 30, 1956) at approximately the same level as the previous year. Noted, however, were marked shifts in stress of propaganda themes.

Themes

Southern tensions over school desegregation (*see* p. 96-116) were most intensively exploited by bigots, who also concentrated on adapting political themes and Arab-Israel tensions as vehicles for their racism. Hatemongers

⁷⁹ *McDonald v. Key*, 224 F. 2d 608, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 895.

supplemented these propaganda lines with fomentation of such perennial canards as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, or more topical anti-Semitic mendacities cast in the same conspiratorial format. They continued to smear Jews as being Communist, or Communist-dominated, and equated Zionism with Communism. To attract reactionary or ultra-conservative elements, they stepped up their attacks upon the income tax (characterized as a Socialist or Communist measure), opposed liberalized immigration, and called for the "abolition of government controls." The United Nations (UN) remained a frequent target of their attacks, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was deplored as the entering wedge of internationalism.

Desegregation

With tension mounting in the South over the problem of public school desegregation, agitators stepped up their exploitation of extreme racist themes during 1955-56. Most of their output combined anti-Semitism with anti-Negro propaganda, reflecting the response to such propaganda on the part of "white supremacy" groups and individuals. Thus, they circulated canards that the Supreme Court's historic decisions of May 17, 1954, and May 31, 1955 (*see* p. 96) were part of a "Jewish-Negro conspiracy" inspired by the Communists to "mongrelize the country." Agitators also charged that the Jews dominated Negro organizations, and they stressed the activities of those prominent Americans of Jewish faith who were in any way linked with efforts to further civil rights. Illustrative of this approach was the May 15, 1956, issue of *Common Sense*, a publication put out by Conde McGinley in Union, N. J. Under a banner heading, *NAACP Leaders and Their Communist Front Citations*, it printed large photographs of Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, Senator Herbert H. Lehman (Dem., N.Y.), and Arthur B. Spingarn. Besides extensive mailing from New Jersey, McGinley's periodical, his pamphlets and leaflets, were shipped in bulk to the South for distribution. This activity marked a curious situation: Most of the anti-Negro and anti-Semitic literature distributed in the South originated from areas where desegregation was not a major issue. Much of the literature of this nature that flooded tense Southern states was published in such states as California, Colorado, Missouri, New Jersey, and New York. By comparison, most of the literature produced by Southern white supremacy groups, dealing with "states' rights" and exhorting Southern whites to resist desegregation by boycott, seemed temperate. Actually, many white supremacy groups and their members were paying for and relying on the imports from the North, Midwest, and West for the more extreme literature.

From Glendale, a Los Angeles, Calif., suburb, Gerald L. K. Smith and his staff increased production of literature along anti-Negro lines, as typified by his pocket-size booklet, *White Man Awaken!*, published in the latter part of 1955. Similar in content was another product of the Los Angeles area, *The American Nationalist*, published at Inglewood, Calif., by Frank L. Britton. This monthly was received by residents of all Southern states, and appeared to be the recognized source for agitation throughout the region.

From Denver, Col., Kenneth Goff, a former Smith assistant, published a pamphlet, *Father Divine—Fake or Father?*, with anti-Jewish, as well as anti-

Negro material. From St. Louis came *The White Sentinel*, edited by John W. Hamilton, another former associate of Smith, which was found to be used extensively as an ideological source by pro-segregation groups. A pamphlet widely circulated in the South and Southwest was Joseph P. Kamp's *Behind the Plot to Sovietize the South*, which smeared and attacked unions and Negro, Jewish, and other groups and their leadership. When a pro-segregation group in Texas conducted a mail solicitation in Houston (November 1955), it enclosed a reprint of Merwin K. Hart's *Economic Council Letter* of August 1, 1955, attacking desegregation and pointing out Jewish organizational support of the measure. The *Economic Council Letter* was published in New York City.

WHITE CITIZENS COUNCILS

The White Citizens Councils (WCC) movement, dedicated to resisting desegregation, became more receptive to anti-Semitic and anti-Negro publications and agitators during 1955-56. As early as the summer of 1954, Robert B. Patterson, executive secretary of the Mississippi state parent-group of the WCC, had recommended to WCC members the products of such agitators as Smith, Conde McGinley, and Britton. Coinciding with increased distribution by WCC members (and in some instances, by WCC units) of such literature, was the rapid growth of the WCC movement itself throughout the South. In its *Second Annual Report* (August 1956) the Mississippi state WCC claimed 80,000 members, boasting that it was "corresponding regularly with interested Americans in forty-eight states. . . . We have mailed over two million pieces of literature . . . and members and officials of the State [WCC] Association have traveled into eleven Southern States, telling them what we have accomplished in Mississippi and helping them to organize." Reliable estimates of WCC membership in the South were unobtainable, although various reports indicated that it had swelled to several hundred thousand. This increase was primarily the result of local reaction to flare-ups of tension in specific areas stemming from specific incidents of attempts to end desegregation. Immediately after the riots attendant upon the attempts of Autherine Lucy, a Negro student, to enter the University of Alabama (see p. 97-98), WCC units in that state rose from forty-seven to sixty-one. Another reason for the proliferation of the councils was that, while its original activators envisioned the WCC as a highly unified movement, the reverse proved to be the case. Actually, WCC units were highly varied in the intensity of their animus and resentment. Illustrative of this diversity was the situation in Alabama, where the state WCC split into two factions, one moderate, the other extremist. The latter, known as the North Alabama WCC, was headed by Asa Carter, a former radio commentator, who openly collaborates with leading anti-Semitic activists. In April 1956, five North Alabama WCC members ran onto the stage of Birmingham's Municipal Auditorium and assaulted Negro singer Nat Cole during his performance before a segregated audience. The five were arrested, along with a sixth who had waited outside in a parked car containing rifles, brass knuckles, and a blackjack. Two of the assailants were held for assault with intent to murder, the others on minor conspiracy charges.

On cordial terms with Carter was John Kasper, an associate and one-time publisher for anti-Semitic writer Eustace Mullins. In 1955 Kasper ran a "nationalist" bookshop in New York, later moved his store to Washington D. C., where in 1956 it became the headquarters for his Eastern Seaboard WCC's. The orderly integration of twelve Negro students into the high school at Clinton, Tenn., was disrupted (end of August 1956) by Kasper's appearance in that town, where he conducted an anti-integration rally attended by 800, haranguing the audience to oppose the Federal Court's integration order. As a result, considerable public disorder and some violence occurred in Clinton for several days before the disturbances were quelled. On August 30, 1956, Kasper was arrested on a writ of attachment for contempt of court. Another visitor to Clinton was Carter, whom Kasper characterized as being "the only sincere and courageous leader in the entire movement." Released on bail, Kasper traveled to other Southern communities, and at Birmingham, Ala., (September 12, 1956) urged the use of "every type of resistance" to fight the "open and naked display of power of the Supreme Court."

Evidence that the WCC movement was not confined to the South was confirmed when a new WCC was launched in Detroit, Mich., during July 1956. Claiming that additional units in Michigan were scheduled to open in Highland Park, Flint, Lansing, and other localities, the council rented headquarters in Dearborn, Mich., under the name of Homeowners' Association of the State of Michigan. After learning the true identity of his tenants, the landlord took steps to oust the organization. In charge of this WCC group was James Douglas Carter, brother of Asa Carter.

The foregoing is representative of the extremism in the WCC movement. However, it is noteworthy that the many WCC units ranged from extreme to mild; while some inspired violence, others concentrated on promoting legal means of avoiding integration, such as interposition (*see* p. 98); still others encouraged boycotts of those aiding the moves to integrate Negroes in public schools, or public accommodations; yet others, such as the Louisiana WCC's, took credit for a court decision prohibiting the activities of the NAACP; and some WCC's resorted to political moves. Most of the WCC's disavowed religious and racial bigotry (including anti-Negro bias), while the presence of locally important individuals in some councils provided a brake on fanaticism. Finally, WCC units tended to reflect the tensions and attitudes of the locality, and its membership and activities appeared to fluctuate in direct ratio to specific incidents involving integration, declining sharply as soon as those incidents were resolved.

Ku Klux Klan

Attempts at revival of the Ku Klux Klan were accelerated during 1955-56. Considering the WCC's to be "too mild," rabble-rousers and other opportunists sought to stimulate public acceptance of the discredited Klan throughout the South. In Montgomery, Ala., (September 1956) Imperial Wizard E. L. Edwards attacked "Catholics, Communists, Jews, Negroes and Northern agitators" as the principal threats to "destruction of the white heritage." His remarks were applauded enthusiastically by the assemblage of 1,200, including 200 robed Klansmen. In Woodruff, S. C., a "Grand Titan," addressing a

Klan rally of 400 by the light of a thirty-foot gasoline-soaked fiery cross (June 1956), declared that "the Klan has always been against the use of violence and has never taken the law into its own hands. The record shows that any time the Klan took action, the facts justified it." A Klan meeting in Tuscaloosa, Ala., (August 1956) reportedly gave the state senator, Albert Davis, a tumultuous ovation as he intoned his peroration, "Give me segregation or give me death!" Several hundred journeyed from many points in Tennessee for a Klonvocation held in October 1956 at Clinton, Tenn., scene of school integration troubles. In Tallahassee, Fla., Bill Hendrix, Grand Dragon of the Florida Klan, informed his followers (August 1956) that he was organizing a Klan unit in Chicago. A state-wide organizing drive was launched at Lakeland, Fla., in July 1956, followed by another meeting at Orlando the following month.

In Atlanta, Ga., traditional home of the Klan, over 3,000 persons attended a Klonvocation and cross-burning ceremony atop Stone Mountain (September 1956), Imperial Wizard E. L. Edwards announcing that "the Klan is growing faster than you think." In June 1956, the Klan obtained a nonprofit corporate charter from Louisiana's secretary of state, Wade O. Martin. In July 1956, at Richlands, N. C., a cross was burned on the lawn of a country church whose pastor had invited a Negro to preach to his white congregation.

There were many other such instances of Klan activity. There were many cross-burnings, especially in connection with demonstrations in opposition to school desegregation. It must be observed that cross-burnings in themselves did not necessarily indicate the presence of the Klan, but rather the perpetration of a Klan-like act, the culprits generally escaping apprehension by authorities. Some prominent targets of cross-burnings were the Washington, D. C., residences of Senator Lehman, and Supreme Court Justices Earl Warren and Felix Frankfurter (July 1956); the home of Speaker Sam Rayburn (July 1956); and the home of Archbishop Joseph F. Rummel in New Orleans, La., (May 1956).

Despite the activity during 1955-56 here reported, the Klan had nothing like the integrated structure and direction it had in the 1920's, or even the 1940's.

Politics

Anti-Semites concentrated on exploiting ultra-conservative political movements more than a year in advance of the 1956 presidential elections. Long accustomed to wooing extreme rightists by tying in their bigotry with attacks upon the UN, the income tax, liberalized immigration, and denunciations of alleged Federal government encroachments, agitators found the emergence of desegregation as a burning issue in the South a fertile political field. Non-Southern political dissidents formed alliances with pro-segregation movements in the South, under a common slogan of "states' rights." Agitators conspicuously lent their support to "third party" and "third force" movements throughout the United States, attending conferences of many such groups. Thus, the ultra-conservative Congress of Freedom, an amalgam of many rightist groups, meeting in Dallas, Tex., April 5-7, 1956, numbered among its participants Elizabeth Dilling, whose periodic newsletter was rarely

rivalled for racial and religious venom. Also present were Kenneth Goff, Denver, Colo., agitator, and Marilyn Allen, a Klan-apologist, and publisher of bigoted pamphlets. Resolutions adopted at the convention voiced the Congress of Freedom's opposition to Federal subsidies, compulsory unionism, income taxes, tax-exempt foundations, desegregation, and social security. Also adopted was a resolution which declared:

The Congress [of Freedom] has come to the conclusion that both major parties have been taken over by socialistic forces, that the socialistic revolution has taken place, and that only a counter-revolution can still save the Christian States from succumbing to the fate of European nations.

In 1952 the anti-Semites had achieved extensive notoriety. In 1956, however, the efforts of agitators to exploit the differences and divisions at the conventions of the major parties met with scant success. The Chicago Committee for the Reception of Nationalist Observers, a project sponsored by Matt Koehl and other local activists, set up headquarters. Its peak meeting, held August 12, was addressed by Joseph E. McWilliams, quondam fuehrer of New York City's Christian Mobilizers, an activist group of pre-Pearl Harbor days. McWilliams had not been overtly engaged in agitation for more than a decade prior to this meeting. He attacked President Dwight D. Eisenhower and ex-President Harry S. Truman for having "turned the country over to the leftists and Communists," and exhorted pro-segregationists to greater achievements. McWilliams praised "nationalist groups" who, he said, were "the nation's defenders against Communist, internationalist, and Jewish infiltration"; he also acclaimed Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser for having seized the Suez canal (*see* p. 217). Materials distributed through the headquarters of the Chicago committee included *The Democratic Party, Arch-Foe of Civilization*, a leaflet from James Madole's National Renaissance Party (NRP) in New York, and *Fightum*, a pamphlet devoted to a letter by Gen. George Van Horn Moseley (ret.). This letter charged the Jews with using the Negro "to mongrelize the race," hoped for Israel to be "completely wiped off the map," and prayed "to see a fearless American leader arise from the Christian majority, take over our nation as did Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey." Conde McGinley's *Common Sense* also was extensively circulated.

At San Francisco, Gerald L. K. Smith achieved national press coverage by gratuitously endorsing Vice President Richard Nixon. Nixon immediately repudiated Smith, pointing to attacks which Smith had previously made on him.

The alertness of anti-Semites to exploit events of political import was best exemplified by Robert H. Williams' vitriolic *Williams' Intelligence Summary* and Conde McGinley's *Common Sense*. When it was uncertain whether President Eisenhower would run for re-election, the July 1955 issue of Williams' publication urged "some Republican patriot" to enter the Presidential race without waiting for President Eisenhower's decision. The October 1955 issue of the same publication, which appeared shortly after the President's heart attack, urged ultra-conservatives to "take advantage of the break." As the Presidential campaign of 1956 drew to a close, a "third party" ticket, headed by former Internal Revenue Commissioner T. Coleman Andrews and former Representative Thomas H. Werdel, running for President and Vice President, respectively, had been agreed upon by ultra-conservative elements

of the North and pro-segregationists of the South. Though this movement was not anti-Semitic, agitators such as McGinley joined it, and assiduously promoted the ticket. On October 1, 1956, *Common Sense* prominently displayed the photos of both these candidates, including what was labeled as the text of an address given before the National States Rights Conference at Memphis, Tenn., on September 14, 1956. It also gave considerable space to a so-called *New Party Directory*, listing the names of third party political groups in twenty-nine states, and it urged its readers to "register your protest against these former two parties which have been merged and are shadow-boxing, while directed by international Marxist Conspirators."

Jack Tenney, former California state senator and colleague of Gerald L. K. Smith, fared poorly at the June 1956 primaries in Los Angeles in his bid for nomination for Municipal Court Judge; Tenney received 79,000 votes against 340,000 for his opponent.

Pro-Arab Propaganda

As tensions in the Middle East mounted during 1955 and 1956, anti-Semites accelerated their promotion of pro-Arab and anti-Jewish themes. At times they actually aided the dissemination of official Arab propaganda in such a manner as to give rise to the inference that there was a working liaison between agitators and official and semi-official Arab units in the United States.

Thus, the May 1956 issue of *The National Renaissance Bulletin*, organ of the neo-Nazi NRP, devoted a page to an "urgent appeal" to its readers "to assist by purchasing any two of the following books for \$1." Of the eight items listed, seven were of Arab origin, including *Zionist Espionage in Egypt*, a tract originating at the Egyptian Embassy. Also advertised were such items of general Arab propaganda as *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, by Egyptian President Nasser, which, according to the NRP Bulletin, "every nationalist needs for his library." An indication of the strenuous effort of Arab agencies in the United States to stir up suspicion and hatred of American Jews was a 250-page manual for American pro-Arab speakers and writers, *Tension, Terror and Blood in the Holy Land*. Issued toward the end of 1955 and extensively distributed during 1956, the book bore the official seal and imprint of the Palestine Arab Refugee Institution, Damascus, Syria. One of its characteristic excerpts read:

It is time that Americans realize that these teeming masses of Zionists who infest their cities and sit astride the arteries of their commerce are, in every sense of the word aliens. They are aliens by choice and by tradition. They are aliens because they render their first allegiance not to the United States of America, but to their own so-called state of Israel.

Charges of "Jewish dual loyalty," either outright or by pointed implication, were contained in most of the public addresses by Arab officials, and by pro-Arab speakers. The leading instance of this charge during 1955-56 was the address of Syrian Ambassador Farid Zeneiddine before the Women's National Democratic Club (November 13, 1955). Zeneiddine was quoted as saying that Jews throughout the world considered themselves "different," rather

than as an integral part of the country in which they resided, and that their allegiance was only to Zionism. The ambassador was reported to have queried, "Why not let New York be a homeland for the Jews?" Some pro-Arab American publicists went beyond this point. Lawrence Griswold published a newsletter, *Background for Tomorrow*, which in its October 31, 1955, issue, referred to "the selfish aggressiveness of privileged Jews, both in this country and abroad. . . . Thoughtful Americans should consider well, if they wish to avoid the demoralization of society which follows pogroms, whether they should employ enlightened self-interest now and write off the ugliness of Israel."

Anti-Semites made continuous use of the Middle Eastern tensions as springboards for their bigotry. Gerald L. K. Smith, for instance, tied in the Presidential campaign with this problem, writing to his followers in his *Special Appeal Letter* (August 6, 1956):

You can rest assured that if Eisenhower can be propped up long enough to get the nomination, and if Stevenson or whoever is nominated heads the ticket of the "kidnapped" Democrat Party, these internationalists who agree on practically everything will outpromise each other in order to get the Zionist Jew vote.

Merwin K. Hart's *Economic Council Letter* (August 1, 1956), copies of which were mailed to legislators, feared that "barring a miracle, the same Marxist-Zionist forces will select the candidates of both parties."

Horace Sherman Miller, of Waco, Tex., digressed from his white supremacy publicity to distribute a flyer reproducing a letter dated March 16, 1956; the letter urged, "I call upon the American Government to arm the Arabs, and help them drive the Jews and Jewish parasites into the sea." Easily the bellwether of anti-Jewish propaganda in discussions of Middle East tensions was McGinley's *Common Sense*.

Specific Agitators

Joseph Beauharnais, who had formerly headed Chicago's anti-Negro White Circle League, started (March 1956) the World Federation of the Pure White Race, and issued a "call" to a convention for anti-Semitic, anti-Negro leaders. However, Beauharnais was unsuccessful in his endeavors to consolidate the segregationist movement. Eustace Mullins, anti-Semitic writer, published a German-language edition of his book, *Federal Reserve*, in West Germany. The work was reported seized by authorities in August 1956. In a suit filed by Mullins against an oil industry public relations group, American Petroleum Industries Committee, for breach of contract (February 1956), Mullins alleged (and the defendant denied) that he had been hired to run what was tantamount to "a clearing-house for anti-Zionist propaganda." John Kasper, Seaboard WCC leader, was charged (September 25, 1956) in Tennessee with sedition for inciting to riot, arising out of his participation in the Clinton, Tenn. demonstrations against integration of Negro students in that city. [He was acquitted after trial in November 1956.] Previously, Kasper had been adjudged in contempt of a Tennessee Federal Court decree, and sentenced to a year in jail on August 30, 1956. He was released on bail pending appeal.

Attempts were made by the NRP to hold weekly outdoor meetings in the Yorkville section of New York City. After disturbances at the first meeting (June 1956), this project was discontinued. Agnes Waters was active in Chicago during the Democratic Convention there (August 1956), resuming her agitation after several years of quiescence.

Anti-Semitic Press

The anti-Semitic press generally continued to register improvement in the quality of its typography. New items consisted mainly of flyers and pamphlets dealing with desegregation, while such staples as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* were extensively circulated through the South. The most widely circulated periodicals appeared to be *Common Sense* and the *American Nationalist*. Examples of poorer typography were Elizabeth Dilling's *Patriotic Newsletter*, and Howard Pyle's *Grass Roots*. Leonard E. Feeney, excommunicated priest of Boston, continued publication of a small, four-page periodical, *The Point*, which stressed Talmud exposé themes during 1955–56. Frederick C. F. Weiss, neo-Nazi promoter, issued a new section of his book, *Russia*, in pamphlet form, under the imprint of LeBlanc Publishers; its advertisements contained anti-Semitic cartoons. Alexei Jefimov, a Conde McGinley assistant, occasionally produced flyers in Ukrainian linking Jews with Communism: these, McGinley produced in English. Robert H. Williams gave extensive distribution to a large flyer in telegram format condemning President Eisenhower and libeling Jews as Red Zionists. Gerald Winrod's *Defender* continued to mix racism with religious messages. Perhaps the low point of racist publications was reached in a pornographic pamphlet, *Virginians on Guard*, distributed by Frederick Kasper, ostensibly suggesting legislation to reinforce segregation. *The Coming Red Dictatorship*, a large flyer containing photos of prominent Americans of Jewish faith smeared as being Communist-influenced, continued to be widely distributed throughout the country, its contents revised with each edition. This work was also published during the summer of 1956 in Oberammergau, West Germany, under the title *Die Kommende Rote Diktatur*, and was accompanied by many Streicher-like caricatures. Its concluding phrases may be said to sum up the import and objective of all such literature:

In case you think we are prejudiced, history for more than 1,000 years indicates that wherever these people have settled, it was necessary to evict them eventually—Babylon, Spain, France, England, and as recent as 1939, Germany. And it will happen in America.

GEORGE KELLMAN

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

EXPLOITING A VARIETY of domestic and world tensions and issues, during the period of this review (December 1, 1956, to November 30, 1957) anti-Jewish agitators maintained a volume and degree of anti-Semitic activity equal to that of preceding years. As in previous years, the anti-Semites continued to attack such targets as the United Nations, the President and his administration, the Status of Forces Treaty of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which ceded jurisdiction over American armed forces to the countries where they were stationed, the income tax, "socialist" laws regulating labor relations, fluoridation of drinking water, and mental health projects. These targets were invariably described as "Jewish conspiracies to rule the world." The agitators assailed Jews and Jewish communities as being Communist-dominated and serving Soviet aims. Simultaneously, Jews were charged with dominating Communism and the Soviet government in order to "enslave the world."

There were three chief situations that the organized anti-Semitic movement exploited during 1956-57: the desegregation tensions of the South; the economic antipathies of ultra-conservatives for both major political parties; and the efforts of Arab and pro-Arab propagandists to denigrate the American Jewish community.

Southern Tensions

Hatemongers' activities kept pace with the mounting troubles of the South over the desegregation of its public schools, ordered by the Supreme Court's decisions of 1954 and 1955 (*see* p. 40). Anti-Semitic literature gravitated to certain areas of the South, especially those where the resentment of white-supremacists was likely to erupt into violence. The agitators' pamphlets, leaflets, and fliers charged that Jews were responsible for a "conspiracy to mongrelize the nation" in pursuance of Communist aims. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was described as the creation and tool of "the Jews"; the Jews were also depicted as having "ordered" the Supreme Court to decree desegregation. Such racist writings were most in evidence in Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, and Texas. In the fall of 1957 the propaganda was also prevalent in Arkansas and Tennessee.

The vast bulk of the anti-Semitic and anti-Negro literature in evidence in the South during 1956-57 was published by agitators from non-Southern regions: e.g., Frank L. Britton (Inglewood, Calif.), Conde McGinley (Union, N. J.), John W. Hamilton (St. Louis, Mo.), and Gerald L. K. Smith (Glen-dale, Calif.). The products of Britton, McGinley, and Smith attained the largest circulation.

Extensive dissemination of such literature was mainly due to the efforts of elements within the White Citizens Council movement and the Ku Klux

Klan and their sympathizers, who had purchased the propaganda in bulk. The literature was sometimes obtained from a local or itinerant "wholesaler." Large quantities invariably accompanied the visits of such racist rabble rousers as Frederick John Kasper to tension spots. In one instance, while Kasper was being arraigned in a Federal court in Knoxville, Tenn. (December 6, 1956), Joe Diehl, an over-enthusiastic supporter, was arrested for distributing Conde McGinley's *Coming Red Dictatorship* in the courtroom.

WHITE CITIZENS COUNCILS

The White Citizens Council movement continued to be a congeries of local units, including the extreme activist type. Estimates of WCC membership ranged from 300,000 to 500,000; the largest groups were in Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, the Carolinas, and Arkansas, in that order. Dedicated to the preservation of "white supremacy," some councils denounced violence, reiterating their objective of preserving segregation "by all legal means." Other councils, however, appeared to be merely disguised Klans.

WCC units (most designated themselves as "Citizens' Councils") were especially active in such areas of tension as Clinton, Tenn., where disturbances over the integration of the high school reached a climax on December 4, 1956, when a minister was assaulted; Nashville, Tenn., where public school integration plans proceeded (September 1957) only after the law enforcement authorities had quelled demonstrations and disorders that included the dynamiting of a school building; Greensboro, N. C. (September 1957), where the executive secretary of the local WCC incited high school students to demonstrate against the admission of a single Negro student; and Little Rock, Ark., where WCC members of that city and surrounding localities distributed large quantities of hate-literature during the disturbances attendant upon high school integration there.

Several WCC's issued their own publications. These included the Tennessee and Knoxville White Citizens Councils' *Knoxville On Guard* (November 1956), which advertised the anti-Jewish forgery, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, for sale.

Some WCC units appeared to be largely tolerated, if not accepted, as part of the local scene in many cities and towns of the South, increasing in numbers and public notice during periods of tension, declining during periods of quiet.

THE KU KLUX KLAN

Klan growth and activity rose sharply during 1956-57, estimates of over-all membership running as high as 100,000. Not as well organized as the Klan movements of the '20s or the '40s, regional or state Klans tended to fragmentize into loose federations, despite the claims of Imperial Wizard Eldon L. Edwards of Atlanta, Ga., and various Grand Dragons elsewhere, that they headed the entire movement.

Klan activities mainly consisted of nocturnal cross-burnings aimed at whites as well as Negroes; motorcades, followed by informal visits to towns in full regalia; demonstrations ("Klonvocations") attended by audiences of from several hundred to several thousand, at which visiting dignitaries de-

nounced Negroes, Jews, and sometimes Catholics (at these demonstrations the hate-literature of non-Southern agitators such as Conde McGinley and Frank L. Britton was invariably distributed); dynamiting, flogging, and other acts of extreme terror and violence.

Among the Klan groups in operation were Edwards' U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan; the Association of South Carolina Klans, headed by Grand Dragon Robert E. Hodges of Columbia, S. C.; the Association of Florida Klans, led by Grand Dragon Bill Hendrix; the Gulf Klans Association, presided over by Elmo C. Barnard of Mobile, Ala.; and Asa ("Ace") Carter's Original Klans of the Confederacy in Birmingham. Edwards' U. S. Klans suffered a schism in Alabama in June 1957 over the marriage of Grand Dragon Alvin Horn to a fifteen-year-old girl; the dissident members formed the Alabama Ku Klux Klan, Inc.

The instances of Klan activity during 1956-57 are too numerous to detail here, but the following are illustrative: Florida was subjected to many Klan meetings, especially during February and March 1957; the demonstrations were designed not only to attract a following, but also to "answer" the inaugural address of Governor LeRoy Collins (January 8, 1957). In this address Governor Collins asserted that school integration was inevitable, though not in the near future. Several of these demonstrations were addressed by Frederick John Kasper, who was generally assisted by Fred B. Hockett, at that time Kasper's White Citizen Council organizer for Florida. In advance of an impending visit of Kasper to Miami, Klan leader Hendrix publicly announced (March 4, 1957) that he would send "thirty riflemen to protect him." On February 25, 1957, police prevented attempts to burn a cross in front of the home of a Negro in Miami because it was located in a formerly white section. Hockett was among those arrested for this act. On bail, he organized picketing of the home.

In Americus, Ga., an interracial farm colony, Koinonia, was subjected to Klan bombings, shootings, and cross-burnings through most of 1956-57. In Birmingham, Ala., the mutilation of a Negro (September 2, 1957), selected at random to prove a Klansman eligible for promotion in the order, resulted in the conviction of two Klansmen (October-November 1957); they were sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment.

In Camden, S. C. (December 1956), a high school teacher was seized by five hooded Klansmen, tied to a tree, and severely flogged "for teaching integration." Crosses were burnt in front of a Baptist church in Tallahassee, Fla. (January 1957); a Methodist Church at Sylacauga, Ala. (June 1957); three Negro homes at Nashville, Tenn. (October 1957); and five Negro homes in Prattville, Ala., the same month. In Monroe, N. C. (October 5, 1957), a Klan motorcade invaded the Negro section, an exchange of shots ensuing.

The Aryan Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a lone operation of agitator Horace Sherman Miller of Waco, Tex., was evidence of the impact of Klan leaflets in highly varied localities. Miller compiled mailing lists and sent out vituperative anti-Semitic literature throughout the United States and to different parts of the world. In May 1957, pranksters distributed Miller's leaflets in England, in areas where there had been a large influx of West Indian Negroes. The British government and its consul general in New

York deemed it necessary to deny the existence of the Klan in Great Britain. Again, in October 1957, Miller sent letters in Spanish to Argentina, advising that the "Grand Dragon of Argentina" had declared "war" on the Jews. Klan elements of Birmingham, Ala., adopted Miller's anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic literature for their own use, though virtually all other Klans relied on the propaganda of non-Southern anti-Semitic publicists.

Klan-like activities were not confined to the deep South. A fiery cross was burned before the executive mansion of Governor Theodore R. McKeldin of Maryland (October 6, 1957), while a cross was ignited at the residence of an official of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in Washington, D. C., on September 26, 1957. The home of a Negro couple in Trenton, N. J., received similar treatment on November 8, 1957. In Levittown, Pa., during September and October 1957, when a Negro couple, Mr. and Mrs. William R. Myers, acquired a home in that all-white community, large "KKK" letters were painted on the side of the home of a friendly next-door neighbor, Lewis Wechsler; several crosses were burned on the lawns of other neighbors. During this period, when partisans of both sides were holding meetings and there were demonstrations and other harassments of the Negro couple, agitators shipped large quantities of their literature into the area for distribution.

Despite the Klan's notoriety, and despite the fact that in April 1949 the United States attorney general had listed two predecessor Klans as having "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence," the Klan appeared to be accepted in one area. The Ku Klux Klan's softball team of Chattanooga achieved semi-final standing in the Softball League, according to reports dated August 14, 1957. Earlier in the season, however, several commercial firms withdrew from the league because of the Klan's participation.

John Frederick Kasper

Kasper was the most peripatetic and inflammatory anti-Semitic rabble-rouser in the South during 1956-57, appearing throughout the region, especially in states and cities undergoing integration tensions. Kasper attained his first nation-wide notoriety in Clinton, Tenn., in August, 1956, by leading segregationists in their opposition to the integration of the high school there. He subsequently became involved in a similar incident in that city during December 1956. Convicted of two offenses of contempt of court for violation of a Federal injunction against interference with school integration at Clinton, Kasper, at large on bonds pending appeals, visited other areas, especially Florida, Alabama, and Tennessee. At Nashville (September 1957) he was arrested and charged with inciting to riot in the course of violence attendant upon public school integration there. On October 18, 1957, Kasper was taken into custody by Federal authorities in Washington, D. C., and on November 21, 1957, he was sent to the Federal Correctional Institution at Tallahassee, Fla., to serve an eighteen-month term in connection with his violations of the injunction against interference with integration at Clinton, Tenn. Kasper, as head of the Seaboard White Citizens Councils, was forced to admit

in an inquiry conducted by a Florida Legislative Investigating Committee (March, 1957), that during the time he operated a bookshop in the Greenwich Village section of New York, Negroes had been among his closest friends, and that he had attended parties and other social affairs with Negroes. This official revelation caused some defection in Kasper's following in the WCC movement and among Klans, though not sufficient to impede his subsequent activities in such places as Nashville.

Politics

Anti-Semites continued their endeavors during 1956-57 to influence extreme right-wing political movements, exploiting the drive of economic ultra-conservatives and pro-segregationists to fuse into a political bloc under the slogan of states' rights.

The Congress of Freedom, an amalgam of such groups, held its annual convention at Biloxi, Miss., on April 18, 1957. There it was announced that the Constitution Party was being reorganized, with New York industrialist Russell Maguire as its national chairman. Maguire's magazine, *American Mercury*, frequently contained matter such as this quotation from its July 1957 issue:

Privately, the international Zionists claim they have the power and the concentrated wealth to do as they please throughout the world. Then why haven't they destroyed international communism instead of financing it?

Reporting his dissatisfaction over the Congress of Freedom convention, however, anti-Semitic newsletter publisher Don Bell (Palm Beach, Fla.) complained (*Don Bell Reports*, April 26, 1957) that the "three-letter-word" [Jew] was not used by the speakers.

The Constitution Party's convention, held at San Francisco on May 31 and June 1, 1957, featured as its principal speakers Russell Maguire and Lt. Gen. Pedro A. del Valle (USMC, ret.). Maguire denounced "internationalist bankers," whom he charged with having planned both World Wars and with plotting "to destroy the United States and Christianity." Del Valle also attacked "private international bankers" and "internationalism," warning of future violence in the streets unless the present political situation was changed. Later, del Valle, according to a report in *The San Francisco News* (June 2, 1957) explained, "It won't be us who start it. But we're going to fight back." A high light of the convention was the extensive distribution of inflammatory literature by Conde McGinley, a nondelegate.

The difficulty ultra-conservative groups encountered in dissociating themselves from anti-Semites was suggested by Elizabeth Dilling in her newsletter for September 1957. Writing of the convention the right-wing group We, The People had held earlier that month in Chicago, Mrs. Dilling explained that she and Lyril Van Hyning, leader of a vitriolic "mothers' group," had rented accommodations in the same hotel as the convention where "literature" was available.

Admiral John G. Crommelin, Jr. (ret.), who unsuccessfully ran in the 1956 Alabama primaries for Senator Lister Hill's seat, announced his intention

of running for the Governorship of that state, according to a letter from General George Van Horn Moseley (ret.) that appeared in the September 1957 issue of *Women's Voice* (Chicago). Crommelin, a character witness at the Knoxville trial of Kasper for sedition in November 1956,¹ sat on the platform at two Gerald L. K. Smith meetings during 1957—at Los Angeles on April 11, 1957, and at Dallas on June 14, 1957. Moseley, in an interview in the racist monthly *The Virginian* (July 1957), called for the creation of a new party:

I recommend strongly that all those good loyal Americans be gathered into a Revolutionary Party. It could sweep the nation. Under such a party, suffrage could be withdrawn from certain classes. The unfit could be sterilized and not permitted to breed. Our frontiers could be closed definitely except for certain selected Nordics.

Asa ("Ace") Carter, Klan and White Citizens' Council leader of Birmingham, Ala., was overwhelmingly defeated when he ran in the elections for police commissioner of that city (May 1957).

Pro-Arab Propaganda

Anti-Semites stepped up their exploitation of Near East tensions during 1956-57; they continued to allege a "Jewish-Zionist-Communist conspiracy" to embroil the major powers in the Middle East and start a "third World War." Paralleling the official Arab line, such propaganda ignored the involvement of Arab countries with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Representative of this approach was the March 1, 1957, issue of *Common Sense*.

That official Arab sources welcomed such efforts was evidenced by a number of incidents. The following were typical: James Madole's openly Nazi National Renaissance Party in New York City sold and distributed official Arab propaganda in bulk. The material included the writings of Nasser and *Zionist Espionage in Egypt*, an anti-Jewish pamphlet originating in Egypt which had originally appeared in 1955. Madole's *National Renaissance Bulletin* for March-April 1957 viciously attacked Israel as "the vampire state" which drained other countries of its resources.

Gerald L. K. Smith, in the July 1957 issue of his *The Cross and the Flag* (Glendale, Calif.), prefaced an autobiographical article by Sami Hadawi, an official of the Arab Palestine Refugee Office (APRO), with the comment:

It was the pleasure of the editors of *The Cross and the Flag* to visit personally with Mr. Hadawi, whose story we reproduce herewith.

The writings of Izzat Tannous, another official of the APRO, appeared in the May and June 1957 issues of *The Defender* (Wichita, Kans.), publication of Gerald Winrod,² once known as "the Jayhawk Nazi."

APRO's monthly *Newsletter*, bearing Foreign Agent Registration No. 897, in its issue of January 1957 charged that "Party politics in the United States made the Democratic President [Harry S. Truman] succumb to Zionist pres-

¹ Kasper was acquitted.

² Died November 11, 1957.

sure." The September 1957 issue of the *APRO Newsletter* prominently displayed a commendatory letter from H. Keith Thompson, one-time registered agent in the United States for the Socialist Reich Party, dissolved in October 1952 by the Bonn government because of its Nazi complexion.

Specific Agitators

Imperial Wizard Eldon L. Edwards of the U. S. Klans appeared on an interview program over a nationwide television network, expounding his views while garbed in Klan regalia (May 5, 1957). James A. Madole, ardent pro-Nazi leader of the National Renaissance Party, appeared on two similar programs in the New York City area, one on radio (July 29, 1957), the other on television (July 30, 1957). In the June-July 1957 issue of his *National Renaissance Bulletin*, Madole boasted that he "got across a tremendous amount of information on racial questions," and that the television station had admitted that "the listener response was exceptionally heavy and spontaneous."

John W. Hamilton, St. Louis publisher of racist material for Southern distribution, was convicted of a morals offense in that city (February 20, 1957) and given a two-year sentence. At the time of writing (November 1957), he was still out on bail pending appeals.

David T. Wang, a young actor of Chinese descent, and Robert L'Hommiedieu, both of the New York City area, attempted to found an "Ivy League" branch of Kasper's White Citizens' Council in New York (July 1957). There was no evidence that they had succeeded by November 1957. Wang addressed a forum at Columbia University (October 29, 1957) on the import of Kasper's theories.

Anti-Semitic Press

The anti-Semitic press achieved a somewhat higher level of circulation during 1956-57 than during 1955-56, largely because of the intensified distribution of literature exploiting desegregation tensions in the South. Among the products most widely distributed were the one-sheet photo-offset leaflets of Frank L. Britton, and a large broadside, *The Coming Red Dictatorship*, put out by Conde McGinley. These were accompanied by still another McGinley product, a leaflet titled *Jew Religion Exposed*. Gerald L. K. Smith continued his publishing enterprise with unabated vigor, his Christian Nationalist Crusade reporting a gross of almost \$174,000 for 1956; Smith's fund-raising letters, widely mailed throughout the United States, supplemented his *The Cross and The Flag* as vehicles for "revelations" of "Jewish plots." One of Smith's leaflets was entitled *A Petition to Impeach Chief Justice Warren, Justice Felix Frankfurter and Others*, and contained lines for signatures. The Keep America Committee of Los Angeles made a specialty of reproducing selected items of various agitators and giving them additional distribution. Leonard E. Feeney, excommunicated priest from Boston, continued his monthly *The Point*, containing anti-Semitic matter as venomous as it was well-written. *Destiny*, the organ of the mystic Anglo-Saxon Federation

(Haverhill, Mass.), frequently contained anti-Semitic references along with its interpretations of the Bible. The same was true of J. A. Lovell's *Kingdom Digest* (Dallas, Tex.); both of these periodicals were unusually well-printed. Another bigoted periodical worthy of mention was William L. Blessing's *Showers of Blessing* (Denver, Col.), which was skillfully designed. Regularly issued during 1956-57 were Frank L. Britton's *American Nationalist* (Inglewood, Calif.), Robert H. Williams' monthly newsletter *Williams Intelligence Summary* (Santa Ana, Calif.) and Elizabeth Dilling's mimeographed *Newsletter*.

Generally, there was a greater tendency toward the use of the photo-offset process and the reproduction of old pictures and cartoons. Agitators resorted more to the leaflet as a quicker, more pungent manner of delivering "the message." There also appeared to be a greater tendency toward reviving and circulating old pamphlets, including those of the late George W. Armstrong of Dallas, Tex. Such staples of bigotry as the Benjamin Franklin forgery, the speech attributed to a fictitious "Rabbi Rabinovich," and the infamous *Protocols* were widely circulated.

Joseph P. Kamp continued the extensive circulation of his 1955 pamphlet, *Behind the Plot to Sovietize the South*. He followed it up with two new pamphlets of equal size and format: *Trickery, Treachery, Tyranny, and Treason in Washington*, published during the spring of 1957, and *The Low-down on Little Rock and the Plot to Sovietize the South*, published during the fall of 1957. The latter pamphlet was distinguished for its references to the memory of Adolf Hitler:

Some intemperate Southern leaders have compared Dwight Eisenhower to Adolf Hitler. . . . They are wrong. . . . Hitler had the constitutional right to use Nazi storm troopers in any way he pleased. Eisenhower has no such right to use Federal troops in Arkansas.

Also published during the fall of 1957 was a luxurious seventy-two page pamphlet, *The Ultimate World Order*, by Robert H. Williams.

During 1956-57, *The Virginian* (Newport News, Va.) changed from newspaper to magazine format with its September 1957 issue. Other publications of recent origin included: *The Southerner*, published by Asa ("Ace") Carter at Birmingham, Ala.; *The Revere*, published from Hinsdale, Ill., by Guy Allen Mann; *The News Behind the News*, anti-Masonic as well as anti-Semitic, published at Willowdale, Ont., by William Guy Carr; and *Banner of Truth*, bi-monthly publication of the Dallas Klan. *The Banner of Truth* described the advantages of Klan membership in the following terms:

If you are a Klansman, and you feel you want to enlighten other Klansmen on the Jewish menace, you may do so with the full assurance that there will not be a single Jew in the Klavern to impose upon you.

GEORGE KELLMAN

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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Finale to the Ellis Case

The celebrated Hildy McCoy Ellis case finally came to a quiet close on July 10, 1957, when Florida Circuit Court Judge John W. Prunty signed a decree making Hildy the legally-adopted child of Mr. and Mrs. Melvin B. Ellis. Asked in what religious faith the child would be reared, the Ellises told the court that she would choose her religion herself when she was old enough.

PHILIP JACOBSON

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

A MARKED INCREASE of anti-Jewish agitation was noted during the period of this review (December 1, 1957, to November 30, 1958), mainly attributable to sustained exploitation of Southern desegregation tensions by anti-Semites. Other anti-Semitic propaganda themes included attacks upon the United Nations and its agencies as tools of "Jews and Communists"; anti-Israel, anti-Jewish, pro-Arab, and pro-Nasser interpretation of the tensions in the Middle East; attacks upon the income tax, collective bargaining, and public welfare programs, designed to attract the sympathy of ultra-conservatives, and "states' rights," appealing to Southerners. The unifying propaganda line was the "Jewish-Communist-Zionist world conspiracy" theme—in effect, a modernization of the notorious Protocols of the Elders of Zion forgery.

The South

Anti-Semitic agitation in the South increased with desegregation tensions. The bulk of the hatemongers' activity continued to be extensive distribution of flyers, leaflets, and pamphlets. As in previous years, this matter originated for the most part in the North—Union, N. J. (Conde McGinley) and Inglewood, Calif. (Frank L. Britton). It was circulated in a variety of ways: by mail, often to general mailing lists; in bulk, to local "wholesalers"; by hand, at meetings and demonstrations, and by surreptitious placement in public conveyances, in mail-boxes, and under doors. Large quantities of such literature invariably accompanied the visits of hatemongers.

Synagogue Bombings

Five bombings and three attempted bombings of synagogues were perpetrated between November 11, 1957, and October 14, 1958. Seven of the synagogues were in the South and one in the Midwest. None of the cases had been solved at this writing, although five men had been indicted and were awaiting trial. Fortunately, no deaths or injuries resulted. These incidents should be considered against a background of more than 80 bombings in the South since the Supreme Court's May 1954 decision on desegregation.

In Charlotte, N. C., on Monday, November 11, 1957, a bomb constructed

of six dynamite sticks enclosed in a metal container was placed outside Temple Beth-El. It was discovered before it could explode.

In Gastonia, N. C., early Sunday morning, February 9, 1958, police discovered a valise containing 30 sticks of dynamite at an entrance to Temple Emanuel.

In Miami early Sunday morning, March 16, 1958, a bomb explosion caused extensive damage to the school portion of Temple Beth-El. About an hour after the outrage, an anonymous caller phoned a rabbi, informing him of the bombing and warning that other advocates of integration would get similar treatment.

In Nashville, Tenn., in the evening of the same day, the Jewish Community Center's building suffered severe bomb damage, shortly after a meeting had ended and the people had gone home. A rabbi then received a telephone call from "a member of the Confederate Union" taking credit for the explosion, and threatening the Temple and "any other nigger-loving place or person in Nashville" as well. A similar call was received by a reporter.

In Jacksonville, Fla., early Monday morning, April 28, 1958, a bomb exploded outside the Jewish Center, damaging the structure. An hour later, a Negro school was bombed. Almost simultaneously, a reporter received a call from "a member of the Confederate Underground," informing him of the bombings and declaring that "Jews must be driven out of Florida except in Miami Beach . . . the bombings will continue until segregation is restored everywhere in the South."

In Birmingham, Ala., later the same day, a bomb consisting of over 50 sticks of high-power dynamite, enclosed in a valise, was discovered in a window-well of Temple Beth-El. Soaked by an overnight rainfall, it had failed to detonate. Had it done so, it would have leveled the entire structure.

In Atlanta, Ga., early Sunday morning, October 12, 1958, the school section of The Temple, the leading Reform synagogue of the city, was shattered by a bomb explosion. At approximately the same time a reporter received a telephone call from "General Gordon of the Confederate Underground," who told him of the bombing, warned of others to follow, and added: "This is the last empty building I'll blow up." A similar call was later received by the radio station of the Atlanta *Constitution*.

In Peoria, Ill., on October 14, 1958, a crude bomb caused comparatively slight damage to Temple Anshei Emeth, exploding in a stairwell leading to the basement. There had been no desegregation or other intergroup tensions, and the incident was generally thought to be the work of a crank inspired by the Atlanta bombing.

Especially after the Miami and Nashville bombings, these incidents produced shock in the communities in which they occurred and brought forth an outpouring of sympathy and solidarity with the Jewish community by the entire population of each city. Reward campaigns were started and received substantial support. Mayor Hayden Burns of Jacksonville called for a conference of police and other officials of cities in which violence had recently occurred. It was held in Jacksonville on May 5, 1958, and the more than 20 Southern municipalities represented there planned a cooperative effort against such outrages.

Especially after the Atlanta incident, public revulsion assumed nationwide proportions. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, speaking in New York City at cornerstone ceremonies for the Protestant Inter-Church Building, on October 12, 1958, departed from his prepared text to say:

I think we would all share in the feeling of horror that any person would want to desecrate the holy place of any religion, be it a chapel, a cathedral, a mosque, a church, or a synagogue. . . .

The President then revealed that he had requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to render all possible assistance to the Atlanta police in apprehending the criminals.

Standing in the midst of The Temple's ruins, on October 12, Mayor William B. Hartsfield of Atlanta said, among other things:

Every political rabble rouser is the godfather of every sneaking dynamiter and cross-burner in the South today. . . .

He called the bombing "the end result" of demagoguery and urged "the decent people of the South to rise up and put an end to the preachers of hate and chaos."

Within a week, the following suspects were indicted, charged with the bombing of The Temple: Wallace H. Allen, 33, an advertising salesman; George Michael Bright, 35, a draftsman; Kenneth Chester Griffin, 32, an auditor in the Georgia Tax Department (since discharged), and Robert A. Bowling, 25, and Richard Bowling, 26, unemployed brothers, the latter arrested after the others. At this writing, the accused were awaiting trial.

The suspects had been connected with the National States Rights Party or associated fanatical racist groups. It was reported that at least one suspect had given a statement to authorities, and that a search of the premises of one defendant had produced highly revelatory letters and documents as well as large quantities of anti-Semitic literature.

The bombing of the Atlanta Temple led to a large number of newspaper articles and "exposés" of the anti-Semitic movement throughout the country. Though well-intentioned, these tended to give unwise personal publicity to anti-Semitic propagandists and leaders of hate movements, small and large. The publicity also apparently set in motion a series of psychotic imitative acts and threats against a variety of targets, both North and South. The Peoria incident was one example. Others were these: mysterious bomb threats came over the telephone to the Unitarian Church in Arlington, Va., and to St. Patrick's Cathedral on October 16 and the Stephen S. Wise Synagogue in New York City on October 17; a bomb fuse was found between St. Peter's Catholic Church and Trinity Episcopal Church in the downtown section of that city on October 17; on October 15 a hand grenade thrown by a juvenile delinquent exploded against the wall of a meeting place of Jehovah's Witnesses in Boston; threats were telephoned to two Protestant churches and one Catholic church in Miami on November 9. As this was written, it could not be said that the crank incidents had abated.

After the Peoria incident, actual violence was directed against public

schools. The school at Osage, W. Va., a mining community, was all but demolished on November 10 by an expertly set charge; the junior high school of Hobbs, N. M., was damaged by dynamite thrown into a classroom window on November 23; the space in a parking lot reserved for the New Orleans school superintendent was also bombed on November 24, the detonation causing damage to the adjoining medical building of the school system.

Federal officials were considering changes in legislation to curb the distribution of hate literature, but such proposals were complicated by problems involving freedom of speech. Also under consideration were laws restricting the possession, sale, transportation, and use of dynamite and other explosives, and laws conferring Federal jurisdiction over bombings in certain circumstances.

Picketing

On July 27, 1958, members of a newly-formed National Committee to Free America from Jewish Domination (NCFAJD) picketed in three cities—Atlanta, Ga., Louisville, Ky., and Washington, D. C. They carried well-lettered placards bearing messages like "Save Ike from the Kikes," as well as pro-Arab slogans. Scurrilous literature bearing the formerly unknown NCFAJD imprint was simultaneously distributed. In Atlanta two days later, five pickets were convicted of disorderly conduct for demonstrating in front of the premises of the *Atlanta Constitution*. Of these, two were later indicted for the October 12 bombing of the Atlanta Temple, George Michael Bright and Kenneth Chester Griffin. A third, Luther K. Corley, had also figured in the police investigation of the Temple bombing but had been released after intensive questioning. The other two were Billy Ray Branham and Philip L. Wilson. In Louisville, Edna Cowan and Bessie T. Morris were arrested for distributing similar literature without a license on behalf of the NCFAJD in front of the Louisville *Courier* building, while five youths demonstrated by carrying placards similar to those displayed at Atlanta. In Washington, eight demonstrators outside the White House bore the same type of hate-inciting signs. They attracted little notice and were not arrested.

A by-product of police and FBI investigation of the Atlanta Temple bombing was the identification of the leader of the NCFAJD and his backer. References to a "fat cat" in the papers of one of the suspects led the investigation to George Lincoln Rockwell, of Arlington, Va., printer and publisher of NCFAJD material as well as producer of items for followers of John Kasper (see *AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK*, 1958 [Vol. 59], pp. 108–109) and to Harold Noel Arrowsmith, Jr., of Baltimore, Md., the son of a late, respected clergyman. While denying any connection with bombings or similar violence, Rockwell said that he was attempting to organize a World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists to determine whether "Jews are born that way, in which case they would have to be sterilized, or something. . . ." Arrowsmith, a doctrinaire Nordic supremacist, had apparently spent more than \$20,000 to buy the house from which Rockwell operated and printing equipment. He was also said to have admitted providing funds for the picketers. He denied any connection with the bombing of the Temple.

Politics

Hatemongers' use of political campaigns as a vehicle for their propaganda was much in evidence. Thus Rear Admiral John G. Crommelin (ret.) entered the Alabama gubernatorial primaries in the spring of 1958 and ran on an outright anti-Semitic platform. In more than 140 stump speeches, and in 15 television appearances, he stressed the "Communist-Jewish" theme in railing against desegregation and distributed great quantities of anti-Semitic literature, including a special edition of Conde McGinley's *Common Sense*. On primary day (May 6) Crommelin received 2,245 votes out of 618,000, but he later told his followers that he had achieved "the major objective . . . to expose the origin, nature, and aims of the Communist-Jewish conspiracy." By his own statement he had received \$9,000 in contributions. At the close of the period he was at work on plans to form a permanent political organization.

In the same primaries Asa ("Ace") Carter, the anti-Semitic leader of a White Citizens Council, received 31,000 votes out of 435,000 for lieutenant-governor.

The National States Rights Party (NSRP), a confederation of Northern and Southern racist, anti-Semitic extremists, was formed in May 1958. The first issue of its publication, *The Thunderbolt*, bore the Hitler youth insignia. Incorporating the United White party, the operational front of Chicago activist Matt Koehl, NSRP claimed units or contact points in Minneapolis, Minn., Portland, Ore., New York, N. Y., Hinsdale, Ill., Knoxville, Tenn., Greenville, S. C., and Atlanta, Ga. The tone of its convention in Louisville (August 30-31, 1958) was set by the anti-Jewish and anti-Negro rantings of Frederick John Kasper and by calls for a "draft" of Admiral Crommelin for President in 1960. Prominent at this convention were Edward R. Fields of the Christian Anti-Jewish party; Millard Grubbs of the Kentucky White Citizens Council; Dan Kurts, self-styled head of the Christian Front of Queens County, N. Y.; Bill Hendrix, a Ku Klux Klan leader, and John W. Hamilton, head of the National Citizens Protective Association. One active NSRP organizer, F. Allen Mann, of Hinsdale, Ill., publisher of *The Revere*, achieved notoriety in the spring of 1958 by putting out a leaflet with the caption, "Communism and Race Mixing are Jewish" and depicting a man hanging from a gibbet, over a heading of "Death to the Traitors!"

CHRISTIAN NATIONALIST CRUSADE

The Christian Nationalist party (alternately known as the Christian National Crusade—CNC), Gerald L. K. Smith's enterprise, reported in November from its headquarters in Glendale, Calif. to the clerk of the House of Representatives that its gross receipts for the first ten months of 1958 were approximately \$115,000. Smith featured desegregation tensions together with attacks on prominent American Jews and endless reiteration of the contents of the Protocols. Smith's advertisements, widely mailed, did not merely solicit subscriptions to his leaflets and pamphlets, but were in themselves complete anti-Semitic broadsides. Some of these ads and appeals tended to deemphasize Smith's name in favor of that of the CNC.

WHITE CITIZENS COUNCILS

Consisting mainly of self-governing local units, the WCC's as a movement maintained the same estimated numerical strength as a year earlier—between 300,000 and 500,000. Councils continued to vary with geography, affiliation, leadership, and—most importantly—the imminence of the execution of a desegregation plan. While some units strove to avoid anti-Semitism and to adhere to their avowed objective of preserving segregation “by all legal means,” other units tolerated, if they did not openly support or encourage, the distribution of hate literature by their members. The Citizens Councils of America, in Greenwood, Miss., strove to coordinate state-wide movements along non-anti-Semitic and legal lines. Its secretary, Robert B. Patterson, however, noted on February 12, 1958, that “anti-Semitic literature is now being distributed by the ton throughout the South as well as throughout the nation,” though he did not put the responsibility on segregationists.

On the other hand, the decision of the United States Court of Appeals in the Little Rock case on August 18, 1958 (see p. 23) referred to the appearance in that city of the Rev. J. A. Lovell, a Dallas rabble rouser, at the height of tensions in the fall of 1957. An ardent Gerald L. K. Smith disciple, Lovell then addressed the Capital Citizens' Council on the topic, “Must America Sell Her Birthright to Appease the Zionists and Internationalists?”, which was reprinted in the November 1957 issue of his magazine, *Kingdom Digest*. During the spring of 1958, the Seaboard White Citizens' Councils published a pamphlet, “Segregation or Death,” in tribute to their leader John Kasper, then in prison, which contained unbridled railing against the members of the Supreme Court, other Federal judges, Jews, and liberals.

But publications of this kind were not usually produced by WCC's. Typically, the vast bulk of such hate literature as was distributed had to be imported from the North, the Midwest and the West.

THE KU KLUX KLAN

Beset by schisms and public revulsion against violence, the KKK registered no progress. Many members took cover by shifting to racist groups bearing other titles. Grand Dragon Bill Hendrix of the Florida Klans reorganized the long-dormant Knights of the White Camellia in its stead.

The U. S. Klans, headed by Imperial Wizard Eldon L. Edwards of Atlanta, Ga., continued to be the largest single aggregation of Klans. At an Ellenton, Fla., Klan rally on September 7, 1958, he took care to make disclaimers of terror and violence in the course of his anti-Semitic, anti-Negro vituperation. Klan prestige was severely injured at Maxton, N. C., on January 18, 1958, when state Klan leader James W. Cole's open-air demonstration against the Lumbee Indians of the area was put to rout by their shotguns and war-whoops. Cole was later convicted of inciting to riot and given a jail sentence of 18 to 24 months, which he appealed. But the Maxton debacle did not deter Cole from attending the so-called Ultimatum Conference of Loyal Americans at Louisville, Ky., on February 1, 1958, where he shared prominent billing with

Admiral Crommelin and Millard D. Grubbs, Kentucky White Citizens Council leader.

A less farcical phase of Klan activity was evidenced by the sentencing of three Klansmen on March 20, 1958, for attempting to bomb a Negro school in Charlotte, N. C., shortly after the February 9 attempted bombing of the Gastonia synagogue. Grand Wizard Francis Caldwell received a sentence of five to ten years, while Arthur M. Brown, Jr., and William O. Spencer received two to five years; all of the convictions were appealed. From Waco, Texas, Horace Sherman Miller continued his one-man Klan operation, putting out editions of photo-offset Klan literature in quantities indicating financial support.

These screeds continued to have international effects. On May 23, 1958, Franz Heinz, self-styled Grand Dragon of Chile, and several of his followers were apprehended in Santiago. Affiliated with Miller's Aryan Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Waco, they were reported to have confessed to acts of terrorism against Chilean Jews and their property. Swastika and KKK flags were found in their possession.

JOHN KASPER

Kasper's rabble-rousing activities were curtailed during most of the year because of his incarceration in the Tallahassee Federal Correctional Institute, where he was serving out a one-year sentence for contempt of court, arising out of his activities in connection with the desegregation disorders at Clinton, Tenn., in 1956. Though he was to be released on August 9, 1958, Federal authorities quietly transferred him to Atlanta Penitentiary, where he was released on August 1. This move successfully defeated plans for a "welcome out" demonstration by Kasperites. He still preached a rabid racism, but Kasper's personal appearances seemed to have lost their old effectiveness. On September 2, 1958, he addressed meetings at Charlotte, Monroe, and Greensboro, N. C. He was severely heckled in Charlotte, his speech was drowned out by power saws in Monroe, and in Greensboro, his attacks on evangelist Billy Graham as "a tool of New York Communist Jews" caused most of an audience of 150 to leave. A meeting at Chattanooga, Tenn., on October 28, 1958, produced a small attendance and none of the public clamor he desired.

Kasper was convicted on November 8, 1958, of inciting to riot in connection with the disorders at Nashville, Tenn., during the school-desegregation crisis in September 1957. Sentenced to a six-month workhouse term and fined \$500, he posted a cash bond to remain at large pending appeal. During the trial, the district attorney had described the New Jersey-born and New York-raised Kasper as a budding "Hitler . . . who came here to feather his own nest." Admiral Crommelin, called as a character witness for Kasper, sat at the defendant's side during the trial and called him "an intellectual Robin Hood."

Other Persons and Groups

Joseph P. Kamp, through his Constitutional Educational League, continued a highly active pamphleteering enterprise aimed at the South. Two of his

pamphlets were consolidated into one, with the title of *The Lowdown on Little Rock and the Plot to Sovietize the South*. His literature was widely purchased and used in ultra-conservative and segregationist circles. In September 1958 Kamp literature was revealed to have been intruded into California's gubernatorial campaign, with a wide distribution of his anti-labor pamphlet, *Meet the Man Who Plans to Rule America*. The national chairmen of both major parties, as well as the candidates themselves, publicly rejected Kamp and his literature.

Merwin K. Hart, who since the 1930's had dominated the ultra-conservative National Economic Council, displayed his inveterate bias in many issues of his semi-monthly *Economic Council Letter*. Its issue of March 15, 1958, bore the heading "The Jews In Our Midst," and contained a variety of canards, including the allegation that "left-wing Jews, working in close conjunction with communists, are largely responsible for the so-called integration decision of the Supreme Court of May 17, 1954." The issue was reprinted as the lead article of the April 15, 1958, issue of Conde McGinley's *Common Sense*. In August Hart teamed up with Edward A. Rumely, head of the Committee for Constitutional Government, in a rare fund-raising collaboration to further a Platform for Patriotic Americans. The Platform, though not anti-Semitic, included among its approximately 100 endorsers the name of Lt. Gen. Pedro A. del Valle (USMC, ret.).

Defenders of the American Constitution, an ultra-conservative, anti-UN group in Washington, D. C., headed by General del Valle, appeared to worsen in its propaganda tone during the period under review. The September 1958 issue of its publication *Task Force*, stressed "international banker" and "Synagogue of Satan" themes and recommended or quoted the works of anti-Semites.

Comings and Goings

The excommunicated priest Leonard J. Feeney, whose bigoted meetings on Boston Common had plagued that city for eight years, retired from the scene of his weekly rabble-rousing attacks in February 1958, taking his 60 "disciples" with him to Still River, near Ayer, Mass. His monthly hate sheet, *The Point*, continued to be published from the new location.

Robert H. Williams (Santa Ana, Calif.) wound up his newsletter, *Williams Intelligence Summary*, with its March 1958 issue. He urged his readers to "keep fighting" and promised to return "in some way which may seem most likely to be effective."

John W. Hamilton, guiding spirit of the racist National Citizens Protective Association (St. Louis, Mo.), and one-time editor of *The White Sentinel*, was acquitted on May 27, 1958, of a morals charge involving a 15-year-old boy, after a retrial. A conviction after his first trial had been reversed on appeal. After his acquittal Hamilton resumed activity.

Ezra Pound, the anti-Semitic poet and mentor of rabble rouser John Kasper, was released for compassionate reasons from St. Elizabeth's Hospital in April 1958. Soon after he left for Italy, from where he had made anti-American broadcasts during World War II. Some of the most eminent men of letters in America, who did not sympathize with his political and racist views, had

argued that the United States would be showing greatness and generosity in releasing an old man, who despite his bigotry had greatly contributed to English literature. To clear the way for his discharge an indictment for treason against him had been dismissed. In a press interview in Naples on July 9, Pound told reporters that "all America is an insane asylum."

Pro-Arab Propaganda

Direct Arab propaganda largely confined itself to exploitation of the miseries of the Arab refugees and insinuations of "dual loyalty" against American Jews. American hatemongers lumped "Jews, Zionists, and Communists" as the cause of Middle East crises both current and past, ignoring the flirtations with Moscow of Nasser and other Arab leaders.

Particularly active in circulating Arab propaganda publications besides his own vitriolically pro-Arab *National Renaissance Bulletin* was James A. Madole, leader of the neo-Nazi group in the Yorkville section of New York City.

The Anti-Semitic Press

The combined circulation of the anti-Semitic press apparently rose somewhat, with Conde McGinley, Frank L. Britton, and Gerald L. K. Smith leading in quantity, areas of the country reached, and variety of methods of distribution. The November 1, 1957, issue of *Common Sense* listed John G. Crommelin, Montgomery, Ala., as a stockholder of the publisher, the Christian Educational Association.

Lyril Van Hyning and Elizabeth Dilling, both of Chicago, appeared to step up their activities, especially the former. *The Virginian*, published and edited by Lacey Jeffreys and William Stephenson, respectively, at Newport News, Va., combined religious bigotry with ultra-conservatism and high-flown dissertations on "race." Another Southern anti-Semitic publication was *The Georgia Tribune*, put out at Columbus, Ga., by Klan-supporter "Parson Jack" Johnston.

Among the anti-Semitic publications attacking FBI Chief J. Edgar Hoover's book *Masters of Deceit* (New York, 1958) for praising major Jewish organizations for their fight against Communism were *Common Sense*, *National Renaissance Bulletin*, and *The Revere*.

New York industrialist Russell Maguire's *American Mercury* continued its decline in tone. Its July 1958 issue, for example, contained the following:

If bombs are dropped on the U. S., over 90 per cent of our casualties will be from broken glass and splinters. Disregarding these facts all new buildings (except synagogues) continue to be built with enormous quantities of glass.

Included in the same issue were "fillers" about "international bankers" and quotations from the Rev. Charles E. Coughlin and Lawrence Dennis.

GEORGE KELLMAN

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

CONCENTRATING especially on the publication and dissemination of leaflets, pamphlets, and periodicals, antisemitic propagandists and agitators maintained their operations at approximately the same level as that of the period previously reported (December 1, 1957, to November 30, 1958; AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 44-62). But in contrast, the year from December 1, 1958, to November 30, 1959, was notable for an abatement of violence involving destruction of property, jeopardy to life, and widespread fear, particularly in the South.

Though in the tradition of timeworn canards about "Jewish plots to rule the nation and the world," the themes exploited by agitators generally appeared in modern versions. Agitators variously portrayed Jews as conspiring with Communists to enslave the world, or to subvert and betray the United States; the United Nations was depicted as a sinister device for the attainment of such ends. Often these slanders were varied by depicting Soviet Russia and the Communists as mere tools and dupes of Jewish masters. Tensions over the desegregation of public schools in the South were exploited by charges that "the Jews and Communists" were striving to "mongrelize" the population as part of their plans to control the nation. Pro-Arab diatribes continued to be frequent, usually attacking Israel as the seat of "Jewish and Communist world power."

To attract the support of unwary ultraconservatives, hatemongers urged repeal of the income-tax amendment and abolition of welfare legislation. Assaults on projects to fluoridate drinking water and on proposals for legislation relating to mental health exploited the fears of those concerned with health problems.

During the period under review there was a tendency to revive and promote the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, "Talmud exposés," spurious reports of sinister conclaves of rabbis, forged letters of famous men of the past, and similar libels.

The South

The most effective propaganda tactics continued to be the exploitation of southern tensions over desegregation—an activity which kept pace with the region's mounting troubles with this problem ever since the Supreme Court's decisions of 1954 and 1955 against segregation in the public schools. The volume of hate literature continued to be large, especially in areas where desegregation moves were imminent. This literature was mainly produced in other parts of the country and exported to the South by mail and other means, where it was circulated by local distributors (who received bulk shipments), and by white-supremacy extremists, including the Ku Klux Klan and elements within the Citizens Council movement. General mailing lists were frequently used, though distribution by hand at meetings and demonstrations and surreptitious placement in public areas was also common. As in previous

years, the screeds of Frank L. Britton (Inglewood, Calif.), Conde McGinley (Union, N. J.) and Gerald L. K. Smith (Glendale, Calif.) were most prominent.

Aftermath of the Synagogue Bombings

The shock and community-wide fears generated by the five bombings and three attempted bombings of Jewish religious institutions between November 11, 1957, and October 12, 1958 (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 44-47) died down by the early part of 1959. Though there were some reports of threats to Jewish persons and institutions during the period under review, no bombings ensued, nor was there the sort of nationwide flood of threats, warnings, and vicious hoaxes which had plagued communities during the preceding year, particularly after the bombing of The Temple in Atlanta on October 12, 1958. There was growing public recognition of the serious threat to law and order in general, as well as to the sanctity of houses of worship. On the day of the Atlanta bombing, President Eisenhower expressed his revulsion and informed the nation that he had requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to render all possible assistance to the Atlanta police.

BRIGHT TRIALS

Law-enforcement authorities, a week after the Atlanta bombing, arrested George Michael Bright, Kenneth Chester Griffin, Wallace H. Allen, and Richard and Robert Bowling, all connected with the National States Rights party (NSRP) and associated fanatical racist groups. All were indicted on October 17, 1958. However, at the time of writing only one—Bright—had been brought to trial. The indictment against Robert Bowling was dismissed.

Bright's first trial ended in a hung jury on December 10, 1958, the reported vote having stood at 9 to 3 for conviction after three days of deliberation. Reindicted two weeks after the mistrial, Bright was again tried on the same charges, the prosecution foregoing insistence on the death penalty in the event of conviction. After brief deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of acquittal on January 23, 1959.

Principal witnesses for the prosecution at both trials were L. E. Rogers, an undercover worker for the FBI, and James DeVore, who had been in jail with Bright while he was awaiting his first trial. Rogers testified that he had attended small, intimate meetings of the NSRP in Atlanta, and described their discussions. DeVore testified that while in jail with Bright the latter had confided to him that he had acted as a lookout when the bomb was being placed. Bright denied this.

At the second trial the defense contended that Bright had spent the entire night of the bombing with a woman in her apartment. The woman corroborated this, stating that she and Bright had a mutual interest in watching for satellites.

At the trials the defense produced such character witnesses as Eldon L. Edwards, Imperial Wizard of the U.S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, and Arthur Cole, Matt Koehl, and Edward Fields, of Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Kentucky respectively, all leaders of the NSRP. Some witnesses used the

stand as a rostrum for speeches on "the Jewish conspiracy." In the first trial Bright, availing himself of the Georgia law which allows a defendant to make an unsworn statement, delivered a long racist tirade. At the second trial, however, he briefly stated that he did not hate the Jews or any other group.

At the time of writing it was doubtful that the defendants still under indictment would be brought to trial.

National States Rights Party

NSRP stepped up its propaganda activities and its attempts to become a clearinghouse of information for hatemongers. Edna Cowan, vice-chairman, of Jeffersonville, Ind., dubbed the defendants "The Atlanta Five," and in the March-April issue of NSRP's publication, *The Thunderbolt*, wrote that "the Atlanta case was a triumph of concerted effort by the NSRP, together with allied patriotic groups."

NSRP continued its efforts (begun during the summer of 1958) to promote "a grass-roots draft" of Rear Admiral John G. Crommelin (USN, ret.) for president on a third-party ticket in 1960. Its national committee met at Knoxville, Tenn., on April 11 to plan a "political offensive." NSRP boasted that it had already made headway with several small right-wing groups in support of the draft. Another feature of the NSRP line was an attack on the FBI and J. Edgar Hoover. By October, *The Thunderbolt*, bearing an emblem similar to that of the Hitler youth insignia, had improved its printing and format and had launched an "Equipment Fund Appeal" to convert the paper into a semimonthly and increase its circulation.

Ku Klux Klan

Though still divided into vying groups, the Klan gave signs of undiminished activity. There were public demonstrations, such as the rally on June 6, 1959, at Plant City, Fla., which included a free chicken dinner attended by 1,500; the rally at Stone Mountain, outside of Atlanta, Ga., on September 26, 1959, attended by approximately the same number, and the Klan parade of some 40 carloads of members outside of Birmingham on July 29, culminating in the burning of crosses in front of the church of a white congregation and two homes. In Alabama the Klan set up welcome signs alongside those of service and civic groups on Federal and state highways at the approaches to Montgomery, Birmingham, Tuscaloosa, Selma, Sylacauga, Gadsden, Bessemer, Prattville, Monroeville, and Heflin. When torn down, they were usually quickly replaced. In September 1959 crosses were burned in front of eleven of Birmingham's white schools, apparently to frighten Negroes away.

In June 1959 J. B. Stoner of Atlanta, long-time operator in the Christian Anti-Jewish party, and formerly a kleagle in Chattanooga, Tenn., came to Louisville and started the Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Stoner declared that membership in his Klan was open to Catholics. At the close of the period under review, he had made little progress and had all but abandoned his scheme.

The Arkansas Ku Klux Klan, started by A. C. Hightower, a Little Rock

barber, was also chartered in June. But its authority was quickly challenged by R. E. Davis of Dallas, Texas, who claimed jurisdiction over the region. Grand Dragon Hightower announced that his klan would "practice cross-burning," but when trouble began brewing in Little Rock over desegregation, he quickly resigned, on August 11, explaining that he did not want to be held legally responsible for the acts of klansmen over whom he had no control. J. R. English, an elderly accountant, became the group's legal resident agent, though denying that he himself was a member.

The largest group in the movement remained Eldon L. Edwards' U.S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, with headquarters at Atlanta, Ga. The smallest was the Aryan Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the one-man operation of Horace Sherman Miller of Waco, Texas, who made up for lack of membership by the abundance and variety of photo-offset antisemitic and anti-Catholic leaflets published under his organizational imprint and circulated throughout the nation and abroad.

White Citizens Councils

Composed of autonomous local groups (generally calling themselves Citizens Councils), the WCCs continued to be active, though actual membership and participation appeared to rise and fall in response to the imminence of desegregation moves in any given area. Estimates of the total membership in the movement ranged between 300,000 and 500,000. As in previous years, individual units might be well within the bounds of respectability, or else they might be outright lunatic-fringe groups. The latter type capitalized on the distribution of antisemitic literature.

In October 1959 the antisemitic and pro-Klan *Georgia Tribune*, edited and published by "Parson Jack" Johnston at Columbus, Ga., announced that the Citizens Councils of Georgia was being formed, and that Johnston had been designated as its executive director. It was claimed that one unit had been formed at Atlanta, and that the organization's initial goal was a council in each of the state's ten congressional districts.

The fanatic Seaboard White Citizens Council continued to be active in the Washington, D.C., and northern Virginia area, despite the absence of its leader, Frederick John Kasper, who, on July 23, 1959, began serving a six-month sentence on a conviction arising out of the Clinton, Tenn., desegregation disturbances in 1956. This was the second sentence he served in this connection. After his scheduled release in December, another six-month sentence awaited him because of his part in the disorders during the 1957 school-desegregation crisis at Nashville, Tenn.

In September J. B. Stoner, failing to attract support in Louisville, Ky., for his new klan project, joined forces with Florida White Citizens Council leader Fred B. Hockett in an unsuccessful endeavor to mobilize opposition to the desegregation of the Orchard Villa school in Miami.

Little Rock

While the demonstration against the reintegration of Little Rock's Central high school on August 12, 1959, was quelled by effective police action, per-

sisting tensions were marked by three bombings within an hour on September 7 (see p. 17). Bombs blasted the school board's offices, the mayor's private business office, and the fire chief's car. Five men were arrested on September 10, charged with destroying public property with explosives. Among them was E. A. Lauderdale, Sr., a segregationist leader, who on November 28 was convicted after trial, the jury recommending a three-year jail term. Another defendant, J. D. Sims, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years; still another, Jesse Raymond Perry, was convicted on October 28, receiving a three-year sentence.

Antisemitic literature appeared during the tensions, and prominent among the items was "A Message to Little Rock" by Frank L. Britton, appealing to the people to "defeat this Jewish plot to mongrelize your schools."

John G. Crommelin

Running for mayor of Montgomery in the Alabama Democratic primaries against two other opponents on March 16, John G. Crommelin, an active antisemitic propagandist and distributor of the products of other hate-mongers, polled 1,760 votes out of a total of 17,330. His platform was found to have been mailed to localities in other states. Toward the beginning of this document was the following clause:

Whereas, the key to segregation of the races and the ultimate survival of the Christian White Race is a thorough understanding by White Christian voters of the Communist-Jewish conspiracy. . . .

In the 1958 gubernatorial primaries Crommelin had run twelfth among 14 candidates, with 2,200 out of 618,000 votes, less than half of one per cent of the state-wide total. A year later, in the 1959 mayoralty primaries, he got ten per cent of the vote.

Crommelin's name was listed as a stockholder of the Christian Educational Association of Union, N. J., which publishes Conde McGinley's rabidly antisemitic *Common Sense*, in that publication's sworn statement of ownership in its issue of October 1. A similar listing of Crommelin had appeared in the issue of November 1, 1957.

George Lincoln Rockwell

George Lincoln Rockwell conducted his Nazi-style propaganda operations at Arlington, Va., under the name of World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS). For this activity he used the house and press purchased for him in 1958 by wealthy Nordic supremacist Harold Noel Arrowsmith, Jr., of Baltimore, Md. (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], p. 47). As commander of WUFENS, Rockwell published a swastika-emblazoned program which declared that "Adolph Hitler was the gift of an inscrutable Providence to a world on the brink of a Jewish-Bolshevik catastrophe." Other points included proposals to establish "an International Jewish Control Authority" and the trial and execution of "all Jews proved to have taken part in Marxist or Zionist plots of treason. . . ." Meetings of small groups of uniformed

youth were frequently held at WUFENS headquarters, causing community friction. In April a display of Nazi symbols, visible from the outside of his house, attracted a demonstration of protest by the neighborhood's youths. Rockwell's aims in promoting his blatant variety of Nazism were described as follows during the summer in a fund-raising appeal bearing the name of Floyd Fleming:

Commander Rockwell said. . . . "We'll aggravate them so bad . . . that they will lose their tempers as Jews always do in their arrogance and go too far in attacking us. We'll attack them! But we will do it legally and peacefully but so arrogantly that they will have to notice us and print something about us in their giant propaganda machinery. . . ."

Neo-Nazi Youth Activities

Indications of a trend on the part of some maladjusted teenagers to violent, Hitlerite expression appeared in widely separated parts of the country.

In April a group of high-school boys was found to be operating as a "Nazi Regime of America" in a suburb of Paterson, N. J. In May four Cleveland high-school students, members of a secret group, "Fourth Reich," were arrested. In June leaders of a "Nazism Club" in Visalia, Calif., were apprehended. Discovery of these groups—between whom no relationship was established—came in New Jersey as the result of investigation of a threatening letter; in Ohio because of crank calls and malicious mischief; and in California because of the theft of Nazi war mementoes from a private collection. In each of these situations the members used Nazi titles, slogans, insignia, and equipment. Some of them were reported to be highly intelligent. Virtually all of the leaders and activists were disciplined by the courts as juvenile delinquents. In all cases prompt action was taken by local school, county, and municipal law-enforcement authorities, who also received FBI cooperation.

In August, 18-year-old Richard V. Smith, Jr., living away from home and described by police as "an avid follower of the Nazi doctrines of Adolph Hitler," confessed to having set fire to a private art museum in Columbus, Ga., and to having painted swastikas on two synagogues in that city. He was sentenced to six to ten years for arson.

In October a "Nazi storm troop" of high-school youths at Alexandria, Va., was uncovered when police investigated the fire-bombing and antisemitic defacement of the home of that city's vice mayor and his wife, a juvenile-court judge, both non-Jews. Three boys, 14, 17, and 18 years old, were arrested. The youngest pleaded guilty to arson charges on October 14, while the other two, at the time of writing, were awaiting grand-jury action.

Pro-Arab Propaganda

Anti-Jewish activists maintained a volume of pro-Arab propaganda comparable to that of the preceding period, equating Communism with Zionism and in that context leveling conspiracy charges against American Jews and

Jewish groups. Fund-raising appeals for Israel were characterized as sinister; dual-loyalty charges were frequent, as were depictions of alleged Jewish cruelty toward the Arabs. A lead article in the January 15 issue of Conde McGinley's openly antisemitic *Common Sense* was ascribed to "Sami Hadawi, Assistant Director, The Palestine Refugee Office."

Economic and Social Issues

Mingling his bigotry with ultraconservative themes, Merwin K. Hart, president of the National Economic Council, in the March 15 issue of his *Economic Council Letter* "answered" columnist Joseph Alsop's denunciation of the Protocols as a forgery, stating:

One would suppose that the important thing about the Protocols is not their possible lack of authenticity, but rather whether they are a prophecy as to something that is now being fulfilled. And most informed Americans would consider them a very accurate prophecy indeed.

Another of Hart's targets was the authenticity of *The Diary of Anne Frank* (issue of April 15).

The National Planning Conference, at its convention in Minneapolis on May 13, warned that organized hatemongers were playing on fears of Communism, integration and "one-world government" in efforts to defeat plans for consolidating obsolete governmental units into unified metropolitan systems. Cited by the NPC as furthering the campaign were, among others, Frederick John Kasper and Don Bell, an antisemitic publicist of Palm Beach, Fla. The latter's pamphlet, *Terrible 1313*, published in early 1959, contained reprints of issues of Upton Close's newsletter *Closer Up*, attacking the consolidation plans as a conspiracy of international bankers.

Periodicals

Hate literature was actively and widely published and distributed, to approximately the same extent as during the preceding period. That the quality of paper and printing in most instances was good and that such publications as *The Thunderbolt* and Elizabeth Dilling's *Bulletin* showed improvement indicated increased support. Leaders in volume and circulation continued to be Britton's slick-paper, multicolored *American Nationalist* and cheaply produced one-sheet leaflets, which were most in evidence in the South; Conde McGinley's *Common Sense* (Union, N.J.), which again (January 15) evoked the New Jersey Assembly's "abhorrence" of the publication and its editor, "who disseminate their scandalous and scurrilous literature throughout the country from this State, thereby bringing discredit to our great State"; and Gerald L. K. Smith's *Cross and the Flag*, as well as his advertising circulars, which were in themselves antisemitic sheets. Smith and McGinley advertised the largest stock of antisemitic items. The latter's list, headed "Patriotic Books and Literature" included the Protocols, Robert H. Williams' *Know Your Enemy*, John O. Beaty's *Iron Curtain Over America*, George W. Armstrong's *Third Zionist War*, Elizabeth Dilling's *Plot Against Christianity*, and

Key to Freedom, a large broadside published by McGinley. Also featured was Louis Marschalko's book, *The World Conquerors* (London, 1958), which, translated from Hungarian, is a compendium of antisemitic canards from ancient times to the present. Another book advertised by McGinley was *Beasts of the Apocalypse*, by Olivia Marie O'Grady (Benicia, Calif., 1959).

Representative items not previously mentioned in this review included Lyril Van Hyning's *Women's Voice* (Chicago), a monthly written in a frantic tone, reiterating the more virulent antisemitic canards and quotations; *The Revere* (Hinsdale, Ill.), published by F. Allen Mann under the name of Christian Patriots Crusade, which often attacked the FBI; *The Point* (Still River, Mass.), well written by Leonard E. Feeney, excommunicated priest, whose followers held hate meetings on Boston Common for over five years until he and they removed to their new location in February 1958, and *The Kingdom Digest* (Rev. J. A. Lovell, Dallas), an "interpretation" of the Scriptures in antisemitic terms which also held that the Anglo-Saxons are the true Israelites. *The Truth Seeker* (New York), originally an old-line freethought monthly, in December headlined the feature article by its editor, Charles Smith, "Jew-led Levelers Plan to Suppress Racial Truth."

New York industrialist Russell Maguire continued to fill his monthly magazine, the *American Mercury*, with a heavy dosage of antisemitism, supplemented by thousands of reprints of such articles. The lead article of the September issue, "The World-wide Betrayal," was described as "A Chronology of the Zionist Master Plan for World Domination," and contained summaries of many vicious canards. A regular feature of the magazine, "Do You Know?" frequently contained lines such as these:

Soviet Russia and South Africa, the world's two greatest gold-producing countries, are controlled by the Zionists [August].

The well-organized and highly financed forces of world-wide Zionism could have destroyed Communism at any time during the last 20 years. They are militant against the Nazis, but soft against Communists [September].

GEORGE KELLMAN

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

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The American Civil Liberties Union protested against the erection of a privately financed, nonsectarian chapel on the southern rim of the Grand Canyon. In a letter to Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton, the union maintained that the government might not allocate public lands even for a nonsectarian chapel, the First Amendment prohibiting government aid to religious enterprises (September 1959).

In December 1959 an elaborate crèche was erected in the lobby of Chicago's city hall. Rejecting protests against the annual display, Mayor Richard J. Daley held that it was appropriate because "we are a Christian nation." G. George Fox, rabbi emeritus of the South Shore Temple, differed with the mayor. "The United States is not a Christian nation," he said, "except in the sense of numbers, and it has never been pronounced as such by the United States Supreme Court" (*Chicago Daily News*, October 28, 1959).

PHILIP JACOBSON

ANTI-JEWISH AGITATION

ANTISEMITIC activities during the period under review—December 1, 1959, to November 30, 1960—were notable for widely publicized agitation, threats, and even violence. Antisemitic literature continued to be produced and distributed in undiminished volume.

The period was further distinguished by a revival of outright Nazism and Nazi concepts on the domestic as well as the international scene, and by the inroads of petty *fuehrers* and their followers into the general public notice and concern. This activity was accentuated with the Israeli apprehension of the Nazi murderer Adolf Eichmann (see pp. 199-208), whom they portrayed as a martyr to Jewish "vengeance."

Another salient feature of the period was the exploitation of the presidential campaigns. Besides spreading anti-Catholic propaganda (see pp. 111-127) some hatemongers attacked the Jews as a sinister force in national affairs.

The mainstay of the agitators continued to be the printed word—periodicals, pamphlets, flyers, and leaflets—openly or surreptitiously circulated. Chief among the producers of these were Conde McGinley, who published the semi-monthly *Common Sense*, from Union, N.J.; Gerald L. K. Smith and Frank L. Britton (both of California), publishers, respectively, of the monthly *Cross* and *The Flag* and *American Nationalist*, and Russell Maguire, whose *American Mercury* carried articles of general interest mingled with bigoted matter. Other representative hatesheets were put out by Elizabeth Dilling (*Bulletin*, Chicago); neo-Nazi leader James H. Madole (*National Renaissance Bulletin*, New York), and Ed Fields (*The Thunderbolt*, Birmingham, Ala.). Augmenting this type of literature were sporadic leaflets and pamphlets by Klan and other extremist pro-segregation and pro-Nazi groups and individuals.

The principal anti-Jewish theme continued to be the "Jewish-Communist-Zionist conspiracy" to subvert the nation and enslave the world. A more

specific canard was the allegation that the Jews, through domination of government and the press, were scheming to "mongrelize the South." This appealed to pro-segregation extremists. Other canards, as in the past, were alleged Jewish control of the UN; Zionism as a conspiracy for war, and Jewish exploitation of welfare laws and programs, including mental health and water fluoridation, for conspiratorial ends.

Swastikas and Bombs

The Christmas-eve (1959) desecration of the Cologne synagogue in West Germany by two neo-Nazis, who daubed its walls with swastikas, touched off a worldwide wave of Nazi-style vandalism (see p. 209 for representative incidents) through February 1960.

Swastika acts continued, though with diminished frequency, after February. Temple Emanu-El in Utica, N.Y., was defaced by three teenagers on April 2. On June 21 a house in Absecon, N.J., was smeared with swastikas and the message, "We want no Jews. If you don't move—liquidation." On August 6, a 15-foot swastika and some obscenities were carved into the greens of a public golf course in New York. On September 22 vandals defaced the walls of one apartment house in New York with swastikas and paint-sprayed swastikas on 50 automobiles in the garage of another.

Even more disturbing were the bombings of two synagogues and the uncovering of neo-Nazi youth groups in addition to those previously reported (AJYB, 1960 [Vol. 61], p. 46).

On January 28 a bomb exploded at Temple Kehillath Israel, Kansas City, Mo., resulting in extensive damage but no loss of life or limb. On January 31 a crudely made bomb shattered the glass of the sanctuary of Temple Beth El, Springfield, Mass. In Kansas City the detonation came shortly after police had rounded up for questioning members of a so-called Nazi club, operating in the high schools of that city in two sections, the Reich Nordic Youth club and the National Socialist Workers party. Two of the youths admitted having previously defaced the temple with swastikas, though no connection was established between the group and the bombing. In the Springfield instance, three boys, 15 to 16 years old, were apprehended. At first they said they were part of a Nazi group, but later retracted the statement.

Two 15-year-olds, apprehended for having defaced a high school, a Catholic church, and a Baptist cemetery near Levittown, N.Y., were found to be members of a group bearing the hybrid name "Naz-Comms." Among other groups uncovered as the result of enquiry by authorities into acts of vandalism were the National Socialist German Sympathizers, consisting of boys 12 to 14 years old, involved in swastika daubings in Detroit, Mich., during January, and the SS Elite club of Yonkers, N.Y., which came to light in March with the apprehension of nine of its members, ages 13 and 14, for a series of swastika defacements during the first three months of the year.

A maladjusted 17-year-old, Hubert Sherril Jackson, Jr. (also known as Jerry Hunt), who had unsuccessfully striven to organize a Nazi youth group in Gadsden, Ala., and who customarily wore a swastika armband, on March 25 threw a fire bomb at Temple Beth El in that city during dedication services,

then shot two members who had come out to investigate the trouble, wounding one of them critically. (Both victims later recovered.) Released on bail and awaiting action of the grand jury, the youth on August 30 drove his father's car into a tree, dying almost instantly in the presence of a high-school band rehearsing on a nearby field. Before this act, he had fired a shotgun in the air several times to attract their attention.

While the initial acts in this country might have been perpetrated by adult instigators in pursuance of a concerted plan, this was not established at the close of the period. The vandalism and other outrages were perpetrated mostly by adolescents, though some of those apprehended were as young as ten, some in their mid-twenties, and a few older than that. The median age of the offenders detained by authorities was between 15 and 16 years. Some of them were found to be emotionally unstable and rejected, seeking attention and identity by imitative acts of vandalism, Nazism, and antisemitism. Scientific studies to determine causes of their actions were in process at the close of the period.

American Nazi Party (ANP)

George Lincoln Rockwell, from headquarters at Arlington, Va., a Washington, D.C., suburb, systematically stepped up his agitation in furtherance of his plan to "aggravate the Jews so bad" that they would be compelled to accord him publicity (AJYB, 1960 [Vol. 61], p. 46).

Rockwell's small group of activists was renamed the American Nazi party (ANP) at the beginning of the period under review, and its members began to flaunt swastikas and other Hitlerite trappings. Literature production was increased, and inflammatory scareheads and swastikas compelled the attention of passers-by. Extensively distributed at the beginning of the period was a leaflet entitled, "White Man! Are You Going to be Run Out Of Your Nation's Capitol Without a Fight?", which, among other things, promised "the gas chamber" for "Jew traitors." A street disturbance occurred on February 8 between a Rockwell henchman preparing to distribute the broadsides in downtown Washington and an indignant Jewish resident of the city. Though charges and countercharges were not accepted by the District corporation counsel, Rockwell seized upon the incidental notoriety accorded by the press to announce that he would hold a rally on the Mall near the Washington Monument in April.

Rockwell's first rally on April 3 and those held on succeeding weekends until October were frequently accompanied by disorders. Dressed like Hitler and surrounded by uniformed bodyguards at rigid attention, Rockwell ranted his racism and proclaimed his devotion to Hitler. Originally he had a loud-speaker to attract a crowd (including many weekend tourists), but permission for its use was later revoked. Outraged persons were moved to voice their protests at the Nazi rabble-rouser and clashed with his storm troopers; Rockwell's meeting of July 3 erupted into violence when, angered by his tirade, more than 50 people attempted to rush at him. Rockwell and seven of his followers, together with six hecklers, were arrested for disorderly conduct. The meeting of July 23 also ended in violence and the arrest of Rockwell and 13

followers on disorderly-conduct charges. By this time permission to use the Mall had been withdrawn.

During his appearance in court on the charges arising out of the July 3 meeting, Rockwell was committed for observation to determine his competence to stand trial. He was found sane on August 4, and proceeded forthwith to exploit this circumstance in leaflets and speeches.

The high point of Rockwell's efforts to compel public notice came during May and June, when he applied for permission to use New York City's Union Square for an Independence Day rally of the ANP. Large groups of citizens, including part of the city's Jewish community and concentration-camp survivors, deluged officials with their protests. Others urged that Rockwell be permitted to speak, remaining subject to prosecution for any violations of law resulting from his remarks or actions. Two court proceedings were instituted, one by two state legislators and the other by a group of citizens, to compel the city to deny the permit. In both of these, Rockwell was represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, which acted for him on civil-libertarian grounds. Appearing in the courthouse on June 22 to oppose these moves, Rockwell expressed the opinion in a TV interview that 80 per cent of the Jews are traitors. Some of the 200 demonstrators, who had been cordoned off by police, tried to rush at Rockwell, but were restrained. Under police protection, Rockwell left for the airport and a plane back to Washington. Later the same day, Mayor Robert F. Wagner ordered that the permit be denied, refusing "an invitation to riot and disorder from a half-penny Hitler." The court upheld the mayor on August 8, and on the same day Rockwell was fined \$100 by the Washington, D.C., court on each of two counts of disorderly conduct arising out of the July 3 and July 23 meetings.

In February 1960 the Navy revoked Rockwell's reserve commission "because of his civilian activities." In July the Marine Corps discharged Pfc. John C. Patsalas, reportedly "under honorable circumstances" (a degree less than "honorable discharge"), after an investigation which established that he was an active member of the ANP. In August ANP member Roger C. Foss, according to his own statement, was requested by the attorney general to register as a foreign agent, after he revealed that before becoming a member of the Rockwell group he had accepted \$500 from Valentin M. Ivanov, first secretary of the Soviet embassy. Foss was reported to have stated that Ivanov wanted him to get civil-service employment in order to infiltrate the government. Ivanov was expelled on August 14. Capitalizing on the incident, Rockwell touted his follower as a nemesis of Communist spies. On October 20, immigration authorities at Washington, D.C., detained another Rockwell supporter, Janos Pall, a Hungarian who had entered Canada after World War II and had since been naturalized in that country. Pall, Rockwell, and four other ANP members had been arrested on October 12 for disorderly conduct in connection with their picketing of the Democratic party's national headquarters. Pall was ordered deported, after a hearing on December 6, for "failing to maintain his status as a visitor."

Pall, the "international secretary of the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists," a revived Rockwell front, appeared on a taped program over a Montreal TV station on October 30, with Rockwell and André Belle-

feuille, who said that he was the leader of the Canadian Nazi party (CNP). Pall claimed that CNP's "Hungarian section" had 500 members in major Canadian cities.

During the fall of 1960, while vigorously promoting his Nazi line, Rockwell began experimenting with "non-Nazi" formats to attract bigots who, he thought, had been "scared away" by the Nazi style of his activities.

Elections

Most antisemitic agitators considered the candidates of both major parties as extreme leftists or "reds." Their propaganda lines confused by the addition of other types of religious bigotry in the campaign, most exploited politics either by "supporting" ultraconservative figures or segregation leaders, or by attacking both principal candidates. *Common Sense* on June 15 carried an article headlined, "Kennedy's Marxist Record," while the main article of the October 1 issue was headed, "Nixon Ignores Vital Issues. What is the Mysterious Force Responsible?" portraying the Republican candidate, like his opponent, as a dupe of Jewish schemers.

NATIONAL STATES RIGHTS PARTY (NSRP)

The National States Rights party, an amalgam of antisemitic, anti-Negro activists from all regions (AJYB, 1960 [Vol. 61], p. 43), at their "convention" at Miamisburg, near Dayton, Ohio, on March 19, "drafted" Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus and Rear Admiral John G. Crommelin (U.S. Navy, retired) as their presidential and vice-presidential candidates, respectively. Governor Faubus, who never was antisemitic, later issued a statement that he had not authorized the nomination and that his only current candidacy was for reelection. Crommelin, a perennial antisemitic candidate in Alabama and at the same time running in the May primaries for the United States senatorial nomination, did not decline. NSRP followers during the succeeding months actively circulated nominating petitions, securing the required number of signatures to place the party on the electoral ballots of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, and Tennessee. At the request of Governor Faubus, the Florida secretary of state removed his name from the ballot, which in effect invalidated the ballot in that state. The actual campaigning consisted of the circulation of the petitions, followed up by distribution of the party's hate sheet, the *Thunderbolt*. The most concentrated and effective effort made by NSRP, as reflected by the total statewide votes on November 8, was in Arkansas.

The Arkansas vote was 29,000 out of 429,000 (round figures); in Alabama it was 4,400 out of 600,000; in Tennessee, 11,300 out of 1,052,000, and in Delaware, where 200 signatures are required for a petition, 326 out of 197,000.

Some observers believed that especially in Arkansas many segregationists had been attracted by the governor's name on the ballot, unaware of the character of NSRP. Others pointed out that agitators could make serious gains by the political exploitation of a state's-rights designation.

In May NSRP moved its headquarters from Jeffersonville, Ind., to Birming-

ham, Ala. Its plans for large headquarters falling through, its operations were conducted from the home of its information officer, Edward R. Fields, long-time collaborator of another leader, J. B. Stoner, a Klan organizer and former head of the Christian Anti-Jewish party.

CROMMELIN

Though quiet as NSRP's candidate, Admiral Crommelin early in 1960 actively campaigned in the Alabama primaries for the United States senatorial nomination against incumbent Senator John J. Sparkman. He toured the state in an automobile equipped with a loudspeaker, made a dozen TV speeches from Mobile and his home city of Montgomery (paid time), delivered stump speeches, and distributed antisemitic literature, repeating that there was a Communist-Jewish conspiracy to mongrelize and control the nation.

In the three-man contest on May 3 Crommelin polled almost 13 per cent of the total state vote—51,600 (round figures) as against 335,800 for Senator Sparkman and 16,800 for candidate Zeke Calhoun. In Montgomery county he won 28 per cent of the total vote. Running for mayor of Montgomery in 1959, Crommelin had polled 10 per cent. In 1956 he had received 32 per cent of the votes in a race against incumbent Senator Lister Hill. In 1958, in a 12-man contest for governor, he received only 2,200 out of 618,000 votes, or about .3 per cent.

Other Groups and Agitators

KU KLUX KLAN

The Klan continued active, though beset with schisms. Imperial Wizard Eldon L. Edwards died on August 1 and was succeeded by Robert L. Davidson of Macon, Ga., who promised a campaign to enlist adolescents in "Junior Klans." In January Edwards had deposed Alabama Grand Dragon Robert M. Shelton, reinstating Shelton's predecessor Alvin Max Horn. Shelton immediately embarked on the formation of his own Klan. In February, H. J. Jones of Jonesboro, designating himself an Imperial Wizard, said his Klan was a consolidation of Klansmen from 17 states and announced a recruiting drive. Over a hundred crosses were burned in various localities in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina in an apparently coordinated "show of strength" on March 28. An innovation in Klan technique was the lighting of an electric-bulb "fiery cross" at Macon, Ga., in April, to intimidate Negro families into moving from a previously all-white section. In July the first-known "ladies only" Klan—Women of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.—was chartered in Fulton county, Ga. On September 4, NSRP leader J. B. Stoner staged a large rally of his Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan at Danville, Va. Two days earlier, a rally of allegedly consolidated Klans was held at Stone Mountain, Ga. An Arkansas Klan leader, Dale E. Birdsell, was convicted on a bad-check charge in Montgomery, Ala., on November 17, and given an indeterminate sentence. Klan signs continued to be displayed on highways near the entrance to many towns and cities in Alabama.

WHITE CITIZENS COUNCIL

White Citizens Councils, usually referring to themselves as "Citizens Councils," engaged in sustained activity during the period under review. Some were Klan-like in nature, while others were respectable. Antisemitic elements in the movement distributed antisemitic propaganda in areas undergoing tension. Seaboard White Citizens Council leader John Kasper was released from jail in Tennessee on July 15 after completing a six-month sentence for inciting to riot in connection with the 1957 Nashville school desegregation disorders (AJYB, 1958 [Vol. 59], p. 108).

Pro-Arab Propaganda

Pro-Arab propaganda was mainly sustained by native agitators, who frequently used "Zionist" and "Jew" interchangeably in their attacks. Arab sources generally confined themselves to the dissemination of charges of dual loyalty against American Jews in varying degrees of subtlety, using literature, lectures, and Arab students in American institutions. An additional branch of the Arab Information Office was opened at Dallas, Tex., in July, headed by Sami Hadawi, formerly an official of the Palestine Arab Refugee Office in New York. An autobiographical article by Hadawi had been featured in Gerald L. K. Smith's *Cross and the Flag* (July 1957) with an appropriate editorial introduction.

GEORGE KELLMAN

RELIGION IN THE 1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN *

JOHN F. KENNEDY, Democratic senator from Massachusetts, was elected president of the United States on November 8, 1960, by a mere plurality of about 112,000, less than .2 per cent of the 69 million votes cast. He was the first Catholic ever to win the presidency. The course of the election campaign and the slim popular margin amply proved that even in 1960, in an atmosphere of widely accepted religious pluralism, religious intolerance and bigotry persisted. Analysis of the voting and study of the deviations from traditional Democratic and Republican voting patterns suggest that the extremely small popular margin was not the only thing the 1960 election had in common with the one in 1884. That was the year Grover Cleveland defeated Republican nominee James G. Blaine by a plurality of 60,000 because a New York Presbyterian minister and Blaine supporter, Samuel D. Burchard, characterized the Democrats as the "party whose antecedents are rum, Romanism, and rebellion." By thus alienating the Irish Catholic voters, Blaine lost New York by about 600 votes and with it the election.

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 391.

Anti-Jewish Agitation

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Anti-Jewish Agitation*

WHILE THE activities of antisemitic agitators and their followers continued at an undiminished rate during the period under review (December 1, 1960, to November 30, 1961), the epidemic of swastika-daubing and hoodlum terror which had characterized the preceding period abated.

Hatemongers attributed virtually all international and domestic tension to a "Jewish" plot to seize control of the nation and the world. In their view, Jews and "the Zionists" were the sinister tools—if not the architects and directors—of the Soviet Union and international Communism; the United Nations was a Zionist-Jewish façade for conspiratorial machinations; southern desegregation troubles were the product of Jewish schemes to "mongrelize" the nation in preparation for Communist conquest; Adolf Eichmann was a martyr, and six million Jews never died in the holocaust. They depicted Israel as the seat of a world-conspiracy, equated Zionism with Communism, and characterized NATO and other collective security arrangements as dominated by both. Exploiting anti-Catholic sentiment, they attacked the Kennedy administration, too, for its "domination by Jews and Communists."

Finally, antisemites exploited themes appealing to ultraconservative elements such as attacks on "Federal control," welfare legislation, the income tax, improved mental-health procedures, metropolitan-government consolidation, and the fluoridation of drinking water, in attempts to influence and infiltrate into the respectable area of the far right.

A nationwide upsurge of ultraconservative and nationalist groups received public attention during March and April when it was revealed that Robert H. W. Welch, leader of the John Birch Society, had made startling, free-swinging charges of Communist involvement against high government officials, including former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The publicity touched off denunciations by prominent Americans, but this was accompanied by a revitalization of moribund rightist groups and a proliferation of new ones, large and small, during the balance of the period reviewed. Three major groups appeared to predominate on the right: the John Birch Society, the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, led by Dr. Fred Schwarz, and the Christian Crusade, led by the Rev. Billy James Hargis. Striving to avoid antisemitism, and even claiming Jewish members, ultraconservative leaders emphatically disclaimed religious or racial bigotry in any form. They were, however, confronted with the problem of dissociating themselves from antisemites.

Thus, Fred Schwarz pointed to Catholic and Jewish as well as Protestant sponsorship for the rallies held by his Christian Anti-Communist Crusade. Hargis, in the course of an address at a Houston, Tex., meeting of the Chris-

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 497.

tian Crusade in June 1961, declared that he would have nothing to do with Gerald L. K. Smith. Life Lines, a rightist radio organization largely supported by Texas millionaire H. L. Hunt, distributed leaflets in Texas in October 1960 soliciting volunteer scripts; a list of "subjects not dealt with" included "criticism of Jews and other minorities."

Robert Welch, in the April 1961 issue of the John Birch Society's *Bulletin*, wrote a lengthy denunciation of "the Communist tactic to stir up distrust and hatred between Jews and Gentiles, Catholics and Protestants, Negroes and whites," and declared that:

I am not anti-Semitic, never could be, and could never allow the John Birch Society to become an agency or even a haven of anti-Semitic feeling as long as I am directing its policies. . . .

Despite these and similar efforts, antisemites continued their enthusiastic endorsement and promotion of ultraconservative programs and leaders.

SOUTHERN TENSIONS

Antisemites and racists stepped up their exploitation of desegregation tensions against a backdrop of "freedom rides", "sit-ins," and public-school desegregation. Klansmen and other extremists, including adherents of the White Citizens Councils, held demonstrations. Besides publishing the usual anti-Negro scurrilities, leaflets and other literature accused the Jews of plotting to "mongrelize" the South in pursuance of a Communist conspiracy; many confined their attacks to the Jews exclusively. The circulation of hate sheets originating in the South increased, although the bulk of the bigoted matter continued to be shipped from points outside the region.

Ku Klux Klan

Although suffering from schisms and internal rivalries, the Klan as an overall movement was highly active. In Atlanta, Ga., during the Christmas season, robed Klansmen counter-picketed Negroes who were demonstrating against lunch-counter segregation, and only decisive precautions by the city's police prevented disorders. Klansmen distributing hate literature were among the rioters in Athens, Ga., in January 1961, when two Negroes were admitted to the University of Georgia; eight of those arrested were members of the Klan. In February 1961 hooded figures called at the homes of two Baton Rouge, La., school-board members, leaving "no integration!" messages, and another board member received a telephoned threat to his life. A cross was burned at the home of Congressman Overton Brooks in Shreveport, La., in protest, according to the congressman, against his having voted for a measure which would facilitate the course of legislative bills from committee to the floor of the House of Representatives. The incident coincided with an organizing campaign in the area by R. E. Davis, Sr., of Dallas, Tex., Imperial Wizard of the Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a group started by him

after his ouster as Texas Grand Dragon of another Klan. Police questioning of Davis in April did not produce evidence for further action.

Klansmen were in evidence during the May rioting attending Freedom Riders' bus trips through Alabama, especially at Birmingham, Anniston, and Montgomery. In Montgomery, Federal District Judge Frank M. Johnston issued in June a temporary injunction against further bus violence, citing the two principal Klan organizations in the state, the U. S. Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (Alabama Grand Dragon Alvin M. Horn) and the Alabama Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a group founded by Robert M. Shelton after his ouster the previous year as Alabama Grand Dragon of the U. S. Klans. The injunction referred to charges that the Klans "conspired to and did commit acts of violence against these student passengers or damage to the busses" at the three cities named (see also p. 158).

Efforts of the Klan and other racist groups in August 1961 to prevent the peaceful integration of Atlanta schools were unavailing, again largely because of effective city police procedures. A score of participants at a Klan "protest meeting" in September unsuccessfully rushed the police chief's car under the "mistaken" impression that he was an FBI agent. Nearby, one-time Rockwell supporter and National States Rights party organizer Roy E. Frankhauser, Jr., of Reading, Pa., was arrested for having assaulted a police captain.

The death of Imperial Wizard Eldon L. Edwards of the U. S. Klans in August 1960 resulted in discord which culminated in the resignation of Edwards' successor, Robert Lee ("Wild Bill") Davidson of Macon, Ga., and of Grand Dragon Calvin Craig of Atlanta, leaving the U. S. Klans under the control of Edwards' widow and the new Imperial Wizard E. E. George. Davidson and Craig immediately formed the United Klans of America, Inc., further fragmentizing the movement, while Mrs. Edwards, claiming ownership of the copyright to the Klan ritual, continued her dispute with them. Craig set up an "educational department" of the new Klan and solicited donations for speakers and literature, which he represented to be tax-deductible. This was promptly and publicly denied by the Internal Revenue Service. Occasional boasts of Klan leaders that the movement had been strengthened by mergers and federations appeared to have little basis. The smallest "Klan" continued to be the one-man outfit of the semi-invalid Horace Sherman Miller of Waco, Tex., whose proliferation of photo-offset materials created an illusion of strength to uninformed recipients of his literature. The most significant statement from a Klan figure was by Bill Hendrix of Oldsmar, Fla., a leader in the movement for over 20 years. Announcing his resignation as Grand Dragon of the Southern-Northern Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in December 1960, he said:

I see no way to stop racial integration and it looks to me like the best thing to do is to accept it. . . . Those in the Klan can only block it by illegal means. I'm not going to agree to such things as bombings and burning schools. But that's what the Klan is going to have to turn to unless it agrees to go along with the laws.

National States Rights Party

The National States Rights party (NSRP), a combination of bigots from all parts of the country, concentrated most of its activities in Southern trouble spots. NSRP had made its greatest political impact during the 1960 presidential elections in Arkansas by garnering 7 per cent of the state's votes (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 109). In Chattanooga, Tenn., in November 1960, it elected its Arkansas leader, Mrs. E. L. Bishop of Little Rock, as national chairman. The real leadership, however, continued to remain with Ed Fields, who edited NSRP's monthly *Thunderbolt* from the Birmingham, Ala., headquarters, and with the party's counsel, J. B. Stoner, who also held the title of Archleader and Imperial Wizard in the Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Atlanta.

The most significant development in NSRP was the increase in venom and volume of the *Thunderbolt*. Copies were circulated wherever desegregation moves were imminent. A "special Georgia edition," dated February 1961, was widely distributed in Atlanta during the picketing of eating places there. In a vitriolic attack on Georgia's Governor S. Ernest Vandiver and Senator Herman E. Talmadge, the publication charged them with responsibility for the decision to desegregate the schools, portraying them as subservient to "the Jews." Most of the issue, dealt with the 1915 lynching of Leo Frank under a two-page banner headline, "Leo Frank Case and Today's Jewish Rape of the South." A lurid picture of the lynching was captioned: "Jews Could Buy Politicians But Not the People." Other issues were headed: "Reds Move Into White House" (January), "Jews Control NAACP" (March), "Eichmann Trial Giant Propaganda Hoax" (April), "If Atom Bombs Fall—Who's To Blame?" (September). The January issue carried a Streicher-style cartoon of "Jewish Money Power." Members of the Arkansas legislature were shocked to find a current issue on their desks in January 1961. Mrs. Bishop later claimed that she had received "permission" for the distribution. Amid denunciation in both chambers, the Arkansas lower house unanimously adopted a resolution prohibiting any literature distribution unless authorized by the clerk, while senators called for stricter enforcement of existing rules.

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy were hanged in effigy at an NSRP rally in Anniston, Ala., in September. In October Ed Fields and NSRP member Robert Lyons were arrested for contempt of a court order prohibiting a "white workers rally" in Fairfield, Ala. The mayor had taken steps to halt the meeting upon learning of its auspices, saying: "Race relations have been good in Fairfield. We don't want a bunch of outside agitators here." However, in November NSRP succeeded in holding a meeting attended by 300 in the municipal auditorium of Montgomery. With Mrs. Bishop in the chair, the meeting's principal speaker was the Rev. Gordon Winrod, also of Little Rock, son of the deceased propagandist Gerald Winrod. At the close of the period under review, NSRP was engaged in protesting its "deprivation of civil rights."

White Citizens Councils

"White Citizens Councils" (or "Citizens' Councils") continued to be a generic designation for autonomous groups loosely associated at the state or regional level. In character they ranged from those seeking to preserve segregation "by all legal means" while avoiding religious bigotry to those engaged in outright hatemongering. Total membership was estimated at 300,000, although, as in previous periods, active participation appeared to rise and fall with the rise and decline of desegregation tensions in any given area. The Mississippi WCC appeared to be increasingly rightist, but its propaganda remained free of antisemitism. The Louisiana councils were led by Leander H. Perez, a former district attorney of St. Bernard and Plaquemines parishes and an ardent segregationist, who since 1960 had been charging "Zionist Jews" with responsibility for Southern problems. An Atlanta meeting of Georgians Unwilling to Surrender (GUTS) in February 1961 was reported by the *New York Times* of that date as follows:

Mr. Perez called out the names of a number of prominent members of the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government, while some in the audience shouted, "Communist Jews." He referred to these officials as 'another pinko', 'that Zionist', 'a smart mulatto,' and 'that 18-time Commie front member.'

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY AND GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL

The most notorious Nazi-style hatemonger was George Lincoln Rockwell, "Commander" of the American Nazi Party (ANP). Rockwell pursued his aim of "aggravating the Jews so bad" that he would achieve extensive public notice (AJYB, 1960 [Vol. 61], p. 46). A ramshackle barracks-like "headquarters" in Arlington, Va., a Washington suburb, housed about a dozen fanatical young "storm troopers" and his printing equipment. With their assistance, the native *Fuehrer* sought to capitalize on topical issues, using picketing and a "hate bus ride" to New Orleans to win publicity. Adept at writing and printing, he used his photo-offset machine to turn out a variety of leaflets, as well as the monthly, swastika-emblazoned *National Socialist Bulletin*.

Taking the local premieres of the motion picture "Exodus" as their picketing targets, Rockwell and some of his followers were the occasion of considerable disorder in Boston and Philadelphia, although similar ANP demonstrations elsewhere had little effect.

Publicity attending Rockwell's advance notice to Boston authorities of his interest to picket the opening of "Exodus" in January 1961 impelled several thousand people to assemble for a counter-demonstration. Upon his appearance at the theater, accompanied by three uniformed storm troopers, the *Fuehrer* was rushed by the crowd and then taken into protective custody by the police, who put him on a plane to Washington. A truckload of other Nazis was turned away by the police and escorted to the Connecticut line.

Shortly afterwards, Rockwell notified the police commissioner of Philadelphia of his intention to picket the movie premiere in that city in February.

As protests mounted, police dissuaded Rockwell from appearing. However, ANP lieutenant Ralph P. Forbes and two other uniformed Nazis appeared at the opening amid considerable disorder among the large crowd waiting for Rockwell. Police swiftly removed the Nazis from the area. They were charged with incitement to riot, disorderly conduct, and breach of the peace. Over 60 anti-Nazi demonstrators were arrested for disorderly conduct and an equal number, mostly youths, were detained but were later released. Rockwell supporters arriving by car and truck from other parts of Pennsylvania and from New Jersey were turned back by authorities.

Encouraged by the nationwide publicity, Rockwell made similar forays into Detroit and Washington, D. C., in February. Efficient police handling in both cities prevented any disorders. The exercises attracted little publicity.

In May Rockwell dispatched a "hate bus" plastered with antisemitic and racist signs and carrying a cargo of Nazis, from Arlington, Va., to New Orleans, La., and then flew to meet the bus at its destination. At the city's outskirts, police halted the bus, refusing it entry into the city until the signs were removed. The Nazis picketed an NAACP rally and the New Orleans premiere of "Exodus." They were arrested on charges of "disturbing the peace in a manner which would unreasonably disturb and alarm the public." In an obvious imitation of the Freedom Riders, the jailed Nazis went on a hunger strike while awaiting trial. Rockwell was released on bail and after a hearty meal wired his followers a message absolving them from fasting. In June they were convicted on two counts of conspiracy. Rockwell, fined \$100 and sentenced to 60 days, posted bail and returned to Arlington, where his henchmen had already started an appeal for funds.

In November 1961 the United States Supreme Court upheld Rockwell's right to a permit to hold an Independence Day rally in a New York city park. In May 1960 the park commissioner had refused such a permit, at the direction of Mayor Robert F. Wagner, who said he rejected "an invitation to riot and disorder from a half-penny Hitler." The state supreme court upheld the mayor in August 1960 (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 108), but the appellate division of that court reversed the decision in February. Justice Charles D. Breitel, speaking for the majority, ruled that "there is no power in government under our Constitution to exercise prior restraint of the expression of views unless it is clearly demonstrated on a record that such expression will immediately and irreparably create injury to the public weal." After affirmation, in June, by New York's highest court, an appeal was taken by the city to the United States Supreme Court. The result was the final affirmation of Rockwell's right of free speech. In these proceedings Rockwell was represented by ACLU, which stressed that the repugnant nature of Rockwell's views was in its view no bar to his right to speak.

Other legal proceedings involving ANP members were as follows: In June 1961 "Deputy Commander" Ralph Forbes and troopers Raymond D. Goodman and Schuyler D. Ferris were acquitted in a Philadelphia court of charges of inciting to riot and conspiracy in connection with the "Exodus" picketing in that city. In July Rockwell's convictions for two breaches of the peace in

connection with his open-air meetings of July 1960 (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 107), were affirmed by the municipal court of appeals of the District of Columbia. Also in July, troopers Richard Braun and Robert Garber were sentenced to a year on the county road gang by an Arlington, Va., court on charges of assault against a 13-year-old Jewish boy. In another Arlington court, trooper Anthony Edward Wells was sentenced to a jail term and fined \$100 for assault and battery on a 16-year-old boy, while James C. M. Malcolm and Roy James were acquitted of disorderly conduct. In March 1961 Rockwell was arrested in Topsfield, Mass., for having violated a state law prohibiting false hotel registration when he so registered in connection with the Boston picketing of "Exodus."

In January 1961, before retiring from office, Attorney General William P. Rogers, while personally condemning the ANP, decided against listing it as subversive, saying that the group, by using the Nazi name, had, in effect, sufficiently warned the public against itself.

At the close of the period under review, Rockwell's autobiography, *This Time the World*, was published under the imprint of J. V. Kenneth Morgan, one of Rockwell's confidential aides. Promotional fliers had previously urged Jews to buy it—at \$10 a copy—warning: "The very lives of American Jews may depend on their reading and understanding this book in time!"

ARAB AND PRO-ARAB PROPAGANDA

Arab propangandists generally aimed their attacks against "the Zionists," while native antisemites exploited Near East tensions by using "Jew" and "Zionist" synonymously in unfavorable contexts.

The principal sources of Arab propaganda in the United States continued to be the Arab League's Arab Information Center (AIC); the embassies and UN delegations of Arab League countries; the Organization of Arab Students, with a membership of approximately 4,000, and such special Arab agencies as the Palestine Arab Refugees Office (PARO).

In a pamphlet published during 1961, *The Arab World and the Christian World*, PARO Director Izzat Tannous wrote that "the people of the Middle East in general and the Arab people in particular are more concerned with Colonialism in its new form—Zionism." Referring to the author in connection with another pamphlet, Gerald L. K. Smith's *Cross and the Flag* of July 1961 editorialized:

The story of Jew-organized gangsterism has been told by a great citizen, a former citizen of Jerusalem, Dr. Izzat Tannous. I have met Dr. Tannous. He is a gentleman of breeding, intelligence, and honor.

Who Benefits from Anti-Semitism?, an AIC pamphlet by Sami Hadawi, director of the agency's Dallas office, which was published in May 1961, declared that "Zionism thrives on insecurity, real or imagined, in Jewish communities throughout the world. . . ." In July 1957 Hadawi had received an accolade from the *Cross and the Flag* similar to that accorded Tannous. An-

other group, the Arab Palestine Delegation, launched in New York in 1961, issued a semimonthly newsletter, *Palestine*. Its August 15 issue stated:

Zionists want to get away with crime, murder and robbery. Any person who mentions Zionist crimes in Palestine is branded a "bigot" and an "anti-Semite."

Domestic hatemongers dovetailed their propaganda with that of the Arabs: *Common Sense* (January 15, 1961) charged that "Zionists engineered the United States into World War I to steal Palestine, to do so created the Soviet Union and unleashed Communism upon the world!" The *Economic Council Letter* of April 15 echoed: "Had it not been for the Zionists, America would undoubtedly never have got into that War [World War I]. Probably there would have been no World War II. Soviet Russia might never have existed. . . ."

ANTISEMITIC PRESS

There was no diminution in the volume of antisemitic literature. *Common Sense*, the semimonthly published by Conde McGinley at Union, N. J., reported a new circulation high of 89,500 as of October 1, 1961. Its statement of ownership revealed John G. Crommelin of Montgomery, Ala., to be a stockholder of the Christian Educational Association, the owning corporation. Crommelin, a retired admiral, was a perennial candidate for a variety of state and national offices, campaigning on an all-out antisemitic platform (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 110).

The *American Mercury*, after eight years of control by Russel Maguire, was acquired in January 1961 by Defenders of the Christian Faith, a fundamentalist missionary organization founded by the late Gerald Winrod. Since Winrod's death, however, the Defenders' literature had greatly improved in tone, an improvement which was reflected almost immediately in the *American Mercury*. Together with articles of general interest the new ownership featured extreme rightist, rather than antisemitic content.

The Winrod name, however, was still a factor in hate literature. The Rev. Gordon Winrod, emulating his father, began publishing his monthly *Winrod Letter* at Little Rock, Ark., in 1961, after having been forced out of a pulpit by congregational opposition to his bigotry. A compilation of vicious canards, the September issue proclaimed that "there is nothing wrong with hate," proposed an anti-Jewish boycott, and charged Jewish "involvement" in "race mixing." The December 1961 issue promoted the distribution of a publication of PARO.

The *National Renaissance Bulletin*, the pro-Nazi publication of James H. Madole's National Renaissance party, courted Southern extremists with a lurid drawing of a Negro embracing a white girl in the July-August issue. (Madole held a pro-Castro meeting in March 1961.)

The Truth Seeker, a free-thought monthly, continued its anti-Negro, antisemitic propaganda along with its usual attacks on religion.

Gerald L. K. Smith's monthly *Cross and the Flag* adhered to its format of

short, concise items which attempted to adjust the antisemitic line to virtually every current topic. Supplementing this was Smith's lesser-known *New Letter*. Smith appeared to stress his Citizens Congressional Committee over other fronts.

Among other antisemitic literature sold and distributed were John O. Beaty's¹ *Iron Curtain Over America*, in its 16th printing, and *World Conquerors*, by Lajos Marschalko, a Hungarian fascist. Translated into English and published in London in 1958, Marschalko's compendium of nearly all antisemitic canards was widely circulated in the United States.

GEORGE KELLMAN

¹ Beaty died in November 1961.

Anti-Jewish Agitation

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sessions" for Peace Corps trainees on the religious atmosphere in their project countries, "since religion is just as much a reality as the economic, social and political life of a country."

HUMANE SLAUGHTER

In December the United States Department of Agriculture approved, as meeting its sanitary requirements, a restraining device permitting ritual slaughter of large meat animals (*shehitah*) without shackling and hoisting. The device also had the approval of halakhic authorities and the humane societies. The mechanism was perfected by Cross Brothers Meat Packers, Inc., of Philadelphia. No comparable device was available for small animals, such as calves and sheep.

In May the Michigan legislature adopted a humane-slaughter law containing the "Case Amendment" exemption for kosher slaughter, and a requirement that animals "not previously rendered insensible, and to be slaughtered in accordance" with ritual requirements be "slaughtered immediately following total suspension from the floor." Michigan was the only state to adopt a humane-slaughter law during the period of this report.

PHILIP JACOBSON

Anti-Jewish Agitation*

AGAINST a background of domestic and world tensions, the impact of antisemitic agitation on the public's consciousness increased during the period under review (January 1, 1962, to December 31, 1962). The tone of hate literature, especially that produced by the activist segments of the antisemitic movement, was worse than it had ever been. "Shock themes" suggestive of violence were promoted, "Jewish ritual murder" canards were revived, and picket lines and other stunts were employed in attempts to stir up mass demonstrations. The widespread use of Nazi-style themes coincided with mounting evidences of a drive by racist elements in various parts of the world to effect a coalition, or, at the least, a closer coordination of international activity.

Hatemongers continued to exploit topical issues. Jews were accused of participating in Soviet and Communist plots; manipulating the courts; "mongrelizing" the nation by furthering desegregation; controlling the wealth of the nation and the world; dominating the press, television, radio, and other

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 433.

mass media; and furthering social-welfare legislation, unionism, the Federal Reserve system, Federal centralization, and even mental-health plans to tighten their grip on the nation and its destiny. The United Nations was characterized as a "Jewish-Zionist-Communist front."

In addition, such staples as the forged *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and "Talmud exposés" continued to circulate.

SOUTHERN TENSIONS

It was in the South, especially, that desegregation tensions were exploited by charges of a Jewish-Communist-Zionist plot to mongrelize the region and the nation. Most of that literature originated outside of the South, although a sharp rise in the products of Southern bigots was noted. Klan elements, the National States Rights party, and kindred groups disseminated the material.

Ku Klux Klan

Despite continual schisms, with regional and local groups splintering off from parent bodies, the Ku Klux Klan continued as an active movement of racism and bigotry, particularly in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. Estimates of total Klan membership ranged between 20,000 and 50,000, although actual strength fluctuated sharply in given areas in reaction to desegregation moves.

During the week of July 2-9 the Klan sponsored counter-demonstrations near Atlanta, Ga., where the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was holding its convention. On September 1 more than a dozen crosses burned in as many localities in Louisiana in a Klan show of strength in opposition to school desegregation. Fire trucks were required to douse the cross at the state capitol. About 3,000 Klansmen attended a rally when a meeting of the Albany (Ga.) Desegregation Movement was held on September 3. Grand Dragon Robert M. Shelton (Alabama Klans) and Imperial Wizard Calvin Craig (United Klans, with headquarters in Atlanta) delivered the featured tirades. Many new membership applications were received. Craig had tried for a place on the ballot for a seat in the state senate, but his petition was rejected for insufficiency of signatures.

On February 12 Klansmen distributed leaflets at the state capitol in Atlanta calling for "action" against "the Jews."

In November 1962 DeKalb county (Ga.) police thwarted a plot to dynamite a five-story cable-car structure being erected on Stone Mountain. Two admitted Klansmen were convicted for stealing the dynamite that was to have been used: Ronald Farmer, 19, received a three- to seven-year sentence and Donald Harrison, 21, a term of two to five years. Both had denied membership in "Nacirema," an underground offshoot of the Klan.

As in previous years, an effort was made by Klan leaders to unify their fragmenting units. A "strategy conference" was held at Tuscaloosa, Ala., on September 15 and 16, with no discernible result other than a meeting in the same city on September 29 at which 150 were allegedly initiated.

National States Rights Party

Though claiming units in many parts of the country, the National States Rights party (NSRP) concentrated its operations in the South, largely from its headquarters at Birmingham, Ala. Sparked by J. B. Stoner, long active as a Klan organizer, and Ed Fields, editor of NSRP's monthly *Thunderbolt*, the racist group registered considerable growth during 1962. Through merger, it acquired the National White Americans party (NWAP) along with the latter's headquarters in Atlanta. NWAP's leader Robert Bowling became NSRP's national coordinator. Bowling was one of several indicted in connection with the Atlanta Temple bombing in 1958 (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 45-46); the indictment, however, was dismissed early in 1959. An NSRP School of Racial Studies and Leadership Training was started in a house in Montgomery, Ala., with Emory Burke as director. Although recently inactive, Burke had been the leader of the Columbians, an Atlanta paramilitary group of the forties, and had served a three-year prison term for his activities. Other recruits to NSRP were Gordon Winrod, son of the late Gerald Winrod, who made an extensive speaking tour for the group in his capacity as NSRP chaplain, and James K. Warner, author of an exposé of his former leader George Lincoln Rockwell, who became associate editor of the *Thunderbolt*. (Burke and Winrod left NSRP toward the end of 1962, each continuing his own activities.)

NSRP's convention in September 1962 in Montgomery, Ala., was addressed by Admiral John G. Crommelin (USN, ret.), perennial candidate for office on an all-out antisemitic platform; Wally Butterworth, a former Atlanta radio announcer and an inciter to antisemitic boycotts, and Robert DePugh of Norborne, Mo., leader of the extremist Minutemen, who called on the delegates to fight an unspecified "enemy."

Crommelin, with NSRP backing, ran in the Alabama primaries on May 1 against incumbent Senator Lister Hill; although he ran last in a three-man race, he took 11 per cent of the vote. One of Crommelin's campaign charges was that "the satanic plot to mix the blood of the white man with the Negro is financed and directed by the Communist-Jewish conspiracy," and he urged the voters to "reject the two Kosher candidates" opposing him.

NSRP suffered a setback in Arkansas, where it had polled 7 per cent of the statewide vote in the 1960 presidential elections. At the April 13 meeting of the state organization, State Chairman Pat R. Crawford and Secretary-Treasurer Theodore C. Baldwin resigned, the former claiming lack of support, the latter because of disagreement with NSRP's tactics.

NSRP stepped up its production and distribution of hate literature, including the products of other bigots. It launched a revival of a blood-libel canard and, with its September issue, expanded the *Thunderbolt* from eight to twelve pages. The publication progressively coarsened in tone, featuring a profusion of anti-Negro and antisemitic pictures and caricatures, attacks against the president and his administration, and such headlines as "Every Soviet Premier Has Been Married To A Jewess."

The Defensive Legion of Registered Americans

Organized in April 1962, the Defensive Legion of Registered Americans (DLRA) made its initial bid for publicity in a series of 15-minute daily broadcasts by Wally Butterworth, one of its leaders, over an Atlanta radio station. The program was dropped in May when Butterworth's Klan associations came to light. Starting as an anti-desegregation movement, DLRA in September expanded its activities by launching an "anti-kosher" boycott campaign against nationally advertised products bearing "U" and "K" symbols. The vehicle for this campaign was DLRA's front group, Christian Voters and Buyers League. Under the signature of DLRA President James R. Venable, an Atlanta attorney, the group sent letters to advertising agencies announcing its institution of a "listing" service. Phonograph records of Butterworth's views on *shehitah* and "the Jewish conspiracy" were advertised in the letter.

White Citizens Councils

In the White Citizens Councils (or "Citizens Councils") loosely affiliated autonomous groups throughout the South, membership fluctuated with the rise and fall of local desegregation tensions. In character they ranged from those seeking to preserve segregation "by all legal means" to those committed to outright hatemongering. The Mississippi Citizens Councils continued as the most prominent in the movement, confining itself to the promotion of legalistic, ultraconservative, and "scientific" themes dovetailing with segregationist concepts.

In March 1962 Louisiana council leader Leander H. Perez, Sr. (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 200) called for defiance of an order by Archbishop Joseph F. Rummel of New Orleans to integrate parochial schools, even urging Catholics to "cut off the water" of the archbishop by not contributing to the church. On April 16 he was excommunicated by decree of the archbishop; he was one of three so disciplined.

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY AND GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL

George Lincoln Rockwell, "commander" of the American Nazi party (ANP), with headquarters at Arlington, Va., continued to be the most blatant and peripatetic exploiter of the "shock technique," which he promoted mainly by flaunting the swastika, declaring that "the Jews are through in '72" and that he would institute the gas chamber for "traitors" upon attaining power. By such techniques he won considerable publicity in the United States and, sometimes, abroad. His publicity strategy had been set forth in his autobiography, *This Time the World*, published in January 1962.

All at once I had the answer! By being an open, arrogant, all-out Nazi, not a sneaky Nazi—with the swastika, storm-troopers and open declaration of our intention to gas the Jew traitors (after investigations, trials and convictions)—

I would . . . make an end of this filthy silent treatment, for they could never ignore Nazis with swastika armbands and talk of gas chambers. . . .

Rockwell achieved a high point in international notoriety when he entered England illegally on July 29, 1962, to attend a camp meeting of Colin Jordan's British National Socialist movement in a rural retreat in the Cotswolds. With the participation of "delegates" from several European groups, Rockwell and Jordan organized the World Union of National Socialists (WUNS), with Jordan as leader and Rockwell as his deputy; its aims and structure were set forth in the so-called "Cotswold Agreement." The document called for "a just and final settlement of the Jewish problem"; all-out efforts for "dramatic world-wide demonstrations at least once a month, and the holding of a World Nazi Congress" in 1963.¹

The Nazi conclave angered the townsmen and farmers of the area and they raided the camp and ousted its tenants. The action attracted extensive publicity, which mounted when Rockwell was apprehended by the London authorities and deported on August 9, accompanied by front-page notices in the world press.

In the wake of this publicity, Rockwell caused a minor public commotion by suddenly appearing on August 28 in Montreal, where he used the press to publicize his approval of the pro-Hitler and Mussolini sentiments of Real Caouette, Quebec Social Credit party leader.

On February 25, 1962, Rockwell was a guest at the Chicago convention of Elijah Muhammad's "black supremacy" movement, Temple of Islam. Heiling an audience of 5,000, Rockwell praised Muhammad as "the Adolph Hitler of the black man. . . . Elijah Muhammad is a leader who is trying what I am trying to do." Sharing the platform was Joseph Beauharnais, leader of Chicago's racist White Circle League. What white and black supremacists had in common was a belief in segregation.

Acting on a United States Supreme Court decision affirming his right to hold public rallies (AJYB, 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 201), in January 1962 Rockwell applied for permission to hold a rally in Union Square in New York City on April 20, Hitler's birthday, which was also Good Friday and the second day of Passover. An alternative location was offered him, which Rockwell refused, thereafter continuing his publicity exploitation of demands upon the city. The meeting did not take place.

Having reaped a harvest of publicity, Rockwell was invited to address the Student Forum of Hunter College (Bronx division) in New York City on April 11. He accepted the invitation but changed his mind as he was about to cross the city limits and sent his henchman "Captain" Seth David Ryan to address an audience of 500. Over a thousand pickets protested outside the college hall.

The Student Forum of Bucknell University invited Rockwell to speak on

¹ In a letter addressed to a Buenos Aires Nazi group, dated October 3, 1962, Rockwell asked for information about Tacuara (see p. 281) and enquired as to the possibilities of holding a world Nazi congress in that city in 1963.

January 31, 1962, and then canceled its invitation in the face of widespread local protests. A few days later, on February 2, he appeared in nearby Lewisburg, Pa., with a uniformed retinue of stormtroopers to harangue a jeering crowd. On March 8 he was struck by an enraged student while speaking on the campus of San Diego State College. On October 9 he delivered a racist tirade at a student-sponsored meeting at Carleton College, Northfield, Minn. (In a variation on this theme, a student-senate committee of the New York State University at Buffalo imported British Fascist leader Oswald Mosley at its own expense to speak on September 26. He addressed an audience of 1,500. Protest demonstrations preceded his appearance.)

On October 12 ANP conducted a picketing foray against the city of Philadelphia. Previously, it announced its intention to picket a local hotel where Communist leader Gus Hall was scheduled to speak and petitioned the United States district court for Federal protection for its pickets, claiming inadequate police protection and comparing its situation to that of James Meredith at the University of Mississippi (see p. 80). The petition, though denied, won Rockwell the publicity he wanted. Disorder broke out upon the appearance of five uniformed ANP pickets in front of the hotel, as many broke through heavy police lines to attack them. Stormtroopers Bernard Cook, Bernard Davids, Edward Kester, Robert Sharp, and Paul Uhrig, all of Arlington, Va., were arrested. They were convicted of disorderly conduct on October 19 and jailed for 30 days in default of payment of fine. At the time of writing they were awaiting trial on charges of incitement to riot and conspiracy.

Other Rockwell followers involved in legal proceedings during 1962 were:

Roy James, 24, of Arlington, Va., who struck the Reverend Martin Luther King in the face on September 28, as the latter addressed a Birmingham, Ala., convention of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; James was given a 30-day sentence.

Roger Foss, 34, and Gene Shalander, 23, who were convicted of vagrancy and inciting to riot when their picketing on July 3 of a building in Miami caused a crowd to collect.

Robert F. Garber, who, after serving a one-year term in Virginia for assaulting a 13-year-old boy, was extradited to Los Angeles and on May 18 was convicted of unlawful possession of a submachine gun.

In April an act of the Virginia Assembly, canceling the ANP's corporate charter, became effective. On September 18, however, a charter was issued for the George Lincoln Rockwell party, whose corporate title omitted the proscribed words "National Socialist."

OTHER AGITATORS

The American National party, formed in New York City during 1961 and composed of disaffected Rockwell stormtroopers, adopted a uniform of black trousers, white shirts, and armbands, and picketed a series of events. On August 18 they picketed an integration rally in Englewood, N. J., at which their leader John Patler was arrested and later convicted of disorderly con-

duct. Patler spent his ten-day jail sentence on a hunger strike in a fruitless effort to achieve publicity. At the demonstration the pickets distributed the American National party's pocket-size magazine *KILL!*, the back cover of which displayed a dangling noose and a bold-type caption, "Impeach the Traitor John F. Kennedy for Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemies of the U.S.A." Its editor Dan Burros had contributed an editorial on "The Importance of Killing" for this issue. On November 10 Patler was given a 90-day sentence at Hyde Park, N.Y., for attempting to demonstrate at Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt's funeral.

The National Renaissance party, openly neo-Nazi, continued active under the leadership of James H. Madole. It held meetings in New York City and published the *National Renaissance Bulletin*, the October 1962 issue of which carried a cartoon of a Jewish stereotype giving James Meredith a bottle of "Blood of Slain Miss. Patriots" with which to write his lessons.

Gerald L. K. Smith confined the meetings of his Christian Nationalist Crusade to the West Coast. His long-time collaborator the Rev. Wesley T. Swift operated in the same area, except for a speaking trip to Florida, where he addressed several National States Rights party units.

ARAB AND PRO-ARAB PROPAGANDA

Agitators promoted the pro-Arab line largely by using the terms "Zionist," "Jew," and "Communist" interchangeably in their lurid depictions of sinister schemes to subvert the nation and the world. Some publications (e.g., those of Conde McGinley and James H. Madole) advertised and distributed literature directly emanating from Arab sources. McGinley also promoted the sale of records and tapes of his supporter Benjamin H. Freedman's "Third World War," which he billed as "the most shocking speech you ever heard."

The principal sources of Arab propaganda in the United States continued to be the Arab League's Arab Information Office (AIC), with branches in several cities; the Organization of Arab Students, whose approximately 4,000 members were active in many American colleges, and the embassies and UN delegations of the Arab countries. While Arab propaganda was for the most part limited to attacks against the "Zionists," Saudi Arabian representative to the United Nations Ahmad Shukairy, in a General Assembly debate on November 30, lapsed into a vituperative speech in which he saluted the antisemitic terrorist Tacuara movement in Argentina (p. 281). He expressed the hope that Tacuara would spread throughout Latin America and that its principles would be adopted by the United Nations. Shukairy's remarks evoked strenuous objections from the Argentine delegate, among others.

ANTISEMITES AND THE FAR RIGHT

Antisemites increased their efforts to infiltrate the ultraconservative movements, seeking accreditation by espousing far-rightist positions on welfare legislation, the United Nations, "Federal control", "states' rights," the in-

come-tax amendment, and foreign aid. Despite right-wing denunciations of racial and religious prejudice, the bigots were unremitting in their efforts to gain influence in rightist quarters. In December the Boston-area coordinator of the John Birch Society (JBS) announced the opening of a "Joe McCarthy bookstore" and recommended it for JBS support. On December 13 the *Boston Herald* revealed the store's owner to be Speros Lagoulis, an ardent supporter of George Lincoln Rockwell. JBS leader Robert Welch thereupon repudiated any connection with the store or its owner, explaining in a letter to the newspaper on December 20, 1962, that "investigation reveals that Lagoulis had been carefully cultivating the confidence of our enthusiastic young coordinator in this area for nearly a year. . . ."

SWASTIKAS, HOODLUMISM, BOMBS

Though the worldwide "swastika furor" of 1960 had long since abated, there were continuing evidences that a pattern for vandalism had been set, as indicated by more than a few incidents in 1962. Five synagogues in Minneapolis were daubed with swastikas during January. On August 27 a Catholic church in Old Lyme, Conn., was smeared with swastikas, Stars of David, and antisemitic epithets; two teenagers were taken into custody. Swastikas and obscenities were carved into the wrecked furniture of a Jewish fraternity house at Syracuse University in October. A synagogue and six nearby houses in San Francisco were defaced in November, and a 14-year-old boy was apprehended for similar acts against a junior high school and adjoining homes at about the same time.

In July 1962 Harold Fahy and William Arnold were given 60-day sentences for desecrating a Norwalk, Conn., synagogue in 1960; their appeals had been denied.

Five youths received jail terms in January for perpetrating a year-long reign of terror and vandalism in San Francisco against Mr. and Mrs. William Bowman, a Jewish couple. In November the arrest and confession of Robert Keenan, 27, brought to light that he had made 2,000 terrorizing phone calls to the same couple during the year. Denying antisemitism and claiming depression, Keenan said he had picked on the Bowmans because he "heard about them last year."

In Englewood, N. J., 18-year-old Frank Sweeney unsuccessfully tried to hold up a bank in order to get money for Nazi activities.

Two boys, 12 and 14, were seized in January while on their way to blow up a synagogue in Fort Worth, Tex. Their equipment consisted of large fire-crackers, gunpowder, liquid heat, fuses, and a swastika armband. Denying antisemitic motives, they said that the idea came to them from reading about the Eichmann trial.

While two ministers—a Unitarian and a Lutheran—were participating in a panel discussion on February 1 at Temple Sinai in Los Angeles, their homes were bombed, their families narrowly escaping injury. At the same time the

grounds of the temple were strewn with leaflets bearing crude drawings of the UN emblem, the Star of David, and the hammer and sickle.

A plot to bomb Temple Anshe Emes in Miami, Fla., was thwarted on April 28 through skillful police undercover operations. Donald Branch, leader of a small activist group, was convicted for his part in the plot, and later convicted for transporting explosives; he received six-year prison sentences on each conviction. At the time of writing he faced trial on an additional charge of having placed explosives in the home of a Miami editor in February.

ANTISEMITIC PRESS

Of the antisemitic press, Conde McGinley's semimonthly *Common Sense* (Union, N. J.), claimed the largest volume of circulation, 91,000 on October 1; John G. Crommelin, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., racist, was one of the owning corporation's stockholders. Gerald L. K. Smith's monthly *The Cross and the Flag* (Los Angeles, Calif.), reported 25,000 subscribers on September 26. Smith's well-produced magazine, composed for the most part of short "editorial" items, frequently sounded topical themes for the use of other hatemongers here and abroad. Kenneth Goff's monthly *Pilgrim Torch* (Englewood, Colo.), exploited Bible themes for its hate campaigns, while the monthly *Truth-Seeker* (New York City), an atheist publication, mixed racist and antisemitic venom with its attacks on religion. James H. Madole's bimonthly *National Renaissance Bulletin* (New York City) pandered to activist elements by highlighting group frictions in the city. Elizabeth Dilling's *Bulletin* (Chicago) featured vicious "interpretations" of the Talmud and the Jewish liturgy. James A. Lovell's *Kingdom Digest* (Dallas, Tex.) insisted that the Jews had usurped the title "Israel"; it also published more topical forms of bigotry. These and other periodicals ranged from well-printed publications to mimeographed screeds, such as Gordon Winrod's *Winrod Letter* (Little Rock, Ark.). Besides its monthly *KILL!*, the American National party started a newsletter, unambiguously titled *The Nazi Fascist*. Adept at typography, layout, and art work, George Lincoln Rockwell converted his bimonthly *Stormtrooper* into a pocket-sized magazine printed in several colors, replete with scareheads, lurid cartoons, self-popularization, and antisemitic canards. His semimonthly newsletter *Rockwell Report* was similarly "improved."

Publishers like Gerald L. K. Smith, McGinley, and the National States Rights party circulated the products of other hatemongers as well as their own, maintaining large stocks of pamphlets, books, old publications, and reprints. Among Smith's offerings were *Iron Curtain Over America*, an antisemitic diatribe by the late Professor John O. Beaty, first published in 1951; *The International Jew* (1920), another long-repudiated canard, and a series of small pamphlets and tracts. McGinley's "patriotic" booklist, among many items, offered *World Hoax*, by pro-Nazi propagandist Ernst Elmhurst, first published in 1938 by Silver Shirt leader William Dudley Pelley, who was

subsequently convicted of sedition by an Indiana court. (Elmhurst was sentenced to a six-month prison term in 1946 for his participation in a New York City street meeting at which blood-libel literature was distributed.) Other "patriotic" offerings were Benjamin H. Freedman's attack on the Talmud, *Facts Are Facts*, first issued in 1954, and *Know Your Enemy* (1951), by pamphleteer Robert H. Williams.

"World Conquerors," a compendium of virtually every antisemitic smear, written by Hungarian fascist Lajos Marschalko and translated into English in London, was widely circulated in the United States. On May 16 the West German ministry of the interior reported the extensive circulation of Rockwell's literature in West Germany. In Oberammergau, Germany, Widar publishing house printed 36,000 copies of Conde McGinley's illustrated broadside *Coming Red Dictatorship*, translating "Jews" as *Sataniden* ("satanic beings"). An example of the material offered on the international exchange was a three-page leaflet issued by the National States Rights party, over the signature of Ed Fields. The circular announced the publication of a reprint of *Jewish Ritual Murder*, by the late British fascist Arnold Leese, first published in England in 1938. An exhaustive discussion of the book's subject matter, the announcement itself was as inflammatory and scurrilous as the ages-old canard about the Jewish use of human blood for festival purposes with which the book dealt. When the book appeared at the end of 1962, it was found to feature hideous illustrations not contained in the reprint distributed at the New York street meeting of 1946, at which Elmhurst and two others were arrested. The publication of *Jewish Ritual Murder* pointed up the growing tendency of the extremist hatemongers to utilize gruesome "shock themes." The trend was further exemplified by the items offered for sale in the November issue of Rockwell's *Stormtrooper*. Among these were: "(9) Nazi Stickers. Bright little hellraisers which do a wonder of good . . ." and "(11) ANN FRANK SOAP WRAPPERS . . . Put it on regular cakes and delight your friends. . . ."

GEORGE KELLMAN

Anti-Jewish Agitation

Author(s): George Kellman

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Anti-Jewish Agitation*

ANTISEMITIC propaganda did not diminish during the period under review (January 1, 1963, to December 31, 1963) though the latter half of the year was marked by organizational reverses for several of the major hate groups.

Techniques ranged from a revival of blood accusations to a generous insertion of Jewish names and references in attacks ostensibly directed against Communism. The conspiratorial note predominated in almost all topical applications of bigotry to national and world problems. The UN and the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) were portrayed as instruments of an alleged Zionist-Communist Jewish plot to control the world. Desegregation tensions were attributed to Jewish domination of Negro organizations seeking to "mongrelize" the nation as a preliminary to Soviet conquest. Threadbare canards charged Jewish manipulation of the press, of banking, of social-welfare legislation, and of mental-health procedures. Racist and religious demagogues also smeared high government officials as dupes of subversive elements, also espousing ultra-conservative concepts in an attempt to attract and influence extreme rightists.

SOUTHERN TENSIONS

The anti-segregation demonstrations of 1963 were extensively exploited by hatemongers. Much of the scurrilous literature circulating throughout the South originated outside, but some of the most vitriolic was produced in the South itself.

Ku Klux Klan

Fragmented for more than a decade into autonomous groups and units by schisms and internal rivalries, the Klan had a membership estimated between 20,000 and 50,000. The problem of identifying activists within the movement was complicated by the Klans' disavowals of responsibility for incidents involving violence and its reiterated pledges to adhere to law and order. The largest and most active was the United Klans of America (UKA), which moved its headquarters from Atlanta, Ga., to Tuscaloosa, Ala., when Robert M. Shelton became its Imperial Wizard. A former Grand Dragon of the Alabama Klans, Shelton merged his group with UKA in 1963, whereupon UKA Imperial Wizard Calvin Craig receded to the subordinate position of Grand Dragon of Georgia. It was active in both states.

* For meaning of abbreviations, see p. 361.

The Klan held a rally at Bessemer, Ala., on May 10, during the riots at nearby Birmingham. An audience of more than 1,200 heard speakers denounce Negroes and Jews. Shortly afterwards, unidentified persons bombed the home of the Rev. Arthur D. King, brother of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King.

In the wake of the news that state action would be taken to bar Negro registration at the University of Alabama, 1,500 cheering spectators witnessed a nocturnal ceremony in Tuscaloosa in which over 200 robed and hooded Klansmen lit a 50-foot fiery cross. Six heavily armed men were arrested on their way to the rally, and nine others were apprehended after the event on charges of possessing such concealed weapons as bale-hooks. A police search of autos at the rally unearthed four bayonets, two clubs, and two pistols.

In Atlanta, Ga., on May 25 a hundred spectators saw 60 Klansmen hold a novel ceremony, in which a cross was illuminated with electric-light bulbs to avoid violation of a city ordinance against cross-burning. On July 20 several hundred Klansmen from Georgia and nearby states met at ceremonies presided over by Grand Dragon Craig in Savannah.

Four Negro leaders were severely beaten on September 20 when they were observed near a St. Augustine, Fla., Klan rally.

Publication of Klan literature was sporadic, members relying on the circulation of the products of other antisemitic groups, notably the National States Rights party. Circulation of the screeds of Horace Sherman Miller, a bedridden invalid who operated the one-man Aryan Knights of the Ku Klux Klan from Waco, Texas, declined materially. For over a decade, his widely mailed broadsides against the Jews and Negroes (in several languages) had caused concern in the United States and in Latin America, Great Britain, South Africa, and Australia over the possibility of imminent "Klan uprisings."

National States Rights Party

A Nazi-style "shirt" organization with Klan overtones, the National States Rights party (NSRP), with headquarters in Birmingham, Ala., virtually preempted the leadership in mobilizing demonstrations against that city's school desegregation during September. Two NSRP open-air rallies on September 3, the day before the desegregation move, attracted crowds of 600 and 2,000, who were warned by NSRP leader Edward R. Fields against a "Jew-Communist plot" to manipulate city and school officials. As classes began on September 4, NSRP members, some wearing the party uniform, were in the forefront of a flying squadron of demonstrators which sped from school to school, picketing, shouting epithets, and battling police. On September 23 leader Fields (officially editor of NSRP's monthly *Thunderbolt*) and seven other members were indicted by a Federal grand jury, Fields being charged with having directed his followers and a crowd of 75 to "overpower the police, cross police lines, injure Graymont School, and commit

depredations" inside it. Others indicted were NSRP counsel Jesse B. Stoner, a former Klan organizer, and James K. Warner, who had left the American Nazi party to help edit NSRP publications.

NSRP was active elsewhere in Alabama, too. On April 1 Warner was sentenced to 180 days in prison for trespassing on Alabama University grounds at Tuscaloosa on March 26 while attempting to picket United States disarmament negotiator Arthur Dean. On April 25, 18 NSRP activists, carrying racist, antisemitic signs, picketed the Montgomery capitol to protest Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's visit to the governor. Their removal by the police was protested by Admiral John G. Crommelin (ret.), who stood on the sidelines. Crommelin, a perennial candidate for office on an antisemitic platform, polled 8.5 per cent of the total vote cast in the Montgomery mayoralty primary election (compared with 10 per cent in 1959). He had promised, if elected, to "expose, eradicate, wherever discovered, what I believe to be the Communist-Jewish subversion in our city government."

The party continued organizing efforts in such widely separated cities as New York, where small meetings were held; Los Angeles, where members met in January in full uniform; San Bernardino, where, after a meeting in a cafe in February, other members engaged in a brawl in which a Mexican-American youth was assaulted; Florida, where long-inactive bigot Dewey Taft was appointed "state chairman," and Cleveland, where Stoner told a small organizing meeting in May that "the only mistake Hitler made was in not killing the six million Jews he was credited with."

NSRP's greatest impact, however, was in the nationwide distribution of its scurrilous publications (p. 72).

Federal prosecution in Birmingham seemed to have ushered in a decline in NSRP strength in the last quarter of 1963. A defense-fund appeal mailed during this period complained of a sharp drop in income; "also, we are behind with our newspaper."

Defensive Legion of Registered Americans

The Defensive Legion of Registered Americans, launched in Atlanta, Ga., in 1962 to promote an "anti-kosher boycott" of food products through its propaganda arm, Christian Voters' and Buyers' League (CVBL), concentrated on the sale and distribution of recordings of its prime mover, former Atlanta radio commentator Wally Butterworth. A typical record label read: "Guns to Arm Your Home Against Communist-led Negro Riots." The group relocated its headquarters in Decatur, Ga.

White Citizens' Councils

The autonomous units of the White Citizens' Councils movement (or, Citizens' Councils) continued to be widely diverse in character, ranging from those which confined themselves to legalistic and "scientific" arguments for segregation to outright hatemongering organizations. While the move-

ment claimed a total of more than 300,000 members, its actual membership rose and fell as desegregation became more or less imminent in a given locality.

The Citizens' Council of Louisiana continued under the leadership of Leander H. Perez, who had been excommunicated in 1962 after denouncing Catholic Archbishop Joseph F. Rummel for ordering New Orleans parochial schools desegregated. In an interview published in *Esquire* (January 1964) he declared:

The Jews are leading the Negroes. They'll resent it and they'll say Perez is antisemitic. And when they say that, I'll say that they are unadulterated damn liars, because I do resent any goddamn Jew trying to destroy our country and our rights and that's what they're doing.

AMERICAN NAZI PARTY AND GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL

With the aid of a dozen followers, American Nazi party (ANP) "Commander" George Lincoln Rockwell produced many publications on his off-set press in the party's dilapidated headquarters in Arlington, Va. Though some of the activities of Rockwell and his stormtroopers (fewer than 50, including nests in metropolitan areas) gave rise to public uproar in various parts of the country, they did not win him as much attention as in previous years (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], p. 107; 1962 [Vol. 63], p. 201; 1963 [Vol. 64], p. 139).

Rockwell's "soft" line on college campuses was in contrast to ANP's usual Nazi style, as he sought to capitalize on a student vogue for having him present his "side" of such issues as "gassing Jew-traitors" at campus forums.

At the University of Virginia on February 14, his remarks, addressed to a thousand students and faculty members under the auspices of the John Randolph Society, were greeted with hoots and laughter. Speaking to nearly 300 students at Chicago University on February 25, he praised the Black Muslims, a Negro racist movement with headquarters in that city. On February 26 he lectured without incident at Shimer College in Mt. Carroll, Ill. He had his largest audience—3,000—at Colorado University on May 14. Though hooted and jeered, he was joyous over the turnout, asserting his reception would win him further invitations. In the fall, the announcement that a Hofstra College (Hempstead, N.Y.) student group had invited him to address it touched off a campus controversy which attracted extensive notice in the New York metropolitan press.

In contrast, outdoor tactics were manifested in Los Angeles on April 28, when ANP stormtroopers picketed an Israel Independence Day celebration at the Shrine auditorium. Police had to subdue pickets who struck protesting bystanders with the heavy sticks which supported their placards. About ten people, including police, were injured. Four stormtroopers were convicted of felonious assault and conspiracy on November 11: Lyle McLaughlin

(minimum penitentiary term of one year), Leonard Holstein (10 months, county jail), and William Krauss and Clifford Huss (care of youth authority). A fifth hoodlum, Dennis M. Reeves, was charged with and convicted of conspiracy only; he received a minimum penitentiary term of one year.

In line with his policy of keying his activities to major events and movements, Rockwell in July and August concentrated on anti-Negro propaganda when he toured Virginia to mobilize a counterdemonstration against the March on Washington (p. 18). For example, in Richmond, on July 4, he addressed a crowd from the steps of the city hall, afterward bewailing the lack of press notices; in Lynchburg, on August 20, he told a group of teenagers to "fight Communist race-mixers in the streets by standing up and meeting them there."

An ANP counterdemonstration to the March on Washington on August 28 ended in a fiasco. Rockwell and about 50 followers paraded briefly, wearing civilian clothes, in a carefully cordoned-off area. They retired in order after "Deputy Commander" Karl R. Allen was arrested for making a speech without a permit. Rockwell boasted that his was "the only opposition" to the March on Washington.

Rockwell and his supporters were engaged in a variety of other activities and legal involvements during the year. In Philadelphia, five ANP members were acquitted after trial on February 25 of charges of incitement to riot and conspiracy. The charges stemmed from their attempt to picket a meeting addressed by Communist leader Gus Hall on October 12, 1962. On March 2 "Deputy Commander" John C. McClure and another stormtrooper picketed an Israel bond rally at the Hotel Fontainebleau in Miami, Fla., but were removed by police when disorders broke out. On March 4 McClure was arrested on a gun charge at new ANP headquarters in Miami (which were soon thereafter closed).

OTHER AGITATORS

James H. Madole's neo-Nazi National Renaissance party (NRP) stepped up its activities. Working out of his home in New York City, Madole at the beginning of 1963 revived his stormtroop unit (renamed the "Security Echelon") and held several indoor meetings. Paralleling Rockwell's academic excursions, Madole lectured to 300 students at Columbia University on April 17, at the invitation of the Political Assembly club. His denial of Nazi responsibility for the mass slaughter of Jews and his charge of Jewish world domination resulted in bedlam, but the smiling Nazi maintained a professorial composure. When Madole advertised that an NRP street-meeting would be held in the Yorkville section of New York City on May 25, 3,000 counterdemonstrators gathered to protest; only a handful of followers came to listen to Madole. NRP lieutenant Louis Mostaccio was arrested for striking a detective with a flagstaff and on June 6 received a five-day sentence. No charges were lodged against Madole.

After NRP counterpicketed a Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) demonstration in the Bronx, on July 14, eight neo-Nazis, including Madole, were arrested, and a cache of arms was seized by police. Three neo-Nazis, who complained to police that CORE demonstrators had attacked them and damaged a truck they were using, were arrested after police examination of the vehicle disclosed firearms, tear-gas weapons, darts, arrows, and a crossbow. Five others (including Madole, who was not at the scene) were subsequently arrested at their homes. Charges included anarchy, attempted incitement to riot, and weapons-law violation.

Conde McGinley, who had edited the semimonthly *Common Sense* (Union, N.J.) for 18 years died in July. His passing proved a serious setback for the publication's supporters. Title to the publication continued in the corporate name of the Christian Educational Association; Crommelin was listed as a stockholder.

Gerald L. K. Smith (Los Angeles) centered his nonpublishing activities on the West Coast. His Christian Nationalist Crusade and other operational front, the Citizens Congressional Committee, circulated several petitions: one to impeach Supreme Court Justice Earl Warren, another to have the United States withdraw from the United Nations, and a third "to investigate the events which led up to the abuse and persecution of General Walker."

Arab propaganda was promoted by the Arab Information Office (AIC), with branches in several cities; the Organization of Arab Students (OAS), and embassy members and UN delegates from Arab countries. Generally circumspect, the propaganda line hinged semantically upon the word "Zionist," the Arabs maintaining that they were not antisemitic but merely anti-Zionist. "The Zionists" were accused of "dual loyalty" and of exercising undue political influence. An article in the *Arab Observer* (April 29), an English-language weekly published at Cairo and distributed in the United States, charged that the Jews had been brainwashed by "Zionist"-controlled movies and that the "next aim was toward a larger target-group, the Goyim, or non-Jews."

ANTISEMITIC PRESS

The principal purveyors of antisemitic literature were the *Common Sense* group (Union, N.J.) and Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist Crusade (Los Angeles), publisher of the *Cross and the Flag*. Both groups maintained large depots for the products of other agitators as well as their own. The average circulation of *Common Sense*, a semimonthly, was 90,000 while the *Cross and the Flag*, a monthly, averaged about 27,000.

The National States Rights party's monthly newspaper, the *Thunderbolt*, claimed a circulation of 30,000—much more for special issues. It published canards against prominent Americans and the blood libel. A January headline "exposed" "Kosher Slaughter Cruelty" and inside pages contained photographs of cattle after kosher slaughter. Also advertised was NSRP's

reprint of "Jewish Ritual Murder," an illustrated compendium of every blood libel leveled against the Jews from Chaucer's time to the 1930s, when it was written by the late British Fascist Arnold Leese. NSRP "literature" included *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* and *The World Hoax*, by Nazi propagandist Ernst Elmhurst. The most mischievous item from NSRP headquarters was a reprint of the "Ritual Murder Issue" (dated May 1936) of Julius Streicher's *Der Stuermer*. In July West German authorities at Karlsruhe arrested three men for possessing a hundred copies of the reprint.

Several ministers published hate sheets in the name of religion. The *Winrod Letter*, put out at Little Rock, Ark., by the Rev. Gordon Winrod, son of the late Gerald Winrod, exploited "prophetic interpretations" and biblical quotations in the interests of bigotry. Winrod frequently attended meetings and rallies of the National States Rights party. Another "prophetic" preacher, the Rev. Kenneth Goff, published *Pilgrim Torch* at Englewood, Col.; an article in the October-November issue, "Who Financed the Bolsheviks?" dwelt on the "international banker" theme. (Goff was a former member of Gerald L. K. Smith's staff.) *Kingdom Digest*, a monthly, published in Dallas by the Rev. J. A. Lovell, carried the claim that persons of English descent are the true Israelites and the Jews usurpers of the title.

At the opposite pole, an atheist monthly, *Truth Seeker*, put out by Charles Smith, promoted racism and antisemitism along with attacks on Christianity.

Continuing her labors of more than a generation, Elizabeth Dilling of Chicago disseminated distorted "interpretations" of the Talmud and Jewish liturgy in her newsletter. From his basement "headquarters" in New York, George A. Lincke, a Rockwell follower, began publication in June of his own monthly, *Hitler Was Right*. Another publication was started in June by the National Citizens' Union, a new antisemitic group in New York, headed by Betty Shepherd. Originally called *Appeal*, and renamed *Count-down Nine*, the monthly's first issue bore the broadside, "The Jews Must Be Resisted Openly—Now!"

James H. Madole's bimonthly *National Renaissance Bulletin* couched its bigotry in "intellectual" terms—in contrast to its venomous cartoons and pictures. Its January–February issue depicted a caricatured Jew as a controller of vice. Madole also sold other racist, and Arab, publications.

A leaflet put out by Gerald L. K. Smith, titled "Jews in Positions of Great Power," listed many Americans of Jewish background. The list was substantially reprinted in the March 1 issue of *Common Sense*.

Other "classical" antisemitic literature widely sold and circulated were *The Iron Curtain Over America*, by the late John O. Beaty; an English translation of Hungarian Nazi Lajos Marschalko's book, *World Conquerors* and the long-repudiated *International Jew*.

The profusion of American Nazi party materials was attributable to Rockwell's adeptness at doing his own writing, typography, layout, and printing; his supporters assisted him with stapling, binding, mailing, and other distri-

bution. Besides the illustrated pocket-size monthly *Stormtrooper* and the fortnightly *Rockwell Report*, he also put out the weekly *Intra-Party Confidential Newsletter*, aimed at sparking controversy and press coverage. Most vicious in conception were Rockwell's "shocker" items, such as "boat tickets to Africa," "Jew Communist traitor's surrender passes" (conferring the privilege of being gassed in choice of flavors), and an advertisement for "Ann Frank soap wrappers." In April 1963 Rockwell published *The Diary of Ann Fink*, a booklet containing a dozen Nazi death-camp atrocity photos, each bearing a "humorous" caption.

GEORGE KELLMAN

Civic and Political

Civil Rights and Intergroup Tensions

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 • CIVIL RIGHTS AND GROUP TENSIONS IN POLITICS (1): REFERENDA AND THE WALLACE PRIMARIES • CIVIL RIGHTS AND GROUP TENSIONS IN POLITICS (2): 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION • POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION • ECONOMIC AID AND COMMUNITY ACTION • VIOLENCE AND INTERGROUP TENSION • CIVIL-RIGHTS MOVEMENT

THE YEAR 1964 witnessed great forward strides in civil rights with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the overwhelming national mandate given to Lyndon B. Johnson. Negro civil-rights organizations showed increased self-confidence and self-reliance, employing a wide variety of approaches and strategies to help Negroes achieve civic and economic equality. Locally, however, implementation of civil-rights programs remained difficult and intergroup tensions were acute in the North and the South, with violence erupting from time to time.

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

On November 27, 1963, five days after President John Fitzgerald Kennedy had been assassinated in Dallas, Lyndon B. Johnson, speaking to an extraordinary joint session of Congress, called on it to translate Kennedy's dreams for America "into effective action," first of all, by passing the civil-rights bill. "No memorial oration or eulogy," Johnson said, "could more eloquently honor President Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil-rights bill for which he fought so long." Within a few days House Rules Committee chairman Rep. Howard W. Smith (D., Va.), who, opposing such legislation, had pigeonholed the bill in his committee, promised President Johnson to release the bill in January and House Republican leader Charles A. Halleck (Ind.) promised his support of the bill.

Passage of the Bill

Debate opened in the House on January 31, 1964; on February 10, the bill, somewhat amended, was passed by a generous margin of 290 to 130 (152 Democrats and 138 Republicans, for; 96 Democrats and 34 Republicans, against). That vote clearly reflected public opinion. A poll conducted by Louis Harris in April 1964 showed that 70 per cent of a nationwide sample favored the bill's passage. Organizations in favor of the bill included the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a coalition of over 70 civic organizations; the leading industrial unions of the AFL-CIO, headed by the United Auto Workers; Protestant, Catholic and Jewish lay and ecclesiastical groups, and powerful groups within the government like the Justice Department and the White House itself. In an unprecedented show of religious unity, over 6,000 Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish religious leaders met in Washington April 28 in an Interreligious Convocation on Civil Rights to call for quick action from the Senate. (The next day 177 of the participants met with President Johnson who spoke to them on the role of religion in "remolding social institutions" and "illuminating the dark places of the human heart.")

Organized to fight the bill was the Coordinating Committee for Fundamental American Freedoms, financed principally by Mississippi and other Southern segregationist states, and headed by John C. Satterfield, a past president of the American Bar Association and legal advisor to former Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett (see also p. 194).

The bill's passage in the Senate was stormier. On March 9 debate began on whether the Senate should consider the bill at all. Its Southern opponents talked for 16 days to block formal consideration, but on March 26, the Senate voted 67-17 to take up the bill after the Easter recess. With firm bipartisan determination to pass it, the Senate opened formal debate on March 30. From this point on, the bill's real progress was guided largely by Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen (R., Ill.), who had undertaken to draft many amendments, particularly dealing with the bill's enforcement provisions in its public-accommodations and fair-employment titles. These amendments were designed to meet his own objections to the bill, to clarify and sometimes strengthen various sections, to meet objections from other senators, and thus to extend support among Republican Senators for both the bill and a vote for cloture. During the long weeks that the Southern Senators engaged in a desperate filibuster, Dirksen worked at his substitute package in the closest contact with Senate majority leader Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.). By mid-May, Dirksen's package of some 70 amendments was ready. It was designed chiefly to give the states more leeway in dealing with their own civil-rights conflicts before the Federal government was brought in to force compliance. After five conferences between a Senate bipartisan committee and administration leaders, including Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, an agreement was reached on the package and Dirksen introduced it in the Senate on May 26 as an amendment.

On June 10 these weeks of laborious and meticulous efforts brought historic results, when the Senate, with all 100 Senators present, invoked cloture 71-29 (44 Democrats and 27 Republicans, for; 23 Democrats and 6 Republicans, against). The 75-day filibuster, the longest in the Senate's history, was over in the first successful vote on cloture since the rule had been adopted in 1917. Then, after debate on amendments, the civil-rights bill was triumphantly passed on June 19, 73-27 (46 Democrats and 27 Republicans, for; 21 Democrats and 6 Republicans, against). On July 2 President Johnson signed the bill into law.

Summary of the Law

The following digest of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is based on a summary prepared by the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

TITLE I: VOTING

This section provides more effective enforcement of the right to vote in Federal elections and a speedier procedure by which voting-rights suits may be decided. It requires that the same standards be applied to all applicants for voting, that the only tests that can be used to determine literacy must be written, and that in contested cases the court must presume a sixth-grade education as evidence of literacy. The Attorney General or the defendant in a voting suit may ask for trial by a three-judge Federal court.

TITLE II: PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS

This section prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in hotels, motels, restaurants, lunch counters, movie houses, gasoline stations, theaters, stadiums, and any other place of public accommodation. (Exceptions include barbershops and beauty parlors, places of recreation which do not serve food, lodging houses with fewer than six rooms for rent, and, under some conditions, private clubs.) An individual or the Attorney General may file suit to enforce these provisions and the Attorney General may, under some conditions, enter a case brought by an individual, whenever he believes there is a "pattern or practice or resistance."

TITLE III: PUBLIC FACILITIES

The Attorney General is authorized to bring suit to compel desegregation of any publicly owned or operated facility like state or municipal parks, libraries, and hospitals, whenever he receives a written complaint of discrimination. He must believe that the complaint merits action and must certify that those making the complaint are themselves unable to take the necessary legal action.

TITLE IV: PUBLIC EDUCATION

The U.S. Office of Education is authorized to determine the availability of equal educational opportunity and to provide assistance in carrying out

school-desegregation plans and in training personnel to deal with desegregation problems. The Attorney General is authorized to file civil suits to compel desegregation of public schools, including public colleges, under the same conditions as set forth in Title III.¹

TITLE V: COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

This section extends the life of the United States Commission on Civil Rights until January 31, 1968, and gives the Commission added authority to serve as a national clearinghouse for civil-rights information and to investigate allegations of voting fraud.

TITLE VI: FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROGRAMS

Federal agencies which provide financial assistance through grants, loans, or contracts are required to eliminate discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or national origin and such agencies may, after due notice and hearings, withhold Federal funds from state or local agencies that discriminate. (Federal assistance to individuals—e.g., social security or veterans' benefits—is not affected.)

TITLE VII: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

This section creates an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to assist in implementing a Federal right to equal opportunity in employment. Employers, labor unions, and employment agencies are required to treat all persons without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In the law's first year in force, beginning July 1965, this section applies only to employers or unions with 100 or more workers. Coverage will be extended each year until July 2, 1968, when employers and unions with 25 workers will be included. The Commission is empowered to use conciliation to secure compliance. The Attorney General may bring the case before a three-judge court under the same conditions of "pattern or practice of resistance" specified in Title II.

TITLE VIII: VOTING STATISTICS

The Secretary of Commerce is required to conduct a survey of persons of voting age by race, color, and national origin in areas designated by the Commission on Civil Rights. A similar survey must be conducted on a nationwide basis in connection with the 1970 Census.

¹ Critics have pointed out that the definition of desegregation in this title excludes problems of racial imbalance. According to Alexander Bickel, professor of law at Yale University, in "The Civil Rights Acts of 1964," *Commentary*, August 1964, pp. 33-39, the effect of this title's provisions will "be felt mainly in the South, and only, if at all, in such school districts in the North as may be found to have intentionally gerrymandered school attendance areas for purposes of separating the races."

TITLE IX: INTERVENTION AND REMOVAL IN CIVIL-RIGHTS CASES

The Attorney General is authorized to intervene in any Federal court action filed by private persons complaining they have been denied equal protection of the law on grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin.

TITLE X: COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE

This section establishes a Community Relations Service to provide conciliation service in the voluntary settlement of public-accommodations complaints and to provide assistance to persons or communities where civil-rights problems threaten peaceful relations in the community.

TITLE XI: MISCELLANEOUS

This section guarantees the right to jury trial in criminal-contempt cases arising out of all sections of the act except Title I, which retains the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 for more limited jury trial.

Compliance

President Johnson appointed Thomas Le Roy Collins, former governor of Florida, to be director of the newly created Community Relations Service, and Arthur H. Dean, a New York lawyer formerly a disarmament negotiator, to be chairman of the National Citizens Committee for Community Relations, a committee of 450 prominent citizens to assist in the peaceful acceptance of the civil-rights law.

In the first weeks after the law was enacted Negroes tested the public-accommodations section in every Southern and border state and in many strongholds of segregation. A survey issued by the Potomac Institute in August 1964 reported that many places of public accommodation in the South were complying with the law. Press surveys (*Wall Street Journal*, January 6, 1965; *New York Times*, January 24, 1965) showed considerable compliance in restaurants and other public accommodations, with compliance greater in large cities and industrial centers and with resistance and defiance greater in smaller communities, especially in rural areas. By the end of 1964 the Justice Department was investigating some 600 complaints of discrimination in public places. A few restaurants and hotels owned by diehard segregationists were closed or were converted into "private clubs."

A speedy constitutional test of the public-accommodations title was made, particularly because Mississippi Governor Paul B. Johnson and Alabama Governor George C. Wallace had claimed that the legislation was unconstitutional and should not be obeyed. Two cases involving an Atlanta motel and a Birmingham restaurant reached the Supreme Court, which on December 14 unanimously upheld the constitutionality of Title II, thus clearing the way for full-scale enforcement by the Community Relations Service conciliators and the Justice Department lawyers. By the end of the year the Justice Department had brought six suits against businessmen for "patterns" of discrimi-

nation and was watching the progress of another dozen suits brought by individuals against businesses alleged to discriminate.

While experts generally agreed that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was of enormous social and historic importance in the eventual elimination of discrimination in the United States, few believed that its effects would soon be felt. Some progress in eliminating discrimination in public accommodations was clearly apparent shortly after the law's passage, but it was generally recognized that Negroes would attain their rights only after prolonged and continued application of the law and its vigilant enforcement.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND GROUP TENSIONS IN POLITICS (I): REFERENDA AND THE WALLACE PRIMARIES

Public opinion overwhelmingly supported the passage of the civil-rights act and national polls showed most people thought it was wrong to discriminate against Negroes in employment and public accommodations. A national poll by Louis Harris (*Newsweek*, July 13, 1964) showed that 83 per cent of respondents believed it was wrong for unions to refuse Negroes membership; 79 per cent for churches to refuse Negroes membership; 76 per cent for employers to refuse to hire Negroes, and 68 per cent for restaurants to refuse to serve Negroes.

But attitudes differed considerably with regard to housing. Only 45 per cent believed it was wrong to refuse to rent or sell homes to Negroes, according to the same poll. The resistance to nondiscrimination in housing was greater than to nondiscrimination in public accommodations according to the results in a series of local and state referenda across the country. Alabama's Governor George C. Wallace undertook to put the civil-rights act to a popularity test in three Presidential primaries. Though he drew a larger vote than had been expected, the results showed that most people in these states favored the civil-rights bill.

Referenda

Beginning in 1963 the referendum and the initiative began to be widely used to oppose local ordinances and state laws intended to enforce constitutionally guaranteed basic civil rights. Originally the initiative and the referendum had been regarded as progressive forms of "direct democracy," introduced in local and state politics at the turn of the century to remedy abuses charged to elected and appointed government officials. Nowadays, however, these forms of direct legislation have, paradoxically, been most frequently invoked by conservatives, who would normally not be expected to resort to techniques of direct democracy. The rightist rejection of such techniques has been expressed in the laconic slogan: "A republic, not a democracy."

Kansas City: In 1963 the Kansas City Council adopted an ordinance, 10-2, prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations. Shortly thereafter the Tavern Owners' Association and an *ad hoc* rightist group, Freedom of Choice,

began a campaign to submit the legislation to a referendum, collecting about 20,000 signatures on a referendum petition. An intensive campaign to uphold the antidiscrimination legislation was conducted by civic and religious organizations, with particular emphasis on registering eligible Negro voters for the special election on April 7, 1964. The vote, 45,476 to 43,733, upheld the ordinance. The white community voted 2 to 1 against it, but the Negro vote provided the bare majority to pass it. A report on the campaign and the election concluded that the social-gospel teachings of the churches had little influence and that the position taken by union leadership had little effect on how union members voted.²

Maryland: On March 14 the Maryland General Assembly adopted a Public Accommodations Law (House of Delegates, 83-50; Senate, 26-3), forbidding discrimination in hotels, motels, and restaurants. This repealed and reenacted a law adopted a year earlier but omitted the earlier law's crippling provision of local option which permitted 11 of the state's 23 counties to exempt themselves. The new law had had the energetic support of Governor J. Millard Tawes and enough political support to overcome strong opposition from segregationist Eastern Shore counties. But the segregationists obtained sufficient signatures on a petition for a statewide referendum, thus preventing the law from going into effect on June 1. The referendum, held during the general election on November 3, upheld the law, 342,715 to 301,505. Ten counties, including Montgomery and Prince Georges, the populous suburban counties of Washington, and Baltimore City voted for the law; thirteen counties, including Baltimore county, largely suburban, voted against.

Tacoma, Wash.: On February 11 voters struck down a fair-housing ordinance by a proportion of 3 to 1. It had been adopted, 7-2, by the City Council in September 1963, but real-estate interests managed to bring the issue to a general vote. The local NAACP called for a boycott of the election on the ground that basic rights were not subject to popular vote.

Seattle, Wash.: On March 10 an open-housing ordinance put before the voters was defeated 112,448 to 53,453. A year earlier the City Council had charged its new Human Rights Commission with the responsibility of preparing open-housing legislation, but upon presentation by the commission of such legislation, the City Council referred it to a referendum. More than 75 community groups and nearly all the churches supported the proposed new ordinance; opposition was formally advocated only by realtors and apartment-houses owners, yet the legislation was defeated by more than 2 to 1.

Detroit, Mich.: In a primary election on September 1 voters passed, 137,671 to 114,743, a "homeowners' rights ordinance," permitting discrimination in the sale of homes. (Thomas L. Poindexter, a Detroit lawyer, a former president of the Greater Detroit Homeowners' Council who claimed to have drafted the ordinance, won nomination in this primary to the city's Common Council and was elected councilman in the general election on November 3.) The ordinance had been opposed by the Detroit bar association, the governor, the mayor, most civic and all religious groups, and organized labor,

² Sidney Lawrence, *Observations on the Public Accommodations Ordinance* (Kansas City: Community Relations Bureau, mimeo, April 1964).

and formally supported only by the Homeowners' Council and the realtors.

Akron, Ohio: An initiative petition to amend the city charter by repealing the city's ordinance against discrimination in the sale or rental of real estate was passed 63,240 to 46,590 on November 3. The issue as stated required a majority vote of the electorate on any similar ordinance that might be enacted in the future.

California: In the November 3 general election Californians voted, 4,526,460 to 2,395,747, for Proposition 14, an initiative constitutional amendment that prohibited the state or any of its subdivisions from passing any legislation that would forbid discrimination in the sale, lease, or rental of residential real property. It was intended to nullify the Fair Housing Law (Rumford Act), which the State legislature had enacted September 1963. California repeated the common experience. Civic, labor, and religious groups, the press, and even the governor campaigned extensively to defeat Proposition 14 which was supported only by the realtors, apartment-house owners, and an array of right-wing groups. Yet Proposition 14 won about two-thirds of the total vote. (Orange County, which elected a member of the John Birch Society to the State Senate, voted 77.8 per cent for Proposition 14). Proposition 14's sweeping victory confronted civic and church leaders with a bitter defeat, for they had deeply committed themselves to opposing it as an issue of morality rather than constitutionality.

Wallace Primaries

Alabama's racist Governor George C. Wallace entered three Presidential primaries—in Wisconsin (April 7), Indiana (May 5), and Maryland (May 19)—“to tell the truth about the so-called civil-rights bill and how it would destroy the private enterprise system in this country.” Three reluctant stand-ins for President Johnson responded to his challenge: Wisconsin's Governor John W. Reynolds, Indiana's Governor Matthew E. Welsh, and Maryland's junior Senator Daniel B. Brewster. Wallace did unexpectedly well in all three primaries.³

Vote for Wallace in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland

<i>State</i>	<i>Vote</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
1. Wisconsin	266,136	24.5
2. Indiana	170,727	31.6
3. Maryland	214,837	44.6

All three states have had a history of conservatism: Wisconsin, a one-party (Republican) state for many decades; Indiana, with a Ku Klux Klan background; Maryland, with Southern loyalties and traditions.

Wallace drew his support from four categories of voters:

(1) White workers, especially the less skilled, who voted for him in pro-

³ Jewish Information Service, *The Politics of Prejudice: Wallace in the Presidential Primaries in Wisconsin, Indiana, and Maryland* (New York: American Jewish Committee, mimeo, July 1964).

portion to the size and militancy of the local Negro community—usually Democrats;

(2) Whites with Southern traditions (Maryland's Eastern Shore and Indiana's southern tier) and white Southern migrants—usually Democrats;

(3) White middle- and upper-class suburbanites—usually Republicans and pro-Goldwater;

(4) Small-town conservatives—usually Republicans.

Prejudice appeared to be a constant factor in the Wallace vote, strengthened by political conservatism among Republicans and economic self-interest among working-class Democrats. Though foreign stocks gave substantial support to Wallace, that vote seems to have been influenced primarily by economic self-interest. The high Wallace vote among these traditionally Democratic voters raised Republican hopes for "backlash" votes that might accrue to them in November because of white disaffection with the Democratic position on Negro rights. These optimistic Republicans did not sufficiently appreciate the fact that Wallace's candidacy offered the voters an opportunity to make a cheap political gesture since no real political decision was at stake.

Group Voting

The Jewish liberal tradition manifested itself in all these elections, wherever the Jewish community was large enough for its vote to be quantitatively observable and significant. Though Jews were not less immune than other groups to prejudice, fears of declining property values, and resistance to neighborhood change, they repeatedly maintained their liberal voting patterns. In the Kansas City referendum Wards 8 and 9, with large Jewish populations, voted to uphold the public-accommodations ordinance. Though the Jews are not a majority in those wards, their influence was apparent in the vote.

According to a Detroit Jewish Community Council study, voters in predominantly Jewish precincts voted overwhelmingly against the homeowners' rights ordinance, in some places by as much as ten to one.⁴ The ordinance was defeated by substantial margins in all precincts in the Bagley area, an attractive, middle-class neighborhood with a large Jewish population.

Jewish precincts in Los Angeles voted about 2 to 1 against Proposition 14, while Californians as a whole voted 2 to 1 for it. A study made by the Los Angeles office of the American Jewish Committee showed that 5 precincts in East Fairfax, 70 per cent Jewish, lower-middle-class, and experiencing some Negro immigration, voted 67 per cent against Proposition 14; 5 precincts in West Fairfax, approximately 75 per cent Jewish and middle-class, voted 61 per cent against; 6 precincts in Beverlywood, about 70 per cent Jewish and upper-middle-class, voted 58 per cent against Proposition 14.

In the primaries Jews were the one group, besides Negroes, that voted overwhelmingly against Wallace. In Wisconsin Wallace ran in an open primary

⁴ Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit, *The "Homeowners' Rights" Ordinance* (mimeo, October 2, 1964).

against Democratic Governor John W. Reynolds, a favorite son pledged to President Johnson, and Republican Representative John W. Byrnes, an uninstructed favorite son. Milwaukee's prosperous suburbs Brown Deer, Glendale, and Wauwatosa gave Wallace a plurality or majority of all votes cast. Elm Grove, adjoining Wauwatosa, gave Wallace 33 per cent and Byrnes 45 per cent (in 1962, Philip Kuehn, Republican candidate for governor, received 84.5 per cent of the vote). Elm Grove was the residence of William J. Grede, a steel-foundry industrialist and a former president of the National Council of the John Birch Society. His brother, Arthur, published a chain of weekly suburban papers, including *Elm Leaves* in Elm Grove and *News-Times* in Wauwatosa, which supported Wallace as well as the John Birch Society.

Wallace did less well in three other Milwaukee suburbs—Shorewood, Whitefish Bay, and Fox Point. Generally Republican, these suburbs, surprisingly, gave Reynolds over a third of their votes, more than he received in 1962. The distinguishing factor between these suburbs and Brown Deer, Glendale, Wauwatosa, and Elm Grove is a substantial Jewish population.

Senator Brewster carried Maryland largely because of the 63 per cent of the vote he received in the city of Baltimore from Negroes, Jews, and some middle-class white Protestants. His greatest strength came from Negroes with strong reinforcements from Jewish voters. Ward 17, practically all Negro, gave Brewster 98 per cent of its vote. Negro precincts in Ward 15 gave him 94.1 per cent and adjoining Jewish precincts in Ward 15 gave him 93.5 per cent. The western half of Ward 27, mostly Jewish—except for some well-to-do Protestants—gave Brewster 80 per cent of its vote. (The other half of the ward, mostly middle-class Italian and prosperous old American and German stock, gave Wallace 50.8 per cent.) Wheaton and Silver Spring, Washington suburbs with substantial Jewish populations, also voted solidly for Brewster.

In general, whether in primaries or in referenda, white working people—mostly Italian-, Irish-, and Polish-stock Catholics, as well as native Protestant southern migrants—tended to vote for Wallace and against civil rights. In the Kansas City referendum Italians voted against the public-accommodations ordinance. In Milwaukee's Ward 2, fairly close to the expanding Negro neighborhood but solidly white, combining working class and middle class, with German predominant among the foreign stock, Wallace got about 36 per cent of the vote, and in the Polish working-class Ward 14 about 30 per cent. In Milwaukee about twenty per cent of the workers defected to Wallace, but working-class voters have been so heavily Democratic that, despite the defections, Reynolds received well over 60 per cent of their vote. Negroes, of course, gave all their votes to Reynolds.

In Indiana Wallace carried two counties: Lake, with 51.5 per cent of the Democratic primary vote, and adjoining Porter, with 54 per cent. In Gary itself the Negroes gave Welsh the margin to carry the city, but Welsh failed to carry a single all-white precinct. Gary was the seat of considerable racial tension, particularly over school segregation.

A high Wallace vote coupled with a high Goldwater vote—an obvious indicator of political conservatism—appeared in several strongly Republican Indiana counties, largely rural and small-town, with practically no Negroes. Their population has the characteristics long associated with the supporters of rightist movements—Fundamentalist and nativist. Disciples predominate in half these counties, and Methodists in the others. For them the civil-rights issue was a matter of abstract principle rather than practice. They voted for prejudice finally, giving Wallace about 40 per cent of the Democratic vote.

In Baltimore, Wallace did best in the white working-class neighborhoods of recent Southern migrants, semi-skilled and unskilled. In Wards 23 and 24, where workers of native stock predominate, Wallace received 62.5 and 65.5 per cent of the vote. In the Polish working-class districts (Wards 1 and 2) Wallace received 60 per cent of the vote. A part of Ward 26 consisting mostly of Polish working-class voters gave Wallace 60.7 per cent. The adjoining northern portion of the ward, inhabited mostly by lower- and middle-class Italians gave Wallace 61.1 per cent.

Christian churchmen, usually silent during partisan political campaigns, began to make themselves heard during the Wallace primaries, since Wallace's racism had turned these primaries into an unambiguous moral issue. Thus the Protestant Episcopal bishop of Maryland, Harry Lee Doll, wrote a letter to the 180 clergymen of his diocese accusing Wallace of having introduced a "bitter racism reminiscent of the early 1930's in Nazi Germany." The *Catholic Herald Citizen*, official paper of the Milwaukee Archdiocese, editorialized:

Moral evil does not float through the air. It walks through the world on the two feet of an individual person—directed by an evil mind and motivated by an evil heart.

Moral evil is invading Wisconsin. Gov. Wallace of Alabama has come to our state.

In Baltimore the archdiocesan *Catholic Review* was cautious in its social criticism: "There is an immense and decisive difference between a law-abiding segregationist and a law-defying racist." But wholehearted or half-hearted, the Catholic hierarchy generally opposed Wallace. Yet they had as little effect on their parishioners as the labor unions had on their membership, duplicating the Kansas City experience and foreshadowing the great failure, despite their deep involvement, of the Protestant and Catholic churches in California in the campaign to defeat Proposition 14.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND GROUP TENSIONS IN POLITICS (2): THE 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Barry M. Goldwater's candidacy for President of the United States on the Republican ticket inflamed and sharpened intergroup and racial tensions far more than the late John F. Kennedy's candidacy in 1960 had stirred inter-religious tensions.⁵

To begin with, Goldwater appeared to all observers the candidate of a Republican Party that had been captured by a radical-rightist minority. Racism and nativism appeared to be concomitants of the radical right. The tolerance that Goldwater and his running mate William E. Miller, former Congressman from Lockport, N.Y., showed for the John Birch Society, the Ku Klux Klan, and other assorted racists, antisemites, and radical rightists aroused enormous anxiety among large segments of voters (see pp. 202–05). Fear that Goldwater might recklessly embroil the United States in nuclear warfare was perhaps the single most pervasive and persuasive campaign issue. His outdated position on social-welfare programs and his shortsighted views on civil rights were the most salient domestic issues. Generally concern among American voters over these basic foreign and domestic issues transcended ethnic, religious, and racial lines.

Civil Rights

Most significant for intergroup relations in the Presidential election was civil rights, which Goldwater had himself made a central issue in the campaign. As senator he had voted against cloture and even against the civil-rights bill. That was the one single fact responsible for his great popularity during his campaign forays into the South. Early in the campaign, the *Charleston News and Courier*, a notoriously racist paper, endorsed Goldwater with these words: "At last—a white man's candidate." Though Goldwater never discussed civil rights in the South, he was always surrounded by the staunchest segregationists. On September 16 Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina bolted from the Democratic party to support him. When Goldwater arrived at Greenville, S.C., the next day, Thurmond greeted him, wearing a gold elephant in his left lapel and a Goldwater button in his right. Thurmond joined the Goldwater campaign and that evening spoke with Goldwater at a rally in New Orleans. Seated on the platform next to Thurmond and frequently applauding Goldwater was Leander Perez, racist and anti-semitic Louisiana political leader, excommunicated from the Roman Catholic church for his violent opposition to desegregating the Catholic parochial schools.

In campaigning in the North, Goldwater appealed to the "backlash," that is, white voters who had been traditionally Democratic but who threatened to punish the Democratic party for its espousal of equal rights for Negroes. At Minneapolis on September 10, Goldwater charged that the Civil Rights Act was an attempt to "legislate morality" and was responsible for "violence in the streets." In Chicago on October 16, he argued that "forced integration is just as wrong as forced segregation" and that laws should not infringe on the right of "free association." At a campaign rally in New York City on October

5 Cf. Lucy S. Dawidowicz, "Religion in the 1960 Presidential Campaign" (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62] pp. 111–128); Lucy S. Dawidowicz and Leon J. Goldstein, *Politics in a Pluralist Democracy: Studies of Voting in the 1960 Election* (New York, 1963).

26 Goldwater attacked plans to desegregate schools "by forcibly busing" children out of their neighborhoods.

Group Appeals

Goldwater's appeal was essentially to the small-town and rural white Protestant American, nostalgic for bygone days. Typical of this approach was the organization of "Mothers for Moral America," to protest "the rapidly deteriorating moral climate in our cities, states, and our country." He himself frequently used the theme of morality *versus* the disorders of the big city. He attacked the "rot and decay" besetting "the moral fiber of the American people" (Salt Lake City, October 10), appealed for a return to religion and piety, and condemned the big cities for crime, violence, and lawlessness.

The lack of Goldwater's appeal to the racial and ethnic minorities was apparent long before the campaign began in earnest. On August 12 the Republican party leaders who had assembled at Hershey, Pa., in a "unity conference" to patch up the differences between mainstream Republicans and Goldwaterites discussed also their difficulties in getting votes in the industrial states. Pennsylvania's Governor William Scranton said: "I cannot find the Jewish vote for us. I cannot find more than a handful of the Negro vote for us."⁶ Charles Percy, Republican candidate for Illinois governor, worried about the Negro vote as well as the Polish and Lithuanian vote. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was apparently surprised by the sensitivities of minority groups. He had received a letter which said mention of switchblade knives in his speech at the Republican convention had been taken in Harlem to mean "that I took a crack at Negroes." That letter had been written by Roy Wilkins, NAACP executive. "I thought switchblade knives were always—and I hope there are no Italians here—identified with Italians," Eisenhower said.

Campaigning in South Bend, Ind., September 7, where the closing of the Studebaker plant had caused considerable unemployment and economic distress and where Wallace had done fairly well in the Democratic primary, Miller made a classic *gaffe*. He charged President Johnson with proposing to "open the floodgates for virtually any and all who would wish to come and find work in this country," a remark that did not endear him to Italians, Greeks, and other groups interested in immigration.

The Citizens for Goldwater-Miller campaign organization established an ethnic division to get votes, a usual political tactic. Co-chairmen were Hollywood actor Cesar Romero, son of a prestigious Cuban family, and Mme. Claire Lee Chennault, widow of the American air general, long associated with Nationalist China. These appointments, as well as those of spokesmen for Latvian Americans, Czech Americans, Hungarian Americans, Polish Americans, and Ukrainian Americans, spelled nothing more than advocacy of a "liberation" policy for the mother countries. Perhaps the most ludicrous "ethnic" appointment was that of Colonel Alexis David Tchenkeli-Thamys,

⁶ A report of this conference, taken from a confidential transcript of a verbatim recording of the proceedings, was published in *Newsweek*, December 14, 1964.

son of a Georgian member of the Russian Duma of 1906, to "win Georgian American Democrats" for the Goldwater-Miller ticket. (The Georgian Democratic votes came from the Southern United States, not Southern Russia.)

Appeal to Jews

The Goldwater campaign organization did not even try to win Jewish votes, apparently convinced by local reports and polls that most Jews would not support Goldwater. A Gallup poll published on September 16, 1964, showed 91 per cent of Jewish respondents favoring Johnson (the only group providing even more solid Johnson support was the "non-white," with 94 per cent). A private poll conducted for President Johnson in August showed 97 per cent of Jewish voters for him (*New York Times*, September 17). Goldwater supporters published one ad in the *Times*, October 30, addressed to "Fellow Americans of the Jewish Faith," appealing to Jews to vote against Johnson; it did not mention Goldwater. It was signed by 23 persons with obviously Jewish names but no prominence in the Jewish community.

Goldwater himself from time to time called attention to his Jewish origins. In answer to a question put to him by the *National Jewish Post and Opinion*, October 30, Goldwater said: "I am proud of my heritage. My grandparents and my father were Jews. My mother was a Christian. I was baptized a Christian, an Episcopalian. I have a high regard for the American Jewish community." In his only campaign appearance in New York City, October 26, Goldwater said: "The Nazi and the Fascist types—the bigots—they're not going to vote for me—because my grandfather was a Polish Jew." But this had little effect on Jewish voters.

The most characteristic Jewish view of Goldwater was expressed by Rabbi Joachim Prinz in remarks from his pulpit at Temple B'nai Abraham, Newark, N.J., on September 26, when he said that "a Jewish vote for Goldwater is a vote for Jewish suicide," that Goldwater himself was "a decent, honest, articulate, religious and most dangerous man," who was surrounded by "every hate group in the United States, every antisemite in America, and the people who believe in simple solutions."

Churches and Goldwater

On October 5, in a special election issue, *Christianity and Crisis*, a prestigious nondenominational Protestant journal edited by Reinhold Niebuhr and John C. Bennett, opposed Goldwater for president. This was the first time in its nearly 25 years of existence that the journal had taken a stand on a specific candidate. "We point simply," the editorial explained, "to the objective, unarguable conflict between his record and the judgments of the Christian churches on most of the major issues of social ethics in our time." This view was very widely shared among the more liberal Protestant denominations and in some Catholic circles. On October 13, at the general convention of the Episcopal church in St. Louis, William Stringfellow, a New York attorney and leading layman, announced that 726 Episcopalian laymen and clergymen, including 10 bishops, had signed a statement accusing Goldwater and Miller

of a "transparent exploitation of racism." (Presiding Bishop Arthur Lichtenberger had to interrupt the proceedings of the convention the next day to declare that the statement was not an official stand of the church.)

Christian Century, the nondenominational Protestant weekly and one of the most influential of Protestant journals, endorsed Johnson, the first presidential candidate it had supported since Wendell Willkie; it kept up a weekly attack on Goldwater for recklessness in foreign policy and racist exploitation in domestic affairs. Other Protestant journals which explicitly or implicitly (by referring to civil-rights issues) condemned Goldwater included the Episcopalian *Witness* and *Churchman*, the biweekly *United Church Herald*, the Methodist student journal *Motive*, the *Covenant Companion* of the Evangelical Covenant church, *American Lutheran*, *Texas Methodist*, *Presbyterian Life*, and the Methodist *World Outlook*.

Many individual ministers preached against Goldwater. One of the strongest statements (*Time*, October 9) came from the Rev. William Sydnor, of Christ Episcopal Church in Alexandria, Va.:

When one listens to and reads Senator Goldwater, one finds that respect for God's law is shockingly absent. Never in the history of our nation have an aspirant for the presidency and his backers espoused principles and practices that so brazenly ignore God's commands dealing with love, peace, reconciliation, brotherhood, care of the poor, respect for law and the constitutional authority.

Dean Francis B. Sayre, Jr., of the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C., in a sermon on September 13, took a somewhat different position, charging that the electorate had a "sterile choice" between "a man of dangerous ignorance and devastating uncertainty" and "a man whose public house is splendid in its every appearance, but whose private lack of ethic must inevitably introduce termites at the very foundation."

Election Returns

President Johnson defeated Goldwater 42,676,220 to 26,860,314, with 61.4 per cent of the popular vote. Goldwater's 38.6 per cent of the popular vote was the second lowest for any candidate of a major party in the history of presidential elections: Republican Alfred M. Landon running against Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1936 received 37.5 per cent of the major-party popular vote. (That year William Lemke, a Republican, ran as Union party candidate and received 890,000 votes. Had Lemke not split Republican votes, Landon might have received 40 per cent of the major-party vote.)

American voters repudiated Goldwater in landslide proportions. He carried only six states, his own Arizona and five in the deep South (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina), emerging unmistakably as the candidate of the racists.

Goldwater's appeal was greatest in the South and weakest in the East (see Table 1), particularly the Northeast. The more populous states, with large cities, industrial centers, substantial population of foreign-born and foreign

stock (children of the foreign-born), and Negroes, gave Johnson a greater proportion of their votes than less populous states, with a small foreign-stock population and with fewer than 20 per cent of Negroes voting.

TABLE 1. 1964 MAJOR-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL VOTE BY REGIONS

<i>Region</i>	<i>Johnson</i>		<i>Goldwater</i>	
	<i>Vote</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>Vote</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>
East	14,858,574	68.5	6,844,024	31.5
Midwest	13,449,674	61.5	8,427,014	38.5
West	7,093,304	59.6	4,815,699	40.4
South*	7,274,668	51.8	6,773,577	48.2
TOTAL	42,676,220	61.4	26,860,314	38.6

* Does not include 209,848 votes cast for independent electors in Alabama.

In a preliminary attempt to analyze the 1964 presidential election, an index of Democratic voting average was used to measure the Democratic increase (Republican defection) or decrease (Democratic defection) as manifested in the vote for Johnson.⁷

The New England states showed the greatest Democratic increase (see Table 2) of the 41 states that gave Johnson a higher proportion of their votes than they normally give Democrats. In 9 Southern states the Democratic percentage decreased, contrary to the national trend. States with a greater proportion of foreign stock shifted more heavily to Johnson than those with small percentage of foreign stock. (The diversity of political traditions of the ethnic groups, too, is important. For example, the comparatively large and recent colony of Volga Germans in North Dakota, classified as Russians, was not likely to vote like foreign-born groups in industrial cities. Similarly, French Canadians, latecomers among immigrants, have shown marked conservative voting habits. Nor are Basque shepherders in Nevada likely to vote like Polish immigrants in industrial centers.) Table 2 also suggests that the Republican defection was greatest on the Eastern seaboard, among the typical conservative Republicans, smaller in the Middle West, and least in the Far West, where populist and radical agrarian traditions still linger. (In the South, too, populism took hold, and strands of the populist heritage—distrust of central government and of industrial capitalism—were surely interwoven in the fabric of Southern ideology.)

Political analysts have tried to determine how many of the nearly 27 mil-

⁷ An average was taken of four elections for each state: two presidential elections (1956 and 1960) and two state elections, gubernatorial and/or senatorial for 1960 and/or 1962. The index is admittedly crude. For one thing, the vote in both presidential elections untypically magnified the Republican vote (Kennedy's Catholicism and Eisenhower's charisma). The use of Congressional votes might have given a truer picture for each state, but such computations were beyond our resources. Also, no account was taken of special state factors which may at times abnormally affect party voting. This index is intended to suggest possible ways of analyzing the sources of Goldwater support or resistance in the electorate.

TABLE 2. DEVIATION FROM DEMOCRATIC INDEX IN 1964 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE,
IN RANK ORDER, BY STATE AND PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN STOCK

<i>State</i>	<i>Democratic Presidential Vote 1964</i>	<i>Democratic Index</i>	<i>1964 Democratic Deviation</i>	<i>Combined Per Cent Foreign-Born and Foreign Stock</i>
1. Maine	68.8	40.1	+28.7	23.3
2. Massachusetts ...	76.5	48.7	+27.8	40.0
3. Vermont	66.2	41.9	+24.3	22.0
4. New Hampshire ..	63.6	41.3	+22.3	29.2
5. New York	68.6	46.4	+22.2	38.6
6. Rhode Island	80.9	59.6	+21.3	39.5
7. New Jersey	66.0	44.9	+21.1	34.7
8. Hawaii	78.7	59.2	+19.5	38.3
9. Kentucky	64.2	44.9	+19.3	2.5
10. Connecticut	67.7	48.6	+19.1	28.8
11. Michigan	66.8	48.9	+17.9	24.3
12. Colorado	61.6	44.2	+17.4	14.9
13. Pennsylvania	65.2	48.6	+16.6	22.1
14. West Virginia	67.7	52.0	+15.7	4.9
15. Maryland	67.7	52.9	+14.8	12.6
16. Wisconsin	62.2	47.6	+14.6	23.1
17. Minnesota	63.9	50.0	+13.9	25.6
18. Kansas	54.6	41.0	+13.6	9.4
19. Montana	59.4	46.3	+13.1	22.1
20. Washington	62.5	49.4	+13.1	22.9
21. Wyoming	56.6	43.5	+13.1	14.6
22. Alaska	65.9	56.9	+13.0	13.7
23. California	59.2	46.2	+13.0	25.4
24. Ohio	62.9	49.9	+13.0	17.0
25. Oregon	63.9	51.2	+12.7	17.0
26. Iowa	62.0	49.6	+12.4	14.0
27. No. Dakota	58.1	45.9	+12.2	30.0
28. Nebraska	52.6	41.2	+11.4	18.3
29. Texas	63.4	52.0	+11.4	11.3
30. Illinois	59.6	48.3	+11.3	24.3
31. Missouri	64.6	53.3	+11.3	8.5
32. Utah	54.7	43.9	+10.8	15.6
33. So. Dakota	55.6	45.3	+10.3	20.8
34. Delaware	61.1	51.3	+9.8	13.2
35. Indiana	56.2	46.4	+9.8	8.1
36. New Mexico	59.5	52.2	+7.3	8.4
37. Oklahoma	55.7	48.6	+7.1	3.9
38. Idaho	50.9	44.5	+6.4	12.4
39. Arizona	49.5	44.7	+4.8	18.1
40. Nevada	58.6	54.1	+4.5	17.5
41. No. Carolina	56.2	54.4	+1.8	1.5
42. Florida	51.1	55.2	-4.1	14.8
43. Arkansas	56.4	61.3	-4.9	1.9
44. Tennessee	55.5	60.9	-5.4	1.6
45. Virginia	53.7	63.0	-9.3	4.5
46. Georgia	45.9	68.6	-22.7	1.9
47. Louisiana	43.2	66.2	-23.0	3.8
48. So. Carolina	41.1	68.2	-27.1	1.6
49. Alabama	*	57.8	-27.3	1.7
50. Mississippi	12.9	80.4	-67.5	1.3

* Johnson was not on the ballot; 30.5 per cent of the vote went to independent electors.

lion people who voted for Goldwater were in fact Goldwaterites, that is, committed to the radical-right ideology that Goldwater appeared to espouse. Some observers believe that about half of these votes were cast by "brass-collar Republicans," described (*New York Times*, November 8) by a party official as "people who would vote for Walter Reuther if he were the Republican candidate for President." A private postelection survey conducted for Republican leaders indicated that at most 5.4 millions may have been Goldwaterites; another assessment of the same data put the figure at 2.5 millions (*Times*, December 18). A Louis Harris poll (*New York Post*, January 11, 1965) concluded that 6 million regular Republicans defected in this election and that only 9 million, about one-third of the people who voted for Goldwater, approved of his views. Louis H. Bean and Roscoe Drummond (*Look*, March 23, 1965) concluded that "the pure Goldwater vote lies between 2,500,000 and 3,000,000—not more."

Analysis of data from the Voter Profile Analysis (VPA) service—operated by Louis Harris, Columbia Broadcasting System, and International Business Machines Corporation—produced a profile (*Times*, November 8) of the committed Goldwater supporter: young, well-to-do, largely found in the new technical, industrial, aerospace centers of the South, Southwest, and Far West. Low-income and rural Goldwaterites were predominantly in the "core South." Voters of German background were the most likely of any ethnic group to be Goldwaterites.

Group Voting

Negroes: The Negro vote was the most significant group vote in electing Johnson. Negro votes gave him the margin of victory in Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia, and considerably increased his victory in North Carolina and Texas. VPA showed that Negro precincts voted 93 per cent Democratic in New Jersey, 94 per cent in New York and Maryland, 96 per cent in Pennsylvania, 98 per cent in Connecticut, and 99 per cent in Ohio and North Carolina.

Jews: The Electronic Vote Analysis of the National Broadcasting Company (*U.S. News and World Report*, November 16) showed Jewish precincts 90 per cent for Johnson in New York and 89 per cent in California and Florida. (The three sets of Jewish precincts in Los Angeles that had voted against Proposition 14 [see p. 163] voted 95 per cent for Johnson.) VPA (*New York Times*, November 4) showed heavily Jewish precincts in all reporting points averaging 89 per cent for Johnson.

In the New York Senatorial campaign between Democrat Robert F. Kennedy and Republican Kenneth Keating, many appeals to Jews were made, none reflecting any serious or real issue, but Kennedy ran considerably behind Johnson in Jewish districts.⁸ In New York Congressional primaries in June, Jewish appeals were made in contests between Reform Democratic candidates (William F. Haddad, Jonathan Bingham, and James H. Scheuer)

⁸ Cf. Milton Himmelfarb, "How We Are," *Commentary* (January 1965), pp. 73–74.

and regular Democrats (Leonard A. Farbstein, Charles A. Buckley, and James C. Healey, respectively), but none had substantive merit.

Irish: NBC's Electronic Vote Analysis showed 88 per cent of Irish precincts in Massachusetts for Johnson and 69 per cent in Illinois. The VPA showed Johnson carrying 66 per cent of Irish precincts.

Italians: NBC figures showed Italian precincts 89 per cent for Johnson in Massachusetts, 75 per cent in Illinois, and 68 per cent in New York State. VPA also showed the New York Italian vote at 68 per cent.

Slavic: According to NBC figures Slavs (presumably Poles, Slovaks, Ukrainians) voted 88 per cent for Johnson in Michigan, 86 per cent in Ohio, 80 per cent in Wisconsin, and 72 per cent in Illinois. VPA showed Polish precincts in New York 82 per cent for Johnson.

"Backlash"

The Wallace candidacy had suggested the possibility that white workers, traditionally Democratic, would punish the Democratic party for its espousal of Negro rights by voting Republican. The anticipated Democratic falloff was called the "backlash." But except for the racist South, that expected backlash did not materialize or was too slight to have any quantitative significance. For most non-Southern white voters, whatever their attitudes toward Negroes and civil rights, the issues of war and peace and economic security were more salient than their prejudices.

An analysis of votes for Johnson in selected areas that had given Wallace a larger vote than expected showed little evidence of backlash (*U.S. News and World Report*, November 16). For example, a Polish ward in Milwaukee which had voted 32 per cent for Wallace voted 18 per cent for Goldwater. A Gary, Ind., precinct that had voted 76.7 per cent for Wallace voted 35 per cent for Goldwater. Maryland counties that had gone 64 per cent for Wallace voted 42 per cent for Goldwater and Baltimore precincts 59 per cent for Wallace voted 25 per cent for Goldwater.

A study prepared for the Democratic National Committee, released April 1965, of voting returns in 233 selected wards in 15 major cities showed that Johnson had actually received a higher percentage of votes in predominantly Polish and Italian wards than had Kennedy in 1960.

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION

Increasingly Negro civil-rights leaders turned their attention to political and social action as an effective means of improving the civic and economic situation of Negroes. Voter education and registration have long been their concern, while political action with a view to exercising political pressure has only recently attained prime significance in Negro strategy. Social action—through demonstrations, protests, boycotts, and other forms of community pressure—has also increasingly been used in the North and South, particularly in campaigns to desegregate public facilities and public schools.

Voter Education and Registration

The Voter Education Project organized by civil-rights agencies in April 1, 1962, and coordinated by the Southern Regional Council, registered 688,800 Negro voters in 11 Southern states between April 1962 and November 1964. Statistics compiled by the Voter Education Project showed that in Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas more than half of the Negroes eligible to vote were registered. In Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia about 45 per cent of eligible Negro voters were registered; 39 per cent in South Carolina, 32 per cent in Louisiana, 23 per cent in Alabama, and 6.7 per cent in Mississippi. Only 4,500 Negroes were registered in Mississippi during this period. In all, about 28,500 Negroes are registered there, amounting to 5.2 per cent of all registered voters, though Negroes are about 36 per cent of the population of voting age. After about two years of activity and an expenditure of over \$50,000, the Southern Regional Council withdrew its support from the Voter Education Project in Mississippi on the ground that white resistance to Negro registration had made further effort futile.

Mississippi Freedom Summer Project

Early in 1964 an extensive plan for Negro political and social action, called the Mississippi Freedom Summer, was announced by the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), consisting of four civil-rights organizations: the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). Calling for the participation of about 2,000 full-time workers, including 1,000 white and Negro college students from North and South, the program envisaged "freedom schools" (with a curriculum ranging from remedial reading to political science), community centers, and "freedom registration," designed to place 400,000 Negroes on unofficial voter lists; a "freedom election," to be held during the regular Mississippi Democratic primary on June 2 and during the general election, to support "freedom party" congressional candidates and to lay a foundation for challenging the rights of the Mississippi delegation to sit in the House of Representatives on the ground that Negroes are denied the right to vote in that state.

The program was explicitly intended to bring the power of the Federal government into Mississippi, as Robert P. Moses, SNCC field secretary, told students on June 19, on the eve of their departure for Mississippi:

This is part of what we are doing, and getting the country involved through yourselves, that is, to open this up to the country and get the backing of the country and get pressure—public pressure, continual, mounting, steady public pressure—on all of the agencies of the Federal government and on all of the informal processes of this country. That's the only way we'll get any kind of creative solution to what's going on down there (*New York Times*, June 21).

Early in June the General Board of the National Council of Churches of Christ (NCCC) approved the participation of NCCC's Commission on Reli-

gion and Race in providing orientation courses for the student volunteers and in helping them understand their legal position and the physical danger that they would face in Mississippi. (The anxiety was not exaggerated: three workers were murdered [see p. 185].) NCCC also recruited ministers to serve as counselors to the student volunteers. The Rev. Bruce Hanson, NCCC summer-projects director, explained the NCCC role (*New York Times*, June 17):

We have agreed to train students out of the conviction that the church has the responsibility to do everything possible to avert violence; out of recognition that organizations recruiting large numbers of students will find it difficult to provide orientation and training; out of the need for people trained in skills like literacy education and voter registration, and out of the belief that orientation and training will benefit not only organizations operating projects and students, but also the states where projects are taking place.

Legal aid was provided by three groups, in addition to the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund: the leftist National Lawyers Guild; the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, founded in 1963, which limited itself to representing NCCC-recruited ministers and to persuading members of the Mississippi bar to defend civil-rights workers, and the Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee (LCDC), founded in the spring of 1964. The LCDC, which received initial financial backing from the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Committee, and other organizations, sent about 125 lawyers to Mississippi.

In all, there were about 1,200 volunteers in Mississippi during the summer: about 800 student recruits; about 235 ministers, rabbis, and adult laymen working on voter-registration; 61 ministers serving as counselors; over 150 volunteer lawyers; a medical committee; some professional teachers, and the COFO staff.⁹ Nearly 50 Freedom Schools, with an enrolment of 2,500 children, were opened as supplementary educational centers and 17 community centers were in operation.

It has been estimated that between one-third and one-half of the student volunteers in Mississippi were Jews,¹⁰ though there were few rabbis among the counselling ministers. (One, Arthur J. Lelyveld, senior rabbi of Fairmont Temple, Cleveland, was beaten by segregationists on July 10 in Hattiesburg, while with two civil-rights workers.) Jews were also well-represented in the legal and medical corps working in Mississippi among the volunteers.

Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party

The Mississippi Freedom Democratic party was founded on April 24, in Jackson, Miss., by COFO, to help carry out its political-action project. The party's first bid was to write John M. Bailey, Democratic national chairman,

⁹ "The Role of the National Council of Churches in the Mississippi Summer Project," *Social Action* (United Church of Christ, November 1964), pp. 10-14.

¹⁰ Report by Asa D. Sokolow on Mississippi, *Judaism in Social Action* (newsletter of the Joint Commission on Social Action of the United Synagogue of America), January 1965, pp. 10-13.

in July, asking the Democratic party to demonstrate loyalty to the Negro, "particularly to the Negro in Mississippi, who has not even had the leavings from the American political table." The Freedom party argued that it, not the regular Mississippi Democratic party, was loyal to the national party's candidates and platform and that its delegates (elected at a state convention early in August) ought to be seated at the Democratic party convention.

In Atlantic City on August 25 the Democratic convention's credentials committee, with Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, worked out a compromise plan to the Freedom party's challenge to unseat the regular Mississippi delegation. The compromise recommended (1) the seating of those members of the regular Mississippi delegation who signed an assurance of loyalty to the party's nominees in the general election, (2) the seating of two designated delegates from the Freedom party, with full delegate status, as delegates-at-large, (3) the admission to the convention as "honored guests" of the other Freedom delegates, (4) and instruction to the Democratic National Committee that the 1968 convention advise each state Democratic party to give all its voters, regardless of race, color, creed, or national origin, the opportunity to participate in party affairs. The convention overwhelmingly approved this compromise, but it was rejected by the regular Mississippi delegation (only 3 of its members signed the loyalty oath) and also by the Freedom party, though its two designated members (Aaron Henry, a Negro, president of Mississippi's NAACP, and the Rev. Edwin King, a white Methodist minister at Tougaloo Southern Christian College) took their seats as delegates-at-large. Because the compromise had generally been considered as a significant victory for the Freedom party, the party's refusal to compromise disappointed many friends and supporters. They thought the Freedom party's position inflexible, purist, naive and absolutistic.

Freedom party leaders tried to get on the Mississippi ballot as congressional candidates in the general election, but the state's Board of Election Commissioners ruled against them. Instead, the Freedom party held a four-day mock election, from October 30 to November 2, intended to demonstrate how Negroes in Mississippi would vote if allowed to register. The results were 45,218 for President Johnson, 12 for Goldwater. In mock congressional elections three Negro women, leaders of the Freedom party, were "elected": Mrs. Fannie Lou Hamer, Ruleville, 18,450 votes; Mrs. Annie Devine, Canton, 2,805 votes; Mrs. Virginia Gray, Hattiesburg, 7,150 votes. They "ran" against Democratic incumbents Jamie Whitten, Arthur Winstead, and William M. Colmer.

On December 6 the Freedom Democratic party announced it would challenge the seating of all five members of the Mississippi congressional delegation on the grounds that their election violated a constitutional requirement that members of the House be elected by all the people and that only 6.7 per cent of the Negroes of voting age were able to vote in Mississippi's last election. By December 23, 17 liberal Democrats were supporting a plan to bar the seating of the five Mississippi congressmen. But a further proposal by the Freedom Democratic party that Mrs. Hamer, Mrs. Devine, and Mrs.

Gray be seated in their stead found little support even among those in the forefront of the Negro struggle for voting rights, on the ground that no winners of a mock election could legally be considered to have been elected to Congress under the Constitution and that their seating would establish a dangerous precedent.

Protest Moratorium

On July 29 leaders of major Negro civil-rights organizations called upon their members "voluntarily to observe a broad curtailment, if not total moratorium, of all mass marches, mass picketing, and mass demonstrations until after Election Day, next November 3." The statement was issued after a meeting of civil-rights leaders in the wake of the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (see p. 155) and the Republican nomination of Goldwater (see p. 165), and represented a profound awareness of the importance of national politics to the advancement of civil rights. It was signed by Roy Wilkins, NAACP executive secretary; the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, SCLC president; Whitney M. Young, Jr., National Urban League executive director, and A. Philip Randolph, Negro American Labor Council chairman. James Farmer, CORE national director, and John Lewis, SNCC chairman, withheld their signatures pending meetings of their steering committees, which subsequently opposed the moratorium. (SNCC and CORE jointly sponsored what were generally considered nuisance demonstrations at the Democratic convention in Atlantic City.)

"The greatest need in this period," the statement declared, "is for political action" and its thrust was clearly against the Goldwater-dominated Republican party. The Republican platform was described as a "states'-rights platform" and the "Goldwater forces" were charged with having injected racism into the campaign. Indeed, the statement concluded, "the Senator himself maintains his position that civil-rights matters should be left to the states—clear enough language for any Negro American."

Desegregation Demonstrations: (1) South

In January militant Negro leaders in Atlanta, as elsewhere in the deep and upper South, began applying more aggressive tactics to secure the desegregation of public accommodations. At that time it did not seem that the public-accommodations section of the civil-rights bill would be passed. In Atlanta SNCC was particularly active in organizing a series of small-scale sit-in demonstrations at restaurants. On January 21 the *Atlanta Constitution*, in an editorial entitled "For a Public Accommodations Law; Against This SNCC-led Lawlessness," abandoned its opposition to the public-accommodations section of the civil-rights bill, since it had become clear that Atlanta owners would not voluntarily desegregate their facilities.

In February and March hundreds of Negro college students in Princess Anne, an Eastern Shore Maryland town, kept up militant demonstrations to desegregate local restaurants. Violence flared when large contingents of state police were called in, with dogs to reinforce their authority. Early in March

the students won a victory in their negotiations when they obtained a pledge that police dogs would not be used "unless there is a riot" and a promise from Governor Tawes that he would exert all the powers of his office to get through the new state law prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations (see p. 161).

In Jacksonville, Fla., Negro demonstrations in March against segregated hotels, motels, restaurants, and theaters erupted in mass rioting by whites and Negroes, numerous injuries, considerable property damage, and the arrests of more than 200 Negroes.

A campaign of a different sort was begun in March, when the NAACP made informal inquiries among concert artists whether they would be prepared to refuse to play before segregated audiences. The idea had come from the New York pianist Gary Graffman who, at SNCC's request, had turned down an engagement to play in Jackson, Miss. (*New York Times*, March 5). On March 9 the pianist Artur Schnabel said musicians should "actively participate in fostering" civil rights. As a Jew, he said, he had personally experienced the painful consequences of prejudice. Many others among America's most distinguished musicians agreed to support the campaign, including the pianist Vladimir Horowitz, New York Philharmonic conductor Leonard Bernstein, and Boston Symphony music director Erich Leinsdorf.

In St. Augustine, Fla., America's oldest city, SCLC began a campaign at the end of March to end segregation in public accommodations. The demonstrations lasted well into June and were marked by sporadic violence; about 300 people were arrested and many injured in clashes with the police and the KKK. On June 17 Martin Luther King sent a telegram to the 75th Annual Convention of CCAR, meeting in Atlantic City, in which he described St. Augustine as a "battleground between the forces of good and ill will in our nation." He said "strong pockets of Birch and Klan resistance, combined with indifference and fear in the white community, create a virtual concentration-camp existence for Negroes." He concluded: "Won't you join me in a prophetic witness against the social evils of our time?" Later that day 16 Reform rabbis and one layman left for St. Augustine; the next day they were all arrested in an attempt to desegregate a public swimming-pool. But in a matter of hours a grand jury proposed a 30-day cooling-off period without demonstrations, after which a biracial committee was named to negotiate the problems of discrimination.

Desegregation Demonstrations: (2) North

In the North civil-rights groups concentrated their most aggressive strategies upon public-school desegregation. Many Northern cities witnessed agitation against *de facto* school desegregation: school boycotts, picketing, and demonstrations. School segregation in the North has largely been the consequence of segregated housing, but school-zoning practices have often solidified and perpetuated residential segregation. Civil-rights organizations have proposed various plans to remedy this situation: redistricting school zones, pairing schools in adjacent districts racially to balance the school population,

transporting children from one district to another on the basis of voluntary choice or by assignment. But racial balance in the big-city schools has been difficult to attain for a variety of reasons: (1) the resistance offered by a slow-moving school bureaucracy, (2) antagonism rooted in prejudice, (3) opposition based on parental anxieties about their children's safety and the quality of their education, and (4) the inflexible facts of population change in our big cities. Central cities have increasingly become the nearly exclusive habitat of small numbers of well-to-do whites and large numbers of poor Negroes, with the result that there are not enough whites to provide a satisfactory racial balance in the public schools, short of engaging in mammoth logistical maneuvers.

The responsibility which school boards have for eliminating *de facto* segregation has been widely litigated. Two cases reached the Supreme Court in 1964. On May 4 the Court left standing a lower court's ruling that the school authorities in Gary, Ind., were not constitutionally obliged to end *de facto* segregation which its own policies had not caused. On October 19 the Court declined to review another lower court's decision allowing the New York City Board of Education to take into account the factor of racial balance in zoning a new school. Legal experts believed that the Supreme Court generally favored giving local school boards wide constitutional discretion to handle problems of racial balance as they deemed best.

According to the NAACP's annual report on school desegregation, more than 13 northern and western school systems took substantial action in desegregating. In White Plains, N.Y., a suburban community of 50,000, where Negroes were 10 per cent of the population and 19 per cent of the elementary-school pupils, the school board in April voluntarily and peacefully accepted a desegregation program that involved the closing of the only predominantly Negro school and distributing its pupils in other schools. A month after the plan was approved, the president of the board, who had endorsed it, was overwhelmingly reelected, by a vote of 2,952 to 511. Other communities acting to desegregate their schools included Teaneck, N.J.; Manhasset, L.I.; New Haven and Norwalk, Conn.; Sacramento, Cal., and Xenia, Ohio.

But these experiences were the exception. Demonstrations and pupil boycotts against *de facto* school segregation took place in Boston, Buffalo, Chester, Pa., Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Gary, Kansas City, and New York City. In Cleveland, school demonstrations were held over a period of months, from January through April, with sporadic violence offered predominantly from "Little Italy," adjoining the Negro neighborhood. On April 7, during a demonstration at a school-construction site in a predominantly Negro neighborhood, the Rev. Bruce William Klunder, a 26-year-old Presbyterian minister, was crushed by a bulldozer in a tragic accident. The Cleveland Chamber of Commerce then organized a biracial committee to deal with school problems. In August, after four months of unpublicized meetings, the committee agreed to support a school program by Cleveland's new school superintendent. The committee continued to meet in secret to explore racial issues in the city.

Biracial committees, appointed by city authorities to make proposals on school desegregation, functioned in Denver, Portland, Ore., and St. Paul, with varying degrees of support from civil-rights organizations.

In New York City the Board of Education was almost continuously embroiled in community controversy about school desegregation, a question which was inextricably associated with that of the quality of education. Most middle-class white parents opposed plans to achieve racial balance, believing that these would bring about inferior education; most Negroes insisted on racial balance, knowing that the segregated Negro schools were bad schools.¹¹ Negro civil-rights organizations called a school boycott on February 3 to protest the Board of Education's slowness in eliminating *de facto* segregation. Over 464,000 pupils, 45 per cent of the total enrolment, stayed out of school, mostly in Negro and Puerto Rican neighborhoods. A second boycott was called six weeks later, on March 16; 267,000 pupils, 26 per cent, stayed out of school. The first boycott had had the support of all major Negro civil-rights organizations (CORE, NAACP, Urban League, and many local groups), and some Jewish intergroup agencies (the American Jewish Committee's New York chapter opposed the use of boycott as a tactic to achieve desegregation). But the second boycott, called by the Rev. Milton A. Galamison of Brooklyn, N.Y., over the opposition of most civil-rights leaders, had little community support.

On March 12, in cold and snow, about 15,000 members of Parents and Taxpayers (PAT), an organization formed in 1963 to oppose desegregation and to maintain the neighborhood school, often charged with bigotry, marched in front of City Hall and the Board of Education to demonstrate their determination to fight the busing of pupils out of their neighborhoods. Civil-rights groups organized a countermarch on May 18, but it proved a disastrous failure, rallying only about 4,000 demonstrators.

Meanwhile, the Jewish Education Committee of New York, fearing that Negro pressure might induce the Board of Education to inaugurate a system of widespread and compulsory busing of school children, wrote the board on March 23 urging consideration for the needs of the Jewish afternoon religious schools, attended by nearly 50,000 public-school children. "School attendance," the letter declared, "should be planned so that it does not infringe upon the limited time and energy that our children have available for study of the religious beliefs, ethical precepts, and cultural heritage of our people." A similar position was taken by the New York Board of Rabbis a few days later: "The future of Jewish religious life depends upon this religious program. Any program of transportation which will reduce the afternoon religious school hours will do irreparable damage to the religious life of the New York Jewish community. We therefore urge you to evolve a pupil-transportation plan which will enable the Jewish community to maintain its afternoon religious school program intact."

Early in June the Board of Education published its school-integration pro-

¹¹ Cf. Midge Decter, "The Negro and the New York Schools," *Commentary* (September 1964), pp. 25-34.

gram, to go into effect September. Some school pairing and busing were foreseen. PAT groups, unsuccessful in preventing the plan from going into operation, called a boycott on the first day of school, September 14. Nearly 276,000 children, 27 per cent of the total enrollment, stayed out, mostly from schools to which pupils had been involuntarily transferred for purposes of integration or from schools that parents feared might in the near future be affected. The next day 233,000 pupils, 23 per cent, stayed out. Thereafter defiance was limited to several small groups, mostly in Queens, where skirmishes with the police ended in the arrests of some 60 parents. In many neighborhoods, private schools, sectarian and nonsectarian, found themselves the reluctant beneficiaries of these tensions, when some parents withdrew their children from the public schools.

School busing became an election issue in some campaigns for election to Congress, the State Assembly, and the City Council in New York, especially in Queens and Brooklyn. The 13th Assembly District in Queens (Glendale-Ridgewood), normally heavily Republican, gave Goldwater a majority of their votes, while electing a Democrat (with Conservative party backing) to the State Assembly, largely because he supported PAT in opposition to busing.

ECONOMIC AID AND COMMUNITY ACTION

In response to a New York *Times* survey in July among Negroes on key questions affecting them, the largest group of respondents, 54 per cent, said that the biggest problems Negroes had to worry about were economic—jobs, welfare, the high cost of living, low pay. The second largest group, 49 per cent, mentioned bad housing and high rents. Clearly, civil-rights legislation and political action, however vital and necessary, were nevertheless not enough for dealing with the deprivations and hardships that Negroes suffered as a consequence of prejudice and discrimination.

Economic Opportunity Act

The enactment of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, signed into law by President Johnson on August 20, 1964, to carry out a program popularly known as the war on poverty, inaugurated a new approach to these problems. The approach had its origins in Michael Harrington's *The Other America: Poverty in the United States* (New York, 1962) which *inter alia* discussed the special conditions of poverty endured by racial minorities. The Economic Opportunity Act, designed to help all poor people, had particular saliency for Negroes and other color minorities like Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans, who have proportionately more poor than other groups. According to a study of family income in 1963, 16 per cent of white families but 45 per cent of nonwhite families had an income under \$3,000. Nonwhites, about a tenth of the population, are a quarter of the poor.

The Economic Opportunity Act provides a variety of youth programs—job corps, training, and work-study programs; community action, with fed-

eral grants to community-action organizations for assisting low-income families in employment, job training, vocational rehabilitation, housing, home management, and welfare; programs to combat rural poverty, to provide business-investment and small-business loans, and to strengthen family life; recruitment, training, and placement of volunteers to assist in the war on poverty in a domestic Peace Corps called VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America).

The bill took nearly five months to pass Congress in one of the most partisan political battles waged there. Although it had some Republican support, its passage was clearly a Democratic victory. Considered as a legislative triumph for President Johnson, the passage of the bill was marred by a vicious attack by Southern Democrats on Adam Yarmolinsky, special assistant to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who was said to have been chosen as deputy to Sargent Shriver, director of the anti-poverty program. Yarmolinsky had long been a target of right-wing groups as an alleged Communist (he is not and has not been), because his name sounds Jewish (he is). He was also credited with having written a report for the Defense Department, recommending the end of racial discrimination in towns adjoining military bases. It was said that the North Carolina congressional delegation, headed by Rep. Harold Cooley, and congressmen from two Southern states had demanded, in exchange for their support of this bill, that the President oust Yarmolinsky from the program.¹² At a news conference on August 15, President Johnson, when asked about the reports that Yarmolinsky "had been offered as a sort of sacrifice to the Southerners in exchange for support of the poverty program," replied that Yarmolinsky had not been recommended for any specific position.

Community-action Programs

An addition to the work of long-established Negro self-improvement agencies like the Urban League and the hundreds of social-welfare agencies across the country, new community-action organizations, professional and volunteer, have come into being to help Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and other disadvantaged groups overcome disabilities resulting from their heritage of prejudice and discrimination. Some have operated privately, while others have enjoyed extensive Federal and private-foundation financial support. Some programs have shown marked success in relatively brief periods; the effectiveness of others is still being evaluated.

Philadelphia's Opportunities Industrialization Center, a highly successful job-training program, grew out of activities conducted by the Rev. Leon Sullivan, pastor of the Zion Baptist church, in the Negro section of North Philadelphia. It has combined social action (the selective economic boycott to force job openings for Negroes) with vocational training, educational and

¹² Cf. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Inside Report: The Yarmolinsky Sacrifice," *New York Herald Tribune*, August 11, 12, 1964; Ted Knapp, "Yarmolinsky Defended by Rep. Pike," *New York World-Telegram and Sun*, August 20, 1964; Evans and Novak, "The Yarmolinsky Affair," *Esquire*, (February 1965), pp. 80-82, 122-123.

tutorial programs, and a variety of self-help activities. It won the support of Philadelphia's mayor and Chamber of Commerce and the cooperation of major industrial companies. Federal agencies (Office of Economic Opportunity, Manpower Administration, Department of Health, Welfare, and Education) have shown an interest in the program and are seeking to expand it with Federal support.

In New York, Haryou-Act (Harlem Youth Opportunities Unlimited and Associated Community Teams), a project to improve the situation of about 71,000 youths in Harlem, was the recipient of several major federal grants under the Federal Manpower Development and Training Act, the Juvenile Delinquency Act, and the anti-poverty program. Haryou-Act's three-year budget amounted to nearly \$120 million. Mobilization for Youth, another New York social-action agency, with a multi-million-dollar program, has received funds under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, the Economic Opportunity Act, and various other public and private agencies. It has encouraged the poor and underprivileged among whom it operates to take part in social-protest activities, including rent strikes and civil-rights demonstrations, as part of a program to combat apathy and despair and build leadership and self-reliance. Both groups have encountered difficulties: Haryou-Act has been embroiled in Negro politics and Mobilization for Youth has been under criticism for Communist infiltration.

A self-help program of a different type was started late in 1963 by CORE, when it opened its first community center in Canton, Miss., in a predominantly Negro rural county. In 1964 CORE established more than 15 such centers in the rural South, as part of the Mississippi Freedom Summer Project. Books and facilities for a modest library and study room and for educational, tutorial, and recreational activities were provided.

An outgrowth of NCC's participation in the Mississippi Freedom Summer Project was NCC's Delta Ministry, a long-term interdenominational commitment to end the low economic, health, and social conditions of Mississippi's poor. In some places associated with the civil-rights forces, it is a wholly independent NCC program which formally opened on September 1. The Delta Ministry has undertaken a health program (health education, hygiene, nutrition, and first aid), relief (food and clothing), literacy, community-center programs, and citizenship-education classes.¹³

Volunteer programs have multiplied during the year elsewhere in the nation. For example, in Indianapolis women's clubs affiliated with the General Federation of Women's Clubs achieved notable success in helping school dropouts and delinquents and in providing study centers and tutorial programs. Many colleges and universities in or near cities with large Negro populations have organized volunteer tutorial and remedial-reading programs. For instance, a University of Chicago program, Student Woodlawn Area Project (SWAP), had 320 tutors in 1964 working with about 350 Negro children in remedial-reading centers.

13 National Council of Churches, *Delta Ministry Fact Sheet*, (mimeo, January 1965).

The National Council of Jewish Women has undertaken a variety of such programs throughout the country. The (Reform) National Federation of Temple Youth organized a Mitzvah Corps for its teenage members to work among underprivileged groups during the summer vacation. Participants in these groups later stimulated other year-round activities. Thus young members of Congregation B'nai Jeshurun in Newark, N.J., undertook to tutor Negro children in school subjects every Saturday morning at their synagogue as part of a program for the "meaningful application of the teachings of Judaism."

In August, in Philadelphia, YM-YWHA and the B'nai B'rith Vocational Service began a pilot project to deal with the problem of high-school dropouts.

In October 1963 the Urban League of Greater New York and the Metropolitan Council of the American Jewish Congress formed an Interracial Council for Business Opportunity, primarily to encourage the development of Negro-owned and -operated business. By the end of 1964 the group had 160 white businessmen as members, all expert in their fields, as volunteers helping Negroes to start or expand their own small businesses.

VIOLENCE AND INTERGROUP TENSION

Violence was a frequent concomitant of the struggle for civil rights and an index to intergroup tensions in both North and South. In 1964 about 16 people were believed to have been murdered in Southern states as a consequence of race hate and in reaction to civil-rights activities. Hundreds of Negroes and whites were injured in violence erupting from civil-rights demonstrations. In many parts of the South, dozens of Negro churches were bombed and schools burned. Racial violence affected also Northern cities, sometimes as a result of civil-rights activities and sometimes as an expression of urban tensions and Negro-white friction.

Mississippi

Violence, terror, and murder, bombings, burnings, and beatings have long been part of Mississippi's lawless treatment of its Negroes. Local autonomy has prevailed in law enforcement, particularly in isolated rural towns and villages, and the lack even of a state police force has enhanced the role of the elected local sheriff. "Mississippi," said James W. Silver, professor of history at the University of Mississippi, in *Mississippi: The Closed Society* (New York, 1964), "is famous for its justice. . . . Mississippi is famous for a past of police brutality, and for the sure harassment, even to death, of those who defy the code" (p. 90). The Mississippi Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, in a report in January 1963, commented that "in general the press is failing to meet its obligation to our society. The people of Mississippi are largely unaware of the extent of illegal official violence and the press is partly to blame." But no one, in Mississippi or out, was unaware of the murder of three civil-rights workers in the Mississippi Freedom Summer project in June. That murder catapulted Philadelphia,

a town in East Central Mississippi's Neshoba county, with a population of 5,500, into national, indeed international, prominence.

COFO's announcement of the Mississippi Freedom Summer project stimulated KKK activity in Mississippi (see p. 198). In March a poster offering 20 reasons for joining the Klan was dropped on the porch of nearly every white, non-Catholic home in Neshoba County, saying "Either you're for us or you're for the NAACP."¹⁴

Joseph Alsop, in his syndicated column (June 17), had written:

A great storm is gathering—and may break very soon indeed—in the State of Mississippi and some other regions in the South.

The southern half of Mississippi, to be specific, has now been powerfully invaded by the Ku Klux Klan, which was banished from the state many years ago. And the Klan groups have in turn merged with, or adhered to, a new and very ugly organization known as Americans for the Preservation of the White Race.

On June 21 three civil-rights workers set out from Meridian to Philadelphia to investigate the burning of a Negro church there some days earlier. They were Michael Schwerner, a 24-year-old settlement-house worker from Brooklyn, N.Y.; Andrew Goodman, a 20-year-old student from Queens, N.Y.; and James E. Chaney, 21, a Meridian plasterer. Schwerner and Goodman were Jews, Chaney a Negro. Both Schwerner and Chaney were members of a CORE-SNCC civil-rights task force in Mississippi. Schwerner and his wife had been in Mississippi for about six months, having opened CORE's community center in Meridian. Goodman was one of an advance group of student volunteers coming to take part in the Mississippi Freedom Summer project and had arrived in Meridian on June 20.

On June 22 the three workers were reported missing after having been allegedly released from jail in Philadelphia where they had been arrested on a speeding charge. That day the FBI began an inquiry into their whereabouts. Six weeks later, on August 4, FBI agents unearthed their bodies from a newly erected earthen dam in a wooded area six miles southwest of Philadelphia.

According to the FBI agents who patiently and laboriously uncovered the details of the conspiracy to murder the three civil-rights workers, leaders of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the Mississippi Klan formed earlier that year, had marked Schwerner for "extermination"—their word—as much as six weeks before the actual murder: he was a Jew, with a beard, unafraid in his comings and goings among Negroes. That Goodman and Chaney happened to be with him that fateful afternoon of June 21 was their tragic accident. The FBI disclosed that at least 50 persons had been in the conspiracy to murder Schwerner, convinced by the Klan that they were facing an invasion by Yankee beatniks, Jews, and other "scum."¹⁵

An illustration of the pervasiveness of hate and bigotry in Philadelphia is the fact that for months after the disclosure of the murder, tacked on the

¹⁴ David Nevin, "A Strange, Tight Little Town, Loath to Admit Complicity," *Life* (December 18, 1964), pp. 38–39.

¹⁵ *New York Times*, December 5, 1964; Nevin, *loc. cit.*

bulletin board of the Neshoba County courthouse in Philadelphia were handbills of the National States' Rights party, a viciously antisemitic and anti-Negro organization centered in Birmingham. One proclaimed: "Jew-Communists Behind Race Mixing," with pictures of Karl Marx and the then acting Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, an Episcopalian whom the racists liked to think of as a Jew.¹⁶

On December 4 the FBI arrested 21 men, including the Neshoba county sheriff and his deputy, for the murder of Schwerner, Goodman, and Chaney. Most of those arrested were members and several were leaders of the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Mississippi; one was a Philadelphia policeman and one a Fundamentalist Baptist minister. On December 10, United States Commissioner Esther Carter, before whom a preliminary hearing was held, ruled an FBI's agent's testimony incompetent and dismissed the charges against 19 of the defendants. The Justice Department subsequently dropped the charges against the other two. On December 29 Federal District Judge W. Harold Cox, in Jackson, at the request of the Justice Department, ordered a Federal grand jury to reconvene early in 1965 to hear charges against the 21.

Northern Summer Riots

On July 16 an off-duty police lieutenant in New York City shot and killed a 15-year-old Negro boy who had allegedly threatened him with a knife. After the shooting about 300 Negro teenagers battled with police with cans and bottles. It had all begun when the superintendent of a building across the street from a summer-session junior high school had allegedly deliberately sprayed water on three boys.

On the night of July 18, during a demonstration in Harlem called by CORE to protest the policeman's slaying of the Negro boy, violence broke out. Rioting and looting lasted four days, intermittently, with varying degrees of intensity, with hundreds of police trying to maintain peace.

On July 21, in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn's Negro area of even greater density and tension than Harlem, after another CORE rally protesting the shooting of the Negro boy, violence erupted and lasted several days. Thereafter rioting and looting broke out in a series of Northern cities, largely as a result of tension between police and Negroes: Rochester, N.Y., July 24-25, where Governor Nelson Rockefeller sent National Guardsmen; Jersey City, August 2-4; Elizabeth, N.J., August 11-13; Paterson, N.J., August 11-14; Dixmoor, a Chicago suburb, August 15-17, and Philadelphia, August 28-31.

On July 29, a conference of civil-rights leaders, which had issued also the

¹⁶ Racism in the South frequently went hand in hand with antisemitism. In February in New Orleans, the White Citizens Council was promoting telephone recordings—"Dial-a-Message"—called "The Voice of Truth" and "The Voice of the White Citizens Council," which attacked Jews as promoters of integration. Nor was racist antisemitism limited only to the uneducated. In December Marvin E. Frankel, a professor of law at Columbia University, sent to every Alabama lawyer a reprint of a *Columbia Law Review* article he had written, criticizing the official journal of the Alabama bar for publishing only white-supremacist views on civil-rights controversies. In response Frankel received mostly unfavorable mail. One anonymous correspondent wrote: "Frankel, the Civil War is over and the Zionist takeover is complete—what more do you want?" (*New York Times*, February 7, 1965).

statement calling for a moratorium on mass protests (see p. 177), in a separate statement condemned the rioting that had taken place: "We would like to once again go on record as strongly opposing looting, vandalism, or any type of criminal activities, and urge the cooperation and support of local leaders toward the elimination of this type of activity, which damages both the community and the civil-rights movement." But it was clear that they were unable to contain or control the Negro masses. This was underlined at a discussion in New York among a group of nationally known Negro writers, artists, and intellectuals, assessing the meaning of the Harlem and Rochester riots. According to the *New York Times*, July 29, all concluded that the established Negro leadership could not "reach the vast, submerged Negro 'lumpenproletariat'—that floating, unaffiliated, unemployed mass at the bottom of the social and economic order."

All these disorders reflected the tension between the police and both Negroes and Puerto Ricans, who have charged the police with brutality and bias. Civil-rights leaders have demanded the establishment of civilian review boards to investigate complaints of police brutalities. Such boards exist in Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Trenton, N.J. Mayor Robert F. Wagner of New York refused to appoint such a board, though on July 23 his office set up a six-man committee of Negroes and whites to review the Police Department's methods of handling complaints against policemen. On August 14 New York Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy appointed Capt. Lloyd Sealy as the first Negro to command a police precinct in Harlem. Negro civil-rights leaders hailed the appointment, but declared it was only the first step toward easing tensions between Negroes and the police.

On September 26 the FBI issued a report, which was submitted to President Johnson, that there was "no systematic planning or organization underlying the riots." The mob violence was dominated by youths "variously characterized by responsible people as 'school dropouts', 'young punks', 'common hoodlums', and 'drunken kids', and a common characteristic was 'a senseless attack on all constituted authority without purpose or object.'" The FBI found no evidence that the Communist party was involved, "though its members were observed taking part" in some of the riots.

Negro-Jewish Tensions

During the Northern city riots hundreds of stores were looted and damaged. Since most were owned by Jews and their Jewish ownership is often mentioned by Negroes, it has been difficult to determine what part antisemitism played in this display of Negro hostility to whites. A spokesman for the Brooklyn Jewish Community Council reported that during the Bedford-Stuyvesant rioting antisemitic slogans were being shouted (JTA, July 23). In Rochester, CORE headquarters and a Black Muslim mosque were untouched while Jewish-owned stores flanking them were looted and destroyed (JTA, July 27). Elmer Lewis, director of the Jewish Community Council of Rochester, explained that "Jewish businessmen were not the prime target because they were Jews" and that the outbreak was not to "be interpreted

as antisemitism." Primarily, he said, "the city faced a breakdown of law and order, but the Jews were the principal sufferers."

In Philadelphia, it was estimated (JTA, August 31) that 80 per cent of the wrecked and looted businesses were owned by Jews and that the losses and damages suffered amounted to several millions of dollars. Though the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia rejected as unwarranted charges that the riots expressed antisemitism, many Jewish businessmen believed that the rioting had a distinctly anti-Jewish flavor, especially since stores displaying signs "this is a Negro store" remained unharmed, while adjoining Jewish-owned stores were wrecked.

In "dismay and disappointment" over Negro wrecking and looting of Jewish stores, Martin Luther King issued a statement in August to the *Southern Israelite* of Atlanta:

While the outbursts in New York City and Rochester cannot be considered expressions of antisemitism, I am particularly pained to learn that a large percentage of looted stores were owned by our Jewish friends since, as a group, the Jewish citizens of the United States have always stood for freedom, justice, and an end to bigotry. Our Jewish friends have demonstrated their commitment to the principle of tolerance and brotherhood in tangible ways, often at great personal sacrifices.

Can we ever express our appreciation to the rabbis who chose to give moral witness with us in St. Augustine during our recent protest against segregation in that unhappy city? And who will ever forget the sacrifice of two Jewish lives, Andrew Goodman and Michael Schwerner, in Mississippi this past June?

It would be impossible to record the contribution that the Jewish people have made toward the Negro's struggle for freedom—it has been so great.

I solemnly pledge to do my utmost to uphold the fair name of the Jews. Not only because we need their friendship, and surely we do, but mainly because bigotry in any form is an affront to us all.

Tension between Negroes and Jews appeared in other situations. On April 21 a group of Negro teenagers, coming from a wake for a murdered friend, passed a Lubavitcher yeshivah in Brooklyn, N.Y., and attacked the younger Jewish children in the school yard. The Negroes yelled antisemitic slogans and shouted, "You don't belong in this country." Several students and two rabbis who came to their aid were hurt. Rabbi Samuel Schrage, principal of the yeshivah, was bitter and said that the school had for a long time wanted to move out of the neighborhood. NAACP official John A. Morsell condemned the attack, with the comment that it was "doubly tragic and ironic that the victims of one type of racism should themselves exhibit ethnic bias against another group." The attack was symptomatic of the tensions between Negroes in Bedford-Stuyvesant and the Jews, who lived mostly in the adjoining neighborhood of Crown Heights. Crime and violence had been increasing and fear engulfed the nearly half million people in the area, about 75 per cent Jewish, with hasidim forming a large sub-community among them. The attack on the yeshivah students was followed in May with an attack and attempted rape by a Negro of a rabbi's wife.

On May 17 Rabbi Schrage formed a civilian radio-car patrol organization called The Maccabees of the Community, patterned after the self-defense groups which Jews in Tsarist Russia had formed to protect themselves against pogromists. Negroes responded hostilely at first to the Maccabees, for in their experience private-citizen patrols meant vigilantism and were scarcely likely to elicit their approval. Yet once it became clear that the Maccabees' purpose was only to protect their neighborhood against crime and violence, Negroes became receptive to participation in the patrol. According to a report early in June by the New York City Commission on Human Rights, the Maccabees then consisted of 20 hasidic Jews, 50 other Orthodox Jews, 70 non-Orthodox Jews, and 60 Gentiles, 20 of whom were Negroes. On June 11 the Ministers Movement of Brooklyn and Long Island, Negro clergymen representing 72 churches, endorsed the Crown Heights Community Patrols—the Maccabees under a new name. One Negro clergyman admitted: "We recognize the absence of adequate police protection in the area. The people in Crown Heights were the ones who brought it to our attention. Perhaps we ourselves have been somewhat apathetic and lethargic in the past."

On June 22 the Council of Crown Heights was formed, a nondenominational, interracial organization of 35 local civic and religious groups, to provide a broader community base for the civilian patrols and help reduce neighborhood crime.

Antisemitism Among Negroes

Antisemitism among Negroes has been an especial Jewish concern partly for its own sake, but even more because of the tragic possibility that in resentment Jews would withdraw from the struggle for Negro equality. In fact, some Negro civil-rights leaders have minimized the extent of antisemitism among Negroes, lest it disrupt the alliance between Negroes and Jews on civil-rights issues. Seven leading Negroes in New York City, asked by the *New York World Telegram and Sun*, August 10, to comment on whether antisemitism was increasing, said it was declining. One, Percy Ellis Sutton, an attorney, said: "The Jew is the landlord. He is the merchant. He is the white man the Negro sees." A similar view was expressed in a press conference on May 21 (*New York Times*, May 24) by Malcolm X, the black nationalist leader who had broken with Elijah Muhammad's Black Muslim movement:

These [Jewish] people conduct their businesses in Harlem but live in other parts of the city. They enjoy good housing. Their children attend good schools and go to colleges. This the Negroes know and resent. These businessmen are seen by the Negroes in Harlem as colonialists, just as the people of Africa and Asia viewed the British, the French, and other businessmen before they achieved their independence.

Antisemitism among Negroes is discussed in William Stringfellow's *My People Is the Enemy* (New York, 1964): "A particularly ominous sign of the extremities of Negro animosity is the emergence in the open of Negro anti-

Semitism." After noting the competition between Negroes and Jews in politics, the economic relations between many Negroes and some Jews, the Negro resentment against the role of Jews in the civil-rights movement, Stringfellow adds that the overriding reason for Negro antisemitism is "some awful emulation of the anti-Semitism so long prevalent and so unyielding among middle- and upper-class white Protestants and Catholics" (pp. 115-116).

Negro-Catholic Tensions

In the spring, during the public debate about the civil-rights bill and during the Wallace primaries, it became increasingly apparent that many of the Catholic laity and even some Catholic church leaders did not comport themselves in accordance with their church's moral and religious teachings on justice and charity. In an editorial condemning such "convenient Catholicism," the Jesuit weekly *America*, June 13, reported that a Catholic laymen's association in Michigan had distributed 100,000 leaflets at the doors of 52 churches denouncing the civil-rights bill, after a letter had been read from the pulpits urging support of the bill.

Father Anthony S. Woods, S.J., in a sermon April 26, at the Church of St. Francis Xavier, New York City, warned against Catholic backsliding in race relations. He cited the role of Catholics in the Boston School Committee election of November 1963 against desegregating the public schools, the considerable vote for Wallace in distinctly Catholic areas, and the stoning of a Negro family that had attempted to move into the largely Catholic community of Folcroft, Pa., a Philadelphia suburb. More explicit condemnation of the Philadelphia archdiocese for its inactivity in civil-rights matters was expressed by Dennis Clark, a Philadelphia resident and former official of the Catholic Interracial Council. In *Commonweal*, May 1, he charged the leadership of the Philadelphia archdiocese with procrastination on civil-rights issues and warned that some Negro Catholics had flatly said they would leave the church if there was no change.

Even more severe public criticism was leveled against the leadership of James Francis Cardinal McIntyre, archbishop of Los Angeles, particularly for his failure to speak out against Proposition 14. (On July 28 he said that to take a stand on Proposition 14 would be contrary to archdiocesan policy and show "preference in political matters.") The controversy within the church reached its high point when Father William H. DuBay, 29 years old, announced on June 11 that he had written Pope Paul VI requesting the removal of Cardinal McIntyre for "inexcusable abuses" of the church's doctrines on racial equality. Two journals edited by Catholic laymen, the New York weekly *Commonweal* (July 10) and the California monthly *Ramparts* (Summer 1964), devoted major articles to Catholicism in Los Angeles, particularly to racial questions and Cardinal McIntyre's inaction. A priest writing in this issue of *Ramparts* said: "It is not surprising that our Catholic lay people are just as infected with race prejudice as anyone else because they never hear the Church's doctrine. The only way Catholics are accustomed to recognizing a doctrine as Catholic is by getting it at least occasionally men-

tioned from the pulpit and this matter of racism is simply not mentioned from the pulpit. Or at most, very rarely."

John Leo, in *Commonweal*, commented: "As for preaching on race, every priest in the Archdiocese realizes that this directly jeopardizes his career. Some do it. . . . The general pattern, however, is for a priest to be reprimanded and, perhaps, transferred for a sermon on race. Of those who are interested in the topic at all, most have learned not to do it."

On July 24, after submitting to Cardinal McIntyre, Father DuBay was transferred to another church. In June Father John V. Coffield, for 24 years a priest in the Los Angeles archdiocese, had been ordered to take a five-month enforced vacation because he had spoken against Proposition 14. In November he was ordered to maintain silence on racism. He chose instead "a self-imposed exile from the diocese as a gesture of protest against, and rather than be a part of, the continuing evil of silence" (*New York Journal-American*, December 29). He obtained a three-year leave of absence from the diocese.

(Protestant ministers, too, suffered reprisals when they spoke out on racial matters, and many clergymen in the North and particularly in the South lost their pulpits. An interesting development was the formation in January by Southern Presbyterian clergy and laymen of an organization to help churchmen whose "stand on racial and social issues has put them under critical pressure.")

CIVIL-RIGHTS MOVEMENT

In 1964 the Negro civil-rights organizations underwent considerable internal dissension and friction about their goals, strategies, and tactics. The intensification of nationalist moods among Negro leadership and the radicalization of considerable segments of the civil-rights movement, coupled with increased self-confidence, were the important developments of the year.

Civil-rights Organizations

NAACP (executive secretary: Roy Wilkins) remained the largest and most influential Negro civil-rights organization, with a membership of about half a million Negroes and whites in 1,600 local groups. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, a coordinating and service agency working primarily in 16 Southern and border states, does not have a mass-based operation comparable to NAACP's, but its president Martin Luther King, Jr., is universally acknowledged as the charismatic Negro civil-rights leader. (King won the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize; in presenting the award on December 10, Gunnar Jahn, chairman of the Norwegian parliament's Nobel committee, said King was the "first person in the Western world to have shown us that a struggle can be waged without violence.") A more conservative and highly prestigious organization is the National Urban League (executive director: Whitney M. Young), with about 50,000 members in 64 local groups, whose emphasis is on community action and social service in combating discrimination. The youngest and most militant among the four major Negro organizations is CORE (na-

tional director: James Farmer), with a membership of about 65,000 in 118 local groups. Founded in 1942, it achieved national prominence in 1960 with sit-ins in the South and Freedom Rides. The newest organization, making a strong bid for national leadership, is SNCC (popularly known as Snick), formed during the sit-ins in 1960; its northern counterpart is the Northern Student Movement. It has a youthful and aggressive leadership, a shifting membership, and a radical mystique. John Lewis is its chairman and James Forman its executive secretary.

Activist Pressures

All five organizations, from the relatively conservative Urban League to the radical SNCC, have been subjected to ideological, strategic, and tactical pressures from Negro nationalist sources, at one extreme, and at the other from clusters of Negro and white radicals (whether pro-Chinese, pro-Cuban, or pro-Russian Communists, or Trotskyite splinters), as well as from the individualistic radical groups sprouting on college campuses, like the Berkeley Free Speech Movement. The nationalist and radical components among the militants in the civil-rights movement are sometimes, but not necessarily, in conflict with each other; often, paradoxically, they reinforce each other, as for instance when three SNCC leaders—Lewis, Forman, and Robert Moses—went to Guinea in September as guests of President Sekou Touré.

In April CORE's Brooklyn chapter threatened to apply a "stall-in," that is, create a traffic tie-up on opening day on the approach to the World's Fair, their purpose being to show that they, the militants, could produce results in the civil-rights struggle by affecting those members of the society who merely passively assent to the evils of discrimination. CORE's national leadership condemned those "essentially revolutionary" tactics because they would alienate and embitter moderates engaged in civil-rights causes. The controversy was typical of the conflict between the radicals and the established leadership. CORE subsequently briefly suspended the Brooklyn chapter, but its national leadership remains under constant activist pressure.

The Black Muslims and the assorted black nationalists and racists also exerted influence on both the established and radical organizations, at least to the extent that these reflected pervasive Negro nationalist and anti-white feelings. Anti-white feeling at a moderate level exists among those Negro civil-rights leaders who believe that white men should not play directing roles in the Negro movement. As Negroes gain in self-confidence and self-reliance, they have become more assured in their own identity as Negroes and less dependent on whites for support.

Radical ideology and Negro racism coalesced on the subject of the "white liberal," a term of contempt matched only by the epithet "Uncle Tom." "White liberal" is intended to signify hypocrisy, applied to one whose acts, if he acts at all, belie his words. The typical "white liberal"—especially in New York, the political and intellectual capital of American Negroes—is more likely than not the urban Jew, long an ally in the struggle for civil rights, active in the labor movement and liberal causes, but increasingly

alienated by the extremism and radicalization of segments of the civil-rights movement and by the intensity of their hatred for all the established institutions of society.

Outlook

With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and growing realization of the ineffectiveness of the nuisance tactics advocated by some of the radicals, the leadership of the civil-rights movement has been faced with major decisions to be made about the movement's future direction. Current indications suggest that responsible leadership is looking toward a twofold program. (1) Intensified political action, involving voter registration and political education, in an alliance with labor and liberal professional elements in American society. Bayard Rustin, organizer of the March on Washington, August 1963, and of the first New York City school boycott, is the most outspoken advocate of this position, as expressed in his article, "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil-Rights Movement" (*Commentary*, February 1965). (2) Intensified community- and social-welfare programs among Negroes in the North and South to overcome their social, economic, and cultural disabilities.

LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ

Rightist Extremism

THE EVENTS and circumstances of the 1964 presidential campaign brought the problem of extremism on the American political scene into sharp focus. An umbrella of respectability was provided to extremists¹ during the campaign which enabled them to blend their efforts with those of legitimate political organizations and to recruit new followers. Propaganda further contributed to the substantial growth of many extremist organizations in the United States in 1964.

As debate raged in the Congress over the civil-rights bill (see p. 156), a coordinated effort to prevent passage of meaningful legislation by racists and extremists—united by their common opposition to civil rights for Negroes—became apparent. Thematically, both decried the use of Federal power to enforce civil rights for Negroes, and they sought to persuade Americans that the civil-rights struggle was part of a Communist conspiracy, extending from street demonstrations to Supreme Court decisions.

¹ For the purpose of definition, extremists are those whose activity and program constitute a threat to the democratic process. Some common characteristics are attempts to suppress differences of opinion, impugn the motives of those with whom they disagree, undermine confidence in the government, intimidate, incite to violence, and disturb the peace in furtherance of their objectives. Rightist extremists are also obsessed with domestic Communism and attach great significance to their insistence that America is a republic and not a democracy.

ORGANIZED FORCES

The precise number of right-wing extremist organizations existent in 1964 varied from day to day, mushrooming in response to the stimulus of national and world affairs, and diminishing as the urgency receded. However, tens of millions of Americans were exposed to their propaganda, disseminated by an estimated four to five thousand weekly radio and TV programs; an uncalculated number of Americans were additionally exposed to films, books, pamphlets, magazines, flyers, bumper stickers, "anti-Communism" schools and "lectures," and editorials and newspaper columns furnished without charge to hundreds of weekly newspapers.

Coordinating Committee for Fundamental American Freedoms

Spearheading the campaign to prevent passage of the civil-rights bill was the Coordinating Committee for Fundamental American Freedoms (CCFAF), created and financed by various southern state-sovereignty commissions to prevent or delay Negro integration in their states. CCFAF was the coordinating force in marshaling opposition to the civil-rights bill. Incorporated in Delaware in September 1963 and directed by John Satterfield, described by the *Washington Post* (August 3, 1963) as a "leading segregationist lawyer," it did not become overtly active until 1964. Before the end of that year, it was formally dissolved.

In the spring of 1964, CCFAF inserted full-page advertisements in more than 200 daily newspapers attacking civil-rights legislation as a "black jack" and a "grasp for executive power." Additionally it mailed more than a million letters and pamphlets all over the country. In implementing parts of its program, CCFAF was aided and abetted by such extremist groups as the John Birch Society, Manion Forum of Public Opinion, and We The People.

John Birch Society

In 1964 the John Birch Society, founded by Robert Welch, dominated the extremist movement and was by far the most successful of its kind in growth, impact, and financial support. Birch Society leaders sat in positions of power in other extremist organizations, and the grass-roots membership doggedly heeded Welch's instructions to "keep working on the leaders of the local and regional patriotic and conservative organizations which have members of our required quality to come into the Society and bring the best of their members with them" (*John Birch Society Bulletin*, July 4, 1963).

Robert Welch was among the foremost denigrators of American democracy, boasting (*JBS Bulletin*, July 1964) that

... we have awakened hundreds of thousands of formerly complacent Americans to the dangers of a democracy, to the fact that our Founding Fathers themselves—like the really informed Romans of a thousand years before—feared a democ-

racy as the worst of all forms of government, and to what our Supreme Court was doing to convert our constitutional republic into a democracy as a help to the Communists in their insidious efforts to take over our country.

In December 1964 the Birch Society, six years old, ended the most successful year in its history, with income totaling \$3.2 million, twice as much as in 1963. With a headquarters staff of 100 working at Belmont, Mass., the largest number of employees in its history, the society began a program of regional expansion, opening offices in White Plains, N.Y.; Houston, Tex.; San Mateo, Calif.; Chicago, Ill., and Washington, D.C. A council of 26 continued to serve as personal advisors to the founder, Welch. The society maintained what it called a research department, a lecture bureau, a monthly magazine, and more than 225 well-dispersed reading rooms or libraries stocked with extremist literature.

The society's program for 1964, aside from its deep but undeclared involvement in the election campaign as supporters of Barry M. Goldwater, included all-out efforts in support of the House Un-American Activities Committee and for the impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren and withdrawal of the United States from the United Nations. By its appeal for sympathy for local police departments, it was able to attract an unknown number of law-enforcement officials. By the end of 1964 policemen in Santa Ana, Calif.; Philadelphia, Pa., and Trenton and Newark, N.J., were revealed to be members. There was reason to believe that there were members in many more police departments as well.

Birch Society members were visibly strong in California, with nine identifiable Birchers entering the 1964 California Republican primaries, seven of whom were successful. The extent of Birch Society involvement in the presidential campaign was a matter of conjecture. Society member John Schmitz was elected to the California state senate. Assemblyman Kenneth J. Merkel, another member, was elected to the Wisconsin legislature. Welch proclaimed that a hundred members of the Birch Society had been delegates to the Republican national convention and "in political campaigns this spring all over the country . . . our members, as individuals, in many instances constituted the most important factor in determining the results . . ." (*JBS Bulletin*, January 1965). One staff member, quoted in the Houston (Texas) *Post* of July 22, 1964, maintained that the society's members kept a vigilant eye on the news media, "neutralized those reporters antagonistic to Senator Goldwater," and "worked in the precincts on door-to-door and telephone campaigns."

As the campaign progressed, the Birchers launched successful membership drives in such diverse sections of the country as Vermont and Texas, New Jersey and California.

The society's numerical strength remained a closely-guarded secret. Welch did state, however, that August 1964 was the most successful month for new chapters and members in the history of the society, that September figures were 27 per cent above August, and that October surpassed September by 37 per cent. Responsible sources estimated Birch Society strength at the year's

end to be between 60 and 80 thousand. At the time of writing the society's campaign was well underway to improve its "image" from that of a super-secret, cell-structured organization to one consisting of dedicated, patriotic, normal Americans with nothing to hide.

Manion Forum of Public Opinion

The Forum's founder, Clarence Manion, railed against the "confiscatory Marxist income tax," "wanton foreign-aid squanders," "socialist public-power destruction of states' rights," "Federal aid to education," and "unrestricted labor bossism." Based in South Bend, Ind., and supported primarily by industrialists, the Forum sponsored weekly TV and radio programs and published a monthly newspaper, tracts, and special reports.

We the People

Founded in 1955 in Chicago, Ill., We The People in 1964 claimed affiliations in over 1,700 communities throughout the United States. It issued home-study kits for the purpose of "educating individuals about the Communist menace in the United States" and published a monthly newspaper, *Free Enterprise*.

Christian Crusade

Not associated with CCFAF, but among the most zealous and energetic proponents of the "Save America from Communism" movements, was the Rev. Billy James Hargis's Christian Crusade. The Christian Crusade in effect was Billy James Hargis. It reached millions of people through radio broadcasts over some 400 stations, public appearances, weekly newspaper columns, a monthly magazine with a claimed circulation of 130,000, books, tracts, pamphlets, sermons, tape recordings, and films. In speech and writing, Hargis ceaselessly preached that the national government was controlled or strongly influenced by Communists, their dupes, or their agents.

At the end of the year Hargis proclaimed that the Christian Crusade had made a financial comeback in 1964 after a serious slump in 1963. As a result of Goldwater's candidacy, he said, "the whole conservative movement has come alive this year."

Southern-Based Organizations

Continuous pressure by Southern Negroes for an end to second-class citizenship, passage of the Civil Rights Act in June 1964, and the efforts of young Northern civil-rights workers to register potential Negro voters in the deep South during the summer (see p. 174) helped revitalize the old Ku Klux Klan. It also brought about the beginning of a new, independent Klan in Mississippi, for the first time since the immediate post-Civil War period.

KU KLUX KLAN

In the years preceding the active civil-rights struggle, Klan influence in the South appeared to be waning, but in 1964 the Klan made desperate efforts to reestablish its leadership in the segregation movement. It recruited intensely all over the South and in West Virginia, Indiana, Minnesota, Iowa, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and California. Estimates of total Klan membership in 1964 ranged between 60 and 75 thousand which, if accurate, would mean an increase of approximately 20,000 since mid-1963.

The Klan became much more militant in 1964 than in previous years, when isolated outrages or acts of intimidation or violence were usually perpetrated by individual Klansmen acting on their own initiative, rather than in obedience to organizational directives. In 1964 considerable dissension between "moderate" Klansmen and those who openly advocated violence led to new affiliations and exchanges of membership.

The Ku Klux Klan was an overall designation for several autonomous organizations, which had frequently been competitive. In 1964, despite indications of a struggle for power among Klan leaders, there was evidence of some growing cooperation. The most active Klan groups on the scene included:

1. *United Klans of America*. This relatively new group was born in February 1963, when the then dominant U.S. Klans was badly split by a struggle for leadership. Calvin Craig,² the Grand Dragon of Georgia, who first sought, unsuccessfully, to oust Robert Lee ("Wild Bill") Davidson as Imperial Wizard, subsequently left the U.S. Klans and organized a competing group, the United Klans of America. Within a short time Robert Shelton, leader of the then unaffiliated Alabama Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, joined Craig and brought his membership with him.

Shelton, who ultimately became Imperial Wizard of the United Klans, strove for unity, money, and respectability, and made a strong effort to erase the Klan's image as a movement of uneducated ruffians with violence on their minds. At some United Klan meetings, members were turned away for failure to wear a tie and jacket.

Shelton appeared to be successful in bringing together other fragmented Klan groups. The United Klans, originally confined to Georgia and Alabama, in 1964 was generally believed to be the nation's largest Klan, with some representation in North Carolina, South Carolina, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Louisiana, and a total estimated membership of 40 to 50 thousand. There were also reports of branches in some Eastern states and in California, though no identifiable Klan activity was recorded outside the deep South.

Shelton's Klan was antisemitic and anti-Catholic as well as anti-Negro.

2. *National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, Inc.* In 1960 a group of independent and splintered Klans organized a loose federation in opposition to the U.S. Klans, under the name of National Knights of the KKK, headquartered

² Grand Dragon Craig, in his first bid for the Georgia state senate in that state's September Democratic primaries, made a surprisingly good, but unsuccessful race.

in Atlanta and directed by a veteran Klansman, an Atlanta lawyer named James Venable. At various times the Dixie Klan of Chattanooga, the Association of South Carolina Klans, the Association of Georgia Klans, the Florida KKK, and other Klans were associated with the National Knights. The United Klans rejected affiliation with the group.

Until 1964 the National Knights was the second largest Klan in the country. However, during the year a serious falling out developed among its leaders. An attempt by the National Knights to rally a million Americans against civil-rights legislation, in cooperation with the American Nazi party, in Washington, D.C., on July 4, was a colossal failure.

3. *Mississippi Klan.* The rise of integrationist pressures on Mississippi (the summer student "invasion," the passage of the Civil Rights Act, and court-ordered school desegregation) paralleled the rise of the Klan in Mississippi, until then a state with segregationist roots so deep that it felt no necessity for any formal organization dedicated to preserving the color line by force and violence. With the arrest of Byron de la Beckwith for the murder of NAACP leader Medgar Evers, the Klan became active in Mississippi. In April 1964, during Beckwith's second trial, numerous crosses were burned in the Jackson, Natchez, and Mississippi Delta areas.

The first Klan inroads were made by the Louisiana-based Original Ku Klux Klan. In turn, its organizing efforts were preempted by the White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, indigenous to Mississippi. By May 1964 the White Knights had eclipsed all of its rivals and, with an estimated 4 to 5 thousand members, was believed to be the largest Klan in Mississippi.

The White Knights adapted its Klansmanship to the native task. It was more secretive, more violent, and more aggressive than other Klan groups. White Knight recruiting, which started in Brookhaven, Miss., during February 1964, used a widely distributed leaflet directed at "Jews, Turks, mongrels, Orientals" and the "Jewish-Communist civil-rights movement."

Because of the suspected implication of the White Knights in the murder of three civil-rights workers (see p. 185), Federal authorities cracked down on this state-wide organization. At the year's end, the White Knights were largely operating in underground fashion. It was believed that some 3,000 hard-core White Knight Klansmen had formed into quasi-military units with military discipline, a tight table of organization, and a considerable cache of arms and ammunition.

4. *Florida Klans.* As in other areas of the South, Florida Klans were sharply divided, agreeing only on their hatred of Negroes, Jews, and the "Federal Bureau of Integration." There were widespread differences in the ranks whether the Klan should be moderate or violent. (The moderates were those who just hated Negroes. Those calling for violence advocated arson and the use of guns and other weapons.)

The Klan claimed 3,000 members in North Florida. However, reliable estimates placed the total number of dues-paying Klansmen at 500. The former

chief of the Jacksonville, Fla., police department's intelligence unit characterized the Florida Klan as "a bunch of professional gunmen spouting off at the mouth, telling people what they are going to accomplish. But where the money goes no one knows" (*New York Journal American*, July 5, 1964).

5. *Louisiana Klan*. On January 18, 1964, more than 150 KKK crosses were ignited in southeastern Louisiana. Observers could determine no other reason for the sudden burst of Klan activity than the unexpected victory of the staunch segregationist John J. McKeithen in the Louisiana Democratic run-off primary for governor on January 11. The burning crosses signified, according to one participant, the start of "our fight for constitutional government and Christianity."

In late 1964 the Louisiana Klan was growing rapidly, but it remained a group of competing organizations. One disturbing aspect of the Louisiana Klan was its emphasis on arms and ammunition. Many Klan units in the state were known to be heavily armed.

6. *North Carolina Klan*. The Klan had been dormant in North Carolina since the 1959 conviction of Klan leader James "Preacher" Cole on a charge of incitement to riot (AJYB, 1959 [Vol. 60], pp. 49-50). In January 1964 the Klan was reactivated; reliable sources reported the existence of several Klaverns with an estimated membership of 650.

7. *Texas Klan*. On the whole, the Klan was inactive or defunct in Texas, although one Klavern in the southeastern corner of Dallas county showed signs of life. What Klan activity there was in the state originated in Texarkana, Ark., which straddles the state line. The Klan group, based on the Arkansas side, consisted of 30 or 40 Klansmen, half of whom lived in Texas.

OTHER SOUTHERN GROUPS

In addition to the Klans, other segregationist groups were operating in the South, particularly in Mississippi. Among the most active were the following:

White Citizens Councils. Once the strongest segregationist force in Mississippi, if not the entire South, the White Citizens Councils, with a claimed membership of 75 to 100 thousand in Mississippi and a national membership of a million, suffered a sharp decline in membership in 1964. The council, which at one time represented the only effective opposition to compliance with Federal integration decrees, lost influence and membership with the corresponding growth of the Ku Klux Klan. Most of the Citizens Councils' "upper-class members" yielded to the massive "Federal presence" in the South and resigned themselves to what they considered to be the inevitable. The more militant members of the Citizens Councils tended to join more aggressive groups.

With the decline of membership in the South, the Citizens Councils sought to expand their influences to other areas, notably California and Maryland. Organizational efforts were made in both of these states, but without great success.

Americans For The Preservation of the White Race. This totally new segregationist movement came into being in the latter part of 1963. By early 1964 it, too, benefited from the reaction to integrationist pressures on Mississippi and for a short time was successful in signing up recruits. By the middle of summer, it claimed a membership of 500,000 men in 30 chapters. Before the firm foothold established by the White Knights of the Klan, APWR was believed responsible for much of the terrorist activity in Mississippi. By the year's end, competent observers reevaluated its strength and membership and concluded that original claims had been grossly exaggerated; APWR was practically dormant.

National States Rights Party. The National States Rights party (NSRP) was active primarily in and around Birmingham, Ala. Emulating the American Nazi party, it boasted of a uniformed "elite guard." Its principal activity consisted of publishing and distributing a monthly newspaper, *The Thunderbolt*. Normal circulation varied between 500 and 3,000, a figure far in excess of estimated party membership. The party boasted of units in Georgia, Arkansas, California, Montana, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the state of Washington, but there was no evidence that these units existed there in anything more substantial than the name. NSRP members J. B. Stoner and the Rev. Connie Lynch, by their inflammatory and demagogic speeches before aroused segregationists in St. Augustine, Fla., contributed greatly to racial unrest as efforts were made to desegregate some of that city's facilities in the spring of 1964. Both of these well-known antisemitic and violently racist agitators functioned as individuals rather than representatives of the party. The party's income, by August 1964 appeared to have declined substantially from 1963 when, according to reports filed with the clerk of the House of Representatives pursuant to the Corrupt Practices Act, total NSRP receipts amounted to \$44,201.

Antisemitic Agitators

The impact, effectiveness, and volume of antisemitic propaganda continued to decline in 1964. Under the stimulus of civil-rights activity in the deep South, however, temporary but localized flare-ups occurred. The dormant KKK in its many varieties, Klan-like groups, and terrorist movements circulated antisemitic literature of an inflammatory nature to persuade the uninformed that the civil-rights movement was dominated by Communist Jews. But even where antisemitism was used in the South, it was not of prime importance in stirring up resistance to civil-rights activity. Anti-Negro prejudice was so deep that violent resistance to Negro demands would have taken place in the absence of antisemitism.

Apart from the antisemitic material produced to discredit the Northern students' voter-registration drive in the deep South, the routine propaganda consisted of hackneyed canards of Jewish domination, Jewish "manipulation" of the American Negro, and Jewish incitement of civil-rights activity for the sole purpose of mongrelizing white Christian America. The Jewish influence was seen as being responsible for the liberal pronouncements of Christian

clergymen, and antisemites continued to promote the sale of the discredited but durable *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

Jack Ruby's killing of Lee Harvey Oswald after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy was declared to be part of a Jewish-Communist plot to prevent the self-proclaimed Marxist from revealing incriminating details. The hate press invariably referred to Ruby as Rubinstein, and he continued to receive large quantities of antisemitic mail in his Dallas jail cell.

GEORGE LINCOLN ROCKWELL'S AMERICAN NAZI PARTY

The American Nazi party, based in Alexandria, Va., remained the creature of its Führer, George Lincoln Rockwell. Its meager fortunes continued to be inextricably tied to his personal activity. Membership fluctuated constantly and rarely, if ever, exceeded 175 in the entire nation.

Rockwell continued to enjoy a disproportionate amount of newspaper, magazine, radio, and TV publicity. He sought to enter the New Hampshire presidential primaries but was denied a place on the ballot by state authorities. His most successful area of activity continued to be personal appearances on the college campus. For a variety of reasons, the native Nazi was a much sought-after speaker by student groups, and during the course of the year attracted sizable though generally hostile audiences at Hofstra College, N.Y., and the universities of Minnesota, Michigan, California at Berkeley, Hawaii, and Washington. While his appearances had no significant effect on the students, the resultant publicity and lecture fees did much to keep the American Nazi party alive.

Other Rockwell-conceived ventures, generally executed with an imaginative flair and calculated to generate publicity, were such party activities as a picket line by uniformed storm troopers of the New York production of the controversial drama *The Deputy* (AJYB, 1964 [Vol. 65], p. 254), a boisterous, antisemitic "welcoming ceremony" for presidential candidate Barry Goldwater (New York Times, July 21, 1964) in the District of Columbia, and the insolent disruption of a hearing in the House Un-American Activities Committee on unauthorized travel to Cuba by a group of American students (September 3, 1964), when a storm trooper physically assaulted a committee witness.

Rockwell sought to organize a huge rally on July 4 in Washington, D.C., to protest against civil-rights legislation. The rally was called by one of his front organizations, the Committee of One Million Caucasians to March on Congress. Fewer than 300, half of whom were hecklers, attended it.

An attempt made to open a West Coast headquarters in Glendale, Calif., was met with firm resistance by city officials. At the year's end, efforts were under way to organize an area headquarters for the party in Dallas, Tex.

GERALD L. K. SMITH'S CHRISTIAN NATIONALIST CRUSADE

Through his *Cross and the Flag*, with a monthly circulation of 30,831, and 140 additional items of literature, G. L. K. Smith continued to be one of the

most successful antisemitic propagandists. His Christian Nationalist Crusade's gross receipts for 1964 were expected to total approximately \$250,000.

Other nationally distributed antisemitic publications circulating during 1964 included the *Winrod Letter*, published by Gerald Winrod, son of the late Gordon Winrod, a notorious antisemite before World War II; Kenneth Goff's *Pilgrim Torch*, and *Common Sense*, which continued to appear after the death of its founder Conde McGinley. The circulation of *Common Sense*, the most widely distributed hate sheet in the postwar period, had declined considerably by the end of the year.

Other Splinter Groups

Other extremist "councils," "parties," and the like were the Committee on American-Arab Relations, Congress of Freedom, Conservative Society of America, Constitution Party, Freedom Forum, Liberty Lobby, Minutemen, National Conservative Council, National Renaissance Party, Paul Revere Associated Yeomen, Inc., Soldiers of the Cross, and the White Party of America. (Some were ephemeral.) All took part in the 1964 election campaign.

ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The 1960 presidential campaign had seen anti-Catholic bigotry on a large scale, but the 1964 campaign was the most vicious and divisive within recent memory (see p. 165). For the first time in American political history, paperback books became a chief source of campaign propaganda. About 17 million copies of smear publications written by extremists of the right purported to offer documentation that the Johnson administration was soft on Communism and that the President was a man of little principle. J. Evetts Haley's *A Texan Looks at Lyndon*, John A. Stormer's *None Dare Call It Treason*, and Phyllis Schlafly's *A Choice, Not An Echo* were characterized by many observers as scurrilous. Birch Society members and officials admittedly distributed millions of copies.

The radical rightists apparently interpreted Goldwater's refusal to repudiate extremist groups and organizations unambiguously as a signal to go ahead. Abusive pamphlets, cartoons, newsletters and flyers with racial and religious overtones cropped up in all parts of the United States. Vilification of public figures and even ordinary citizens known to oppose Goldwater's candidacy was commonplace. In New York, Philadelphia, and northern New Jersey, citizens were urged to dial a telephone number to hear a recorded message on behalf of "conservative Americanism." During the week of August 11, dialers heard an anonymous voice attack Senator Jacob Javits (Rep.-N.Y.) as 100 per cent pro-Communist. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, people who had taken a public anti-Goldwater position received hate mail and crank telephone calls in the middle of the night.

Shortly after the Republican convention Robert dePugh, national leader of the small but militant Minutemen, an extremist group which advocated pro-

iciency in guerilla warfare in order to "repel the Communist invaders," announced that his group would play an "active, though clandestine role in support of Senator Goldwater during the presidential campaign." DePugh said that the Minutemen would infiltrate President Lyndon B. Johnson's campaign headquarters around the country and, he added, "their task will be to sabotage efforts in behalf of the President." DePugh was further quoted as saying that "it is important to defeat President Johnson because he is a political opportunist who would sell the United States out to the Communists or anyone else" and that "Senator Goldwater is a patriot who will try to stop the drift towards a Socialist police state that has been accelerated under the present administration."

White Citizens Council support for the Goldwater candidacy was unofficial but prevalent. Richard D. Morphew, public-relations director for the Citizens Councils of America, the coordinating body of all White Citizens councils, endorsed the Republican presidential candidate. Roy B. Harris, formerly a political power in Georgia, publisher of the avidly racist *Georgia Tribune*, and president of the Citizens Councils of America, was an organizer of a Democrats-for-Goldwater group. Former Georgia Governor Marvin Griffin made frequent appearances before Citizens Council groups, endorsing the Goldwater candidacy. Jack Galloway, president of the Georgia Citizens Council, in commenting on his endorsement of Senator Goldwater, cautioned reporters not to "underestimate the power of the Citizens Councils in the ballot box."

While some followers of the Christian Crusade, like other extremist elements, had reservations about the extent of Senator Goldwater's conservatism, they were assured by their director, Billy James Hargis, that Goldwater's election would be a step in the right direction, that some of his positions on public issues had been modified only for campaign purposes, and that once elected he could be persuaded to move more to the right.

And then there was the worrisome background of Karl Hess, Goldwater's principal speech writer and author of the provocative statement in Goldwater's acceptance speech: "I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you, also, that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue." Hess had been listed on the masthead of the *American Mercury* magazine from December 1955 through March 1958—a time when the previously respected *Mercury* was under the direction of publisher Russell Maguire and was emerging as a patently antisemitic publication. Former Major General Edwin A. Walker, in a speech in August to Hargis's followers, came out for Goldwater.

The National Conservative Council, a coalition of ultraconservative groups from 21 states, met in Chicago soon after the Republican convention and voted unanimously to support the Goldwater-Miller Republican presidential ticket. Among other things, the Conservative Council sought reversal of the Supreme Court's decisions on reapportionment of state legislatures and banning school prayers; repeal of the Federal income tax; an end to public housing, urban renewal, disarmament, and coexistence, and a return to religion,

patriotism and morality. It hoped to achieve these objectives by the election of Senator Goldwater. At the Chicago meeting many delegates predicted that defeat in November could come either through the reelection of President Johnson or through the election and capitulation of Senator Goldwater. There were repeated assertions that a failure to reverse "the trend towards collectivism" in this country might ultimately lead to violence.

The antisemites Gerald L. K. Smith and Kenneth Goff backed the Goldwater bandwagon enthusiastically. In August Smith sought to impress upon his followers that the Republican party was a white Christian party and that "anyone of his followers who would disregard Goldwater because of his Jewish background would disregard Saul of Tarsus. . . . Goldwater was raised in a Christian environment and was a confessed Christian all of his life." In the same month Kenneth Goff predicted to his Soldiers of the Cross that the hour of decision was at hand and that those who opposed Goldwater's candidacy were part of a "devil-inspired conspiracy." The numerically small but viciously antisemitic New Orleans-based organization, Paul Revere Associated Yeomen, Inc., proclaimed that the destiny of America was at stake and they should, therefore, "fight like Trojans" to elect Goldwater as president. The racist, antisemitic weekly Jacksonville (Fla.) *Chronicle*, in announcing its support for Goldwater, predicted that President Johnson's support would come from Jews as well as Negroes and that the election of Barry Goldwater would start America on the "long march out of the political wilderness."

Although official KKK support was not forthcoming, high Klan officials such as Georgia Grand Dragon Craig and the Imperial Wizard of the United Klans of America, Shelton, publicly endorsed Goldwater. Venable, of the National Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, based his endorsement on the fact that Senator Goldwater had not been raised as a Jew and had never worshipped as a Jew.

Kent Courtney, publisher of the *Independent American* and the head of the Conservative Society of America, organized a "conservative headquarters" in San Francisco from which he promoted pro-Goldwater demonstrations on the Republican convention floor, while gaining notoriety for an extremist attack on Governor William W. Scranton of Pennsylvania. George Thomas, long identified with the Congress of Freedom movement, expressed some reservations about Goldwater but argued that there was no other leader in sight to whom conservatives might turn and urged that he should therefore be supported. Joseph P. Kamp, a veteran extremist pamphleteer whose material in the past had indulged heavily in antisemitic innuendo, emerged from semi-retirement to write a widely distributed pro-Goldwater tract. Liberty Lobby, an extremist pressure group, produced and distributed a considerable quantity of "smear" literature attacking President Johnson.

Such publications as the *Dan Smoot Report*, *Human Events*, and *Free Enterprise* consistently echoed the "traitors in government" theme in order to attack Johnson's candidacy. The Life Line Foundation, the Rev. Carl McIntire's "Christian Beacon," and the Twentieth Century Reformation Hour emphasized the same theme over 600 radio stations.

Allen A. Zoll, whose defunct American Patriots, Inc., was once described as fascist by the U.S. attorney general, and whose record of professional antisemitism dated back to the 1930s, was discovered to be a full-time staff worker in the headquarters of Citizens for Goldwater-Miller in Washington, D.C.

Third Parties

In 1964 two of the splinter parties that inevitably emerge on the political scene during every presidential election were racist and antisemitic.

The National States Right party offered the electorate a slate consisting of the racist John Kasper, a former convict, for president and the veteran Klansman and outspoken antisemite J. B. Stoner for vice-president. NSRP appeared on the ballot in Arkansas, Kentucky, and Montana, polling a national total of 6,980 votes. In Montana NSRP ran Jack Gunderson as its candidate for Congress. He polled 644 votes, 125 more than NSRP's national ticket.

The Constitution party, whose various state units consisted of an amalgam of antisemites, rightists, and extremists, ran Joseph B. Lightburn for president and Theodore C. Billings for vice-president. The party, committed to the concept that America is a Christian nation, recorded a total national vote of 5,060.

Goldwater's Jewish antecedents generated less antisemitic literature than might have been reasonably anticipated. Antisemitic attacks on Goldwater were limited, for the most part, to the dissemination of anonymous greeting cards, letters, and post cards, supplemented by literature from professional bigots. Material produced by Rockwell's American Nazi party and the antisemitic NSRP charged him with being a "kosher conservative" and the "Jewish candidate." Greeting cards with the Star of David read: "I am for B. Morris Goldwater," and "a Half Jew in the White House is better than. . . ." A postcard with the slogan "Communism is Jewish" and the message that "Jews hope Barry makes the grade come November," and spurious "Jews For Goldwater" flyers promising that Goldwater could do for the Jews what "Kennedy did for the Catholics and Irish," were other widely distributed items. Other antisemitic anti-Goldwater propaganda pointed out that one of his daughters had spent a summer in an Israeli kibbutz, that he voted for the confirmation of Arthur Goldberg as a Supreme Court judge, and that he had publicly declared Admiral Lewis Strauss a great patriot.

President Johnson was similarly attacked because of his purported friendship with David Dubinsky and sympathy for Israel. A nationally distributed flyer bearing the imprint of "Labor for Goldwater" pointed out support of Johnson by "international bankers" and a businessmen's committee consisting of Sidney Weinberg, Ralph Lazarus, Robert Lehman, and Max Rabb, among others.

Local Campaigns

Some primary and local campaigns were marred by racial or religious factors.

In New York anonymous racists distributed a flyer captioned "The Kennedy NAACP Membership Application," and sought to link the senatorial candidate with Negroes on relief, a majority of whom, it implied, were dishonest.

The Committee on American-Arab Relations, a small but strident arm of the Arab propaganda effort, distributed flyers on the streets of New York City attacking Senator Kenneth Keating (Rep.-N.Y.) for his "extremist, pro-Israeli position," which it was alleged, had damaged American prestige in the Middle East. Later in the campaign the same group widely distributed a leaflet with the headline "KKK—Keating and Kennedy for Knesset," and the legend that "each candidate has done his utmost to express his love and devotion to Zionism and Israel, and hatred and opposition to the Arabs."

In a school board election in Dade county, Fla., a Jewish candidate was identified in his opponent's political advertisement as a former vice-president of the American Jewish Congress and was also charged with "still prosecuting lawsuits to ban Bible reading" in the public schools.

In the Maryland Democratic presidential primary, where Alabama's racist Governor George Wallace was an active candidate, a flood of racial and anti-semitic mail came into the state in an unsuccessful attempt to turn the tide in his favor. Many Marylanders received a letter from Gerald L. K. Smith, which, after boasting that the Christian Nationalist Crusade had rendered a practical and effective service in the Wisconsin and Indiana primary elections said: "I am confident that my friends in Maryland will be as loyal to my friend Governor Wallace as they were in the two other states."

A newly created racist and antisemitic movement, the White party of America, a splinter from the American Nazi party, urged Wallace to "denounce the Democratic party" and "openly declare himself a candidate of a white man's party."

Several days before November 3, Election Day, an antisemitic newsletter with the imprint of an organization calling itself the Harlem Council For Economic Development pledged its support to a candidate who, the letter said, had been denied the Liberal party's support in a New York judicial election because "Zionists in the Liberal party have joined their ilk" in the reform Democratic clubs to repudiate him. The newsletter accused the Zionists of endorsing an opposition candidate in order to increase their grip on the courts.

A candidate for alderman in Chicago's 49th ward found the windows of his home, which displayed photographs of President Johnson, splattered with eggs and marked with swastikas. In addition, crude swastikas were glued to his doors and his windows.

In Westchester county, N.Y., persons identified in a newspaper as being anti-Goldwater received National Renaissance party "literature" which screamed: "You are being brainwashed by a pro-Communist, Jew-controlled press."

CIVIL RIGHTS

In June the Civil Rights Act was enacted into law over the vote of the Republican candidate for president. The intensity of a heated election campaign exacerbated existing tensions.

The brutal murder of three young civil-rights workers (see p. 185), two of whom were Jews, in the outskirts of Philadelphia, Miss., focused the world's attention on that state, but bitter resistance was evident in other parts of the deep South as well.

Between the passage of the Civil Rights Act, in June, and the election on November 3, there were *at least* 109 instances of Negroes being beaten or assaulted; 85 cases of Negroes being actually shot; 87 bombings against premises they occupied or worked in; 89 Negro victims of miscellaneous types of violence, and 858 arrests of proponents of civil rights.

To what extent the radical-right organizations shared culpability with southern extremists for the violence and harassment inflicted upon southern Negroes and northern civil-rights workers was conjectured. But by their wide distribution of intemperate and hysterical propaganda, which labeled the law as "immoral, ungodly, and unconstitutional," a "huge step forward by the Communists in their sinister schemes and plans for taking over America," they laid themselves open to blame, if only in part, for the summer's carnage.

APPRAISAL

Almost without exception, extremist groups were enthusiastic and diligent supporters of the Goldwater candidacy. They permeated and penetrated the various *ad hoc* Goldwater-Miller units that mushroomed into existence in almost every community in the United States. It was often the Bircher or other extremist zealot who rang doorbells, distributed handbills, heckled the opposition, mounted telephone campaigns, and served as a foot soldier in the army of campaign volunteers.

At the end of 1964 there were two and a half to six million people intensely determined to lead and carry on a fight to provide America with rightist leadership locally, in the states, and on the national level. It could be predicted that they would bring to future political activities equal or greater zeal, intensity, and enthusiasm. The John Birch Society promised renewed vigor in its drive to "educate" the people and kept its pledge by a rapid growth whose roots were known to reach into such sensitive agencies as municipal police departments. Post-election harassment by Birchers of libraries and institutions promoting the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) was on the record.

The rightists, dominant in the Democratic party machinery of most southern states, appeared to be still firmly entrenched in the apparatus of the Republican party at various levels. They would not abdicate or yield hard-won influence without a fight. There was talk about the formation of a third po-

litical party which would serve as an organ for the right-wing extremists, southern segregationists, racists, and bigots. More political action by the rightist extremists was likely.

Any notion that the Johnson landslide in the 1964 elections had eliminated or even seriously impaired the extremist movement was not warranted.

MILTON ELLERIN

Church and State

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .

THE TWO RECENT Supreme Court decisions which applied this clause in the First Amendment to strike down a state-prescribed prayer and state-authorized reading from the Bible and recitation of prayers¹ evoked a storm of controversy and hastened a process of searching and reappraisal about the meaning of the enigmatic phrases of the First Amendment and the role of religion in American society. The critical response to the Court's decisions did not come entirely from the Court's unreconstructed Southern opponents or from troglodytic rightists, but also from forward-looking civic and religious leaders and distinguished legal experts, many of whom were reluctant to draw the far-reaching conclusion that the juridical separation of church and state meant an actual separation of religion from society. John C. Bennett expressed this fear of the secularization of public life in an editorial in *Christianity and Crisis* (June 8, 1964), liberal interdenominational Protestant biweekly, saying "we cannot assume that the best policy for the nation is to establish inhibitions on religious expression in the context of public life."

Most religious institutions believe their function to be broader than providing religious guidance to their own memberships and feel it is their responsibility to inform the society at large with their moral and ethical values. Thus, they have striven to exercise moral authority and persuasion on government and the public at large in great social issues like civil rights and the war against poverty. A position of strict separation if applied to the social reality will, they fear, relegate them to an obscure corner of human life, without impact as a moral or spiritual force in society. Thus, Thomas G. Sanders, professor of religious studies at Brown University, in *Protestant Concepts of Church and State* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964; x, 339

¹ *Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (AJYB, 1963 [Vol. 64], p. 105); *School District v. Schempp*, and *Murray v. Curlett*, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S. Ct. 1560 (1963), (AJYB, 1964 [Vol. 65], pp. 42-44).

pp.), published in cooperation with the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (NCC) as part of its ongoing program to clarify thinking in this area, argued that

American church-state independence . . . is neither co-operation nor separation, but a free functioning of religious groups with which the government does not ordinarily interfere unless the welfare of society, religious freedom, or nonestablishment seem threatened or violated. Whereas no real separation lies between church and state as far as the influence of the churches on the state is concerned, one can genuinely speak of separation, but not a "wall," with respect to the influence on or support of the churches by the state [p. 295].

Instead of citing "separation" as a traditional aspect of church-state relations in America, many Protestants have begun to talk about "separation and interaction."

"Separation and Interaction of Church and State" was indeed the title of a statement of general findings issued by the First National Study Conference on Church and State, convened by the NCC in February in Columbus, Ohio, with delegates from 24 Protestant and Orthodox communions and observers from the Roman Catholic and Jewish faiths. The convocation of this conference was in itself precedent-setting in that the participating groups were prepared to undertake a serious reappraisal of long-held and loyally-defended positions. The conference discussed many problems affecting church and state including those of conscience and resistance to civil authority, religion as an element in civic life and an influence on public policy, and government aid to church-related educational and welfare institutions. The statement of general findings which was issued combined generality with ambiguity, since it attempted to reconcile the most diverse views. Nevertheless consensus was obtained on this reading of the First Amendment:

While it is not the business of government to underwrite religion or to use its coercive powers to sanction or compel acceptance of any religious creed or practice, neither should it sanction or promote secular creeds or ideologies. Government exceeds its proper authority if it shows hostility or even indifference to religion. It may appropriately recognize in its public practice and in its publicly supported educational programs the role of religion in American history and life.

While it is not the business of government to promote or support religion, it is government's role and duty to further religious liberty. The clause of the First Amendment prohibiting an establishment of religion must be balanced against the clause prohibiting interference with the free exercise of religion. These clauses operate in many situations to supplement each other but are sometimes in conflict. Any concept of "neutrality" must take into account the proper balancing of the establishment and free exercise limitations.

A similar interpretation of neutrality in the First Amendment has been advanced by Wilber G. Katz, professor at the University of Wisconsin Law School who is also chairman of the National Commission on Church-State Relations of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and who took part in the study conference. In his book *Religion and American Constitutions* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1964; vii, 114 pp.), Katz argued for a

distinction between the concepts of separation and neutrality, citing this passage from Justice Black's opinion in the *Everson* case:

[The First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is to favor them.

According to Katz, "provisions for religious services in the armed forces are not aids to religion which violate the neutrality principle. They are not designed to promote religion, but to protect the religious freedom of those whom the government isolates from civilian life." Under an interpretation of absolute separation, Katz believes, such provisions would be outlawed, as would any incidental aid to religion resulting "from measures which are not designed to promote religion and the benefits of which are not limited to religious groups" (pp. 12-13).

This exploration on the part of religious leaders for a better understanding of the more subtle distinctions between separation and neutrality and of the many-faceted relations between religion and society has drawn on the experience and expertness of various constitutional lawyers. For example, Paul G. Kauper, professor of law at the University of Michigan, has served as an active member of the Commission on Church-State Relations in a Pluralistic Society of the Lutheran Church in America. In *Religion and the Constitution* (Louisiana State University Press, 1964; ix, 137 pp.), he set down three possible interpretations of the First Amendment: (1) the no-aid or strict-separation theory; (2) the neutrality theory as advanced by Philip B. Kurland;² (3) the accommodation theory (which he favors). Kauper holds that since both clauses of the First Amendment are interrelated, in some situations the government *must* and in some it *may* "accommodate its policies and laws in the furtherance of religious freedom" and in recognition of America's religious pluralism. Kauper's views on the constitutional aspects were clearly influential in the position paper *Church and State, A Lutheran Perspective: The Interaction of Religion and Law in a Pluralistic Society* (New York, 1963; ix, 47 pp.), prepared by the Commission on Church and State Relations in a Pluralistic Society of the Lutheran Church in America. This paper distinguished between institutional church-state separation and what it termed "functional interaction." Areas of functional interaction include church activity in furtherance of civic and political morality and in behalf of civic justice. The state, for its part, must ensure religious liberty for all, must acknowledge that the rights of man are not the creation of the state, and ought to provide "incidental benefits on a non-preferential basis in recognition of the church's civil services which are also of secular benefit to the community" and "financial aid on a non-preferential basis to church agencies

² In *Religion and the Law: Of Church and State and the Supreme Court* (Chicago, 1962): "The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden" (p. 112).

engaged in the performance of social services which are also of secular benefit to the community."

The gradually changing climate in Protestant attitudes, particularly toward church-state separation, has been the result of a genuine concern for religious pluralism and the growing recognition that American society must be broad enough to accommodate its diverse religious groups on an equal basis, sharing privileges and obligations equally. Specifically this has meant that most Protestants have come to realize that the public school is no longer their vehicle for Protestant religious culture. The changing climate has also meant a greater acceptance of Catholics and the kinds of institutions they choose to maintain, rather than insistence on civic conformity.

Among Jews, too, some stirrings of a changing attitude have been apparent but by and large Jews still favor a concept of the strictest separation of church from state because states in which the church was dominant in the pre-Hitlerian and pre-Soviet European past were more hostile to Jewish existence than secular states.

The changing temper on church-state questions has manifested itself most clearly in the area of Federal aid to education, where the shift in public opinion appeared to have developed from a national concern to improve education and educational facilities at all levels.

FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION

1964 witnessed a significant shift in public opinion in extending Federal aid to pupils in church-related schools and also a remarkable breakthrough in hitherto obstructed programs of Federal aid to education because of the deadlock over aid to church-related schools. Though bills for Federal aid to education have been introduced in every session of Congress since World War II, no important bill had ever been enacted because bills that did not provide for aid to parochial schools were blocked by Catholics, those that did were blocked by separationists and anti-Catholics, and all were obstructed by economy-minded congressmen who, opposing any Federal aid at all, took advantage of the impasse created by the two apparently irreconcilable positions.³ But the concern for the quality of education and the need of financial aid has produced a considerable change in opinion.

Concern for Education

On May 1, 1963, Walter Lippman in a television program, "CBS Reports," advocated Federal aid for all schools, including parochial schools, and declared that a bill for Federal aid to education most urgently needed to be enacted. Parochial schools, he said, were part of the American system of education. Since it was important that they, too, should receive financial assistance, "a way should be found of getting rid of this religious knot we've

³ A noteworthy account of the Congressional legislative unhistory of bills providing Federal aid to education is Robert Bendiner, *Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964).

tied ourselves into." Similarly, Robert M. Hutchins, president of the Fund for the Republic, at a conference on church-state questions at the University of Chicago on January 9, 1963, argued that "aid to all educational institutions that meet Federal standards would promote religious freedom as well as education. The overriding public purpose would be to improve education, including education under religious auspices."

The liberal weekly *The New Republic*, too, on March 2, 1963, urged Federal aid for parochial schools with Federal controls:

The national interest is in better education for *all* children, regardless of race, creed, or parental income. Nobody needs to send his child to a private school; but millions do. No useful purpose is served if these children grow up knowing less history or less chemistry than children who attend public school. Ignorance, not the Catholic hierarchy, is the enemy.

Educators, too, have manifested growing sympathy for the educational needs of children in parochial schools. The American Federation of Teachers, a union-affiliated organization which for years had opposed Federal aid to nonpublic schools, reversed its position in a statement of its executive council released October 7, declaring that "Federal support must reach the child where he is. It must provide that the child shall have the benefit of such Federal support in any given educational situation where he or his guardians elect to have him."

Catholic Parochial Schools

The growing awareness of the validity of different points of view held by different religious groups about religion and society, referred to earlier, has in some places been coupled with a willingness to take account of these differences in some suitable civic arrangement, specifically some form of constitutionally permissible aid to the Catholic parochial schools.

About 5.5 million Catholic children, 42 per cent of Catholic school children and 12 per cent of all school children in the United States, attend parochial schools. Many Catholic parents believe they unjustly bear a burden of double taxation for education. Some Catholics feel that their schools suffer because they do not enjoy the financial support that public schools receive, even though the parochial schools fulfill a public-welfare function by providing part of the school population with an education which the state would otherwise have to provide. The crisis situation of the parochial schools is generally acknowledged: most parochial schools are overcrowded, inadequately staffed, and financially unable to cope with the modern demands of education. Their financial plight was dramatized in September in the Catholic archdiocese of Cincinnati and its surrounding counties, when Archbishop Karl J. Alter closed the first grade in all parochial primary schools because of their financial inability to recruit qualified teachers. About 10,000 Catholic children were affected, 3,000 in Cincinnati alone where 19 classrooms had to be rented in community buildings and churches to provide for the new pupils in the public schools.

Catholics have insistently requested Federal and state aid for their schools. Citizens for Educational Freedom (CEF), a predominantly Catholic pressure group for Federal aid to parochial schools with a membership of over 30,000, at its fifth annual convention in August, heard assistant commissioner of the U.S. Office of Education, Peter Muirhead, compliment them for "leaving no stone unturned to find an equitable solution to providing equal educational opportunities for all the nation's youth."

Shared Time

The predicament of the Catholic schools has prompted educators and some Protestant groups to seek a just, legal, and charitable solution to what has been described as "our cold war in education." The most important proposal that emerged has been the idea of shared time, now more commonly called dual enrolment. Under this plan children would attend the public school for a certain period of time and study a certain portion of the curriculum—mathematics, languages, science, physical training. If their parents so desired, the children would attend a church school for other subjects. (A bill to provide Federal assistance for facilities to be used in shared-time programs was introduced by Congressman Adam C. Powell, Dem., N.Y., in the first session of the 88th Congress. Hearings on it were held during the second session, February and March, but the bill was not reported out and expired with the 88th Congress.⁴ The National Education Association submitted a study showing that shared-time programs have actually been in operation for some time in a small proportion of school systems—fewer than 300 out of 7,410, mostly in six states: Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—and have involved about 18,000 parochial-school pupils. Testifying before the Powell subcommittee, Francis Keppel, U.S. Commissioner of Education, said "there is a definite national need to strengthen and support such essential educational programs.")

The NCC's National Study Conference on Church and State, in February, referred to earlier, reaffirmed the right of parental choice in the selection of schools and the responsibility of the government to support education, concluding: "In recognition of the seriousness of the financial problem of the parochial schools, we propose shared time as the most creative measure for solving this problem and are willing to explore other legal methods for solving it."

On June 4, the NCC's General Board adopted a policy statement, "A Protestant and Orthodox Statement Regarding Dual School Enrollment," which approved further experimentation with dual-school enrolment:

It is our hope that dual school enrollment may prove to be a means of helping our nation to maintain the values of a general system of public education, yet at the same time meeting the needs of those who desire a system of church-re-

⁴ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearings Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Study of Shared-Time Education* (Washington, D.C., 1964).

lated education, while upholding the historic American principle of the separation and interaction of church and state.

A notable relaxation appeared evident in the testimony before the Powell subcommittee of Franklin C. Salisbury, general counsel for Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (POAU), the arch-separationist organization whose ardent defense of separation is matched only by its anti-Catholicism. He described POAU's attitude toward shared time as "watchful waiting":

. . . aware of the present financial problems of the parochial and independent schools, we are studying the various experiments in shared time to see if they will develop answers consistent with the needs of education and the freedoms secured by church-state separation.

Christianity and Crisis, in an editorial, May 11, urged experimentation with shared time, careful observation, and evaluation, declaring that the issues constituted "too fundamental a debate to be left to the 'church-staters,' who view all educational developments through the lens of their special interest."

The United Presbyterian Church, at the closing session of its 176th general assembly, May 27, was the first individual Protestant denomination to endorse the shared-time concept of education, as "perhaps the most creative possibility of breaking the legislative stalemate on the urgent and vital issue of Federal aid for public elementary and secondary pupils in the United States."

Jewish organizations have been more critical of shared time because of their deep commitment to the public school and their opposition to any measure that would appear to give government aid to religious institutions. The CCAR submitted a statement to, and the American Jewish Congress testified before the Powell subcommittee against shared time. Back in June 1962 the NCRAC had voted opposition to shared time, with the UOJC abstaining. Other Jewish organizations appeared to take a position of watchful waiting.

Limited Federal Aid to Church-Related Schools

In addition to favoring shared-time programs, several Protestant groups, further modifying their long-held separationist views, have now come to support other types of Federal aid to church-related schools. Thus, the NCC's National Study Conference on Church and State also approved the use of Federal funds for the health and welfare programs of church-supported primary and secondary schools—school lunches and dental and medical care. (It rejected a motion opposing any Federal aid at all to parochial schools.)

In October the 61st General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church adopted a resolution on limited Federal aid to parochial schools which was a significant departure from the position of total opposition to any Federal aid to these schools, held by the church since 1949 and reaffirmed as late as 1961. The 1964 resolution, presented by a Commission on Church-State Relations, headed by Professor Wilber G. Katz, recognized "the propriety of including [private, parochial, or sectarian] . . . schools in general

public-health and public-welfare programs, such as, among others, the provision of standard text-books and of equal bus transportation."

Even among Baptists and Fundamentalists, for whom the principle of church-state separation has been their historic guarantee of freedom and whose anti-Catholicism arises out of a long history of persecution and suppression in Europe, some shift in opinion has been discernible, especially regarding the advantages to their own educational institutions in accepting Federal aid. Thus, W. E. Price, Jr., president of the general board of the North Carolina Baptist Convention, at the convention's annual meeting in November, advocated the acceptance by Baptist colleges of Federal funds for construction. A year earlier he had opposed accepting such funds for new construction of the Baptist Hospital of Winston-Salem. Nonetheless the convention rejected the request which the Baptist college presidents favored and wanted badly. One of the consequences was widespread student protests and demonstrations at Wake Forest College where students flaunted "To hell with the Baptists" banners.

Jews are less prepared than Protestants to find some accommodation for the Catholic schools, largely because of their European experiences with established churches, and particularly with the Roman Catholic Church. Even today many Jews are suspicious and mistrustful of the instruction which pupils in Catholic parochial schools may receive about Jews and Judaism. But confronted with the problems of the growing number of Jewish day schools and their financial predicament, some Jewish groups have begun to have more sympathy for the Catholic position. Thus, self-interest and a growing perception of Catholic-school needs have had the effect of breaking down the seemingly monolithic Jewish position against any aid to nonpublic schools. A survey made in 1963 of the views of principals and directors of Jewish day schools affiliated with the National Association of Hebrew Day-School Parent-Teacher Associations showed them overwhelmingly in favor of Federal aid to day and parochial schools. (Under provisions of the National Defense Education Act, 32 Hebrew day schools have received \$479,500, besides aid through school-lunch programs and purchase of surplus property.)

The UOJC has been bitterly divided over the question of Federal aid. At its 66th biennial convention in November, a resolution advocating Federal aid to day schools passed by one vote, with many abstentions. But a motion to reconsider was subsequently adopted. The Union planned to submit the question to referendum among its member congregations.

Enactment of Federal Aid

The deadlock in Federal aid to education was broken in 1963 when several bills providing aid for specific types of educational programs were enacted, the more significant being the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 (Public Law 88-204), providing grants and loans to public and nonpublic colleges for constructing and improving academic facilities; the Vocational Education Act of 1963 (Public Law 88-210), expanding the 1958 National Defense Education Act, vocational-training programs and aid to projects in

impacted areas, and the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1963 (Public Law 88-129), providing aid for construction of medical and dental teaching facilities at public, private, and church-related schools (AJYB, 1964 [Vol. 65], pp. 57-58).

These laws, so successfully maneuvered through Congress that President Johnson characterized the first session of the 88th Congress as one that would go down in history as the "Education Congress of 1963," were a heritage of proposals made by the late President Kennedy's first education task force, appointed when he was president-elect, with Francis Keppel as its head. Keppel, then dean of Harvard's Graduate School of Education, became U.S. commissioner of education in 1962 and has remained President Johnson's chief education advisor. Also John W. Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation, has advised the President on educational matters, having chaired the 1964 presidential task force on education. By approaching specific educational problems and directing aid specifically to pockets of educational poverty, economically depressed areas, and dense concentrations of population, the first major breakthrough in Federal aid to education was accomplished. A lesser, though equally notable, innovation was provision of some Federal aid to church-related institutions of higher education with a minimum of public controversy.

The second session of the 88th Congress in 1964 continued this impressive legislative record, enacting a series of major and minor laws providing Federal aid to education. Two were of considerable scope: the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Public Law 88-452), popularly known as the "anti-poverty law," and Amendments to the National Defense Education Act, Impact School Aid (Public Law 88-665), a three-year extension of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958, a one-year extension of its impacted-area legislation, and a considerable expansion of the total program.

The Economic Opportunity Act, signed by President Johnson, August 20, 1964, embraces a variety of educational programs: Title I (Youth Programs) provides for basic education and vocational training for young people, 16 to 21, in conservation camps and residential training centers and for work-training and work-study programs. Title II (Urban and Rural Community Action Programs) grants \$340,000,000 "to provide stimulation and incentive for urban and rural communities to mobilize their resources to combat poverty through community-action programs." Education was one such program.

During the hearings on the bill before the House Committee on Education and Labor, representatives of Protestant, Jewish, and nonsectarian civic organizations were particularly disquieted about a provision in Title II for general aid to education in all schools on the ground that "no child shall be denied the benefit of such a program because he is not regularly enrolled in the public schools." (The National Catholic Welfare Conference, on the other hand, had expressed regret that the bill did not provide for "the full utilization of all the educational resources of this nation in the war against poverty.") The House Committee amended the bill before reporting it to the Senate on July 21, by replacing that provision with a stipulation against gen-

eral aid for elementary or secondary education in any school or school system. Instead, remedial reading and noncurricular educational assistance for the poor were specified as programs eligible for aid.

Church-related institutions or students in such institutions are eligible for Federal aid under the law and may take part in community-action programs. Both the work-training and work-study programs of Title I stipulate, however, that no Federal funds shall be used to assist enrollees or students on projects involving "the construction, operation, or maintenance of so much of any facilities used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship."

On December 16 the Office of Economic Opportunity, which administers the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, announced grants to parochial schools for programs under Title II in New Haven, Pittsburgh, and Detroit. The activities included remedial-reading centers, tutorial programs, prekindergarten programs, and supervised play and study centers. Conditions attached to grants going to church-related schools of school systems specify that none of the grant funds shall be used for the teaching of religion or religious proselytization; that the program shall be made available to all residents in the area; that participation in the community-action program shall not be used to induce participation in sectarian or religious activities or institutions; that textbooks shall be devoid of religious or sectarian content, and that facilities shall be devoid of religious or sectarian symbols and decorations. Grant funds shall not be used to release funds regularly expended by the school.

The NDEA, as amended in 1964 and signed into law by President Johnson on October 16, broadened the act to give aid to the improvement and strengthening of instruction in history, civics, geography, English, and reading. (NDEA aid had previously been limited to mathematics, the sciences, and foreign languages.) Assistance in these fields is extended, as in earlier NDEA aid, to both public and private nonprofit educational institutions, including church-related schools. The act provides for loans to students, including those in private schools; loans to schools, including private nonprofit schools, for equipment in the instruction of the specified fields; graduate fellowships and stipends, with the restriction that no fellowship be awarded for study at a divinity school for training in the ministry or any other religious vocation; aid for testing and guidance counseling available through the states to public and private schools; aid for the establishment of centers for language research and studies; aid to teachers in both public and private schools who wish to participate in advanced training institutes.

STATE AID TO EDUCATION

On November 30 hearings began in Annapolis, Md., on what is expected to become an epoch-making case in church-state educational questions. A year earlier the Horace Mann League, an organization whose primary objective is to foster and strengthen the public school and increase the esteem in which it is held, brought suit to enjoin the state of Maryland from appropriating

\$2.5 million dollars to four church-related colleges for construction of facilities: \$750,000 each to Notre Dame, Baltimore, and St. Joseph's College, Emmitsburg, Catholic colleges operated by religious orders, for science buildings; \$500,000 to Western Maryland College (Methodist-related), Westminster, for a science building and dining hall, and \$500,000 to Hood College (United Church of Christ), Frederick, for a dormitory.

Since the early days of the republic, Maryland has been allocating state funds to private educational institutions, regardless of religious affiliation, on the ground that they performed public functions. The colleges themselves contended in these hearings that their purposes were educational, not religious. The Horace Mann League has claimed that the state grant of funds violated the First Amendment because it "established" religion and the Fourteenth Amendment because it deprived taxpayers of their property without due process of law. The first witness for the defense, Manning M. Patillo, associate director of the Danforth Foundation, testified that 817 of the 1,189 private colleges and universities in the United States were church-related in some degree. The trial will continue into 1965. Leo Pfeffer, general counsel for the American Jewish Congress and chief counsel for the Horace Mann League, has predicted that the case will be argued before the Supreme Court. Obviously it will have the widest repercussions on the entire system of higher education, for church-related colleges and universities have been receiving Federal funds for a variety of specific purposes (designated as "categorical aid"), including the construction of science and research facilities.

Bus Transportation

In August, Dover, N.H., city attorney T. Casey Mohr ruled that the decision of the Dover School Committee to provide public bus transportation to students of a Catholic parochial high school was legal. Opposition to the city's provision of such service had been expressed by the Dover Ministers' Association.

In the general election, November 3, Anne Arundel county, Md. (county seat Annapolis), voted 27,648 to 21,604 in a referendum to repeal a 1963 state law providing for the use of public-school buses by children attending parochial schools in the county. POAU and the Maryland *Baptist* were influential in the repeal campaign. The county is largely Methodist and Baptist. (It voted also to repeal the state law forbidding discrimination in public accommodations; see p. 161.)

RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL

Despite the Supreme Court's decisions outlawing Bible reading and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the public schools as well as the recitation of the New York State Regents nonsectarian prayer, a variety of these and other practices continued in many schools.

In Miami, on January 29, a Florida Supreme Court for the second time upheld a state law requiring Bible reading in public schools and permitting

religious programs in graduation exercises and religious holiday observances in schools, despite the fact that the Supreme Court had returned the case for further consideration in the light of the *Schempp-Murray* decision (AJYB, 1964 [Vol. 65], pp. 53-54). The following month, four parents of Miami schoolchildren appealed the case once again. On June 1, the Supreme Court, without hearing argument, reversed the Florida Supreme Court decision 8 to 1, citing the *Schempp-Murray* decision. The complaints about other school religious practices were dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs had no standing to raise these issues.

Florida's state school superintendent Thomas Bailey provided the schools with the state attorney general's legal interpretation of what could and could not be done in the schools under the Supreme Court's decision. A report on school practices (Miami *Herald*, October 25, 1964) showed that compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling had been left largely to local authorities. In Dade county, where the case had originated, a period of meditation and the reading of inspirational and patriotic materials had been substituted for prayer and Bible reading. School boards in St. Lucie and Walton counties voted to continue prayer and Bible reading.

Surveys of practices in school districts in Indiana and in Kentucky similarly showed that prevailing local autonomy led to widespread disregard of the Supreme Court's rulings and that many schools and/or teachers encouraged "voluntary" or "spontaneous" prayers or Bible readings.

In Moscow, Idaho, a three-judge Federal court ruled in August, on the complaint of 35 Protestants, to "halt the practice of religious indoctrination," that a section of the Idaho code requiring compulsory daily Bible reading in the public schools was unconstitutional.

In two widely separated communities, Pueblo, Colo., and Olean, N.Y., the boards of education had agreed to accept Gideon Bibles for distribution upon request of the pupils' parents, but when challenged on the constitutionality of the practice, both school boards, in November, rescinded their approval.

Teaching About Religion

In writing the opinion for the majority in the *Abington v. Schempp* case, Justice Tom Clark said:

It might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistent with the First Amendment.

Though there was no widespread rush to introduce the study of religion in the school curriculum (a UPI survey, *New York Times*, September 1964, showed considerable reluctance on the part of school administrators to introduce into the curriculum a subject calculated to affect many sensibilities), many educators and religious leaders expressed interest in the idea.

The Cincinnati Board of Education, late in 1964, approved a policy governing the interaction of religion and education in the public schools, which permitted certain practices, in connection with Christmas for instance, that it believed had become part of the community's cultural heritage, and provided for instruction about the role of religion in history and culture. In June 1964 the Maine Board of Education issued a policy statement permitting the public schools to use the Bible in literature and history courses. Pennsylvania's State Department of Public Instruction retained a tri-faith panel of five scholars to recommend a Bible course to be given in the public schools. *Religious Education* (November-December 1964) published a symposium "Religion in the Public Schools," to which 19 religious and educational leaders contributed, nearly all of whom favored an objective course of study about religion in the public schools (two of four Jewish participants disapproved).

A report by the Commission on Religion in the Public Schools of the American Association of School Administrators, *Religion in the Public Schools* (Washington, D.C., 1964; vi, 67 pp.), supported the idea of teaching about religion: "The Commission believes that the public school curriculum must give suitable attention to the religious influences in man's development." The commission strongly favored the production of high-quality material on the history of religion and of comparative religion suitable for use at the secondary level that would accent the role of religion in America's cultural heritage. The commission further expressed its belief that public schools should help develop "worthy moral and ethical values," and must take cognizance of the religious pluralism that is America. (In accepting religious pluralism, the commission also recommended that the public schools adopt a policy that "encourages reasonable recognition of Christmas" in the "spirit of exposition of the differing rites and customs of families, cultures, and creeds—each with deep meaning for its adherents, and in sum revealing the many different religious, philosophical, and cultural practices and beliefs held by Americans.")

The National Conference of Christians and Jews was working under a grant from the Ford Foundation to develop materials for the public-school curriculum dealing with the religious heritage. One study under way was being prepared in cooperation with the Pittsburgh school system, concerning material on the role of religion to be introduced in the social-studies curriculum of the Pittsburgh senior high schools.

Campaign for a Constitutional Amendment

From the start of the 88th Congress in January 1963, a number of congressmen had introduced resolutions to amend the Constitution so as to permit prayer in the public schools. These resolutions reflected the emotional response of many Americans that the court was somehow depriving them of their religion, indeed, of their traditional way of life. Because Rep. Emanuel Celler (Dem., N.Y.), chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, had scheduled no hearings on these resolutions, Rep. Frank J. Becker (Rep.,

N.Y.), a most vigorous advocate of a constitutional amendment who had proposed the first such resolution in the 88th Congress (and also a later amended version), filed a discharge petition on behalf of his proposal to take it out of the Judiciary Committee and bring it directly before the House. Becker had obtained only 167 of the 218 signatures required for discharge, but the enormous flow of mail to congressmen on behalf of an amendment made it appear likely that the pressure from their constituencies would induce others to sign Becker's discharge petition. At this point, with 146 resolutions filed by 110 congressmen, Celler scheduled Committee hearings.

In advance of the hearings the Committee on the Judiciary issued a staff study of the proposed amendments.⁵ The study found that there were 35 versions of amendments among the 146, differing in language and scope, which could be classified in seven types:

1. To permit prayers in public schools (5 resolutions);
2. To permit prayers in public schools and other public places (19);
3. To permit prayers and Bible reading in public schools (12);
4. To permit prayers and Bible reading in public schools and other public places (30);
5. To authorize any state to permit the Regents prayer, declared unconstitutional in the *Engel* decision, to be offered in public schools and other public places (1);
6. To permit "any reference to belief in or reliance upon God" in any government or public document, proceeding, or ceremony or upon currency and coinage (1);
7. To permit prayers, Bible reading, and references to belief in God in public schools, other public places, and in governmental matters (78).

Congressman Becker's second resolution (H.J. Res. 693)⁶ was in this last category; 60 Congressmen filed the identical text in individual resolutions.

After the Committee hearings began, several Congressmen continued to file resolutions. In all, 117 Congressmen filed resolutions to amend the Constitution. Several filed two resolutions and Congressman Robert W. Hemphill (Dem., S.C.) filed three. 65 were Republicans, 52 Democrats. The South provided the largest single bloc of 43; the Northeast 36, the North Central states 24, and the West 14.

An analysis in *Report from the Capital*, a bulletin published by the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs in March gave the religious identity of the

⁵ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *Proposed Amendments to the Constitution Relating to School Prayers, Bible Reading, etc.: A Staff Study* (Washington, D.C., March 24, 1964).

⁶ H.J. Res. 693 reads:

"Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit the offering, reading from or listening to prayers or biblical Scriptures, if participation therein is on a voluntary basis, in any governmental or public school, institution, or place.

"Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit making reference to belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a Supreme Being in any governmental or public document, proceeding, activity, ceremony, school, institution, or place, or upon any coinage, currency, or obligation of the United States.

"Nothing in this article shall constitute an establishment of religion."

then 110 sponsors of amending resolutions: 95 Protestants (25 Presbyterians, 21 Methodists, 16 Baptists, 8 Episcopalians, 7 Congregational Christians, 3 Lutherans, 2 each of the Christian Church and the Evangelical Free Church of America; one each of the following denominations: Apostolic Christian Church, Church of Christ, Evangelical and United Brethren, Latter-day Saints, Schwenkfelder, 6 unspecified "Protestants"), 13 Roman Catholics, one Jew (Congressman Charles S. Joelson, Dem., N.J.),⁷ and one Unitarian.

Public Opinion

A Gallup poll released August 1963 showed that 70 per cent of the respondents disapproved of the Supreme Court's decision against prayer and Bible reading in the public schools (24 per cent approved and six per cent had no opinion). A poll by Louis Harris taken in the closing days of the presidential election campaign (New York *Post*, October 30, 1964) showed that 88 per cent of the voters interviewed supported Barry Goldwater's position that prayers in the public schools should be restored. The Minnesota Poll (Minneapolis *Tribune*, June 28, 1964) showed 61 per cent of Minnesotan respondents favoring a constitutional amendment to permit prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. (Nevertheless, 77 per cent believed that even if the amendment were passed, it would not make much difference in the United States.)

The mail campaign on this question overwhelmingly favored a constitutional amendment by even larger margins than the public-opinion polls. A spot check of congressional offices, according to *Congressional Quarterly*, May 1, 1964, showed record amounts of mail pouring in, nearly all of it favoring a constitutional amendment. Some of the mail was nationally solicited, but much seemed to be locally stimulated or spontaneously conceived.

Pros and Cons

The House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on school prayers from April 22, 1964, to June 3, 1964.⁸ A long line of witnesses appeared to testify for and against the proposed amendments and an enormous quantity of opinion was entered in the record.

Leading constitutional lawyers appeared to testify against a prayer amendment. Many taught at outstanding American law schools and included highly respected Protestant and Catholic lay leaders, like William B. Ball, prominent New York and Pennsylvania lawyer and Catholic layman; Paul A. Freund, Harvard University; Wilber G. Katz, University of Wisconsin; Paul G. Kauper, University of Michigan Law School; Rev. William J. Kennedy, S.J., Boston College Law School; Philip B. Kurland, University of Chicago Law School. Erwin N. Griswold, dean of Harvard Law School, who had bitterly

⁷ Congressman Joelson's proposal differed from H.J. Res. 693 in one respect. It specified "listening to nonsectarian or nondenominational prayers or such Biblical Scriptures." He was, presumably, concerned to exclude Christological matter that would be offensive to Jews.

⁸ U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, *Hearings on Proposed Amendments to the Constitution Relating to Prayers and Bible Reading in the Public Schools* (Washington, D.C., 1964).

criticized the court's position as "absolutist" on church-state questions,⁹ wrote the committee opposing the constitutional amendments.

The division between proponents and opponents of a prayer amendment was political rather than religious. To some, adoption of a constitutional amendment symbolized an assault on the Supreme Court, a means of curbing its authority, and a retribution for its decisions on civil rights. Others favored a constitutional amendment perhaps only because it would enact into law, and force compliance with, a code of behavior that appeared to be vanishing. Like Fundamentalist Protestants a half century ago who enacted state and local Bible-reading and anti-evolution laws to enforce Protestant morality, many Fundamentalist Protestants and like-minded Catholics saw in a possible constitutional amendment an opportunity to use the authoritative power of government to enforce an old-fashioned kind of religious morality that they believed was unfortunately passing from our society.

This campaign for a prayer amendment showed the compatibility between religious and political conservatism. The 1964 Republican party platform—the most conservative and controversial in many years—supported a constitutional amendment

permitting those individuals and groups who choose to do so to exercise their religion freely in public places, provided religious exercises are not prepared or prescribed by the state or political subdivision thereof and no person's participation therein is coerced, thus preserving the traditional separation of church and state.

The Democratic party platform did not mention the subject at all. Its silence was criticized as "utter disregard for God" by Republican presidential candidate Barry M. Goldwater in a campaign speech at the Salt Lake City Mormon Tabernacle on October 10.

Civic groups favoring a constitutional amendment included the Catholic War Veterans, U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce, American Farm Bureau Federation, local branches of the Daughters of the American Revolution, Sons of the American Revolution, General Federation of Women's Clubs, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the American Legion. *Ad hoc* citizens groups like the Constitutional Prayer Foundation (Baltimore, Md.), Massachusetts Citizens for Public Prayer, Committee for the Preservation of Prayer and Bible Reading (St. Petersburg, Fla.), and Project Prayer (Los Angeles), which came into being to stimulate and organize public pressure on behalf of a prayer amendment, appeared to be rightist. Sam Cavnar, executive director of Project Prayer, according to his own testimony at the hearings, had been executive director for Project Alert, a West Coast anticommunism school, one of whose lecturers had once declared that Chief Justice Earl Warren ought to be hanged. Charles W. Winegarner, who testified for an amendment on behalf of a Citizens Congressional Committee (Los Angeles), has been on Gerald L. K. Smith's staff. Governor George C. Wallace of Ala-

⁹ Erwin N. Griswold, "Absolute Is In the Dark—A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions," *Utah Law Review*, Summer 1963, pp. 167–82.

bama, too, testified before the Judiciary Committee, inveighing against the Supreme Court's decision ruling out prayer as "part of the philosophy of socialism elevated to the dignity of law" and "part of the deliberate design to subordinate the American people, their faith, their customs, and their religious traditions to a godless state." (Robert E. Van Deusen, public-relations secretary of the National Lutheran Council, in his monthly *Washington Memorandum* to Lutheran church leaders, April 1964, had characterized the advocates for an amendment as more strongly motivated against the growth of federal power and the intervention of the Federal government in civil rights than by concern for the religious aspects of American culture.)

Religious Groups

Only a minority of religious groups and religious leaders favored a prayer amendment, though a substantial number had disagreed with the Supreme Court's ruling and held that it would have been preferable had the Court not ruled at all on matters they felt best left to local consensus or agreement.

Protestants

Nearly all major Protestant denominations and their influential leaders opposed a prayer amendment and testified against it: Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Baptists (including the Southern Baptist Convention), Lutherans (including the conservative Missouri Synod), Methodists, Disciples, and Seventh-Day Adventists. Few nationally known Protestant church leaders favored a prayer amendment, the most notable being Daniel A. Poling, editor of the conservative nondenominational *Christian Herald*, and Bishop Fred Pierce Corson, president of the World Methodist Council.

Only three segments of Protestants could be identified as favoring an amendment:

1. The Eastern churches—the largest and most outspoken being the Greek Orthodox Church in North and South America, headed by Archbishop Iakovos—coming out of a tradition of a close interrelation of church and state and originating in countries where political leaders were closely aligned with ecclesiastical authorities and changes in civil government were followed by comparable changes in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. The criticism by these Eastern churches of the principle of separation of church and state in America is largely a consequence of their close ties with the mother churches overseas and the fact that, as an immigrant religion, they are still in a fairly early stage of American acculturation.

2. The theologically more conservative Fundamentalists and evangelicals affiliated with the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). The NAE itself, founded in 1941 because its members thought the NCC was too liberal theologically and politically, early in January issued an official policy statement endorsing a prayer amendment, and its former president Robert A. Cook, chairman of its Evangelical Action Commission, testified for an amendment before the Judiciary Committee. The National Holiness Association, 14 evangelist denominations affiliated with NAE, adopted a resolution at its an-

nual convention in April, urging its affiliates to "bring all possible pressure to bear upon Congress" in favor of a prayer amendment. Also some individual Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Baptist churches belonging to NCC-affiliated denominations but maintaining their own NAE membership because they find its theology and politics more compatible than NCC's, testified or submitted statements favoring an amendment.

Yet, even the NAE conservatives were divided. *Christianity Today* editorialized, on June 19, against the Becker amendment because it threatened the First Amendment whose "precise definition of church-state separation stands as a unique American contribution to government, basic to our most precious liberties and worthy of being preserved intact." Billy Graham, too, failed to testify on behalf of the Becker amendment, even though he had once expressed support for it.

3. Carl McIntire, president of the International Council of Christian Churches, Collingswood, N.J., one of the earliest and perhaps the most adamant foe of liberal Protestantism, as well as the NCC's most vitriolic critic, testified in favor of a prayer amendment. McIntire, who considers the NCC communist and subversive, also holds that the NAE is too liberal. His son, Carl Thomas McIntire, is national chairman of International Christian Youth in the United States of America, which is actually the youth commission of his father's International Council of Christian Churches. This group sponsored Project America, a national petition campaign to "return the Bible to the schools," and claimed to have collected a million signatures asking for a constitutional amendment. At Judiciary Committee hearings, Larry Miller, Project America's national director, stated that his undertaking was not the same as a Project America sponsored by Liberty Lobby, a right-wing organization dedicated to abolishing the income tax by constitutional amendment, which coincidentally also supported a constitutional prayer amendment.

Catholics

Though Catholics had been vociferous in condemning the Supreme Court decisions and three out of five Catholic cardinals had loudly voiced their disagreement with the Court's rulings on religion in the schools (Richard Cardinal Cushing, Francis Cardinal Spellman, and James Francis Cardinal McIntyre), no leading Catholic ecclesiastic supported a constitutional amendment. The only ranking church leader who appeared before the Judiciary Committee was Bishop Fulton J. Sheen, who testified in support of school prayer but did not actually endorse an amendment. As a matter of fact he said he believed "our first amendment and ninth amendment presently are preferred [to H.J. Res. 693 or any of the other proposed amendments] and would preserve prayer in school and the liberties of the people of the United States."

America, the Jesuit weekly, had long opposed amending the First Amendment; an editorial on April 18 adduced a new argument: that a prayer amendment would not solve questions affecting the relationship between religion and education—specifically Federal aid to parochial schools—and "might freeze the court's Church-State doctrine as it now stands." *Ave Maria* (June

6, 1964), a national Catholic weekly, surveying the views of editors of Catholic publications, found that 35 of 48 opposed a prayer amendment. The editors gave the following reasons for their opposition: "Reluctance to resort to constitutional amendment, concern over weakening of chances for aid to parochial schools should the amendment be enacted; the view that public school devotions with proper concern for all involved are a practical impossibility; and the fear that many parents would consider public school prayers as adequate religious instruction for their children."

On June 16, nearly two weeks after the Judiciary Committee's hearings had ended, the legal department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference urged caution on amending the Constitution: "The department continues to believe the present clauses in the Constitution are of incalculable benefit to religion. . . . In combination, the 'free exercise' and 'no establishment' clauses are guarantees too vital to be tampered with lightly." This statement so infuriated Becker that he charged the NCWC did not speak for the Roman Catholics of the United States. He then undertook to poll the 229 Catholic bishops, but apparently received too few replies to publicize them.

Jews

Jews were practically unanimous in opposing Becker's amendment and others like it. Rabbi Menachem M. Schneerson, the Lubavitcher rabbi who favored nondenominational school prayer like the Regents prayer, opposed sectarian prayer and Bible reading, and sent a statement to this effect to the committee. Major national Jewish organizations testified or submitted statements against the proposed prayer amendments: the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Anti-Defamation League, Synagogue Council of America, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and National Community Relations Advisory Council.

The Outcome

While the hearings were still under way, public opinion reversed itself. Mail to Congressmen began to run heavily against the amendments. After the hearings the Judiciary Committee took no further action on any of the amendments, and Becker was unable to obtain more signatures for his discharge petition. All amendments died with the 88th Congress.

CHURCH AND STATE AT THE VATICAN COUNCIL

On September 14, the third session of the Second Vatican Council convened. High on the agenda was a draft declaration on religious liberty which had been prepared for the previous session by the Vatican Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity, headed by Augustin Cardinal Bea, with the participation of John Courtney Murray, S.J., Catholic philosopher and foremost American Catholic authority on church-state relations. The draft declaration stressed that religious liberty must be recognized and respected by all, that

it is unlawful for the state to discriminate against religion, and that it must protect and encourage religious liberty. The debate was launched on September 23 by Richard Cardinal Cushing, Archbishop of Boston, in his first speech since the Council opened in 1962. Saying that he spoke for "practically all the bishops of the United States," he declared that "the church must become the champion of religious freedom. We must insist on this declaration because it is so important for all nations. . . . It is something the Catholic world and non-Catholic world alike have been waiting for." Opposition to the declaration came from some of the Italian and Spanish prelates, particularly from the conservative wing led by Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, secretary of the Supreme Congregation of the Holy Office.

On November 17 the document on religious liberty was distributed to the members of the Council with the promise that it would be voted on the 19th, but on that morning Eugene Cardinal Tisserant, Dean of the Sacred College, announced that the vote would be delayed (the Council was to close within 48 hours). That announcement precipitated an extraordinary reaction among the Council Fathers, particularly the Americans to whom this declaration, like the one on the Jews, had become of the utmost actual and symbolic importance. Commotion broke out on the Council floor, with people milling around. Albert Cardinal Meyer, Archbishop of Chicago, began to remonstrate with Cardinal Tisserant. Then, Bishop Francis Reh, rector of the North American College in Rome, asked for paper. He, with Cardinal Meyer, Joseph Cardinal Ritter, Archbishop of St. Louis, and Paul-Emile Cardinal Léger of Montreal, hastily drew up a petition to present to the Pope, asking him to reverse this ruling "lest the confidence of the world, both Christian and non-Christian, be lost." Within an hour, they had over 800 signatures and eventually about 1,400, more than half of the Council Fathers. But to no avail. F. E. Cartus, a pseudonymous Catholic observer at the Council, wrote in *Commentary*, January, 1965, that the prevailing disillusion over the maneuvers to set aside the declaration on religious liberty forced the conservatives to allow the declaration on the Jews to come to a vote on November 20, even though they had intended to block its passage too (see pp. 126-27). It was expected that at the final session of the Vatican Council in 1965 the discussion on religious liberty would be resumed, and the declaration which the overwhelming majority clearly favored would most likely be adopted.

Government Aid to Church Schools

On November 17 Cardinal Spellman opened the debate on a draft declaration on Christian education in which he proposed the following amendment:

Parents should be free to choose the schools they wish for their children. They should not in consequence of their choice be subject to unjust economic burdens which would infringe upon this freedom of choice. Since it is the function of the state to facilitate civil freedoms, justice and equity demand that a due measure of public aid be available to parents in support of the schools they select for their children.

Moreover, if these schools serve the public purpose of popular education, the fact that they may be religious in their orientation should not exclude them from a rightful measure of public support.

Cardinal Ritter, on the other hand, said that the problem of government aid to church schools was complicated by the "relationship of church and state in each country, a delicate matter better solved country by country."

SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS

Numerous local and state ordinances and laws affecting Sunday closing were enacted, repealed, appealed, criticized and debated. Most problems arose over questions of economic competition and confusing contradictions in the regulations, while only few related to questions of religious conscience.

In March, the Massachusetts Legislature passed a measure permitting a person solely in control of a business to operate it on Sunday if for religious reasons he cannot do so on Saturday. The bill was supported by the Massachusetts Council of Churches, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston, and the Boston Rabbinical Association.

CHURCH-STATE BITTER-ENDERS

Extremists on either side of the church-state question continued to try to force their points of view upon the community. Thus, Mrs. Madalyn Murray, a militant atheist whose suit against the Baltimore school board had resulted in the elimination of the recitation of prayer in the schools, demanded in April that the Baltimore Board of Education delete the reference "under God" from the pledge of allegiance. (The board refused.) A suit challenging the inclusion of "under God" in the pledge as a violation of the Constitution had been brought in 1956 in New York on behalf of the Freethinkers of America; on June 10 the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, sustained previous lower court decisions upholding the pledge's inclusion of "under God." The Freethinkers of America nevertheless carried the case to the Supreme Court which, on November 23, unanimously refused to review the New York ruling.

At the other extreme, Fundamentalists in several parts of the country challenged the teaching of evolution as a deprivation of their religious freedom, nearly 40 years after the Scopes trial had made a laughing stock of William Jennings Bryan's defense of Fundamentalist beliefs about the origin of the world. Two housewives in Orange county, Calif., backed by Fundamentalist organizations, demanded that at the least the textbooks should be edited to contain statements that evolution was only a "theory." (The California State Board of Education refused.) Rev. Aubrey L. Moore, a Fundamentalist Baptist minister in Phoenix, Ariz., had petitioned the Arizona State School Board to eliminate the teaching of evolution. After his petition was denied, he tried, unsuccessfully, to collect signatures to bring the issue to a public referendum. In May, 43 Methodist ministers and the president of the

Phoenix Rabbinical Council issued a statement urging people not to support Moore's initiative petition. (Moore responded: "It was the Jews who crucified Christ. Jews don't believe in the Bible. And neither do those hypocritical Methodist ministers"—*Arizona Republic*, Phoenix, May 23, 1964.)

In Houston, Tex., Fundamentalists belonging to several denominations started a drive in August against the use of several standard biology textbooks whose preparation had been sponsored by the National Science Foundation, but in November the Texas State Board of Education voted 14 to 6 to adopt them for use in the public schools. The New Mexico State Education Department in December also recommended these books despite the opposition of the New Mexico (Southern) Baptist Convention to the teaching of evolution "as a fact rather than a theory."

Early in November, Mayor John F. Knowlan of Hasbrouck Heights, N.J., authorized the flying of a pennant with the motto "One nation under God" under the American flag outside the town's municipal building. The suggestion had come from a local Knights of Columbus council and a Holy Name Society. In a short while, the pennants became a center of community controversy in several New Jersey and Connecticut towns, the pro-pennant side regarding the display of pennants as a symbol that religion had not been outlawed from public life and the anti-pennant side regarding the display of the pennants as a sign of defiance against the Supreme Court decisions.

LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ

Civic and Political

Civil Rights

THE YEAR 1965 witnessed a basic shift in the struggle for civil rights in the United States. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was followed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which led historian C. Vann Woodward to declare that "under Administration pressure, Congress has put more teeth in the law and more law on the books than it has in the whole period since 1875. It was as if the first Reconstruction had been endowed with the 14th and 15th Amendments, the Reconstruction Acts, the Freedmen's Bureau, the Civil Rights Act and the Ku Klux Klan Act by one session of Congress."

Yet, despite legislative and economic gains, and two decades of the most rapid advance for Negro Americans since emancipation, Negro bitterness and frustration mounted and culminated in riots in the North, in 1964, and in Watts, in 1965.

As Negro economist Andrew F. Brimmer, assistant secretary of commerce for economic affairs, reported, the continued boom in the American economy has brought Negroes "the largest gains relative to the white community experienced since World War II." In 1964, the report said, "The median family income of Negroes actually grew faster than the income of white families, in both dollar figures and percentage: by \$374, or 10.8 per cent, for Negroes, compared with \$310, or 4.7 per cent, for white families"; half of non-Southern Negro families had incomes of more than \$5,000 a year, and nearly a million families earned \$7,000 or more. At the same time, total jobs for Negroes increased 3.5 per cent in 1964-1965, half again as much as for whites. At the end of 1965, the unemployment rate for married Negro men whose homes were not disrupted by divorce or separation was less than 2 per cent—the same as for white men with the same marital status. The general effects of these gains were stated in the *Economic Report* of the President's Council of Economic Advisers: "The progress of the last two years confirms a crucial lesson. A prosperous economy and the labor demand that it generates are potent forces for eliminating discrimination and income differentials even though they cannot create equality. Improved Negro purchasing power will not fully overcome the effects of discrimination, but it will have a beneficial influence."

But the gains did not affect the entire Negro community. (Forty-eight per cent of Negro families with children were still poor, stated Brimmer, and Negro unemployment was still 8.3 per cent, compared to 4.1 per cent for whites.) Moreover, the gains were accompanied by an increase in segregated housing in the North and growing *de facto* segregation of schools. Some 57 per cent of Negro families (as compared to 27 per cent of white) with annual incomes of less than \$4,000 lived in substandard housing. Of Negro families with an annual income of more than \$4,000, 20 per cent lived in substandard housing (compared to 6 per cent for white families) as a result of direct discrimination. Negro civil-rights organizations and their white allies therefore increasingly dealt with the problems of employment, education, and housing, called for an expanded war on poverty, and concentrated their activities primarily on Northern ghettos.

THE CALL FOR FULL EQUALITY

"American Negroes have been another nation, deprived of freedom, crippled by hatred, the doors of opportunity closed to hope." These words, uttered by President Johnson at Howard University, June 4, 1965, were hailed by millions of Negro and white Americans as the most forthright and important statement on civil rights made by a president. Johnson viewed the voting-rights bill as "not even the beginning of the end," but perhaps "the end of the beginning." True, the barriers to freedom "are tumbling down," but "freedom is not enough. . . . You do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, . . . and then say, you're free to compete with all the others, and still justly believe that you have been completely fair. . . . It is not enough just to open the gate of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates." But, the President continued, "the isolation of Negro from white communities is increasing rather than decreasing," for many Negroes are trapped in "inherited, gateless poverty." Although this is true also of some whites, "Negro poverty is not white poverty . . . there are deep, corrosive, obstinate differences which are not racial but the consequence of ancient brutality, past injustice and present prejudice."

Using a Labor Department memorandum prepared by Daniel P. Moynihan¹ as basis, the President expressed grave concern about the "breakdown of the Negro family structure," for "when the family collapses, . . . when it happens on a massive scale, the entire community itself is crippled." Therefore, while stressing the need for jobs, schools, and welfare and social programs, he insisted that "unless we work to strengthen the family" no actions will "be enough to cut completely the circle of despair and deprivation." Johnson promised to call a White House conference to accomplish these ends by helping the American Negro "move beyond opportunity to achievement,

¹ *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, March 1965).

to shatter forever not only the barriers of law and public practice but the walls which bound the condition of man by the color of his skin."

The Moynihan Memorandum

Although the President's speech was widely praised, Daniel Moynihan was bitterly attacked four months later for its underlying ideas. The main point of Moynihan's report, as sympathetically analyzed by Whitney Young of the National Urban League, was that "as a consequence of slavery and oppression, the colored family as an institution has deteriorated to the point where its pathological state threatens to engulf the gains colored Americans may make in the future."

Its real message, he added, was that "unemployment among colored persons, twice the white rate and affecting perhaps 25 per cent of colored men, has effects which go beyond the economic, harming the social fabric of family life" and takes "a tremendous toll from the man who is jobless, the housewife who is forced into the labor market to make ends meet, and the child denied the atmosphere he needs to grow up properly motivated."

Benjamin F. Payton, a Negro and director of the Commission on Religion and Race of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., charged, however, that Moynihan "evades the real issue, formulates a false problem," and that he considered family instability as the *cause* of Negro failure to achieve equality, rather than the *result* of patterns of discrimination which deny the colored citizen equal opportunity with the white to hold a job and earn a decent living. Payton, James Farmer of CORE, and Harvard psychologist William Ryan accused Moynihan of "inexact statistics" which, they said, encouraged "a new form of subtle racism."

Moynihan's intentions were thoroughly misunderstood, for his program recognized the welfare and stability of the family as a principal aim of social policy, for whites as well as for Negroes. The conditions reported in the Negro family, said Moynihan, were "the classic conditions of a lower-class city population plagued by unemployment, bad housing, low income and powerlessness. Nineteenth century Europe and America teemed with such populations. . . . The Negro slums might have more broken families and less drunkenness than an Irish slum, but the essential 'culture of poverty' does not seem to change much." He noted that the number of recipients of Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)—a New Deal measure to assist children whose fathers had died or had become permanently disabled and expanded to aid also those whose fathers were simply absent—had grown from 250,000 (or 30 per cent of all ADC children) in 1940 to almost two million (or two-thirds of the total) today. Moynihan pointed out that this plan giving children an allowance "only after the family breaks up," would be viewed in other countries as "a form of social insanity."

The importance of Negro family life to the civil rights struggle was underscored by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., who said that "Our very survival is bound up in it," since "Nothing is so much needed as a secure family life

for a people seeking to pull themselves out of poverty and backwardness." And the Negro family, he pointed out, is vulnerable because of the strains exerted on it by slavery, oppression, poverty, and the man-made social and psychological jungle in which it exists.

White House Planning Conference

The White House Planning Conference to Fulfill These Rights convened in Washington, November 16, with A. Philip Randolph as honorary chairman, and Morris B. Abram, president of the American Jewish Committee, and Negro lawyer William T. Coleman of Philadelphia, as co-chairmen. Randolph called for a \$100 billion freedom budget for eradicating slums and segregated schools, and creating jobs for all poor, black and white alike. President Johnson urged the 250 conferees to devise a program to release from bondage "the jobless, the unskilled, the broken families housed in squalor—a prey to crime and violence, their children destined for the same bleak fate." He also pledged to ask Congress in 1966 for legislation to prevent "injustice to Negroes at the hands of all-white juries."

Many of the attending civil-rights leaders, educators, labor leaders, and other civic heads felt that the Administration had not been sufficiently strong in enforcing civil rights. They urged the President to protect "the lives and safety of Negroes and civil rights workers in the deep South" by immediately implementing a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recommendation for sending more federal officers, with authority to make on-the-spot arrests, to trouble spots, and to "direct . . . a speed-up in the enforcement of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts." The conference's panel on education also asked that the Office of Education be ordered to withhold funds from Southern and Northern schools practicing racial discrimination.

Conference chairmen Randolph, Abram, and Coleman, reported to the President that the planning session had succeeded in its basic purpose of provoking public debate on how to narrow the growing gap between Negro and white Americans. They noted that, while there was agreement on the causes of inequality, opinions differed on which phases should be given priority because of the depth of the problem for which there was no pat solution. All conferees recognized the importance of the Negro's economic condition. But while many felt that his "economic dependency was the overriding issue," others maintained that "if the economic gap were closed tomorrow, some of the problems caused by centuries of segregation and discrimination would remain." The co-chairmen stressed that there was no attempt to reach "final, definitive answers" but rather "to generate wide and practical ideas" and to decide on the question of priority.

THE WATTS RIOTS

The riots in the Watts section of Los Angeles August 11-17, the most violent in more than two decades, were sparked by the arrest of a drunken Negro

driver by a white motorcycle policeman. The result was thirty-four dead, 1,032 wounded and hurt, \$40 million in property damage, and 3,952 arrested. Governor Edward P. Brown created a commission headed by John A. McCone, former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, to investigate the causes and prescribe remedies. The commission's report stressed that behind the riots were too few jobs, inadequate schooling, and hatred of the police as a symbol of authority, and warned that they would be a mere "curtain-raiser" for future violence unless a "revolutionary attitude" was adopted toward racial problems.

The recommendations, however, were criticized by many Negroes as timid and shallow, and the California advisory committee of the United States Commission on Civil Rights called the report a "bitter disappointment" that "prescribes aspirin where surgery is required." The committee accused Los Angeles Mayor Samuel W. Yorty² and Chief of Police William H. Parker of "gross negligence" in failing to take "constructive steps to avert a riot" and in preparing "to deal with one when it occurred." It also insisted that Parker "has constantly refused to meet with Negro leaders, has challenged their right to represent their community and has disparaged the civil rights movement." The committee endorsed as "essential preliminaries to a more serious treatment of issues" the McCone commission's recommendations for an emergency literacy program in schools in disadvantaged areas; a large scale job-training program and placement centers in the Watts area, and an independent inspector general under the authority of the police chief to deal with civilian complaints. Commenting on Governor Brown's earlier call for \$250 million in federal aid to provide 50,000 jobs in California, the McCone report questioned the capability of Watts Negroes to fill such jobs.

The advisory committee's own recommendations were:

1. Immediate assignment of a federal official to make decisions on allocation of federal funds in the Los Angeles area and the establishment of a crash program to help the unemployed find jobs, including new jobs created with federal funds.
2. Immediate expansion of the presidential executive order relating to discrimination in housing (AJYB, 1964 [Vol. 65], pp. 30-31).
3. Designation of Los Angeles by the new Department of Housing and Urban Development as an area for top-priority attention.
4. Hearings in Los Angeles by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, at the earliest possible date.

A special census of the Watts area, conducted after the riots by the Census Bureau for a study group appointed by President Johnson, revealed a constant pattern of high unemployment, low income, and a high percentage of broken families and substandard housing. The purchasing power of the typical family in South Los Angeles, including Watts, had dropped by \$400 since

² In the spring Yorty had been warned by the United States Community Relations Service that there was potential danger of racial violence in his city, but he refused the offer of a federal conciliator to help Los Angeles through the summer.

1960, while the average national income for white families had risen 14 per cent and for non-white, 24 per cent. Dilapidated and deteriorating housing units had increased from 18 to 33 per cent. The Negro male unemployment rate was 10.1 per cent in 1965, compared to a national Negro male jobless rate of 6 per cent. At the same time, before the riot broke out, nearly one million of 2.7 million dollars in federal funds granted to Los Angeles for its war on poverty remained unused; 13,000 of 16,000 neighborhood Youth Corps jobs and fewer than 2,000 of 5,000 openings in the Work Experience Program had been filled.

The rioters, the McCone report said, "concentrated on food markets, liquor stores, clothing stores, department stores and pawnshops," and it noted with interest "that no residences were deliberately burned, that damage to schools, libraries, public buildings was minimal and that certain types of business establishments, notably service stations and automobile dealers, were for the most part unharmed."

Although many Jewish store owners suffered heavy losses, Charles Posner of the Los Angeles Jewish Federation-Council denied that the riots had anti-semitic implications. "To the best of our knowledge," he declared, "we could not find any anti-Semitism . . . but only anti-white feelings," although a number of stores burned down in the fire were owned and operated by Jews (some of which had employed Negroes). Arthur Groman, chairman of the Los Angeles Chapter of the American Jewish Committee, agreed that no Jewish-owned stores were singled out as special targets and that "a number . . . remained unharmed." The destruction of "the seemingly disproportionate" number of Jewish-owned businesses,³ he added, was due to the fact that Watts had once been a densely Jewish populated area, and many stores were still owned by Jews. Noting that riots "provide a field day for the bigot and extremist within the white community," Groman warned that "it would be tragic if we allow the Jewish community to ally itself in any way with such elements."

Newsweek (August 30, 1965), on the other hand, declared that "looting and burning revealed a virulent strain of anti-Semitism—not so much blind race hatred as fury against individual Jewish store owners: the liquor store boss who refuses to cash checks (many of which would bounce), the pawnbroker." One black nationalist told *Newsweek*, "They put the NAACP sticker in the window and pat us on the back and say 'We know how it is because we have been persecuted too.' But every day they put the money in the sack and get in their Jew canoes—those damn Cadillacs—and drive on out of here."

In September, President Johnson appropriated \$29 million in federal projects for Los Angeles, including basic education, vocational training, health services, legal aid, and housing assistance. However, by the end of 1965,

³ Lenora E. Berson's *Case Study of a Riot—The Philadelphia Story* (New York: American Jewish Committee, January 1966), reported a similar pattern in the 1964 North Philadelphia riot.

while a number of the McCone commission's recommendations on employment and training had been implemented, unemployment still remained at a record high and virtually no new construction was started on the sites of 155 buildings damaged beyond repair within the Los Angeles city limits.

THE CIVIL-RIGHTS MOVEMENT: NEXT STEPS

The failure of legislation to make more than a dent in the pattern of living for most of the nation's 20 million Negroes increasingly convinced civil rights leaders that neither civil rights *per se* nor desegregation would bring about the desired change. Even if Negroes won complete legal civil rights, they would still have to deal with complex problems, such as the heritage of centuries-old slavery, generations-long poverty, family deterioration, entrapment in slums, inadequate education, ingrained defeatism, and cultural isolation. Almost all Negro leaders agreed on the need for a radical change in the economy and an all-out attack on poverty, unemployment, and slums. Most of the civil-rights organizations were trying to enlarge their constituencies, especially in the Northern Negro ghettos, by linking the struggle for Negro advancement to the war on poverty. At a conference on "The State of the Race," held in New York in January, 45 leaders of 26 Negro or Negro-led civil-rights organizations issued a "consensus" statement asserting that "the major tool for correcting these evils lies in the maximum application of political power" and urged that "political action should be the major point of emphasis of the civil rights movement during 1965." The Civil Rights and Economic Opportunity Acts, they said, made possible "a new climate," in which "the first responsibility of civil rights groups is to consolidate the political consciousness of Negro Americans," and they pledged themselves to seek "adequate representation of Negroes at all levels of policy-making and administration of government as well as in the administration of programs, both public and private, designed to correct inequities." Other goals were "removal of barriers to voting," the use of "more realistic desegregation" techniques, and "more effective education of Negro children in all public schools in the North and South," higher minimum wages, and a massive public works program.

Congress of Racial Equality

A complicating factor was that none of the traditional civil-rights organizations had been able to establish real strength in the Northern urban ghettos. After the Watts riots James Farmer, national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), conceded that "Civil rights organizations have failed. No one has any roots in the ghetto." Bayard Rustin, who organized the 1963 March on Washington of more than 200,000 Negroes and whites, said: "We must hold ourselves responsible for not reaching out to them [Watts young people] . . . Roy [Wilkins], Martin [Luther King], and I haven't done a damn thing about it. We've done plenty to get votes in the South and

seats in the lunchroom, but we've had no program for these youngsters." CORE had planned to open store-front community centers in Negro communities in both North and South to use as bases for "awakening the Negro ghettos" and mobilizing them into a force for political and community action, but failed to make significant progress by year's end.

At the 1965 CORE convention, national chairman Floyd McKissick declared, "In mobilizing the ghetto to be a political force, we will have to understand and work with all elements of the ghetto and that includes the Black Muslims," who could "reach parts of . . . [the ghetto] that we could never reach alone." As a gesture of cooperation toward the Black Muslims, four of its members were allowed to expound their anti-integration, anti-white views to delegates. CORE had been cooperating also with the Deacons for Defense and Justice, a group of armed Negro vigilantes calling itself a self-defense organization, which claimed more than 50 chapters in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. They worked with CORE in Bogalusa, La., where Klan violence was widespread. A Deacons official told the convention that civil-rights workers needed the vigilante group "to let the Klan know that the Negro as a whole is not non-violent." But the CORE delegates voted 120 to 4 against any involvement that might put the organization on record as encouraging growth of armed defense groups like the Deacons. During the year, CORE moved toward becoming a predominantly Negro-led organization, downgrading the leadership role of many whites who had been its long-time leaders, even founders. Its income dropped from about \$850,000 in 1964 to \$650,000 in 1965, its membership decreased, and many of its staff left to work for the war on poverty.

Southern Christian Leadership Conference

Even before the Watts riot, King and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference announced plans for concentrated efforts to create a "broadly based vibrant non-violent movement" in some cities of the North. He stressed that he was "less concerned with building an organization than with building a movement" which could create "a national consensus that will arouse the conscience of Americans and cause them to respond creatively to Negro demands." King began in Chicago, thus lending his support to the months-long protests of its civil-rights coalition, the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations, against school superintendent Benjamin C. Willis whom they held responsible for Chicago's failure to solve *de facto* school segregation. King planned to work also on voter registration, job opportunities, police brutality, and slum clearance. His use of target cities frequently had been effective, for, as he pointed out,

Birmingham, Alabama, once the most segregated city in the South, was our target city for public accommodations, and our nonviolent movement there gave birth to the Civil Rights Bill of 1964. Selma, Alabama, was our pilot city for the Voting Rights Bill of 1965, and I have faith that Chicago, considered one of the most segregated cities in the North, could well become the metropolis

where a meaningful nonviolent movement could arouse the conscience of this nation to deal realistically with the northern ghetto.

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), with 445,000 members, remained the largest and most influential Negro civil-rights organization. It lost about 20,000 members in 1965 because, said one NAACP official, "we're now basically middle-class oriented, and while we were trying to figure out ways to organize the poorer Negroes, we lost a good number of our regular members." NAACP's major concern continued to be piling up Negro voter registration and voting totals in the South to deal effectively with issues and candidates at the polls.

Clarence Mitchell, Jr., NAACP lobbyist in Washington, warned that real problems must also be faced in the North. He stressed the importance of giving "the people accountings on what has been done and what remains to be done" since the "realization that efforts made have brought success serves to spur people forward." Telling them that all their efforts and achievements "have left them worse off than they were before," he warned, "produces hopelessness and confusion," and an atmosphere in which "the demagogues take over." For this reason, NAACP continued to stress not only voter registration, but fair-employment practices, aid to education, and community organization through anti-poverty programs.

Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee

This attitude contrasted sharply with that of the Atlanta-based Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC, known as Snick) in the rural Black Belt among the most impoverished and disfranchised Negroes. They used sit-ins, picket lines, boycotts, demonstrations, freedom schools, and co-operatives to encourage the Negroes to assert themselves. At the same time, they rejected ties with labor, liberals, church groups, other civil-rights organizations, and the federal government, and attacked them all as the "establishment." Thus, as the total of registered voters in the South grew, Snick urged Negroes to boycott the Democratic primaries where Negroes had a chance to defeat extreme segregationists, and to create new Black Panther parties. The establishment of these parties, Charles Silberman maintained in an article "Beware the Day They Change Their Minds" (*Fortune*, November 1965), may be useful as a "means of exerting pressure for change, but it also dooms Negroes to the role of perennial outsiders." The militants, he added, "can't have it both ways; they can't acquire the political power they consider essential unless they are willing to bring Negroes into the existing political system."

Snick lost more than 50 of its 200 field workers to the Office of Economic Opportunity; it had a deficit of more than \$100,000 because of a drop in contributions from the general public.

National Urban League

The one civil-rights group that grew both in membership and funds was the National Urban League, directed by Whitney Young. Staffed principally by trained social and community workers and financed by community chests in scores of cities, the League's efforts were centered on education and youth incentives; health and welfare; housing; job development, and employment. (Its "national skills bank" placed more than 5,300 Negroes in jobs in one year.) It received numerous grants from government, industry, unions, and foundations for research and pilot projects for improving conditions in Negro areas.

Negro-White Coalition

A. Philip Randolph, president of the AFL-CIO Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and chairman of the Negro American Labor Council, headed those who called for a coalition of white and black Americans as the only hope for the Negroes. One of their most articulate spokesmen, Bayard Rustin, recognized the need for "white allies," trade unionists, liberals, and religious groups—the forces that passed the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts—who, together with the Negroes, would become the "effective political majority in the United States." The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, NAACP, and Urban League strongly backed this approach.

Organization for Black Power

Among the various fringe groups ranging from the Black Muslims to radical sects that operated in the Negro community, was the Organization for Black Power. It was headed by rent-strike leader Jesse Gray who, during the 1964 Harlem riot, called for "100 skilled revolutionaries who are ready to die," and later explained that he meant revolutionaries trained to get "maximum registration to protect our wives and children against rats." The group hoped to promote independent political action by Negroes in the ghettos, but was unsuccessful in its electoral attempts in 1965. Its conference in Detroit in September had the support of Julius Hobson of Washington, D.C., a former CORE leader; Stanley Branche, who led demonstrations in Chester, Pa.; Lawrence Landry of Chicago, and Gloria Richardson who led the protest rallies and boycotts in Cambridge, Md., in 1964.

VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965

On January 4 President Johnson proposed in his State of the Union message that "we eliminate every remaining obstacle to the right and the opportunity to vote." Spurred on by the brutal treatment by Alabama law enforcement officials of Negro and white civil-rights marchers on their trek from

Selma to Montgomery to dramatize their appeal for full voting rights, the President appeared before a special session of Congress to urge speedy passage of voting legislation because "the harsh fact is that in many places in this country men and women are kept from voting simply because they are Negroes." He added, "No law we now have on the books . . . can ensure the right to vote when local officials are determined to deny it." (Earlier laws, including the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 [AJYB, 1958 (Vol. 59), p. 43; 1961 (Vol. 62), pp. 75-78; 1965 (Vol. 66), pp. 155-60], required extensive litigation, and were desperately resisted by many Southern officials.)

Nevertheless, whereas the Southern Regional Council (SRC) estimated that only 1,238,038 Negroes were registered in 11 Southern states in 1956, the number jumped to an estimated 2,174,200, or 43.3 per cent of the voting-age Negro population, in the same states in 1964, partially as a result of SRC's Voter Education Project (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 174). At the same time, only 23 per cent of voting-age Negroes were registered in Alabama; 32 per cent in Louisiana, and 6.7 per cent in Mississippi. Only some 36,000 Negroes were registered in the nearly 50 counties where the Department of Justice brought lawsuits to enjoin individual registration officials from continuing discriminatory registration practices.

The Administration bill, introduced in the House of Representatives on March 17 and in the Senate the following day, provided for the suspension of all literacy tests and other devices used to deny Negroes their voting rights in states where less than 50 per cent of the population had been registered or had voted in the 1964 Presidential election. It also called for the appointment by the U.S. Civil Service Commission of federal examiners to list voters in areas covered by the legislation, and gave the United States attorney general broad power to designate these counties. These central features remained intact, although the bill was modified during the four months debate in Congress. One original feature of the bill was an easing of existing state poll-tax regulations by allowing new voters to go to the polls if payments of these taxes for the current year were made within 45 days before an election. While the House passed a bill of its own abolishing poll taxes altogether, the Senate approved accelerated court challenges of state poll-tax requirements by the attorney general, rather than outright abolition. The Senate added a provision to allow a prospective voter to qualify without taking a literacy test if he completed six grades in an American school, even if not conducted in English, which enfranchised Puerto Ricans living on the mainland.

The Senate approved its version of the bill on May 26, the House on July 9, and the Senate-House Conference Committee reported a compromise bill on August 2, containing the Senate's proposal for challenging the poll tax and the administration's provision for its payment. The bill was approved by the House on August 3 by a vote of 328 to 74, and by the Senate on August 4, 79 to 18. It was signed by the President on August 6.

Summary of Law

The Voting Rights Act, as finally adopted,⁴

1. Suspended literacy tests and others devised (found to be discriminatory) for voting in any federal, state, local, general or primary elections in the states of Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, at least 26 counties in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona.
2. Provided for the assignment of federal examiners to conduct registration and observe voting in states and/or counties covered by the Act.
3. Directed the attorney general to initiate suits immediately to test the constitutionality of poll taxes because the U.S. Congress found that payment of such tax has been used in some areas to abridge the right to vote.
4. Provided civil and criminal sanctions against anyone who interferes with persons seeking to vote and those who urge or aid others to vote, and provided administrative and civil remedies for persons prevented from voting.

Implementing the Voting Rights Act

In the first three months following the passage of the Voting Rights Act, 170,000 Negro voters were added to the rolls in the seven Southern states affected by it, 56,000 of them by federal examiners in 20 counties. Later, registrations slowed to a trickle because of apathy born of near-illiteracy and fear by Negroes of economic or physical reprisals. Negro groups and the Commission on Civil Rights warned that voting would be limited unless the federal government, which had merely removed the legal barriers, now took affirmative steps to encourage registration. The Justice Department responded by sending federal examiners into 16 additional counties and, on December 20, filed its first voter intimidation suit charging that landowners in West Feliciana parish, La., evicted from their lifelong homes Negro sharecroppers and tenant farmers who had registered. It also brought suit in the federal courts to challenge the legality of the poll tax in Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, and Virginia.

CIVIL RIGHTS AND GROUP TENSIONS IN POLITICS 1965

A Gallup poll in August found that, over a seven-year period, racial and religious prejudice in politics had declined sharply. For the first time since the public opinion polling on this subject began, clear majorities of the nation said they would vote for a qualified Jew, Catholic, or Negro for President of the United States if he were nominated by their party. In the 1958 Gallup

⁴ Based on Summary prepared by United States Commission on Civil Rights (*CCR Special Publication—Number 4*, August 1965).

survey, 62 per cent of adults across the nation had said they would vote for a well-qualified candidate if he happened to be a Jew; in 1965, 80 per cent. Similarly, support for a qualified Catholic increased sharply, from 68 per cent in 1958 to 87 per cent in 1965, and for a qualified Negro from 38 per cent in 1958 to 59 per cent in 1965. Younger people (21 to 29) and those with some college training were consistently less prejudiced in their attitude toward race and religion as factors to be weighed in a Presidential candidate than were less educated or older people.

The vote in scattered areas in the 1965 elections demonstrated that the Negro voter was far more independent than many political observers had expected, and even emerged as a powerful factor in big city politics. Despite appeals from Negro Congressman Adam Clayton Powell and Negro Tammany leader Raymond Jones, New York Negroes gave a substantial share of their votes—40 per cent—to help elect Republican-Liberal John Lindsay mayor. In Louisville, Kentucky, where a Republican mayor had helped push through ordinances to open to Negroes public accommodations, housing, and jobs; hired Negro policemen and lawyers, and put Negroes in white-collar jobs at city hall, Negroes voted overwhelmingly to retain Republicans in office. In Cleveland a young Negro state legislator, Carl B. Stokes, running as an independent Democrat, lost to incumbent Mayor Ralph S. Locher in the mayoralty election by a slight margin of 85,374 to 87,833 votes. In Ohio, Robert C. Henry, a Negro and top vote-getter for the City Commission of Springfield (population 85,000) in the November elections, was selected as mayor by his colleagues on the commission. Woodmere, a suburb of Cleveland, voted in attorney Samuel S. Perry, its first Negro mayor.

A notable shift of Negro votes occurred in Virginia where Negroes had voted in 1961 against the Byrd Democratic machine; but in 1965, 70 to 75 per cent of Negro votes went to Mills Godwin, its gubernatorial candidate who also had the support of labor and some Negro groups, because he had stressed his support of Lyndon Johnson in 1964 and refused to inject racism into the campaign—which cost him thousands of segregationist votes in southern Virginia.

A crisis occurred in Detroit after the September primary when several Negro ministerial and secular organizations charging that, while Negro voters supported liberal white candidates there was no corresponding support of Negro candidates from the white community, urged Negroes to vote only for the four Negro candidates for city council. The Citizens Committee for Equal Opportunity with the support of civic, labor, and denominational groups including the Jewish Community Council, then launched a campaign to impress upon Detroit voters the need for a truly representative city council. As a result, the Negro organizations endorsed several white liberal candidates, and in November the voters elected a Negro, Reverend Nicholas Hood, to the city council (the second time in Detroit's history); provided a clear victory for the liberal-labor-Negro coalition backing a liberal city council, and repudiated two incumbents, Thomas Poindexter and Anthony

Wierzbicki, both identified with forces advocating a punitive or anti-liberal approach to race relations. In the mayoral race, Negro voters backed incumbent Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh, a Democrat, by about ten to one (his city-wide margin was two to one).

In Newark, N.J., now 54 per cent Negro, former Negro Assemblyman George C. Richardson campaigned for a new Negro party, the United Freedom party. Other Negro leaders urged Negroes to work through the established parties, and of the 60,000 Negro voters in Newark, only 6,000 supported United Freedom candidates. In Essex County, N.J., Negro candidates drew enough votes to win county-wide offices.

In Philadelphia, Pa., Arlen Specter was elected district attorney as a Republican with strong Jewish support and important inroads into the traditionally Democratic Negro vote. Chester, Pa., where racial violence marked demonstrations against alleged school segregation last spring, elected its first Negro city councilman, Leo S. Holmes, a Republican.

DESEGREGATION OF SCHOOLS

South

During the 1964–65 school year less than three per cent of the Negro students in 11 Southern states attended classes with whites. For the 1965–66 school years, however, the federal government expected to score massive gains on the basis of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 158), prohibiting discrimination in federally-assisted programs. The United States Office of Education (USOE) guidelines called for desegregation of at least four grades in 1965–66, and complete desegregation by the fall of 1967; school districts were eligible for federal funds only if they desegregated accordingly. All but 140 of 2,892 school districts agreed to do so. But in many rural areas of these states where resistance has been strongest, integration has been token. The USOE estimated that 216,000 Negroes—7.5 per cent of the total Negro pupils—were attending classes with whites. A survey conducted independently by the Southern Regional Council, a biracial civil-rights research agency based in Atlanta, found only 151,409 Negroes, or 5.2 per cent of the total, in desegregated classes, while an estimate by the Southern Education Reporting Service put their number at 182,767, or 6.01 per cent. These estimates proved that the situation continued to be what the American Friends Service Committee and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund called “paper compliance and continued segregation.” Civil-rights groups and the Southern Regional Council noted that some Negro children had been threatened with demotion or loss of credits if they transferred to white schools, that Negro families had been intimidated, and that Negro school officials responding to pressure from white school boards in many areas advised Negro students to remain in their own schools.

Most criticism was leveled at the freedom-of-choice approach—usually adopted by school districts because officials rightly anticipated that it would

result in the least integration—which placed the burden of desegregation by transfer on the Negro parents who were subjected to intimidation and economic reprisals. In response to the criticism, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare moved to strengthen its Title VI enforcement machinery and the USOE prepared a new set of guidelines for the 1966–67 school year.

TABLE A.^a STATUS OF DESEGREGATION IN SOUTH

	<i>With Negroes and Whites</i>	<i>School Districts</i>		<i>Total</i>
		<i>In Compliance^b</i>	<i>Not in Compliance^b</i>	
Alabama	119	105	14	118
Arkansas	217	400	10	410
Florida	67	67	0	67
Georgia	180	192	5	196
Louisiana	67	33	34	67
Mississippi	149	118	31	149
North Carolina	170	165	4	170
South Carolina	108	86	21	108
Tennessee	129	149	2	152
Texas	850	1,303	7	1,325
Virginia	127	124	12	130
SOUTH	2,183	2,742	140	2,892

^a *Southern Education Report*, Nashville, Tennessee, Jan.-Feb. 1966, p. 31.

^b The sum of the number of districts "In Compliance" and "Not in Compliance" does not always equal the total number of districts because the USOE figures for districts differ from those given by some state departments of education.

TABLE B.^a STATUS OF DESEGREGATION IN SOUTH

	<i>Enrolment</i>		<i>Negroes in Schools with White</i>	
	<i>White</i>	<i>Negro</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Per Cent^b</i>
Alabama	559,123 ^c	295,848 ^c	1,250 ^d	.43
Arkansas	337,652 ^c	111,952 ^c	4,900 ^d	4.38
Florida	1,056,805 ^d	256,063 ^d	25,000 ^d	9.76
Georgia	784,917 ^d	355,950 ^d	9,465 ^d	2.66
Louisiana	483,941	318,651	2,187	.69
Mississippi	309,413	296,834	1,750 ^d	.59
North Carolina	828,638 ^c	349,282 ^c	18,000 ^d	5.15
South Carolina	374,007	263,983	3,864	1.46
Tennessee	714,241 ^d	176,541 ^d	28,801	16.31
Texas	2,136,150 ^d	349,192 ^d	60,000 ^d	17.18
Virginia	757,037 ^c	239,729 ^c	27,550 ^d	11.49
SOUTH	8,341,924	3,014,025	182,767	6.01

^a See note a, Table A.

^b The number of Negroes in schools with whites, compared to the total Negro enrolment.

^c 1964–65.

^d Estimated.

North

Although there were in 1965 a few school boycotts demanding an end to *de facto* school segregation, the removal of racial barriers in the North was very slow. The NAACP, continuing its heavy involvement in campaigns to eliminate *de facto* segregation, reported that only 49 public-school systems in the North and West had either abandoned segregation or taken "substantial steps toward desegregation." During the year, such action was taken in Westbury, Port Chester, and Lawrence-Cedarhurst, N.Y. New but limited desegregation occurred in Portland, Ore., Hempstead and Rochester, N.Y. The states of New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and California have adopted statewide policies opposing *de facto* segregation.

The proposal by staff committees that New York City adopt a 4-4-4 school pattern under which children would attend four years each of primary, junior high, and high school (the old system was 6-3-3) was backed by civil-rights leaders who felt that it would hasten the time when Negro children—separated from whites in their earliest grades in schools serving predominantly segregated neighborhoods—would sit next to whites in junior high and high schools attended by children from wider areas. The Board of Education agreed on a reorganization for maximum desegregation and improved schools by September 1966.

In Chicago, civil-rights leaders charged that the school system under Superintendent Benjamin Willis had gerrymandered school boundaries, kept Negro students in overcrowded schools while vacancies existed in predominantly white schools, and required Negro elementary-school pupils to advance to predominantly Negro junior high and high schools. As a result, USOE ordered state officials to withhold \$34 million in federal funds until the question of discrimination was cleared up. Heavy political pressure from Mayor Richard J. Daley brought the quick release of funds by USOE. Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach then issued guidelines requiring proof of discrimination and efforts by federal officials to obtain voluntary compliance before funds could be withheld under the Civil Rights Act.

NAACP branches in Bridgeport, Conn.; San Francisco, Calif.; Boston, Mass., Seattle, Wash., and Milwaukee, Wisc. also filed formal complaints with the USOE under Title VI, citing discriminatory practices and calling for withholding of federal funds.

Gallup Poll

Opposition of white parents in the South to school integration had dropped dramatically in just two years. A Gallup poll in May 1963 found 61 per cent of Southern white parents opposed to sending their children to schools attended by a few Negro pupils. In 1965 the percentage fell to 38. Objection to sending children to a school where *half* the pupils were colored was much higher, but even here it dropped from 78 per cent in 1963 to 68 per cent in 1965.

In the North most white parents were willing to send their children to a school with a *few* Negro pupils: 87 per cent in 1963, 91 per cent in 1965. When asked about sending their children to a school where *half* were Negro, 33 per cent objected in 1963, and 28 per cent in 1965.

Ousted Southern Teachers

There was growing concern during the year that thousands of Negro teachers would lose their jobs when Southern schools became integrated. A special study group of the National Education Association (NEA) recorded the dismissal of 452 Negro teachers in Southern and border states, and the demotion of 216 others in Florida, for failure to pass the national teachers' examination. The report added that the actual number of displacements was probably much higher and that, in at least two states, "the climate was sufficiently threatening to prevent those who had been displaced or demoted from appearing before the task force." A number of Northern school systems with severe shortages of teachers, including New York and Philadelphia, received federal funds for training hundreds of these teachers to qualify for their systems. The NEA and the American Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, aided in this effort. Meanwhile, the Justice Department brought a number of suits against Southern school systems for failure to desegregate faculties and to stop discriminatory employment practices.

ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS

Employment

A total of 3,263 complaints of job discrimination were filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission between July 2, 1965 (when the fair employment section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 came into force) and Dec. 31, 1965. Ten Southern states provided more than two-thirds of complaints serious enough for possible action, reported Chairman Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. Employers were charged in 1,822 cases, and unions in 466 others. In 1,492 cases complaints came from Negroes, 19 involved other specified races, 27 national origin, 391 sex, and 25 religion. According to Roosevelt, the commission and its staff received "tremendous cooperation" from unions and employers. "Walls are literally coming down," he stated, "where segregated facilities once existed—often at considerable expense. Most employers are outreaching individual complaints to open up new opportunities for minorities in their plants and businesses."

Health and Welfare

A survey by the United States Commission on Civil Rights of local health and welfare programs in more than 40 Southern and border communities in the summer and fall of 1965 found that:

1. Written agreements to comply with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 have been secured from most federally assisted programs. There has also been progress in the elimination of the most overt forms of segregation in hospitals, such as separate wings, waiting rooms, and public facilities, and, in a few cases, rapid and complete desegregation.

2. Widespread segregation of Negroes in, or exclusion from, federally-assisted programs at the state and local levels continued in state-operated hospitals and their training facilities; ward or room assignments; child-care institutions, nursing homes, and training facilities providing service for a fee to white beneficiaries of federally-assisted programs; certain federally-assisted local health programs; offices of physicians and their referral of patients to hospitals, and Operation Head Start projects. Moreover, the removal of racial designations did not eliminate segregation where dual facilities were maintained, and administrators took no further action to do so.

The commission recommended that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare apply immediate sanctions in instances where negotiations had failed to correct violations of Title VI. It called for immediate surveys and thorough field inspections to determine the extent of continued discrimination in the nearly \$18 billion federally-assisted programs. The department was urged to establish affirmative goals of actual participation on a desegregated basis in all benefits offered, and the creation of effective regular reporting systems.

DISCRIMINATION IN JUSTICE

Negroes involved in federal court action in the South found themselves in a particularly difficult position. As the Southern Regional Council in its report on *Racial Discrimination in the Southern Federal Courts* (April, 1965) pointed out, a Negro "could go from the beginning of the case to the end without seeing any black faces unless they are in the court audience, or he happens to notice the man sweeping the floor." Of 1,588 persons in categories ranging from judges to secretaries employed by the Southern federal courts, the report stated, there were five Negro assistant U.S. attorneys, nine deputy U.S. marshals and a handful of secretarial and clerical workers. Although Negroes were called for jury service, their number was far smaller than their population ratio, and most of those called were dismissed by peremptory challenges or for other reasons.

Another report on *Southern Justice: An Indictment* issued jointly (October 1965) by the Southern Regional Council and the American Civil Liberties Union described the "double standard of justice" in the South. "An FBI informant," it said, "testifies that he is in the same car with three Ku Klux Klansmen as they shoot to death Mrs. Viola Liuzzo, a Detroit housewife, on an Alabama highway" (p. 151), but the jury failed to convict the first defendant charged in the crime even of manslaughter. While waiting for a new trial, the Klansmen rushed off to a Klan rally in North Carolina to sign autographs. The Hayneville, Ala., community leader Tom Coleman shot two civil rights workers: Jonathan Daniels, a seminarian, died at once and

the Rev. Richard Morrisroe, a priest, was critically wounded. The trial, said the report, "turned into a circus, with Coleman not simply acquitted but almost proclaimed a hero."

These were not isolated cases. During sit-in demonstrations from 1960 through spring 1965 at least 26 Negro and white civil-rights workers were killed by white racists in the South, and only one assailant was sentenced to a ten-year prison term. During the same period, four Negroes went to prison, one for life, when two white segregationists died in the aftermath of racial demonstrations. (Later, in November, a Mississippi jury found Norman Cannon, a 19-year-old white man guilty of the rape of a Negro girl and sentenced him to life imprisonment; a month later an all-white Alabama federal jury convicted three Klansmen of conspiracy charges in connection with Mrs. Liuzzo's murder and they were sentenced to 10 years in prison.) Dual justice, continued the report, "is a standing abuse to all Negroes—the maid, the undertaker, the field hand, the school teacher, the minister." In traffic cases, too, where a Negro and a white are found guilty of driving while drunk, and both are sentenced to a year in jail or \$150 fine, the "cash register justice" is much harsher for Negroes since they earn far less than whites.

At year's end the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, representing over 100 civil-rights, religious, labor, and civic groups, launched a campaign for the enactment of strong, comprehensive legislation on law enforcement, going far beyond President Johnson's proposals for ending racial discrimination on juries and for strengthening laws to protect civil-rights workers from attacks or intimidation. It drafted a bill to give Negroes and the poor greater representation on both local and federal juries by the use of random lists of all eligible adults in judicial districts; strengthen conspiracy statutes for the protection of Negroes and civil-rights workers; permit court injunctions against persons depriving Negroes or civil-rights workers of a constitutional right; make states or counties financially liable for damages in police action against civil-rights workers; permit removal of police officials for gross violations of civil rights, and increase the power of federal marshals and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to make on-the-spot arrests during racial unrest.

Court Action

During the 1964–65 term, the United States Supreme Court handed down decisions in a number of cases dealing with civil rights and racial equality. In *Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States*, 85 S. Ct. 348, and *Katzbach v. McClung*, 85 S. Ct. 377, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Title II of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 barring discrimination in restaurants, hotels, and certain other places of public accommodation. In *Hamm v. Rock Hill*, 85 S. Ct. 384, the Court reversed the conviction of sit-in demonstrators in the South in a decision affecting an estimated 3,000 cases pending against persons who had unsuccessfully sought service in public places. The Court did not rule on the constitutional right of the defendants to be served with-

out discrimination. A five-man majority voted to reverse the convictions and to direct dismissal of the case on the ground that the proceedings had been "abated" because Title II prohibited the kind of discrimination to which the defendants had been subjected.

Louisiana statutes and procedures designed to curb voting by Negroes were rejected by the Court in a unanimous decision in *Louisiana v. United States*, 85 S. Ct. 817. The federal government charged systematic exclusion of Negroes from the ballot since 1898, and challenged the use of a state "interpretation" test giving voting registrars *carte blanche* in passing on the applicants' right to vote on the basis of their ability to interpret correctly provisions of the state or federal constitution. While a three-judge federal court was considering the government's complaint, Louisiana adopted a new "citizenship" test for all prospective voters. The federal court then barred the use of the "interpretation" test as well as the new "citizenship" test unless a reregistration of all voters was ordered. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed this decision. Similarly, in *United States v. Mississippi*, 85 S. Ct. 808, the Court had unanimously directed that a suit brought by the government to halt the systematic exclusion of qualified Negroes from the ballot in Mississippi, practiced since 1890, should be set down for trial "without delay." A three-judge district court had dismissed the government's suit, 2 to 1, but the Supreme Court reversed on all points.

The Court, in *McLaughlin v. Florida*, 85 S. Ct. 283, unanimously set aside the conviction of a Negro man and a white woman for violating a Florida statute making it illegal for a man and a woman of opposite races, who are not married to each other, to occupy habitually the same room at night. The Court found it unnecessary to consider the defendants' challenge of Florida's anti-miscegenation laws since it based its reversal on the ground that "to punish promiscuity by one racial group and not that of another" was unreasonable.

In *Swain v. Alabama*, 85 S. Ct. 824, the Supreme Court, by a vote of 6 to 3, upheld the conviction in Alabama of a Negro who had been sentenced to death for raping a white girl, despite a claim that Negroes had been excluded from the juries that had indicted and tried him. It ruled that the defendant had failed to establish a case of systematic exclusion, and, in a concurring opinion, Justice John M. Harlan emphasized his understanding that the question before the Court was not the systematic use of peremptory challenges to bar Negroes from juries.⁵

STATE CIVIL-RIGHTS LEGISLATION

By giving states a chance to redress grievances under their own laws within specified periods ranging from 30 to 120 days before federal enforcement

⁵ *The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Decisions of the United States Supreme Court for the 1964-65 Term, a Summary and Analysis* (New York, American Jewish Congress, Commission on Law and Social Action, 1966).

TABLE I.^a NEGRO AND OTHER NON-WHITE POPULATION IN STATES
HAVING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS

State	Laws ^b				Negro ^c	Other Non-White ^c	Total Pop. 1960 ^c
	E	S	H	A			
Alaska	X		X	X	6,771	44,850	226,167
Arizona	X			X	43,403	92,824	1,302,161
Calif.	X		X	X	883,861	378,113	15,717,204
Colo.	X		X	X	39,992	13,255	1,753,947
Conn.	X		X	X	107,449	3,969	2,535,234
Del.	X			X	60,688	1,277	446,292
D. C.	X		X	X	411,737	6,956	763,956
Hawaii	X				4,943	425,599	632,772
Ida.	X			X	1,502	8,306	667,191
Ill.	X			X	1,037,470	33,436	10,081,158
Ind.	X	X	X	X	269,275	4,669	4,662,498
Iowa	X			X	25,354	3,474	2,757,537
Kan.	X			X	91,445	8,500	2,178,611
Me.	X		X	X	3,318	2,656	969,265
Md.	X			X	518,410	8,360	3,100,000
Mass.	X	X	X	X	111,842	13,592	5,148,578
Mich.	X	X	X	X	717,581	19,748	7,823,194
Minn.	X		X	X	22,263	19,998	3,413,864
Mo.	X			X	390,853	5,993	4,319,813
Mont.	X			X	1,467	22,562	674,767
Neb.	X			X	29,262	7,304	1,411,330
Nevada	X			X	13,484	7,797	285,278
N. H.	X		X	X	1,903	684	606,921
N. J.	X	X	X	X	514,875	12,904	6,066,782
N. M.	X			X	17,063	58,197	951,023
N. Y.	X	X	X	X	1,417,511	77,722	16,782,304
N. D.				X	777	12,131	632,446
Ohio	X		X	X	786,097	10,602	9,706,397
Ore.	X		X	X	18,133	18,517	1,768,687
Pa.	X	X	X	X	852,750	12,612	11,319,366
R. I.	X		X	X	18,332	2,444	859,488
S. D.				X	1,114	26,302	680,514
Utah	X			X	4,148	11,961	890,627
Vt.	X			X	519	270	389,881
Wash.	X	X		X	48,738	52,801	2,853,214
Wis.	X		X	X	74,546	18,328	3,951,777
Wyo.	X			X	2,183	4,961	330,066
Total					8,551,059	1,453,674	128,660,310
Total U.S.					18,871,831	1,619,612	179,323,175

^a Based on *Summary of 1964 and 1965 Anti-Discrimination Laws* (New York: American Jewish Congress, Commission on Law and Social Action, January 1966).

^b This column indicates whether the state has a law against discrimination in employment (E), private schools and colleges (S), housing not receiving public assistance (H), and places of public accommodation (A).

^c Figures for Negro, other non-white, and total population are taken from the 1960 census.

machinery could be set in motion, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 spurred them to pass laws against discrimination in employment and places of public accommodation. As a result, more state civil-rights legislation was adopted in 1964-65 than in any previous two-year period.

Today, 71 per cent of all Americans are covered by state fair-employment and public-accommodation laws; 52.5 per cent by laws against housing discrimination; and 30.5 per cent by fair-education laws. For Negroes the percentages are lower (45.3, 33.2, and 20.8 respectively) because many live in Southern states where no civil-rights laws have been adopted.

TABLE II.^a PROPORTION OF NEGRO AND OTHER NON-WHITE POPULATION IN STATES HAVING ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS

<i>States having</i>		<i>Negro</i>	<i>Other Non-White</i>	<i>Total</i>
Fair Employment Laws	Population Per Cent of U.S. Total	8,549,168 45.3	1,415,241 87.4	127,347,350 71.0
Fair Education Laws	Population Per Cent of U.S. Total	3,932,572 20.8	194,048 12.0	54,655,936 30.5
Fair Housing Laws	Population Per Cent of U.S. Total	6,258,236 33.2	661,619 40.9	94,075,629 52.5
Public Accommodation Laws	Population Per Cent of U.S. Total	8,546,116 45.3	1,028,075 63.5	128,027,538 71.4

^a See Table I, note a.

War on Poverty

The shift of the civil-rights struggle to an expanded war on poverty revealed that millions of Americans live in abject poverty which has been perpetuated for generations and from which the young see no escape, especially since modern technology was eliminating unskilled and semi-skilled jobs in which large numbers of Negroes and other minorities have been concentrated. It is with the factor of "generational poverty" that anti-poverty programs must deal.

The Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 181-82) declared that it was the nation's policy "to eliminate the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty in this Nation by opening to everyone the opportunity for education and training, the opportunity to work, and the opportunity to live in decency and dignity." The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), headed by Sargent Shriver, provided a variety of programs: job corps, training, and work-study programs; community action, with fed-

eral grants to local community-action organizations for grass-roots assistance to low-income families in employment; job training, vocational rehabilitation, housing, home management, and welfare; programs to combat rural poverty, to provide business-investment and small business loans, and to strengthen family life; recruitment, training, and placement of volunteers to assist in the war on poverty in a domestic peace corps called VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America), and Project Head Start for pre-school training of disadvantaged children.

The Neighborhood Youth Corps provided 513,000 jobs for enrollees during 1965, the Job Corps 17,500. By year's end, some 2,000 Volunteers (VISTA) were serving in urban slums, in migrant labor camps, on Indian reservations, in Appalachian hollows. In the first year of the poverty program, over 3,000 grants totaling \$800 million were made for local community-action programs; the estimated cost for the second year was \$1.5 billion. (The cost of established welfare programs, such as social security, unemployment insurance, and aid to slum schools, was more than \$18 billion a year in federal funds.)

Education was part of most of the poverty programs run by the OEO and the Labor, Education, and Agriculture departments since, as explained in a widely distributed government booklet *Education: An Answer to Poverty*, to be ignorant is to be poor; hard-core poverty, like established wealth, is inherited (90 per cent of the poor had impoverished parents), and the best way to break the "chain of dependence" of generations of poor Americans on the dole is to educate them. Last summer's Project Head Start, which reached 560,000 pre-school-age children, instructed them in small groups and gave them medical care and nutritious food. Often, however, lack of funds, facilities, staffs, and lethargic local school boards prevented the continuation of this aid when school began.

During 1965, two acts were passed to provide massive financial support to schools and colleges and to help disadvantaged youth. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act authorized over a billion dollars in grants to local school districts to broaden and strengthen programs for educationally disadvantaged children in public and nonpublic (including parochial) schools (p. 134). The Higher Education Act (p. 141) funded at \$2.3 billion, included community service and continuing education programs; college library assistance and library training and research; strengthening developing institutions; scholarships for needy and deserving students; strengthening teaching, and aid for construction of needed facilities. Both Acts created problems in respect to church-state separation (pp. 137-40).

One of the major controversies during the year centered around the role of the Community Action programs. Many of these programs encouraged the poor among whom they operated to take part in protest activities, such as rent strikes and civil-rights demonstrations, and in this way to help combat apathy and despair, and build leadership and self-reliance for the development of the poor's political power. The Economic Opportunity Act asked

that these programs be "developed, conducted and administered with the maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas and members of the groups served," and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey called them an attempt to give "persons never before given the chance to be heard a voice in programs that directly affect their lives." Big-city mayors and other politicians, however, have complained that the programs were financing competitive political groups by organizing the poor for political action. Approximately 13,000 men and women served on the boards of 650 local community action programs, and about 3,700 of these, reported Sargent Shriver, came "from the impoverished communities—the slums." Many of the poor felt that "maximum, feasible participation of the poor" should mean majority control of the boards, and the conflict between them and political leaders continued.

Religious Groups

In 1946 the Synagogue Council of America, the social action department of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the industrial relations division of the Federal (now National) Council of Churches of Christ adopted a "Pattern for Economic Justice," a declaration of moral principles as applied to economic life. The statement held it "the duty of the state to intervene in economic life whenever necessary to protect the rights of individuals and groups and to aid in the advancement of the general economic welfare." Catholic, Protestant and Jewish religious groups largely ignored the declaration until the inception of the anti-poverty program in 1965 when action guides were quickly prepared: *One Fifth of the Nation: Fact and Action Guide to Poverty in the Midst of Plenty in the U.S.A.* was published by the department of church and economic life of the National Council of Churches; *The War on Poverty: A Handbook*, by the National Catholic Coordinating Committee on Economic Opportunity, and *There Shall Be No Poor*, by the commission on social action of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. The Union also called on all agencies of Reform Judaism to ask their members to participate in tutoring, effective social action, and other programs.

The National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice organized Project Equality calling on archdioceses to end any discriminatory practices in their own hiring systems, and to require similar action by their suppliers of goods and services. The archdioceses of St. Louis, Detroit, San Antonio, and Hartford adopted such programs. In Detroit the program developed into an interfaith action in December, with the Metropolitan Detroit Council of Churches, the Jewish Community Council, the Council of Eastern Orthodox Churches, and the Roman Catholic archdiocese joining forces. Similar action was anticipated in many cities throughout the nation.

Other examples of Catholic activities included a tutoring program in reading and first aid, crafts, movies, and sports offered by Our Lady of Guadalupe Shrine, in St. Paul, Minnesota, a parish populated mainly by Mexican-Amer-

icans; a remedial reading program for culturally deprived upper-grade students, sponsored by the Newark, N.J., Queen of Angels parish, in cooperation with Seton Hall University; a pre-kindergarten unit, remedial reading, tutorial programs, and a family enrichment program at St. Martin de Porres parish school in New Haven, Conn., in cooperation with the New Haven Board of Education and Community Progress, Inc.

In Detroit, parochial schools received an OEO grant to operate pre-school centers for the development of health, cultural and general school preparation among deprived children, and the distribution of supplementary reading materials to children of poor families. In New Mexico, the archdiocese of Santa Fe joined with the New Mexico Council of Churches in a statewide program for migrant farm laborers, featuring multi-functional community centers with courses in child-care, home-making, language development, vocational counseling, housing and sanitation, and adult, youth, and pre-school education. In Washington, D.C., more than 100 nuns, seminarians, lay volunteers, and teenagers participated in an interreligious, interracial program at Project Head Start centers in nine parishes and in an education and enrichment program in four public schools. The diocese of Natchez-Jackson, Miss., launched a program, sponsored by STAR, Inc. (Systematic Training and Redevelopment), and headed by Auxiliary Bishop Joseph B. Brunini and an interracial board, to train 25,000 persons for jobs and to give guidance to 75,000 others in 18 centers across the state.

Protestant groups joined with Catholic and in some cases with Jewish groups in underwriting the programs of the Industrial Areas Foundation, headed by Saul Alinsky, a criminologist and sociologist advocating the use of power to fight power by arousing apathetic slum dwellers to fight their own battles. Chicago, Buffalo, and Rochester were among the cities where his methods received church support. The presbytery of St. Louis organized a youth development and vocational training program with 450 tutors for 800 children; cultural enrichment programs; a remedial reading clinic staffed by 20 volunteers, and special counseling and a sheltered workshop for drop-outs. St. Philip's Community Youth Center in New York City, in cooperation with other Protestant agencies and the city's Youth Board, served 175 teenagers and 225 younger children, and cooperated with the Urban League, Opportunities for Youth Unlimited, and Associated Communities Teams (which became part of HARYOU-ACT) in youth employment.

Jewish Secular Agencies

Among Jewish groups, 70 federations affiliated with the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJFWF) were involved in community-wide activities to develop anti-poverty programs and projects. In many communities, Jewish health and welfare agencies helped mobilize local forces to guarantee maximum involvement of the poor themselves; to prevent the use of anti-poverty programs as political footballs; adhere to the principle of sepa-

ration of church and state, and to develop maximum public understanding of poverty needs and programs.

Most national Jewish agencies cooperated in anti-poverty programs. The National Jewish Welfare Board participated in a neighborhood Youth Corps program through its Jewish community centers; the Jewish Occupational Council offered guidance to Jewish vocational services; the American Jewish Committee organized intergroup relations activity with ethnic community groups, conferences of Jewish business leaders throughout the country on opportunities and job training, and cooperated with a number of local and federal government agencies in support of the war on poverty; the American Jewish Congress worked with agencies to aid Negro small businessmen, informed community agencies of anti-poverty programs in their areas, and participated in remedial programs for underprivileged children; Hadassah urged its members to help Project Head Start; the National Council of Jewish Women joined non-Jewish and Negro women's groups in Women in Community Service to work with Job Corps and other girls and participated in Project Head Start and other programs to aid poor school children; the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds co-sponsored with non-Jewish groups a conference of religious leaders on VISTA and urged Jewish health and welfare agencies and synagogues to enlist volunteers and to utilize VISTA volunteers in local programs.

Labor

Labor has done its share to implement the war on poverty. Maintaining that "more than half of the poverty problem is linked to low wages, unemployment and involuntary part-time work, and that the poor are eager to work when jobs are available," the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), at its 1965 convention, backed the President's anti-poverty effort, but called for a broader program. It urged its affiliated organizations "to become integral, active and leading members of the anti-poverty groups now being formed in hundreds of communities throughout the country." It set up an AFL-CIO anti-poverty office and prepared a guide, "Labor's Role in the War on Poverty," listing ways in which unions could help.

Unions in all parts of the United States have been involved in many projects, such as work-training and experience for "hard to serve" unemployed youths; making available to agencies in communities of poverty youth work-teams for maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation services, at times linked with a part-time return to school program, and training of community action workers. In Cincinnati, for example, the AFL-CIO Labor Council co-sponsored a unique program with the Neighborhood Youth Corps and the city's Urban Rehabilitation Division, in which skilled union craftsmen, at prevailing wages, trained and supervised crews of youths in repairing rundown houses in poor neighborhoods, owned by persons who qualified for rehabilitation grants of up to \$1,500 from the Federal Housing Administration.

(The program was so successful that the Labor Department was asked to approve an expanded program under which the project would become a source of apprentice referrals for the participating unions.)

Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers, sparked the formation in New York City (October 1964) of the Citizens Crusade Against Poverty in which religious and civil-rights groups, farm organizations, labor unions, businessmen, and student associations participated. Its officers included Reuther, Rabbi Richard Hirsch, director of the Religious Action Center of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and Jerry Anderson of the Rural Electric Cooperative Association. In 1965 the Crusade organized an information network of more than 4,000 neighborhood-block clubs and other grassroots organizations in poverty-stricken areas, and planned to train 1,000 workers to help the poor play a more active part in resolving their problems.

NEGRO-JEWISH RELATIONS⁶

Jewish organizations, for decades, have been active in civil-rights work by promoting legislation and engaging in mass-educational activities. The leaders of most Negro civil-rights movements have welcomed such Jewish support and have referred to the historical kinship between the persecuted Negroes and the persecuted Jews. Yet, in both groups there was a tendency to share the prejudices of the general society. Some Jews, like other whites, tended to make unfavorable generalizations about Negroes and, conversely, some Negroes expressed their hostility toward white society through antisemitism. Most Jews and Negroes had high expectations of behavior toward each other, and where such behavior fell short of the expected, resentment grew.

In the past, partial causes for Negro antisemitism have been listed as:

1. Confrontation between the Jew as employer, landlord, and merchant, and the Negro as worker, tenant, and customer.
2. Christian theological teachings and antisemitic references in religious textbooks.
3. The general mildly, but pervasively, antisemitic environment.

In recent years, however, a new dimension was added by the appearance and increasing activity in the Negro community of black nationalists spreading virulent antisemitism. And while it is impossible to establish whether Negro antisemitism has recently grown or diminished, there has been demonstrably increased expression of anti-Jewish feeling in 1965. Such hostility existed not only among the poor, but on almost every level of the Negro community—intellectuals, professionals, businessmen, and young people. That mass demonstrations like the Watts riots showed some evidence of antisemitism could be expected. But anti-Jewish feeling was expressed also at the planning session of the November 1965 White House Conference to Fulfill

⁶ Much of the material in this section is based on a confidential survey by Ann G. Wolfe for the American Jewish Committee.

These Rights (p. 101) where Lawrence Landry of Chicago, executive director of a militant Negro group ACT and coordinator of the second Chicago school boycott, and other Negro participants described the conference as dominated by a disproportionate number of whites and Jews (Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, syndicated column in New York *Herald Tribune*, November 24, 1965).

LeRoi Jones, the *avant-garde* Negro playwright and poet whose HAR-YOU-ACT-sponsored play contained strong anti-white statements, was also critical of the Jews. One of his poems appearing in *The Liberator*, a magazine published by the Afro-American Research Institute and specializing in anti-white and antisemitic material, read:

We want live words of the hip world
live flesh & coursing blood.
Hearts Brains Souls splintering fire.
We want poems like fists beating niggers
out of Jocks or dagger
poems in the slimy bellies of the owner-Jews.

A small Negro group in Washington, D.C., Association for the Improvement of Education, was strongly antisemitic and anti-Israel in an attack on the superintendent of schools in a newsletter published in November:

At the precise moment that community leaders and parents in righteous indignation were accusing the Sup't. of discrimination in hiring and promotions, and practicing programmed retardation in the education of their children, the Sup't. was in Israel . . . Some parents . . . wonder if the Sup't is going to set up welfare and feeding programs here similar to those set up for the Arabs and Palestine refugees in Israel but are not given a right to participate in the economy. It is suggested that the Superintendent read 'The International Jew' before he incorporates Israeli-oriented programs into the D.C. public schools.

In March a small Philadelphia nationalist group, the Committee of Full Equality, distributed a leaflet outside a factory that was being picketed by CORE, which stated:

WE AGREE with CORE that discrimination is present at this plant. At the highest level we have WHITE JEWS in a proportion that is not justified by the number of WHITE JEWS employed at lower levels. The Company should replace some WHITE JEWISH FOREMEN with NEGROES and replace a number of NEGROES in the lower level jobs with WHITE replacements.

In Los Angeles, a rabidly racist Negro newspaper, the *Herald-Dispatch*, carried antisemitic items regularly. In the issue of March 20, Waldo Phillips, a columnist, stated:

The Jew is out for his own advancement without any love or concern for the black community. This can be seen in social welfare, education. The Negroes are the experiments for all research but the Jewish communities get the finished product. The Negro is the experiment at the public hospitals, but the Jews take the results to their hospitals. Negroes receive the butt of the punish-

ment on the civil rights battlefield, but the Jews use the legal breakthrough for his (sic) advantage.

This intense antisemitism among the Negroes, however, was not reflected in a poll conducted by *Newsweek*⁷ which stressed Negro opinion on the role of Jews in the civil-rights movement, rather than antisemitism. It found that 42 per cent thought Jews were helpful in the struggle for Negro rights, and 9 per cent that they were not; 49 per cent were uncertain. Among Negro leaders, 71 per cent felt that Jews were helpful, and 8 per cent that they were not; 21 per cent were uncertain. Portions of a survey on *Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism* by Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark (Harper & Row, 1966), sponsored by ADL and released late in 1965, indicated further that there was somewhat less antisemitism among Negroes than among white Christians. But while antisemitism decreased among the more educated whites, the strongest Negro antisemitism was found at the high-school-graduate level. The survey found much less antisemitism among Negroes who were members of civil-rights organizations than among those not involved.

At a Conference on Negro-Jewish Relations in the United States, sponsored by the Conference on Jewish Social Studies in May 1964, Horace Mann Bond, dean of the school of education, Atlanta University, discussed antisemitism among Negroes in a statement on "Negro Attitudes Towards Jews":⁸

Attitudes toward Jews—either negative or positive—have always been, and are now, part and parcel of the American culture. In the process of acculturation of sorts, the Negro has absorbed the cultural traits characteristic of the social and economic class to which he belongs—with variations, resulting from the unique caste status assigned to Negroes.

It is my considered view that Negro attitudes and actions toward Jews that are frequently interpreted as 'antisemitic' actually lack the sinister thought-content they are sometimes advertised as holding. The occasional riots against small businessmen and landlords in Harlem—persons who may happen to be Jews—do not, in my opinion, actually possess the 'classic' emotional load of aggression against a Jewish 'race' or 'religion'; that has been considered the essence of 'antisemitism.'

At the same conference, Negro civil rights leader Bayard Rustin suggested that one factor in Negro antisemitism was Negro awareness of past Jewish support:

In times of desperation, socially, you act like a child having a tantrum, a child saying, 'watch me mother, I am going to do something naughty, because I want you to come and show me a better way.' After [jumping on] Jim Farmer and Roy Wilkins and Rev. King . . . it is most likely that they will next jump on Jews who historically have been friendly to them. He who does not understand this, does not understand the psychology of people in motion.

⁷ The poll was analyzed by Celia S. Heller and Alphonso Pinkney in "The Attitudes of Negroes Towards Jews," *Social Forces*, March 1965, pp. 364-69.

⁸ *Jewish Social Studies*, January 1965, p. 7.

He blamed lack of real leadership for excesses, and asked for cooperation among all groups to solve the problem. In this spirit B. Z. and May L. Sobel in an article "Negroes and Jews: American Minority Groups in Conflict" (*Judaism*, Winter 1966) cautioned: "Large scale work in and with the Negro community must be undertaken, even in the face of a rebuff from the revolutionary Negro leadership, and work in the Jewish community should be intensified even in the face of violent reaction."

HARRY FLEISCHMAN

Church and State

FEDERAL AID TO SECTARIAN WELFARE • FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION •
HIGHER EDUCATION • STATE AID • RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
• SHEHITAH • SABBATH-OBSERVANCE LEGISLATION

IN 1965 the complexion of church-state problems altered significantly. Legal, legalistic, and philosophic controversy over the meaning of the First Amendment's no-establishment and free-exercise clause gave way to action programs in which church and state shared. Many sectarian agencies undertook to join the nation's war on poverty and ignorance with the aid of federal and sometimes state funds.

Reasons for the change in emphasis and climate were many, perhaps the most important being the churches' insistence on their right to function in the secular society and to exert a moral-political influence on government and community. Much of the impetus for the churches' expanded participation in the major social and political issues of the day had originated in the involvement of rabbis, ministers, and priests in the civil-rights movement. That energy and commitment were subsequently channeled into the war on poverty and ignorance.

Secondly, the pervasive national concern for more and better education for all American children in both public and nonpublic schools had even before 1965 begun to undermine the long-standing opposition to any form of governmental aid that would have benefitted nonpublic school children (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 211-15). The idea of educational aid for poor children especially, even if administered through sectarian agencies, proved sufficiently attractive to overcome resistance from some opponents of federal aid to nonpublic schools. The cautious willingness of separationist-minded liberal Protestants to go along with limited forms of federal aid to the beneficiaries of sectarian welfare and educational institutions was in part attributed to the expansive ecumenical mood induced among Protestants by the spirit of *aggiornamento* which the late Pope John XXIII had introduced in the Catholic church.

Most Jews were less willing than Protestants to reexamine their views on the separation of church and state in the interest of ecumenism. Jewish community-relations agencies as well as national Reform and Conservative bodies continued to adhere to their strict separationist views. Orthodox organizations, however, held sharply divergent opinions: they believed religion should not be legislated out of public life and, maintaining a considerable educational establishment, they welcomed the benefits of federal aid. These groups began to challenge the non-Orthodox hegemony in Jewish communal life and to lobby independently for their interests. Thus, they became a new political

influence in the Jewish and general community, and are to be reckoned with. One manifestation of this new phenomenon was the formation, late in 1965, of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA), consisting of Orthodox laymen, mostly lawyers, to defend the interests of Orthodox Jews in matters of church and state.

Finally, scholars and intellectuals whose dedication to liberty and justice could not be gainsaid continued to express anxiety lest the legal exclusion of religion destroy the traditional cultural character of American society, which they sometimes explicitly described as Christian. Thus, Mark DeWolfe Howe, professor of law at Harvard University, in *The Garden and the Wilderness: Religion and Government in American Constitutional History* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1965), an erudite and witty history of the Founding Fathers' legislative intent and of the Supreme Court's interpretations of the no-establishment and free-exercise clause, wrote:

My deeper concern with the Court's current inclination to extract a few homespun absolutes from the complexities of a pluralistic tradition is derived from the conviction that in these matters the living practices of the American people bespeak our basic constitutional commitment more accurately than do the dogmatic pronouncements of the justices [p. 174].

Even more outspoken was Robert Ulich, James Bryant Conant professor of education, emeritus, of Harvard University, in "The Educational Issue," in Paul A. Freund and Ulich, *Religion and the Public Schools* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). Speaking of "the serious opponents" of the recent Supreme Court decisions, whose outlook he shared, he said:

They are aroused by the fear of taxation of religious institutions and by the threat of an unhistorical disruption of national customs and symbols, which today probably have a more patriotic and aesthetic appeal than a deeply felt religious one. But there are even more profound, though sometimes unconscious, reasons for the anxiety of many people. These reasons became clear to me when I read the book by the novelist Herman Wouk, *This Is My God*. The author rightly believes that the Jewish people would not have survived the long years of persecution without faithful adherence to their rituals, festivals, and prayers. May then the loss of the Christian past not jeopardize the future of *this* nation, just as the desertion from the covenant would have jeopardized the survival of the Jews? Nations, as well as men, though living by bread, do not live by bread alone [p. 40].

FEDERAL AID TO SECTARIAN WELFARE

Sectarian agencies have had a long tradition of providing social-welfare services in the United States, where public welfare, originally based on the English Poor Law system, was niggardly. Some states, during the nineteenth century, transferred part of their welfare services to private sectarian agencies, retaining only basic financial responsibility. Since the New Deal, government has substantially enlarged its role in welfare and its financial commitment, but it continued to make use of sectarian and secular voluntary agencies to

implement or conduct welfare programs and it financed many social services performed in a sectarian setting. The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs estimated that sectarian health, welfare, and education agencies were eligible for federal grants or other forms of financial aid under 115 different programs.¹

According to a study based on responses to a questionnaire, 73 per cent of over 400 private health and welfare agencies had a policy of accepting government funds or accepted such funds in the absence of a formal policy.² Of Catholic agencies 92 per cent accepted government funds, with or without policy, as compared with 68 per cent of Jewish and 63 per cent of Protestant agencies. Of the nation's sectarian hospitals, Protestant hospitals, accounting for 41 per cent of the total, received 37 per cent of federal Hill-Burton grants to sectarian hospitals; Catholics, with 55 per cent of these hospitals, received 58 per cent of the grants, and Jews, 3.5 per cent, received 4.4 per cent. Protestants as a whole received less than their proportional share primarily because Baptists and other "free-church" denominations maintained a fairly strict policy of not seeking or accepting government funds, though other denominations (Lutherans, for instance) readily accepted government financial aid.

The questionnaire asked welfare-agency executives if they believed acceptance of government subsidy was compatible with their views on church-state separation. Jews and Catholics overwhelmingly saw no real conflict, but more than half the Protestant administrators saw a considerable degree of conflict. Nearly all Catholics and Jews favored government's purchase of voluntary services and saw no violation of the principle of separation. Most Protestants, though not in the same high degree, shared that view. But the Protestants in the free-church tradition had more difficulty in reconciling themselves to new relations with government as a consequence of vast social changes in the United States. The tension between principle and practice was evident in the remark of a Southern Baptist administrator in Missouri whose hospital accepted tax funds: "We are opposed in principle, but recognize we must live under the laws of the land."

As for the Jewish agencies, the author of the study concludes:

The practices and attitudes of Jewish Welfare administrators concerning church-state separation are similar to those of Catholic administrators. In spite of the admonitions of Jewish civil-rights and public-relations groups, Jewish welfare executives have little fear that cooperation with government and the receipt of tax funds either compromise church-state separation or endangers the autonomy of their agencies.³

¹ Alice Moody, "Church Agencies Eligible in 115 Government Programs," *Report from the Capital*, July 1965.

² Bernard J. Coughlin, *Church and State in Social Welfare* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), especially Chapter 5, "A Matter of Money," pp. 58-74.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 103. At a conference of the New York metropolitan region of the National Welfare Board in March 1965 both executives and lay leaders of recreational and cultural agencies were convinced their acceptance of federal funds did

Sectarian Housing

In 1965 sectarian institutions began to plan housing projects for the elderly, the infirm, and the poor who were eligible for government assistance under the Housing and Urban Development act of 1965 providing low-interest loans to nonprofit corporations for low-income housing. In August the general synod of the United Church of Christ organized a task force to advise local congregations how to take advantage of the housing act and plan for effective community action in housing development. In December the general board of the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. (NCC) voted to assist its member-denominations in setting up nonprofit housing corporations to participate in church housing projects for the aged and the infirm.

Anti-poverty Programs

The federal anti-poverty program gave renewed impetus to sectarian welfare activities and provided many with government funding (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 181–82, 216–17). It also touched off new conflicts about church and state.

Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish sectarian agencies were generally welcomed as active participants in the war against poverty, since they could provide considerable resources in personnel and facilities for the local community. All major religious groups set up machinery to take part in government-financed programs and established various interreligious groups for joint activities, often in partnership with public agencies. A much-lauded interreligious anti-poverty organization was Women in Community Service (WICS), formed early in 1965, whose constituent agencies were the National Council of Catholic Women, the National Council of Jewish Women, the National Council of Negro Women, and the United Church Women. WICS specialized in recruiting and screening disadvantaged young girls for enrolment in women's training centers of the Job Corps, a program administered by the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).

Church-related institutions accounted for about 3.5 per cent of all summer 1965 Head Start projects, nursery-school programs for underprivileged four- and five-year olds. (Most Head Start projects were conducted by boards of education or school boards.) Catholic institutions received about \$1.69 million, more than half the funds allocated to sectarian agencies, Protestants nearly \$1 million, and Jews about \$50,000.⁴

In New York City, sectarian agencies received nearly \$1.3 million or 2.1 per cent of all funds allocated for approved anti-poverty projects. Jewish

not endanger their institutional autonomy or the principle of separation (p. 190). The National Community Relations Advisory Council executive remained convinced separation was endangered.

⁴These approximate figures were derived from an analysis of all approved grants for summer 1965 Head Start projects, published in two volumes by the Office of Economic Opportunity.

institutions received 37 per cent of the sectarian funds, Catholics 32 per cent, and Protestants 31 per cent.⁵

Many Protestant and Jewish agencies had to resolve conflicts of conscience in choosing between two desirable but conflicting goals: fighting the war against poverty and ignorance or maintaining the wall of separation between church and state. For Southern fundamentalists, whose commitment to secular education was weak and whose attitude toward Negro poverty was at best indifferent, the choice in favor of separation was not difficult. Protestants liberal in religion and politics had greater difficulty in choosing the greater good. NCC straddled the issue because of widespread differences of opinion within its member bodies.

Shirley E. Greene, coordinator of NCC's anti-poverty task force, reported on October 1 that the major involvement of state councils of churches had been in relation to the migrant ministry and to rural anti-poverty programs. State councils in Arizona, New Mexico, and North Carolina had government contracts with OEO, while the councils in Michigan and Indiana were involved in such contracts with Roman Catholic cosponsors. Early in 1965, according to *The Lutheran*, April 21, 1965, nearly \$3 million had been allocated by OEO to religious groups for aid to migrant workers. Some state councils were engaged in rural anti-poverty programs, but chose to do so without government funding. Many metropolitan Protestant church councils, Dr. Greene reported, sponsored Head Start programs, participated in neighborhood youth corps, VISTA, tutorial, and many other programs.

Jewish health, welfare, educational, and recreational agencies participated in a great variety of programs, including job training and retraining, vocational guidance, and tutorial and remedial educational programs, as well as many pilot and experimental projects to test and develop new programs.

Catholic participation in anti-poverty programs was coordinated through the National Catholic Coordinating Committee on Economic Opportunity. Catholics, who had traditionally favored government aid for their ramified network of educational, welfare, and social institutions, had few inhibitions about the propriety of accepting government funds. Indeed, the fact that Catholic welfare institutions were often inadequately financed encouraged Catholics to make considerable use of government funding. In the South, Catholic institutions actively undertook many anti-poverty projects designed primarily to help Negroes. STAR (Systematic Training and Redevelopment Program), an \$8-million OEO project initiated by the Catholic diocese of Natchez-Jackson for a clientele predominantly Negro and non-Catholic, was credited with a fair measure of success by objective, non-Catholic observers. The Catholic archdiocese of New Orleans was an active participant in Total Community Action, the city's community-wide anti-poverty agency, conduct-

⁵ Derived from an analysis of approved New York City anti-poverty projects listed in "New York City's Anti-poverty Program," a special supplement to *City Almanac* (New School for Social Research, Center for New York City Affairs), January 1966.

ing remedial-reading programs, recreational and counseling services, guidance in community organization, and neighborhood improvement. The remedial-reading program, known as Project SCORE and inaugurated late in 1965, embraced some 1,500 children, about 25 per cent Catholic and 80 per cent Negro. The teachers, including some nuns, and teachers' aides were about 90 per cent Negroes.

Public opposition to the participation of church-related organizations in government-financed anti-poverty programs was limited to those who held a rigorous position on church-state separation or who, by reason of their own religious history, feared the expansion of Roman Catholic secular power, or both. Protestants and Other Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (POAU), American Civil Liberties Union, and the American Jewish Congress were the most active in efforts to make constitutional tests of the involvement of sectarian agencies in government-financed anti-poverty programs.

The church-state question was also exploited by rightists whose indifference to the hardships of the poor led them to oppose the war on poverty. Thus, Rep. John H. Buchanan, Jr., a Southern Baptist minister and Goldwater Republican,⁶ elected in 1964 to represent the congressional district of Birmingham, Ala., introduced an amendment in the House on July 21, 1965, to bar grants to church corporations or religious organizations for community-action programs under the Economic Opportunity Act. Buchanan's amendment was supported by Rep. Howard H. Callaway of Georgia, another of the nine Southern Republican congressmen elected in 1964. Callaway urged separation of church and state in poverty grants though he had favored prayer in the public schools. Buchanan's amendment was overwhelmingly defeated in a voice vote.

FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION

On April 11 President Johnson signed into law the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-10), to strengthen and improve educational quality and educational opportunities in elementary and secondary schools, particularly for poor children. An appropriation of \$1.33 billion was authorized for the act's first year of operation. It was the first major legislative breakthrough providing a broad program of federal aid to education. Though impressive legislation authorizing specific types of federal educational aid had been passed in 1963 and 1964 (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 215-17), none had embraced so large a school population or made so large a financial commitment. Particularly noteworthy was the relative ease with which the bill hurdled the perennial church-state obstruction, even though it authorized aid to pupils in private nonprofit schools as well as to those in public schools.

⁶ In a speech July 15, 1964, Buchanan described the John Birch Society as "an organization of dedicated Americans."

Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965: Summary

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), unlike a general-aid-to-education law, concentrates on the educational needs of the children of the poor and on the needs of the educational institutions that serve them. Title I is a three-year program authorizing federal payments to state educational agencies for basic and incentive grants to local educational agencies serving children in low-income families. (An appropriation of \$1.06 billion was made for the program's first year of operation.) The grants are to pay for programs and projects, including, where necessary, acquisition of equipment and construction of facilities which are designed to fit the needs of educationally deprived children and "which are of sufficient size, scope, and quality to give reasonable promise of substantial progress in meeting those needs."

This title stipulates that the local educational agency must provide also for educationally deprived children in its school district who are enrolled in private schools by offering special educational services and arrangements in which these children can participate, such as dual enrolment (shared time), educational radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment.

Title II, a five-year program with \$100 million appropriated for the first year, authorizes grants through state agencies for the acquisition of school-library resources, textbooks, and other instructional materials for use by pupils and teachers in both public and private elementary and secondary schools. Control and administration of these materials are to be vested only in a public agency; the materials to be made available to pupils in nonpublic schools must be those approved for use in public schools of that state.

Title III, a five-year program with a first-year appropriation of \$100 million, provides grants to states to permit local educational agencies to set up supplementary educational centers and services for vitally needed educational programs not otherwise available in sufficient quality or quantity. Services include academic and vocational guidance and counseling, remedial instruction, as well as health, psychological, and social-work services; development of dual-enrolment programs; provision of specialized instruction and, if necessary, of equipment for students wishing to study advanced scientific subjects, foreign languages, and other academic subjects, for persons who are handicapped or for preschool-age children, and for children in rural or other areas isolated from normal educational facilities. Special services for gifted children in arts and music are included, as is also the development, production, and transmission of educational radio and television programs for classroom use. Under this title pupils in nonpublic schools are eligible for benefits not only through shared-time programs, but also as recipients of therapeutic, remedial, or welfare services as well as special educational services for the gifted, the retarded, or the needy.

Title IV, expanding the Cooperative Research Act of 1954 for educational

research, authorizes grants for research, surveys, and demonstrations in the field of education and educational-research training, with an appropriation of \$22.5 million for the first year. It also provides for the construction of regional educational research facilities, for which \$100 million has been budgeted over a five-year period.

Title V envisages a five-year program, with a first-year appropriation of \$25 million, to stimulate and assist the states in strengthening their educational agencies to take a leading role in meeting educational needs.

Title VI ("General Provisions") prohibits federal control over educational programs, curriculum, administration, personnel, or selection of textbooks and other teaching materials. Its final paragraph (Section 605) prohibits payments "for religious worship or instruction."

ESEA's Legislative History

In his State of the Union message to Congress on January 4, President Johnson included a recommendation for a major national educational effort. Paraphrasing Jefferson's statement that "no nation can be both ignorant and free," he said that "today no nation can be both ignorant and great." On January 12 the President transmitted to Congress his education message, which highlighted the major educational tasks confronting the nation: to bring better education to the disadvantaged who need it most; to provide incentives for those who wish to learn; to put the best educational equipment, ideas, and innovations within the reach of all students, and to advance the technology of teaching and the training of teachers.

That day companion bills embodying these educational proposals were introduced in the House and Senate. The general education subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee held ten days of hearings and, on March 2, reported the bill to the full committee, which reported it out on March 8. Full House debate began on March 24 and on March 26 the bill passed by a vote of 263 to 153 (228 Democrats and 35 Republicans, for; 57 Democrats, mostly from the South, and 96 Republicans, against).

The education subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee held seven days of hearings and reported the House version of the bill to full committee on April 1, which on April 6 unanimously reported it out. On April 9 the Senate passed the bill without change by a vote of 73 to 18 (55 Democrats and 18 Republicans, for; 14 Republicans and four Southern Democrats, against). On April 11, the President signed the bill in the old country school in Johnson City which he had attended as a child.

The major objection to the bill centered on the church-state issue. Opponents of the legislation as drafted, believing that some or all forms of aid to pupils in nonpublic schools violated the First Amendment, urged that a provision for constitutional judicial review be included.⁷ Active supporters

⁷ Since the Supreme Court had held (*Massachusetts v. Mellon*, 262 U.S. 447 [1922]) that no single taxpayer could bring suit to enjoin the execution of an

of the judicial-review provision included the American Civil Liberties Union, POAU, American Jewish Congress, and the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). The Baptist Joint Committee, NCC, and the American Jewish Committee favored the judicial-review amendment, but did not make it a condition for their support of the bill.

Proponents of the bill believed that its provisions were constitutional and that taxpayers' suits would impede the law's operation and impair its effectiveness. Senator Wayne Morse (D., Ore.), who guided the bill through the Senate, opposed the insertion of a judicial-review clause and Emanuel Celler (D., N.Y.) in the House and Jacob Javits (Rep., N.Y.) in the Senate successfully warded off judicial-review amendments. (On April 7, during Senate debate, Senator Morse said that he did not think an independent judicial-review bill was needed with regard to this particular legislation, but on June 7 he reintroduced a bill, offered previously in the 87th and 88th Congresses, to provide for judicial review of the constitutionality of grants or loans under certain acts. The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.)

Public Opinion

In a Gallup poll report released on March 7, 1965, 49 per cent of a national sample thought the federal government should pay a greater share of the increasing cost of education, while 42 per cent thought that the states and local communities should continue to meet most of the educational expenses, and 9 per cent had no opinion. The same survey found that 51 per cent of the persons interviewed approved of federal aid for Catholic and other private schools as well as public schools, as against 41 per cent who thought federal aid should go only to public schools; 8 per cent had no opinion. In a Louis Harris public-opinion poll released on June 7, 49 per cent of the respondents favored federal aid for building educational facilities that could be used jointly by public- and parochial-school pupils, while 35 per cent opposed it and 16 per cent were not sure.⁸

The shift in public opinion was dramatically illustrated by the National Education Association (NEA), long opposed to government aid to nonpublic schools. On January 13 NEA gave its "wholehearted support" to the President's education message as "one of the strongest commitments to meeting the urgent needs of education ever to come from the White House." Testifying before the Senate subcommittee on education, Robert E. McKay, chairman of NEA's legislative commission, said the proposals in the education

appropriation made by Congress because the amount of his interest in the appropriation was too minute and undeterminable to cause him irreparable injury, the only guarantee of a constitutional test was to write it into the law.

⁸ The same Harris poll found that only 36 per cent of the persons interviewed favored "direct" aid to parochial schools, 52 per cent opposed it, and 12 per cent were not sure. The discrepancy between this finding and the others reported by both Harris and Gallup may be accounted for by the wording or the failure to put it in a context of educational need.

bill did not violate the tradition of separation of church and state and that it incorporated "sufficient safeguards and restraints" against possible violation.⁹ United States Commissioner of Education Francis Keppel, in a statement read before the Senate subcommittee on January 26, appealed for educational aid to all children: "The ills of poverty . . . are not confined to a particular region, or color, or faith. Therefore, if we are to respond fully, we must do so in ways that help all our children in all types of schools—both public and private."

The American Association of School Administrators, at its annual meeting in Atlantic City, N.J., in February adopted a resolution supporting the bill, with the admonition that control of public money be vested in public institutions. The resolution also pointed to an expanding role for school superintendents who "will increasingly have to share many more responsibilities in relationship to nonpublic schools than they have in the past."

Walter Lippmann, dean of political journalists, in his syndicated column (*New York Herald Tribune*, April 15, 1965), argued that religious schools were an essential part of the American school system and entitled to receive federal aid for the nonreligious portion of their curricula:

A parochial school is an American school, and those who would deny it any public assistance ought, if they had the courage of their convictions, to ask that parochial schools be outlawed. In fact, parochial schools are regarded as legitimate educational facilities, and in actual practice they have long been helped in one way or another by state and local authorities.

Protestant Views

Arthur S. Fleming, president of the University of Oregon, appeared before the Senate subcommittee on February 11, representing NCC, of which he was a vice president, and cautiously endorsed the education bill. He cited NCC's support of federal aid to public schools and its endorsement of the anti-poverty program and the dual-enrolment plan, but reminded the subcommittee that NCC insisted on a clear "line between assistance to students in private schools and assistance to private schools." NCC hoped that such safeguards would make the bill an instrument of reconciliation and eliminate the divisiveness which the church-state issue had induced in the past.

Because Baptists had been the most consistent champions of separation of church and state, support of the bill from C. Emanuel Carlson, executive director of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, composed of representatives from seven Baptist conventions in the United States, was particularly noteworthy. Dr. Carlson, testifying before the Senate education subcommittee on February 2, gave general, if cautious, approval of the bill, urging only that adequate safeguards be provided so that federal funds would not be supporting sectarian institutions, but would be distributed on the basis of

⁹ This and other testimony from U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, *Hearings before the Subcommittee on Education: Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965* (Washington, D.C., 1965).

child benefits or categorical grants. In *Report From The Capital*, March 1965, Carlson described the bill as "an ingenious measure for meeting the needs of our time with a maximum of consensus," and concluded that "perhaps the time has come to let the children win one round in the political battle."

H. B. Sissel, secretary for national affairs of the United Presbyterian Church, in a statement to the Senate education subcommittee in February, characterized the bill as "a fantastically skillful break in the stalemate occasioned by the church-state dilemma in previous legislative efforts." Though he wanted clearer language to ensure public control of the programs, he specifically endorsed the dual-enrolment proposals.¹⁰ In February, the Protestant Episcopal executive council, meeting in New York City, unanimously adopted a statement supporting the education bill.

In June the annual convention of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod adopted a resolution, by a vote of 291 to 252, endorsing federal aid for nonpublic schools. The Missouri-Synod Lutherans, maintaining the largest Protestant church-related school system in the United States, agreed to take advantage of the newly enacted legislation so long as the federal funds do "not interfere with the distinctive purposes for which such schools are maintained." The synod justified acceptance of federal funds by Lutheran schools on the ground that otherwise "the children attending private and parochial schools would be deprived of educational opportunities which the nation has offered to all citizens."

Strong reservations about the constitutionality of aid to nonpublic school pupils were shared by two bodies that otherwise had little in common: the Unitarian-Universalists and the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). Both urgently called for a constitutional-review provision. The NAE, an interdenominational group whose members seceded from the NCC because they found it politically and theologically too liberal, has opposed any federal aid to church-related schools, direct or indirect, because it would violate the separation of church from state. NAE was nevertheless a most vigorous advocate a year earlier of a constitutional amendment to permit prayer and Bible reading in the public schools (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 224-25).

C. Stanley Lowell, associate director of POAU, testifying February 4 before the Senate education subcommittee, charged that Titles III and IV of the bill were "a massive assault" on the principle of separation. He urged elimination of those features of the bill aiding nonpublic-school pupils and, failing that, a provision for judicial review.

¹⁰ Dual enrolment, an arrangement whereby a pupil enrolled in a nonpublic church-related school regularly attends also a public school for part of the school day to pursue a part of the school curriculum, has been approved by most Protestant denominations and opposed by most Jewish groups (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 213-14).

Catholic Views

Most Catholics supported the bill. They argued that Catholic schools were primarily educational institutions, not churches, and their pupils, as part of the nation's children, were entitled to the same educational assistance as pupils in public schools. James O'Gara, in *Commonweal*, January 29, 1965, described opponents of aid to Catholic school pupils with some asperity:

Anyone who does not travel exclusively in Catholic circles is bound to run into people who discuss Catholic education more or less as if they were describing the indoctrination efforts of some obscure sect. To listen to such conversations one would get the idea that Catholic education was either a tribal rite or a more-or-less elaborate Sunday School program, more complicated on the university level, of course, but essentially something that has little to do with education. The general thesis behind such discussions, of course, is that Catholic schools cannot really be called educational institutions at all, and hence that it would be preposterous to even consider any question of aid for them.

Msgr. Frederick G. Hochwalt, director of the department of education of the National Catholic Welfare Conference (NCWC), characterized the NCWC position before the Senate subcommittee on February 2 as one of "reserved approval and cautious optimism" because the education bill offered a way out of the church-state impasse. The caution reflected fears that pupils in Catholic schools might not receive as much benefit from the law in actual operation as it offered in principle.

Citizens for Educational Freedom, a predominantly Catholic group lobbying for federal aid to church-related schools, testified in February in favor of the education bill, urging even more aid to the secular education of children in nonpublic schools.

Jewish Views

The greatest disagreement over the education bill was manifested among Jewish organizations, unable to reconcile their traditional commitment to more and better education with their long-held, cherished belief in the separation of church and state. Unreserved support for the bill came only from Orthodox institutions: Torah Umesorah-National Society for Hebrew Day Schools, Agudat Israel, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States, Rabbinical Alliance of America, Rabbinical Council of America, Po'ale Agudat Israel, Religious Zionists of America, and the Lubavitcher movement.

The American Jewish Committee took a position of cool approval:

It is our view that so long as the state or federal government does not aid religion or religious education or church-related institutions; so long as its grant of aid is extended to the protection and improvement of the welfare of the child, it is irrelevant that the assistance goes to a person who happens to be of any one race, creed, or ethnic origin.

Most other Jewish organizations endorsed only the bill's provisions for aid to public-school pupils. They objected to all forms of aid to nonpublic-school pupils, asked for their elimination, and, finally, for a provision for judicial review. This position was held by the American Jewish Congress, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, National Council of Jewish Women, Jewish War Veterans, Jewish Labor Committee, American Association for Jewish Education, and the Anti-Defamation League. (Oscar Cohen, a leading official of ADL, had urged his organization at a conference in February to support the bill and have "compassion for the children of America." After heated debate, the membership voted against him.^{10a}) But the AJCongress took the strongest exception to the bill's provisions aiding nonpublic-school pupils. "Indeed," said both its spokesmen in identical testimony in February before the House and Senate subcommittees, "we find ourselves opposed to the measure in its present form." In March Joseph B. Robison, director of American Jewish Congress's commission on law and social action, wrote in a memorandum to Jewish community-relations councils:

We believe that enactment of the bill in its present form would do more harm than good to the public-school system and that consequently it is unsound to accept the bill as a necessary "compromise" in order to get needed funds for the public schools.

In February, at the Senate education subcommittee's hearings, Senator Jennings Randolph (D., W.Va.) tried to determine which Jewish groups most accurately represented the Jewish community. He asked Amos Bunim, representing Torah Umesorah, how he could explain the difference between him and the American Jewish Congress. Bunim replied that the Congress was a secular organization, while the strength of the Jewish community lay in its "religious" (meaning Orthodox) segment, including the 300 day schools represented by Torah Umesorah.

No firm data are available on the opinion of the Jewish man in the street. The Gallup poll of March 1965, cited above, included a small representative Jewish sample (64 persons), 85 per cent of whom favored increased federal aid to education. The Jewish respondents were evenly divided on whether these funds should go only to public schools or also to Catholic and other private schools. This datum, admittedly flimsy, suggests that Torah Umesorah may have been just as representative of Jewish opinion as the AJCongress. Torah Umesorah prided itself on encouraging Jewish support for the bill; its national director, Joseph Kaminetsky, in a report in May, claimed to have rallied "key and wavering legislators." Whether or not Torah Umesorah was

^{10a} President Johnson, who had addressed the ADL conference, felt that the vote was against him too. On June 16, 1966 he recalled: "I remember speaking to the B'nai B'rith and the next morning they proposed a resolution against my school bill. I was like the lawyer who said he made the greatest speech that he ever made in his lifetime before the jury. He was asked, 'What did they do to your client?' And he said, 'They hung him.'"

responsible, all Jews in the House and Senate voted for the bill. (Congressman Herman Toll [Dem., Pa.], absent because of illness, was paired for it.)

Elementary and Secondary Education Act in Operation

On June 28 the joint advisory committee of the Synagogue Council of America and NCRAC submitted to the United States commissioner of education proposals for administering the law, intended to ensure public-agency control of all programs and funds. Other groups, including NCC, submitted similar proposals. Subsequently the Office of Education issued its own guidelines on the administration of the law's titles.

A spot check made by the United States Office of Education early in 1966 in 62 school districts in twelve states disclosed that of 347,000 children benefiting from educational programs authorized under Title I, about 37,000, or 10.7 per cent, were in private, mostly Catholic, schools. They were receiving such benefits as after-school tutoring, remedial-reading instruction, and use of visual aids.

HIGHER EDUCATION

On November 8 President Johnson signed into law the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-329), designed to strengthen the educational resources of United States colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for their students. With a \$2.3-billion authorization, the law provided federal aid of many kinds besides construction of facilities, including community service, library assistance, library training and research, strengthening small and/or substandard institutions through a system of grants for cooperative programs and national teaching fellowships (intended especially to help the 123 struggling Negro colleges), establishing "educational opportunity grants" to help college students with "exceptional financial needs," subsidizing loans to college students, enlarging the scope of studies eligible for aid under the National Defense Education Act of 1958 to include economics, civics, and industrial arts, establishing a national teacher corps for service in impoverished school districts, improving undergraduate instruction through a matching-grants program for books, equipment, and facilities, and expanding the federal loan-and-grant program for construction. The law provides:

No grant may be made . . . for any educational program, activity, or service related to sectarian instruction or religious worship, or provided by a school or department of divinity.

The question of federal aid to sectarian colleges aroused relatively little public controversy. In June the American Civil Liberties Union issued a policy statement opposing federal or state aid to schools or colleges at which religious services, programs, or institutions were required and where religious

symbols, pictures, and objects in the school area were displayed with "the intent of fostering religion."

Meanwhile a major test case on state aid to sectarian colleges was approaching the Supreme Court. In March Maryland Circuit Court Judge O. Bowie Duckett ruled that it was constitutional for his state to give grants of \$2.5 million to four church-related colleges (two Catholic, one Methodist, and one United Church of Christ) for construction of study and dormitory facilities (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 217-18). Declaring that the constitutional test was whether "the legislative purpose or the primary effect of the enactment advances or suppresses religion," Judge Duckett said it seemed "crystal clear" that in the present case the Maryland legislature was in no way concerned with religion in making the appropriation. Furthermore, the grants were for the construction of buildings "for secular purposes and the testimony in this case clearly established that the secular courses taught in these institutions are practically identical with the courses at nonreligious colleges." Since Judge Duckett ruled that the plaintiffs had a right to bring suit as injured taxpayers, they were assured of a hearing in the Supreme Court.

The Maryland case dramatized the nationwide predicament of 817 church-related colleges and universities in the United States, described in Manning M. Pattillo, Jr., and Donald M. Mackenzie, *Eight Hundred Colleges Face the Future* (St. Louis, Mo.: Danforth Foundation, 1965). The foundation's commission on church colleges and universities found that the 817 church-related colleges and universities enrolled 897,016 students, 18.7 per cent of the total enrolment in American colleges and universities. The largest denominational groups were Roman Catholic (139 institutions, 42 per cent, including many with fewer than one hundred students), Methodist (102, 12 per cent), Southern Baptist (52, 6 per cent), and United Presbyterian (45, 6 per cent). Their relationships with their parent religious bodies varied widely in policy, staffing, financing, and curriculum. But except for some Roman Catholic and conservative Protestant colleges with heavier-than-average requirements in religion and philosophy, the study noted, "the curricular pattern of church institutions is quite similar to that of other undergraduate colleges." Indeed, the commission reported:

It is our considered opinion that religion is not as strong in the programs of church-related institutions as one would expect. In fact, there is good reason to believe that these institutions are, by and large, stronger academically (in the secular sense) than they are religiously.

In most cases, official church support is inadequate, the noteworthy exceptions being the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons). Roman Catholic colleges and universities have the poorest church support. Commenting on the impression widespread among educators unacquainted with church-affiliated colleges "that these institutions are narrowly sectarian, that they are engaged primarily in religious indoctrination, and that their faculties are selected only for their

evangelistic zeal," the report said that that description would apply to not more than ten per cent of the church colleges:

Many more institutions reflect a loose, vaguely defined religion and bend over backward to avoid any suggestion of sectarianism. Very few colleges restrict faculty appointments to members of their own churches. People who think that rigid sectarianism is the principal defect of church-related higher education are fifty years behind the times.

The greatest tension between the concept of the modern liberal-arts college and the college as "defender of the faith" existed among Baptists. Conflicts between Baptist college administrations and state Baptist conventions, which in principle operate the colleges, have erupted over the issue of accepting federal aid. In November Furman University in Greenville, S.C., which had received a federal grant of a little more than \$0.6 million for the construction of a science building, agreed after considerable controversy with the state Baptist convention to return the grant, on the convention's promise that member churches would raise the required funds. In the meantime, the state convention appointed a commission to study the issue and report in two years. Five other Baptist state conventions have similar committees studying church-state questions as they affect Baptist colleges.

Presidents of five Southern Baptist colleges, in a rebuttal to the traditional Baptist separationist position, argued that "inducing young Baptists to come to a Baptist college where they receive a substandard education handicaps them for the future and is not fair to them or their parents" (*Religious News Service*, October 18, 1965). The Rev. Dr. W. Wayne Dahomey, president of the Southern Baptist Convention, in an interview (*New York Times*, November 28, 1965), made this distinction between church and church-related college:

Absolute separation is imperative where the church alone is served, but it is not necessarily the best way of dealing with a church-related college where the public at large is the chief beneficiary.

In September, Governor Warren Knowles signed into law the Wisconsin tuition-grant program, providing grants from \$50 to \$500 a year to students paying tuition in excess of \$400. The tuition-grant proposal had been supported by the 18 institutions of the Wisconsin Association of Independent Colleges and Universities (13 of which were Catholic) and the Citizens for Educational Freedom. Private colleges in Wisconsin, after raising tuition fees to meet their costs, found that students bypassed them to attend state-supported colleges, with the result that the proportion of freshmen in private colleges dropped from 28 per cent in 1956 to 16 per cent in 1963.

STATE AID

In August Ohio Governor James A. Rhodes signed a law, to become effective in 1966, providing free bus transportation for all public and nonpublic

elementary-school children living more than two miles from their schools. Passed by a very wide margin in both houses of Ohio's legislature, the bill had had widespread Catholic support. (Catholics were about 25 per cent of Ohio's population and pupils in Catholic parochial schools about 15 per cent of the school population.) Opposing the bus bill were the Council of Churches of Greater Cincinnati, the Cincinnati Jewish Community Council's community-relations committee, American Civil Liberties Union, and POAU. At least one Protestant churchman publicly supported the bill—Protestant Episcopal Bishop Roger Blanchard of the Southern Ohio diocese.

The Pennsylvania legislature enacted a similar bill, providing bus transportation to public- and private-school pupils. Governor William W. Scranton signed it in June. (Catholics were about one-third of Pennsylvania's population and more than 20 per cent of the state's school children attended Catholic parochial schools.) Passed by the Pennsylvania Senate by a vote of 32 to 16, the bill aroused considerable community friction. The Philadelphia Fellowship Commission's committee on community tensions issued a statement declaring that the debates over the bill had degenerated into an exploitation of bigotry, a development it regarded as "divisive, dangerous, and a disservice to the general welfare." It rebuked POAU by name for using brochures appealing to "anti-Catholicism through content and provocative titles"; it criticized some proponents of the bill (without mentioning they were Catholics) because they charged "all opponents with prejudice, thus needlessly offending those whose opposition was based on honest conviction."

The Jewish community was divided. A group of 50 Philadelphia rabbis, mostly Orthodox, supported the measure. The Jewish Labor Committee and the Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Philadelphia opposed it as a violation of church-state separation.

The Ohio and Pennsylvania enactments brought to at least eleven the number of states providing bus transportation to nonpublic-school pupils by constitutional amendment or judicial decision (California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York).¹¹ Similar bills were defeated in 1965 in Iowa, Kansas, and Minnesota. Idaho's Attorney General Allan G. Shepard ruled early in January that the use of public-school buses to transport parochial-school children violated the state constitution and he ordered the practice discontinued. The Wisconsin legislature passed a resolution for a constitutional amendment to provide public-bus transportation for nonpublic-school pupils. To take effect, the resolution would have to be passed once more by the next legislature (1967) and then approved in a statewide referendum.

In June New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller signed into law a bill requiring school boards to supply nonpublic-school pupils in grades 7 to 12

¹¹ Chester James Antieau, Phillip Mark Carroll, and Thomas Carroll Burke, *Religion Under the State Constitutions* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, Institute for Church-State Law, 1965). See chapter 2, pp. 31–36, for state constitutional provisions on transportation for nonpublic-school pupils.

with textbooks their schools requested from a list of approved public-school textbooks. The state was to reimburse the school boards up to \$10 per pupil. To go into effect September 1, 1966, the law was passed overwhelmingly in both houses of the legislature. (Catholics were about 30 per cent of the state's population and about 20 per cent of the state's school children were enrolled in Catholic parochial schools.) The bill had been supported by Catholics, Orthodox Jewish educational and rabbinical organizations, and the AFL-CIO. The American Jewish Congress, American Civil Liberties Union, and some teachers' groups opposed the law on the ground that it violated the state constitution.¹²

In June, the Michigan Legislature passed the Auxiliary Services Act (Act No. 343 of the Public Acts of 1965), providing the same auxiliary services on an equal basis for pupils in nonpublic schools that any public-school district provides for its pupils. These included health and nursing services, speech correction, and remedial-reading and other noninstructional services, as well as services for the delinquent, mentally and physically handicapped, or emotionally disturbed. Legal counsel of the Detroit board of education expressed the opinion that the act was "of questionable federal and state constitutionality." Enactment had been opposed by the Detroit Council of Churches, American Civil Liberties Union, American Jewish Congress, POAU, and the Jewish Community Council of Detroit. These organizations planned to test the law's constitutionality.

In these four states, and also in Wisconsin where the tuition-grant program was enacted, Republican governors endorsed legislation which Catholics strongly supported. In all five states the growing Catholic population represented an increasingly important urban bloc. Republican responsiveness to Catholic political pressures suggested the possibility that issues like aid to nonpublic schools might become more potent politically in luring Catholics out of big-city Democratic coalitions.

Shared Time

Under the impetus of Titles I and III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act authorizing dual-enrolment programs, several states examined the legal status of dual enrolment under their constitutions. These varied widely: Pennsylvania had enacted legislation in 1911 permitting such arrangements, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld in 1913. The Utah attorney general ruled that "if students of private schools choose to have their education supplemented by the public schools, they certainly are entitled to such privilege."¹³ Iowa's attorney general ruled against such arrangements.

In September Colorado's Attorney General Duke W. Dunbar ruled that

¹² In 1928 Louisiana enacted a law providing free textbooks to parochial-school pupils; its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1930 (*Cochran v. Board of Education*, 281 U.S. 370). Mississippi, West Virginia, and Rhode Island enacted similar laws.

¹³ Quoted from Chester James Antieau *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

nonpublic-school pupils could attend public schools for part-time instruction and that public-school teachers could be assigned to parochial schools. In contrast, Ohio's attorney general William B. Saxbe ruled that Ohio's revised code made no "express provision" for dual-enrolment arrangements and that the public-school boards had not been granted either "express" or "implied authority" to establish such programs (*Religious News Service*, February 1, 1965.)

The Minnesota school boards were advised in May 1965 that dual-enrolment programs would be constitutional in Minnesota. Because no state law or rule authorized or prohibited state aid for part-time students under shared time, "the public schools could be entitled to state aid for the extent of that participation." At least sixteen Minnesota school systems inaugurated dual-enrolment plans in the fall term of 1965 (*Christian Century*, November 3, 1965).

New York State Education Commissioner James E. Allen, Jr., ruled in July that nonpublic-school pupils could attend special public-school classes financed entirely by federal funds. The New York state constitution prohibits the state or any subdivision from using property or money or permitting them to be used "directly or indirectly, in aid of maintenance . . . of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught. . . ." Allen's interpretation was based on a ruling by Attorney General Louis L. Lefkowitz, who had held that the federal law did not require the use of state money for such programs and that the entire cost of these programs could be paid out of federal grants. Spokesmen for Roman Catholic and Orthodox Jewish schools publicly expressed their satisfaction with this ruling.

Under the auspices of the Bureau of Educational Research and Development of the United States Office of Education, the actual operation of nine dual-enrolment programs was studied.¹⁴ The study found that the limited dual-enrolment program in which nonpublic-school pupils took public-school courses only in homemaking and industrial arts had existed in some communities for over thirty years (e.g., Hartford, Conn., and Pittsburgh, Pa.). In more recent years, however, a half-day plan had been emerging in a number of communities, primarily in the junior and senior high schools, under which nonpublic-school pupils studied science, mathematics, foreign languages, technical education, and many other subjects in the public school. Conditions helping to make dual-enrolment programs work successfully were found to include a favorable legal and policy framework, a local climate favorable to negotiation and cooperation, flexibility of administrative staffs in establishing new procedures, maintenance of the prerogatives and identity of the participating schools, reasonable proximity of the schools, and manageable costs. The advantages of the dual-enrolment program were primarily the greater educational opportunity and benefit for all children, the maintenance

¹⁴ James E. Gibbs, Jr., et al., *Dual Enrollment in Public and Nonpublic Schools: Case Studies of Nine Communities*, Washington, D.C., 1965, vii, 93 pp.

of educational pluralism, reduction of costs for the operation of nonpublic schools, and savings to the taxpayers. (Nonpublic schools might otherwise have discontinued some grades and sent their pupils into the public schools.) The disadvantages included the lessened emphasis on religiously oriented subject matter in nonpublic schools, the pupils' inability to participate in public-school extracurricular activities, a tendency on the part of some students to divide their loyalty between the two schools, and a possibility that the arrangement might lead to a weakening of the religious school system.

RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL

On December 13 the United States Supreme Court refused to review the appeal of a suit by parents against a public-school principal in New York, who had halted kindergarten pupils from reciting, before they ate their morning snack: "God is great, God is good/ And we thank Him for our food./ Amen." The parents had argued for their "right to have the child feel that God is with him the whole day long" and that the children should be allowed to "pray voluntarily to God each day." On July 7 Judge Henry J. Friendly, for the United States Court of Appeals, had upheld the school authorities in banning all classroom prayers as a violation of the First Amendment. "The plaintiffs," he ruled, "must content themselves with having their children say these prayers before nine or after three." It was this ruling that the Supreme Court let stand.

In another step toward wider compliance with the Supreme Court decisions of 1962 and 1963, forbidding the recitation of a state-prescribed prayer and state-authorized reading from the Bible and recitation of the Lord's Prayer,¹⁵ Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley issued a lengthy opinion on religious practices in the schools. The only form of religious exercise he believed permissible was a "strictly voluntary program of student prayer or other religious exercise" so long as "it does not take place during regular school hours" and if school authority is not used in any way to institute or maintain it. Also, courses in religion, "when presented objectively as part of a secular program of education," without attempt to indoctrinate, were not prohibited (the language used was taken from Justice Tom Clark's opinion for the majority in *Abington v. Schempp*).

Controversy over Christmas observance in the public schools appeared to have diminished. In December the American Jewish Congress issued a new set of guidelines on Christmas observance which declared that sectarian practices violated the separation of church and state and that the introduction of Hanukkah celebrations in the public schools compounded the impropriety. Los Angeles school superintendent J. P. Crowther, in the school district's annual bulletin on religious observances, advised that "to preserve the spirit

¹⁵ *Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (AJYB, 1963 [Vol. 64], p. 105); *School District of Abington Township v. Schempp* and *Murray v. Curlett*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (AJYB, 1964 [Vol. 65], pp. 42-44).

of good will that is characteristic of the Christmas season, administrators should make every effort to plan and conduct Christmas observances in a manner that will reflect respect for the religious sensibilities of all students and members of the staff."

The State vs. the Amish

The three-year old dispute between Iowa's public-school officials and the Old Order Amish community of Hazleton, Ia., became a subject of national interest with the reprinting all over the country of Thomas DeFeo's photograph, first published in the *Des Moines Register and Tribune*. The picture showed Amish children, with their sideburns and black hats, scurrying for cover in the cornfields to escape the pursuing public-school truancy officer. For religious reasons the Amish did not permit their children to attend public schools; instead, they maintained their own private schools. For some years the Amish had complied with requirements for state-accredited teachers until they became convinced that these requirements were unfair to them and decided to use their own members as teachers. Consequently, school officials filed charges against Amish parents for failure to enrol their children in accredited schools; in September the Amish were found guilty and fined each day their children were not in an accredited school. In November, unable to force the Amish into the public schools by the possible loss and confiscation of their property because of the cumulative fines, the school authorities forcibly picked up the children from their Amish school and took them by bus to public-school classes. Out of this seemingly minor and small-scale issue (involving about 40 children; the whole United States Amish population was less than 25,000), a major moral question emerged: could the state override the rights of parents—in this case, law-abiding, industrious, and gentle—over their children? "The public authorities in Iowa," wrote Professor Frank H. Littell (*Christian Century*, February 23, 1966), "are, whether they recognize it or not, advancing an essentially pretotalitarian claim." Because of the inability of the Iowa Council of Churches to help mediate this conflict, Dean M. Kelley, executive director of NCC's commission on religious liberty, visited Iowa to learn whether the religious liberties of the Amish were indeed being infringed and, if so, to help them. Iowa's Governor Harold E. Hughes also joined efforts to reach a compromise, but no solution had been reached by the end of 1965.

SHEHITAH

In September the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act, to take effect a year later, "providing certain requirements for the commercial slaughtering of livestock" and "defining the humane methods that may be used." Similar to a model bill sponsored in many states by the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), the Pennsylvania law contained

an exception clause for ritual slaughter (*shehitah*) and a clause patterned after one in the federal humane-slaughter law (Public Law 85-765, August 27, 1958), declaring that "nothing in this act shall be construed to prohibit, abridge, or in any other way hinder the religious freedom of any person or group."

The law, as finally amended (Act No. 263), had the support of the Jewish community-relations councils of Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and other Jewish communities in the state. It was opposed by rightwing Orthodox groups, particularly the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada (Agudat Ha-rabbanim). In November a bill to amend Act No. 263 was introduced in the Pennsylvania assembly, intended to guarantee more explicitly the practice of *shehitah*. It had the active support of the Agudat Ha-rabbanim.

Late in 1965 a humane-slaughter bill was introduced in the New York state legislature (Senate Introductory 4393 and Assembly Introductory 5995), sponsored by ASPCA. Another bill, introduced by Assemblyman Albert J. Hausbeck (Dem., Buffalo), was supported by a New York group calling itself Friends of Animals. All Jewish groups actively opposed the Hausbeck bill which gave no protection at all to *shehitah*. (From their advertisements and publicity Friends of Animals were clearly no friends of Jews.) In December the National Council of Young Israel declared its opposition to any legislation affecting *shehitah* or its preparatory methods. Other groups taking a similar position were Agudat Israel, Agudat Ha-rabbanim, Rabbinical Alliance of America (Iggud Ha-rabbanim), and the Lubavitcher and Satmar Hasidim.

The Jewish community was divided about legislation on *shehitah*. Some Jews, believing *shehitah* as practiced to be inhumane or less humane than other forms of slaughter, supported humane-slaughter legislation. Most community-relations agencies sought to protect *shehitah* by opposing anti-*shehitah* legislation or obtaining a legal exemption for it. The Orthodox, for whom *shehitah* was a central feature of their religious life, were divided on public-policy aspects of the question. They agreed that legislation was obnoxious and frequently associated with antisemitism, the European history of anti-*shehitah* legislation providing ample documentation. They were willing to institute whatever more humane procedures were available that did not violate their religious laws. One Orthodox segment, convinced that Jews were politically too weak to oppose humane-slaughter legislation, agreed not to oppose such legislation so long as it contained an exemption for *shehitah* or an explicit declaration that *shehitah* was humane. Other Orthodox groups objected to such a formula on various grounds: (1) the exemption put *shehitah* in an unfavorable light; (2) Jewish practices were singled out for special legislation—which, in effect, was discriminatory; (3) an eventual outright prohibition of *shehitah* was rendered more likely by the simple expedient of removing the "privilege" or exemption, and (4) the First Amendment's guarantee of religious liberty was violated by legislating on a religious practice that in no way contravened established public policy or morality.

SABBATH-OBSERVANCE LEGISLATION

In July New York Governor Rockefeller signed a Fair Sabbath Law which extended throughout the state the right of family businesses to stay open on Sunday if they were closed on Saturday in observance of the Sabbath. Previously, this right had existed only in New York City under a local-option law.

In July the Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, unanimously upheld a broad interpretation of the concept of the family store as applied to New York City's Fair Sabbath Law. Under this decision nonfamily employees might work on Sunday as long as management of the business remained in the hands of the Sabbath-observing family.

LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ

Rightist Extremism

KU KLUX KLAN

IN a dramatic and unusual television broadcast on March 26, 1965 President Lyndon B. Johnson announced the arrest of four Klansmen in connection with the fatal shooting of Mrs. Viola Gregg Liuzzo, a Detroit housewife, and white civil-rights worker who had participated in the historic protest march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama. In a manner and tone described by one news commentator as "sorrowfully solemn" and with "controlled indignation," the president seized the opportunity to denounce the Ku Klux Klan.

He warned members of the Klan "to get out of the Ku Klux Klan now and return to decent society before it is too late," suggested a congressional investigation "of this hooded society of bigots," and promised to offer legislation to bring the Ku Klux Klan "under effective control of law."

House Un-American Activities Committee Investigation

On March 20 the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) formally resolved to investigate the Klan. Public hearings began on October 19, with doubts by many that the examination would be meaningful or result in the passage of effective legislation, and fear by some that a Klan investigation would serve merely as a pretext for a later investigation of the civil-rights movement. Actually, the open sessions had been preceded by many months of investigation and two months of closed hearings.

The public phase of the inquiry began before a five-man subcommittee, Edwin E. Willis (Dem., La.) chairman, and the first witness called was Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton of the United Klans of America, the largest of the several competing Klans. Before the open hearings the committee's chief investigator, Donald T. Appell, told the press that a "climate of fear" in the South hampered the inquiry. So great was the fear of reprisal in some communities, he said, that it was difficult to find reliable witnesses willing to testify.

Shelton set the pattern for his followers and subsequent witnesses from other Klan organizations appearing in response to subpoenas. In two days on the witness stand, Shelton invoked more than 150 times the First, Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution in refusing to answer questions put to him by the committee.¹ The various Klans and other self-

¹ On February 2, 1966, the House of Representatives voted contempt-of-Congress citations against Shelton and six other Klansmen, including grand dragons and other state leaders, for refusing to turn over to HUAC subpoenaed Klan documents.

proclaimed "patriotic" groups had in the past consistently condemned witnesses before HUAC who had invoked constitutional protection against self-incriminations.

On November 9 the committee concluded the first phase of its public inquiry. After hearing from 52 witnesses and taking 1,400 pages of testimony, it released a preliminary report² which, while less revealing than some had hoped for, nevertheless shed considerable light on the Klan. Among the more significant disclosures were that the Klan was a fragmented, rather than a monolithic, movement of a dozen or so different competing organizations, the largest of which was the United Klans of America; that Klan membership was 50,000, far greater than the 10,000 previously estimated, and that the Realm consisted of 381 Klaverns, primarily in the south, with beachheads in Delaware, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. A bizarre turn of events momentarily diverted the country's attention from the House hearing when McCandlish Phillips of the New York *Times* disclosed that a blatantly antisemitic King Kleagle of the New York State Ku Klux Klan, Daniel Burros, was by birth and religious training a Jew. Disregarding Burros' threats, Phillips published his discovery on October 31. Burros then shot and killed himself.

The HUAC report also disclosed that the various Klans tried to conceal the existence of Klaverns and location of bank accounts by making extensive use of fronts masquerading as civic organizations (e.g., Alabama Rescue Service, Tuscaloosa), improvement associations (Craven County Improvement Association, New Bern, N.C.) and hunting, skiing, or sportsmen's clubs (Ancient City Gun Club, St. Augustine, Fla.).

A sordid story of deceit by Klan leadership became public record with the disclosure of bank accounts wrongfully held by individual leaders in their own names, diversion of funds from Klan accounts for personal use by Grand Dragons, and insurance programs purportedly set up for the benefit of Klan members but manipulated for the personal gain of officers. Testimony also revealed that many Klan officers and members had criminal records, having been convicted for crimes from burglary to operating a disorderly house, and refuted the Klans' repeated contention that they did not tolerate or engage in violence. Both leaders and rank and file were identified as having waged war on the civil-rights movement by burning or bombing schools, stores, homes, and churches, and by burning to intimidate. Weapons were frequently carried, even during meetings and other seemingly peaceful activities.

The record also revealed the existence of Klan-organized "wrecking crews," an "elite" of violent men assigned to terroristic and unlawful acts. The Klan membership in general did not know of the existence of these wrecking crews who were camouflaged and operated clandestinely in organizations such as the Vigilantes, Black Knights, Underground, and White Band.

² Statement by Edwin E. Willis, chairman of U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, November 9, 1965.

These received special training in firearms, unarmed combat, and the preparation and handling of explosives. Klan members frequently purchased arms and ammunition from other members licensed as gun dealers and used citizen-band radios for communication. In short, the Klan had the will and the means to murder and terrorize.

As a result of the hearings the secrecy was stripped from the hitherto "Invisible Empire"; federal agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Communications Commission, began investigations of their own, and the state governments of North Carolina and Georgia announced plans for stricter regulation and closer surveillance of units within their respective states. Some rank-and-file Klansmen left, made aware for the first time of the Klans' true nature. Coincidentally, on December 3 an all-white federal jury from Alabama's Black Belt convicted three Ku Klux Klan members of conspiracy in connection with the murder of Mrs. Liuzzo. Two state juries, empaneled from an area where assaults by whites against Negroes were rarely punished, previously had failed to convict Collie Leroy Wilkins, Jr., the only one of the three brought to trial.

JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY

In 1965 the John Birch Society continued to grow in numbers and maintained its position of dominance over all other groups on the far right.

Policemen

Special emphasis was placed on recruiting policemen. Support Your Local Police committees were set up to convince Americans that the Communists were trying to undermine confidence in police departments. To rally support for the police departments—an aim that most Americans would endorse—the society widely distributed automobile-bumper stickers and strips with a "Support Your Local Police" legend. It also provided opposition to the establishment of civilian-review boards, in order to curry police favor in communities where this was advocated by civil-rights organizations and spokesmen for minority groups. This program helped recruit members among the police force and stirred controversy in many communities over the propriety of police membership in a monolithic body of a racist and totalitarian political character.

Other Programs

The Birch Society also directed its members to support such other ultra-conservatives and right-wingers as Dan Smoot, Carl McIntire, and Billy James Hargis in Operation Monitor, an organized campaign to reverse the Federal Communication Commission's "fairness doctrine," which made it possible, in certain conditions, for "responsible persons" to avail themselves of free rebuttal time on radio and television if they had been the subject of

a "controversial" program;³ to support the National Right to Work Committee in its pressure against repeal of Section 14b of the Taft-Hartley Act⁴ (the authority for state "right to work" laws), and to initiate a campaign to save the Panama Canal from an alleged plan by the State Department to turn the canal over to a "Communist-run international agency." Other suggested activity included participation in the Let Freedom Ring program,⁵ implementation of the continuous "Impeach Earl Warren" and "The U.N.-Get U.S. Out" programs, and the widespread promotion of JBS-produced or -approved literature, mostly to enhance the desired image of JBS as an educational society.

Civil Rights Act

The major activity of the Birch Society was a massive drive to repeal the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], pp. 157-59). Beginning in May 1965, founder Robert Welch sought to impress upon his followers, chiefly by means of his 16-page pamphlet *Two Revolutions At Once*, that this drive was the single most important Society undertaking since its inception. "Fully expose the 'civil rights fraud,'" he urged, "and you will break the back of the Communist conspiracy." He called the civil-rights movement part of a world-wide, Communist-dominated movement. The campaign began in earnest in July with an exhortation to JBS members to "work more diligently and concentrate more heavily on this educational task than we have ever requested . . . on any earlier projects."

The Welch plan called for the establishment of hundreds of local or regional *ad hoc* Truth About Civil Turmoil committees (TACT) "for the specific purpose of telling the truth about the civil turmoil which is now being made so unusual and unhappy a part of the whole American scene." TACT committees cropped up all over the country, attracting many non-Birchers to their ranks. Communities were flooded with books, pamphlets, tapes, and films seeking to explain why Welch called the drive for Negro equality the "civil-rights fraud." JBS American Opinion Lecture Bureau speakers, appearing under TACT committee auspices, delivered scores of lectures; full-page newspaper advertisements carried the TACT message, and hundreds of letters to the editor were published in newspapers all over America—all professing "to tell the truth about civil turmoil."

³ In 1965 ultra-conservatives and right-wingers sponsored or produced 7,000 to 10,000 radio and television programs.

⁴ Efforts by labor and other interested groups to repeal 14b failed in the 89th Congress.

⁵ The Let Freedom Ring movement, founded by Birch Society member William C. Douglass of Sarasota, Fla., was a national network of prerecorded "patriotic messages" activated when a caller dialed a designated telephone number. It was described as "automated bigotry" by a *Los Angeles Times* columnist. Complaints by civic organizations resulted in the telephone company's ruling that in future all such messages would be required to include the name of their sponsors.

Political Influence

Despite repeated assertions by its leadership that the Birch Society was an educational not a political organization, indications to the contrary were more numerous in 1965 than at any other time since the Society's inception. Welch inserted a pamphlet entitled "Looking Ahead," in the *JBS Bulletin* for March 1965, announcing a plan to influence the outcome of the 1966 elections in congressional districts:

... one hundred chapters of the John Birch Society, in any congressional district, can exercise enough influence . . . to control the political action there . . . simply by our members proceeding on their own initiative from the basic principles and purposes of the Society, and persuading others to do the same—as a result of our continuous and massive educational program. . . . The quietly rising tide of Conservative influence would be . . . impossible for the Communists to hold down. . . . While a great many Americans have been "sold" many aspects of socialism, under such labels as welfarism and security, at least ninety-seven per cent of all Americans are still bitterly opposed to anything they can clearly identify as Communism.

If you do not think . . . the John Birch Society in any congressional district could awaken enough of their fellow citizens . . . to the methods and menace of the Communist conspiracy—enough to expose the purposes and defeat the plans of the pro-Communist politicians in that district—then you simply have not seen the dedication with which our members work, and the effect of their efforts, in any situation where "the chips are down." And if you doubt this appraisal you might check with Messrs. Elliot of Jasper, Alabama; Rutherford of Odessa, Texas; and Harding of Pocatello, Idaho—all of whom are ex-Congressmen who made it clear that they were running against the John Birch Society instead of against their regular political opponents.

Regarding the reference to Ralph Harding of Pocatello, Idaho, the political columnist Marianne Means noted in the *New York Journal American* for December 5, 1965:

The John Birch Society's quest for political power has nowhere been put to a more severe test than in Idaho. . . . Thus far, the score is one for the Birchers and zero for the nice guys. . . . The bitter backdrop of the 1966 Senate race between incumbent Republican Len Jordan and Democrat Ralph Harding is a well-documented case history of the way the Birch Society goes after a fellow it doesn't like. The Society devoted both money and manpower to defeating then-Rep. Harding last year, and when it succeeded, a Society bulletin gloated over the fall of a "most persistent and vicious enemy." . . . The Birchers collected money for his opponent from as far away as Florida, provided pickets outside halls where he spoke, flooded his district with anti-Harding pamphlets and radio broadcasts, and sent Reed Benson (a Birch official who is the son of former Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson) to Boise to supervise the efforts against Harding.

Nine months after JBS announced its intention to influence the selection

of congressional candidates, it successfully withstood the efforts of important Republicans to reduce its influence in their party.⁶

In September Senator Thurston B. Morton of Kentucky charged that Birchers were infiltrating the Republican party and asked that they be expelled from the party, as equally dangerous with the Ku Klux Klan and the Communists. Their denunciation of the Birch society by name followed the decision by an admitted Bircher, Robert Murphy, to run against Carl E. Mundt for the South Dakota Republican nomination to the Senate in the June 1965 primaries because "Mundt was too liberal." Many Republicans felt that if he could be attacked as too liberal, many other Republican candidates would undoubtedly face damaging Birch attacks. Morton was also believed to be convinced that JBS chose the Republican party as its political instrument just as the Communists had sought to use the Democratic party a generation earlier. Other prominent Republicans quickly followed. Senators Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois and Milton R. Young of North Dakota, Michigan Governor George W. Romney, and House leader Gerald R. Ford, Jr., of Michigan, while not unanimously agreed that JBS had indeed infiltrated the Republican party, nevertheless supported Morton's denunciation. In October the president of the 63,000 member California Federation of Republican Women denounced the Birchers for pursuing "divisive tactics" within the Republican party and federation. Also in October Barry Goldwater, although maintaining that the JBS did not threaten the control of the party, called on Republicans to resign from the society—a request which seemed to overlook the fact that Birchers were Birchers first and Republicans second.

The Associated Press then asked 45 state Republican leaders about Birch strength and influence in their party. While most said that Birchers were far removed from positions of influence, there were some indications of Bircher inroads. In California and Pennsylvania Birchers were members of county and precinct organizations, and hard party workers. Oregon state chairman Peter Gunnar complained that Birchers were interfering with fund-raising efforts. Several unidentified Republican leaders, while insisting that the number of active Birchers within the party was small, suspected that they were "secretly at work within the state Republican organizations." According to Tom Brown of Florida, right-wing forces were very vocal although few, that they had made a bid for power in the women's branch of the party, and that he was concerned over their tactics and activities in the elections. Michigan Republican vice-chairman William McLaughlin reported that Society members "seem to be dedicated workers, and I don't think they'll be scared away." Nebraska chairman Walter Witthoff reported that eight or ten known Birchers were members of the state central committee.

Despite the general tendency of the Associated Press survey, some Republican leaders felt that the Birch society was in fact becoming a burden and that failure to take definite action would result in a loss of votes. In Decem-

⁶ According to JBS sources, 100 delegates or alternates to the 1964 GOP presidential nominating convention were JBS members.

ber Idaho Governor Robert E. Smylie urged the Republican coordinating committee, when it met that month, to adopt a formal resolution disassociating the Republican party from the Birchers and similar extremists. But the columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported in the December 12 New York *Herald Tribune* that right-wing Republicans "working quietly in the background . . . are trying to sink the anti-Birch Society resolution even before it's floated. . . ." The top-level, 28-member Republican coordinating committee pointedly refused to name the Society in a statement on December 13 asking all Republicans to ". . . reject membership in any radical or extremist organization including any which attempts to use the Republican party for its own ends or which seeks to undermine the basic principles of American freedom and constitutional government. . . ." Birchers hung on to footholds in Republican-party organizations in California and the state of Washington where, despite a strong denunciation of JBS by Republican Governor Dan Evans, they exercised influence in 10 of the states' 39 counties. By year's end they were also believed to have penetrated most state organizations in the new and emerging Republican organizations in the South.

Disavowal of Antisemitism

Welch and other JBS spokesmen have frequently disclaimed antisemitism. Welch has publicly said that, despite pressures from Society members—"We have them resigning every week because we won't fight the Jews,"—he would not tolerate antisemitism in any phase of JBS official business. But the program tends to attract antisemites who feel comfortable with the Birch type of anticommunism. (Olive Simes, a generous contributor to the notoriously antisemitic Gerald L. K. Smith's Christian Nationalist Crusade, is a stockholder in *American Opinion Magazine*; a prominent Los Angeles businessman and supporter of the Pacific Coast antisemitic preacher Wesley Swift was a zealous Bircher who sent his customers unsolicited packets of hate literature.)

JBS bookstores and readingrooms were not quite fanatical about avoiding antisemitism. In various states bookstores stocked, either openly or under the counter, pamphlets, tracts, and books by such notorious antisemites as the pamphleteer, Marilyn Allen; Myron Fagan, leader of the Cinema Educational Guild, and Kenneth Goff, once a disciple of Gerald L. K. Smith. The JBS-endorsed *American Opinion* featured advertisements—and, more importantly, a highly favorable review by Revilo Oliver⁷ of *World Revolution: The Plot Against Civilization*, dealing with an alleged Jewish conspiracy behind Communism and liberally quoting from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. The Australian antisemite Eric Butler was a regular correspondent for *American Opinion* and a sponsored lecturer. The California state senate's subcommittee on un-American activities reported in June "an influx of emo-

⁷ Oliver was a JBS leader; his lectures were frequently spiked with antisemitic innuendo, and when he wrote about the assassination of President Kennedy he never failed to mention that Jack Ruby, who killed Lee Oswald, was born Jack Rubinstein.

tionally unstable people" into JBS and a "dangerous increase of antisemitism among the minority of its membership."

JBS came under attack from the *National Review*, whose editor, columnist, and theoretician, William Buckley, Jr., had unassailable ultraconservative credentials. In a three-part series of syndicated columns in August, Buckley concluded that it was "impossible to defend the leadership of the John Birch Society if one reads closely even its contemporary utterances" and wondered how the membership "tolerates such paranoid and unpatriotic drivel." Despite prior declarations to the contrary, Buckley concluded that most Birchers endorsed what he termed the irresponsible preachings of its founder. In addition, *National Review* (October 19, 1965) published a special six-part section, "The John Birch Society and the Conservative Movement," compiled by the editors. This characterized as ludicrous Welch's charge that the United States was locked in the vise of an internal Communist conspiracy that controlled 60 to 80 per cent of America's affairs and permeated the government; and because ludicrous, a threat to the conservative anticommunist movement.

OTHER RIGHT-WING ACTIVITY

Predictions after the 1964 Goldwater debacle that the right wing would not disappear proved to be accurate. The election lent the right wing political respectability, and this it sought to maintain in 1965. With more than 65 new organizations appearing in 1965, right-wing extremism continued to thrive. While the activities of these groups were national in scope, it was in the local communities that their extremism was most manifest. Activity centered on issues generated by the crisis in Santo Domingo ("American troops were ordered to protect the Reds"); opposition to campus demonstrations and peace marches, alleged to be evidence of pervasive Communist influence in the American government and the United Nations; support for Ian Smith's government in Rhodesia, and renewed agitation for prayer and Bible reading in the public schools. Other traditional targets were the Parent-Teacher Associations, the National Council of Churches of Christ in America, clergymen, teachers, school boards, libraries, and advocates of civil rights.

Nationally, Goldwater announced the establishment of the Free Society Association to "crusade for political education" and to give his supporters a "focus" for their political activities. While he emphasized that the association would not be a political party and would perform no organizational tasks, the announcement, according to Tom Wicker (*New York Times*, June 18, 1965) caused "some dismay at the Republican National Committee headquarters." Political observers like Professor Walter Burnham, writing in *Commonweal* (August 6, 1965), predicted that it would evolve into a "kind of holding company for every major right-wing group in the country except the Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi party," and might "provide something quite new in American major party politics . . . a year-in, year-out fi-

nancial, organizational, and agitprop structure for the eventual conquest of power.”

The American Conservative Union, organized at a secret meeting in Washington, D.C., in the latter part of December 1964 by a group consisting of what the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* described “as about 100 leading ultra-conservatives,” had as its purpose to initiate political action to influence Republican policy and choice of candidates. It was headed until October 1965 by former Representative Donald C. Bruce of Indiana.

The Washington, D.C.-based Liberty Lobby, an extremist pressure group, reached the peak of its overtly political activities in 1965. According to the March 1965 *Liberty Letter*:

A LIBERTY LOBBY . . . will work at the “top”—right at the seat of federal power—while the grassroots groups will continue their essential work at the “bottom”—at the precinct and district level . . . together they will be far stronger than alone. . . .

A LIBERTY LOBBY will also bring the Northern and Southern groups together for political action . . . for the long-overdue formal coalition of conservative forces which is so desperately needed.

Testimony to the Lobby’s effectiveness was its role in preventing the ratification of the consular treaty with the Soviet Union⁸ which never reached the Senate floor despite approval by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and endorsement by President Johnson. (Although widely interpreted as authorization for opening additional Soviet consulates in the United States and American consulates in the Soviet Union, the document was, in fact, only an agreement on the legal framework of operation for new consulates if any were to be established.)

District Speakers, Inc., was established by the Texas oil man H. L. Hunt to enlist the help of young speakers for the right wing in every congressional district through speakers’ contests.

Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), a campus-based organization, announced at its 1965 convention the formation of a political-action group, Young Americans for Freedom Political Action Committee. In addition, according to Senator J. W. Fulbright (Dem., Ark.), reported in the *New York Times*, July 26, 1965, the distribution by YAF of handbills containing “the familiar fulminations of the right wing along with dark hints of immorality and worse” forced the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company to abandon its plans to build a synthetic rubber plant in Rumania (p. 393).

Among other new organizations were the American African Affairs Association, supporting *apartheid* in South Africa; the Veritas Committee on Pacem In Terris, to prevent “subversion of Pope John’s Encyclical on Peace”; the Labor Education Association, and the Conservative Library Association.

⁸ Allied with Liberty Lobby were the right-wing publication *Human Events*, the American Conservative Union and members of the John Birch Society.

THIRD-PARTY MOVEMENT

A Congress of Conservatives, convoked by Kent Courtney, the founder of the Conservative Society of America, to plan conservative strategy, met in Chicago at the end of April. Courtney's real aim was to lay the groundwork for a new "anti-Communist" third party which was to capture control of Congress in the 1966 election. But most of the several hundred invited delegates representing right-wing extremist groups rejected it.

One delegate, Mark Andrews, campaigned for a third party in Missouri shortly after the congress closed; and William C. Douglass of Let Freedom Ring announced the formation of a third party in Florida in June. In October Courtney claimed that third parties had been, or were being formed in Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York, Virginia, and Texas.

The congress delegates endorsed a "statement of principles" calling for the liberation of Cuba by the United States and the detention of "Chinese and Russian Communists now based on Cuba . . . as hostages, pending release of Americans from Russia and Red China"; an end to "federal support of Communist subversion of America through agitation and racial turmoil in the streets"; breaking diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and its satellites; repeal of "the Marxist-oriented graduated income tax"; restriction of "permanent immigration"; restoration of "the dignity of the Supreme Court," and a curb on "political activities of the churches." Lester Maddox of Atlanta, who had closed his cafeteria in August 1964 rather than serve Negroes in compliance with the Civil Rights Act, received a standing ovation when he lashed out at civil-rights leaders, federal power, and President Johnson, and told the congress, "We need [Alabama Governor] George Wallace in the White House. He's the man of the hour." There was no indication that Wallace tried to influence the delegates for or against suggesting that he run for president on a third-party ticket in 1968.

1965 Election Campaigns

William Buckley ran as the 1965 Conservative party's candidate for mayor of New York, attracting many of the more ardent Goldwater supporters and receiving 339,000 votes, or 13.4 per cent of the total. The New York Conservative party viewed this as a "vindication of Barry Goldwater."

In Virginia, where a strong Republican candidate threatened the long-held Democratic control of the governor's office, William J. Story, candidate of a new Conservative party who was an avowed Birch Society member, and a militant segregationist, polled 70,000 votes, or 13.5 per cent of the total.

While there were no authoritative data on right-wing financial support during the 1965 elections, Group Research, Inc., which maintains extensive files on extremist groups, found that it continued to be adequate. Director Wesley McCune, in *The American Right-Wing During 1965*, reported that ". . . there certainly has been no overall decline [in financial support during

1965] and that some of the most significant organizations have increased . . . their large budgets."

Publications

McCune also found that right-wing literature continued to gain in circulation, with *Liberty Letter* showing the most spectacular increase—73 per cent between 1963 and 1964, and more than tripling that rise in 1965; it passed the 100,000 circulation mark. *Human Events*, with a circulation of nearly 125,000, was up 8 per cent from 1964, and *American Opinion Magazine* 39 per cent. The reported circulation of other right-wing papers were: *Christian Crusade*, 81,000; Carl McIntire's *Christian Beacon*, 50,000, and *Dan Smoot Report*, 33,000.

Mass production of propaganda paperback books, reaching its peak in the 1964 presidential election campaign, continued strong. Among them were Billy James Hargis's *Distortion By Design*, a so-called exposé of America's liberal press; Kent and Phoebe Courtney's *The Silencers*, a purported "documented exposé of how liberals are suppressing conservative opinion in the USA"; Richard P. Jennett's *The Man From Minnesota*, an attack on Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey, comparing him with Hitler and Mussolini; *The Grave Diggers* by Phyllis Schlafly and Admiral Chester Ward (Phyllis Schlafly was the author of *A Choice, Not An Echo*, distributed in millions of copies during the 1964 presidential campaign); and Alan Stang's *It's Very Simple*, the "true story of civil rights" published by the JBS subsidiary Western Islands Press.

John Stormer's *None Dare Call It Treason*, with an estimated distribution of 7 million copies since its first appearance during the 1964 presidential campaign, was widely used by right-wing groups in an effort to reach high-school and college students. An aggressive but little known right-wing organization, Constructive Action, Inc., of Whittier, California, launched a campaign in the spring to send to 25 college campuses 400,000 right-wing books, including *You Can Trust The Communists*, by Fred Schwarz, head of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, and Alan Stang's *It's Very Simple*.

Antisemitic Activity

The organizational activity and influence of the antisemitic movement continued to decline in 1965 for lack of exploitable issues. Group meetings, street-corner rallies, and demonstrations all but disappeared from the American scene. The 50 to 75 surviving organizations continued to exist as producers of antisemitic pamphlets and news sheets. Such house organs as *Common Sense* (Christian Educational Association), *The Councilor* (Citizens Councils of Louisiana), *The Stormtrooper* (American Nazi party), *Thunderbolt* (National States Rights party), *The Cross and the Flag* (Christian Nationalist Crusade)—all had declining circulation and all repeated the old canards: Jewish control of radio, TV, and the press; Jewish influence in the government, Jewish manipulation of the National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People, and, in general, of Jewish culpability for current problems and tensions.

American Nazi Party

The difficulties of George Lincoln Rockwell's American Nazi party were indicative of the general trend. In December the United States Internal Revenue Service padlocked its Arlington, Va., headquarters for nonpayment of \$3,879 in withholding, employment, and corporate income taxes for 1963, 1964, and 1965. At the same time the service seized addressograph plates and printing equipment, a photograph of Adolf Hitler, a quantity of swastika armbands, and miscellaneous Nazi memorabilia which were later offered for sale at a public auction to raise the amount owed. Rockwell later filed suit against the federal government for \$100,000 compensation for damages allegedly sustained as a result of this move. He had previously sought to get a restraining order and an injunction against the Internal Revenue Service to prevent the auction. In a "Confidential—To Our Inner Circle of Members and Supporters" letter of December 17, Rockwell declared that the American Nazi party was "not wiped out":

The American Nazi party will soon hit them [the Jews] again with full force! I can say no more. The blow will be far more telling when they believe we are out of action. . . . The biggest *Rockwell Report* and *Storm Trooper* [party publications] in history will soon be on the way from our secret location. . . . Meanwhile, watch the papers and TV for the unpleasant surprise we have for our Jew friends.⁹

Following a pattern established in 1964, Rockwell continued his college-campus appearances arranged by student groups who wanted to hear representatives of all viewpoints. He spoke at such institutions as Antioch, the University of New Mexico, Ohio University, Northwestern University, and Northern Illinois University. In November Rockwell ran for governor of Virginia on an anti-Negro platform as the "white man's" candidate in an effort to capture the state's hard-core segregationist vote. Surprisingly, Rockwell polled 6,312 votes although the support of most ultra-conservatives went to Story (p. 160).

Christian Nationalist Crusade

Gerald L. K. Smith, the 68-year-old leader of the Christian Nationalist Crusade and once the most effective speaker for the organized antisemitic movement, now traveled little and seldom held public meetings. He continued to publish his racist, antisemitic monthly magazine, *The Cross and the Flag* (circulation 33,000), and to operate a profitable literature depot for antisemitic and anti-Negro publications. With a reported 1964 gross income in excess of \$300,000,¹⁰ Smith's major activity, as revealed in the Little Rock,

⁹ Subscribers to the Rockwell publications reported that no American Nazi publications had been received after party headquarters were padlocked.

¹⁰ 1985 figures were not available, but current indications are that they have declined.

Ark., *Gazette* (March 28, 1965), was the promotion of a plan to erect a 50-foot "Christ of the Ozarks" statue on Magnetic Mountain just outside Eureka Springs, Ark. Subsequently he also announced that his wife had bought a three-story stone house there to be converted into a memorial to himself and to General Douglas MacArthur, Henry Ford, Charles A. Lindbergh, Father Coughlin, and Huey Long, whom he called his close friends.

National States Rights Party

Based in Birmingham, Ala., for about seven years, the National States Rights party (NSRP) moved to Augusta, Ga., in the spring. The members of this white-supremacist, antisemitic group, essentially a vehicle for distributing hate literature, also harassed civil-rights workers and occasionally picketed southern department stores employing an integrated sales force (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 200). Its official publication, *The Thunderbolt*, had a circulation of 500, exceeding its estimated membership. NSRP's importance lay in its definitely established connection with the Ku Klux Klan. J. B. Stoner and the late Matt Murphy belonged to both organizations and frequently appeared as counsels for Klan leaders. In May Murphy was counsel to the Klansmen accused of the murder of civil-rights worker Viola Liuzzo and used antisemitic, anti-Negro, and anti-Catholic remarks in court without censure from the presiding judge. Stoner, NSRP counsel and its 1964 vice-presidential nominee (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66], p. 205), frequently spoke at Klan functions in full Klan regalia. The Rev. Charles "Connie" Lynch, a self-proclaimed evangelist and an organizer for the NSRP, traveled across the country seeking recruits for the Klan. With the decline in civil-rights activity in the south in 1965, many NSRP members became strong supporters of the Klan, which offered a greater visible activity than NSRP.

Antisemitic Incidents

Despite the comparative inactivity of antisemitic organizations, 18 antisemitic incidents were reported in 1965, as compared with 12 in 1963 and 8 in 1964. In the five-month period from early August to December 13, 1965, the American Jewish Committee recorded fourteen antisemitic incidents in San Francisco, Chicago, Albany, Hillside, N.J., Mt. Lebanon, Pa., Trumbull, Conn., Brooklyn, N.Y., Woodbridge, N.J., New Orleans, La., Bridgeport, Conn., and Holyoke, Mass.—more than in any comparable period since the worldwide outbreak of desecrations following the 1959 Christmas-eve swastika daubings of a synagogue in Cologne, Germany (AJYB, 1961 [Vol. 62], pp. 106–7). While speculation about motives continued, careful analysis of the known facts led to the conclusion that the acts were not conceived, planned, or perpetrated by any of the known antisemitic groups, and therefore had to be considered as willful and malicious cases of overt antisemitism.

MILTON ELLERIN

United States Immigration Policy

The Immigration Act of October 3, 1965,

- Abolished national-origins quotas.
- Established numerical ceilings for immigration visas on a “first-come, first-served” basis:
 1. 170,000 for natives of the Eastern Hemisphere.
 2. 120,000 for natives of the Western Hemisphere.
- Abolished restrictions on persons of half-Asian parentage.
- Established new preferences in granting visas:
 1. Relatives—74 per cent.
 2. Outstanding scientists and artists—10 per cent.
 3. Skilled or unskilled labor (not temporary)—10 per cent.
 4. Refugees—6 per cent.
- Introduced stricter “labor clearance” procedure.

ON October 3, 1965, seated before the Statue of Liberty in the presence of an assemblage of high government officials and leading citizens from all walks of life, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed a new immigration bill, PL 89-236. Addressing his nationwide television audience, he stated that the new law “repairs a deep and painful flaw in the fabric of American justice. It corrects a cruel and enduring wrong in the conduct of the American nation. It will make us truer to ourselves as a country and as a people.” The new law “says simply that from this day forth those wishing to emigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here.” This “simple” and “fair” test, the President said, eliminates the “harsh injustice of the national-origins-quota system,” under which, for over four decades, “the ability of new immigrants to come to America depended on their country of birth.” This system “violated the basic principle of our democracy—the principle that values and rewards each man on the basis of his merit as a man.”

In the same address, the President informed the people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here will find it. He announced that he had requested the relevant Executive departments “to make all the necessary arrangements to permit those in Cuba who seek freedom to make an orderly entry into the United States,” and appealed to all the American voluntary agencies for the “continuation and expansion of their magnificent work” to aid in this program.

The President's enthusiasm for the new law was not mere political rhetoric; PL 89-236, indeed, introduced a major reversal of a policy which had been in force since 1924, and which had antecedents in even earlier national policies and attitudes. This policy, which was rooted in concepts of racial and ethnic superiority and assimilability, in suspicion of alien "radicalism" and foreign labor competition, had survived decades of reform efforts. These efforts, which did not avail the victims of Nazism during the 1930s and early 1940s, produced limited results after World War II in the form of temporary refugee legislation and minor revisions of the fundamental law. However, the basic policy remained intact until October 3, 1965.

HISTORY

Anti-alien and "nativist" attitudes existed in this country as early as the colonial period when discrimination was practiced against Catholics and Jews in most of the colonies. In the last years of the 18th century, these attitudes produced the Alien and Sedition Laws, empowering the President to deport aliens deemed dangerous to the country's safety or suspected of treasonable activity, which were repealed in 1800. In the first half of the 19th century, they were reflected in hostility against Irish and German immigrants; in the second half, they had anti-Catholic and antisemitic overtones, expressing resentment against Eastern and Southern European immigrants.

Despite these attitudes, the Federal Government, in the main, followed a policy of liberal immigration. The first *general* Federal law, enacted in August 1882, was designed to exclude only *individual* undesirables: lunatics, idiots, convicts, and persons likely to become public charges; it did not change the general policy of unlimited immigration.

The one serious exception had been the Chinese Exclusion Act of May 1882, the first of a series of acts based on racist concepts that were to be added to the United States immigration policies in the following decades. It stopped for 10 years the immigration of Chinese laborers. In 1907, under a "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Japan, the immigration of Japanese laborers was limited, and in 1917, by a "barred zone" rule, immigrants from the Asiatic and Pacific regions of the world were excluded (despite President Wilson's veto). In the same year, a "literacy" test, designed as a restrictive measure against East Europeans, was introduced. However, while restrictions on "qualitative" and racial grounds were progressively expanded, the policy of numerically unlimited immigration continued until after World War I.

The factors leading to the introduction of the "qualitative" and racist principles, which also produced the climate for the 1924 national-origins-quota law, were various. Among them were the dissemination of scientific writings by early ideologists of "Nordic" supremacy; antisemitic and anti-Catholic sentiments; organized labor's fear of oriental and other cheap labor; the nationalist-chauvinist feelings stirred up by World War I, and the adverse reaction to the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. The authors and supporters of the

1924 Act did not disguise their belief that persons of non-Nordic origin (i.e., English, Irish, German, French or other West European) were inferior and less assimilable than other national stock. It was only later that apologists for the national-origins system insisted it was compatible with American democratic and equalitarian ideals since a nation had the moral right to try to preserve its ethnic and cultural character, especially after its population had grown to mature proportions.

Immigration Act of 1924

The 1924 Act (following a temporary immigration program, enacted in 1921) embodied the national-origins-quota system, which continued in force for over 40 years until the enactment, in October 1965, of PL 89-236. In 1924 Congress established an overall annual maximum quota of 150,000 of which all eligible countries—i.e., excluding the Asia-Pacific “barred zone”—were to receive shares. Each country’s yearly quota was to bear the same relation to the total quota (150,000) as the number of persons derived from that country by birth or descent bore to the total *white* population in the United States in 1920.

Based on statistical techniques of dubious scientific reliability—the person’s name was taken as the main indicator of his national origin—this system resulted in disproportionately large quotas for England, Ireland, and Germany, and small ones for the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe. Nor did the Act allow immigrant applicants from low-quota countries to use the unused visas of the high-quota countries. On the other hand, no numerical ceiling was imposed on Western Hemisphere immigration until passage of the 1965 law.

McCarran-Walter Act of 1952

In 1952, after extensive hearings, Congress adopted a new immigration law, popularly identified with the names of its leading Congressional sponsors, Senator Pat McCarran (Dem., Nev.) and Congressman Francis Walter (Dem., Pa.). This controversial law, passed over the veto of President Harry S. Truman, codified rather than revised the existing immigration and nationality statutes. While it did introduce a very small increase in the combined ceiling for all quota immigration, partly by granting token quotas of 100 to previously ineligible countries, in effect, it reaffirmed the principles of the 1924 Act. Thus, though it substituted for the “barred zone” an “Asia-Pacific triangle” concept and gave token quotas to all independent countries within this vast region, it left the national-origins system unchanged. However, in establishing these token quotas—the continuation of a policy initiated during and immediately after World War II for China, the Philippines and India—Congress started the process of reversing the racist policy first begun in 1882. But it did this grudgingly and inconsistently, since, at the same time, it introduced into the law a crudely racist “one-half ancestry” rule. This provided

that persons of mixed Asian and non-Asian parentage, wherever born—even in Europe or the Western Hemisphere—were to be admitted only on the quotas of the countries of their Asian parents. Non-Asians, of course, entered on the quotas of their countries of birth.

The 1952 Act also applied discriminatory rules to Caribbean countries with predominantly Negro populations by limiting to 100 the sub-quotas of colonial territories within the Western Hemisphere (and subtracting them from the quotas of their mother countries). Moreover, when certain of these territories, notably Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, became independent, they were not given the same quota-free status as other independent countries of the Western Hemisphere.

Post-World War II Refugee Legislation

Though post-World War II advocates of liberalizing the immigration laws failed to achieve their larger objective of abolishing the national-origins system, they succeeded in persuading Congress to enact a succession of temporary, but generous, measures for the admission of displaced persons and refugees. Among them were the Displaced Persons Acts of 1948 and 1950, the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, and the "Fair Share" Act of 1960. These measures and the elastic construction of discretionary authority vested in the Executive branch under the basic law, to grant temporary asylum (originally intended to permit the entry on a "parole" basis only of individual needy persons), opened the doors to hundreds of thousands of refugees who would otherwise have been excluded by the restrictive features of the basic law. Though inspired by genuine humanitarian motivations, the special measures had the incidental, and in some cases intended, effect of lessening pressures for revision of this law.

IMMIGRATION ACT OF OCTOBER 3, 1965

Factors in Passage of Act

Until 1963, reformers had not dared hope to obtain more than an improvement of the existing system, such as reallocating unused quotas; changing the census base year for computing quotas from 1920 to 1960 (to reflect more recent immigration trends), or establishing continental quotas. It was only under President John F. Kennedy that the more fundamental objective, the total abolition of the existing system, became a realistic goal.

The immediate antecedents of the 1965 Act were proposals by President Kennedy in a special message to Congress on July 23, 1963, calling for the elimination of the national-origins-quota system in stages over a five-year period. President Johnson, in his January 1964 State of the Union Message and on later occasions, gave these proposals his vigorous endorsement. They were then incorporated in principal bills introduced in the House by Congressman Emanuel Celler (Dem., N.Y.), and in the Senate by Senator Philip A. Hart

(Dem., Mich.). The latter had previously sponsored a bill to admit even larger numbers of immigrants under a different scheme of quota allocation.

In the early period of the Johnson Administration, action on these bills was frustrated partly by Congressman Michael A. Feighan (Dem., Ohio), chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality, who would agree only to modest changes in the law, such as provision for the use of unused quotas. His subsequent receptiveness to more fundamental changes followed urging by President Johnson, pressures within Feighan's Cleveland Congressional district, and the House leaders' curtailment of his power by enlarging the membership of his subcommittee to assure a pro-reform majority. The vigorous opposition to Feighan's role by Congressman Celler, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, was also an important factor in the success of the reform effort.

Feighan's change of attitude also helped soften the resistance of some of the rightist and traditionally anti-immigration organizations in the country, especially after his significant February 4, 1965 address to the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, calling, for the first time, for the complete abolition of the national-origins system. In the same address, he asked for a numerical ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration, a proposal which was eventually adopted.

However, the 1965 Act was, in fact, the product of a forty-year-long educational effort by religious, nationality, and other citizens' organizations, and of several independent and converging developments. The two-to-one Democratic majority in both Houses of Congress, highly responsive to the wishes of a President who was elected by a landslide vote, and the positive changes in the attitudes of the American people on questions of race and ethnic origin—changes reflected in the extensive progress achieved in the general field of civil rights—were two such developments. A third was the support by organized labor, elements of which had been strongly hostile to immigration in earlier decades.

One of the main groups supporting immigration reform was the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference (AICC) with headquarters in New York City. Founded in 1960 as a merger of two similarly-minded coordinating bodies, AICC had about 100 affiliated or cooperating organizations which it served as a clearing-house and coordinator of information, research, and educational activity. Its member agencies included numerous influential Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish welfare and community-relations agencies (such as the National Catholic Welfare Conference, National Council of the Churches of Christ in the USA, Lutheran Immigration Service, United HIAS Service, American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, and National Community Relations Advisory Council); labor unions (such as the United Steel Workers of America and the Industrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO), and a variety of nationality groups (such as the American Committee for Italian Migration, AHEPA [American Hellenic Educational Program Association], and the Japanese-American Citizens League).

In Washington, the National Committee for Immigration Reform, an *ad hoc* pro-immigration lobbying group formed early in 1965, made an important contribution in consolidating support for immigration reform. It was composed of individuals rather than organizations, and included among its members former Presidents Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Opposition to reform came from the Liberty Lobby, formed in 1965, and the American Committee on Immigration Policies, established a year earlier. Also initially opposed were conservative and rightist organizations joined in the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies.

In the House of Representatives

Congressman Celler introduced his immigration bill HR 2580 in the House of Representatives on January 13, 1965. Some seven months later, on August 3, it was approved with substantial amendment by the House Judiciary Committee by a vote of 27 to 3. The resulting bill, while retaining the basic purpose of HR 2580, abolition of the national-origins principle, incorporated important provisions of a bill introduced earlier by Congressman Feighan. On August 6, Congressman Feighan, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted Report No. 745 to the full House. This Report which declared the purpose of HR 2580 to be "... the elimination of the national origins system as a basis for the selection of immigrants to the United States," included the Committee's amendments as well as "additional views" of seven members, which had been rejected, recommending inclusion of Western Hemisphere immigrants under a world-wide numerical ceiling. On August 25 the House passed the bill, as amended, by a vote of 318 in favor, 95 opposed, and 19 abstaining.

A principal amendment approved by the House had been based on a recommendation of AFL-CIO. It required the Secretary of Labor to make an affirmative finding, on an individual case basis, to the effect that there is no available qualified American worker for the job the immigrant worker proposes to fill in the locality to which he is going, and that his entry would not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly-employed American workers. This amendment did not apply to certain classes of immigrants, such as close relatives and refugees. Another amendment raised the 166,000 ceiling in HR 2580 to 170,000, and reduced from five to three years the transitional period between passage of the new law and its full operation. (A third liberalized the criteria of eligibility for suspension of deportation from danger of "*physical* persecution" to danger of "persecution on ground of race, religion or political opinion." Yet another amendment tightened the provisions for adjustment of status—from non-immigrant to immigrant, without leaving the country—by excluding from eligibility *all* natives of the Western Hemisphere.)

The principal controversy on the House floor centered on the proposal by Congressman Clark MacGregor (Rep., Minn.), to place a ceiling of 115,000 on immigration from the Western Hemisphere. It was supported by Congress-

man William M. McCulloch (Ohio), ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, and most of the Republican members. This proposal, opposed by the Administration as endangering the "Good Neighbor" policy, was rejected by a narrow vote of 218 to 189. It was strongly supported, among others, by the traditional anti-immigration groups, such as the American Legion and the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, and opposed by most of the pro-immigration groups.

The overwhelming majority of the more than 75 Congressmen participating in the debate strongly urged enactment of HR 2580. Congressman Celler, the sponsor of the bill and Floor Manager for the Democratic side, spoke of his struggle since 1924 to achieve abolition of the national-origins system. Other leading spokesmen were House Speaker John McCormack (Dem., Mass.), who demonstrated his long stand against the quota system by placing in the *Congressional Record* a speech he had made in the House some 30 years earlier; Congressman Peter W. Rodino (Dem., N.J.), who placed in the *Record* a full-page *Washington Post* advertisement of the National Committee for Immigration Reform, "Leading Americans Speak Out for Immigration Reform Now," signed by some 400 leaders in all fields of American life, including former Presidents Truman and Eisenhower; Congressman Feighan, who described the bill as a bi-partisan product of his Subcommittee on Immigration and Nationality, and Congressman Arch A. Moore, Jr. (W. Va.), Republican floor manager and ranking Republican member of the subcommittee, who supported the bill mainly because what he regarded as an excessive grant of discretion to the Executive branch in the original version had been eliminated.

In the Senate

On August 26, the day after its passage by the House, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization, by a vote of 6 to 2, ordered that HR 2580, as amended, be reported, with several further amendments, to the full Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Voting in favor were Senators Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.), who had served as chairman, Sam Ervin (Dem., N.C.), Everett M. Dirksen (Rep., Ill.), Hiram L. Fong (Rep., Hawaii), Jacob K. Javits (Rep., N.Y.), and Philip A. Hart (Dem., Mich.). Opposed were Senators James O. Eastland (Dem., Miss.) and John L. McClellan (Dem., Ark.). The chief amendment, adopted by the subcommittee on the urging of Senator Ervin and against the opposition of Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Hart and Javits, provided for the establishment of an annual Western Hemisphere ceiling of 120,000 immigrants (exclusive of parents, spouses and children of United States citizens), to go into effect July 1, 1968, unless, before this date, Congress enacts modifying legislation. The Subcommittee also voted to establish a commission to study Western Hemisphere demographic trends with a view to possible future policy change.

On September 8 the full Judiciary Committee voted 14 to 2 to report out

HR 2580, as amended, to the Senate floor. The opposing votes were again cast by Senators Eastland and McClellan.

The Senate debate opened on September 17, with Senator Edward M. Kennedy serving as Democratic Floor Manager. It ended on September 22, with the adoption of the bill by a vote of 76 for, 18 against, and 6 not voting. Opposition came chiefly from the Southern Senators. A notable exception was Senator George A. Smathers (Dem., Fla.) who supported the bill as being consistent with the national security and economic well-being of the United States.

Senator Kennedy opened the debate by describing the inadequacies of the existing law which, having caused personal hardship to many thousands, had necessitated the adoption of emergency refugee legislation on six occasions between 1948 and 1962. On four other occasions (1957-1962), special legislation for relatives of United States citizens and for orphans, and thousands of private bills were required. He observed that of the 3.5 million immigrants admitted since 1952, two-thirds had entered outside the quotas, whereas only half of the 2.5 million quota numbers authorized since 1952 had been used. Senator Dirksen concurred that the constant need for patchwork legislation was evidence of the law's defects.

Although the bill under consideration eliminated a fundamental discriminatory immigration practice, it contained what some senators considered to be serious shortcomings. Among those who spoke out vigorously against the provision placing a ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration as a policy that would impair better Western Hemisphere relations were Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Javits, and Hart. Senator Leverett Saltonstall (Rep., Mass.), on the other hand, thought the ceiling would not affect relations and that the high rate of population increase in the Western Hemisphere warranted such a safeguard. For Senator Dirksen the issue was not important since, in his view, the ceiling was high enough not to pose problems. Senator Ervin, who made the inclusion of the ceiling a condition for his support, agreed with Senators Eastland and McClellan, who voted against the bill, that the national-origins provision was fair because preference should be given to countries whose people helped build the United States.

Senator Javits expressed concern about the absence in the bill of a statute of limitations on deportation, but cited the assurance given by the Attorney-General that study would be given to his proposal for a 10-year statute of limitations—as well as to his proposal for establishment of a board of visa appeal. Senators Claiborne Pell (Dem., R.I.) and Wayne Morse (Dem., Ore.) raised the same point. The latter placed in the *Record* a memorandum of the American Civil Liberties Union in support of such a statute.

The occupational preferences, listed by the new bill, also were variously interpreted. Senator Edward M. Kennedy rejected the argument that new immigrants take jobs from Americans and Senator Fong maintained that immigrants helped rather than hindered the economy. Senator Dirksen thought the proposed law would not flood the labor market. Among the reasons Sen-

ators Eastland and McClellan gave for voting against the bill were these preferences. Eastland maintained that they discriminated against unskilled labor, and McClelland felt that, in giving preference to skilled persons, the proposed law would encourage their leaving countries which needed them more than the United States and to which we were extending technical aid in order to help develop those very skills.

Senator Allen J. Ellender (Dem., La.) favored halting all immigration for five years, pending a study of its effect on the labor market, assimilation, and urban centers. Senators John B. Towers (Rep., Tex.) and Strom Thurmond (Rep., S.C.) thought the bill would admit too many immigrants. For Thurmond even the existing law was too liberal.

On September 22, following its adoption by the Senate, as amended, the bill went to the House-Senate Conference which issued its report on September 30. With some exceptions, the conferees accepted the amendments adopted by the Senate. The bill was thereupon passed by the House by a vote of 320 to 69, and by the Senate by a voice vote.

Provisions of Act of October 3, 1965 (PL 89-236)

PL 89-236 changed some of the key terminology of the previous law. It substituted the term "selective system" for "quota system," the term "immigrant" for "quota immigrant," and the term "special immigrant" for "non-quota immigrant." It defined "special immigrant" as one "born in *any* independent country of the Western Hemisphere or in the Canal Zone and the spouse and children of any such immigrant" and certain other categories of immigrants.

The new law established two numerical ceilings. One, of 170,000, is to come into force Dec. 1, 1965, and is to apply to immigrants who are natives of countries outside the Western Hemisphere, not including "immediate relatives" who are defined as children under 21 years of age, spouses, and parents of United States citizens, and who are to be admitted outside the limitation. (This new provision added parents of United States citizens to the classes of relatives admitted outside the quota under the prior law. Previously, these had been eligible only for second preference *within* the quotas. It was believed that this new exemption, in view of the extensive use by parents of this second preference under the old law, would have great practical significance, for it would free many thousands of visas for other immigrants.) Also exempted from the 170,000 ceiling are to be certain other "special immigrants," such as ministers of religion and returning residents.

A second ceiling, of 120,000, is to be applied to natives of the Western Hemisphere (again not including "immediate relatives"). This ceiling may be changed by Congress before July 1, 1968 on the basis of the findings of a commission that is to be established for the purpose of studying demographic and other relevant issues.

Within each of the two ceilings, immigrant visas are to be granted on a "first-come, first-served" basis, without regard to an applicant's birthplace or

nationality, but, except in the case of the Western Hemisphere, in conformity with a revised system of preferences based on family relationship, skills, and refugee status. Also, except for the Western Hemisphere, where this limitation does not apply, the natives of no one country are to receive more than 20,000 visas.

In the transitional 2½ year period, from December 1, 1965 (when the new law became operative), the old quotas applicable outside the Western Hemisphere are to remain in effect. However, during each fiscal year in this period, quota numbers unused during the preceding year are to be transferred to an immigration pool and made available to preference category immigrants who could not otherwise obtain visas because their quotas are oversubscribed. Such visas are to be allotted in accordance with the new order of preferences, without regard to quota chargeability.

Also, during this transitional period, Western Hemisphere natives are to continue to enter without numerical limitation. The newly independent countries, such as Jamaica and Trinidad-Tobago, will no longer be charged to sub-quotas of 100, but are to have the same status as other independent countries of the Western Hemisphere.

The new law also abolished, as of December 1, 1965, the Asia-Pacific triangle provision of the previous law which restricted persons of half-Asian background, regardless of place of birth, to the quotas of their countries of ancestry. Henceforth, such persons will have the same status as others born in the Western Hemisphere.

The law limited quotas of dependent territories of foreign states to 200.

The new law also introduced modifications in the previous preference system. It established three preference categories for relatives (1,2,4,5); two occupational preferences (3,6), and preference for refugees (7). Of the 170,000 visas to be allotted to non-Western Hemisphere immigrants, 74 per cent are to go to relatives, as follows: *first* preference, up to 20 per cent, for the unmarried sons and daughters, over 21 years of age, of United States citizens; *second* preference, up to 20 per cent, for the spouses and unmarried sons and daughters, regardless of age, of alien residents (plus any unused portion of preference 1); *fourth* preference, 10 per cent, for the married sons and daughters of United States citizens (plus any unused portions of preferences 1,2,3); *fifth* preference, 24 per cent, for the brothers and sisters of United States citizens (plus any unused portions of preferences 1,2,3,4).

Under a *third* preference, 10 per cent (of the 170,000) are to go to prospective immigrants who are members of the professions, or who possess exceptional abilities in the sciences or arts; and under a *sixth* preference, 10 per cent are to go to persons capable of performing skilled or unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature.

Under a *seventh* preference, 6 per cent are to go to refugees who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion, have fled from any Communist or Communist-dominated area, or from any country within the general area of the Middle East; or to persons

uprooted by natural calamity and unable to return to their usual place of abode. Persons in this refugee category are not to be given immigrant visas, but will be allowed to enter the United States conditionally for a period of two years, after which they may have their status adjusted to that of permanent residents.

Finally, "non-preference" immigrants, i.e., aliens who cannot qualify for one of the preference classes, are to be admissible on a "first-come, first-served" basis under the visas which are not used up by applicants in the preference classes.

However, the new law introduced an important labor-clearance procedure which is to apply to all non-preference immigrants as well as to immigrants in the third and sixth preference classes, and to *all* immigrants (except immediate relatives) who are natives of independent Western Hemisphere countries. In all such cases an individual determination by the Secretary of Labor is required that there are insufficient Americans, able and willing to perform, in the same place, the skilled or unskilled labor which the aliens intend to perform, and that the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly-employed American workers. (This requirement is not to apply to certain categories of relatives or to refugees.)

As noted, this labor-clearance procedure, which was not included in the original Administration bill, had been added in the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization on the suggestion of labor union representatives. The intent was to tighten the procedure of the prior law by which aliens seeking admission as skilled or unskilled laborers were *admissible* unless the Secretary of Labor certified that there were already in the country sufficient workers able and willing to perform the jobs sought by the aliens, or unless their employment would adversely affect the wages or working conditions of similarly-employed United States workers. Under the revised procedure, aliens in *all* categories other than relatives and refugees cannot receive visas, and are *inadmissible* unless they obtain individual certification from the Secretary of Labor that they would not, at the time of application for their visas as well as at the time of their entry to the country, displace similarly-employed American workers or adversely affect their wage levels or working conditions.

Though pro-immigration groups were concerned from the outset about the restrictive impact of the new procedure, they did not protest vigorously, preferring to avoid endangering thereby the achievement of their overriding goal: repeal of the national origins system.

However, following passage of the new law, as awareness of the significance of the labor clearance procedure impressed itself, they became intensely concerned. They voiced publicly the fear that the new, administratively cumbersome procedure might easily result in paralyzing most immigration of skilled and unskilled workers as well as of non-preference immigrants. They therefore initiated efforts to secure liberalizing legislation on the ground that the new procedure had been introduced without adequate consideration of its implications.

The new law did not change any provisions of the previous law relating to bars against admission of undesirable immigrants, such as subversives, criminals, drug peddlers, and immoral persons. However, it introduced a new provision, allowing a waiver of the grounds of ineligibility based on mental retardation or previous attack of insanity, for aliens who are the immediate relatives of United States citizens or resident aliens. (Previously, such persons had been excludable.) It also liberalized the "suspension of deportation" provisions of the previous law, which limited the discretion of the Attorney-General to cases of aliens who could prove that they would be subject to "physical" persecution if deported. Henceforth, the alien need only prove that he would be subject to "persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion."

The new law tightened the provisions of the previous law relating to the "adjustment of status" of aliens in the United States, so as to prohibit such adjustment in cases of natives of all countries of the Western Hemisphere. Previously, only the natives of Canada, Mexico, and the islands adjacent to the United States had been ineligible for such adjustment of status.

* * *

Pro-immigration groups were generally satisfied with the new law, especially its thoroughgoing elimination of the national-origins and racist concepts. But they were greatly concerned about the hardships that would ensue from the labor-clearance provisions, from the failure to provide means for adjusting the status of Cuban and other Western Hemisphere refugees, and from certain technical, yet actually substantive, defects, such as the absence of a statute of limitations on deportation and of a visa-review board. Its operation was to be closely watched by the pro-immigration groups as well as by the Department of Justice and the Congressional immigration committees, and efforts would doubtless be made in the future to correct its remaining weaknesses.

SIDNEY LISKOFKY

Review
of the
Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

IN 1966 intergroup relations showed marked variations. The areas in which discrimination against Jews was manifested became fewer. Overt antisemitism was rare, despite disquieting incidents and portentous possibilities. There were few signs of organized antisemitism. Several important studies probing antisemitism and anti-Jewish attitudes were published during the year. The relative tranquility of the Jewish situation contrasted sharply to that of Negroes. Their accelerated drive for civil rights, marked by violence and counterviolence, exacerbated Negro-white tensions, especially in the period preceding the November elections. Relations between Negroes and Jews grew noticeably acrimonious. Interreligious relations, principally between Catholics and Jews, which had been improving as a consequence of the ecumenical movement among all religious groups, suffered a setback because of tensions generated by explosive differences over church-state issues.

ANTISEMITISM

The constant preoccupation of American Jews with discrimination and antisemitism often appeared neurotic and obsessive to non-Jews. They saw Jews as mainly well-to-do, highly educated, and standing relatively high in socio-economic status and occupational rank.¹ Nevertheless, Jews themselves believed that in the perspective of Jewish history and with the memory of the annihilation of six million European Jews still painfully alive, their concern with antisemitism was rational and precautions. The immensity of the United States and the diversity of its people made it possible for the country to harbor simultaneously contradictory and antithetical attitudes of acceptance

Note: I wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Mrs. Lotte Zajac, of AJC's Clipping Service, in the preparation of this review.

¹ The most recent socio-economic data comparing Jews, Protestants, and Catholics, appear in Norval D. Glenn and Ruth Hyland, "Religious Preference and Worldly Success: Some Evidence from National Surveys," *American Sociological Review*, 32 (1967), pp 73-85.

and rejection, of tolerance and hostility towards Jews. This coexistence of good and bad, this ambiguity reinforced Jewish feelings of insecurity and intensified the desire among Jews to fathom the mysteries of non-Jewish attitudes towards them.

Executive-Suite Discrimination

The extent to which Jews have been accepted in the United States was dramatically evident in the access they gained to institutions and occupations that in earlier times were barred to them. Quotas restricting the enrolment of Jewish students at prestige schools, colleges, and universities became curiosities of the past. Jews were occasionally excluded from living in some upper-class communities dominated by America's untitled Protestant aristocracy, and seldom had entrée to the social clubs of this elite group; but in most other places they were accepted. In employment, most barriers have fallen, even in fields once closed to Jews. This change was effected partly by the greater tolerance in American society, and partly by the changing character of the American economy in which more people were now employed in service industries than in manufacturing. The explosion of the knowledge and information industry pushed open occupational doors previously closed to Jews as, for instance, in publishing and in the universities.

Yet the employment of Jews in managerial and executive positions in various fields of business and industry lagged. The American Jewish Committee and, subsequently, other Jewish organizations undertook programs to combat this type of anti-Jewish discrimination. By 1966 these efforts had already achieved some success.

Early in 1966 federal agencies began a quiet campaign against religious discrimination in executive positions in insurance companies in response to a complaint filed in 1965 by the American Jewish Committee with Labor Secretary W. Willard Wirtz. The Social Security Administration, in its relations with insurance companies selected to distribute Medicare funds, also began to require the same compliance procedures with regard to religious affiliation, as for race, color, and national origin.

On May 14, 1966 the AJCommittee released a study showing that, though Jews made up 10–12 per cent of the student bodies and faculties at 775 non-sectarian senior colleges and universities, fewer than one per cent of the presidents of these institutions were Jewish.² The study concluded that, in the absence of any other conclusive factor, bias was at work. It showed that almost a generation had elapsed since Jews in significant numbers had begun to attain full professorships—the rank from which deans and college presidents were chosen. Hence, the earlier exclusion of Jews from faculties and the ensuing time lag did not sufficiently explain the paucity of Jews among top college and university administrators.

² The American Jewish Committee, *Jews in College and University Administration* (New York: Institute of Human Relations, May 1966), 9 pp. (Processed.)

Another American Jewish Committee study, released September 1, 1966, investigated the virtual absence of Jews from executive positions in America's 50 leading commercial banks.³ According to the study, 45 of these banks had no Jewish senior officers; four banks had one each, and one bank had four Jewish senior officers. The study further identified only 32 Jews out of 3,438 executives in the middle-management level. Therefore the conclusion was inescapable that bias was one of the factors at work in keeping Jews from policy-making positions in commercial banks. The study was made public a few days after the United States Treasury Department announced that approximately 95 per cent of the nation's 15,000 commercial banks would be considered government contractors under federal fair-employment regulations to go into effect November 30, 1966 and, as such, would be required not to discriminate in their hiring policies for reasons of race, color, creed, or national origin.

Discrimination against Jews in executive posts in New York City commercial banks was regarded as particularly extreme. Nine of the 50 banks under study were in New York, and in these only one of 173 senior officers and only nine of 927 middle-management executives were identified as Jewish. Reacting to the study's findings, New York City Finance Administrator Roy M. Goodman proposed on the WNBC-TV "Direct Line" program on September 4 that the city withhold the millions of dollars of city funds from deposit in commercial banks found to be practicing discrimination. On September 24 two New York City council members announced that they would introduce in the city council a proposal to amend section 421 of the city charter. Hearings on the bill were held in November, but no action was taken by the council.

The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) announced in October that it would work jointly with the Bell Telephone System to end the "under-utilization of Jews" in the company's executive and managerial positions. The plan involved ADL participation in Bell's recruitment programs, "educating its recruitment staff to the best potential available among Jewish college students."

On October 26 John R. Bunting, Jr., executive vice-president of the First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company, announced at a meeting of AJCommittee's Philadelphia chapter that his bank, the largest in that city and the nineteenth largest in the country, was actively looking for Jewish applicants who might eventually qualify for top positions.⁴

New York City's 50 mutual-savings banks were the subject of a follow-up review by AJCommittee's New York chapter, released October 30. This review charged that a year after the publication of the original study showing *de facto* discrimination against Jews in their executive posts, the mutual-sav-

³ The American Jewish Committee, *Patterns of Exclusion from the Executive Suite: Commercial Banking* (New York: Institute of Human Relations, August 1966), 12 pp. (Processed.)

⁴ Frederick C. Klein, "Jews and Jobs: Religious Groups Push to Get Firms to Hire Jewish Executives," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 26, 1966.

ings banks had increased the number of their Jewish trustees, but the number of their Jewish executive officers remained substantially the same.

A quite different area of executive-suite discrimination receiving public attention in 1966 was top administration of art museums. A leading publication in the field editorialized:

Because most American museums were founded by Old Money—the town's country-club set, established bankers, merchants, landlords—their boards of trustees retain a distinctive coloration chiefly marked by a suspicion of—let's say, snobbishness to—the New Rich. Which suggests a reason for one of the more curious anomalies in the museum world: its anti-semitism—the most widely known, unspoken fact in the field.⁵

Surveys and Studies of Antisemitism

A survey of religion in the United States and of attitudes of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews towards each other, conducted by George Gallup's American Institute of Public Opinion in 1966 on behalf of the *Catholic Digest*, revealed considerable distrust among the religious groups for one another.⁶ In the main, more Protestants than Catholics thought ill of Jews or expressed hostility to them. Only 70 per cent of Protestants thought Jews were as loyal to the United States as they, or more loyal, compared to 85 per cent of Catholics. Only 74 per cent of Protestants said they would just as soon live next to Jews, compared to 88 per cent of Catholics. Only 51 per cent of Protestants said they would vote for a Jew as president, compared to 83 per cent of Catholics. Unreciprocally, Jews were far more distrustful of, and hostile to, Catholics than they were to Protestants.

A sample survey of Lutheran youth in St. Louis and Detroit showed that 20.3 per cent felt Jewish businessmen to be not as honest as other businessmen.⁷ No appreciable difference in attitude was evident between young Lutherans who had received all their education in Lutheran parochial schools and those who had attended public schools.

Two surveys of Catholic parochial-school students exposed considerable anti-Jewish bias, though the surveyors could not determine whether home, school, church, society, or a combination of these shaped or encouraged that bias.⁸ The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) study found that

5 T. B. H., "Notes on American Museums," *Art News*, November 1966, p. 27.

6 Published in monthly instalments beginning June 1966, and continuing well into 1967. Four articles dealt with intergroup attitudes: "Who is Loyal?" (August 1966); "What We Think of Each Other" (November 1966); "Do Americans Get Along Together?" (February 1967); and "Religion in American Politics" (April 1967).

7 Ronald L. Johnstone, *The Effectiveness of Lutheran Elementary and Secondary Schools as Agencies of Christian Education: An Empirical Evaluation Study of the Impact of Lutheran Parochial Schools on the Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behavior of Lutheran Youth* (St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Seminary, School for Graduate Studies, 1966), 188 pp. Only this one question probed attitudes towards Jews.

8 Andrew M. Greeley and Peter H. Rossi, *The Education of Catholic Americans* (Chicago, 1966), xxii, 368 pp. (National Opinion Research Center monograph in social research, No. 6.) See especially pp. 121-137.

Reginald A. Neuwien, ed., *Catholic Schools in Action: A Report: The Notre Dame Study of Catholic Elementary and Secondary Schools in the United States* (Notre Dame, Ind., and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), xv, 328 pp. See especially pp. 189-201.

only 40–45 per cent of parochial students expressed tolerant attitudes towards Jews, but that public-school Catholics were even less tolerant. The Notre Dame study, based on a questionnaire administered to parochial-school students, found that only 47 per cent of their respondents disagreed with the statement that “there is something strange and different about Jews; it is hard to know what they are thinking or planning, or what makes them tick.” The study disclosed also that persons of high social class and high education had less bias toward both Jews and Negroes than those of low social class and low education.

In April *Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism* by Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark (Harper & Row, xxi, 266, 24 pp.), the first book in a series of studies on prejudice and antisemitism, sponsored by ADL and produced by the University of California Survey Research Center, appeared. This study was based on responses of a random sample of nearly 3,000 North California church members, who filled out a questionnaire about their religious beliefs, reinforced by nearly 2,000 interviews, representing a modified random sample of the national adult population, which asked about some of the more important items in the written questionnaire. The study concluded that 25 to nearly 50 per cent of the respondents held hostile religious images of modern Jews, regarding them as Christ-killers, beyond salvation, and in need of conversion to Christianity. While these views were rather uncommon among more liberal Protestant groups, they were almost unanimously held among more conservative Protestant groups like Missouri Synod Lutherans and Southern Baptists. The authors concluded that religious hostility toward the modern Jew provided the link between religious dogmatism and antisemitism, that the “contemptuous religious image of Jews predisposes Christians to embrace a purely secular variety of antisemitism as well.”

A second ADL-sponsored study analyzed the public response to the Eichmann trial. In 1961, when the Eichmann trial was nearly over, 436 persons in Oakland, Cal., (a representative sample) were interviewed about their familiarity with the trial and their attitudes towards Jews.⁹ The findings were inconclusive: “Anti-Semitism seemed to play no role in determining respondents’ over-all evaluations of the trial.” The investigators found, however, that only 36 per cent of the white respondents knew the official estimate of the number of Jews killed by the German (six million), and that only about half of these regarded that estimate as valid. The authors concluded that antisemitism in some way accounted for the rejection of that particular item of knowledge, among both informed and uninformed alike.

The AJCommittee sponsored a two-part study on antisemitism in the United States, entitled *Jews in the Mind of America* (New York, 1966; xiv, 413 pp.). The first part, by Charles Herbert Sember, analyzed public-opinion polls from 1937 to 1962 that directly or indirectly probed attitudes towards Jews. The second part consisted of papers presented at a conference of social

⁹ Charles Y. Glock, Gertrude J. Selznick, Joe L. Spaeth, *The Apathetic Majority* (New York, 1966), xii, 222 pp.

scientists to discuss Stember's findings and a summary of the conference proceedings. From his analysis of the polls Stember concluded that "anti-Semitism in all its forms massively declined in the United States between the prewar or war years and the early 1960s." However, conference participants were reluctant to accept at their surface level these public-opinion findings of a 25-year period, in the light of the 2000-year persistence of antisemitism in the Western world and of the historic tensions between Jews and gentiles. Thomas F. O'Dea, professor of sociology in the department of religion at Columbia University, asserted that the poll findings represented merely a temporary lull in the long history of antisemitism, a lull characteristic also for past periods in European history, and that the possibility of renewed antisemitism still lurked in the background. Ben Halpern, associate professor of Near Eastern and Judaic studies at Brandeis University, expressed the view that the striking changes in attitudes, as registered in the polls, reflected not the prevalence of antisemitism, but rather its lack of respectability. Halpern advanced the concept of the perennial "hostility-tolerance syndrome" which determined the conditions of Jewish existence. Viewed in this historical perspective, the situation of Jews in America, however unique it has appeared in comparison to European Jewish history, remained, according to Halpern, "confined within the traditional framework of ambivalence between anti-Semitism and toleration."

Vandalism and Violence

No reliable estimate of the extent of antisemitic vandalism and violence could be made, partly because the data were imprecise and insufficient, and the social and psychological factors involved were often obscure. From time to time, most public, identifiably Jewish institutions have been defaced; synagogues and other Jewish buildings have been smeared with anti-Jewish and obscene slogans. Only a very small proportion were reported to the police or publicized since they were generally regarded as trivial and yet also inevitable and, except when repeated persistently, aroused relatively little anxiety. Year after year, vigilant Jewish organizations reported that there was no evidence to indicate the existence of an organized antisemitic conspiracy behind these incidents, which were attributed to "crackpots," "nuts," the mentally unstable, and to irresponsible and/or delinquent teenagers bent on "kicks."

Vandalism was presumed to fall into two categories: (1) vindictive antisemitic vandalism, usually perpetrated by organized youth gangs, and (2) wanton vandalism, more likely committed by less closely knit groups, usually neighborhood cliques.¹⁰ The perpetrators were seldom found. Property damage was generally insubstantial and seldom commensurate with the police work required to track down the offenders.

¹⁰ Ann G. Wolfe, *Why the Swastika?: A Study of Young American Vandals* (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1962), 39 pp.

A list of some of the antisemitic incidents reported in the press in 1966 showed the usual pattern.

January: Swastikas and antisemitic slogans were painted on the Liberty Jewish Center in Baltimore, Md.

March: Fires were set to three synagogues and two hospitals under Jewish auspices in Chicago, Ill.; antisemitic slogans were smeared on the walls of the Chizuk Amuno synagogue in Baltimore, Md.

April: Garages and automobiles were smeared with swastikas and obscene antisemitic slogans in Oak Park, a predominantly Jewish suburb of Detroit, Mich.; vandals damaged a menorah on the outside wall of Congregation B'nai Jacob in Jersey City, N.J.

May: The homes of two Jewish refugees from Germany, the only Jews in a rural area north of Utica, N.Y., were daubed with swastikas and Nazi slogans; vandals set fire to Congregation Beth Israel in the East Flatbush section of Brooklyn, N.Y.

June: A Jewish War Veterans post in Queens, N.Y., was stoned and smeared with swastikas; vandals desecrated the Blue Hill Shul in Boston, Mass., and then assaulted a synagogue official who came upon them; the Petah Tikvah synagogue and the building of the Independent Order Brith Sholom in Baltimore were defaced with antisemitic and obscene inscriptions and burglarized.

July: For the second time in six months, the Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Somers, N.Y., was desecrated and defaced with swastikas and obscene antisemitic slogans.

August: The Young Israel Shomrai Emunah synagogue in Hyattsville, Md., was vandalized four times in a five-day period; four teenagers were arrested for defacing and painting swastikas on Congregation Beth Sholom synagogue in Teaneck, N.J.

October: Vandals set small fires in the Beth Israel synagogue in Vineland, N.J., and scrawled swastikas and antisemitic slogans on its walls.

November: For two months the hasidic Vurka synagogue in the Flatbush-Borough Park area of Brooklyn, N.Y., was stoned and vandalized.

Antisemitism for "Kicks"

The increasing restiveness among youth and the accelerated craving for "kicks" appeared to have had an impact on anti-Jewish vandalism of a more serious nature. On January 25 Thomas Alfred Ruppert, a 17-year-old Youth Corps enrollee, was arrested and accused of having set fire, on December 20, 1965, to the Yonkers Jewish Community Center in which nine children and three adults were burned to death. Ruppert confessed having started the fire for a thrill. On May 19 he was indicted for murder and arson by a Westchester county grand jury.

The quest for "kicks," multiplying violence, vandalism, as well as anti-semitism, has been received in some quarters with permissiveness and unex-

pected tolerance. Riots, violence, and looting among Negroes have been condoned, and even praised, by some segments of the civil-rights movement as liberating expressions of selfhood. Elsewhere, the sit-ins, lie-ins, and demonstrations characteristic of leftist-student movements have been justified as exercises of liberty. Violence and lawlessness among lower-class whites—motorcycle gangs, for example—have been analyzed, and even romanticized, as an escape from the boredom and emptiness of their lives. Antisemitism has been a perceived factor among some of these groups; others have exploited antisemitism as a perverse amusement.

George Lincoln Rockwell, founder and leader of the American Nazi party, who has called for the mass-murder of the Jews and whom New York's former mayor, Robert F. Wagner, once characterized as a "half-penny Hitler," continued to accept invitations from college students to address ("entertain" and "instruct") campus groups. In 1966 Rockwell's college tour included Rice University, Houston, Tex.; Columbia University, New York City (where he was arrested on an old charge before he could speak); New Mexico Highlands University, Las Vegas, N.M.; Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass.; Brown University, Providence, R.I.; Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill.; and New York State University College, Oneonta, N.Y. (He had been invited to speak at several other colleges, but the invitations were subsequently canceled.)

For about five years, Rockwell has enjoyed some popularity on college campuses. He was invited usually by liberal student groups and advocates of unlimited free speech, who got their "kicks" from the outrage with which their invitation to Rockwell has been greeted by Jews (parents, faculty, other students) and university officials. As a "compromise" or a "concession" to "fairmindedness," some student groups offered a platform also to Gus Hall, general secretary of the Communist party, U.S.A. Max Lerner commented on Rockwell's appearance in the Harvard Law School auditorium:

I wondered what we were all doing there, and how insane a people could get in a democracy, to have the flower of their youth listening to plans for mass murder, and treating him as if he represented some substantial body of rational if wrong-headed opinion.¹¹

Georgetown University's basketball team provided another example of perverted student humor. A Nazi-uniformed cheerleader accompanying the team closed his performance with a Nazi salute and "Sieg Heil" cheer. This particular brand of humor was lost on New York University students, many of them Jewish, who played Georgetown on February 5. (But the Rev. Anthony Zeits, director of Georgetown's student personnel, thought the "Nazi" cheerleader amusing.) More than a week later the Georgetown students, in a burst of ecumenism, apologized to the NYU students, describing the incident as "innocent in origin, but which had possibly offensive implications."

Among lower-class youth, German and Nazi insignia and slogans have

11 "A Sick Evening," *New York Post*, September 28, 1966.

become status symbols. Motorcycle gangs, particularly, have appropriated many elements of Nazi youth groups that proliferated some years ago, especially in big-city high schools. The more notorious of these lawless, disreputable, and irresponsible motorcycle gangs, which intermixed lawlessness and violence with elements of Nazism, included the Pagans of Newark and Washington, D.C., the Misfits of New York, the Aliens of Queens, the Deuces of Cleveland, and Hell's Angels and Satan's Slaves of California. On November 27 members of the New York-based Misfits wearing helmets with Nazi emblems marched in front of a Jewish restaurant in Los Angeles's predominantly Jewish neighborhood of Fairfax, shouting "Heil Hitler." They were arrested and served an 82-day jail term. An investigation into anti-semitic activity in the Fairfax area was authorized by the Los Angeles city council.

The Cleveland Deuces, whose leader calls himself Adolf Hitler, vowed allegiance to George Lincoln Rockwell's American Nazi party. Their activities have aggravated racial disturbances in Cleveland's central city.

In New York, a police raid on a Greenwich Village apartment, on December 9, uncovered hundreds of thousands of dollars of stolen goods, burglars' tools, pornographic photographs and films, marijuana, torture devices, and Nazi literature and paraphernalia. The apartment itself was decorated with Hitler's photograph and a huge Nazi flag. One of the arrested men, a German-born, naturalized American citizen, belonged to the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang. Hell's Angels have been described as desperate men, without education, jobs, status, mobility (despite their motorcycles), and without a future: "In a world increasingly geared to specialists, technicians, and fantastically complicated machinery, the Hell's Angels are obvious losers, and it bugs them."¹²

These motorcycle gangs disturbingly recall the motorcycle cult of pre-Hitlerian Germany, the uprooted jobless and violent men of the *Frei Korps*, the toughs, drinkers, and brawlers, with a yen for pornography and blood, who became the brawn of Hitler's first army, the brown-shirted *Sturmabteilung*. In 1966 the violent motorcycle gangs were numbered in the hundreds, perhaps a few thousands,¹³ but they may be the warning signals of a changing society. In an increasingly technological society, in which education more than any other single factor determines mobility, the lazy, the stupid, the incompetent, the dropouts are consigned to the dreariest jobs or left without jobs. Automation, also, gives them more leisure than they can consume. The boredom of their existence, then, drives them to sadism in sex, spurred by the rise in sadistic-pornographic literature, to drug addiction, and to violence in politics.¹⁴ The relationship between pornographic sadism and

¹² Hunter S. Thompson, *Hell's Angels: A Strange and Terrible Saga* (New York, 1967), 278 pp.

¹³ The American Motorcycle Association, with a membership of over 75,000, claims that these gangs are only one per cent of all motorcycle riders.

¹⁴ See Pamela Hansford Johnson, *On Iniquity* (New York, 1967), 142 pp. In reporting on the gruesome and sadistic Brady-Hindley Moors murders in England in 1966, Miss Johnson noted the murderers had an interest in both sado-masochistic and Nazi books.

political sadism brought about the "cult of despotism" among early Italian Fascist and German Nazis. George Steiner calling attention to the coincidence in time of "the new barbarism and the breakdown of verbal and pictorial taboos" cited the enormous mass of sadistic and antisemitic erotica which preceded the Nazi period. Céline, "the virtuoso of scatological narrative" was also Céline, "the prophetic advocate of the 'final solution.'"¹⁵

Passivity and "Tolerance"

The passivity and tolerance with which democratic society treated extreme antisemites was evident in February, when J. Lee Rankin, New York City corporation counsel, informed the Board of Education that, under its regulations, it had to extend its facilities for after-class-hours meetings to the National Renaissance party, a miniscule but viciously Nazi and antisemitic group. The rationale for the ruling was that the group was a political party. ADL attacked this decision: "To accept this lunatic-fringe clique's definition of itself as a political party is to pervert the meaning of the term" (*New York Times*, February 16, 1966). The National Renaissance party used the auditorium of a junior high school, on March 18, for a meeting at which its founder and leader, James H. Madole, denounced Jews, Negroes, Communists and the United States.

Another instance of democratic permissiveness was a decision handed down, June 19, by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to renew the license of radio station KTYM in Inglewood, Cal. A complaint had been filed by ADL that the station had broadcast several antisemitic programs and that its owners declined to halt these programs. By a 5 to 1 vote, the commissioners held that radio was "a medium of free speech" and that they could not censor programming. They also denied a public hearing on the issue. Nevertheless, they admitted that the broadcasts "did contain statements that can be regarded as anti-Semitic, and that will surely be highly offensive to many persons of the Jewish faith as well as to fair-minded people of other faiths." Kenneth A. Cox, the dissenting commissioner, termed the decision "incredible," declaring that "in light of the history of the world in our century, these programs stand as a bald attack upon the lives, the fortunes, and the sacred honor of our fellow countrymen."

A month later, in a similar case, the FCC ruled to renew provisionally for one year the license of radio station WXUR at Media, Pa., a Philadelphia suburb, and agreed to hold a public hearing on the charges that the station broadcast antisemitic and anti-Negro programs.

An editorial in AJCommittee's *Newsletter* (November-December 1966) called attention to the "talk-back" radio and television programs which, in their desire for sensationalism, provided large audiences to bigots, racists, antisemites, and a variety of questionable characters. The editorial stated: "We bar the airwaves to frauds, slanderers and pornographers. Why, then, open

¹⁵ George Steiner, "Pornography & the Consequences," *Encounter*, March 1966, pp. 46-47.

them to bigots, who often represent no one but their own warped selves, and whose invited appearances on certain programs are meant only to irritate, not educate?" In one of the programs cited, a notorious bigot had said that Jews had plotted to drag the United States into World War I so as to win support for the idea of a Jewish homeland! Another program broadcast crude antisemitic propaganda, ostensibly in a discussion of Negro anti-semitism.

Racism and Antisemitism

Anti-Negro demonstrations provided an avenue for open antisemitism. In Baltimore, July 28, the racist Maryland National States Rights party held a rally at which the speakers made anti-Negro and antisemitic remarks and incited gangs of white youths to riot. During racial disorders in July in Brooklyn, N.Y., James Madole made an appearance to harangue white customers in a tavern. In Chicago, August 20–21, counter-demonstrants to Martin Luther King's open-housing marches openly derided and reviled Jews. In working-class areas where residents of Lithuanian, Polish, Bohemian, and Italian background predominated, local speakers and outside agitators called to arms against "nigger scum" and "Jew Commies." One native Chicagoan of German descent told a reporter: "All these whites in these demonstrations are Communists, and I've noticed that a lot of them are Jews. The only loyalty Jews have is to Israel" (*New York Times*, August 21, 1966). The following day George Lincoln Rockwell and leaders of the National States Rights party and the Ku Klux Klan were haranguing white mobs in Chicago's Marquette park. Robert Jacobs, a reporter for Columbia Broadcasting System, became the target of a volley of bricks thrown by an angry crowd after someone shouted, "He's a dirty Jew—get him."

Rockwell was arrested on August 29 in Chicago for disorderly conduct, and on September 10 for marching without a permit. On September 11 Christopher Vidnjevich, Chicago leader of the American Nazi party, threatened to lead a march into a Jewish neighborhood: "The Jews are the real troublemakers." Rockwell himself subsequently announced plans to march into Jewish neighborhoods during the High Holy Days to "convince the Jews not to support the Negroes and the Communists." On the petition of the Jewish War Veterans, Federal District Judge Joseph Sam Perry issued first a temporary and then, on September 30, a permanent restraining order forbidding the Nazis to parade near synagogues on the Sabbath and Jewish holidays. Rockwell then asked for, and received, assistance from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to appeal the order. (Rabbi Ralph Simon, leading Conservative rabbi of Chicago, resigned from the ACLU when he learned of its "regrettable decision" to defend Rockwell. Jay A. Miller, the local union's executive director, deplored Simon's resignation and argued that the best defense against fascism would be to devote "all of our resources

to alleviating the underlying causes of poverty, ignorance and lack of identification that produce this dangerous condition.”¹⁶)

Racial troubles in the North and South boosted the membership of Ku Klux Klan organizations throughout the country and multiplied their activities. An ADL report, released in September, claimed that Klan membership rose by about 10,000 since the beginning of 1966 to a new high of nearly 30,000. Some of the new recruits were in the North and the West.

Antisemitism has been a staple in Southern racism;¹⁷ it manifested itself also in other places. At a rally of a revived KKK in Soledad Canyon, Los Angeles county, Klan leader William V. Fowler rallied his small following against the “dirty kikes” and “niggers,” and promised: “Jesus beat the Jews from the market steps and we’re going to beat the Jews out of the Federal Reserve System.”¹⁸

The Radical Right

Racial issues dominated the activities of radical-right organizations and sparked their membership recruitment. Before the November elections, the John Birch Society released a 75-minute film it had produced, *Anarchy, U.S.A.*, whose purpose was to smear the civil-rights movement as influenced and directed by Communists. It insinuated that the sympathy of high government officials (President Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey, the late President John F. Kennedy) for the civil-rights movement involved them in a “communist conspiracy.”¹⁹

Concern about the growth of extremism, particularly by organizations in the orbit of the Birch Society, led to the formation of the Institute for American Democracy on November 18. Its committee consisted of 48 prominent leaders in church affairs, business, education, labor unions, and public service, under the chairmanship of Iowa Wesleyan College President Franklin H. Littell. Jewish leaders on the committee included Morris B. Abram, president of the AJCommittee, and Dore Schary, chairman of ADL.

The radical right was the subject of several scientific papers published in 1966. These included: Irving Crespi, “The Structural Basis for Right-wing Conservatism: The Goldwater Case,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Winter 1965–66, pp. 523–543; James McEvoy, *Letters from the Right: Content-Analysis of a Letter Writing Campaign* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Research on Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, University of Michigan, April 1966), 58 pp. (processed); Lawrence F. Schiff, “Dynamic Young-Fogies—

16 *The Sentinel* (Chicago), December 15, 1966; January 26, 1967.

17 Ben H. Bagdikian, “Justice on the Bench in Mississippi,” *The New Republic*, February 18, 1967, pp. 12–13, describes the antisemitism of Mississippi judges. Tom Wicker, “George Wallace: A Gross and Simple Heart,” *Harper’s Magazine*, April 1967, pp. 41–49, quotes George Wallace, “. . . I don’t believe all this talk about poor folks turning Communist. It’s the damn rich who turn Communist. You ever see a poor Communist? Like them Rosenberg folks and all. They were moneyed people.”

18 Jerry Goldberg, “KKK,” *The New West Magazine*, November 1966, pp. 42–43.

19 Martin Hayes Bickham, “New Film Smears Civil Rights Cause,” *The Christian Century*, December 14, 1966, pp. 1553–54.

Rebels on the Right," *Trans-action*, November 1966, pp. 31-36; Everett C. Ladd, Jr., "The Radical Right: The White-Collar Extremists," *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, Summer 1966, pp. 314-324.

Meanwhile, more evidence accumulated to indicate that, despite its denials to the contrary, the Birch Society harbored antisemites and used antisemitic propaganda. Early in 1966 ADL released a study on the Birch Society which charged that the society was strongly "contributing to anti-Semitism and waging an all-out war against the civil-rights movement."²⁰ Birch Society publications contained the writings of antisemites and and the society's bookstores distributed antisemitic books and pamphlets. On July 28 Alan Cranston, then California controller, released a report which charged that the Birch Society was soiled "with the muck of anti-Semitism and racism, and a smattering of anti-Catholicism," and that "anti-Semitism and racism, intentional or inadvertent, abound at all levels of the society and in all its outlets—from its founder on down."²¹

To discredit charges of its antisemitism, the society tried to organize a Jewish branch, the Jewish Society of Americanists, but only seven Jews turned up at the first national meeting called in Chicago in April.

The annual New England Rally for God, Family, and Country, held in Boston, July 2, 1966, was dominated by Birchers, in addition to Klansmen and Southern racists. One of the rally's main speakers was Revilo P. Oliver, one of the Birch Society's original eleven founders, a member of its governing council, and an associate editor of its monthly *American Opinion*. Oliver addressed the rally on a subject he has written frequently about in *American Opinion*—the "Jewish conspiracy," which he believed to be the conspiracy behind the conspiracy. Shortly thereafter, Oliver resigned from the society, presumably in a dispute with Robert H. W. Welch over the public and undisguised expression of antisemitism (*New York Times*, August 16, 1966).

The Minutemen, a paramilitary racist and antisemitic spinoff of the Birch Society, believed its members must be armed to ward off the "Communist conspiracy."²² Robert B. DePugh, founder and head of the Minutemen, also attempted to form his own party. In July he held a convention in Kansas City, where he founded the Patriotic party. Kenneth Goff, a notorious anti-semitite and former aide of Gerald L. K. Smith, was a featured speaker. (Goff heads his own extremist, paramilitary Soldiers of the Cross, which is closely associated with the Minutemen.)

On October 30 New York City and upstate police raided the Minutemen's New York organization. They arrested nineteen Minutemen and seized an enormous arsenal of rifles, bombs, mortars, machine guns, hand guns, knives,

²⁰ Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Forster, *Report on the John Birch Society 1966* (New York, 1966), xi, 112 pp.

²¹ Alan Cranston, *The John Birch Society: A Soiled Slip Is Showing: A Report* (July 28, 1966), 26 pp. (Processed.)

²² The relationship is documented in a film in possession of the police. It shows a baseball game between Minutemen and Birchites. See Jerome Bakst, "America's Latter-Day Minutemen," *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, Winter 1966-67, pp. 29-31. See also William W. Turner, "The Minutemen," *Ramparts*, January 1967, pp. 69-76.

grenades and grenade launchers, mortar shells, and more than one million rounds of ammunition. (Minutemen are advised to join the National Rifle Association and to form or join NRA clubs, so they can buy weapons below market price and be eligible for free ammunition.) Besides the arms cache, the police seized large quantities of racist literature and the classic antisemitic "document," *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. California police have several times confiscated large weapons arsenals collected by Minutemen.

On November 14 DePugh was convicted in Kansas City of conspiracy and violation of the National Firearms Act. A prosecution witness in the case testified that his membership application was accepted after he declared that he was already a Birch Society member, and that it was his opinion that "the last Jew administration started selling us down the tube and the present one will complete the job."²³

The disclosure, on January 26, of an antisemitic and racist clique, called Rat Finks, within the New Jersey Young Republicans proved even more disquieting to Jews than the arsenals of the Minutemen. The existence of the Rat Finks documented the intimate, indeed integral, relationship between antisemitism and the political right. A year earlier, at a New Jersey state convention and at a national convention of Young Republicans, the Rat Finks amused themselves with their own mimeographed antisemitic and racist songbooks and songfests. The lyrics to one such song, to the tune of "Jingle Bells," were:

Riding through the Reich in a Mercedes-Benz,
Shooting all the kikes, making lots of friends.
Rat tat-tat-tat, mow the bastards down,
Oh what fun it is to have the Nazis back in town.

Investigations were started by the Young Republicans on state, regional (Mid-Atlantic), and national levels of their organization and also by New Jersey Attorney General Arthur J. Sills (Democrat). Sills had recently been investigating the state's Minutemen, who were reportedly associated with the Rat Finks. Thomas Van Sickle, Young Republican national chairman, was himself accused of having been closely associated with the Rat Finks. On February 23 Episcopal Bishop Alfred L. Banyard threatened possible excommunication for any member of the diocese (14 southern N.J. counties) who had participated in distributing or singing the antisemitic and racist Rat Fink songs. In June the state Young Republicans expelled seven county units for being controlled by the Rat Finks. Sharply divided but under continued public pressure to purge itself of the Rat Finks, the executive committee of the national Young Republican Federation, on August 13, reached a compromise by a vote of 25 to 19. Richard F. Plechner, leader of the New Jersey faction, was absolved of charges of racism and bigotry, but his resignation as vice chairman of the national Young Republican Federation was

²³ Milton Ellerin, *The Minutemen—An Appraisal* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, January 1967), 28 pp. (Typescript.)

demanding in return for the conditional reinstatement of the seven expelled New Jersey county units. To be eligible for reinstatement, each unit had to resolve, by at least a two-thirds vote, to dissociate itself from the Rat Finks, Exterminators (anti-Rat Fink), John Birch Society, or any other factional group.

Negro Antisemitism

Antisemitism among Negroes erupted as a serious concern in 1966. It exploded publicly on February 3, when Clifford A. Brown, a Westchester county probation officer and educational chairman of the Mount Vernon chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), shouted at a meeting of the Mount Vernon Board of Education that "Hitler made one mistake when he didn't kill enough of you [Jews]." The occasion was an ongoing dispute on school policies to end *de facto* segregation in the public schools. Four days later, James Farmer, then CORE's national director, termed Brown's antisemitic remark "intolerable," said an investigation had been ordered to determine the context in which the remark had been made, and added that "also intolerable" were the school board's "delaying tactics" on racial imbalance in the schools.

The slowness of CORE's repudiation of Brown's antisemitism and Farmer's equation of Auschwitz with Mount Vernon served to intensify Jewish reaction against CORE. Will Maslow, executive director of the American Jewish Congress, resigned his membership on CORE's national board, accusing it of a "tepid and ambiguous response" to Brown's "horrifying" remark. "I cannot continue," Maslow said, "an association with a group whose moral fiber is so flabby as to respond in an equivocal manner to the horrifying and racist public statement" made by Brown. On February 9, after Farmer's intervention, CORE's Mount Vernon chapter accepted Brown's resignation "with great sadness."

The only public Negro response criticizing Brown came from Jackie Robinson in his column "We Also Have Black Bigots" (*Amsterdam News*, February 19, 1966), in which he deplored also the absence of any "spontaneous rebuke from other Negro leaders and civil rights organizations."

Finally, on May 27, after continued dissension over antisemitism, CORE expelled its Mount Vernon chapter, which meanwhile had moved to reelect Brown as an officer. CORE's dilatory responses resulted in the substantial withdrawal of financial support by CORE's Jewish contributors. Lincoln Lynch, CORE's associate national director, admitted that contributions had fallen sharply after the Mount Vernon incident. About 80 per cent of CORE's support came from the white community and, Lynch added, "you could say that Jewish contributions have been predominant."²⁴ On December 21, Bayard Rustin, executive director of the A. Philip Randolph Insti-

²⁴ Edward C. Burks, "Militant Rights Groups Feel Pinch as Gifts Drop," *The New York Times*, July 25, 1966.

tute, told the national executive committee of the Jewish Labor Committee that he was deeply ashamed of the antisemitism among Negroes, but urged Jews to continue to give their support to the civil-rights movement.

Negro accusations against merchants, mostly Jewish, of unfair marketing and pricing practices, coupled with Negro looting and burning of white-owned (mostly Jewish-owned) retail stores in Negro neighborhoods, focused attention on the economic aspects of Negro-Jewish tensions. Populist Negro leaders like Stokely Carmichael of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), with anti-capitalist and anti-urban views, agitated their Negro followers against the Jewish shopkeepers: "It was . . . the exploitation by Jewish landlords and merchants which first created black resentment toward Jews—not Judaism."²⁵ Negro author LeRoi Jones threatened: "It is almost common knowledge that the Jews, etc., will go the next time there's a large 'disturbance,' like they say."²⁶

In Chicago on January 7, Donald Jackson, a Negro with a criminal record, shot and killed Sidney and Edward Fohrman, brothers in the used-car business, and Albert Sizer, their salesman. Jackson had been in three accidents and had become involved in a dispute with the Fohrman brothers over a \$100-deductible insurance policy. A Chicago Negro alderman and Negro press and TV commentators justified the brutal murders and cheered the murderer because used-car dealers charged high interest rates.²⁷

The defense made by some Negro writers and radicals on behalf of six Negro boys found guilty of murdering, without any apparent motive, Mrs. Margit Sugar, a Hungarian Jewish refugee, in her tailor shop was even more implausible. William Epton, a leader of the Maoist Progressive Labor party, became involved in the belated defense and appeal of the six, who were believed to have been connected with a terrorist group called the Five Percenters. In November James Baldwin wrote a petition, opening the drive for a new trial, which declared that "what is at issue here is not their guilt or innocence" but "the manner of their arrest."²⁸

Another senseless action against Jewish merchants was a SNCC-led boycott of their shops in Washington, D.C., protesting the failure of Congress to vote home rule for residents of the District of Columbia. On March 21 the Jewish Community Council of Washington, D.C., criticized SNCC and the Free D.C. Movement for boycotting these merchants. While the Metropolitan Board of Trade had opposed home rule, the boycott of the local merchants, the council said, was irrelevant to the issue and a violation of their privacy.

Looting, burning, and destruction of many Jewish businesses in Negro neighborhoods continued during the 1966 summer riots (pp. 83-84). De-

²⁵ Stokely Carmichael, "What We Want," *The New York Review of Books*, September 22, 1966, pp. 5-8.

²⁶ LeRoi Jones, *Home: Social Essays* (New York, 1966), p. 249.

²⁷ *The Sentinel*, Chicago, February 10, 1966; Sidney J. Jacobs, "The Comfort of Eliphaz," *The Reconstructionist*, March 4, 1966, pp. 21-28.

²⁸ Joan Hanauer, "Baldwin Opens Drive to Win New Death Trial for 'Harlem Six,'" *World Journal Tribune*, November 12, 1966.

spite reports by Jewish community organizations in Chicago and Cleveland that antisemitism was not a factor, Jewish businessmen suffered considerable property losses and were subjected to physical danger. In Minneapolis, following rioting in August in a Negro area once predominantly Jewish, many Jewish businessmen began to display "for sale" signs. The *American Jewish World*, Minneapolis's Jewish weekly, editorially commented that while everything possible was being done to aid the Negro residents, nothing was being done to help the victimized businessmen, nearly all of whom were Jewish.

The greater awareness of Negro antisemitism pointed up the lack of hard data about Negro attitudes towards Jews and whether present feelings represented a rise in hostility or merely its more public, uncontrolled expression. A preliminary report on an ADL-sponsored study underway at the University of California Survey Research Center in Berkeley showed that more Negroes preferred to do business with Jews than with non-Jews; but most Negroes saw no difference between Jews and non-Jews.²⁹ *Midstream* published a symposium on Negro-Jewish relations, with twenty-four Jewish participants, most of whom were actively engaged in the Jewish community; a few were primarily associated with labor or civil-liberties institutions. Only two symposiasts were Negroes, and one was a white Protestant. Diverse assessments about Negro antisemitism were made, and many contributors probed the historical, economic, and religious causes for Negro-Jewish tensions.³⁰

PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AMERICAN JEWS, AND VIETNAM

The greatest disquiet experienced by American Jews in 1966 came as a consequence of President Johnson's criticism of Jewish attitudes towards the war in Vietnam. The incident began on September 6, when Malcolm A. Tarlov, newly elected national commander of the Jewish War Veterans (JWV), and several other JWV officers paid a courtesy call on President Johnson as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.³¹ The JWV delegation used this routine occasion to express to the President its organization's support of the government's policies in Vietnam. In his response, President Johnson voiced his disturbance over the lack of support for the war among the Jewish community. According to Tarlov, who reported the conversation to the *JTA* (September 7, 1966), President Johnson compared American commitments to Vietnam with those to Israel, and drew a parallel between the political principles involved in American relations with both countries. He seemed also to have suggested that American support for Israel would de-

²⁹ Oscar Cohen, "'Negro Antisemitism' Analysed," *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, Winter 1966-67, pp. 13-15, 38.

³⁰ "Negro-Jewish Relations in America: A Symposium," *Midstream*, December 1966, pp. 1-91.

³¹ For the detailed story, see Phil Baum, "Johnson, Vietnam and the Jews," *Congress Bi-Weekly*, October 24, 1966, pp. 7-9.

pend on Jewish support of administration policies in Vietnam. A substantiating account in the *New York Times* (September 11) of this meeting intensified Jewish anxiety, consternation, and also outrage over the President's remarks and his singling out the Jews as a group to be a target of his displeasure.

A flurry of denials and counterdenials followed; a B'nai B'rith delegation, which had called on the President for clarification, issued a vague but reassuring statement. In an effort to learn what the President had actually said and what the implications of that statement were, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations met on September 13 with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg. Ambassador Goldberg reportedly reassured the Jewish delegation that no government official had intended to stifle dissent over Vietnam, and that no *quid pro quo* had been expected or desired when the President had compared American responsibilities toward Vietnam with those toward Israel. (Ambassador Goldberg said then, and several times later repeated, that he acted entirely on his own, that he had not discussed this matter with President Johnson, and that he was in no way the President's intermediary.³²)

The only word from the White House came in a letter written by Harry C. McPherson, Jr., special counsel to the President, in response to an inquiry by a Cleveland college student and reported in the *JTA*, October 7, 1966: "Any inference in news stories that the President linked American Jewish support for this country's struggle in Vietnam with continued United States support for Israel is wholly fanciful."

On November 5 the Texas White House (President Johnson was in Johnson City for the weekend) announced that the United States would lend Israel \$6 million for expansion of electric-power facilities. The release specifically stated that President Johnson had made the decision in an apparent effort to prove that the President's unhappiness over Jewish attitudes towards the war in Vietnam did not affect his commitments to Israel.

The anxiety provoked by the episode found little public expression. Jews limited themselves almost entirely to insisting on their right to dissent and to disclaiming any monolithic Jewish position on Vietnam. As proof they cited a Gallup poll, released September 21, which showed that national opinion was about evenly divided on the Vietnam war and that the Jewish respondents did not differ significantly from the national or Protestant sample. Jewish fears that criticism by the highest official in the country of political views held by some or many of them could open the floodgates of prejudice went unvoiced. (The incident, however, created a comic-pacifist button slogan: "You don't have to be Jewish to be against the war in Vietnam.")

The public positions taken by some Jewish organizations on the war in

32 "Goldberg Says Role in Talk Was His Own," *New York Times*, September 19, 1966. A sensitive appreciation of Ambassador Goldberg's position as "the Administration's ambassador to the Jews, and the Jews' tribune in the government" is Andrew Kopkind, "The Adventures of Arthur Goldberg," *The New Republic*, October 8, 1966, pp. 15-18.

Vietnam remained unaffected by the incident. Politically and religiously liberal organizations, like the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC) and the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR), continued to oppose the war, and justified their position by recourse to Jewish ethical teachings. Politically and religiously conservative groups, like JWV and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (UOJCA), supported the war. UOJCA, at its national biennial convention in November, adopted a resolution supporting the war and America's determination to resist Communist aggression anywhere in the world.

RACIAL TENSIONS

Public-opinion polls conducted in the second half of 1966 showed a continuing decline in discriminatory attitudes on the part of most white people (including Southerners) toward Negroes, but increasing resentment and opposition to civil-rights demonstrations and racial violence. A midsummer public-opinion survey by Louis Harris of white and Negro attitudes showed that 46 per cent of white respondents would mind if a Negro family moved next door (51 per cent in 1963). But it also showed that 63 per cent of whites thought all civil-rights demonstrations were harmful (50 per cent in 1963). In contrast, most Negroes thought demonstrations were helpful. Furthermore, over 75 per cent of the whites said riots had harmed the Negro cause, and 70 per cent thought Negroes were "trying to move too fast" (64 per cent in 1963).³³

A Gallup poll, released September 28, showed that 52 per cent of a national sample (the highest since May 1962) thought the Johnson administration was pushing integration too fast. Only 5 per cent of the Negro respondents thought so. According to a Harris poll conducted in October, 59 per cent of white respondents in big cities felt personally uneasy over racial violence; 85 per cent of all whites thought Negro demonstrations hurt the civil-rights cause.³⁴ A survey of 8,500 United Church of Christ members in 151 congregations found that 62 per cent of metropolitan-area church members felt Negroes were moving too fast in demanding their civil rights, but only 45 per cent of the Great Plains church members (where Negroes were fewer and less militant) felt that way.³⁵

This growing disaffection of whites was widely attributed to the emergence of "black power" as a slogan and philosophy in the civil-rights movement and to an increase in racial violence.

Black Power

"Black power" as a civil-rights slogan first made headlines in the nation's press during the second lap of the James H. Meredith march into Mississippi.

³³ "Crisis of Color, '66," *Newsweek*, August 22, 1966, pp. 11, 20-59.

³⁴ Louis Harris, "White Backlash Mounting," *New York Post*, October 10, 1966.

³⁵ "White UCC Members Studied: Little Zeal for Rights Drive," *Religious News Service*, October 25, 1966.

Meredith, the first Negro to attend the University of Mississippi from which he was graduated in 1963, began the march on June 5 to inspire Mississippi Negroes to conquer their fear of living in that state and to register to vote. The next day, just south of Hernando, Miss., he was shot in the back from ambush and wounded. Within a day, the march was resumed by the Rev. Martin Luther King, head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Floyd McKissick, national director of CORE, and Stokely Carmichael, chairman of SNCC, though they had not responded to Meredith's original call. Enlarging on Meredith's purpose of a "march against fear," these leaders introduced a more militant tone in their demands. In the course of the march, which many youthful Southern Negroes joined, Carmichael introduced the simplistic and appealing slogan of "black power," which the marchers appropriated as a chant.³⁶

It was often not clear what "black power" meant or what it was intended to achieve. McKissick, who first introduced the concept as a militant racial philosophy at a CORE convention in 1965, defined it as a form of social and political autonomy: "Black people should have the right to determine what courses" of action they were going to take, he said. "We're going to control our movement, and we're going to call the shots."³⁷ Carmichael, too, defined black power as "nothing more than black people coming together as a political, economic and social force and forcing their representatives or electing their representatives to speak to their needs." Notwithstanding these unexceptionable definitions, this do-it-yourself philosophy articulated also more strident and discordant outlooks: racism, black separatism, and, above all, a mystique of violence. A position paper prepared some months earlier by dissidents in SNCC, which had been used to exclude whites from policy-making and organizational positions in the organization, had expressed this extremist position.³⁸ Black-power advocates were ambiguous about the use of violence. Carmichael put it this way:

As for initiating the use of violence, we hope that such programs as ours will make this unnecessary; but it is not for us to tell black communities whether they can or cannot use any particular form of action to resolve their problems. Responsibility for the use of violence by black men, whether in self-defense or initiated by them, lies with the white community.³⁹

This ambiguity exacerbated the distrust and cleavage already marked in the civil-rights movement and intensified suspicion and alarm among whites, particularly among Jews grown sensitive to the antisemitism within militant civil-rights groups. "Black power is a dangerous and retrogressive step cre-

³⁶ For a sympathetic account of the march, see "Talk of the Town," *The New Yorker*, July 16, 1966, pp. 21-25.

³⁷ "Black Power—Six Views," *New York Post*, July 30, 1966. McKissick elaborated on his views in an interview for a Communist journal (Alvin Simon, "Black Power and Cambodia: A Dialog with Floyd B. McKissick," *American Dialog*, Nov.-Dec. 1966, pp. 15-18.)

³⁸ Gene Roberts, "Black Power Idea Long in Planning," *New York Times*, August 5, 1966.

³⁹ Stokely Carmichael, *loc. cit.*

ating a vacuum in the civil-rights movement," one well-to-do white contributor explained the withdrawal of her rather extensive support of CORE.⁴⁰

The deleterious effect of the black-power slogan on the civil-rights movement and the fear that it would provoke political backlash in the elections spurred responsible Negro leaders to repudiate it. On October 14 the leaders of seven major Negro national organizations issued an anti-black-power manifesto.⁴¹ Entitled "Crisis and Commitment," the statement rejected violence and strategies of violence, and reaffirmed their commitment to the democratic process and to integration as a goal of American Negroes.

Racial Violence

In 1966 racial violence was more widespread and turbulent in the North than in the South. Except for the violence endemic to Mississippi (visible even in the beating of little Negro children trying to attend a white public school in Grenada in September) and incidents in St. Petersburg and Atlanta, the most rampageous racial strife in the North was that of Negroes rioting in their own neighborhoods. On a smaller scale, less destructive but equally deplorable, were anti-Negro disturbances perpetrated by bigots and youth gangs.

The Negro riots during the long, hot summer of 1966 were, in most cases, touched off by tensions between Negroes and the police or between Negro and white teen-agers. In most instances, the rioting and consequent looting and burning appeared to be nothing more than irresponsible, criminal behavior, though civil-rights leaders, sociologists, and social workers tried to interpret that behavior as the distress signal which inarticulate and disorganized Negro masses used to call attention to their plight. In many communities in which rioting and looting occurred, the National Guard was called in to reinforce the police. Serious racial outbreaks took place in Brooklyn, N.Y.; Benton Harbor, Mich.; Chicago, Ill.; Cleveland and Dayton, Ohio; Jackson, Mich.; Los Angeles, Cal.; Minneapolis, Minn.; Muskegon, Mich.; North Amityville, L.I.; Omaha, Neb.; St. Louis, Mo.; San Francisco, Cal., and Waukegan, Ill.

White counter-rioting occurred in Baltimore, Md., Brooklyn, Chicago, Cleveland, and Kensington, Pa.⁴² The whites involved were mostly low-income workers living near Negro neighborhoods. In the Northern industrial

⁴⁰ Lee Berton, "Black Power Impact," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 22, 1966.

⁴¹ The signers were: Dorothy Height, president, National Council of Negro Women; A. Philip Randolph, president, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, AFL-CIO; Bayard Rustin, director, A. Philip Randolph Institute; Roy Wilkins, executive director, NAACP; Whitney M. Young, Jr., executive director, National Urban League; Amos T. Hall, executive secretary, Conference of Grand Master of Prince Hall Masons of America; and Hobson R. Reynolds, Grand Exalted Ruler, Improved Benevolent and Protective Order of the Elks of the World.

Martin Luther King did not sign the statement, but, at a news conference in Atlanta on October 14, he said he endorsed its principles.

⁴² For an analysis of the last, see Murray Friedman, *The Kensington Riot of 1966—A Look at the Underlying Factors*, paper read at the Lutheran Settlement House, Kensington, Pa., February 3, 1967. (Mimeographed.)

cities, they were predominantly Catholics of Irish, Italian, and Polish origin. The white Chicago rioters against Martin Luther King's open-housing demonstrations were overwhelmingly Catholic.⁴³ Their furious anti-Negro hostility was believed to have accounted for Archbishop John Patrick Cody's plea on August 10 to desist, addressed not to the rioters, but calling on the Chicago Freedom Movement to suspend their civil-rights marches.

President Johnson himself appealed to these groups to resist prejudice and extend a helping hand to Negroes. Addressing the annual Columbus Day dinner of the Italian-American Professional and Businessmen's Association on October 12 in Brooklyn, N.Y., he said that "it hasn't been too many years since Italian-Americans felt the raw pain of discrimination in America." On October 16 in Doylestown, Pa., the President participated in a ceremony consecrating the new Roman Catholic Shrine of Our Lady of Czestochowa. On that occasion, he reminded his predominantly Polish-American audience that Thaddeus Kosciuszko, the Polish volunteer who had fought in the American Revolution, had bought slaves only in order to free them. "We need that spirit in America today—perhaps more than ever before," he said.

On November 19 the National Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a pastoral statement on race relations and poverty, reaffirming Catholic teachings that discrimination was "contrary to right reason and to Christian teaching" and stressing that "we are all the children of God."

Civil-Rights Legislation

The stridency of the black-power advocates and racial violence frustrated the passage of the civil-rights bill of 1966 in the Senate. (The House had passed the bill August 9, by a vote of 259 to 157, in the full awareness that it would not emerge from the Senate.) On September 19, after twelve days of debate over a motion to consider the bill, the Senate failed for the second time to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority for cloture. (Two years earlier the less liberal Senate of the 88th Congress had mustered more than the required two-thirds vote, had ended the filibuster, and passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.) The most controversial section of the 1966 bill was its open-housing provision. Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), unwilling to blame Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen (R., Ill.), who had opposed that section of bill, for the failure to shut off debate, singled out for censure the "demagogues" on both sides of the civil-rights struggle, and the "rioting, marches, shootings and inflammatory statements which have characterized this simmering summer." He strongly attacked also the black-power advocates who "in the name of racial equality or perhaps more accurately in the name of a new racial superiority, have not advocated further civil-rights legislation, but, in fact, have actively spoken and fought against it."

Nevertheless, the 90th Congress passed other bills designed to help Negroes,

⁴³ Michael E. Schiltz, "Catholics and the Chicago Riots," *Commonweal*, November 11, 1966, pp. 159-163. See also "An Exchange of Views," *loc. cit.* (December 16, 1966), pp. 321-324.

particularly the poor. These represented a pragmatic economic approach rather than the political-legal. Two rent-supplement appropriations were approved (for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for fiscal 1967), providing subsidies to enable poor families to live in decent housing outside the slums. On September 7, 1966, when President Johnson signed the 1967 appropriations bill containing the \$22-million rent-supplement program, he praised it as "the single most important breakthrough in the history of public housing." On October 20 Congress gave final approval to three important measures: an extension of the Economic Opportunity Act (anti-poverty program) for one year; an authorization of \$6.2 billion in federal aid, extending the Elementary and Secondary Education Act for two more years, and the new Demonstration Cities Act of 1966, providing \$1.3 billion to fight urban blight and suburban sprawl. The law provided that funds would be distributed over a five-year period to some 60 or 70 cities meeting a set of federal criteria. The thrust of the law was to bring together a wide variety of resources, and to apply them to a program for the combined physical, social, and economic rehabilitation of a single blighted neighborhood.

Social and Community Action

In 1966 there was a growing awareness that many problems facing American Negroes were more susceptible to solution by economic, social, and community action than by political or legislative action. A leading advocate of this shift in civil-rights strategy was Bayard Rustin, who conceived the grandiose Freedom Budget. Released in October by the A. Philip Randolph Institute over the signatures of nearly 200 Americans, white and Negro, the Freedom Budget asked the federal government to provide an additional \$185 billion in the federal budget in the next ten years to achieve "freedom from want" by 1975.⁴⁴ Its basic objectives included full employment, with a federal minimum wage, a new farm program, a guaranteed annual income for those who could not or should not be employed, and demands for decent housing, medical care, and education. It was not clear what steps were being planned to implement these demands.

Three related proposals for slum rehabilitation emerged late in 1966, all combining the efforts of private business with federal financial backing. On November 4 the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) submitted a plan to the President for a nationwide, nonprofit corporation which would merge private and public resources to rehabilitate urban slums. Established and staffed by HUD, this corporation would operate like the Communications Satellite Corporation (Comsat), in that its board would be headed by industrial management, and labor, academic and government leaders. On December 16 Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D., N.Y.) announced

⁴⁴ A "Freedom Budget" For All Americans: *Budgeting Our Resources, 1966-1975 To Achieve "Freedom from Want"* (New York: A. Philip Randolph Institute, October 1966), 84 pp.

the impending formation of two corporations, one of community leaders and the other of businessmen, to cooperate in the redevelopment of Bedford-Stuyvesant, a heavily Negro neighborhood in Brooklyn, N.Y. Besides housing, this plan incorporated also a variety of social and economic programs (anti-poverty, job training, recreational facilities, etc.), a thrust similar to that envisaged in the Demonstration Cities Act of 1966. Senator Jacob E. Javits (Rep., N.Y.) also proposed a plan which emphasized greater utilization of business and which provided financing of the corporation's program through sales of shares to the public.

The question of equal educational opportunities for Negro and other minority children continued to agitate the civil-rights movement. In New York City, Philadelphia, and elsewhere, militant black-nationalist groups demanded control over both personnel and educational policies in schools attended mostly by Negro children. In many instances they demonstrated, demanding the replacement of white (Jewish) school principals with Negroes. In New York City, parents and community groups organized mass demonstrations and a short-lived boycott at the opening in September of Intermediate School 201, a new, air-conditioned school in Harlem, with many features designed to bring superior education to its pupils. Because no white children were attracted to the school, the parent-community groups (including black-nationalist and Maoist elements) demanded first the resignation of the Jewish principal (antisemitic remarks were common in the controversy), and then communal control over the school. After some negotiations, the Board of Education proposed to set up an advisory panel of parents, community representatives, teachers, and supervisors. The parent-community group rejected this and also a subsequent board proposal to establish a task force of educators, public officials, and community leaders to recommend ways of improving Negro schools. By the end of the year, this dispute had not been resolved and no action had been taken. The Jewish principal remained.

In July United States Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II released a survey, authorized under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to assess "the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities" by reason of "race, color, religion, or national origin" in the country's public schools. Entitled *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, the study was conducted by the National Center for Educational Statistics of the United States Office of Education, with Professor of Sociology James S. Coleman of Johns Hopkins University largely responsible for its design, administration, and analysis.⁴⁵ The findings were based on responses to questionnaires by, and educational tests of, over 645,000 public-school pupils in 4,000 schools in five different grades in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as on questionnaires answered by 60,000 teachers, principals, and district school superintendents. The survey analyzed six racial and ethnic groups: Negroes, American Indians, Oriental Americans, Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans, and

⁴⁵ James S. Coleman, et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 737 pp.

whites. It made important regional, urban-rural, and class distinctions. Its unprecedented scope and seriousness of purpose made it perhaps the most significant piece of educational research in recent years, but it appeared to have been little noticed.

The findings of the study indicated that "the sources of inequality of educational opportunity appear to lie first in the home itself and the cultural influences immediately surrounding the home; then they lie in the schools' ineffectiveness to free achievement from the impact of the home, and in the schools' cultural homogeneity which perpetuates the social influences of the home and its environs."⁴⁶ One important finding was that Negroes who had self-confidence and a sense of control of their own fate did better on tests than whites who had less self-confidence; this attitude was more highly related to achievement than any other factor in the student's background or school. Professor Coleman concluded, therefore, that "internal changes in the Negro, changes in his conception of himself in relation to his environment, may have more effect on Negro achievement than any other single factor."

The reluctance of most civil-rights groups to deal with the internal social problems of the Negro community was most apparent in the controversy surrounding the Moynihan report (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 99-101). The White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights," held June 1-2, had originally been conceived to deal with problems arising from the pathology of the Negro family and its impact on the fulfillment of Negro equality. But the violent objection of civil-rights leaders and social workers to this approach turned the conference into a more traditional and familiar civil-rights meeting presenting a bulging package of recommendations on employment, education, housing, and legal justice.⁴⁷

The conference, generally regarded as ineffective, represented an artificial consensus on civil rights. Boycotted by SNCC pickets on the outside, it failed to generate interest, discussion, or a true interchange of ideas inside. Daniel P. Moynihan, whose report was not mentioned at the conference, later charged that the civil-rights movement had lost an opportunity for an unparalleled national effort to deal more effectively with the problems of Negro equality.⁴⁸ A study of this controversy concluded that the Moynihan *report* had provided a strong justification for a government that wanted to move vigorously on social and economic reform to benefit Negroes, but that the Moynihan *controversy* justified the government's inaction and its withdrawal from expanded commitments.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ James S. Coleman, "Equal Schools Or Equal Students?" *The Public Interest*, Summer 1966, pp. 70-75.

⁴⁷ White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights," *The Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 177 pp.

⁴⁸ Daniel P. Moynihan, "The President & the Negro: The Moment Lost," *Commentary*, February 1967, pp. 31-45.

⁴⁹ Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967), xviii, 493 pp.

Racial Tensions in Politics

"White backlash," reprisal by white voters against pro-civil-rights candidates, was widely predicted as a major factor in the 1966 election. Backlash in the North had been provoked chiefly by open-housing legislation, school busing, concern over crime and public safety, black-power militancy, and Negro riots and violence. Backlash in the South had been exacerbated by conflicts over federal guidelines for school desegregation issued under the 1964 Civil Rights Act and by the 1965 Voting Rights Act. Nevertheless, a study of the results of the election showed that backlash materialized only in the Deep South, where race still remained *the* salient issue in politics.⁵⁰ The study found that the white backlash succeeded in electing governors in Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. It failed dramatically in the gubernatorial races in Arkansas and Maryland, and in the senatorial race in Massachusetts. There, 61 per cent of the voters in a normally Democratic stronghold elected Republican Edward W. Brooke, a Negro, to the Senate. He was the first Northern Negro senator in the nation's history and the first Negro elected since Reconstruction.

The election in Maryland was a dramatic illustration of group tensions over racial issues. The conflict began in September in the Democratic primary. In the rough-and-tough power struggle between two contending Democratic slates, a third contender, George F. Mahoney, a millionaire paving contractor who six times before had unsuccessfully run for state office, managed to win the party's gubernatorial nomination with a minority of the votes. A racist, Mahoney appealed to the same body of voters who had given Wallace over 44 per cent of their vote in Maryland's Democratic presidential primary in 1964.

In the primary, Mahoney received 46 per cent of the white vote in Baltimore city and Baltimore county, 60 per cent of the labor vote, and 68 per cent of the Slavic (Polish) vote. Jews gave Mahoney only 15 per cent, with 50 per cent voting for Rep. Carlton R. Sickles and 22 per cent for Maryland's Attorney General Thomas B. Finan. Negroes gave Sickles nearly 70 per cent of their vote.⁵¹

Mahoney targeted his campaign in the general election to the potential backlash vote. His slogan was "Your home is your castle," and his crude bigotry provoked nearly all important Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergymen to denounce him. Responsible, civic-minded Democrats, moderates and liberals alike, switched to the Republican candidate Spiro T. Agnew, chief executive of Baltimore county and a racial moderate with political experience and competence. A third, independent, candidate was City Con-

⁵⁰ Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The 1966 Elections: A Political Patchwork* (New York: The American Jewish Committee, April 1967), 26 pp. (Processed.) Much of the following section is drawn from this study.

⁵¹ Robert D. Loevy, *Computer Analysis of 1966 Democratic Gubernatorial Primary in Baltimore City and Baltimore County* (Maryland: Field Politics Center, Goucher College, October 3, 1966), 3 pp. (Processed.)

troller Hyman C. Pressman, a racial liberal. The gubernatorial race brought out over 913,000 voters, a record for a nonpresidential year. Agnew won with 49 per cent of the vote; Mahoney drew about 41 per cent, and Pressman about 10 per cent.

Mahoney's support came from two types of backlash voters. One consisted predominantly of white working-class voters in and around Baltimore, overwhelmingly native-stock Southern migrants, Poles, Italians, and Irish, poorly educated, with incomes in the low-middle range. The second group was made up of white voters in Maryland's southern and Eastern Shore counties. These counties had given Wallace substantial majorities (69 to 82 per cent) in 1964. Now they voted for Mahoney, but not quite so heavily as they had for Wallace. The fall-off was most marked in the Eastern Shore counties which were solidly Fundamentalist and anti-Catholic. Thus, Roman Catholic Mahoney himself became a victim of sub-backlash from the back-lashers. In the southern counties, however, two of which were predominantly Catholic, the vote for Mahoney remained solid.

Other normally Democratic voters, including Jews, Negroes, middle- and upper-middle-income white Protestants, government officials, and professionals, voted overwhelmingly for Agnew. Montgomery county (suburban Washington), normally narrowly Republican, gave Agnew over 70 per cent of its vote. In 24 predominantly Jewish precincts, 46 per cent voted for Agnew, 23 per cent for Mahoney, and 31 per cent for Pressman. Some Jews no doubt voted for Pressman because he was a Jew, but Pressman probably benefited from the votes of Democrats who could not bring themselves to vote for Mahoney, but for whom voting Republican would have been equally traumatic. They solved their dilemma by voting for Pressman.

In 19 of 26 contests for House seats where backlash had been predicted, the more liberal candidates on civil rights were elected, though in some cases with diminished margins. The impotence of backlash as the decisive factor was particularly evident in four Chicago congressional races, mainly in working-class districts where civil-rights marches and violence had occurred and which were sensitive to backlash. In these districts the four liberal Democratic incumbents were reelected, three of them by a large margin. All had voted for the 1966 civil-rights bill, with its open-housing provisions. In the 3rd C.D., Democrat William T. Murphy defeated Albert F. Manion, with 52 per cent of the vote. In the 6th C.D., Democrat Daniel J. Ronan defeated Samuel A. Decaro, with 57 per cent of the vote. In the 8th C.D., Democrat Daniel D. Rostenkowski defeated John H. Leszynski, with 60 per cent of the vote. In the 11th C.D., Democrat Roman G. Pucinski squeaked by with less than a 4,000-vote plurality over Chicago's most indefatigable backlasher, John J. Hoellen, who had inherited his aldermanic seat from his father and, for 19 years, had been the "vigilante alderman."

It could not be stated categorically that backlash accounted for the defeat of other liberal candidates. In most contests, party loyalty, economic interest, and voting traditions were more persuasive factors than racial bias. This was

especially apparent in the contest for the House seat in the 6th congressional district in Wisconsin's dairyland territory. The Republican candidate William A. Steiger, a state assemblyman for six years and a racial liberal, had been co-author of Wisconsin's 1965 fair-housing law. The Democrat, incumbent John A. Race, had barely won the 6th C.D.'s House seat in the 1964 anti-Goldwater landslide, with 50.7 per cent of the vote. That was the first time since the 1930's that the district had sent a Democrat to Congress. In his eagerness to build up voter support, Race began to vote against the policies and programs of the man on whose coattails he had been elected. He voted against foreign aid, and was the only congressman in the Wisconsin delegation (6 Democrats and 5 Republicans) to vote against the 1966 civil-rights bill. The 6th C.D., with only about 100 Negroes, had been one of three that had given Wallace substantial support in the 1964 primary. Presumably counting on that backlash vote, Race used the slogan popularized by Mahoney in Maryland, "A man's home is his castle." But Steiger won the election, with 52.4 per cent of the vote and a plurality of about 7,000. Party loyalty reasserted itself in the 6th C.D. and that, along with class interest, was more decisive than the racial issue in determining the outcome of the election.

Attention had focused also on the referendum in New York City to abolish civilian review of the police. The campaign reflected tensions between Negroes and police and also the widespread concern among all New Yorkers about crime and the need for greater police protection. A survey conducted in August among New York Negroes found that the 1,200 respondents were concerned more about police protection than about police brutality.⁵² But the campaign, as conducted by the proponents of civilian review, turned it into an issue of symbolic significance to the Negroes, while the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association conducted an emotional campaign around the issue of crime in the streets and confidence in the police. Thus, both sides contributed to the polarization of attitudes which seemed to pit the Negroes against the police and, hence, against law and order. The results were disastrous for supporters of civilian review: 63 per cent of the voters favored abolishing the civilian-review board.

About six weeks before the election, a public-opinion poll was conducted for Federated Associations for Impartial Review (FAIR), the organization campaigning for civilian review. That poll showed that two-thirds of the respondents thought safety in the streets a most important city problem, while only a little over one-third thought the civilian-review board a most important problem. Only the Irish among the various ethnic, religious, and racial groups thought that the civilian-review-board issue was *the* most important issue. They listed safety in the streets as second most important. But most Italians, Puerto Ricans, Jews, and Negroes uniformly cited safety in the streets as the most important city problem. Out of nine issues, civilian

⁵² Robert B. Semple, Jr., "Negroes in Poll Ask More Police," *New York Times*, September 4, 1966.

review was rated fourth by the Italians, fifth by the Puerto Ricans, and sixth by both Jews and Negroes. The Irish, then, perceived civilian review of the police as a most threatening issue. After all, most policemen are Irish and the Irish in America have had long and intimate associations with both police and politics. These, they felt, were now endangered.

Civilian review had been introduced and was being vigorously defended by a reform Republican mayor who had upset the traditional political arrangements in New York. John V. Lindsay was not merely Republican, but also Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. This mayor had challenged the historic Irish Catholic hegemony in New York City's police department. On the issue of civilian review, he forced out Police Commissioner Vincent L. Broderick. Then, the new Police Commissioner Howard B. Leary, shortly after taking office, promoted Sanford D. Garelik, a Jew, to chief inspector of the police department and Lloyd G. Sealy, a Negro, to assistant chief inspector, giving rise to accusations that the promotions were directed by City Hall. The Irish began to feel beleaguered.

While less than 10 per cent of all respondents perceived the civilian-review board as an instrument "to protect or satisfy minority groups," 22 per cent of the Irish perceived that as the board's purpose. Eighty-six per cent of the Irish respondents said they would vote against the civilian-review board, as compared with 72 per cent of the Italians, 50 per cent of the Jews, 30 per cent of the Puerto Ricans, and 10 per cent of the Negroes.

The actual vote generally bore out the poll's findings. German, Irish, and Italian voters voted heavily to abolish the civilian-review board. Jewish voters split. The more affluent, more educated, and younger Jews tended to vote on principle (or ideology), and supported civilian review. The poorer, older, and less educated voted against—they wanted more police protection. The civilian-review board lost by considerably smaller margins in districts with large numbers of Jews than in densely Irish, German, or Italian districts.⁵³ There was a correlation between a high vote to abolish the civilian-review board and a high vote for the Conservative party (mostly German and Irish voters). Similarly, a low vote against civilian review was often paired with a high vote for the Liberal party (mostly Jewish voters). Major-party affiliations, however, had no bearing on how people voted.

INTERRELIGIOUS TENSIONS ON CHURCH-STATE ISSUES

Efforts at mutual understanding between Catholics and Jews, growing out of Vatican Council II, were often canceled by Catholic-Jewish tensions over questions of church and state. These were particularly rancorous in the conflict over federal and state aid to sectarian nonpublic schools. Protestants were divided among themselves denominationally and on issues. Some liberal

⁵³ See also Milton Himmelfarb, "Are Jews Still Liberals?" *Commentary*, April 1967, pp. 67-72.

Protestant church groups favored federal aid and opposed prayer in the schools, while conservative (Fundamentalist) groups adamantly opposed federal aid to parochial schools and vigorously argued for prayer and Bible reading in public schools. Within the Jewish community, the most bitter divisions were between Orthodox organizations ranged in favor of federal aid, and nearly all other Jewish organizations who opposed it. An off-the-record church-state conference, convened by the joint advisory committee of the Synagogue Council of America and the National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), reinforced that division. The proceedings revealed deep divisions between Orthodox and non-Orthodox and angry suspicion on the part of the secularists and non-Orthodox that the Orthodox, in insisting on their need for federal funds to support their institutions, were intent on robbing the public treasury.

The strongest Jewish criticism of the Jewish separationist position was made by Milton Himmelfarb in *Commentary* and aroused critical comment from separationists.⁵⁴ Himmelfarb provided his own summary of his views: "It is not true that freedom is most secure where church and state are separated; separation and separationism are not the same; even in America, separationism is potentially tyrannical; separationism needlessly repels some from the democratic consensus; it is harsh to those who prefer nonpublic schools for conscience' sake; and it stands in the way of a more important good (and a more important safeguard of Jewish security), the best possible education for all."

Federal Aid to Education

Separationists, who had given only reluctant support to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965 because of its provisions for federal aid to children attending nonpublic schools (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 133-141), in 1966 viewed all such aid with the utmost suspicion. They believed that such aid was given at the expense of children in public schools. In fact, according to an early report of the Office of Education's accomplishments in distributing grants, only seven per cent of the children receiving such aid were in sectarian nonpublic schools, though these schools accounted for 15 per cent of the total school population.⁵⁵ (Reliable statistics about the proportion of nonpublic-school pupils receiving federal aid were generally unavailable.)

Representatives of the National Council of Churches and of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs met with U.S. Commissioner of Education Howe in April to ask for firmer federal guidelines and regulations regarding funds allocated for pupils in sectarian nonpublic schools. The AJCongress, ACLU, and Protestants and Other Americans United for the

⁵⁴ "Church and State: How High a Wall?" *Commentary*, July 1966, pp. 23-29. See also Ivan Shapiro and Milton Himmelfarb, "Controversy: Church & State," *loc. cit.*, December, 1966, pp. 79-89.

⁵⁵ Jonathan Spivak, "Education's Challenge," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 19, 1966.

Separation of Church and State (POAU) continued their unyielding opposition to any form of aid to pupils in these schools. Leo Pfeffer, special counsel of the AJCongress, testifying before the education subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, April 19, charged there was "grave reason to fear" that federal aid was being used "to finance a private and parochial school system paralleling the American public school system." The aggressive attacks of these three organizations against all forms of aid to parochial-school children earned them the opprobrium of both Catholic and Orthodox Jewish groups. Father Virgil C. Blum, professor of political science at Marquette University, described AJCongress, ACLU, and POAU as "doctrinaire separationists" who were "carrying forward the crusade of the 19th-century Nativists and Know-Nothings."⁵⁶

Tensions over the distribution of federal funds to nonpublic sectarian schools were particularly abrasive in New York. The Board of Education was subjected for several months to intense pressure about a proposed allocation of \$65 million in federal funds under Title I of ESEA. About \$15 million had originally been earmarked for 213 nonpublic sectarian schools, mostly Catholic, but including also fifty or more Jewish day schools and some Greek Orthodox, Lutheran, and Episcopalian schools. After months of haggling, the Board of Education approved the program on August 31, with criteria that restricted aid to the nonpublic-school pupils more than originally planned and with considerably reduced allocations to them. As a consequence, both the opponents and supporters of federal aid to nonpublic-school pupils were dissatisfied.

On June 13 the POAU chapter in Dayton, Ohio, filed suit in the U.S. District Court, aimed at declaring unconstitutional ESEA's Title II (provision of books and library materials to nonpublic-school pupils). On November 14 a group of taxpayers, sponsored by POAU, filed suit in Philadelphia, attacking Title I's provisions of aid to nonpublic-school pupils.

On December 1 Leo Pfeffer, on behalf of the AJCongress, the New York CLU, the United Parents Associations, and the United Federation of Teachers, filed two suits in New York state and federal courts. One charged that ESEA's aid to pupils in sectarian nonpublic schools was unconstitutional. The other charged that New York City public-school officials, in administering programs under ESEA, discriminated in favor of nonpublic-school pupils. Both suits provoked angry statements from Orthodox Jewish organizations and an announcement that they would defend the education program against these suits. Rabbi Morris Scherer, director of Agudath Israel of America, charged that the AJCongress was damaging Jewish interests and that its court action would "serve as grist for the mills of those elements who would defame the Jewish people by characterizing it as a nonreligious secularist group."

A bill to permit judicial review of nine specifically designated acts pro-

⁵⁶ Virgil C. Blum, "This Heartless Business," *America*, September 10, 1966, pp. 247-249.

viding federal funds to sectarian institutions was passed by the Senate by voice vote on July 29, but died in the House judiciary committee. Its chairman, Rep. Emanuel Celler (Dem., N.Y.) had long opposed such a measure on the ground that, under existing law, public agencies could obtain a Supreme Court test on the constitutionality of these laws. The AJCommittee, AJCongress, and many other Jewish organizations favored judicial review and submitted statements to that effect during the Senate hearings. The National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs (COLPA), representing the interests of Orthodox Jewish organizations, submitted a statement opposing judicial review.

State Aid

Early in 1966 the school board of East Greenbush, N.Y., filed suit in the State Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the New York State Textbook Loan Law of 1965, to go into effect September 1, 1966. Under that law, school boards were required to supply nonpublic-school pupils in grades 7 to 12 with textbooks requested from a list of approved public-school textbooks. The school boards were to be reimbursed by the state up to \$10 per pupil. (After that suit had been filed, the New York State legislature, on May 18, passed a bill providing an increase in the state's reimbursement to school boards to \$25 for each pupil's first year in school and \$10 for each year thereafter. Under pressure from the bill's separationist opponents and then from its supporters, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller, on June 27, prevailed upon the legislature to amend the bill to provide a maximum state reimbursement of \$15 per pupil for the first three years in school and \$10 thereafter.)

On August 19 New York State Supreme Court Justice T. Paul Kane, ruling on the East Greenbush suit, declared the textbook-loan law unconstitutional and "in violation of both the establishment clause and the free-exercise clause." The following week Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz appealed the decision to the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court. The state meanwhile received a stay on the court's restraining order to carry out the law. On September 1 New York State school districts were informed they could receive funds under the law; two weeks later, the New York City Board of Education announced that it would purchase textbooks for parochial-school pupils under the law, at an estimated cost of \$2,250,000.

Amicus curiae briefs in support of the state's appeal were filed by the Agudath Israel of America and COLPA. On December 31 all five justices of the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court declared the Textbook Loan Law constitutional. Because they held that the plaintiffs had no standing to bring suit, three justices did not base their decision upon constitutional arguments, though they said they believed the law was constitutional. The other two justices supported the law's constitutionality primarily on the basis of the child-benefit theory: "The availability of books to students at nonsecular schools is little different from the availability of books in the

public library, which are loaned to individuals, regardless of race, color or creed."

Public-bus transportation for parochial-school pupils was at issue in several states. On January 20 the New York State Supreme Court expanded the public-school district's obligation to provide transportation to pupils in parochial schools, even outside their own school district. In March four organizations (Jewish, Unitarian, Baptist, and Presbyterian) filed suit, contending that the 1965 Pennsylvania School Bus law was unconstitutional in its provision of service to parochial-school pupils. On February 2 Delaware Governor Charles L. Terry vetoed a bill that would have provided transportation for parochial- and private-school pupils who lived along established bus routes. He based himself upon a State Supreme Court advisory opinion that the law would violate the state constitution. In a Nebraska statewide referendum, November 8, a bill proposing local options for the public transportation of nonpublic-school pupils was defeated 250,000 to 190,000. The campaign was marked by crude anti-Catholic propaganda including a cartoon of the Pope driving a bus.

Prayer in the Schools

Except for the Bible-belt Southern states, most schools were complying with the Supreme Court rulings forbidding Bible reading and prayer in the public schools. On September 13 Oklahoma's State Attorney General Charles Nesbitt ruled that the continuing Bible reading and prayer in Oklahoma City's public schools were unconstitutional. (He added that he personally did not agree with the Supreme Court decisions.) His ruling did not appreciably affect school boards in Oklahoma City, Tulsa, and elsewhere in the state, which continued their practices of school prayer and Bible reading.

On September 21 the Senate failed to provide the necessary two-thirds majority to pass Senator Everett M. Dirksen's (Rep., Ill.) constitutional amendment to permit prayer in the public school.

Higher Education

On June 2 the Maryland Court of Appeals handed down a ruling on the constitutionality of state grants of \$2.5 million to four church-related colleges, two Catholic, one Methodist, and one United Church of Christ. In 1965 a lower court had upheld the grants as constitutional (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 142). The Court of Appeals, in 4-3 decision, held that the grants to the Catholic and Methodist colleges were invalid because of the schools' pervasively sectarian character. The grant to Hood College (United Church of Christ) was ruled constitutional: "We are unable to say that the college is sectarian in a legal sense under the First Amendment, or to a degree that renders the grant invalid." State Attorney General Thomas B. Finan then appealed the case to the Supreme Court. But, on November 14, the Supreme Court declined to review the case, leaving in effect the Court of

Appeals ruling that public grants to sectarian colleges, even for nonreligious purposes, were unconstitutional. The next day the legislative specialist of the U.S. Office of Education said that the Supreme Court's refusal to review the Maryland case did not affect federal-aid programs to church-affiliated colleges and universities and that such programs would continue as before. The Maryland case involved only Maryland law, he ruled, and the federal government had not been a party to the litigation.

In July Michigan Governor George Romney signed a law designed to equalize tuition costs for students at private and public colleges. Sponsored by the predominantly Catholic Citizens for Educational Freedom and endorsed by the state Board of Education as well as the state's Protestant and Catholic colleges, the law provided tuition grants of \$100 to \$500 a year, based on need. Opponents of the law had included the Michigan and Detroit Council of Churches, various Protestant groups, JWV, and ACLU.

Sabbath Observance

On March 28 a Jewish employee of New York City's Department of Welfare since 1938 brought suit in the State Supreme Court against the city, challenging the scheduling of civil-service examinations on Saturday. He complained that, as an Orthodox Jew, he had unfairly been denied promotion because he was unable to take the examinations on the Sabbath. On May 11 Justice Samuel J. Silverman dismissed the case on the grounds that the city authorities had not violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the petitioner.

The state legislature, on May 22, enacted a law providing that Sabbath observers be permitted to take civil-service examinations scheduled for the Sabbath or a religious holiday on some other, mutually convenient, day.

The federal Equal Opportunity Commission issued, in June, guidelines on Sabbath observance, declaring that it was not religious discrimination for an employer to require his employees to work on Saturday. This ruling was issued in response to about 70 complaints received by the commission during the first year of its operation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In August a delegation from the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada met with Dr. Luther Holcomb, chairman of the commission, requesting him to revise the guidelines in such a way that Sabbath observers might be enabled to adhere to their day of rest without being dismissed from their jobs.

LUCY S. DAWIDOWICZ

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, in 1966, prospects of Arab unity once again dwindled, as conflicting national interests reasserted themselves.

The increasing division of the Arab world into opposing camps presented the United States government with a difficult dilemma: If it maintained its traditional policy of nonintervention in local disputes, it ran the risk of having friendly regimes overthrown and important American interests jeopardized. If, on the other hand, it gave them the needed military and diplomatic support, it ran the risk of becoming identified with one side, a situation that would have exacerbated local and great power rivalries and thus furthered the very polarization that it had striven to avoid. The pressure of events forced the United States to take a more active role than it may have desired.

Revolution vs. Tradition in the Arab World

At the beginning of the year King Faisal of Saudi Arabia embarked on a personal diplomatic offensive, visiting the Middle East and North Africa, from Morocco to Pakistan and from Turkey to the Sudan, in an effort to promote a vague and loosely structured Islamic alignment as a counterweight to the Egyptian-centered Arab League. He found varying degrees of support and common interest among the more conservative, pro-Western states, such as Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, and Tunisia. These shared Saudi Arabia's concern over President Gamal Abdel Nasser's regional ambitions and his heavy dependence on Soviet arms and political support.

Nasser quickly responded by branding Faisal a tool of reactionary elements and an agent of Western imperialism which, he charged, was using the Islamic coalition to block the path of revolutionary Arab socialist regimes. He declared, in February, that "progressive forces must increasingly unite and be vigilant" in order to counteract the reactionary alignments in the Arab world and beyond.

The break became even sharper when Nasser, on June 15, announced the end of the policy of peaceful coexistence among all Arab states irrespective of ideology, a policy he had championed since early 1964 when he convened the first of a series of Arab summit conferences to coordinate Arab policy against Israel. He had now become convinced, he said, that the "progressive forces," among which he usually counted the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Algeria, Syria, and Iraq, could no longer march together with "Arab reactionary elements" (an obvious allusion to Jordan and Saudi Arabia), "even if the road leads to the liberation of Palestine." Nasser regarded the reactionaries as "a danger even greater than Israel itself," and stressed the need to "liquidate Arab reaction, Arab reactionary regimes and reactionary lead-

ers" before Palestine could be liberated. Subsequently, the 1966 Arab summit erupted into a heated dispute, fanned by Cairo and Damascus propaganda and countercharges by Riyadh and Amman, in which Nasser was accused of subservience to Soviet Communist policy and abandoning the struggle against Israel.

South Arabia—New Focus of Middle East Rivalry

While Nasser's hostility to Israel in no way diminished, his preoccupations multiplied in 1966. The British decision to cut its commitments east of Suez and to withdraw from Aden in 1968 had greatly raised the stakes in the stalemated civil war in neighboring Yemen. In an August 1965 agreement with Saudi Arabia, Nasser had promised to withdraw his troops (reported to number 50,000), which were keeping in power an Egyptian-picked Republican regime. But in March 1966 Nasser reversed himself and announced that he would not do so "until the Yemeni revolution is able to defend itself against the conspiracies of imperialism and reaction," and declared his readiness to stay in Yemen for five and even twenty more years, if necessary. (What he did not announce was that he intended to defend Yemen not only against the Royalist faction supported by Saudi Arabia, but also against prominent Yemeni Republican leaders who had become disillusioned with Egyptian domination and who found themselves placed under house arrest when they came to Cairo in September to plead for greater independence.)

The international scramble to fill the vacuum being left by Britain's disengagement in Aden intensified in 1966. A look at the map reveals the reasons. Strategically placed, Aden controls the southern exit from the Red Sea and thus the passage to East Africa, India, and the Far East. Moreover, Aden, as well as the South Arabian Federation of sultanates and sheikhdoms with which it is being united, border on both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. A firm foothold in Yemen and Aden could serve as a useful base for extending influence and eventual control to the oil-rich regions of the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The Cairo-backed Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen increased three-fold its terrorist campaign in Aden, and toward the end of the year a series of explosions, for which Saudi officials held pro-Nasserist Yemeni infiltrators responsible, occurred within Saudi Arabia itself, in Jidda, Riyadh, and along the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) pipeline.

The great powers did not remain indifferent. The removal of Western bases from the strategic Middle East had long been a basic aim of Moscow's policy, and Nasser's decision to remain in Yemen was widely rumored to have been reached with Soviet approval. Massive shipments of modern Russian arms into Egypt continued, and Moscow joined Cairo in condemning Faisal's diplomatic initiative as a new version of the unsuccessful Baghdad Pact, engineered by Washington and London.

For its part, the United States on several occasions reaffirmed its opposi-

tion to the use of force, or the threat of force, to change the *status quo* in the Middle East. The American commitment to the preservation of Saudi Arabia's independence and her territorial integrity was dramatized by the official state visit of King Faisal to the United States in June. It was given concrete expression by the start of delivery in 1966 of U.S.-Hawk anti-aircraft missiles (together with British Lightning and Hunter fighter planes) in a \$400 million Saudi air defense system. The United States also agreed, in September, to sell Saudi Arabia \$100 million in armored personnel carriers, trucks, and other vehicles for the modernization of the Saudi army. (The extent of international rivalry for influence in southern Arabia is also indicated by the competition in providing aid and "advisors" in Yemen. The Soviet Union has built a hospital, a school, an airfield and a port; the United States has built roads and installed waterworks; Communist China has built a textile factory and some roads, and East Germany and India have furnished telecommunications and water-pumping equipment.)

The polarization of the Arab world was increased by the February military coup in Syria, which brought into power the most leftist elements of the army and the Ba'ath party. The new regime, which accused ousted President Amin Hafez of having abandoned socialism and watering down the earlier nationalization decrees, was Marxist in ideology and almost Maoist in its doctrinaire style and militant fervor. It received substantial military aid and diplomatic support from the Soviet Union.

Syria's relations with Egypt had been strained since the dissolution of the United Arab Republic in 1961, and relations with Iraq (which was still pre-occupied with the Kurdish rebellion) and with Jordan were hardly better. The Soviet Union was eager to help Syria break out of its isolation, and Nasser was looking for allies to bolster the revolutionary camp. Accordingly, during Syrian Premier Yussuf Zu'ayen's visit to Moscow, in April, and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's journey to Cairo, in May, Kosygin worked to bring about a reconciliation which culminated in November in an Egyptian-Syrian mutual defense pact. While some observers feared that Syria would move Egypt to adopt a more militantly anti-Israel posture, others saw in this agreement less of a commitment by Nasser to aid Syria, than an attempt to restrain the hotheads in Damascus from prematurely embroiling the Arab world in a clash with Israel.

There was also some evidence that the Soviet Union, while continuing to denounce the policies of Israel, was not prepared to support the extreme Arab demands for its liquidation. Soviet opposition to any renewal of hostilities in the Middle East was emphasized in a communiqué issued on December 27 at the conclusion of Premier Kosygin's visit to Turkey.

Anti-Israel Terrorist Activities

Nasser's indefinite postponement of the war against Israel brought no decline in Arab-Israel tension. On the contrary, the Arab states' realization that

they were not ready to attack Israel led to an intensification of terrorist activities by paramilitary guerrilla bands. While disclaiming official responsibility for these activities, Syria espoused the doctrine of a people's war and gave aid and support to various Palestinian Arab terrorist bands, the most active of which was al-Fatah. Meanwhile, the United Arab Republic continued to support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) of Ahmed Shukairy, although the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza served as a buffer between his men and Israel.

The other "revolutionary" Arab states, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Republican Yemen, also gave varying degrees of support to the PLO. Indeed, one point they shared in common was a sympathy for "liberation" movements. Thus, in 1966, they all issued statements supporting the South Vietnamese Liberation Front (Vietcong) and condemning American policy in Vietnam. These were usually reciprocated by Communist Chinese and Vietcong statements of support for the Arabs' struggle against "Western imperialism" and for the "Palestine Arab liberation" movement. Egypt continued to be a major foreign diplomatic outpost for the Vietcong, and the Vietnamese Liberation Front, in October, increased to eight the staff of its political office in Cairo, headed by a member of the Vietcong Central Committee. Shukairy announced, in June, that members of his Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) would go to North Vietnam for guerrilla training and, in December, he stated that PLA trainees had returned from Communist China. Western journalists reported from Cairo that Communist China had been supplying Shukairy with light weapons under a 1965 agreement.

United States Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, in a June 1966 statement to the Jewish Press Association, confirmed the presence of "a militant type of Communist action in the Middle East, much of it directed from Peking," with which "Communist China seeks to infiltrate, to assist, to generate more trouble in the Palestine Liberation movement." The State Department, however, stated that it had no evidence Shukairy was receiving substantial Chinese support. The PLA also had some Soviet equipment, but it was not clear whether it was obtained directly from Moscow or from Nasser's stockpiles.

The PLO and Jordan

In the Arab world Shukairy found growing opposition from some of the more pro-Western Arab states. Tunisia continued publicly to disassociate itself from the "unrealistic" plans to destroy Israel. Although King Hussein of Jordan had originally welcomed the PLO and allowed it to establish headquarters in Jordanian Jerusalem, he and Shukairy soon clashed over PLO plans to impose its own taxes on Palestinians in Jordan and to set up a separate PLA among the refugees. Both Jordan and neighboring Lebanon refused to allow Shukairy to establish training camps or to recruit refugees.

In January Hussein attacked the PLO for its "treasonable" attempts to

undermine Jordanian unity. A pro-PLO demonstration in Jericho a few days later and the discovery of arms caches in Hebron and Jerusalem led to the arrest of some PLO supporters. Discussions, in March, between Shukairy and Hussein led to an agreement giving the PLO facilities and quasi-diplomatic status in Jordan. But the basic differences could not be resolved, and, in April, scores of PLO officials were arrested on charges of illegal activities.

In June King Hussein publicly denounced the PLO leaders and their Arab supporters for their "subservience to international communism." He ruled out cooperation with the PLO because of its attempts to destroy the unity of the Jordanian people "who constitute the majority of Palestinians." (Jordan has more Palestinian Arabs than all the other Arab states combined; two-thirds of its population is of Palestinian origin.) Shukairy replied in a Cairo radio broadcast, calling for the overthrow of the Jordanian government.

In October Hussein sent Nasser an official protest against PLO use of Egyptian territory to launch its attacks on Jordan. Following widespread anti-government demonstrations, triggered by an Israeli retaliatory raid and fanned by PLO agitators, King Hussein in November ordered the arrest of hundreds of suspected PLO followers and the seizure of PLO headquarters in Jerusalem and branches in other cities. Shukairy responded by announcing, at the end of December, that he was creating an underground revolutionary council whose membership and activities would be secret. He called for a virtual holy war against Hussein, the "tyrant of Amman who has betrayed God, the Prophet and Palestine."

The rapprochement with Egypt moved Syria to intensify its anti-Hussein stand. At a rally of Palestinians in Damascus in December, Syrian President Nureddin Attassi urged all "revolutionary forces in Jordan" to close ranks in the "decisive battle against the traitor king." He pledged support and "sufficient arms" to bring about "today the liberation of Jordan; tomorrow, the liberation of Palestine." Early in December King Hussein reported the capture of several Syrian infiltrators, identified as al-Fatah "stormtroopers," after clashes with Jordanian troops. At year's end explosions were set off near government buildings in Amman and Jerusalem, and three members of a Syrian army patrol were arrested. In an interview with *U.S. News and World Report* (December 26, 1966) King Hussein called the infiltration of Syrian commandos via Jordan into Israel "contrary to what was agreed on at Arab summit conferences," that the Arab states were to "prevent anyone from crossing into Israel at this stage." Hussein noted that, for some time, these activities were being directed against Jordan even more than against the Israelis. "We have captured shipments of arms coming into Jordanian territory," he said, "and people have crossed over the border to create trouble here to spread the idea of assassination . . . to create chaos wherever and whenever possible." As a result, Hussein warned, Soviet Communist influence was coming in "through the back door," and posing a "very serious threat to the future of Arabism." He claimed that Moscow had already achieved a position of substantial control over Egypt and Syria.

United States Military Aid

The United States announced in December the shipment of additional arms "to strengthen the defensive capability of the Jordanian armed forces" and to enable Jordan "to assure its security, and thus to contribute further to the stability of the area." The new arms reportedly consisted of \$5 million worth of armored trucks and related equipment to increase the army's strength and mobility along the borders with Israel and Syria. The State Department also let it be known that the United States would expedite the delivery of 36 supersonic F-104 fighter-bombers, which it had agreed to sell to Jordan in April, but which had not yet been shipped because of the exigencies of the Vietnam war. Shukairy denounced the United States for its continued support of Jordan.

In addition to the arms supplies to Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the United States in 1966 significantly increased its arms sales to Israel. State Department announcements during the year continued to repeat that the established United States policy was "to refrain from becoming a major supplier of arms" to Middle East countries. Exceptions were made, the Department explained in an official statement on February 5, only for "occasional, selective sales," which were deemed necessary to a state's defense and which "would not be a destabilizing factor." However, in response to developments in the Middle East and the reported overriding of State Department objections by the Pentagon and the White House, sufficient exceptions were made to transform the United States into an important, if not a major, supplier of arms to Israel and the pro-Western Arab states.

In January 1966 the shipment of American Patton tanks to Jordan and of Hawk missiles to Saudi Arabia, as well as the continued flow of Soviet arms to Egypt, evoked public demands by 75 congressmen and 21 major American Jewish organizations for American action to assure Israel's security. As a result, the State Department officially disclosed in February that the United States had, in fact, recently supplied Israel with various items of military equipment "to meet modernization requirements," including the same type Patton tanks furnished to Jordan in 1965. In response to the oft-repeated proposal that the United States seek to persuade the Soviet Union and the other arms suppliers to end the Middle East arms race, the Department revealed that the United States had, over the years, made "repeated quiet efforts" to limit arms buildups in the area. Until those efforts bore fruit, however, the United States could not be indifferent to "the potentially destabilizing effect of massive Soviet sales of arms to the area."

The State Department announcement was welcomed in Israel and denounced by the Arab League in Cairo. Egypt's anger was also aroused by a similarly worded statement, in April, announcing the supply of jets to Jordan, in accordance with "our policy of preventing instability developing" in the Middle East and of maintaining an arms balance. An editorial in the authoritative Egyptian newspaper *Al Ahram* expressed "surprise and resentment"

at the American action. Cairo was most offended by United States expression of continued regret at "the massive Soviet sales of arms to certain countries of the Near East which have intensified the arms race in that area"—an obvious allusion to Egypt. *Al Ahram* also took umbrage at the implication that the United States was concerned with "the arms balance between the UAR and Jordan." The United States-Jordan transaction marked the failure of Cairo's efforts to convince Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon to switch to Soviet arms, ostensibly in order to unify all Arab weapons systems. (Lebanon had just purchased French Mirage jet fighters.)

In mid-May it was revealed that the United States had also agreed to sell Israel some "tactical" jet bombers, of the kind given to Jordan, to serve as a deterrent to the numerically superior air power of the Arab states. The State Department had urged that the transaction be kept secret, and reluctantly acceded to Israel's request to make the sale known when Premier Eshkol's government came under opposition fire for not reacting to the American arms shipments to Israel's Arab neighbors. While Israel hailed the agreement as "a positive step towards the maintenance of stability in the Near East," the Arab states, joined by the Soviet press, attacked it as an American attempt to drive a wedge between the Arab states. Military observers called the transaction a significant departure from past American practice of providing Israel only with strictly defensive missiles, and indicated Washington's acceptance of the view that Israel needed bombers capable of striking at Arab bases and other distant targets to deter the Arabs from launching a sneak air attack. Other sources emphasized that the agreement was proof of America's firm intention to take concrete measures to assure Israel's security.

United States Reaffirms Commitment to Israel

The American concern for Israel's welfare was further demonstrated by the cordial reception President Zalman Shazar received in Washington in August on what the State Department termed a "private and informal visit" at the conclusion of his Latin American tour. President Johnson, however, received him with virtually all the pomp and circumstance of a formal state visit. At a White House state dinner on August 2, Mr. Johnson, in a toast, recalled the American commitment to Middle East peace made by the late President John F. Kennedy on May 8, 1963 "as a declaration of the leader of this country and as a spokesman for this land." Quoting Kennedy's words, "We strongly support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. . . . We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East," President Johnson added: "We subscribe to that policy."

An Israeli retaliatory raid into Jordan in November provoked American condemnation, but only briefly clouded the amicable relations. In December Vice President Humphrey noted "the great potential for conflict in the Middle East," and again emphasized United States commitment to oppose aggression which could threaten Middle East peace and to secure "the integrity of Israel as an independent state."

In the nonpolitical field, the close ties between Israel and the United States were strengthened by the announcement, in January 1966 at Independence, Mo., of a \$4.1 million Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace, to be built in Jerusalem with American private contributions; the dedication on July 4 of a striking monument to President Kennedy atop a hill in the outskirts of Jerusalem in the center of the Kennedy Peace Forest, and the announcement, in November, by Jacob Blaustein that he was donating \$500,000 for the construction of a Center for American Studies at the University in Jerusalem, which will accommodate 1,500 students and house a specialized library, document archives, and audio-visual facilities (p. 427).

United States Aid to Israel

However, Israel officials found it increasingly difficult to convince the United States government that Israel still required economic aid. During their visits to the United States, Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Finance Minister Phineas Sappir pointed out that Israel's extraordinarily heavy defense burdens and unabsorbed immigrant population made such aid necessary. In December 1965 Sappir had presented to Washington requests for a \$39 million loan for development of industry, communications, and electrical power, and for \$70 million in surplus foods to be delivered over the next two years. The previous food-aid agreement had expired on June 30, 1965, as had a similar but larger-scale United States agreement with the UAR (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 262).

After lengthy negotiations, two new Food for Peace agreements were concluded in Washington in June to provide Israel with \$32 million worth of agricultural commodities during the year. Under one agreement Israel was to pay \$23.5 million in her own currency for feedgrains, wheat, cottonseed, and soybean oil. Seventy per cent of the Israel currency generated from the sale was to be used for approved social and economic development projects in Israel; 25 per cent by the United States government for its expenses, and the remaining 5 per cent for loans to private American and Israeli firms. The other agreement provided for the purchase on long-term credit of \$8.5 million worth of feedgrains to be paid for in dollars. In addition, Israel has been buying annually an average of \$50 million worth of food from private sources in the United States. As Israel's government-directed "moderation" of the inflationary economic boom began to boomerang into a recession, Sappir said, in September, that he would try to convince the United States to sell more food to Israel for local currency because the dollar cost "has now become a heavy burden on Israel's foreign currency balance." On September 29, at a Washington dinner, Sappir received pledges of \$336,000 for Capital for Israel, Inc., a new holding corporation seeking to attract \$20 million in private United States investments. In May Israel completed repayment of its first independence bond issue.

A request for allocation of I£3 million (\$1 million) from United States counterpart funds in Israel for the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem was at

first denied by the United States government. The appropriation was later included, with bi-partisan congressional support, in the foreign aid act after testimony in the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Mrs. Mortimer Jacobson, Hadassah's national president.

Israel was granted a \$10 million United States development loan in May, and in November President Johnson announced that \$6 million of a previous AID development loan had been earmarked for expansion of electric power facilities in Tel Aviv. Discussions continued during the year on the proposed \$200 million nuclear-fueled desalination and electric power plant in Israel. However, in view of unresolved economic and political questions, no firm agreement was reached.

Aid to the United Arab Republic

President Johnson opened the way for resumption of United States aid to Egypt when he informed Secretary of State Rusk, on December 29, 1965, that "I hereby determine that it is essential to the national interest of the United States to finance export sales of surplus agricultural commodities to the United Arab Republic." An irate Congress had earlier barred all aid to Egypt unless the President specifically made such a determination.

In January 1966 an agreement was signed in Cairo under which the United States was to provide Egypt with \$55 million of surplus wheat, cooking oil, tobacco, and frozen chickens. The terms were somewhat stiffer than earlier agreements. One-fourth of this amount, \$13.75 million for wheat, was to be repaid in dollars over a period of 20 years at a low 2½ per cent interest. The remainder was to be paid in Egyptian currency, with 75 per cent of United States counterpart funds to be used for mutually acceptable development projects in Egypt. These terms were similar to those in the subsequent agreement with Israel, but the agreement with Israel was for a whole year while that with the UAR was limited to six months.

In addition to the usual provisions of aid agreements, requiring that the commodities be used for domestic consumption and forbidding the export of these or like commodities to "nations unfriendly to the United States," the United States also set the special condition that the total cotton acreage planted in the UAR in the coming year would not be higher than "the present acreage." This was interpreted as an indirect effort by the United States government to help curb the arms race, since President Nasser in recent years had been increasing his cotton acreage to pay for the more than \$1 billion in Soviet arms shipments. One of the major Congressional arguments against aid for Egypt was that American wheat enabled Egypt to use its land to grow cotton for Russian arms instead of food for its own people. An editorial in *Al Ahram* acknowledged that six of every ten loaves of bread eaten in Egypt were made of American wheat.

In response to Representative Leonard Farbstein's (Dem., N.Y.) protest against the resumption of aid to Egypt, Assistant Secretary of State Douglas MacArthur II wrote on February 1 that the administration had acted be-

cause of the improvement in relations with the UAR; Egypt's "increasing attention to internal problems of economic and social development," and the "constructive and helpful role the UAR has played in several current international issues"—apparently a reference to Cairo's unsuccessful efforts to intercede with North Vietnam for the release of American prisoners.

In February the United States turned over to Egypt the second half of its \$12 million contribution to the fund for saving the Temple of Abu Simbel. In September a \$40 million electric power plant, which doubled the energy available to Cairo, was inaugurated. The plant, the largest American industrial aid project in Egypt, had been authorized by President Kennedy under a 40-year loan with interest at only $\frac{3}{4}$ of 1 per cent. Another symbol of improving relations was the official visit to Washington in February of Anwar Sadat, speaker of the Egyptian national assembly and one of the group of army officers who overthrew King Farouk in 1952. Sadat was the first member of President Nasser's inner circle to visit Washington.

However, the era of good relations did not last. The very day Sadat arrived in Washington, Nasser lashed out at the United States for its support of Israel and his "reactionary" Arab enemies, condemned American policy in Vietnam, and announced his determination to stay in Yemen. The domestic economic reform measures, cited by Secretary MacArthur, soon proved disappointing. Premier Zakariya Mohieddine was hampered in his efforts to reform the Egyptian economy through austerity measures, cutting of the bureaucracy, and shifting the emphasis from prestigious but unproductive industrial projects to expansion of agriculture on a scientific basis. Mohieddine was also opposed by the doctrinaire Socialists in the Nasser regime for trying to encourage Western private investment in the newly discovered oil deposits and in a free trade zone at Port Said. In part to offset concessions granted to two American firms—Pan-American Oil (a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana) and Phillips Petroleum Company—the UAR in February concluded a technical agreement with the Soviet Union to help the Egyptian government-owned General Petroleum Corporation search for oil. This agreement was used to block the bids for oil rights submitted by other Western firms.

An urgent request by the Egyptian government in the spring for a \$70 million loan from the International Monetary Fund was rejected in August because of Cairo's failure to undertake recommended economic measures, including the devaluation of the Egyptian pound and a sharp cut in inflationary government deficit spending. A team of Russian economists gave Nasser much the same advice in October. The Fund was also concerned over the continuing economic drain of the Yemen war, conservatively estimated to cost more than \$40 million annually, as well as the expenditure of roughly \$650 million a year for military and security services.

For these and other reasons, Washington also refused to act on Nasser's request for \$150 million in additional surplus food after the January agreement ran out. The ouster in September of Premier Mohieddine and his team

of experienced economic advisors; the appointment of the more leftist Mohammed Sidky Solaiman as premier, and the inclusion of additional army officers in the cabinet, were interpreted in the West as signs that Nasser was again turning to more centralized control of the economy and the adoption of other policies unfavorable to foreign investment.

Another complicating factor was the change in the United States foreign-aid legislation introduced in 1966, barring United States wheat to countries trading with North Vietnam. Egypt had exported a small quantity of cotton to North Vietnam during 1966.

In addition to the wheat it received from the United States under the January aid agreement, the UAR during 1966 imported \$58 million from American commercial sources, for which it has to pay dollars within three years, and from Western European suppliers. But by the end of the year, Egypt's foreign exchange shortage had become so acute that it had to sell one-third of its dwindling gold reserves and defaulted on payments due on its loans to foreign creditors, including the United States and the International Monetary Fund.

United States Revises its Aid Policy

In December it was reported from Cairo that the Soviet Union, which had had a bumper crop of grain, had promised to provide wheat to Egypt which had almost depleted its stock. The United States did not move to match the Russian offer, as it would have done previously, because of a basic reappraisal of its approach to foreign food aid. The reasons were that doubts had been raised as to the value of aid as a means of political influence, and that a growing population and past aid shipments had virtually eaten up the American food stockpile. Accordingly, under the revised Food for Peace program, the United States placed major emphasis on encouraging underdeveloped countries to develop their own agriculture. At the same time, the United States prodded the other developed countries to join in providing technical assistance and supplying food aid. Moreover, Washington viewed the serious famine in India as a more urgent problem.

The new thinking was reflected in the overall drop in American aid to Israel and to 12 Arab states from \$402 million (of which \$267 million was surplus food) in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1965, to \$262 million (\$154 million in food) in the 1966 fiscal year. The only country continuing to receive large-scale grants in 1966 was Jordan, which got \$35.6 million in grants plus \$7.9 million in loans. Algeria received \$25.4 million and Morocco \$40.3 million, mostly in surplus commodities; Sudan received \$17.4 million and Tunisia \$18.9 million, mostly in development loans. Other Arab states received less than \$5 million each.

Jordan Water Dispute

One of the heralded creations of the Arab summit conferences of 1964

and 1965 was the Arab Authority for the Exploitation of the Jordan River and Its Tributaries, for the proclaimed purpose of diverting the sources of the Jordan before they could flow into Israel (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 254). With the widening split in the Arab world in 1966, the diversion authority lost much of its impetus, and probably much of its financial backing as well. General Ali Ali Amer, the Egyptian commander-in-chief of the Unified Arab Command (UAC), disclosed in Cairo that Arab League members had paid only 26 per cent of the 1966 budget for the UAC, which was created primarily for the military defense of the Arab diversion works against possible Israeli attack.

The individual riparian states continued their various diversion schemes. In May King Hussein laid the foundation stone for the Mukheiba Dam on the Yarmuk River, the principal tributary of the lower Jordan (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 256). In his dedication speech, Hussein appealed to the Arab states to bury their differences and cooperate "to eliminate the Zionist threat." The official reaction in Israel was that the dam's projected capacity (200 million cubic meters) was consistent with Jordan's allocation of Yarmuk water under the 1955 Johnston Plan (AJYB, 1955 [Vol. 56], p. 288; 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 256), and thus not in conflict with Israel's own national water carrier.

Israel was far less sanguine, however, regarding the diversion activities in Syria. Prime Minister Eshkol, on several occasions, reaffirmed Israel's willingness to adhere to its obligations under the Johnston Plan if the Arab states did likewise. In a radio broadcast on April 23, in an obvious reference to Israel's shelling of Syrian diversion works in 1965 (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 255), he noted that "with firmness and commendable efficacy, the Israel Defense Forces frustrated the beginning of a diversion plan" by neighboring states "aimed at robbing us of water due to us by virtue of elementary justice and international law."

On July 14, Israel air force jets, in an unusual daylight raid, penetrated 10 miles into Syria and attacked engineering installations, earth-moving equipment, and tractors near the north-eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, which Israel said were being used "to divert the Jordan tributaries." In the air action Israel planes shot down their first Syrian Mig-21. An Israel army spokesman explained that the attack was also in retaliation for 103 Syrian incidents of mining, sabotage, shootings, setting fire to fields, and damage to agricultural equipment, that had caused 16 casualties since February.

The Syrian daily *Al Thawra*, which reflects official thinking, charged that the attack was "part of an over-all imperialist conspiracy against the Syrian revolution." The government-controlled Egyptian press blamed the United States, arguing that U.S. bombing of North Vietnam had encouraged Israel's "provocative aggression" against Syria. The Syrian government vowed to continue its efforts for the "liberation" of Palestine.

In September it was reported that Syria had resumed work on the diversion project, this time with tractors of the Syrian Army's engineering corps.

In December the manager of kibbutz Shamir in northern Israel reported steady progress by the Syrians on a project to divert the waters of the Dufela springs. (The kibbutz's entire water supply comes from the springs located 300 yards within Syria, which the kibbutz has been sharing with Syria under a 1951 agreement.) At the end of the year Israel Minister of Labor Yigal Allon reiterated Israel's warning that she would not allow Syria to deprive her of water.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE

In a rare display of agreement, both Israel and the Arab states publicly urged U Thant to accept an additional term as secretary-general of the United Nations, and subsequently expressed their satisfaction at his reelection. In his annual report to the General Assembly in September, Thant warned that "dangerous tensions persist" in the Middle East and pleaded for peace in the region.

United Nations Emergency Force

In a separate report on the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) stationed along Egypt's Sinai and Gaza Strip border with Israel, Thant noted that the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) had increased its activities and that there had been "differences" between PLA and UNEF personnel. Although serious incidents were avoided with "the help of local authorities," the report emphasized that "the operational deployment of detachments of the Palestine Liberation Army just outside the 500-metre zone of the Armistice demarcation line and increased patrolling and training activity of their units in this area are unavoidably of concern to UNEF and its functioning." It said that, while UNEF had no means of establishing the size of PLA, "public indications by local sources in Gaza have put its strength at 12,000."

UNEF's own strength at the end of June was down to 3,959 and a further reduction to 3,400 was planned for economy reasons on the assumption that "relative quiet" would continue. While there had been no major incidents, the report noted "some disturbing signs recently" that the situation could change, and warned that, in the event of the removal of the UN buffer, "serious fighting would, quite likely, soon be resumed."

After terrorist incursions into Israel and increasingly severe military clashes along the Jordan-Israel and Syrian-Israel borders had escalated in November, Senator Jacob K. Javits (Rep., N.Y.) urged Secretary of State Dean Rusk to ask that UNEF buffer forces be stationed along these Arab-Israel borders as well, a proposal that was rejected by Assistant Secretary MacArthur because of "major difficulties both of a political and financial nature." He noted that neither Israel nor Jordan would accept UN forces on their common borders. In view of this opposition, Washington offered both Israel and Jordan the latest technical devices for detecting infiltrators as a more

effective means of guarding the borders. Reports from Israel indicated that it had, on its own, begun to erect physical barriers along the more troublesome border stretches near urban centers.

A vigorous Israeli dissent to the whole concept of UNEF was presented by Major General Moshe Dayan, commander-in-chief of the Israel Defense Forces in the 1956 Sinai Campaign and more recently a leader of the Rafi party, in an address before the Zionist Organization of America in New York on November 27. Dayan said he would have "preferred to see the Egyptian troops returning to their positions in Sinai," together with a guarantee of Israel shipping through the Strait of Tiran to Elath. He explained:

I prefer the normalization of even hostile relations over artificial arrangements. Arab and Israel farmers should plough their lands right up to the frontier, and get used to living in neighborly proximity. The troops and government of Egypt must reconcile themselves to the fact that Israel is their neighbor. The buffer of foreign troops merely creates a fiction in neighbor-relations, and thereby defers peace.

In response to this criticism, State Department officials made a point of emphasizing that American efforts to improve Arab-Israel border security were not intended to seal Israel off from its neighbors permanently and hermetically.

After a visit to the area, Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.) proposed in December that, instead of creating a new UNEF, the personnel of the observer teams of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) be increased five-fold and an attempt be made to organize mixed Arab-Israeli patrols along the Syrian and Jordanian borders. This followed a report to the Security Council by Secretary-General Thant, calling for more cooperation by Israel and the Arab states in providing around-the-clock liaison with UNTSO, more flexibility for its operations, and greater use of experts. He recommended the use of helicopters and speedboats for greater mobility of the observer teams, but noted that this would "substantially increase the cost of operation." MacArthur, in his reply to Javits, stated that "the United States intends fully to support the Secretary-General's proposals."

During the year the deficit-ridden UN again sought, without success, to find an agreed formula for financing its various peace-keeping operations. The cost of UNEF was \$14 million in 1966.

Security Council Debates Border Incidents

As Arab terrorist raids within Israel and armed clashes across the Syrian-Israel and Jordanian-Israel frontiers increased (p. 424), scarcely a week passed without a letter of complaint from one of the parties to the UN Security Council. On three occasions during the year the Security Council engaged in extensive debates after it was formally asked to intervene and adopt resolutions of condemnation.

The first debate grew out of a Syrian complaint in July over Israel's "act

of aggression" against Syrian diversion works on July 14. The following day Israel filed a countercharge, asking the Council to consider "the repeated acts of aggression committed by Syrian armed forces and by armed saboteur groups, and Syrian Government statements openly inciting to war against Israel." After more than a week of deliberations, the Council rejected a draft resolution submitted by Jordan and Mali asking for a condemnation of Israel's air attack. The vote was six in favor (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, and the USSR), with nine abstentions (Argentina, China, France, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.) The resolution was not adopted since it failed to receive the requisite nine affirmative votes.

United States delegate Joseph J. Sisco explained that the United States could not support the draft because it pointed blame only in one direction and failed to take into account Syria's responsibility for the mining incidents, which had killed one Israeli and wounded three others in four incidents near the Syrian border during the 48 hours preceding Israel's retaliatory raid. Earlier, during the debate, Sisco rejected the Syrian claim that it had no responsibility to prevent the terrorist raids. He also "deplored" Israel's decision to reply with armed force instead of relying on the UN. Similar views were stated by the other abstainers. Soviet Delegate Nikolai T. Fedorenko charged that Israel's action reflected the "strengthening of the imperialistic policies of the Western powers and their agents in the Near East." The Syrian and Iraqi delegates echoed the charges of American-Israeli collusion. In reply, Sisco insisted that the United States had not been consulted and had no prior knowledge of the air strike.

The second major debate, in October and November, dealt with Israel's complaint against the "renewal of organized and armed infiltration by Syria into Israeli territory," with the dynamiting of two apartment houses in Jerusalem—the 61st major incident since January 1965—and Syria's open incitement of al-Fatah and other terrorist groups to destroy Israel.

United States Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, in his opening statement on October 14, pointed out that there was abundant evidence that al-Fatah had committed a series of acts of violence against Israel, causing loss of life and posing "a constant threat to the citizens of a Member State." The root of the problem, he said, was "the attitude and policy" of the Syrian government, as expressed on October 12 in a statement of the Syrian army's chief of staff, that al-Fatah's operations were "legitimate actions which we should not restrict but should support and abet," and in a Syrian government broadcast a day earlier that "under no circumstances" would it be willing "to hold back the revolution of the expelled and oppressed Palestinian people." Goldberg emphasized that Syria was "bound by solemn commitments" not to support such actions, not only under the UN Charter, but also by its vote in favor of the December 21, 1965 General Assembly resolution providing that " . . . no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent over-

throw of the regime of another State . " Most specifically, Syria was bound to refrain from such hostile actions by the terms of the Israeli-Syrian General Armistice Agreement. Goldberg called the activities "Syria has been condoning in violation of these commitments," very dangerous to peace in the area and urged Syria to ensure that its territory was not used as "a base for terrorism or destruction, with or without the consent of the Syrian Government."

In the midst of the Security Council debate, 19 members of Brith Trumfeldor (Betar), the Zionist Revisionist youth group, forced their way into the ambassador's office at the Syrian Mission in New York, where they staged a half-hour sit-in, chanting "End Syrian aggression!" and singing Hebrew songs as well as "We Shall Overcome." After the police led the demonstrators away, Ambassador Goldberg personally signed a complaint against them on behalf of the United States government. They appeared in criminal court on charges of disorderly conduct, unlawful assembly, failure to disperse, and trespassing. They pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct and the other charges were dropped; they were let off with a judicial reprimand. Planned to lend moral support to the presentation of Israel's case in the Council, the demonstration quickly backfired, enabling the Arab states and their supporters to divert public attention from the issue debated and to focus instead on the Zionist "invasion" and "aggression" perpetrated against the Syrian mission. The demonstration was universally condemned in the Jewish community, and by the Israel mission to the UN.

Although Ambassador Goldberg publicly apologized to Syria for "this highly regrettable incident," a formal protest on behalf of the UN African-Asian group was delivered to Secretary-General Thant by the representatives of Jordan, Mali, and Turkey. After presenting the protest to Goldberg on November 17, Thant announced that he had received assurances that the United States would fulfill its obligations as host government.

During the Council's debate later on the same day, George J. Tomeh, the Syrian delegate, charged that Goldberg's support of the Israel complaint was proof of his "complete identification" with Zionism, not only as a spiritual and cultural heritage (referring to the Goldberg speech of May 1965; AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 273) but also as a "rigid political organization." Goldberg denied this accusation and noted that he had been quoted out of context, for he had also called for good relations with the Arab states. Goldberg emphasized that more important than his personal statement—but by no means inconsistent with it—were his enunciations of the policies of his government, whose basic position was that "the United States, in keeping with the action taken by the United Nations, supports the independence of all states in the area—Israel, Syria and other countries, all other Arabic countries in the area."

On October 28, after Arab terrorists had derailed an Israeli freight train near Jerusalem, Goldberg emphasized the need for quick Council action to ease tension and prevent a "showdown." Had it been a passenger train, he

said, "there would have been a shock wave all through the Middle East with incalculable consequences." Goldberg also expressed his government's approval of Israel's desire to seek assistance through "peaceful political means" by bringing its complaint to the Security Council "where matters such as this should be settled."

A joint American-British resolution moderately critical of Syria, that appeared to have no chance of adoption, was replaced by a milder resolution sponsored by Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Uganda. This six-power draft deplored the incidents and the loss of life caused by them; invited the government of Syria "to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constitute a violation of the General Armistice Agreement" (the Anglo-American draft would have "reminded" Syria "to fulfill its obligations" to prevent the use of its territory as a base for anti-Israeli acts); invited Israel "to cooperate fully with the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission" (Israel had not attended regular meetings since 1951 because of a dispute as to the competence of the MAC to deal with the demilitarized zones), and called on both sides to facilitate the work of the UN Truce Supervision Organization and to refrain from any action that might increase tension.

When put to a vote on November 4, the resolution was supported by 10 members, with China abstaining, and although only 4 voted against (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali and the USSR) the Soviet Union's veto defeated it. Soviet delegate Fedorenko said that Syrian responsibility had not been proved and repeated the charge that the real threats to peace were "the aggressive policies of Tel Aviv" and "the imperialist circles" which were trying to thwart progressive Arab development.

Despite the veto, Israel officials expressed satisfaction over the moral vindication of their position. Similarly, Ambassador Goldberg noted that widespread support of the resolution on a broadly geographical basis was "a matter of high import not to be ignored," and reemphasized the fundamental United States policy in the Middle East "to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and the maintenance of unbroken peace."

However, on the night of November 12 another sabotage incident occurred on the Jordanian border (p. 426). Israel responded with a large-scale daylight retaliation action, which rapidly escalated as Jordan Arab Legion reinforcements rushed to the scene. In the resulting clash, according to UN observers, 18 Jordanians were killed and 54 injured, with three of the fatalities and 17 of the wounded being civilians. (One Israeli officer was killed and 10 soldiers were wounded.) The UN report stated that more than 150 houses had been destroyed in Es Samu—Israel said that the actual number of buildings demolished was 40. Three days later Jordan called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider Israel's "act of aggression against the citizens and territory of Jordan."

At the Council session on November 16, the three major Western powers joined the Soviet Union in vigorously condemning Israel. Ambassador Gold-

berg declared that the nature of the Israeli raid and its "consequences in human lives and in destruction far surpass the cumulative total" of the Arab terrorist acts. He summed up the general sentiment in the Council when he pointed out that "this deliberate governmental decision must be judged as the conscious act of responsible leaders of a Member State and, therefore, on an entirely different level" than the earlier Arab terrorist incidents, "which we continue to deplore." Moreover, the government of Jordan had not been implicated in the terrorists acts—a point that was stressed by the British and French delegates as well.

At the end of the debate, on November 25, the Security Council censured Israel in its most strongly worded resolution against Israel in more than a decade, which diplomats considered just a step short of a specific threat of economic and other sanctions. It was adopted by a vote of 14 in favor, with New Zealand abstaining. New Zealand refused to support the resolution because it failed to include a fair appraisal of the total situation that moved Israel to retaliate as well as constructive proposals for checking a recurrence of violence. An implied reference to Arab terrorism was made in a preambular clause referring to earlier resolutions "for the cessation of violent incidents across the demarcation line, and not overlooking past incidents of this nature." The resolution warned Israel that "actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts."

United States support of this resolution was partly based on a concern that Israel's action had embarrassed King Hussein, the moderate, pro-Western ruler of Jordan, and jeopardized the stability of his kingdom by providing a rallying point for anti-Hussein Palestinian militants. It took several weeks for Hussein to quell the widespread demonstrations and disturbances that erupted after the Israeli attack and which, Hussein said, had been instigated by the PLO and "Communists and Marxists," with the backing of Syria and Egypt.

ARAB REFUGEES

UNRWA's Financial Difficulties

In his report to the General Assembly for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, Lawrence Michelmore, commissioner-general of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), concluded that "as year succeeds year, there is no sign that the refugees are becoming any less embittered," and that, therefore, the refugee problem's implication for peace and stability in the Middle East "remain as grave as ever."

The number of refugees registered with UNRWA at the end of the period totalled 1,317,749, an increase of nearly 37,000 from the previous year. The decline in the number of ration recipients from 874,594 to 861,122 was al-

most entirely caused by the fact that UNRWA's 12,000 local workers and their families received a cash allowance in place of rations. The number of ration recipients did not rise because UNRWA continued to impose ceilings on the total in each of the four host countries—Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip.

UNRWA also failed to make any substantial progress in resolving its chronic financial problems. An emergency fund-raising trip by Michelmores early in the year brought several additional contributions, including \$2 million from Sweden, which, he said, succeeded "in averting a collapse of the Agency's services" by reducing the 1966 deficit to about \$1 million from the \$4.2 million projected at the start of the year.

Michelmores expected 1967 contributions to fall "more than \$4 million short of the target" for several reasons. To begin with, the 1967 budget was projected at \$39.3 million as against \$37.8 million in 1966, of which \$17.3 million went for relief, \$15.5 million for education, and \$5.0 million for health services. The \$1.5 million increase in 1967 was to meet rising costs and an increase of student enrolment in elementary and preparatory schools. A second factor was a cut in the United States contribution to UNRWA from \$22.9 million to \$22.2 million for the 1966-67 fiscal year, in keeping with the policy of gradual retrenchment instituted by Congress (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 267). At the UNRWA Pledging Conference in December, United States delegate Harding F. Bancroft noted that the United States had contributed more than \$400 million over the years and that Washington believed that its current contribution was still "disproportionately high." The United States further asked that as much of its contribution as possible be used for education and vocational training. Other states, such as Britain, France, Switzerland, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries, specifically earmarked increasing portions of their contributions for education.

The cut in the United States contribution also indicated congressional impatience over UNRWA's failure to rectify its ration rolls and prevent fraud in the relief program. Michelmores conceded in his report that "only limited progress" had been made in this direction in response to the General Assembly's directive of December 1965 calling for equitable distribution of rations on the basis of need. UNRWA considered the state of the ration rolls in Lebanon "reasonably satisfactory." In Gaza the local authorities had helped remove 4,265 ineligible persons from the rolls. Their places were given to children from the waiting list, which had grown to over 27,000. In Syria, UNRWA had been unable to check who was receiving rations or to insure that they were distributed according to proven need.

The greatest problem continued to be Jordan, with more than half of the registered refugees, and with a waiting list of over 205,000 children. Michelmores noted that past attempts to rectify relief abuses in the country, "such as the activities of the so-called merchants, who traffic in ration cards and ration commodities and who have a vested interest in the existing inaccuracies in the rolls, have also often failed, owing to adverse reactions among

the refugees." A potentially significant step forward was an agreement concluded in June between Jordan and UNRWA, providing for the exchange of all existing ration cards for new ones, the personal appearance of heads of families showing proof of their identity, and the investigation of suspected false or duplicate registrations by a joint Jordanian-UNRWA committee. Jordan, the only Arab host country to grant the Palestinian refugees full citizenship and equal rights, has quietly taken measures to facilitate their economic rehabilitation. A further sign of realistic approach to the refugees' integration within Jordanian society was a statement by King Hussein on June 14, condemning the maintenance of the refugees in a state of poverty "in their camps surrounded by barbed wire" so that Arab delegates could justify their "continued begging" for funds at the UN. He declared:

People living on charity lose their dignity and their cause. To say that this misery produces hatred and that hatred, ignorance and starvation lead to victory is nonsense and absolutely illogical. The victors will be those who live proudly on their land and the land of their family and brothers where they are given a chance to become physically and mentally fit.

Shukairy's answer was a denunciation of the King over Cairo radio, with shouts from the audience calling on the Jordanians to revolt and kill Hussein. The strength of the refugee opposition may have prompted Jordan to ask UNRWA, later in the summer, to defer "temporarily" implementation of the rectification agreement.

UNRWA and the Palestine Liberation Army

Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.), Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on refugees and escapees, reported in June that members of his staff, who had just completed an on-the-spot investigation, found that PLA recruits were still receiving UNRWA rations in Gaza and Syria, and that such aid was "incompatible with United States policy and with the fundamental concept of the United Nations." At the same time, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved an amendment by Rep. Leonard Farbstein (Dem., N.Y.) to the Foreign Assistance Act, banning further United States contributions to UNRWA unless it takes "all possible measures to assure that no part of the United States contribution shall be used to furnish assistance to any refugee who is receiving training as a member of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army."

In testimony before the Kennedy subcommittee on July 20, Raymond A. Hare, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs—though critical of relief abuses and the continued presence on UNRWA lists of refugees in Gaza and Syria serving in the PLA—asked the Senate to restore the \$700,000 cut by the House on the ground that this might force UNRWA to make reductions in its vital health and education services. Kennedy proposed that the \$700,000 in question be earmarked to

build a vocational training school to be operated by one of the Arab host governments for the benefit of both refugee and nonrefugee students. However, the committee failed to adopt the Kennedy proposal and the Senate approved the cut made by the House. The Senate also endorsed the House ban on the use of United States aid to feed PLA recruits.

UNRWA officials claimed that it was impossible for them to screen out PLA recruits in the absence of both accurate relief rolls and active cooperation by the local Arab authorities. Officials in Gaza and Syria continued to refuse access to PLA trainees lists on the ground that this was classified military information. To meet the objections by the United States and other governments, Michelmores announced, he had arranged for "special added donations"—subsequently revealed to have come from Arab sources—in the amount of \$150,000, "which meets the total cost of any rations consumed" by refugees in the PLA. He said, in conclusion, that these arrangements "provide a practical means of disposing of the problem insofar as the Agency is concerned."

However, during the annual debate in the UN Special Political Committee in the fall, several states took issue with Michelmores's approach. Frank Corner of New Zealand remarked pointedly that, while the commissioner-general's arrangement might provide a practical solution for the agency, "it does not dispose of the issue of principle so far as Governments are concerned." He stressed that no UN agency could give "any support, direct or indirect," to a group like the PLO, since "the extremist demands of the refugees" to annihilate Israel, "whether by direct attack by regular forces, or by a so-called war of national liberation by irregular forces, would represent a threat to international peace and security and, by implication, a threat to all United Nations members." Ambassador Michael Comay of Israel stated that PLA recruits in the Gaza Strip were "openly and officially recruited and trained, and even march in public parades." And since a certain age group had been conscripted (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 266), Comay suggested that the ration cards of all men in that group be suspended, and the burden of proving which of them had been exempted from recruitment be placed on the authorities, or the refugees concerned.

In the debate, U.S. Ambassador Bancroft reiterated American opposition to UNRWA aid to the PLA, even through Michelmores's financial arrangements. As a matter "of principle," he said, the UN "should not give the impression that it condones or regards with indifference the involvement of any United Nations agency with an organization" dedicated to the use of armed force. He also emphasized that "much more" needs to be done to rectify relief rolls and also called on UNRWA to act "promptly and vigorously" to "stop the trafficking in ration cards and ration commodities." He called it "outrageous to allow a few profiteers to cheat needy refugees out of benefits provided by the international community." The announcement at the December pledging conference of the American contribution to UNRWA for fiscal 1967 indicated, however, the United States govern-

ment's apparent tacit acceptance of the view that the commissioner-general's arrangement did not violate the letter of the congressional injunction against United States aid to the PLA.

UNRWA Debate at the UN

The UNRWA debate in the General Assembly's Special Political Committee generally took the lines of earlier years. All Arab League UN members, except Tunisia, joined in a request to give a hearing to a spokesman of the PLO, which was followed by a similar request from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on behalf of the Palestine Arab Delegation, a rival refugee group backed by the Arab Higher Committee of Haj Amin el-Husseini, former Mufti of Jerusalem. As in the previous year, the committee agreed to hear individual speakers from both groups with the understanding that such authorization did not imply UN recognition. On November 14 the committee adopted a United States draft resolution, similar to that adopted in 1965. The resolution contained three amendments proposed by Somalia, which 1. eliminated the implied criticism of the Arab states for impeding progress in rectifying relief rolls; 2. specifically appealed to "non-contributing Governments to contribute and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions" (although the number of UNRWA contributors had increased considerably in the past two years, and some states had increased their aid, two-thirds of all UN members, including the Soviet Union, refused support), and 3. substituted for the draft's expression of regret that the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) had been unable to achieve any "progress on implementation of paragraph 11" of a 1948 resolution on the repatriation or resettlement of the refugees, "because of the unchanged situation in the area," a request that the CCP "intensify its efforts" for implementation. (This ran counter to the CCP's own admission, in its report of September 30, 1966, that it saw no way out of the present impasse without "substantial changes" in the underlying political climate—and that "there was no evidence that such changes were taking place.")

A fourth Somali amendment, which would have singled out Israel instead of calling on all the parties to cooperate with the CCP, was defeated by a vote of 39 to 33, with 38 abstentions. The committee also rejected (by a vote of 38 to 36, with 36 abstentions) a separate resolution by Afghanistan, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Somalia, calling for the appointment of a UN custodian "to protect and administer" and to collect income from Arab refugee property in Israel. (While the sponsors had picked up two more votes than in 1965, the number of abstentions had increased by 13, reflecting the reluctance of the newly independent states to support a precedent undermining a state's exclusive jurisdiction within its own territory.)

The United States resolution, as amended, was adopted by a vote of 65 to 0, with 45 abstentions. Israel, which had cast the sole negative vote in 1965, decided to abstain, as did all the Arab states. Comay explained that

Israel would have voted for a separate resolution continuing UNRWA's relief and welfare services—especially in view of the resolution's call for rectification and the stated opposition of the United States and other delegations to UNRWA aid to the PLA—but did not do so because it considered the reference to the controversial paragraph 11 superfluous, ill-advised, and an obstacle to progress. Comay asked the UN to concentrate, “without prejudice to political attitudes,” on the economic and social rehabilitation and integration of the refugees, for which massive funds should be placed at its disposal. At the same time, he reiterated Israel's willingness to pay compensation within the framework of a settlement of the refugee problem.

ARAB ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

The Arab Boycott

In his January 1966 report to Congress on United States foreign aid during fiscal 1965, President Johnson stated that “there has been some success in mitigating the effects of the Arab boycott on certain American firms and individuals.” As for travel restrictions imposed against United States citizens on religious grounds, which had been gradually reduced in recent years, he noted that “there was little progress in fiscal 1965.” During 1966 the same inconclusive pattern emerged as the continued Arab efforts to intimidate American businessmen from dealing with Israel met with varying degrees of resistance.

Under an amendment to the Export Control Act, adopted by Congress in 1965 (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 270–72), American exporters for the first time were required to report to the Commerce Department's office of export control whenever they received a request for information or action relating to the boycott. But the law did not prohibit American firms from replying to the boycott questionnaires or complying with boycott demands if they wished to do so.

The department reported that it had received 5,235 reports reflecting restrictive trade practices between October 7, 1965, when the regulations first went into effect, until June 30, 1966. Of these, 4,095 were Arab demands directed against Israel, with about a third of these involving certification of goods as not of Israeli origin. The rest were Arab restrictions on the use of ships of Israeli registry, or other ships stopping in Israeli ports or appearing on the boycott blacklist. In October the department stated that shipping restrictions aimed only at insuring the safe delivery of goods were not restrictive trade practices within the intent of the law, and henceforth need not be reported.

Earlier in March, after the publication of the first quarterly report by the Commerce Department, Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (Dem., N.J.) and Senator Jacob K. Javits (Rep., N.Y.), the sponsors of the antiboycott amendment, wrote to Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor, objecting

that the regulations "weaken the intent of the law" because they gratuitously pointed out that businessmen "are not legally prohibited" from complying with boycott requests, and that the report gave only a bare statistical tally of boycott requests received without indicating what response was made either by United States government agencies or the businessmen concerned. The regulations were not modified, and the department reports grew less specific; the one for the last quarter of 1966 stated, without explanation or breakdown, that 1,146 reports has been received. No reference was made to the reaction in the business community subsequent to the report for the first quarter of 1966, which said that a preliminary analysis indicated "a general pattern of refusal" by American firms to comply with boycott requests.

In a letter to Secretary Connor, in April, Representative Seymour Halpern (Rep., N.Y.) called for congressional hearings on the implementation of the law. He asked that American firms be formally prohibited from replying to boycott demands. Assistant Secretary of Commerce Mark C. Feer replied that the department was "opposed to any amendment which would require a fixed course of action to be taken by the Executive Branch" irrespective of other foreign policy considerations.

The boycott continued to be much in the news during 1966. In December 1965 it had been revealed that the American President Lines had cancelled the scheduled Haifa stop of the *S.S. President Roosevelt*, on its round-the-world cruise from San Francisco, out of fear that the ship would not be allowed through the Suez Canal. After congressional protests, a demand by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) that the United States government's \$30 million annual subsidy to the line be cut off if it yielded to Arab pressure, and private discussions with the State Department and United Arab Republic officials, the company restored the Israel stop in January 1966, with the explanation that it had "misinterpreted" instructions from its Alexandria agent.

In April an ADL report accused the Coca-Cola Company of bowing to the Arab boycott by refusing to grant a franchise to an Israeli bottler, the Tempo Soft Drinks Company Ltd. In response to Coca-Cola's assertion that its decision was based on "economic and market conditions rather than political considerations," ADL pointed to special financial and operating requirements established for the Israeli bottler, in an "assiduous attempt to camouflage its submission" to the boycott. Coca-Cola, in turn, said that it did not operate in other Middle Eastern states, such as Jordan, Syria, and Afghanistan because it was not profitable to do so. In April a counterboycott of Coca-Cola by various enterprises and consumers in the United States brought a lengthy statement from James A. Farley, chairman of the board of the Coca-Cola Export Corporation, calling the charges "completely unfair and unfounded" and assuring the public that the company "has not and will not conduct its affairs in response to any boycott, and that includes the so-called Arab boycott." After negotiations, in which Morris B. Abram, the president of the American Jewish Committee, participated, Coca-Cola an-

nounced that it had made an agreement with Abraham Feinberg, an American industrialist, to "sign a letter of intent as a first step in the establishment of a bottling plant for Coca-Cola in Israel." Feinberg had originally obtained the Israel franchise from Coca-Cola in 1949, but the Israel government had denied a permit "because of the difficult hard currency situation at that time."

Mahmoud Mahgoub, commissioner general of the central Arab boycott office in Damascus, announced in May that Coca-Cola was being given three months to cancel its arrangements with Israel or face expulsion from the Arab world. Coca-Cola went ahead with its plans for Israel although the November conference in Kuwait of boycott directors from 12 Arab League members and five Persian gulf sheikhdoms unanimously voted for the boycott. A month later Mahgoub announced that the Arab Coca-Cola plants would be given a nine-months grace period to "re-adjust their position" before the ban would take effect.

The Kuwait conference also decided to ban the Ford Motor Company and its subsidiaries, and the Radio Corporation of America from the Arab world. Ford was blacklisted because it had licensed its Israeli dealer, Palestine Automobile Corporation, Ltd., to assemble British and American Ford trucks and tractors. Henry Ford II reaffirmed that "we are definitely going ahead with our plans for Israel. We feel we have the unchallenged right to compete in any market of the world willing to accept us as an industrial citizen." Although the reason for the ban on RCA was not officially stated, it was generally reported to be the company's licensing of an Israeli firm to press phonograph records under the RCA label. In December the company denied a Beirut press report that it was suspending its business with Israel. The Zenith Radio Corporation was blacklisted earlier in the year after it had contracted to establish a television assembly plant in Israel. Another major American firm that continued to resist the boycott was the Sheraton Hotels Corporation, which signed an agreement with the Israel Ministry of Tourism in June for construction of a new luxury hotel in Jerusalem. In September the Israel cabinet approved an agreement with the Columbia Broadcasting System, under which CBS was to serve as technical consultant in setting up general television in Israel for a fee of \$150,000 in the first year. There was no report of Arab reaction.

Arab Restrictions on American Jews

An intimation that American personnel of Jewish faith were not assigned to posts in Arab countries was contained in a letter of January 14 from Assistant Secretary of State MacArthur to Representative Richard S. Schweiker (Rep., Pa.). He wrote that, while the United States did not normally "take into account the religion of its employees in assigning them for duty abroad, this is regrettably a factor which cannot be ignored in the case of certain countries whose policies in this respect we cannot control, however much we disagree with them." After the American Jewish Committee and

the American Jewish Congress wrote Secretary Rusk and met with State Department officials to protest this acquiescence in Arab discriminatory policies, the department gradually clarified its position. It first stated that it did not inquire into religion, but carefully assessed all factors affecting an employee's effectiveness. As Assistant Secretary of State Raymond A. Hare explained in his March 7 letter to Morris B. Abram, "while religion is not a criterion in personnel assignments, the Department would not deliberately place any employee in a position in which he could not fully and effectively discharge the duties of his job or practice his personal beliefs without hindrance or embarrassment."

Finally, Deputy Undersecretary of State for Administration William J. Crockett declared that MacArthur's original letter was "in error with respect to policy and practice," and reaffirmed in a letter of May 19 to Joachim Prinz, past president of the American Jewish Congress, that "assignments are made on the basis of need or merit, without in any way taking into account race or religion." Crockett stressed, as had Hare, that our embassies had been active in making "clear our opposition to any policies of foreign countries that discriminate against Americans because of their religion."

Among such acts of discrimination cited by the Jewish organizations in their discussions with the State Department were the travel restrictions still imposed by some Arab states on American Jews.

The continuing tendency of some Arab leaders to equate American Jews, Zionists, and Israelis as objects of their hostility was dramatized by a widely publicized incident that occurred on June 22 during the visit of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia to Washington. Asked at a Women's National Press Club luncheon about the Arab boycott of American firms dealing with Israel, King Faisal replied: "Unfortunately, Jews support Israel and we consider those who provide assistance to our enemies as our own enemies." In response to an earlier question as to whether he considered Israel or the United Arab Republic the greater enemy, the king insisted that despite some differences with Cairo, he viewed the UAR as a "sister republic" and the Egyptians as "our brethren." The "enemy" were the Zionists, whose "aggression" had dispossessed the Palestinian Arabs. Some diplomatic observers thought that the king's response to this embarrassing question was dictated by considerations of public opinion in the Arab world. They found it significant that he backed away from a statement widely attributed to his predecessor by stressing that "it was never our aim to exterminate the Jews and drive them into the sea." However, Faisal's statement that he considered American Jews who supported Israel his enemies outraged the Jewish community, and the public outcry was echoed in Congress and in New York, where Mayor John V. Lindsay cancelled an official dinner in the king's honor because he viewed the remark as "extremely offensive, not just to Jews, but to all citizens of New York." Governor Nelson Rockefeller also officially snubbed Faisal, although his brother David, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, played host to the king at his Tarrytown estate.

While public condemnation was almost universal, some in the Jewish community shared the view of Secretary Rusk and Senator J. William Fulbright (Dem., Ark.) that King Faisal was a guest in this country and, as such, should be treated with courtesy even though his remarks offended his hosts.

In retaliation for the snub to the king, the representatives of 12 Arab League states, including the UAR, declared in September that they would boycott a dinner-dance sponsored by Mayor Lindsay in honor of diplomats attending the UN General Assembly session. A month later, the local diplomatic crisis had apparently eased, for Cairo's UN ambassador, Mohamed el-Kony, was found seated next to Lindsay in the mayor's box at a concert in Carnegie Hall.

GEORGE E. GRUEN

Review
of the
Year

UNITED STATES
CIVIC AND POLITICAL
OTHER COUNTRIES

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

IN 1967 the fabric of the American nation was severely shaken by widespread political, social, and racial confrontations. Racial violence rocked over 100 cities, and a national commission was created to study the riot problem.

In this setting, discrimination against Jews continued to show marked variations. Acts of overt antisemitism were rare, but they aroused much concern when they did occur. Self-awareness among Jews and their interest in the attitudes of others toward them made for an intense interest in fathoming the roots of antisemitism, and intergroup hostility in general. However, general preoccupation with anti-Jewish prejudice among Negroes obscured awareness of its other dimensions in the nation.

More than ever before, the elections in November were the focus for important intergroup struggles. The campaigns and voting in two cities, which elected Negro mayors, had manifest racial overtones. While, in each case, backlash votes were insufficient to carry the election, the margins of victory were such as to indicate that the racial element would, in the future, be an explosive electoral factor in many cities.

The divisive effects of differences regarding church-state issues continued to plague particularly Catholic-Jewish relations. The outstanding episode in this area was the highly charged campaign in New York state over the proposed constitution repealing the Blaine amendment, which, if enacted, would have permitted the use of public monies for private sectarian education.

Aspects of the Arab-Israeli June war sparked concern in religious circles for the future of Christian-Jewish dialogue. Many Jewish religious leaders expressed regret over the failure of important churchmen to give moral support by condemning the Arab threats of genocide against Israel (pp. 220-23).

PATTERNS OF ANTISEMITISM

Surveys and Studies

In May Jews were cautioned that a vast reservoir of more than 35 million Americans still retained anti-Jewish attitudes, although overt antisemitic acts had declined sharply. The report, prepared by the American Jewish Commit-

NOTE: I would like to acknowledge the helpful counsel and contributions of Mrs. Lucy S. Dawidowicz, and the assistance of Mrs. Geraldine Rosenfield and Mrs. Lotte Zajac, all of the American Jewish Committee staff, in the preparation of this review.

tee,¹ said that while sociological studies indicated a decrease of 41 per cent in such persons since the early years of World War II, this figure may be somewhat low, since expressed prejudice was becoming less and less respectable.

In fact, Bertram H. Gold, executive director of the American Jewish Committee, said in December that Jewish communities throughout the country were experiencing "increasing hostility" from extremists of both the right and the left. He spoke of the antisemitic attitudes of such right-wing groups as the Minutemen, John Birch Society, Liberty Lobby, Congress of Freedom, and the Defendant of the Constitution (p. 260). To these, he said, could now be added "the thunder from the left"—specifically, the antisemitic statements in the June-July issue of the *SNCC Newsletter* (p. 242) and the resolution condemning Israel as the aggressor in the June war, pushed through at the New Politics conference in Chicago (pp. 228–29).

The Many Faces of Antisemitism, a pamphlet prepared by the American Jewish Committee in December, summarized the theological, economic, sociological, political, and psychological sources of antisemitism. It urged that the study of antisemitism move into new areas, with the improvement of tools for scientific analysis and attitude research. "Not every antisemite is a rabid bigot or a practicing demagogue," the report held. "Some are mere fellow travelers. Science is just beginning to investigate what makes the bigot's fellow traveler act as he does." In his foreword to the pamphlet, the sociologist Nathan Glazer held that, in light of "the gravity of the American racial crisis, one can suggest that the understanding of antisemitism may also do something to reduce the more virulent prejudice of white against black which has had such evil consequences for American society."

Public Opinion Polls

A Gallup poll, released June 3, found that 82 per cent of Americans would vote for a Jew for president, if he were qualified. Only 13 per cent said they would not, and 5 per cent had no opinion. Thirty years ago only 46 per cent said they would vote for a Jew for president; 46 per cent said they would not; 8 per cent had no opinion. The 1967 poll showed that 89 per cent would vote for a Catholic for president. However, only 54 per cent said they would vote for a qualified Negro for president.

Rejection of a Jewish, Catholic, or Negro possible presidential candidate was greatest in the South. Only 67 per cent of Southern respondents said they would vote for a Jew, compared with 83 per cent in the Midwest, 89 per cent in the West, and 91 per cent in the East. More educated respondents were less prejudiced: 93 per cent of college-trained persons said they would vote for a Jew, compared with 84 per cent of high-school graduates and 66

¹ *Antisemitism in the United States*; presented at the annual National Conference of Jewish Communal Service, May 25, 1967.

per cent of persons who had attended only grade school. The poll found that Jews were the least prejudiced, with Catholics next, and Protestants last.

In the continuing series of surveys conducted by Gallup for the *Catholic Digest*, a 1966 survey published in the periodical's August 1967 issue, showed considerable improvement in attitudes of trust toward Jews as compared with a similar study made in 1952. When asked whether Jews were about the same, better, or not as good as members of their own religious group "in being fair in business," 61 per cent of Catholic respondents said that Jews were the same as most Catholics; only 45 per cent of Protestants said Jews were the same as they. Among Catholics, 23 per cent said Jews were not as good; among Protestants, 28 per cent. In response to a question about honesty in public office, 74 per cent of Catholics said Jews were the same as others, compared with only 55 per cent of Protestants. Despite these findings, which show Catholics as less prejudiced against Jews than Protestants, Jews still continued to regard Catholics with greater suspicion. Thus, 26 per cent of Jews thought that Protestant employers would discriminate against them, compared with 37 per cent who said Catholics would do so. (Conversely, 11 per cent of Protestants thought Jews would discriminate against them in employment, while only 8 per cent of Catholics thought so.)

Executive-Suite Discrimination

The Federal Equal Opportunity Commission's report on its investigation of hiring practices in New York City revealed that only a small number of Jews were employed as high-level business executives. While Jews constituted 25 per cent of the city's population, only 4.5 per cent of the 2,104 officers in major corporations were Jews. Banks, insurance companies, shipping companies, and law firms had the smallest number of Jewish executives.

Antisemitism in the Academic Community

Some observers have expressed anxiety that the lowering of barriers against Jews as faculty members at American colleges and universities, particularly the more prestigious ones, was arousing some resentment, envy, and discontent among less successful non-Jewish faculty members. An exaggerated expression of such disgruntlement was evident in an anonymous 19-page single-spaced antisemitic tirade, dated April 1967 and mailed from Chicago, Ill. on May 17 to thousands of social scientists. It charged that "Jewish culture and Jewish influence have been so pervasively and incessantly imposed on many generations of Americans that we already have, to some extent, undergone alterations in our value system, in our culture content, in our vocabulary, and in our world view." More subtle expressions of resentment against Jewish success in the academic community appeared in letters to the editor in *Chemical and Engineer News*, December 4, 1967, and *Columbia University Forum*, Summer 1967.

The New Left and Antisemitism

The discernible Jewish presence among the New Left and hippies has aroused and/or exacerbated latent antisemitism. A case in point was the trial of Captain Howard B. Levy, an army doctor who had refused to train the army's Green Beret medics in the treatment of skin disease and who was found guilty on June 2 by a general court martial at Fort Jackson, S.C. Charles Morgan, Jr., American Civil Liberties Union lawyer who defended Levy, suggested that the decision to punish Levy was rooted in anti-Jewish prejudice. At the trial, Morgan drew an analogy between Levy and Alfred Dreyfus. Though the parallel was farfetched, the case stirred anti-Jewish sentiments throughout the South.²

Another illustration was the case of Leslie A. Fiedler, professor of English at the New York State University at Buffalo, novelist, and literary critic, who argued that his advocacy of the legalization of marijuana triggered antisemitism:

... the first really vile note I received after my arrest and the garbled accounts of it in the local newspapers (made worse by a baseless reference to "trafficking in drugs" in the initial release from the University concerning my case) should have struck an antisemitic note, reading, "You goddamned Jews will do anything for money." Though I had not really been aware of the fact, antisemitism was already in the air and directed toward the University of which I was a member. (Hate mail from an organization calling itself MAM, or more fully, Mothers Against Meyerson, had already begun to refer to Martin Meyerson, the President of our University, as "that Red Jew from Berkeley.") It was all there, ready to be released: hostility to the young, fear of education and distrust of the educated, antisemitism, anti-Negroism, hatred for "reds" and "pinkos," panic before those who dressed differently, wore their hair longer, or—worst of all—dissented from current received ideas.³

At the University of Wisconsin, demonstrations by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) against campus recruitment by the Dow Chemical Company, manufacturer of napalm, aroused anti-Jewish comments and stimulated some state senators to try to limit out-of-state student enrollment at the University to 15 per cent, instead of the present 25 per cent. The general assumption in the community was that the trouble on campus had been caused by some two to three hundred "New York Jew agitators."⁴

An editorial in Madison's *Capital Times*, November 29, 1967, commented on the hostile reaction to the demonstrations, "Everywhere you went about town you heard sneering remarks about the 'Brooklyn Indians.'" The *Milwaukee Journal*, February 17, 1967, remarked that "charges of antisemitism also were heard, since many of the Eastern students are Jewish."

² Homer Bigart, "Dr. Levy Convicted by Military Court," *New York Times*, June 3, 1967; Max Lerner, "The Levy Case," *New York Post*, June 9, 1967.

³ Leslie A. Fiedler, "On Being Busted At Fifty," *The New York Review of Books*, July 13, 1967.

⁴ Richard Roth, "Wisconsin Students Halt Dow," *Observation Post* (College of the City of New York), December 21, 1967.

In sharp contrast to these incidents on the New Left, which provoked anti-semitic reactions, was one showing antisemitic tendencies within the New Left itself. The San Francisco Mime Troupe, a left-oriented, "revolutionary" theater group presented in 1967 an avant-garde production of "L'Amant Militaire," a classic 18th century Italian farce by Carlo Goldoni. The play was presented in San Francisco, New York, and elsewhere. In this production the original play had been converted into an allegory on contemporary American society, with implicit and sometimes explicit parallels with the war in Vietnam, the draft, hippies, and other American phenomena. This modern adaptation turned the original Italian villain in the plot into a Jew:

Pantalone wears an exaggerated hook nose, speaks with a Yiddish accent, and uses Yiddish expressions. He is portrayed as an ugly, sexually depraved scoundrel, obsessed with making money. At one point he muses at length about selling his own daughter.⁵

Wherever the play was performed, it elicited protests from Jews. But both actors and backers of the play justified and even praised its anti-Jewish aspects on the ground that it mirrored current reality. Most of the Mime Troupe's personnel are themselves Jews, who share the New Left alienation from middle-class values and life styles, which they associate with their Jewish parents and the community in which they were raised.

Vandalism and Violence

In 1967 reported incidents showed a characteristic pattern.

January: More than 100 gravestones and monuments in two Jewish cemeteries were smeared with hammer-and-sickle emblems, or with such inscriptions as "They shall die" and "Six million—was it enough?", in New Orleans.

February: Swastikas, Nazi slogans, and obscenities were painted on the walls of the Hebrew Congregation synagogue in Somers (Westchester County), N.Y.

March: A fire, which caused damage estimated at tens of thousands of dollars, was set, and a swastika and the word "Juden" scrawled on the blackboard of a basement classroom in the Beth Israel synagogue in Trenton, Mich., a residential town southwest of Detroit.

June: On the eve of the six-day war, 72 headstones were vandalized, with damage totalling \$19,000, in the Mount Lebanon cemetery in Hyattsville, Md., a Washington suburb.

A bomb threat, that proved to be a hoax, forced the evacuation of Torahs and other valuables of the new \$2 million Temple Emanuel in Denver, Colorado, which was smeared with several large swastikas.

September: For the second time in three months, vandals desecrated and damaged headstones in the Mount Lebanon Jewish cemetery in Hyattsville, Md. Damage was estimated at \$15,000. The cemetery, one of the largest in

⁵ Robert Frankel, "Alienation, Antipathy—Anti-Semitism," *ADL Bulletin*, January 1968, pp. 1-2.

the Washington area, serves a score of Jewish synagogues and fraternal organizations. Since no damage was done to nearby nonsectarian or Christian cemeteries, authorities concluded that these were antisemitic incidents.

A hit-and-run bombing damaged Temple Beth Israel in Jackson, Miss.

A swastika was burned on the lawn of a Jewish home in Cleveland Heights, Ohio.

October: Within less than two weeks, the Beth Moses congregation of Detroit, Mich., was the victim of three fires and two break-ins.

A robbery and arson, at a loss of \$25,000, took place at the Beth Aaron synagogue in Detroit, Mich. Its cantor had been assaulted some time before.

November: The home of Rabbi Perry E. Nussbaum of Temple Beth Israel in Jackson, Miss., was destroyed by bombing. It was generally acknowledged that the bombings of the rabbi's home, and of his temple two months earlier, had been executed by a secret band of terrorists in retaliation against recent arrests and trials of Ku Klux Klan members on civil-rights charges. Rabbi Nussbaum cited the Klan and the Americans for Preservation of the White Race as being responsible for creating a climate that permitted this "reign of terror." He believed that the bombings were a "gesture" against the Jewish community which has supported various civil-rights movements. Mississippi Governor Paul B. Johnson, Jr., and Governor-elect John B. Williams asked the people to cooperate in apprehending "these depraved bombers" and vowed to protect the citizens, no matter what the cost. Among Jewish organizations, both the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and the American Jewish Committee urged law enforcement officers to take swift and firm action to prevent similar incidents in the future.

More than 130 gravestones were overturned in the Jewish section of Zion Hill Cemetery, Hartford, Conn. Some strong expression of sympathy and outrage at these acts came from the Christian community.

December: A threatening circular, by the Minutemen, was mailed to members of the Houston, Tex., Jewish community.

The Sharey Zedek synagogue in Southfield, Mich., was robbed and the guard brutally beaten.

Antisemitic Attitudes

WAYNE, N.J.

The suburban town of Wayne, N.J., furnished the most dramatic example of underlying antisemitic attitudes. The turmoil centered around what otherwise would have been a routine school-board election. What occurred prompted one observer to note that "once again the problem is not that so many are committed to antisemitism; the problem is that too few are committed *against* antisemitism."

Of the five candidates running for three vacancies on the board, Jack Mandell, an attorney standing for reelection, and Robert Kraus, a corporation

executive seeking a first term, were Jews. A week before the election, on February 6, the school board's vice president, Newton Miller, attacked Mandell and Kraus in a statement to the local daily *Wayne Today*. Both favored a proposed increase in the school budget, as did two other candidates and all board members except Miller. Miller's statement read in part:

Most Jewish people are liberals, especially when it comes to spending for education. If Kraus and Mandell are elected and Lafer [another Jewish board member] is in for two more years, that means a three to six vote [on the nine-member board]. It would only take two more votes for a majority and Wayne would be in real financial trouble. Two more votes and we may lose what is left of the Christ in Christmas celebrations in our schools. Think of it!

These remarks transformed the previously obscure township of Wayne into a center of national attention. Reporters and television crews publicized the pre-election events across the nation. Public officials and clergymen from every part of the country sharply criticized Miller's remarks. Both the school board and the township council censured Miller; the board voted 8 to 1 to "censure Mr. Miller's appeal to bigotry," and called for his resignation. Miller refused to resign and denied that he was prejudiced. Although he apologized, he defended his statement, which he refused to retract, as true, but misinterpreted. By election day, community leaders and officials in Wayne, Jewish and Christian alike, were confident that the strong negative reaction to Miller's statement had erased this issue from the voters' minds. One community leader summed it up by saying, "Open political antisemitism simply is no longer tolerated in American life."⁶ But the general certainty that Miller's appeal to prejudice would be repudiated at the polls proved to be unfounded.

A record number of voters—10,000 out of 16,000 who were registered—turned out on election day. Kraus and Mandell were defeated 2 to 1, and the proposed school budget of \$8.5 million was turned down 3 to 1. The largest vote went to David Caliri, a known supporter of the school budget; Miller's candidate, John McLaughlin, who was generally considered to be a conservative and was opposed to the budget, received the second-highest number of votes.

Shortly after the election, the school board replaced Miller as vice president with the one remaining Jewish member, Fred Lafer. The board then gave Miller a unanimous vote of confidence. The proposed school budget was again defeated on March 1 by 2 to 1, and the school board acted on March 10 to reduce the proposal by \$300,000. At the same time, the Wayne township council defeated a proposal for the establishment of a human-relations commission. One local columnist suggested that the idea failed because its creation might have given the erroneous impression that Wayne had prejudice problems.

⁶ Rodney Stark and Stephen Steinberg, "Jews and Christians in Suburbia," *Harper's*, August 1967, p. 73.

The Wayne incident aroused concern because hundreds of other American towns like it might become the scenes of similar antisemitic occurrences.

Aside from exclusionary practices in the Packanack Lake and Pine Lake communities in Wayne, which had been closed to virtually everyone who was not a white Protestant (the New Jersey courts had invalidated these practices in Packanack Lake in the spring of 1966), the 2,500 Jews of Wayne seemed to be integrated into the community and were active in civic affairs. Besides the two Jewish members that had been on the school board, two others were elected to the nine-member township council. The general impression was that harmonious Christian-Jewish relations prevailed in the town.

This tranquillity was shattered by Miller's pre-election statement, and the resultant responses. The array of reactions indicated the latent nature of this kind of antisemitism. Miller's own failure to recognize the antisemitism in his remarks was mirrored in the reactions of many Wayne residents. In the vast collection of statements and condemnations, there was very little effort to explain to the Wayne residents exactly what was antisemitic about them. Instead, most of the discussion locally and elsewhere centered around the general evils of antisemitism. Thus, while most seemed to agree that antisemitism was deplorable, they could find nothing antisemitic in the school board controversy. Comments from local people, such as: "My God, we tried and tried to apologize and they wouldn't accept it. Now I ask you, what do you make of that?", and "People have said worse things in a campaign. It wasn't the right thing to say, but he apologized, what more can he do?"⁷—these echoed prevailing sentiments.

Many other residents were simply hostile because of the unwelcome publicity their town was receiving. Some even suggested that Jews were responsible for having injected religious prejudice into the campaign.

The reactions of Jewish leaders and organizations differed. Some local spokesmen, hoping that the incident would lose in importance, withheld immediate comment. Others, however, quickly branded Miller's statement as antisemitic. The involvement of several regional and national Jewish organizations seemed to add to the confusion. The underlying problem they all grappled with had to do with clarifying the antisemitic nature of Miller's remarks to the Wayne residents. If the election results were a measure of their success, then their combined efforts either failed to make the point, or the community was not unreceptive to Miller's allegations.

The Wayne episode was probed further, as a case-study of antisemitism in the United States in the mid-1960s, prepared by Rodney Stark and Stephen Steinberg, research sociologists at the University of California.⁸ Shortly after the election, they went to Wayne to interview local residents and talk with community leaders, clergymen and teachers. Their analysis of the climate of opinion, especially in relation to antisemitism, has implications

⁷ Stark and Steinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁸ *It Did Happen Here* (University of California, Berkeley: Survey Research Center, 1967).

for Jews in every suburban community. In their view, "roughly a quarter of the nation's population holds a substantial number of negative stereotypes about Jews as crafty, pushy, greedy, unethical, clannish, and the like."⁹ These attitudes, they contended, are quite far from the virulence of classic European antisemitism. And while they are not strong enough to motivate anti-Jewish behavior, they are sufficiently hostile to support some varieties of discrimination. Holding that "American anti-Semitism is characteristically a matter of shades of grey," Stark and Steinberg described persons with such attitudes as "dark grey" antisemites. In their view, however, America also has a blander, or "light grey" form of antisemitism:

The light grey American anti-Semite holds some of the less noxious beliefs about Jews, but these are not sufficient to cause him to recognize that he dislikes Jews. Perhaps his feelings are not strong enough to intrude in his response to individuals. For such light anti-Semites it is actually true that, although they have mild feelings about Jews generally, it is entirely possible for some of their "best friends" to be Jewish. Such persons do not recognize that they are tainted with anti-Semitism because they do not face any internal sense of hostility towards Jews with whom they come in contact. Thus, their sense of innocence goes unchallenged in the day-to-day world.¹⁰

From their exploration, the key to understanding what happened in Wayne, and indeed what might happen elsewhere, lies in the distinction between shades of antisemitism. Black and dark grey antisemites, if and when they exist, are too few in number to turn the electoral tide. Rather, "the electoral outcome lay with that substantial number of residents who fall into the light grey area of anti-Semitism."¹¹ Their prejudice was not manifest but acquiescent. Above all, it was their naive perspective that made them insensitive.

HILLSIDE, N.J.

In Hillside, another New Jersey town, a different type of antisemitic incident occurred in August. Here a 13-year-old Jewish boy was barred from a summer typing class because he insisted on wearing a *yarmulke*. The school superintendent ruled that *yarmulkes* were not allowed because they "would disturb" non-Jewish children and "might cause incidents." "Anything that identifies a person as a member of any race, creed or color can cause a disturbance and must be eliminated," he said.¹²

This action drew a quick and strong response from many Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the American Jewish Congress. They joined with others in the following petition to the state education commissioner:

While our immediate concern is the right of Orthodox Jewish children attending the public schools of this state, we share as well a broader commitment to

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹² *New York Post*, August 10, 1967.

the principles of religious freedom and of public education. While the ruling we request may affect directly only a small number of children in the state, it is nevertheless required both for the preservation of religious freedom and the advancement of public education.

Differences among several of the sponsoring groups led to the withdrawal of the petition in September. The student in question stopped attending class, and the problem became "academic." No report of formal school-board action was recorded.

Negro Antisemitism

Growing antisemitism among Negroes was a matter of serious concern in 1967 (p. 244). Overt expressions were closely associated with the radicalization of the Negro protest movement.

In the wake of the Israeli-Arab June war, a vicious attack on Zionism and Israel, with antisemitic cartoons and photographs of alleged Israeli atrocities appeared in the June-July issue of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee's *SNCC Newsletter* (p. 228). At a press conference in August several SNCC leaders repeated that "the Jews were imitating their Nazi oppressors" and committing "some of the same atrocities against the Arabs." SNCC, they said, was not against all Jews, "only Jewish oppressors," those in Israel and "those . . . in the little Jew shops in the ghettos." At the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP), in Chicago on the 1967 Labor Day weekend, a resolution sponsored by the so-called Black Caucus "to condemn the imperialist Zionist (Arab-Israeli) War," which, it said, "does not imply antisemitism," was carried over the protest of many delegates, who walked out of the convention.

Reactions from both Jewish and Negro leaders was quick and sharp. They indicated growing misgivings about increasing antisemitism among Negroes, as well as concern among civil-rights leaders over what effect this hostility might have upon continued Jewish support of their cause.

Nathan Perlmutter of the American Jewish Committee, referring to the SNCC statement, said it was "interesting and ironical and sad that this outrageous attack is of a piece with a similar attack in the current issue of *Thunderbolt*, the official organ of the racist National States Rights party (NSRP)." Benjamin Epstein of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith revealed that a study, conducted by his organization, found SNCC and NSRP publications sharing the same Arab sources of antisemitic hate materials. SNCC, he said, is "no longer a civil-rights group," but one seeking the "radical overthrow of American political, social and economic institutions by any means necessary, including violence." Will Maslow of the American Jewish Congress asserted that SNCC had "disqualified itself from any claim to be taken seriously in the struggle for human decency. There is no room for racists in the fight against racism." Hadassah president Mrs. Mortimer Jacobson put her organization on record as strongly protesting "the language and

intent" of the NCNP resolutions in Chicago. "It is a disservice to Americans," she said, "to pretend to add new dimensions to American freedom by attacking the very organizations and movements which have been in the forefront of the fight for these freedoms."

In the same vein, Whitney Young, Jr., of the National Urban League, maintained that "Negro citizens are well aware of the contributions made to the drive for equal rights by Jewish citizens. Negroes have been the victims of racism for too long to indulge in group stereotypes and racial hate themselves." A. Philip Randolph and Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph Institute made a joint statement, saying they were "appalled and distressed by the antisemitic article" in the *SNCC Newsletter*. Rustin later elaborated: "One of the more unprofitable strategies we could ever adopt is how to join in history's oldest and most shameful witch-hunt, antisemitism."

The late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., in a letter to American Jewish Committee President Morris Abram, put the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) on record as having "expressly, frequently and vigorously denounced antisemitism and will continue to do so. It is not only that antisemitism is immoral—though that alone is enough. It is used to divide Negro and Jew, who have effectively collaborated in the struggle for justice."

The discussion of Negro antisemitism was centered particularly around Negro-Jewish relations in the urban ghettos. Bayard Rustin, writing in the *Amsterdam News*, a Negro newspaper published in New York City, said: ¹³

This attitude, though not typical of most Negro communities, is gaining considerable strength in the ghetto. It sees the Jew as the chief and only exploiter of the ghetto, blames the ghetto on him, and seems to suggest that anything Jews do is inherent in the idea of their Jewishness.

Let's face it: Everybody gets a piece of the action in the ghetto: those who are Jews and those who are Christians; those who are white and those who are black; those who run the numbers and those who operate the churches; those—black and white—who own tenements, and those—black and white—who own businesses.

A series of articles, "Semitism in the Black Ghetto," in the black nationalist magazine *Liberator*, moved novelist James Baldwin to resign in protest from the publication. Commenting on the series, he said, "I think it is distinctly unhelpful, and I think it is immoral to blame Harlem on the Jew. Why, when we should be storming capitals, do you suggest to the people we hope to serve that they take refuge in the most ancient and barbaric of European myths?" In a subsequent essay on Negro antisemitism Baldwin probed the basis for these feelings: ¹⁴

The root of antisemitism among Negroes is, ironically, the relationship of colored peoples—all over the globe—to the Christian world. This is a fact which

¹³ *Chicago Daily News*, September 30, 1967.

¹⁴ James Baldwin, "Negros Are Anti-Semites Because They're Anti-White," *New York Times Magazine*, April 9, 1967, pp. 135-136.

may be difficult to grasp, not only for the ghetto's most blasted and embittered inhabitants, but also for many Jews, to say nothing of many Christians. He [the Jew] is singled out by Negroes not because he acts differently from other white men, but because he doesn't. His major distinction is given him by that history of Christendom, which has so successfully victimized both Negroes and Jews. And he is playing in Harlem the role assigned him by Christians long ago: he is doing their dirty work.¹⁵

A strongly antisemitic incident involved Cecil B. Moore, a militant Philadelphia lawyer and civil-rights leader. Acting as defense attorney for several men, who appeared at a court hearing in November for involvement in a black-power demonstration at the Board of Education building, Moore shouted at the opposing lawyer, "Jew get out of our business; I'm tired of you Jews who try to run our business." The resultant unprecedented decision by the Board of Judges of the Common Pleas Court to look into Moore's professional conduct brought strong reactions from Negro militants, as well as from the Jewish community.

The local National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) passed a resolution to defend Moore against "the challenge of the Jewish community to try to discredit him in his profession." Moore, himself, said in a letter to the Philadelphia B'nai B'rith, the Jewish Community Relations Council, and others, that he did not consider calling a person by his "self-designated name" an antisemitic slur, and that he resented their attempts to divide the Negro community. He suggested that the community "rid [itself] of the Jews who exploit black men."

The local chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) distributed a vicious mimeographed leaflet titled, "We the Black Community of Philadelphia Demand that the Jewish Community Censor"—and as the object of what obviously should have read "censure," CORE listed the Jewish merchants "who rob and cheat Black people," Jewish "slumlords," Jewish individuals and organizations calling for action against Moore, and those "who continually scream antisemitism as a defense for their own injustice against Black people."

In West Hartford, Conn., a largely Jewish middle-class suburban community, the Black Caucus, under the leadership of John Barber, staged a march for open housing on Yom Kippur night. The group had been conducting marches to end housing discrimination in several Hartford suburbs. In August its demonstration in an Italian section touched off rioting and arrests. However, in West Hartford they were joined by white marchers, some of them Jews.

It was reliably reported that attempts to stop the march on this High Holy Day, had no effect on Barber. When he was cautioned that the march might alienate the Jewish community, he allegedly replied that he was more concerned with Negroes than Jews—or any other liberal group. If Jews

¹⁵ As reported in *Chicago Daily News*, September 30, 1967.

wanted to help, he was quoted as saying, they could start by publicly condemning the "slumlords" and merchants in the ghettos for their shoddy business methods.

The writings of LeRoi Jones, the controversial Negro poet who was arrested during the Newark riots, are examples *par excellence* of Negro antisemitism. His antisemitic style is best exemplified by several poems offered in the December 1967 issue of *Evergreen Review*, a New York avant-garde literary magazine with a tendency toward pornography. One, "The Black Man Is Making New Gods," referred to the "atheist Jews" who have "double-crossed the Negro and stolen his secrets." Jones' bitterness was reflected in the connection he made between Christianity and Judaism in his general attack against the white man:

... They give us
to worship
a dead Jew
and not ourselves
chained to the bounties
of inhuman
mad chains
of dead jews
The empty Jew
betrays us, as he does
hanging stupidly
from a cross, in an oven, the pantomime
of our torture,
so clearly, cinemascope the jews do it
big, hail the whiteness of their
waking up unhip.

The poems were subsequently widely distributed by Liberation News Service, a press service supplying the New Left underground campus and hippie publications.

Jewish Response

Concern over growing Negro antisemitism was challenged by Gary T. Marx in *Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community*¹⁶ (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), based on interviews conducted in 1964 with 1,119 Negro adults in Chicago, New York, Atlanta, and Birmingham. Marx found that generally there was *less* antisemitism in the Negro community than in the country as a whole. This conclusion was based on an index of antisemitic attitudes, which he constructed from responses to statements about the economic behavior of Jews, their "power" in American society, and their "clannishness—" e.g., "Jews have too much power in the United

¹⁶ It is part of the continuing investigation of antisemitism in American life conducted by the Anti-Defamation League, in conjunction with the University of California Survey Research Center.

States"; "Jews are warm and friendly"; "Jews stick together too much"; "Jews are just as honest as other business men."

Marx found Negro responses showing an index of antisemitism on a par with, or lower than, that of responses by whites to similar statements. Thirty-six per cent of the Negro sample emerged as not antisemitic, 40 per cent as low on the antisemitism scale, 18 per cent high, and 6 per cent very high. Nationally, 24 per cent of Negroes considered Jewish landlords to be better than other white landlords, and 7 per cent worse; 20 per cent said Jewish store owners are better than other white store owners, 7 per cent worse; 34 per cent found Jews better to work for than other whites, 19 per cent worse.

After the summer riots, major Jewish organizations formulated programs aimed at promoting better Jewish-Negro relations. The National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), the coordinating body of nine national Jewish agencies and eighty local Jewish community councils, called on American Jews to intensify their efforts to help the Negro achieve full equality, despite the antisemitic utterances by "black demagogues." NCRAC released a *Guide to Program Planning for Jewish Community Relations in 1967-68*, in which it declared:

Jewish community-relations agencies have a continuing obligation to interpret intensively to the Jewish community the facts of antisemitism among Negroes, its nature, its origins, its real significance, and the effective ways of combating it.

The guide also warned against mistaking "legitimate protest" by Negroes for antisemitism and "exaggerating the true dimensions" of anti-Jewish expressions that may arise. "For the Jewish community to be deflected from its support and advocacy of equality for Negroes on the ground that Negroes are antisemitic," it said, "would not only be self-defeating but to repudiate a fundamental tenet of Jewish tradition—equal justice for all."

NCRAC made the following recommendations to its affiliated groups:

Work for the adoption of appropriate national policies and programs to solve the national problems of slum housing, unemployment, and poverty.

Create wherever feasible community-wide groups to assure proper maintenance of law and order and to take all necessary steps against the misdirection of law enforcement and the subversion of civil liberties.

Establish in each community appropriate procedures and mechanisms for review and appeal of conflicting charges against the local police in coping with outbreaks of racial violence.

In a similar move, the leaders of American Reform Judaism formulated a wide-ranging program to help the Negro achieve full economic, social, and political equality. At the biennial assembly of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC), Albert Vorspan, director of its Commission on Social Action, said: "While anti-Negroism is more pervasive than Negro antisemitism, and while both are dangerous, both are irrelevant to the desperate problems of saving the American city from decay, violence and even insur-

rection." Among other things, it was decided that congregations and rabbis exert moral pressure on "Jewish slumlords and ghetto profiteers . . . [establish] a code of ethical business practices," and participate in such programs as "Project Equality," in which religious institutions pledged to do business only with companies that do not discriminate against Negroes in employment.

Irving Fain, chairman of the Action Committee, cautioned American Jews that, "in this whole area of racial injustice . . . our goal is to take the initiative though it be unpopular. Here we Jews must fulfill our destiny as gadfly to the conscience of mankind."

At its biennial national convention in November, the Jewish Labor Committee called for the forging of a new Negro-labor alliance and restoration of the liberal coalition to fight "the juggernaut of backlash and bigotry which is loose in our midst." The delegates approved resolutions which reaffirmed their support of the Negro civil-rights movement but repudiated extremism, and called for a massive assault on poverty by the adoption of A. Philip Randolph's "Freedom Budget."

To these substantive programs, Jewish leaders added general cautions on Negro animosity toward Jews. A statement, in November, by Arnold Aronson, secretary of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, was typical of others:

Negro antisemitism exists, it is growing, and Jewish leaders should denounce it when it appears.

They also have a right to expect the Negro leadership to denounce it.

But the best way to counter Negro antisemitism is to help wipe out the conditions under which anti-white and anti-Negro bias are both spawned. These are bred in frustration, denial, and want.

THE URBAN CRISIS

In the summer of 1967, rioting, looting, and arson erupted on an unprecedented scale in dozens of cities, large and small. The cold statistics were: 85 persons dead, approximately 3,200 injured, some 16,000 arrested, and estimates of more than \$550 million in property damage. Most of the rioters were Negroes—who, many observers believed, were responding to decades of discrimination, poverty, slum housing in congested ghettos, low-paying jobs, and unemployment.

Two cities, Newark, N.J., and Detroit, Mich., were the scenes of the most serious upheavals. Violence broke out in Newark on July 12, following the arrest of a Negro cab driver. Burning and looting continued for five days and completely destroyed several blocks in the run-down Negro district. The grim totals were 25 persons killed, 1,200 injured, at least 1,600 arrested, and property damage estimated at more than \$15 million. Stokely Carmichael, who was in England at the time, tersely remarked: "In Newark, we applied war tactics of the guerrillas." In Detroit rioting occurred July 23-28.

Here, too, there was widespread looting and violence. The dead numbered 41 and property damage was some \$500 million—the most extensive in any city.

Rioting and violence occurred in scores of other cities and towns across the nation, among them Chicago, Ill., Houston, Tex., Boston, Mass., Syracuse, N.Y., Washington, D.C., Cambridge, Md., Des Moines, Ia., Cincinnati and Dayton, O., Atlanta, Ga., Milwaukee, Wis., San Francisco and Fresno, Cal., and Wichita, Kan. During the June 14 outburst in Dayton, SNCC chairman H. Rap Brown told a crowd: "How can you be nonviolent in America, the most violent country in the world? You better shoot the man to death; that's what he's doing to you." The next night, in Cincinnati, Brown said the city "will be in flames until the hunkie cops get out." On that day he said "SNCC has declared war."

In some cities the uprisings were so violent that National Guard units had to be called in to clear the streets and help impose strict curfews. President Johnson responded to Michigan Governor Romney's July 24 request for federal troops to restore order in Detroit—the first time since 1943 that federal soldiers had to be used in such disorders.

There was no overwhelming evidence that Jewish-owned businesses were the special target of looters during the riots of the past several years. ADL officials from New York, Detroit, Chicago, and Milwaukee reported that Jewish-owned stores were not singled out during the riots in the summer of 1967. Some were "hit" and some were not. In a report on the Newark riots, David Stoloff of the American Jewish Congress maintained:

Approximately 1,200 business establishments were damaged, many of them looted and some fire-bombed. Most of the heavily damaged stores were owned by whites, of whom an estimated 90 per cent were Jews. However, the riots left no overt signs of antisemitism such as swastikas or other markings that might have been expected if antisemitism had been an important factor, nor were any Jewish institutions located in Negro districts touched by the riots.¹⁷

As with general antisemitic vandalism and violence, this statistical census is incomplete, for it cannot offer any real understanding of underlying attitudes. One thing is clear: The Jewish presence in the Negro slums is a fact of American life. In the major cities of the northeast, Jewish business predominates in Negro districts. In the South and West there are considerably fewer Jews in such areas. Whether or not the rioting and looting were purposefully directed at merchants and landlords because they are white and/or Jewish, the results were equally painful, and widened the gulf between black and white.

¹⁷ *The Impact of the Newark Riots of 1967 on the Jewish Community* (New York, American Jewish Congress, 1967; mimeo.).

Public Reaction

The real casualty of the violence was the civil-rights movement itself. As civil disorders increased in 1967, there was a hardening of public attitudes against programs designed to aid Negroes, and an increasing disinclination on the part of Congress to enact civil-rights legislation, or to maintain or expand war on poverty and urban programs. In a poll, conducted in August among members of Congress, governors, and mayors, each respondent singled out joblessness, especially among young Negroes, as the major cause of the urban ghetto riots.¹⁸ There was much less agreement on a solution. The respondents fell into two broad categories: those favoring greater federal, state, and local efforts to solve social problems, and those favoring stiffer punishment for rioters and persons inciting to riot.

Public reactions to the summer turbulence showed even greater differences. Negroes and whites disagreed sharply on the causes of the riots and ways to prevent future trouble.¹⁹ A national Louis Harris survey, released August 14, revealed that among whites interviewed, 45 per cent contended the violence was provoked mainly by "outside agitators," "minority radicals," or "Communist backing." Only 7 per cent of the Negroes took this view: 93 per cent cited Negro frustration over lack of progress on jobs, education, and housing as the prime cause. Another 40 per cent of the whites, generally those at higher educational levels, attributed the riots to the "way Negroes have been treated in the slums and ghettos of the big cities" and "the failure of white society to keep its promises to the Negroes."

Of the whites interviewed in a Gallup Poll (released August 15), 32 per cent said they thought differently about Negroes from "several months" ago. Virtually all in this group said they had less regard or respect for Negroes now, describing them as "too violent," "demanding too much," or "going too far."

In August a Senate subcommittee, chaired by Abraham Ribicoff (Dem., Conn.), began a series of hearings on the role the federal government should play in attacking urban problems. The hearings ended 10 months later, in June 1967, a few weeks before the riots broke out. All social scientists with experience in the cities agreed that the urban problem stemmed from racial injustice and poverty, and that the nation's current urban policies were bankrupt.²⁰ They disagreed, however, on the best way to tackle the problem: Daniel P. Moynihan and Lee Rainwater argued for some form of a guaranteed annual income; Kenneth B. Clark suggested that an agency like the RAND Corporation be created to study urban problems; Herbert J. Gans and Anthony Downs supported massive housing programs.

¹⁸ The poll was conducted by *Congressional Quarterly* and reported in *Congressional Quarterly Guide* (Washington, D.C.), Spring 1968, p. 134.

¹⁹ From public opinion polls, reported *ibid.*, p. 137.

²⁰ "Special Report-Sick Cities, and the Search for a Cure," *Trans-action*, October, 1967, pp. 34-54.

The primary value of these hearings lay in the very fact that they were held. Their occurrence symbolized a growing national concern for and commitment to urban problems and the plight of the Negro as a racial and economic minority group; but the meaning of the concern remained unclear. In a rapidly changing context, the very purposes of traditional "integration" programs—in education, jobs, civil rights, etc.—were undergoing radical redefinition by both the black and white communities. The disparity of opinions within each of these two groups was often as great as the differences between them.

This uncertainty was reflected in the ever-changing meaning of Black Power. The militant essence of the Black Power slogan conveyed the image of H. Rap Brown, the SNCC chairman, and his urgings to violence, his labeling of all whites as "honkeys," his call for Negroes to arm themselves and to burn. The moderate flavor of Black Power was conveyed, for example, by Bayard Rustin's call for a "coalition politics" of liberal blacks and whites, pressing for massive economic and social reforms.

Just what effect these extremes in appeal have had upon the mass of Negroes is unclear. Some of the research reported in 1967 revealed the ambivalence created by "rising expectations." From his 1964 data, Gary Marx predicted that larger proportions of the Negro community would become aroused and militant.²¹ He saw continued progress, in which whites were achieving quicker gains in education, health, and welfare, as one impetus for increasing militancy among Negroes. At the same time, Marx said, his index showed that the more militant Negroes were also the most tolerant and the least anti-white. He found militancy more prevalent among better-educated and more prosperous Negroes. The volatility and instability of the racial situation was reaffirmed by the fact that a half of the sample said riots did some good, and a third felt that violence could help.

A special survey conducted by *Fortune* magazine reported in December that a new mood, marked by a mixture of "hope and anger," was emerging among American Negroes.²² The study rejected what it described as a prevalent myth about urban Negroes—that they had little sense of priorities and small desire to help themselves. Better education for their children, better jobs, more job training, more police protection, and neighborhood improvement were among the goals cited by those interviewed. Seventy-five per cent felt their condition was better than it had been in recent years. Almost half of all those interviewed were more angry than they had been a few years ago. Three out of four Negroes felt more hopeful that the problems of blacks would be solved, while four per cent were less hopeful. A majority endorsed the aggressive, nonviolent tactics of the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., whereas more than a third advocated more violent tactics. The survey also found a new feeling about integration:

²¹ *Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).

²² Roger Beardwood, "The New Negro Mood," *Fortune*, January, 1968, pp. 146–51 ff.

One Negro in 20 of those interviewed rejects integration as a primary objective; in the 16 to 25 age group, the proportion is nearly double. At the other extreme, about one Negro in 10 wants integration in every sense of the word—i.e., believes in the dismantling of all racial barriers. But a substantial majority of urban Negroes—77 per cent—opt for “limited integration.” To them, integration is useful mainly as a means to equal opportunity and increased self-respect.

The report found that, thus far at least, the radicalization of the Negro protest movement had not gained the support of the overwhelming number of black Americans, despite the succession of major events since 1964—the Watts riots, the shooting of James Meredith in Mississippi, the death of Malcolm X, the birth of Black Power, and the spread of rioting and looting to black slums in scores of American cities. By the end of 1967 conflicts over goals and approaches in the black community seemed to be adding up to an impetus for black separatism, a movement reportedly endorsed by many white liberals (*New York Times*, December 17, 1967). Its rising momentum, based on the feeling that Negro institutions must be built up first, further complicated the problem.

The Storm over Urban Education

The 1966 Coleman report²³ stirred a controversy which continued in 1967. Its main thesis was that lower-class children perform better in schools with high proportions of middle-class students. In its report on *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*, released in February, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights²⁴ made the logical extension from class to race, contending that only massive school integration will result in educational progress for Negro children.

The Coleman report itself was attacked on substantive and methodological grounds.²⁵ One aspect of the controversy centered around the opposing values of integrated education vs. segregated schools. Joseph Alsop argued that the quality of educational programming in predominantly Negro urban schools was far more important than black-white student ratios. For, he said, regardless of efforts to integrate schools, “the great majority of ghetto children are inevitably going to be educated in *ghetto schools* for a very long time to come; and this is why the prospects of *improved education in the ghettos* now constitute a subject of such urgent interest and importance.”

23 James S. Coleman and others, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Office of Education, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 1966), Washington, D.C., 737 p.

24 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 2 vols. Appendices), 276, 293 pp.

25 See: Meg Greenfield, “What is Racial Balance in the Schools?,” *The Reporter*, March 23, 1967; “Review Symposium” (on the Coleman report), *American Sociological Review*, June 1967; Joseph Alsop, “No More Nonsense About Ghetto Education,” *New Republic*, July 22, 1967; Charles Silberman, “A Devastating Report on U.S. Education,” *Fortune*, August 1967; Robert Schwartz, Thomas Pettigrew, and Marshall Smith, “Fake Panaceas for Ghetto Education,” *New Republic*, Sept. 23, 1967, and Alsop’s rebuttal, “Ghetto Education,” *New Republic*, November 18, 1967.

Opponents contended that the experience of integrated schooling would have greater value in education and socialization.

The slow and seemingly inadequate response of boards of education, in New York and elsewhere, to the proposals for change highlighted the urgency of the educational problem. The connection between school issues, race relations, and living patterns in the cities was evident in the responses of fiscal conservatives, who would curtail expenditures, and public-office seekers, who based their campaign on open or covert promises to oppose busing and similar programs. Such appeals served only to harden attitudes, especially among those less inclined to accept the responsibilities for cooperative social reform.

The great concentration upon education as the key to the socio-economic and racial liberation of the Negro was reflected in the unprecedented anger aimed at the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) for its strike against the New York City Board of Education in September. UFT's action was widely condemned as doing damage to the education of black children. The resultant controversy highlighted the issue of unionism vs. professionalism and the extent to which the teacher had become a special focus of public attention. It also revealed the expectations—that the school would play the primary role in creating and altering future economic and social roles.

In New York City the storm over educational policies also revealed active hostilities and intergroup tensions.²⁶ A group of black teachers, members of the African-American Teachers Association (formerly the Negro Teachers' Association), took violent issue with UFT and announced that they would work during the strike. Congress of Racial Equality leaders in Brooklyn called upon the Board of Education to send striking teachers to Vietnam. Their stands produced angry confrontations with pickets, in some cases actually making it impossible to maintain a picket line.

Of equal concern was the fact that the controversy over education became the arena for the release of certain Negro hostility towards New York City Jews. One incident, in June, involved the distribution of antisemitic literature in teachers' mailboxes at P.S. 284 in Brooklyn, telling Jewish teachers, in specific and vulgar language, to get out. Various Brooklyn CORE officials, who were blamed for these outrages, called the charges fictitious and a cover-up for the poor quality of education in many schools in Brooklyn's Negro neighborhoods. The breakdown of school discipline and of community-school relations at this and other schools in the city moved many teachers to declare their intentions of leaving. At P.S. 284 the faculty members, many of them Jews, viewed the incident as just one aspect of a generally threatening attitude toward the schools.

The turmoil over education in the slums often made it difficult to distinguish specific antisemitic feelings from general anti-white hostilities. But the large number of Jewish teachers and administrators in New York's school system tended to increase the likelihood that criticism of the edu-

²⁶ Deborah Meier, "The New York Teachers' Strike," *Midstream*, December 1967.

cational establishment at times would have antisemitic overtones. Floyd McKissick, national director of CORE, condemned all expressions of anti-semitism and threats of violence, and reaffirmed the March 1966 CORE policy statement, advocating the expulsion of anyone espousing such "evil doctrine."

Open Housing

Another focus of civil-rights protest activity in 1967 was open housing. In Milwaukee, Wisc., Father James E. Groppi, assistant pastor of St. Boniface Roman Catholic Church, began a series of marches in August to induce the city council to pass a strong open-housing ordinance. Father Groppi, who is white but who was quoted as having said, "I am a Negro with white skin," attracted nationwide attention. His demonstrations soon assumed the form of a movement. Its heart was the Milwaukee Youth Council of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

In all, Groppi led between 200 and 2,000 Negroes and some whites in about 200 nightly demonstrations against such acts of discrimination as the white-only membership practice of the Milwaukee Eagles Club—to which all top city officials belonged, and the city's repeated refusal to enact an open-housing law. The marches divided the Catholics, more than a third of the area's residents. Archbishop William E. Cousins of Milwaukee refused to stop Father Groppi because he believed that the majority of Catholics supported him.

The mounting tension became evident on September 9, when Father Groppi led 1,000 Negro and white civil-rights marchers into the heart of Milwaukee's predominantly Polish Catholic southside district. The white crowds of the neighborhood, carrying placards with such slogans as "Burn Groppi, Burn," aimed most of their dissatisfaction at him. On their trek across the local bridge, connecting the Negro and Polish districts (it is a local joke that the half-mile-long viaduct is the longest bridge in the world because it connects Africa and Poland), the marchers were greeted by shouts of "Sieg Heil, Sieg Heil," from a group of white men who gave the Nazi salute.

The Jewish community in Milwaukee was placed in an especially precarious position. On the one hand, its lay leaders and rabbis, who had been supporting open housing from the beginning, increased their pressure for such legislation in paid newspaper advertisements and clear statements of their positions in news stories. On the other hand, however, they tried to avoid direct association with Father Groppi and his Youth Council movement. This labeled them as reluctant liberals, unwilling to plunge into the battle which would prod the city into action.

The national headquarters of some Jewish groups working for civil rights inquired why participation of local Jews in the Groppi marches was not greater, and whether they should send delegations to the marches. They were informed that such action would very likely alienate local Jews and drive a

wedge between them and their neighbors. Quite a few individual young Jewish men and women did participate in the marches.

In September the Milwaukee Jewish Council announced its strong support for enactment of a municipal ordinance guaranteeing to all, regardless of race, the right to buy, rent, or lease property. It urged the city council "to show the moral leadership so desperately needed," and called on the state legislature "to enact enabling legislation if such were required." The statement also expressed the Jewish Council's "deep concern with the events of recent days which have witnessed intolerable bigotry and violence, the brandishing of swastikas and other racist symbols on public streets, the appearance of self-styled Nazis and their ilk in our community, who are attempting to exploit the emotionally charged atmosphere for their evil purposes."

On December 13 the Milwaukee Common Council passed an open-housing ordinance, which, however, was far weaker than the one demanded by the civil-rights groups during their three-and-a-half-month demonstrations. The ordinance simply restated the provisions of the state law, which did not apply to an estimated 66 per cent of the housing in Milwaukee. The only change was the transfer of enforcement powers from a state agency to the city attorney's office. Father Groppi's reply was that the demonstrations would continue and intensify. He called the Milwaukee marches "perhaps one of the last tests of peaceful demonstration for racial goals." "If this fails," he said, "the young militants would then be able to say you marched for that many days and that many of your people went to jail and nothing happened. Violence then would be inevitable."

GROUP TENSION IN POLITICS

The dominant issues in the off-year elections had crystallized: American policy in Vietnam and race conflict in the cities. In some areas the question of race impelled more voters to go to the polls than in any other by-election year. Backlash, an important factor in the 1966 voting, figured prominently in elections in Buffalo, Boston, Gary, Cleveland, and New Jersey. Religious prejudice was a discernible aspect of the campaigns in Kentucky, New York State, and Philadelphia.

Anti-integration Candidates

Two women candidates, who spoke up against changes in the status quo and thus against school integration, met different fates at the polls. In Buffalo Mrs. Alfreda Slominski, a Republican, received the highest vote for city council, shaking loose one of the seats formerly held in tight control by the Democratic majority. Mrs. Louise Hicks in Boston, with a similar political stance and a comparable white ethnic constituency, met defeat, primarily because Negroes turned out in large numbers to vote for her opponent in

the race for mayor. Of all the registered Negroes in Boston, 69 per cent went to the polls; Kevin White received 83 per cent of their vote.

Election of Negro Mayors

Both in Gary, Ind., and in Cleveland, O., Negroes were candidates for mayor, and in both elections Negroes voted in unusually high proportions. In Cleveland 80 per cent of all registered Negroes turned up at the polls, and of these, 95 per cent voted for the Democrat Carl Stokes, the Negro candidate. In Gary, Negro voters turned out in higher proportion than whites, and were able, by a bare plurality, to elect the Negro Democrat Richard Hatcher.

White voters in both communities could not break habits of prejudice. In Cleveland the party lost about 80,000 Democrats, who voted for the white Republican candidate; in Gary, Hatcher received only about 17 per cent of the white vote.

New Jersey Backlash and Counter-backlash

In the New Jersey elections for the state legislature there was an unexpected and sweeping upset of the Democratic majority. Newly-elected Republican senators and assemblymen outnumbered Democrats 3 to 1, despite the fact that Governor Richard Hughes, a Democrat, had been reelected by a landslide as recently as 1965. Informed opinion attributed the strong defection from the Democratic party to a white backlash, intensified by the Newark riot, by fears about school busing and a Negro invasion of the suburbs, by suburban resentment of high taxes to pay for inner-city problems, and by a general mistrust of Governor Hughes's numerous legislative innovations.

Only one community, Englewood, went against the tide. Here, for the first time in 56 years, the mayor and other city officers elected were Democrats. The five-to-one Democratic vote was a tribute to the decisive action taken by the Negro community and those, like Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, whose consciences were aroused by the overtones of racism in the local Republican campaign.

Religion

Kentucky, where registered Democrats outnumbered Republicans 2 to 1, elected its first Republican governor in 20 years. Lou B. Nunn, a conservative, pro-Goldwater Republican, won 51.2 per cent of the votes after a singularly colorless campaign, whose main feature was opposition to Johnson's Vietnam policy. His Democratic opponent, Henry L. Ward, was in essential agreement with him on domestic issues; he took no stand at all on the war. The real issue contested in Kentucky was not Vietnam, but civil rights. In a tense primary election Nunn defeated a more liberal Republican, County Judge Marlon W. Cook, whom he accused of having "consorted" with the

wealthy, liberal Louisville Jews of the Louisville-Jefferson County Human Relations Commission. In the rural areas of the south-eastern Bible Belt, Nunn's supporters distributed anti-Catholic literature (Cook is a Catholic); in urban areas they promoted the image of Cook as a renegade Republican, who "coddled and encouraged agitators" during a Negro open-housing demonstration and would deliver the Kentucky delegation in 1968 to the "Romney-Javits ticket."

The Republican national leadership came to Nunn's aid when he won the primary, sending in prominent Republicans to speak for him. In a last minute deal with right-wing Democrats (such as former Governor A. B. "Happy" Chandler), they were able to deliver a split vote—conspicuous in Democratic voting in western Kentucky—that elected Nunn as governor and the Democrat Wendell Ford as lieutenant-governor. In the cities the choice between Nunn, a conservative Republican, and Ward, a non-liberal Democrat, evoked no partisan enthusiasm, with the result that the Negro turn-out was less than 75 per cent of what it had been in the 1963 election.

In Philadelphia the Democratic incumbent James H. J. Tate, a loyal party man and a Catholic, defeated Arlen Specter, a liberal Republican and a Jew, for mayor. The scene of one of the nation's first riots, in August 1964, Philadelphia had continued to have problems of race conflict and inner-city tensions. Under the Democrats, Negroes were able to find civil-service jobs, were admitted to all labor unions, and held a fair number of electoral positions. But housing, unemployment, and education remained sources of tension. For reasons of internal politics Tate did not have the Democratic machine behind him, but he did command the loyalty of ward captains and union leaders. Tate also needed the Catholic vote—according to 1960 estimates, Philadelphia had 3½ times as many Catholics as Jews—and in courting it, he appeared to assume an anti-Jewish posture. Specter's spectacular vote-getting ability when he ran for district attorney and his liberal, sophisticated approach to the race problem won him the great majority of liberal and Jewish votes, but not quite enough to win.

The New York state election was of a different dimension. It was not a choice between candidates but a referendum on whether to reject or accept a new constitution. The proposed charter included a number of liberal reforms, but also a repeal of the provision against the use of state money for church-affiliated schools. Proponents and opponents of the proposed constitution were divided mainly on the church-state issue. Those whose interest lay in parochial schools—Catholics and Orthodox Jews—were for the charter; those who, above all, believed in the sanctity of church-state separation—most Jewish and Protestant groups—voted no. However, the pattern was not universal. Many Catholics, more concerned about higher taxes, ignored the advice of their religious leaders and joined the 72.4 per cent who voted down the proposed constitution in the referendum. Many Negroes voted for it.

INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS

Church-State, Education, and the Supreme Court

In October the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments on whether taxpayers could challenge Federal grants to church-related institutions on the ground that they violated the principle of separation of church and state. The Court granted appeal in the *Fast v. Gardner* case, in which seven New York taxpayers challenged the constitutionality of Federal aid to parochial schools under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 134-35). Sponsored jointly by the American Jewish Congress, the New York Civil Liberties Union (CLU), the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), and the United Parents Association (UPA), the test case was brought against Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John W. Gardner and Commissioner of Education Harold Howe 2nd. The individual complainants were Mrs. Florence Fast, president of UPA; Mrs. Helen D. Henkin, former president of UPA; Albert Shanker, president of UFT; Frank Abrams and C. Irving Dwork, officials of the American Jewish Congress; Mrs. Florence Levin, a tax-payer, and Mrs. Helen D. Bittenwieser, a lawyer and member of N.Y. CLU.

A decision in this case would have broad implications for a wide variety of federal spending programs that annually allot millions of dollars to church-related institutions for programs in higher education, health, research, and anti-poverty and welfare projects. A ruling in this case would be the first Supreme Court action since 1923 when the court ruled, in *Frothingham v. Mellon*, that taxpayers could not sue in such cases because their share of the tax burden was too small to give them a real interest in the decision. This precedent has largely prevented judicial consideration of federal aid to sectarian schools.

The court's decision to accept the case was hailed in a joint statement by the four organizations sponsoring the suit as having "paved the way to an authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality of Federal aid to religious schools."

Abortion Law Reform in New York State

The attempt to liberalize New York's 84-year-old abortion law stirred a significant political, social, and religious controversy in the state. In January Assemblyman Albert Blumenthal (Dem.) of Manhattan introduced a bill in the state legislature to expand the present law which allows an abortion only when necessary to save the mother's life. The Blumenthal bill would also have permitted abortions when continued pregnancy would "permanently or materially" impair the mother's physical health or so impair her mental health as to make her "a mentally ill person as defined in the [state's] mental-hygiene law;" when there was substantial risk that the child would be born

physically deformed or mentally defective; when the pregnancy resulted from incest or first- or second-degree rape; or when the pregnancy occurred while the woman was mentally ill or mentally defective.

Catholic opposition to the bill was intense. On February 12 a pastoral letter, read at all masses in most of the state's 1,700 Catholic churches, declared:

Since laws which allow abortion violate the unborn child's God-given right, we are opposed to any proposal to extend them. We urge you most strongly to do all in your power to prevent direct attacks upon the lives of unborn children.

The pastoral letter was the first ever issued jointly by the bishops of New York's eight dioceses. Earlier, Richard Cardinal Cushing of Boston had urged "all persons of good will to unite in opposition" to nationwide movements for revising abortion laws. Catholic opposition was based on the religious teaching that a fetus is a human being from the moment of conception and that its destruction therefore constitutes murder.

The Blumenthal bill had the endorsement of medical societies, civic groups, and Protestant and Jewish organizations. Support among medical groups came from the New York Academy of Medicine, County Medical Society, Obstetrical Society, and Gynecological Society. Polls indicated that 90 per cent of the psychiatrists and 85 per cent of the gynecologists in the state also favored the reform.

In a joint statement issued on February 25, the Protestant Council of the City of New York, the New York Federation of Reform Synagogues, the Association of Reform Rabbis, and the (Conservative) New York Metropolitan Region of the United Synagogue of America called the Roman Catholic Church's posture in efforts to liberalize the abortion law "harsh and unbending." The groups maintained that their support of these efforts was based on the same "concern for human life as Catholic opposition, and that the contemporary spirit of ecumenism had not been reflected in the public discussion to this point." Read by Dr. Norman Vincent Peale, the statement declared that religious groups must "respect each other's differences as well as their much greater areas of agreement if ecumenism is to have any real meaning."

Catholic opposition, although widespread and intense, was not total. Under the leadership of Ethan C. Eldon, a Catholic and executive director of the New York Committee of Democratic Voters, the parent organization of New York city's Reform Democrats, a group of 40 Roman Catholic laymen, most of them active in the organization, broke with the Church's position and urged passage of the bill. In a brief statement, they said that while "we as Catholics may believe that the abortion of a child is both wrong and sinful, this should not be imposed on persons of other faiths," and that legislation should be passed "to allow individuals the free exercise of their conscience."

The controversy seemingly also affected Blumenthal's status in the legislature. When it was revealed in February that Assembly Speaker Anthony

Travia (Dem. Bklyn.), had removed Blumenthal as chairman of the influential Democratic advisory committee, there was speculation that the move had been brought on by differences over the abortion law reform. On March 7 the Assembly codes committee voted 15 to 3 against reporting the bill to the floor.

Sabbath Observance

In the middle-class suburban community of Merrick-Bellmore, Long Island, N.Y., which has equal numbers of Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic residents, the question of sabbath observance was raised in connection with the scheduling of local school events. In the spring Jason Bauch, a cantor, requested the school board to reschedule Friday-night events so that his sons could participate. The board, having rejected the request, subsequently turned to the Merrick Clergy Council representing the major religious faiths, for advice. The council recommended in June that school events not be scheduled either on the Jewish Sabbath or the Christian Sunday "out of respect for the religious integrity of the community."

The board rejected this recommendation, and instead adopted a policy which allowed for requests to reschedule events within two weeks of their initial announcement, specifying reasons for the change, proposing alternate dates, and estimating the number of people affected. This policy was protested in December at a meeting called by the seven Jewish congregations in the area and attended by more than 700 persons. Petitions gathered at two Roman Catholic churches and an Episcopalian church also protested the board's action.

EDWARD T. ROGOWSKY

Rightist Extremism

AN ASSESSMENT of the current state of the right-wing movement, particularly of the lunatic fringe, must consider its reaction to two 1967 events that deeply affected the American people: the summer race riots and the Middle East conflict in June.

Race Riots

Contrary to expectations, the gutter bigots, racists, and native American stormtroopers failed to exploit the rioting in many of America's large cities (p. 247). Membership recruitment, fund raising, and national publicity, all seemed obtainable to organized hatemongers in the early days of the uprisings. All that racist organizations needed to achieve some measure of identity as fighters for white America and to exploit the rising resentment against the Negro rioters, was to be physically present. The hate press, their advance men, and membership recruiters had long proclaimed their leaders and their organizations to be the saviors of the white race, excepting, of course, the Jews. Respectable or status groups, such as the John Birch Society, which were publicly committed to preserving the status quo of the Negroes under the guise of saving America from internal subversion, had for more than a decade claimed that all civil-rights efforts were part of a Communist plot. Nevertheless, the ultra-rightists' response to the riots was merely a collective "we told you so."

For many months before the riots broke out, militant black leaders, speaking under the auspices of such organizations as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Black Panthers, Mau Maus, Revolutionary Action Movement, publicly urged ghetto uprisings and death to the white man. Yet, neither the Ku Klux Klan, nor other antisemitic and violently anti-Negro groups were in evidence during the riots. The reason was that, with the exception of the various Southern-based movements, they have all but disappeared. The assassination of George Lincoln Rockwell has led to the virtual dissolution of the American Nazi party, and the hundred odd members of the Georgia-based National States Rights party lacked the necessary commitment and mobility to take action even close to home, in the Atlanta ghetto.

However the hate literature of these groups exploited the riots for their own ends. In Newark, there was widespread distribution of antisemitic and racist material. *Common Sense* (Union, N.J.)—once the most widely distributed hate sheet in the United States, but now published only sporadically—ran a special printing of its May 1, 1967 issue for the large circulation in the ghetto. It called the rise of Negro antisemitism a setback for Zionist plotters,

and used standard canards to explain why Jews were disliked by Negroes. National Renaissance party literature, produced by the relatively small and insignificant Yorkville group, also found its way into the hands of Negroes in the ghetto.

The John Birch Society maintained that Communist influence and involvement in planning and executing the riots was all pervasive. (J. Edgar Hoover, in testimony before the President's Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders in August, indicated that, while outside agitators played a role in the ghetto riots of 1967, there was no evidence of any conspiracy, and no evidence had been uncovered indicating a relationship between the riots in one city and those of another.) Billy James Hargis, in the August-September 1967 issue of the *Christian Crusade*, denounced the "gelatine manner in which the crisis was handled in Washington, D.C." The National Economic Council, in its *Economic Council Letter*, September 1, 1967, maintained that "in the past political leaders never questioned their obligation to maintain the civil peace forces; and law-enforcement agencies never questioned their responsibility to enforce the law." Others denounced what they called "preferential treatment" of Negroes and asked whether the passage of more civil rights laws would not in fact give the Negro greater license to loot, burn, and pillage.

The hate press played heavily on the theme of a "Negro threat" to white America. Gerald L. K. Smith screeched in banner headlines in *The Cross and The Flag*, October 1967, "The Black Revolution Is On—Anarchy in Force!—America on Fire," and blamed the riots on the Supreme Court, "the sappy preachers, insipid educators—and Moscow-trained agitators." *The Thunderbolt*, official publication of the National States Rights party, bitterly protested that Negroes were given jobs as a reward for bloody rebellion; and *White Power*, the American Nazi party successor publication to the *Rockwell Report*, urged its followers: "The time was now at hand to stop the blacks."

The casualness of the Ku Klux Klan's response to the riots was surprising. *Fiery Cross*, official publication of the United Klans of America, merely deplored the eruption of violence and complained that its press releases on the riots were ignored by the newspapers. Subsequent Klan claims that it dispatched armed resistance groups to white areas to resist "Negro gangs which were roaming Newark" appeared to be nothing more than a sop to impress its members. Responsible police officials in Newark reported no Klan presence during the 1967 riots.

Middle-East Crisis

America's right wing and, indeed, the ultraconservatives, have not been distinguished for their friendliness or sympathy for Israel. For years they called the Jewish state "socialistic" and, as such, anathema to America's right wing. To some, Zionism somehow was thought to be akin to Communism, and editors of right-wing journals did little to clear up this misconception. Therefore it was surprising that a section of the right wing, those organiza-

tions with no programmed antisemitism, circumspectly, but unmistakably, showed a pro-Israel attitude. In the tense May days leading up to the actual outbreak of hostilities, there was some demand in their publications that the United States live up to its commitments to Israel by making arms available, and to help break the Egyptian blockade of the Strait of Tiran. However, the majority remained silent during a crisis, which in previous years and with different antagonists might have produced a harshly critical reaction.

It was only after Israel's military victory and the confirmation of Russian involvement that the rightists came out strongly for Israel. Among the loudest in praise was the John Birch Society.¹ Its organ *Review of the News* of July 5, 1967, in an unaccustomed vein, observed that "the nasty Israelis had put an end to the Russo-American scheme to install Comrade Gamel as undisputed Communist gauleiter in the area." With more characteristic severity, the publication also declared that the United States "should treat the Israelis exactly as we should have treated the Hungarians if they had won in 1956 we should support them—firmly, openly and decisively."

Surprising, too, was the mild reaction to the sinking by the Israelis of the *Liberty*, and the resultant loss of 44 American lives. With some exceptions, the right-wing press castigated the Defense Department for its "stupidity" in dispatching what was generally conceded to be an electronics intelligence-gathering ship to the war zone, and played down the fact that the ship was sunk by Israeli torpedoes at pointblank range.

The overwhelming Israeli military victory became the springboard for the rightist charge that United States policy towards Russia was timid, and for the advice that where Communist-oriented states confronted the United States, a "damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead" policy was the only effective and typically American response. But, above all, the magnitude of the Arab defeat provided the right wing with a rare opportunity to gloat over the reverses of the Soviet Union. However, on balance, it would be justifiable to conclude that the right wing did not love Israel more, but rather that it loved Nasser and the Russians less.

By contrast, the lunatic fringe antisemitic movement was in a difficult situation because of the contending forces in the Middle East war. For years they had proclaimed that Communism was but another manifestation of the international Jewish conspiracy. An enduring antisemitic equation has been that Judaism was Zionism, and Zionism was Communism. How then explain away Jewish armies fighting forces backed by Communist Russia?

Ultimately, Edward Fields, like most antisemites, maintained that "a giant hoax is being perpetrated upon the American people. They're being fooled into believing that Communist Russia is supporting the Arabs in their confrontation with Israel." It was only reasonable, wrote Fields, that the "heavily Jewish Soviet government would certainly aid their fellow Jews in Israel."

¹ An endorser of the John Birch Society, a major contributor to right-wing causes, contributed \$300,000 to the United Jewish Appeal of Greater New York's emergency fund-raising campaign for Israel (*New York Times*, June 13, 1967).

Gerald L. K. Smith saw the Mid-East crisis as a "Jewish conspiracy" to "start a third world war in the Middle East, hoping that we [the United States] will enter it and thus be compelled to withdraw our forces from the Orient and surrender to Communism." He asked rhetorically, "Now will we fight World War III to enthrone the Jews and enslave the Arabs and later ourselves?"

Thunderbolt, *Common Sense*, and *The Cross and the Flag*, all sought to prove at great length that the Russians were not really supporting the Arabs. Indeed, the July 1967 *Thunderbolt* attempted at some length to "prove" that Russia had made a "secret deal with Israel not to help the Arabs."

If the right-wing extremist press sought to play down the sinking of the *Liberty*, the hate press used the tragedy as a reason to hate the perfidious Jews. *The Thunderbolt* demanded vengeance, while *Common Sense* brought old slogans up to date, "Remember the Alamo, remember Pearl Harbor, remember the *Liberty*."

Arab Propaganda

In the wake of the six-day war, Arab propaganda in the United States increased perceptibly. In contrast to such efforts after the 1956 Arab-Israel hostilities, when professional propagandists tried to engage the antisemitic hate press in a campaign against Jews and Israel, the propaganda thrust in 1967 was a do-it-yourself venture. In the main, Arab students, Arab intellectuals, and Arab professors teaching on American college campuses articulated the Arab point of view. The quick closing of Egyptian and other Arab embassies and consulates in the United States in protest against alleged American military assistance to Israel, deprived the Arabs of more professional spokesmen.

Data and materials were supplied by the Arab information centers, maintained by the Arab League in New York, Dallas, Chicago, and San Francisco. Their propaganda, apparently carefully designed to avoid the charge of pandering to anti-Jewish prejudice, that frequently combined the legitimate presentation of the Arab point of view with the kind of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist propaganda that aroused hostility against all Jews. Official Arab statements concentrated on Israeli "atrocities," using photographs of napalmed victims of Israeli "aggression" and the plight of the Arab refugees, and contained many accusations of pro-Israel bias or Zionist control of the American press. There were frequent allegations of wanton civilian killings, bombings of hospitals, and looting by Israeli soldiers, as well as assertions that Israel, peopled largely by victims of Hitler's cruelty, had a war machine hardly distinguishable from Nazi militarists—a charge subsequently repeated by Communist and left-wing sources in the United States.

Ku Klux Klan

The Ku Klux Klan failed to make significant membership gains in 1967. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, in his annual report to the United States Attorney General on FBI activities in 1967 (released January 1968), declared that the 14 Klan organizations concentrated in the South had a total membership of 14,000 to 15,000. On December 11, 1967 the House Un-American Activities Committee made public a final report² based on a three-year investigation of the Ku Klux Klan, which stated that, as of January 1967, the total Klan membership, exclusive of a handful of Northern adventurers, was 16,810. It would appear from these reports that the Klan in the South dropped during a period of heightened racial tensions.

The dominant characteristic of today's Ku Klux Klan continued to be its fragmentation—in sharp contrast to the flourishing, monolithic invisible empire it had been in the 1920s. The number of Klan groups fluctuated from month to month, but federal authorities pinpointed it as between 14 and 17. All these groups adhere to the broad organizational objectives of white supremacy, anti-Communism, anti-Catholicism and antisemitism, and had similar rituals and insignia. But the constant struggle for control among various competing leaders unwilling to share authority and, of course Klan-derived income, doubtless was an important factor in the failure of the groups to unite. Another was the absence of a leader, who was able to consolidate the various factions.

The largest and most influential of all American Klan groups was the Alabama-based United Klans of America, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, led by Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton of Tuscaloosa. Other Klans known to be functioning in 1967 were the Association of Arkansas Klans; the Association of Georgia Klans; the Association of South Carolina Klans; the Dixie Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klans Inc.; Improved Order of the United States Klans, Knights of the Ku Klux Klans, Inc.; Militant Knights of the Ku Klux Klans; Mississippi Knights of the Ku Klux Klans; National Knights of the Ku Klux Klans, Inc.; Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klans; United States Klans, Knights of the United States Klans Inc.; United Florida Ku Klux Klans; United Knights of the Ku Klux Klans, and White Knights of the Ku Klux Klans.

Besides the off-again on-again existence of skeletal Klaverns in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Wisconsin, New York, New Jersey, and Michigan, with an estimated combined membership of 500, Klan efforts to secure a foothold outside the old Confederacy were unsuccessful. The units north of the Mason-Dixon line proved to be little more than outlets for individuals, enamored of Klan paraphernalia and ritual. Indeed, *Detroit News* reporter Michael Maharry, who penetrated the city's Ku Klux Klan and reported his

² *The Present Day Ku Klux Klan Movement: Report by the Committee on Un-American Activities*, House of Representatives, 90th Congress, First Session, p. 19.

findings in a series of five articles concluded (April 14, 1967 issue), that the members of the Klan in Michigan, the largest of any state, except the South, "do not engage in organized violence. They do not use threats or intimidation to 'keep the niggers in their place'." Reporter Maharry noted that, in fact, "they don't do much of anything."

The year's most startling development in Klan activity in the North was the December 28 disclosure by Chicago Police Superintendent James B. Conlisk, Jr., that a year-long investigation by his department had uncovered six city patrolmen who were members of the Ku Klux Klan and that a raid on their homes produced a supply of weapons, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, and a quantity of hate literature. While Klan penetration of police departments and sheriff's offices in the deep South was not uncommon, the Chicago affiliation was the first known case of Northern police department membership since the 1920s.

At the end of 1967 the Ku Klux Klan had lost all popular appeal. With the main thrust of the summer's riots in Northern cities, it failed to recruit members among Northern whites. In the South, which, with the exception of Atlanta, was spared racial disorders, but nonetheless was apprehensive about Negro militancy, membership declined.

Perhaps, primary among reasons for the Klan's failure to exert a major role in Southern life was that Klan attitudes on the Negro were now shared by a substantial majority of Southerners. Legitimate Negro aspirations could be thwarted through the ballot box, a much safer and easier method than bullets or burnings. Then, too, the Klan for all its romanticized past, has suffered a total loss of status. Status is important in Southern life, and the Klan has lost it because the genteel folk of white Southern society look with abhorrence on the Klan's crudities and disrespect for law and order. Even the widespread use of scores of front organizations operating as hunting, fishing, or gun clubs (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], p. 125), a thinly disguised way of providing Klan affiliation without the present stigma attached to membership, failed to lure the wary.

Another significant factor which discouraged membership was the growing inclination by local authorities to prosecute Klansmen for indictable acts of violence. More importantly, there was a discernible effort by the federal government to step in and prosecute in situations where city, country, or state was reluctant to enforce the law when breached by Klansmen, or where local juries refused either to indict or convict despite damning evidence. Utilizing the broad "conspiracy against the rights of citizens" section of the U.S. Code (Section 241, Title 18), the U.S. Department of Justice prosecuted members of the United Klans of America who had been accused and absolved of the fatal shooting of Lt. Col. Lemuel Penn, a prominent Negro federal official, on a Georgia highway in July 1964.

In a far-reaching and significant case, the Justice Department took legal action against seven Mississippi Klan terrorists who were convicted in October

by a federal court, with a Mississippi empaneled jury, of participating in a Ku Klux Klan conspiracy to murder three young civil rights workers in Neshoba County. That a federal jury of Mississippi citizens convicted white Mississippians, though on a conspiracy rather than a murder charge, after repeated nonfeasance in local courts was a serious, if not fatal, blow to the survival of the indigenous White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, the most violent of all Klan splinter groups in the United States. Damaging testimony was offered against the defendants by federal agents who had infiltrated the Klan and become key leaders. FBI penetration of various Klans also was a strong deterrent to the growth of Klan membership.

Despite anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish trappings, the overriding Klan objective remained the preservation of "white supremacy," as indicated by the hearings. Violence attributable to the Klan has been targeted against Negroes or those whites indicted by the Klan as "nigger lovers." The House Un-American Activities Committee noted³ that there were relatively few reports of any overt Klan action aimed against Jews and Catholics in recent years, and concluded:

Klan activity targeted against Jews appears in the main to consist of the dissemination of anti-Semitic literature seeking to create animosity and social ostracism of Jews and indeed Catholics and aliens.⁴ The extent and quantity of such literature cannot be measured, but its distinguishing characteristic promotes the underlying theme that contemporary scallawags are the "alien thieves and traitors who control the United States government and the Communist-directed combination of Negroes and Jews."

John Birch Society

Despite reports in the early part of 1967 of a precipitous drop in the membership of the society, it managed to show signs of a rapid recovery. Receipts for the year totaled \$4,258,000, as against \$4,089,000 in 1966. Birch Society members spent another estimated \$1.5 million on billboards and local advertising, and planned to hire eight new full-time and 24 part-time coordinators. The Birchites were able to send to various congressmen mass petitions with 675,000 signatures, urging an all-out drive for a Vietnam victory. The Birch Society fronts TACT (Truth About Civil Turmoil), Support Your Local Police, and TRAIN (To Restore American Independence Now) were active on the local level. With the exception of the lunatic fringe, America's ultra-right wing never officially espoused a hate program. Yet, there has been increasing seepage of antisemitism into the movement. The John Birch Society, which remained the largest, most tightly disciplined, and perhaps most effective right wing extremist group, continued to promote the works of antisemitic authoress Nesta Webster, while its founder, Robert Welch, dis-

³ *The Present-Day Ku Klux Klan Movement*, op. cit., p. 75.

⁴ The perpetrators of bombing outrages in the fall of 1967 against the home and synagogue of Jackson, Miss. Rabbi Perry Nussbaum, an outspoken advocate of Negro civil rights, while presumed to be Klansmen, have not as yet been positively identified (p. 238).

missed the whole issue of antisemitism in America by simply calling it one of the chief Communist weapons. According to him, the Communist method of doing irreparable harm to anti-Communists was to accuse them of antisemitism. But in order to do so, the Communists logically must insure that there is enough antisemitism by fomenting it.

Liberty Lobby

Liberty Lobby grew in importance as a catalyst of extreme rightist activity. Its publication *Liberty Letter*, as reported by *Group Research Report* of December 29, 1967, had the widest circulation of any right-wing publication. Originally formed to influence pending legislation, Liberty Lobby now openly called for the capture of the Republican party. Columnist Drew Pearson, in a series of newspaper articles apparently based on Liberty Lobby files, claimed late in 1966 that they revealed "a conspiracy against both Jews and Negroes." He described Willis Carto, its founder and still a vital force in the movement, as an open admirer of Adolph Hitler. Listed on Liberty Lobby's policy board in 1967 were antisemites Kenneth Goff; Joseph P. Kamp; Ned Touchstone, publisher of a viciously racist and antisemitic periodical, *The Councilor*, and Professor Austin App, a Nazi apologist. Allen Zoll, a notorious and active Christian Front antisemite of the pre-World War II days, joined Liberty Lobby's professional staff in 1967.

Through Carto's efforts, *Western Destiny*, a magazine of intellectual racism, merged with the *Washington Observer*, a Liberty Lobby newsletter with growing antisemitic tendencies. The once respected *American Mercury* magazine, which had become a viciously antisemitic sheet under Russell Maguire's ownership and ceased publication in the early 1960's, reappeared with strong Liberty Lobby backing. On its editorial board were Austin App and David Hoggan, both open Nazi apologists. Among its contributing editors were such known antisemites as W. Henry McFarland; Richard Cotten, radio broadcaster and publisher of *Conservative Viewpoint*, Curtis Dall, Joseph P. Kamp, and Ned Touchstone.

The Minutemen

New Orleans District attorney James Garrison, maintained (*Playboy Magazine*, October 1967) that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated by anti-Castro Cuban exiles operating, at the "control level," under the direction "of a number of people of ultra-right wing persuasion, not simply conservatives, but people who could be described as neo-Nazis, including a small clique that had defected from the Minutemen because it considered that group too liberal." So far, no federal fact-finding agency or responsible investigator has been able to prove the existence of such a group. However, there was no doubt about the existence of a potentially dangerous Minutemen movement. On October 25, New York State Attorney General Louis J. Lefkowitz, at a press conference marking the conclusion of a lengthy and exhaustive

investigation of the Minutemen by his office, reported that the Minutemen were active in 15 states; that their members included policemen, national guardsmen, members of the armed forces, doctors, teachers, public servants, and employees in sensitive industries, and that fanatics among them were prepared to assassinate high-ranking governmental officials. Lefkowitz concluded that they were a potential threat to the peace and security of New York and other states.

A previous investigation and report, *Para Military Operations in California, April 1965*, prepared under the direction of California Attorney General Thomas C. Lynch, stated that "The founders [of the Minutemen] arrogated to themselves the right to pass judgment on what was pro-American, and what was anti-American." After concluding that the Minutemen were in fact "insurgents," having their own military force, the report recommended, without indicating how, that their activities in California be curbed.

While the total national membership of the Minutemen organization was probably less than 10,000, the fanaticism of its members, their access to arms and ammunition, their addiction to violence, and their apparent readiness to condemn those with whom they disagree, all point to a potential for doing considerable harm.

Originally avoiding politics, the Minutemen established in spring 1966 the Patriotic party as "the political arm of an overall resistance movement," although they had no hopes that it would be a third party in 1967. As Robert DePugh, leader of the Minutemen said in a special message to key members, "no third party can possibly be developed in the short period of freedom that remains in the U.S." (Kansas City *Star*, November 5, 1967). During the year, the Minutemen also departed from a previously-held tenet that racism and antisemitism were not to be tolerated. It began to attract racists and rightists; it changed from a group, whose literature originally consisted primarily of training manuals into one stocking the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. It now accepted antisemites as members, and the notorious long-time antisemite Kenneth L. Goff became one of its top speakers.

American Nazi Party

The sniper's bullet which killed George Lincoln Rockwell on August 25 may have put an end to the American Nazi party. The shot fired by John Patler,⁵ one-time Rockwell confidante and high in the party hierarchy before his expulsion for protesting too vehemently against the partiality to Nordic types within the party, highlighted the intra-party warfare and disillusionment of many of Rockwell's followers.

In its nine-year existence, the Rockwell-conceived and Rockwell-commanded party became the most widely publicized antisemitic force in the United States. Rockwell's flare made him and it internationally notorious.

⁵ Patler was found guilty of Rockwell's murder on December 16, 1967 by an Arlington, Va. county jury.

Stunts such as troopers picketing the White House during the Eisenhower administration with such signs as "Save Ike from the kikes," staging counter-demonstrations to the then regular civil-rights marches, with members dressed in guerrilla costumes; sending into the Congress chambers a member made up as a Negro, who carried the sign: "I's the Mississippi delegate," and strutting around America's streets in what looked like Nazi uniforms with swastika armbands, were sure-fire media copy.

At no time did the party's ranks exceed 150. But Rockwell propelled it into the forefront of the hate movement. His followers, for the most part political illiterates and often men with criminal records, who did not understand the Nazi philosophy and cared less, joined the American Nazi party for several reasons. Rockwell's personality held them in the movement. Rockwell allegedly left a will bequeathing party command to his deputy, Matthias Koehl, Jr. The 33-year-old Koehl, a dark, intense, articulate man who, before his involvement with the American Nazi party, belonged to other hate groups, lacked Rockwell's flare, leadership, ability, and personal magnetism. Under Koehl's leadership, the party has virtually disintegrated. A few units, notably the one in Los Angeles, moved to become autonomous rather than follow Koehl. There was some evidence that, immediately before his death, Rockwell tried to eliminate one important deterrent to the party's growth—the avowed declaration that it was a Nazi party—and to capitalize on growing white backlash. In January Rockwell changed the name of his group to National Socialist White People's party, and that of its organ from *The Stormtrooper* to *White Power*.

Other Antisemitic Activity

Other right-wing extremist groups veering toward antisemitism included the Congress of Freedom and Women for Constitutional Government. The former bestowed merit awards on Gerald L. K. Smith, and others of his ilk. The latter featured antisemitic speakers and opened the pages of its organ *Woman Constitutionalist* (July 1967), to Opal Tanner White, a long-time confidential secretary and close ally of Gerald L. K. Smith, for the promotion of Maurice Pinay's violently antisemitic book, *The Plot against the Church*.

The Let Freedom Ring telephone network, conceived and promoted by Dr. William Campbell Douglass, a Sarasota, Fla. physician and a self-proclaimed member of the John Birch Society, continued to carry tape recordings of right-wing messages to telephone dialers in approximately 100 American cities. For the first time, in 1967, one of its messages was antisemitic in character, charging that the hallucinatory drug LSD was being manufactured by the Weizmann Institute in Israel and smuggled into the United States as the institute's contribution to the Communist design for destroying the moral fiber of American cities.

Third Party Movement

For the first time in many years a political force with clear racist and potentially antisemitic overtones emerged in the United States. In January supporters of former Alabama Governor George Wallace openly launched a Wallace-for-President Club movement. Among its prominent figures were former Selma, Ala., sheriff, Jim Clark and Asa (Ace) Carter, a key figure in several racist and antisemitic organizations in the late 1950s. Carter first achieved notoriety when he led a faction of violent activists out of the Citizens' Councils of Alabama to form an antisemitic splinter group, the North Alabama Citizens' Council. He also had been organizer of the original Ku Klux Klan of the Confederacy and a close collaborator of John Kasper, the founder of the now extinct antisemitic Seaboard White Citizens' Council.

Other workers for Wallace were Karl Allen, former deputy commander of the American Nazi party in Virginia, and Gerald L. K. Smith in Hollywood, California. In Ohio, Wallace's candidacy was promoted by the George Wallace Christian Conservative party, a Cleveland-based group whose campaign headquarters featured racist and rightist literature, as well as antisemitic material, such as *The Talmud Unmasked*, written by Col. Eugene Sanctuary under the pseudonym Justin B. Pranaitis, and Henry Ford's *The International Jew*.

Among the organized groups working for Wallace were the Liberty Lobby, segments of the John Birch Society, Citizens' Councils, and the Ku Klux Klan. In the spring Imperial Wizard Robert Shelton boasted, "We have made him Governor and we must make him President." The National States Rights party promoted Wallace-for-president material and distributed campaign buttons as well as Bill Jones' official biography, *The Wallace Story*. In March, the miniscule, crudely antisemitic Sons of Liberty declared its support of Wallace, as did the late George Lincoln Rockwell. Wallace pointedly has refused to repudiate the support of any of these groups.

MILTON ELLERIN

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

THE EVENTS OF 1968 presented a picture of social upset and unrest that was alarming in its magnitude and implications. The violent deaths of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Senator Robert F. Kennedy, both national leaders and important spokesmen for the minorities and the poor, stunned and stirred the nation. They symbolized the deep conflicts in American society.

Bleak analyses of race relations and the warning of the danger of widening economic and racial cleavages in America's cities by the National Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) were given support by the findings of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, impaneled after the assassination of Senator Kennedy. A national trend toward the growing militancy of urban Negroes was evident in matters of welfare rights and housing, but particularly in the area of education. The drive in New York City for the decentralization of the school system and the institution of community control produced unprecedented expressions of overt antisemitism by some blacks. As the dispute continued during the lengthy teachers' strike, social commentators and particularly Jewish spokesmen openly debated the seriousness and significance of this wave of anti-semitism.

College and university campuses across the nation also were the scenes of serious disruption, as students demonstrated against the Vietnam war, and for major reforms in higher education.

Reflecting the mood of the nation, the two major issues dominating the 1968 presidential campaign were the war in Vietnam and the matter of law and order. These issues, reinforced by the third-party candidacy of George Wallace, were the catalysts for expressions of divisive intergroup and inter-racial hostilities. In the campaign, as elsewhere, the viability of traditional means of resolving social conflict was seriously tested.

In the Jewish community the reaction to all this was a significant increase of Jewish self-awareness and concern over antisemitic prejudice in America.

PATTERNS OF ANTISEMITISM

While American Jews continued to be cautioned that "anti-Semitism is embedded in many of the social structures of our culture and in the attitude of many individuals"; that "in latent form, it is chronic to our society"; that "its overt manifestations fluctuate, being aggravated by social tension," and that severe social conflict may "cause it to become acute,"¹ they were told there was "no hard evidence" or a significant general increase or intensification in 1968. Despite the strong manifestations of overt antisemitism, including its appearance in the black communities (pp. 76-86) and among intellectuals of the New Left (p. 72), antisemitism was believed to continue at a low ebb.

Corroborating this view were the findings of an October Harris poll. At the request of the American Jewish Committee, a question probing public attitudes for antisemitism or expressions of anti-Jewish hostility at the peak of the 1968 election campaign was included in the survey. Asked whether they thought each of ten groups in a given list, among them the U.S. government, Communists, Negroes, Jews, and others, were "responsible" or "not responsible" for the country's ills, only 6 per cent of the 1,675 respondents across the nation blamed the Jews. Eighty-two per cent specifically said that Jews were "not responsible." Thus, according to an American Jewish Committee analysis of the poll, the Jews emerged not only as the group least likely to be blamed for the country's troubles, but also the one "most readily absolved of blame, in explicit fashion." However, this finding must be considered within the context of the fact that the survey was conducted at a time when public attention was focused on the election campaign, the violence accompanying the Miami and Chicago conventions, the Vietnam war, riots in the cities. This, as well as the increasing reluctance to give public voice to anti-Jewish sentiments, were factors tending to reduce the percentage of respondents who blamed the Jews.

Student Activism, New Left, and Antisemitism

On and off the campus, college students fomented a variety of protest activities symbolic of the politics of the New Left. Since the public reaction to student agitation was largely unfavorable, the continued presence of Jewish students in the ranks of the protestors again was noted as a possible impetus to antisemitism. Sociologist Nathan Glazer, in an article for a

¹ Statement adopted by a conference on Combating Anti-Semitism Today, held in September 14-16, 1968 under the auspices of the National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC).

special edition of *Fortune* magazine on American youth,² took a sanguine view of the problem. In his view, this period in American history did not pose "much danger that Jews will suffer from unequal treatment, prejudice, or discrimination." If it were, he said, he would hesitate to discuss in a non-Jewish publication "the interesting and peculiar phenomenon" that Jews, who in all likelihood were the most prosperous religious group in America, now were so prominent among young radicals, both on and off campus. Glazer saw the issue not as "why are Jews radicals?", but as "why are there so many Jews among the relatively small number of student radicals?" He estimated that there were 325,000 Jews, among 6.7 million college students of all kinds. Of the small number of committed, identifiable radicals on the most active campuses probably one-third to one-half were Jews, which, Glazer concluded, "at the very most comes to 3 to 4 per cent" of all Jewish students.

Jewish students' propensity for radicalism, Glazer explained, was in part rooted in the Jewish politico-cultural heritage of liberal and Socialist thought, and the influence of liberal and/or radical parents. At the same time, he noted, "today's Jewish radicals differ in the matter of *awareness* of being Jewish." There was little evidence that their concern for the Vietnamese, Biafrans, or American Negroes was grounded in their recollections of the extirpation of the Jews in Nazi-dominated Europe. Glazer also pointed out that, on the whole, Jewish radicals stood on the more intellectual rather than the violent side of radicalism.

The Spring 1968 issue of *Columbia College Today*, the publication of and by the Association of the Alumni, was entirely devoted to a minute account of the spring riots at Columbia University and their aftermath. The article titled "Six Weeks that Struck Morningside Heights" and written by its editor, George C. Keller, touched off a controversy over what some felt were its antisemitic overtones. In a formal complaint in January 1969, Paul O'Dwyer urged the New York City Human Rights Commission to investigate the publication for "promoting antisemitism." Among the passages he cited to support his contention were references to Jewish suburbs, Jewish mothers, life in the kibbutz. Keller's statement that "Nearly all of the leaders and many of the members of Columbia's SDS chapter are of the Jewish faith," O'Dwyer maintained, was aimed at casting "aspersions on the SDS or the Jews or all of them."

In December Rabbi Benjamin M. Kahn, national director of B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations, the campus organization for Jewish college students, cautioned the Jewish community against "confused judgments" over the character and number of Jewish college youths in the New Left. He noted that many Jewish leaders had shown "excessive preoccupation" that "has been compounded by their inadequate understanding of the attitudes and

² "The Jewish Role in Student Activism," *Fortune*, January, 1969.

convictions" of Jewish youths who were attracted to radical student movements.

Another dimension of the role of Jewish students in the disorders was gleaned from interviews with Jewish students and faculty members at Columbia. The impression of the interviewer³ was that "academic Jews are now completely at home in the university world," and that, at Columbia, "there is not one serious concern voiced about the reincarnation of campus antisemitism."

A research report issued by the American Jewish Committee⁴ dealt with the problem as it affected the Jewish community. Here the concern was over "the alienation from the Jewish tradition of the many bright, socially conscious young people," who joined the New Left movement, "the self-destructiveness of the hippy way of life" which a good number of them adopted, and "the possible support the youthful dissenters seem likely to give to anti-Israel factions and black antisemitism."

Indeed, young Jews in the New Left, off and on the campus, mouthed their respective groups' views of events in the Middle East. An American Jewish Committee analysis of *Arab Appeals to American Public Opinion Today* (July, 1969) covering the last two years gave this picture: "Groups aligned with Moscow see the Soviet Union as the protector of the exploited Arabs and the only force for peace in the Middle East. Maoists, Trotskyites and Third World groups sympathetic to the Arab guerrilla movements distrust the Soviet Union as a protector of bankrupt regimes."

As for the campus New Left, it "is generally anti-Israel, anti-Zionist and anti-U.S. without being aligned with foreign ideologies." What united the entire far left movement was "its condemnation of Israel and of the 'imperialist powers' siding with her . . ."

The propaganda material of the various official and unofficial Arab propaganda agencies—ranging from the Arab Information Center, with five offices in the United States, to the militant Palestine Liberation Organization, committed to the destruction of Israel—found their way into the publications of the far left, as well as those of the militant black and outright antisemitic groups in this country.

The American Jewish Committee report devoted a special chapter to the Organization of Arab Students, founded in 1952, which claimed "8,000 members and over 100 chapters in universities across the U.S. and Canada." Describing its purpose as cultural and educational, the organization's main activity in fact was "strident propaganda, as is shown by its record." In line with resolutions passed at its 1967 convention, the student group formed and strengthened "alignments with black militants, anti-Vietnam war groups and the New Left." The Organization of Arab Students was particularly active

³ Geraldine Rosenfield, "Faculty Thoughts on the Jewish Role in the Student Disorders at Columbia University," The American Jewish Committee, November 1968, mimeo.

⁴ Geraldine Rosenfield, *Interim Report on the New Left and Alienated Youth* (New York: American Jewish Committee, December, 1967 mimeo).

on the Wayne, California, Chicago, and Michigan university campuses. Becoming more militant, increasingly supporting al-Fatah, and seeking to exploit black antisemitism, its success varied from campus to campus, depending on the climate and opportunity to influence student leaders and professors.

Vandalism and Violence

For the most part, incidents of antisemitic vandalism and violence showed a characteristically random pattern in 1968. However, a series of acts in New York City in the fall and winter months, which occurred in the emotionally charged atmosphere of the school controversy, aroused great public concern.

April: A fire set to Beth-El congregation in Bethesda, Maryland, presumably by youthful vandals attempting burglary, caused severe damage, estimated at \$100,000.

May: A rash of antisemitic abuse, ranging from outspoken refusals to rent to Jews, to garbage dumped on a local rabbi's lawn, was reported in Hollywood, Florida, a resort city north of Miami.

June: A bomb exploded outside a synagogue and study building of the Hebrew Theological College in Skokie, Illinois.

A suspected bomber was seriously wounded, and his woman companion killed, by police guarding the home of a prominent Jewish businessman in Meridian, Mississippi. The suspect, Thomas Tarrants, 3rd, was regarded as a "prime suspect" in a series of bombings in Meridian and Jackson, Mississippi, that destroyed the home of Rabbi Perry Nussbaum of Jackson, and damaged his synagogue (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 238). A notebook found in Tarrant's possession had this entry: "I have committed myself totally to defeating the Communist-Jew conspiracy which threatens our country—any means necessary will be used."

August: More than 200 tombstones in the Linden Hill Central Synagogue Cemetery at Maspeth, Long Island, were damaged; obscenities were scrawled on others. Total loss was estimated at \$20,000.

September: Members of the *hasidic* congregation Yetev Lev D'Satmar and Puerto Ricans engaged in a rock-and-bottle-throwing fight in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn as congregants were walking home after Rosh Ha-shanah services.

October-December: Acts of vandalism were perpetrated against 11 Jewish houses of worship and schools in New York City. Fire bombs and rocks were hurled at the Yeshivot Torah Vodaath, Mesifita Tifereth and Ahi Ezer in Brooklyn. The last was damaged beyond repair.

A fire of suspicious origin broke out in the Hebrew Institute of University

Heights, the Bronx, which also housed a synagogue and a YM and YWHA. Swastikas were painted on the exteriors of the buildings.

Congregation Toirei Zonov in the Bronx was destroyed by fire, the eleventh synagogue to be desecrated in the New York area within three months.

The synagogue of the Yeshiva of Eastern Parkway in Brooklyn was gutted by fire, and many sacred scrolls ruined or damaged. Total damage amounted to several million dollars. Some of the lost religious articles were irreplaceable.

Jewish religious leaders voiced their anger and outrage at this wave of incidents. The Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations demanded that attacks against Jewish institutions be halted. Rabbi Zev Segal, president of the Rabbinical Council of America, the representative body of the Orthodox rabbinate, urged that a day be set aside for prayer and fasting to mourn the burnings and desecrations. Mayor John V. Lindsay and Police Commissioner Howard Leary announced the formation of a special police unit to look into the vandalism. In an attempt to allay fears, Lindsay visited some of the sites, and met with religious leaders to assess the extent of damage. The occurrence of these events at a time of general concern over black antisemitism led some to conclude that they were related. However, investigations by the police department and the commissioner of human rights uncovered no evidence that blacks were involved in any significant way. The vandalism was generally attributed to rampaging youths including whites and even a Jewish boy.

BLACK ANTISEMITISM

The overwhelming concern with antisemitism was focused in New York City, where the response to a series of related events in the area of education was virulent anti-Jewish attitudes among some Negroes.

Hatchett Affair

The first of these events centered around John F. Hatchett's appointment, in July, as director of the Afro-American Center, established in memory of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., at New York University. Hatchett, then a substitute teacher at Junior High School 35 in Harlem, had written an article entitled, "The Phenomenon of the Anti-Black Jews and the Black Anglo-Saxon: A Study in Educational Perfidy," in the November-December 1967 issue of the *African-American Teachers Association Forum*. The gist of the article was that the Jews, who, according to Hatchett, constituted 90 to 95 per cent of all employees in the New York City public school system (the best estimates put the figure below 60 per cent), "dominate and control [its] educational bureaucracy," and daily practice "misery, degradation, racism and cultural genocide against my people." After more rambling accusations, he issued this call: "Arise you Black teachers and

cast off the chains of fear and frustration, the fight will be bloody and long, but we will win. Black Power to you all." Hatchett had been discharged by the Board of Education in February when, in violation of orders, he took his class to a Malcolm X memorial service at I.S. 201 in Harlem.

New York University's announcement of Hatchett's appointment as director of the Afro-American Student Center brought forth sharp criticism and demands for his removal. NYU President James Hester asked former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, then president of the American Jewish Committee, for counsel. Goldberg hoped to "alleviate rather than exacerbate tensions" by advising Hatchett's retention, under the supervision of Judge Constance Baker Motley, who was to serve as chairman of the center's board. In Goldberg's view, "As a result of my frank and candid talk with Mr. Hatchett, I believe he now understands the injustice and dangers inherent in the kind of criticism he voiced in the article. Mr. Hatchett strongly denies he is anti-semitic, although the expressions in his article can be so regarded." This endorsement moved the NYU administration not only to reconfirm its appointment, but to defend Hatchett. Goldberg made it a point to say that he was acting solely as an individual, and not as a spokesman for any Jewish communal group. Indeed, the New York chapter of the American Jewish Committee, in a statement to NYU Chancellor Allan M. Cartter, strongly opposed the choice of Hatchett, "a man who in his public statements appeals to racial hatred" and sullies "the institution with which he is formally associated."

The controversy continued as Hatchett made other inflammatory statements. In a talk to 700 students at the NYU Bronx campus in October, in the midst of the presidential campaigns and the school controversy, Hatchett called then Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey, Richard M. Nixon, and Albert Shanker "racist bastards." Dore Schary, national chairman of the Anti-Defamation League, chided the university for continuing "to tolerate or apologize for the unbridled bigoted mouthings of a staff member who holds an ostensibly responsible position in a sensitive area," and urged Hester to "reconsider" Hatchett's appointment. Among others calling for Hatchett's ouster were Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Bronx Congressman James H. Scheuer (Dem.-Lib.), and the Jewish Labor Committee.

Shortly thereafter, Hester removed Hatchett. His announcement said that many of Hatchett's actions and public statements were incompatible with a major objective of the center, "to work toward improving relations among all religious and ethnic groups," and that it was impossible to reconcile his behavior with that objective.

Giving strong support to NYU's decision was an editorial in the Negro newspaper, *New York Amsterdam News* (October 19):

The university hired him [Hatchett], giving him, in his own words, "the opportunity to be judged on the merits of what I will do at NYU."

He showed them what that was last week. . . The university relieved him but made no effort to silence him as an individual. . . We feel the recklessness and obscenity of Mr. Hatchett's remarks thoroughly justify the university's action.

Commenting on the affair in *Midstream* (November 1968), the well-known writer Marie Syrkin saw the Hatchett episode as highlighting "the intellectual confusion which befalls decent, well-intentioned people as to what constitutes anti-Semitism. Though they condemn the evil, they have difficulty in spotting its extreme, let alone refined, symptoms." Miss Syrkin maintained that "Anti-Semitism is latent and endemic, and can become epidemic whenever social tensions seek an easy focus for their discharge," that only some twenty years ago Germany showed how it is done, and that in Eastern Europe today "'Zionist' conspiracies deflect all discontents." She warned that, "To allow Negro extremists, without meaningful opposition, to utilize this familiar technique because Negroes, in a paradoxical sense, have become untouchables, is a dangerous development, boding good neither to Jews or Negroes, nor to the country as a whole."

"Harlem on My Mind"

Illustrating this point was the controversy over the catalogue of New York Metropolitan Museum of Art's exhibition "Harlem on My Mind," which opened on January 18, 1969. The preface to the booklet, written by 18-year-old Candice Van Ellison, read in part:

Behind every hurdle that the Afro-American has yet to jump stands the Jew who has already cleared it. Jewish shopkeepers are the only remaining "survivors" in the expanding black ghettos . . . The lack of competition in this area allows the already exploited black to be further exploited by the Jews. Another major area of contact involves the Jewish landlord and the black tenant. Our contempt for the Jews makes us feel more completely American in sharing a national prejudice.

Indignation was widespread, and the situation was aggravated by the museum's quasi-public status. Museum director Thomas P. Hoving refused Mayor Lindsay's demand for the immediate deletion of the preface. He thought the piece expressed "the truth," and, "If the truth hurts, so be it." The catalogue's publisher, Random House, sided with Hoving. American Jewish Committee New York chapter president, Theodore Ellenoff, hailed the Mayor's stand and, at the same time, expressed his organization's dismay at the Museum's failure "to sense the grave potential harm coming from such an article at this time, when intergroup tensions are at such a critical point." Among other Jewish leaders who pressed for deletion was Dore Schary of the Anti-Defamation League, who called Hoving's defense "careless and capricious," and rejected his "cavalier assessment of what is obviously an insult and attack on Jews who, despite the hasty appraisal of a few blacks, have been a central core in the fight for black freedom,

equality and opportunity." Arthur J. Lelyveld, president of the American Jewish Congress, accused Hoving of having given "credence and support to the most slanderous and irresponsible of charges" by his defense of the "anti-Semitic material" in the introduction to the catalogue. Speaking for the Jewish Labor Committee, its chairman David I. Ashe wrote to Hoving that, while Miss Van Ellison was "constitutionally entitled to her views, no matter how misguided and bigoted," a museum, which relied on public funds, "has no right to disseminate racial falsehoods and Nazi-like propaganda, no matter under what guise."

With some effort, the young woman was persuaded to make a disclaimer of racism, which was hurriedly inserted in the catalogue. However, after continued pressure from Jewish organizations and political leaders, the museum withdrew the catalog on January 31.

NEW YORK CITY SCHOOL STRIKE

The series of New York City school strikes during the first half of the 1968-69 school year and the events surrounding them exacerbated intergroup tensions. The strikes pitted the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) against the governing board of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville experimental district. The sides in the dispute coincided in large measure with ethnic alignments: The union was largely Jewish in its membership, and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville district was predominantly Negro, with large Puerto Rican minorities.

The Ocean Hill-Brownsville district was established in the summer of 1967, with the aid of a Ford Foundation grant, as an experiment in decentralization of the educational process. At the outset, when the district was still in the planning stage, teacher representatives actively participated in the deliberations of the planning council. But from the beginning, when parent representatives began consultation with the militantly anti-union Herman Ferguson, who had been indicted for conspiracy to assassinate NAACP leader Roy Wilkins, relations between teachers and others on the planning council started to deteriorate. In September 1967, after the refusal of the district's governing board (elected in August 1967) to support the union's strike and its attempt to keep open the schools in the district, relations between the union and the board were so seriously ruptured that the union forbade its members to become members of the board.

The ensuing months, during which tensions did not abate, witnessed attempts to define the authority of the local governing board and the local district. Drawn out negotiations took place between the governing boards of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville and the two other districts created as part of the same experiment (Two Bridges and I.S. 201), and the Board of Education over the powers to be delegated to the districts. In February the Board of Education proposed guidelines drawn up by a special committee on decentralization, headed by John Niemeyer, president of the Bank Street

College of Education. Although the guidelines provided for the delegation of substantial powers, they did not satisfy the districts which offered counter-proposals in March for more sweeping powers. The Board of Education held that, under the law, it could not grant many of the powers demanded by the districts and that, in fact, some of them were powers the board did not itself possess. In the absence of agreement on this matter, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville board continued without *de jure* status. It nevertheless exerted *de facto* control over the schools in the district.

However, the effective authority of the district remained unclear and, in an attempt to establish it in dramatic fashion, the governing board of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, on May 7, sent the following letter to 19 teachers and supervisors:

The Governing Board of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district has voted to end your employment in the schools of this district. This action was taken on the recommendation of the Personnel Committee. The termination of employment is to take effect immediately. In the event you wish to question this action, the Governing Board will receive you on Friday, May 10th at 6 P.M. at I.S. 55.

The consequences of this notice were conflict, bitter and acerbic, between the office of the superintendent of schools and the governing board, as well as between the power of UFT to protect the jobs of its members and the power of the governing board to dismiss unwanted personnel.

The various attempts to settle the conflict peacefully were not successful. The Ocean Hill governing board rejected the report of Judge Francis E. Rivers who, as trial examiner, heard and dismissed the charges against the teachers—reduced to ten by voluntary transfers and otherwise. Similarly, the recommendations of mediator Theodore Kheel were not accepted by the governing board.

By September 9, the opening day of the following school year, no agreement had been reached regarding the reinstatement of the ousted teachers, and UFT went out on strike. Two days of negotiation brought an agreement on September 11 between the Board of Education and UFT, extending the regular grievance procedure, based on binding arbitration, to all dismissals and transfers by local boards, and providing for the return of the “disputed teachers” to their classes. But the returning teachers, met by harassing and threatening mobs, were not assigned to their normal teaching duties. Rhody McCoy, the unit administrator, announced that he could not guarantee their safety.

On September 13 the union struck again, demanding enforcement of the original contract. A new agreement, reached on September 30 as a result of Mayor Lindsay’s intervention, provided for the return of the teachers and the presence of observers with the power to close down the schools, if necessary. But it also permitted the Ocean Hill board to retain its new

teachers, giving it a large number of extra teachers for special educational projects.

After the schools reopened, a dispute again arose regarding the classroom assignments of the returning teachers and climaxing in a call by UFT for a new strike. The third and final strike began on October 14. A settlement was finally reached and the strike ended on November 18, 1968.⁵

Before the 1968 school strikes, the use of antisemitic epithets had, on occasion, entered the developing struggle between teachers and militant community dissidents. As early as May 1967, antisemitic remarks were hurled at the principal and some teachers of P.S. 284 in Brownsville by demonstrators urging their transfer. And a month later, 30 of the 50 teachers at the school sought transfers because of antisemitic literature, threats and harassment by community groups. At the time of the 1967 UFT strike, teacher-pickets at Ocean Hill complained of antisemitic remarks, abuse and threats.

However, during the 1968 strikes, antisemitism erupted as a full-fledged issue, creating a mood of approaching hysteria in many Jewish middle-class areas. Handbills, signed and otherwise, appeared, warning "Middle East murderers of colored people" to get out "or your relatives in the Middle East will find themselves giving benefits to raise money to help you out from under the terrible weight of an enraged black community." Another circular charged that the "So-Called Liberal Jewish Friend . . . is Responsible For the Serious Educational Retardation Of Our Black Children." The leaflet carrying this last charge was widely circulated by UFT as the "verbatim text of leaflet distributed by the Parents Community Council of J.H.S. 271." Its authenticity was later challenged on the grounds that J.H.S. 271 had no such community council.

UFT came under attack from many quarters for its role in spreading the hate literature throughout the city. An official of the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) charged that the teachers' union was the major source of extremist leaflets being circulated in the school dispute. Aryeh Neier, NYCLU executive director, called the UFT action "a smear tactic reminiscent of the McCarthy era against the governing board in an attempt to create guilt by association." Whitney M. Young, Jr., of the National Urban League charged that "Shanker created the issue of racism and anti-Semitism and is trying to smear the local board with such charges." William Booth, then chairman of the City Commission on Human Rights, asserted that the statement "reproduced on a flyer by the UFT as representing the opinion of the governing board and the Negro community at large has undoubtedly contributed to the rising tension."

The union defended its actions, claiming that it sought to educate the

⁵ For more detailed accounts of the strike and its settlement, see Martin Mayer, *The Teachers Strike: New York, 1968* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969) and Naomi Levine, *Ocean Hill-Brownsville: A Case History of Schools in Crisis* (New York: Popular Library, 1969).

public to the "really extremist things that go on" in the district, and insisting that the hate literature was symptomatic of the "impossible climate" in which union teachers were being asked to work. A UFT spokesman said, "It's absolutely shocking that people in high places are more intent on keeping the people of New York from learning the extent of the hate literature being produced than in doing something about the people who are producing it."

Tensions continued at a high level. Extremists continued to denounce the "Weinsteins and Goldbergs" for miseducating Negro children, calling white teachers "blue-eyed pigs." Angry shouts, such as "Jew pig" and "You will go out in a pine box," were hurled at Jewish teachers at the daily picket lines, as striking teachers, community people, and others confronted each other. Comparable threats and epithets were leveled at teachers opposing the strike.

Other sources also contributed to the high level of tension. Oliver Ramsey, educational director of the city's Council Against Poverty, denouncing Mayor Lindsay's part in the second settlement (September 29), charged that Lindsay had been told by the "Jewish Mafia" of UFT that if he wanted to become governor "You've got to kill Ocean Hill-Brownsville." ADL and the Jewish Labor Committee responded by urging Mayor Lindsay to take prompt action against Ramsey.

Attempts were made by many to dispel the mounting hysteria about anti-semitism by denying or denouncing its existence. Thus, in September, Rhody McCoy invited striking teachers and people from all over the city to visit the district's schools, talk with the faculties, and see for themselves "that we're not anti-Jewish, we're not anti-white." The Ocean Hill governing board pointed to the fact that half the teachers it had hired were Jewish. Keith Bard, director of Afro-American studies in Ocean Hill and chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee of Teachers for Community Control, stated that whoever had introduced the hate literature was attempting to create strife and destroy the "natural alliance" between Negroes and Jews.

Some 350 teachers from Ocean Hill-Brownsville published a full-page statement in New York city newspapers (November 11), which sought to set the record straight, as they saw it. It pointed out that of the 541 teachers in the district, 70 per cent were white, and 50 per cent of those were Jewish, and that of 350 new teachers hired by the governing board during the summer, more than 50 per cent were Jewish. It deplored tactics used by UFT to publicize its position, pointing to the Civil Liberties Union's condemnation of UFT for apparently using two separate pieces in what it claimed to be the reprint of one leaflet. These teachers strongly supported the governing board, which, they felt, clearly had shown its opposition to antisemitism by both word and deed. The ad concluded: "We all feel that education is one of the best ways to curb anti-Semitism and racism. But there is an even better way through the establishment of trust and confidence between both groups in day-to-day relationships."

ADL issued a statement indicating that it found no evidence of any organized effort behind the antisemitic literature being distributed, which it characterized as sporadic in content and issuance.

Whitney Young, in his column, "To Be Equal," which appeared in more than 70 newspapers in the third week of September, stated that the friction in New York was not to be interpreted as a case of black antisemitism. "Jews who are caught in such conflict," he wrote, "aren't singled out because they are Jews but because they are whites whose presence in some ghetto institutions is resented." In January 1969, with tensions remaining high, Young stated, "We are certain that the great mass of Jewish inhabitants of New York know that most black people are not anti-Semitic, and vice versa. We cannot emphasize too strongly that all oppressed minorities have a common stake in defending one another from the corrosive effects of bigotry."

On October 19 five clergymen, including Archbishop Terence J. Cooke of New York and Rabbi Gilbert Klapperman, president of the New York Board of Rabbis, issued a joint statement deploring the racial and religious bigotry aroused by the school crisis and calling upon all parties to "remove bigotry, discrimination and violence from our lives and particularly from the present school crisis."

And later, Bayard Rustin, director of the A. Philips Randolph Institute, writing in the New York *Amsterdam News* (February 8, 1969), urged Negroes and Jews not to use against each other "the same weapon [of prejudice] which the white majorities of the West have used for centuries to crush and deny both of them their sense of humanity." He appealed to the Negro community "that just as we call on Jews to continue their dedication to democracy and social equity, that we pledge not to ignore or excuse any manifestation of anti-Semitism in the black community."

Despite the various attempts to defuse the atmosphere, incidents resparking tensions tended to occur. Thus, in December 1968, after UFT threatened to bring as many teachers as were necessary to escort nine teachers through a mob that was keeping them out of a school in the I.S. 201 complex, Jesse Gray's Tenants Rights Party issued a leaflet that said:

Zionists kill black people in their own land in the Middle East. They run the people out of their own communities.

Now, here, SHANKER is trying to use the same tactics and throw us out of our community.

HARLEM WILL NOT STAND BY WHILE THESE RACIST, RUTHLESS, ZIONIST BANDITS (SHANKER & THE UFT) AND HIS PUPPET THE POLICE RUN US OUT OF OUR OWN COMMUNITIES.

After the strike, Leslie Campbell, vice president of the African-American Teachers Association, appeared as a guest on a radio program conducted by Julius Lester on radio station WBAI. He read and praised as beautiful and true a poem which, he said, had been written by a 15-year-old girl

student. Called "Anti-Semitism" and dedicated to UFT President Albert Shanker, it read in part:

Hey, Jew boy, with that yarmulka on your head
 You pale-faced Jew boy—I wish you were dead;
 I can see you Jew boy—no you can't hide,
 I got a scoop on you—yeh, you gonna die. . . .
 I'm sick of seeing in everything I do
 About the murder of six million Jews;
 Hitler's reign lasted only fifteen years. . . .
 My suffering lasted for over 400 years, Jew boy, . . .
 When the UN made Israel a free independent state
 Little 4- and 5-year-old boys threw hand grenades.
 They hated the black Arabs with all their might,
 And you, Jew boy, said it was all right.
 Then you came to America, land of the free,
 And took over the school system to perpetuate white supremacy.
 Guess you know, Jew boy, there's only one reason you made it—
 You had a clean white face, colorless and faded.
 I hated you, Jew boy, because your hang-up was the Torah,
 And my only hang-up was my color.

The United Federation of Teachers and various organizations protested to the Federal Communications Commission. WBAI's defense was that it "exposed" the antisemitic material by presenting it and that, in any case, freedom of speech was involved. As a result of the controversy, WBAI's board of directors adopted a statement to the effect that the responsibility of a radio station to give the public access to opinions, facts, ideas, and persons, representing the full range of contemporary history and social reality, involved the presentation of views repugnant to everyone connected with the station. The statement added that "the anti-Semitic views expressed over WBAI are deeply repugnant" but suppressing them would "fall into the trap of those who would refine the rawness of truth in order to make it socially convenient." But the statement recognized the station's responsibility "not only for presenting views contrary to those expressed by anti-Semites, but for establishing a forum of public discussion and education in which the dangers of bigotry are counteracted by informed and enlightened analysis of what the social and educational problems really are."

Rabbi Klaperman called for Campbell's dismissal, as did Board of Education member Rose Shapiro. Mayor Lindsay declared that Campbell did not belong in the school system. UFT President Shanker, however, said that he would lean over backward to establish the principle that a teacher should only be judged by his activities in school.

The events connected with the school strike unquestionably increased intergroup tensions and caused strains in the relationships between Negro and Jewish groups. But these relationships were not destroyed; cooperation between the leading Jewish and Negro organizations in the fields of civil and human rights continued. Such Negro leaders as Roy Wilkins and Bayard

Rustin did notable work in combating antisemitic tendencies in the Negro community, while the major Jewish organizations worked to prevent the development of "Jewish backlash." It seemed likely that, though there would be some residue of heightened intergroup tension for some time to come and an occasional repetition of incidents causing this tension, Negro-Jewish cooperation would suffer no long-term damage.

Botein Commission and ADL Report

In October 1968, as interracial and intergroup hostilities escalated, Mayor Lindsay appointed a Special Committee on Racial and Religious Prejudice, under the direction of Bernard Botein, a presiding justice of the New York State Appellate Division, to study the problem and report to the city. In mid-January the Botein commission, which was provided with ADL staff service, issued an 11-page report that found "an appalling amount of racial prejudice—black and white—surfaced in and about the school controversy." It cited the "dangerous component of antisemitism" but, at the same time, also condemned the manifestations of anti-black bigotry, which, though expressed "in more sophisticated and subtle fashion," was "equally evil, corrosive, damaging and deplorable."

The commission warned that, unless the city administration immediately undertook adequate measures to improve interracial relations, "the school controversy may be only the first" of a number of similar confrontations. The panel felt that civic and community leaders had been too slow in responding to the racial tensions, and in speaking up "for the vast majority of citizens committed to an orderly process of change in a dynamic democratic society." Their failure to do so "early, clearly and sufficiently . . . was in itself a contributing factor to the exacerbation of hostilities." Specifically, the report recommended that the Mayor appoint a permanent committee to continue the work of the panel, and "to anticipate imminent racial or religious disturbance."

Shortly after the Botein commission issued its report, the ADL, on January 23, 1969, released a more detailed study of *Anti-Semitism in the New York City School Controversy*, warning that "raw undisguised anti-semitism is at a crisis level in New York City schools where, unchecked by public authority, it has been building for more than two years." It maintained that "there is a clear and present danger that schoolchildren in the city have been infected by the anti-Semitic preachings of Negro extremists who, in some cases, are teachers and to whom these youngsters increasingly look for leadership."

Specifically, the 23-page report charged that black separatists and other militants involved in the school dispute have deliberately created a pattern of antisemitism to further their objectives toward greater control within the public school system. It listed incidents in a dozen schools, as well as at school district headquarters, the majority of which involved "Sonny" Carson

and others connected with Brooklyn CORE. (During the strike, the Ocean Hill-Brownsville board officially cooperated with Carson and named him an "observer" on its behalf. Carson was also involved in a number of projects receiving public and foundation funds.)

The ADL report also noted a number of antisemitic statements by officials of the city's Council Against Poverty. It pointed out that, on several occasions, witnesses testifying at Board of Education hearings had made antisemitic remarks without being rebuked by Board members present, although some of these had not hesitated to interrupt and take issue with critics of the Board's decentralization proposals.

RESPONSE AND DEBATE IN THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Responses to antisemitism, in the New York school crisis and elsewhere, indicated a considerable division of opinion among leaders of the Jewish community. Some felt that an exaggerated reaction might bring on a backlash and hasten the development of political antisemitism. Others were concerned less with antisemitic manifestations than with the situation of the Negroes. Political scientist Leonard Fein of the Joint Center for Urban Studies, Harvard-M.I.T., believed that some Jews have responded to the antisemitism in a "slightly paranoid manner"—although he added, "we come by our paranoia honestly."⁶

On October 27, Arthur Goldberg, then president of the American Jewish Committee, cautioned that "the great body of Negroes do not share the opinion of the few extremists within their own community," adding that Jews should be "particularly sensitive" to the consequences of racial or religious discrimination against any group. Going a step further, Bertram H. Gold, the Committee's executive vice-president, maintained simultaneously, "Just as we call upon Jewish leaders to stamp out every trace of anti-Negro sentiment and action within the Jewish community, so we call upon black leaders to militantly combat anti-Semitic sentiment and action within the black community."

In October Rabbi Bernard Weinberger, a leader of the Orthodox Williamsburg community and a member of the city's antipoverty program policy-making board, urged Orthodox Jews to give up "exploitive businesses in ghetto areas," and to avoid interfering in the efforts of Negro communities to decentralize the schools. He suggested a new strategy of disengagement to ease racial tensions in urban slums. In a letter to the editor of the *New York Times*, November 9, Harry Golden offered another perspective when he suggested that Negro antisemitism was peripheral to the main issue, i.e., that "the Negroes achieve first-class citizenship and that their children are uninhibited by segregation and discrimination."

⁶ "The Black and the Jew: As Falling Out of Allies," *Time*, January 31, 1969.

Speaking to the General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds on November 17, United Jewish Appeal president Max M. Fisher rejected black antisemitism as an excuse for Jewish withdrawal from the battle for equal rights and justice for Negroes: "If Jews truly believe that advancing social justice is a Jewish obligation, there can be no lingering doubts that helping people in the inner city—which is largely what we mean when we say 'meeting the urban crisis'—does represent a genuine Jewish commitment."

The Synagogue Council of America, representing the rabbinical and congregational bodies in the United States, issued a statement in November which condemned "irresponsible and reckless individuals" for "exploiting the tensions created by the school dispute to fan anti-semitic and racial animosities." While racism and antisemitism must be condemned, no matter what their source, the statement continued, "Equally imperative is that responsible leadership on both sides not permit the uninformed and the reckless to obscure the real issues. To dismiss the legitimate goals of the teachers' union as motivated by anti-Negro racism is as false and immoral as to distort the legitimate desires of the Ocean Hill-Brownsville local board as anti-white racism or anti-Semitism."

A disquieting appraisal of the situation was offered by Earl Raab, sociologist and San Francisco Jewish community leader. His thesis was that black militants, frustrated by unrealized social and economic expectations, were developing "an antisemitic ideology" as part of their political strategy.⁷ Militants, he held, could find allies among politicians willing to pacify extremism at the expense of the Jewish community. Though he could find "no serious trace of political anti-Semitism in America" in the last quarter of a century, in his view the emergence of antisemitism in the black power movement and the reaction of the extreme right to the rise of the New Left have combined to change the nation's mood of political tolerance. "Three obvious conditions that coincide to produce a period of political anti-Semitism," he added, were "the kind of political and social instability that makes anti-Semitism useful; a political leader who is willing to use it; a mass population that is willing to embrace it."

Raab cautioned that the belief in the obsolescence of antisemitism as a cultural form in America, which gives Jews their greatest sense of security, was itself obsolete. One need not be an antisemite, he said, in order "to engage in or support anti-Semitic behavior." Thus, though many middle-class blacks were horrified by the antisemitic utterances of the black militants, they were likely to feel that they could not oppose it on the community level "where the pressure is," because this would be construed as "an attack on the militant movement itself." Raab took issue with the tendency to dismiss the antisemitism of black power leaders as "just poetic excess," since even murderous political antisemitism has always been expressed in precisely

⁷ "The Black Revolution and the Jewish Question," *Commentary*, January, 1969.

this manner. The black power movement was in fact developing an anti-semitic ideology.

Raab maintained that Jewish leaders, who minimized Negro antisemitism as confined to a radical minority and constituting only part of a broader anti-white attack, ignored the fact that it "already succeeded in reintroducing political anti-Semitism as a fashionable item in the American public arena—with what consequences no one can yet tell." It would be "a repetition of old mistakes," he said, "to think that if a black movement used anti-Semitism, anti-Semitism must therefore be rejected by anti-black whites." Raab's alarming conclusion was that the increasing dominance of the Negro population in the major cities and the continued use by black militants of anti-semitism as a political weapon could force the establishment to seek a political truce, possibly at the expense of the Jewish community.

The general debate also dealt with the concern over rising antisemitism, as it affected the relationship between Jewish organizational leadership and the rank and file of American Jewry. Bertram Gold discussed this aspect at the American Jewish Committee's annual meeting in May:

Jews are beginning to feel that their own national leadership is more concerned with bettering intergroup relations than protecting the interests of the Jewish community. Though we must reject demands for withdrawal from the civil rights struggle, the Committee's leadership would not fulfill its function if it were to ignore the legitimate demands for greater power by the Negro community at the expense of hard won gains made by individual Jews.

Milton Himmelfarb carried further the analysis of antisemitism and the reaction it stirred, by posing the question, "Is American Jewry in Crisis?"⁸ He pointed out that, despite the generally high level of education and income, Jews maintained their singular support for the 1968 Democratic presidential nominee and the liberal policies he represented. Pro-Wallace far-right support among Jews was two per cent. Himmelfarb pointed to the continued liberalism of the Jews despite antisemitism from the New Left and among blacks. Mounting social pressures of this kind, he noted, have driven others to the political right.

Questioning what was alleged to be root of anti-Jewish hostility among Negroes, Himmelfarb maintained that Negro shopkeepers and black leaders, too, were criticized for actions upon which this hostility was said to be based: overcharging by shopkeepers in black neighborhoods, and earning a livelihood in these neighborhoods, while residing in more affluent communities.

The reintroduction of a quota system to insure adequate participation of blacks in higher education and elsewhere was seen as a deplorable development. The article pointed out that Jews have been particularly successful in the meritocracy (which would be replaced by quota systems); therefore, "the

⁸ *Commentary*, March 1969, pp. 33–42.

reasoning goes, then the whole thing is unfair, a Jewish conspiracy in effect if not in original intention."

Two elements in the pattern of response to the reappearance of anti-semitism were equally disturbing to Himmelfarb. Jews not only had no real allies among other whites—as manifested in the failure of public agencies, such as the New York City Board of Education, to respond to overt anti-semitism—but Jews, themselves, were distracted and disunited in their responses to the problem. And yet Himmelfarb was somewhat sanguine as he analyzed the outcome of the Metropolitan Museum incident and the broader political implications:

Politics are still democratic. The calculus of votes and grievances still operates, the normal office-holder still hesitates to write us off. Jews are not quite so lacking in the instinct of self-preservation. What we will need for a while is a little bit of luck.

THE URBAN CRISIS

The summer of 1968 saw no recurrence of the unprecedented 1967 rioting and violence in America's cities. To be sure, civil disorders continued, but nowhere were they as widespread and intense as before. The most violent disorder occurred in Washington, D.C. in April, after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. For three days and nights a 57-block area was ravaged by riot. It took the lives of nine persons, eight black and one white. More than 1,200 were injured. Damage and destruction of 909 businesses and 283 housing units represented a loss of millions of dollars.

Civil-Rights Legislation

Federal troops were still in Washington to help patrol sections of Negro neighborhoods, where tension continued to persist, when President Johnson, on April 11, signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which was intended to end racial discrimination in the sale and rental of 80 per cent of the homes and apartments in the United States. It had been introduced in Congress in 1966 (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], p. 84), and rescued from a Senate filibuster in February 1968, by a vote of 229 to 195. In both houses, Republicans provided the margin needed to pass the bill because of defections among Southern Democrats. Though civil-rights supporters held that the legislation would have passed in any event, the prevailing feeling seemed to be that Dr. King's assassination influenced the outcome.

The Civil Rights Act lowered housing barriers in three stages. It immediately barred discrimination in federally-owned housing and multi-unit dwellings insured with federal funds. Effective December 31, 1968, it covered all multi-unit dwellings and homes in real estate developments, except those occupied by owners with four or fewer units, such as boarding houses.

Effective January 1, 1970, it was to extend coverage to all single-family houses sold or rented through brokers.

The act also provided stiff federal penalties for persons convicted of intimidating or injuring civil-rights workers and Negroes engaged in schooling, housing, voting, voter registration, jury duty, and in the use of public facilities. It made it a federal crime to travel from one state to another, or using TV or radio, or other interstate facilities, to incite a riot. It made it a federal crime to manufacture, sell, or demonstrate the use of, firearms or explosive devices meant for use in riot or other civil disorders.

On June 17, two months after the first open-housing provision of the act went into effect, the Supreme Court turned a civil rights law of 1866 into a sweeping fair-housing statute in a 7-to-2 ruling prohibiting racial discrimination in all sales and rentals of property. The decision grew out of a suit brought by Joseph Lee Jones, a St. Louis Negro, and his white wife, against a real estate owner in a suburb of the city for refusing to sell them a home site because he was a Negro. The Court held that the 1866 law guaranteed to all citizens in all states and territories of the United States "the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." In effect, the Court created a fair housing law going beyond the 1968 act in that it included sales or rentals by private homeowners, as well as dwellings containing fewer than five units.

The Report of the National Commission on Civil Disorders

In March the Kerner Commission issued its report on the 1967 civil disorders, underscoring its major conclusion with a statement that jolted the nation:

Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal. Reaction to last summer's disorders has quickened the movement and deepened the division. Discrimination and segregation now threaten the future of every American.

This deepening racial division is not inevitable. . . . To pursue our present course will involve ultimately, the destruction of basic democratic values.

The alternative, the report held, was not "blind repression, or capitulation to lawlessness," for "the community cannot—it will not—tolerate coercion and mob rule." What was required was "commitment to national action—compassionate, massive and sustained, backed by the resources of the most powerful and the richest nation on this earth." Segregation and poverty, the report continued, have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment totally unknown to most white Americans." Yet, white institutions created the ghetto and were maintaining it.

The extensive report gave a detailed profile of the disorders and an analysis of the behavior patterns involved. It traced the basic causes to 1)

the underlying pattern of pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education, and housing that have resulted in the continuing exclusion of great numbers of Negroes from the benefit of economic progress; 2) black in-migration to, and white exodus from the central city, that have produced massive and growing concentrations of impoverished Negroes in our major cities, creating a growing crisis of deteriorating facilities and services and of unmet human needs; 3) black ghettos, where segregation and poverty converge on the young to destroy opportunity and enforce failure, resulting in crime, drug addiction, dependency on welfare, and bitterness, and resentment against society in general, and white society in particular.

The commission felt that these factors contributed to a mood of violence among many urban Negroes. It urged "a commitment to national action on an unprecedented scale," whose "primary goal must be a single society, in which every citizen will be free to live and work according to his capabilities, not his color." The only possible choice for America, it said, was the adoption of a policy combining ghetto enrichment with programs designed to encourage the movement of substantial numbers of Negroes out of central city areas, and their integration into the larger society.

Supplemental Studies

The Kerner Commission published three supplemental studies to its report in July.⁹ The most dramatic, and probably the most meaningful, for white Americans was *Who Riots? A Study of the Participation in the 1967 Riots*. It deals with the "riffraff theory," which held that the riots were fomented by only a tiny, nonrepresentative faction of the Negro community and some outside agitators. According to the authors, Dr. Robert M. Fogelson, associate professor at M.I.T., and Dr. Robert B. Hall, associate of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, the "riffraff theory" was used by police chiefs and city and state officials to explain the 1960's riots, and the explanation was widely accepted because it was reassuring to most white Americans.

The reason for its acceptance, the authors suggested, was that "If, indeed, the rioters were a tiny fraction of the Negro population . . . and opposed by a large majority of the ghetto residents, the riots were less ominous than they appeared." Also, the riots were considered "a function of poverty, which in American ideology is alterable, rather than race, which is immutable; in which case too, they were peripheral to the issue of white-black relations in the United States." If the theory were true, there would be no need for radically changing American cities and its basic institutions, or seriously inconveniencing its white majority, in dealing with the riots. However, the authors challenged the theory after studying the Negro communities and 10,000 arrest records in Cincinnati, Dayton, Detroit, Grand

⁹ *Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (Washington, D.C., July 1968).

Rapids, Newark, New Haven, Boston, Plainfield, and Phoenix, where rioting occurred in 1967.

They found that, in six of the ten cities, about 18 per cent of the Negro residents, who were fairly representative of their communities, participated in the disorders. Also,

1. The overwhelming majority of rioters, and about three-fourths of those arrested had jobs.
2. More than two-thirds of those arrested were over 18 years of age; 90 per cent of them men. It was also found that many women participated in the riots.
3. Most rioters were native to the area. Older migrants from the South tended to join the disorder only in its later stages, but they, too, participated in the arson and looting.
4. Although 40 to 90 per cent of those arrested had records of prior arrests, criminal elements were not over-represented.

The study concluded that the 1967 riots were carried out by a "small but significant minority of the Negro population, fairly representative of the ghetto residents," which was "tacitly supported by at least a large minority of the black community." This the report interpreted as indicating that they were "a manifestation of race and racism in the United States, a reflection of the social problems of modern black ghettos, a protest against the essential conditions of life there and an indicator of the necessity for fundamental changes in American society."

A second supplemental study, *Racial Attitudes in 15 American Cities*, conducted by Professors Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman of the Institute for Social Research, of the University of Michigan, supported these findings at least in part. Interviews with more than 5,000 Negroes and whites in Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Gary, Milwaukee, Newark, New York (Brooklyn only), Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, St. Louis, and Washington, aimed at analyzing the Kerner Commission's charge of white racism, found that there was "no universal pattern of racial conduct among white people in this country." On the contrary, the survey disclosed a "fundamental and perhaps growing schism between those whose basic orientation toward Negroes is positive and those whose attitudes and behavior are negative." It even found various patterns in, and attitudes toward, different aspects of racial issues.

The surveyors rejected neat characterization of the white population as racist or prejudiced. They also regarded simple and oversimplified distinctions between prejudiced and unprejudiced whites as inaccurate: "Racial prejudice is not a matter of either-or but of more-or-less." While the authors found that "only a very small percentage of the Negro population define the riots as essentially criminal actions to be suppressed by public force," only about one-third of the white population agreed with Negroes that the riots were a revolt against real grievances; an equal number regarded them as

criminal acts, inspired by radicals, to be dealt with only by police power.

The subject of the third study, conducted under the direction of Prof. Peter H. Rossi of the department of social relations, Johns Hopkins University, was institutions operating in the Negro slums. In the cities surveyed by the Michigan team, six occupational groups—the police, teachers, retail merchants, welfare workers, political party workers, and employers—were asked about their attitudes toward, and knowledge of, life in black neighborhoods. The findings strongly suggested that “the delivery system of the central institutions of our local communities serve the ghetto poorly and are insensitive” to the plight of urban Negroes. From this the report concluded: “If these are the faces that American institutions present to the ghetto, then the alienation of the ghetto from the main community is scarcely to be wondered at.”

National Commission on Urban Problems

In July the National Commission on Urban Problems, chaired by former Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois, released a study showing that, if current trends continued, “America by 1985 would be well on the road towards a society characterized by stratification along racial and economic lines as well as geographic separation.” Conducted by Patricia Hodge and Philip Hauser of Chicago University, with technical assistance from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the study’s population projections indicated that, by 1985, central cities will have gained 10 million nonwhites, a 94 per cent increase, while the suburbs will have gained 53.9 million whites, a 104 per cent increase. At the same time, the nonwhite population in the suburbs was expected to rise from 2.8 million in 1960 to 6.8 million in 1985, a 1 per cent increase in the total population. The central cities will have lost 2.4 million, or 5 per cent of their whites. “These projections vividly portray the geographic fulfillment and the fears expressed by the President’s Commission on Civil Disorders—that the American society is becoming an apartheid society.” When the study was released, Douglas said, “the further division of our cities by racial groups raises the most compelling questions for a democracy.” It was his hope that the publication of these trends would enable the American people to judge “the greatest threat to our social order and then take the necessary steps to alter them.” Douglas urged suburban areas to make a conscious effort, “in the interests of peace,” to absorb Negroes in larger numbers.

CAMPUS DISORDERS

American higher education was at the center of turmoil, as many demands for change had direct political implications and some racial undertones.

The campus-wide upheaval at Columbia University, that erupted when

dissident students occupied and barricaded themselves in the dean's office, on April 23, was symptomatic of the problems in academia. The issues—opposition to the Vietnam war and to white racism allegedly practiced by colleges and universities—were those around which the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and other militant students generally rallied. The particular focus was on Columbia's plan to construct a gym in Harlem's Morningside Park and the university's relationship with the Institute for Defense Analysis. Several buildings were occupied by students in a series of campus strikes during which black students preferred to act independently of militant whites.

At San Francisco State College, the campus unrest began in November, partly as a result of a demand for "black studies," an autonomous program of Afro-American historical and cultural studies, with students to determine curriculum and faculty appointments. The strike often was accompanied by violence in police-student confrontations.

Several volatile ingredients combined to spread student activism and rebellion to colleges across the country. Demands for university reform and greater student participation and decision-making, along with demands for "black studies" and opposition to the Vietnam war, provided the basis for protests and strikes and a potential for violence also at Harvard, Berkeley, Howard, Queens, City College, Radcliffe, Wisconsin, New York University, Minnesota, Brown, Washington University (St. Louis), Fordham, and elsewhere.

While the debate engendered by student rebelliousness revealed the magnitude of some of the basic problems in higher education, no resolution was immediately apparent. However, few issues held more potential for intergroup divisiveness than the "black studies" question. Nor was there agreement on this matter among Negro leaders. In January 1969 Roy Wilkins, executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), called these demands simply "another version of segregation and Jim Crow," and stated that his organization was prepared to challenge in the courts separate facilities and programs for blacks. On the other hand, Dr. Nathan Hare, director of the Negro studies program at San Francisco State College, declared at the annual meeting of the Association of American Colleges that Negroes must be taught from a "black perspective" how to solve the problems of American society. He said that Afro-Americans "must first blackwash—revamp—the existing educational system and revolutionize America's youth, black, yellow, brown and white." United Negro College Fund president Dr. Stephen J. Wright criticized Hare's views as expressing "a kind of separatism that isn't going anywhere."

THE POLITICAL ARENA

The 1968 political campaigns were the catalysts for the expression of a variety of intergroup hostilities, and gave rise to unusual incidents of violence.

Republican National Convention

As the Republicans met in Miami, Fla., August 5-9, to reunite their national party, with Richard M. Nixon as its standard-bearer, rioting took place among Negroes in a 20-block area six miles from the convention hall. The major cause was the failure of Governor Claude R. Kirk to make a promised appearance to discuss grievances with the rioters. The disorders, which lasted for several days, were met with a show of strong force, including Miami policemen and the National Guard. Three blacks were killed and five critically wounded as policemen exchanged gunfire with snipers. One hundred and fifty blacks were arrested in what was the first major riot in Miami's history.

Democratic National Convention

The Democrats assembled in Chicago, August 26-29, with battle lines having been drawn within the party and in the city. Senator Robert F. Kennedy's assassination in June had shaken the party and narrowed the nomination to Vice-President Hubert H. Humphrey and Senator Eugene J. McCarthy. Despite a threatened telephone strike, that would have severely hampered news coverage, and a possible strike of cab drivers, Mayor Richard C. Daley was determined to have the convention in his city. At the same time, Chicago was to be host to a convention of the Yippies (Youth International party), who were joined by thousands of other young people converging on the city to support McCarthy, as well as the anti-Vietnam, pro-peace position at the convention. Daley had made preparations to accommodate and protect convention delegates and to control the anticipated demonstrations.

As the Democrats bitterly debated the Vietnam platform plank, as well as the seating of contested delegations from Mississippi and Georgia inside the convention hall, unprecedented violence erupted between police and demonstrators in Chicago's streets and parks. The use of raw physical force to keep noisy Vietnam-war critics, including collegians, clergymen, hippies and Yippies, away from the hotel headquarters of the candidates and the convention hall, became an issue at the convention, as delegates registered sharp criticism of Daley and of the police for its repeated use of tear gas and indiscriminate attacks on demonstrators and innocent bystanders alike.

A study of the convention violence was undertaken for the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence by a study group under the direction of Chicago attorney Daniel Walker. Released in Decem-

ber, the study report, *Rights in Conflict*, charged the Chicago police with perpetrating a "police riot" in response to mounting provocation. It described the response as "unrestrained and indiscriminate police violence, on many occasions, particularly at night," made all the more shocking by the fact that "it was often inflicted upon persons who had broken no law, disobeyed no order, made no threats." According to the Walker study, newsmen and photographers were singled out for assault, and their equipment deliberately damaged.

The report cautioned that to characterize the crowds as "entirely hippy-Yippie, entirely youthful political dissenters is both wrong and dangerous," though such stereotyping "helps to explain the emotional reaction of both police and public during and after the violence."

It also held Mayor Daley's precautionary measures in anticipation of strife and his April order to the police to "shoot to kill arsonists and shoot to maim looters" responsible for the violence, as it did the excessive provocations of the demonstrators. When the report was released, Walker accused the Chicago police department of dropping a "blue curtain" on the disorders, and of failing to "root out and punish" most of those who had used "unrestrained and indiscriminate violence."

The debate over the report and its findings highlighted the problem of how police could cope with mass dissent without infringing on the constitutional rights of citizens. Mayor Daley, at a news conference called shortly before the report was released, said that "over-all it is an excellent study," though he had some reservations about the summary. Albert E. Jenner, Jr., a Chicago corporation lawyer and member of the President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, also felt that the language of the summary was too strong. He doubted whether the term "police riot" had been "backed up" in the report. Representative Richard H. Ichord (Dem., Mo.), acting chairman of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, which was conducting hearings on the demonstrations, said the Walker investigators "overreacted" to the evidence and wrote a report that "read like a novel instead of a fact-finding report." In his view, newsmen were as guilty of "overreaction" during the disorders as were "a small minority" of Chicago policemen. "If the police attempt to enforce the law," he continued, "they consider that they have the right to use force to defend themselves, as they put it."

The Presidential Campaigns

As the presidential campaigns proceeded, pollsters Louis Harris, George Gallup, and others were measuring the attitudes of the electorate. According to Harris, the two issues dominating the voters' outlook were the Vietnam war and "law and order." He reported that 81 per cent of the public believed that "law and order has broken down," and 84 per cent that "a

strong president can make a big difference" in this matter.¹⁰ Harris's data also showed that 58 per cent of the electorate rejected most of the usual stereotypes about black Americans, and that the remaining 42 per cent continued to harbor some form of personal prejudice which could contribute to political polarization in the presidential election.¹¹ In 1968, for the first time in modern political history, divisions created over race were directly reflected in the national political campaign. A large majority of those still believing in stereotypes favored Nixon or Wallace. Humphrey led among those whose attitudes towards Negroes had softened.

The importance of the traditionally liberal Jewish vote in what was expected to be a close election was highlighted by one aspect of Nixon's campaign strategy. In September, at the convention of the Zionist Organization of America, Nixon said that the balance of power in the Middle East "must be tipped in Israel's favor." Speaking at a B'nai B'rith convention several days before, Nixon declared his "firm and unwavering commitment to the national existence of Israel." Vice-President Humphrey took an equally strong stand on Israel, stating his support for the U.S. sale of supersonic Phantom jets to Israel. However, his position was somewhat weakened by President Johnson's unwillingness to permit delivery at that time. Some observers regarded Nixon's strongly pro-Israel stand as an attempt to gain the support of traditionally Democratic Jewish voters, who might have been vulnerable because of the law and order issue.¹²

The electorate's group orientation and sensitivity also were noted when Republican vice-presidential candidate Spiro Agnew used derisive ethnic terms while campaigning. In September he referred to Polish-Americans as "Polack," and called an American newspaperman covering his campaign a "fat Jap." The news media reports of these references stirred some criticism, and Agnew offered a public apology to anyone who interpreted what he called the humorous use of these "racial appellations" as racial or ethnic slurs.

Wallace Movement

The third-party presidential candidacy of George Wallace was a significant development in American national politics. Wallace's name was on the ballot in all 50 states; his American Independent party was the first third party in a century to constitute a major movement on the right, rather than on the left.

The movement, more than the man himself, was the focus of considerable interest. The Anti-Defamation League reported in October that, "under the cover of a political campaign," Wallace had become "the standard-bearer of the Radical Right in America, the front man in a mass movement of

¹⁰ Harris poll release, September 9, 1968.

¹¹ Harris poll release, September 16, 1968.

¹² Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Nixon and the Jews," *New York Post*, September 25, 1968.

extremism, dissension, and ill-concealed racism.”¹³ Based on a study of state and local Wallace campaign headquarters, their organizers, petition gatherers, precinct and state chairmen, delegates, and electors, the ADL report asserted that the movement attracted, along with ordinary frightened or prejudiced Americans, “the legions of the far Right, and the dangerous hate fringe—John Birchers, Ku Kluxers, White Citizens’ Councilors, Liberty Lobbyites, Minutemen and many far-flung extremists who peddle race hatred and antisemitism.”

The report contended that Wallace had become the spokesman for “the fears and suspicions,” and the “bizarre fantasies” typical of the extremist and white-backlash “demi-world.” By using “hypocritical” calls for “states’ rights” or “strident cries for ‘law and order,’ he has pandered to the violent emotions of those advocating physical action as the solution of delicate human problems.” As a result, the report continued, the extremist legions, who contributed their influence and numbers to the Wallace campaign, have often used it to “fill their own ranks and their own coffers.”

However, contrary to expectations, the 1968 presidential campaign was “significantly free of antisemitism, more so in fact than any Presidential election [in] the past two decades,” Milton Ellerin found in an American Jewish Committee study of the Wallace movement. The report, released in December 1968, held that local and state Wallace headquarters used no material even faintly suggesting bigotry; nor was there any national distribution of antisemitic or anti-Negro material.

Analyzing the development of the Wallace movement during the campaign, Ellerin noted a steady decrease in the expected percentage of the total vote. He cited the September-October Harris and Gallup polls showing as high as a 20 per cent support for Wallace, and the election results giving him 13.6 per cent of the popular vote. According to Harris, the Wallace voter appeal stemmed “basically from the cleavage over race and the deep feelings and fears about the breakdown of ‘law and order.’”

Ellerin suggested the drop in Wallace support by election day could have been a result of his greater national exposure. The mass media stepped up coverage of Wallace, as it became increasingly possible that he might receive enough votes to prevent a Nixon or Humphrey victory in the electoral college and thereby throw the election into the House of Representatives. However, since the support dwindled mainly in the working-class districts of the northern cities, the educational work of the labor unions appeared to have been directly responsible. Despite the steady loss of support, the Wallace candidacy tapped an undeniable vein of discontent among Americans throughout the nation. Ellerin concluded that the final weakening of the Wallace support in 1968 did not eliminate the elements for a mass-base third party, and the attendant danger from the right, as a political possibility in the future.

¹³ “The Extreme Right Invasion of the 1968 Campaign,” *Facts*, October 1968.

In another study of the Wallace movement, *Radicalism—Southern Style: A Commentary on Regional Extremism*,¹⁴ Reese Cleghorn, the associate editor of *The Atlanta Journal*, presented Wallace as an example of the Southern politics of "irrationalism," that early in the last century "had to begin reconciling its devotion to democracy with its denial of democracy to Negroes." This irrational attitude syndrome, Cleghorn said, provided a fertile ground for the Wallace appeal. In a state-by-state analysis of the Wallace vote, Cleghorn asserted that it "almost perfectly reflects the Southern nature of his candidacy and the unwillingness of those outside the South to follow him."

Voting Patterns and Electoral Outcomes

The narrow margin of the Richard Nixon victory and the support of George Wallace by northern urban voters raised questions about certain traditional patterns of electoral behavior. In the course of the campaign, pollsters were recording an apparent shift to the right by many urban whites who were considered part of the liberal Democratic coalition. Because of growing racial tensions, lower middle-class whites were expected to be especially receptive to the Wallace appeal. There also was conjecture that the Jewish voters might break their overwhelming Democratic voting habit and shift to Nixon, in response to his campaign appeals to them and the salient ring of "law and order" in their own urban communities. There also was discussion of the possibility of a Jewish backlash in response to overt black antisemitism.

However, the election returns revealed a pattern of mixed responses. Nixon's slim percentage margin over Humphrey prompted one observer to describe the election as an "abortive landslide," more a Democratic defeat than a Republican victory.¹⁵ The Wallace vote was 6.4 per cent less than earlier polls had indicated. Also, the regional base of his support was revealed by the fact that 57 per cent of his national total came from the South. His share of the total vote in the rest of the country was 7.5 per cent, still a significant figure, particularly in view of the close outcome.

Various trends were noted in the ethnic voting patterns. The Gallup poll reported a discernible shift among Catholics to Nixon, with Jewish and Negro voters maintaining their traditional support of the Democratic candidate.¹⁶ The sample indicated that 62 per cent of Catholics voted for Humphrey, 28 for Nixon, and 10 for Wallace. (By contrast, the Catholic vote in 1964 was 76 per cent for Johnson and 24 per cent for Goldwater.) According to Gallup, Jewish and Negro voters in sampled areas maintained

¹⁴ Published by the American Jewish Committee and the Southern Regional Council, December 1968.

¹⁵ Walter Dean Burnham, "Election 1968—The Abortive Landslide," *Trans-Action*, December 1968.

¹⁶ Gallup poll release, November 7, 1968.

an 80-90 per cent support level for the Democratic presidential ticket. Based on sample precinct data, NBC News reported a significant vote for Wallace in certain ethnic communities: 10 per cent in Italian-American areas and 11 per cent in Slavic-American areas. According to the final and corrected national per cent sampling of returns compiled by NBC News, the Jewish vote was 81 per cent for Humphrey, 17 per cent for Nixon, and 2 per cent for Wallace.¹⁷ Several other post-election analyses¹⁸ emphasized the tenacity of liberal Jewish voting patterns and the Jewish repudiation of Wallace.

Liberal-Conservative Trends

The congressional and state elections showed an over-all drift to the right. Three leading Democrats and active liberals, Senators Joseph S. Clark (Pa.), A. S. Mike Monroney (Okla.), and Wayne Morse (Ore.), lost their bids for reelection. Senate conservative ranks were strengthened by the return of former Senator Barry Goldwater (Ariz.). On the other hand, Max Rafferty, who had defeated liberal Republican Senate minority whip Thomas H. Kuchel in a bitter and acrimonious primary race, in turn was defeated by liberal Democrat Alan Cranston.

The Republicans gained four seats in the House of Representatives. One of the surprising Democratic victories was won by Allard K. Lowenstein, a peace candidate and supporter of Eugene McCarthy, who defeated Mason L. Hampton, a conservative endorsed by Republicans, for a congressional seat in Nassau county, N.Y. Another Democratic victory was the election of Mrs. Shirley Chisholm, the first black woman to be sent to Congress. She defeated Republican-Liberal candidate James Farmer, former head of CORE, in the newly created 12th Congressional District (Brooklyn, N.Y.), which included the Bedford-Stuyvesant area.

State and local tax, and economic issues dominated the gubernatorial elections in which Republicans won 13 of 21 contests. The racial issue was a factor in North Carolina, where Lt. Gov. Robert W. Scott (Dem.) beat back a challenge from Rep. James C. Gardner (Rep.). Each candidate charged that the other did not do enough to prevent action by the federal government on racial segregation in the schools. Gardner made an open bid for Wallace support.

Locally, in Newark, N.J., Anthony Imperiale, head of the militantly white North Ward Citizens Committee, and Anthony Giuliano, former president of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, easily defeated two Negro candidates for the city council.

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¹⁷ *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, November 29, 1968. An earlier NBC News estimate had put the Jewish vote for Wallace at 13 per cent, stirring a strong Jewish protest.

¹⁸ *Voting Survey: November 5, 1968 Election*, Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit; "Patterns of Jewish Voting, 1968," *Midstream*, February 1969 (analyses of Baltimore, Chicago, St. Louis, and Los Angeles).

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

BY THE END of 1968, little appreciable progress had been made toward a peace settlement in the Middle East. The growth of the Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the increasing influence and power of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations were new factors of potential danger. Intermittent violations of the cease-fire along the borders between Israel and its Arab neighbors produced an atmosphere of tension and hostility. Perhaps the most promising development toward an eventual settlement was the growing realization by the United States and the Soviet Union that the constantly escalating pattern of attack and retaliation must be broken, that another war must be averted if the states in the Middle East are to survive.

American Policy

Since 1968 was a presidential election year, more attention than usual was given to American foreign policy, and particularly to American policy in the Middle East. Major party candidates issued a number of statements regarding the proper orientation of American policy, and both Hubert H. Humphrey and Richard M. Nixon made strong pronouncements in favor of United States support for Israel. Nixon went further than Humphrey when, speaking to B'nai B'rith on September 8, he urged that the United States give Israel

... sufficient military power to deter an attack. As long as the threat of Arab attack remains direct and imminent, sufficient power means the balance must be tipped in Israel's favor. An exact balance of power, which in any case is purely theoretical and not realistic, would run the risk that potential aggressors might miscalculate and would offer them too much of a temptation.

If giving Israel an edge required the sale of Phantom jets, Nixon said, then the United States would supply them. Here, for the first time, the idea of giving Israel a decided military advantage was mooted, United States policy having traditionally been to maintain a balance of arms between Israel and the Arab countries.

Two days later, on September 10, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed himself to the question of peace in the Middle East. However, contrary to the expectations of many observers, he did not announce a decision on the proposed sale of Phantom F-4s to Israel; he rather emphasized again the urgent need for Soviet agreement to arms limitations for the Middle East. At the same time, he repeated that the United States had "no intention of allowing the balance of forces in the area to become an incentive for war." Johnson called for secure and recognized boundaries "as part of the transition

from armistice to peace," which now must be "a real peace of justice and reconciliation—not a cease-fire, not a temporary truce, not a renewal of the fragile armistice." He cautioned that the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967 was not self-executing, that the parties involved therefore must make the major effort to initiate progress toward peace. This statement reflected no real change in United States policy; it was largely a reaffirmation of earlier pronouncements. The State Department continued to oppose the sale of the Phantoms, claiming they were not essential for Israel's security and would only accelerate the flow of Soviet arms to the Arab countries. There was also some speculation that Israel's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as the United States wished it to do, may have been a factor in State Department opposition.

Acting on the basis of a Foreign Aid Authorization Act amendment that expressed congressional approval of the sale of the Phantoms, President Johnson announced, on October 9, that negotiations with Israel would begin shortly. This announcement came just after unproductive discussions between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko on the possibility of reducing arms shipments to the Middle East. However, the President's statement did not eliminate opposition within the State Department, and some officials claimed it did not necessarily mean a definite commitment to supply the jets.

Despite this opposition, the State Department initiated negotiations with Israel. In November these were transferred to the Pentagon, indicating that agreement was near. On December 27 it was announced that the United States had agreed to sell Israel 50 Phantoms at an estimated total cost of over \$200 million. Delivery was to begin late in 1969. Informed sources said at least 10, and probably 16, of the planes would be delivered by the end of the year. The Phantoms have a maximum speed of over 1,200 miles an hour, a range of over 1,000 miles, and serve as both bombers and fighter-interceptors. They have been in extensive use in Vietnam, where they proved superior to the Russian MIG-21, the aircraft supplied by the Soviet Union to the Arab states. Israeli crews were scheduled to come to the United States for a six-month training period. The decision to sell the jets to Israel, coming almost one year after the subject was first discussed between President Johnson and Israel Premier Levi Eshkol, reflected the administration's reluctance to step up the arms race. This was overcome only by its greater concern over the growing Soviet buildup of Arab military strength and its determination not to put Israel in a militarily vulnerable position vis-a-vis the Arabs.

That President-elect Nixon regarded the Middle East situation as a high-priority issue was demonstrated early in December, when he sent William S. Scranton on a fact-finding tour of the region's capitals. Scranton talked with Arab and Israeli leaders, and came away cheered about the prospects of peace. His comments regarding the need for a more "even-handed" United States policy in the Middle East caused some fear that he was advocating some concessions to the Arab states at the expense of Israel. In any event,

his precise recommendations remained unclear, and a complete report of his findings was not made public. Scranton's remarks, on returning to the United States, caused Nixon some embarrassment; he disassociated himself from them when his press representative Ronald Ziegler said they were "Scranton remarks, not Nixon remarks." Other than that, there was no indication before Nixon's inauguration as to what his position would be. Both Israel and the Arab states waited for the new administration to take over, in the hope that it would pursue a policy favorable to their respective interests.

Soviet Presence in the Middle East

The buildup of the Soviet fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean was intensified in the latter part of 1968 to perhaps 50 ships, but it was reported that 20 of these were withdrawn at the end of the year. According to *New Middle East* (London), October 1968, the fleet included nuclear submarines, some carrying nuclear missiles, several long-range missile-carrying destroyers, and at least one helicopter carrier. The Soviet Union stationed ships at Alexandria and Port Said in the United Arab Republic, and at Latakia in Syria. The Soviet determination to maintain a substantial position in the Mediterranean was affirmed by the official newspapers *Izvestia* (November 12) and *Pravda* (quoted in the *New York Times*, November 28), which called for the withdrawal of the American military and political presence from the Mediterranean and alleged that the United States was supporting the "expansionist" policies of Israel in order to maintain American supremacy in the region. On November 27 *Pravda* said that the Soviet Union was now a Mediterranean power and, as such, had an interest in all problems involving the interests of that area. It further stated that the Soviet fleet was there "with the approval and in accordance with the interests" of the Arab states.

The United States responded to the Soviet challenge on November 21 by setting up, as part of a new NATO air command, a system of intelligence on Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. This intensive surveillance may have accounted, at least in part, for the reduction of the Soviet fleet at the end of the year. Having given a show of naval strength, the Soviets also may have thought it wiser to withdraw part of its fleet, lest its presence encourage the Arab states to provoke another war, in the expectation of full Soviet support. The act doubtless reflected Soviet reluctance to risk the outbreak of such a war or an incidental confrontation with the United States.

Yet, the Soviets continued to provide the Arab countries with arms and technical and military advisers. About \$2.5 billion worth of arms were delivered to the Arab states, bringing their arms levels up to, if not beyond, those before June 1967. It was estimated that there were 2,000-3,000 such advisers in the United Arab Republic, compared with 500-700 before the June war; some estimates rose as high as 5,000. At the same time, their presence in the United Arab Republic was causing friction between them and

the Egyptians who, while welcoming the assistance, were wary of Russian control.

An editorial in the December 3 issue of *Pravda* declared that the Middle East question could and must be settled by "political" means and that the Soviet Union would take the necessary steps to facilitate such a settlement. *Pravda* declared that the Soviet Union would not permit a new war to break out. In line with these statements, the Soviet Union, at year's end, appeared to be making an all-out effort to reach agreement with the United States on possible peace terms to be suggested to—or perhaps imposed on—the Arab states and Israel.

On the initiative of the Soviet Union, talks were held in New York early in December between Yosef Tekoah, the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir S. Semyonov. The meeting was shrouded in secrecy, but there can be little doubt that it represented a Soviet attempt to gain insight into Israel's position regarding a settlement. Gromyko went to Cairo for discussions with President Gamal Abdel Nasser on December 22, amidst rumors that the Soviets were worried lest the constant escalation of Arab-Israeli hostilities might lead to an American-Soviet confrontation.

On December 19, and again on December 30, the Soviet Union submitted to the United States Middle East peace proposals. According to a report in the Beirut newspaper *Al-Anwar*, the plan called for a phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories over a period of three months. At the same time, each side was to declare the end of the state of belligerency. Also, United Nations troops were to be posted in Gaza, on the Sinai frontier, and at the entrance to the Strait of Tiran. The Soviets apparently intended that this plan be conveyed to the Arabs and Israel through Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union and United Nations mediator, upon the resumption of his mission late in January. However, the Johnson administration was reluctant to begin in the last weeks of its tenure what would necessarily be a long process of negotiation. Discussion of the proposed plan therefore awaited the incoming Nixon administration. Israel indicated that it was opposed to the Russian plan.

The Soviet Union also appeared to be considering expanding American-Soviet talks on the Middle East, to include France and Great Britain. Soviet officials met with British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart in London and with President Charles de Gaulle in Paris to discuss ways of easing tensions. The French strongly favored four-power talks, having called for them on several occasions. In view of the Soviet overtures to the Western powers, there were some grounds for hope that the Soviets were coming to the conviction that a settlement was in their own interest, and that they were prepared to work toward this end.

United Nations Peace Efforts

Throughout 1968 United Nations efforts to find a solution to the Middle East conflict had little result. Jarring held several sets of meetings with Arab and Israeli representatives in an attempt to find some basis for negotiations. In December and January he conveyed Israeli proposals for an agenda for peace discussions to the United Arab Republic, but there was no reply or counterproposal to either. In March a proposal that Israel, the United Arab Republic, and Jordan meet under Jarring's auspices was accepted by Israel, but not by the two Arab states. On May 1 Ambassador Tekoah conveyed Israel's acceptance of the United Nations resolution of November 22, 1967, declaring his government's willingness to seek agreement with each Arab state on the issues in the resolution. At the end of August Israel gave to UAR Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad an explanation of its understanding of the term "a just and final peace." His reply simply made a general reference to the United Nations resolution, but gave no details on its implementation. The interpretation of the resolution continued to be a source of disagreement between Israel and the Arab states: The Arabs regarded it as a formula for settlement, to begin with Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories; Israel said the resolution was not self-executing, that it was merely a guideline for a settlement and not an exact formula for it.

Hopes for a solution were raised slightly with the opening of the new session of the United Nations General Assembly. On October 8 Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban presented a nine-point program for peace, dealing specifically with all issues involved. Its first point was the establishment of a just and lasting peace, duly negotiated and contractually expressed. Such a peace, Eban said, would not be the mere absence of fighting, but rather "a positive and clearly defined relationship with far-reaching political, practical and juridical consequences." It would lay down the exact terms of Arab-Israeli coexistence, including a map of secure and recognized boundaries. These boundaries, Eban said, would replace the cease-fire lines, and "the disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with the boundaries under the final peace." This point was interpreted as indicating a measure of flexibility in Israel's position—a willingness to withdraw from occupied territories.

Eban also called for security arrangements to prevent the kind of situation which led to hostilities in 1967; the establishment of an open frontier, especially on the Jordanian border, and freedom of navigation in the region's international waterways. As for the refugees, Eban suggested that the interested states meet, even before the beginning of peace negotiations, to work out a five-year plan for a solution of the problem. Under a settlement, he continued, joint refugee integration and rehabilitation commissions would be set up to devise projects with regional and international assistance. With regard to Jerusalem, Eban expressed Israel's willingness to have the Christian and Moslem Holy Places become the responsibility of the respective religious

authorities. Perhaps the most important principle enunciated by Eban was the recognition of Israel's sovereignty, integrity, and right to national life, a point on which the Arabs have been notably reluctant. In conclusion, Eban called for programs of regional cooperation and development in the Middle East. Israel also indicated a willingness to give up, at least temporarily, its insistence on direct negotiations with the Arabs, and to exchange ideas on "certain matters of substance" through Ambassador Jarring. This, too, represented a softening of Israel's previous position.

The initial Arab response to these proposals was disappointing. There was some exchange of positions through Jarring, but it was apparent that the two parties had not come much closer on the essential points of a settlement. While the foreign ministers of Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Republic were in New York for the meeting of the UN General Assembly, Jarring had intensive discussions with them in an attempt to define the position of each country. Through him, Israel and the United Arab Republic exchanged a series of questions about the definition of such terms as peace and secure, recognized boundaries. A similar outline of Israel's position was given to Jordan.

After the foreign ministers had left for their respective capitals, Jarring undertook another tour of the Middle East for further conversations with the governments concerned. Nothing substantive emerged from this new round of talks, but the parties appeared to favor that Jarring continue his mission at the end of the year. He agreed to carry on consultations with Israel and the Arab states late in January, after a brief return to his post in Moscow. There was speculation that he might take a more active role than in the past, either by presenting his own proposals for a settlement or conveying those put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The Arab World

In the Arab world, 1968 was a year of considerable ferment. Judging by manifestations of discontent within the United Arab Republic, President Nasser's position may have been weakened in the course of the year. These appeared first in February over what were thought to be overly lenient sentences given to officers, accused of dereliction of duty during the June war. A series of violent protests by students and workers closed the universities on February 26. On March 3 Nasser called the sentences shocking, and promised a retrial. On March 30 he called for changes in the Arab Socialist Union, the only political party in the country, in order to make it more responsive to the wishes of the country. Although a referendum, held on May 2, gave Nasser a resounding show of support, with 99.98 per cent of the votes cast, the feelings of discontent against the regime did not subside completely. Another wave of unrest occurred in November, again centered in the universities, which were closed on November 24 and remained shut at the end of the year. Although these riots were not as serious as those of

February, they reflected continuing opposition to the government and its policies.

It is difficult to say what effect internal weakness had on Nasser's policy toward Israel, but it may, in the long run, limit his options. He may be forced to adhere to an inflexibly belligerent stance in order to divert attention from these weaknesses and to maintain his position. However, despite the uncertainties of his position, he remained the key to any peace settlement in the Middle East.

King Hussein of Jordan was in an even more tenuous position, as demonstrated in his dealings with the Arab commandos operating from his territory. Early in November Jordan was torn by several days of riots following a clash between Hussein's troops and Kateb al-Nasr, a splinter guerrilla group linked to the Syrian Ba'athist regime. Although this confrontation ended in a victory for Hussein, it brought his difficulties with the commandos into sharp focus. In mid-November he came to an agreement with the largest groups, al-Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The terms were that the commandos promised not to interfere with Jordan, in return for virtual *carte blanche* in their terrorist operations against Israeli territory.

Hussein's pact with the guerrillas, which was never publicly acknowledged, reflected their emergence during the year as an important factor in the Middle East. Claiming to represent the people of Palestine, they continuously operated against Israeli territory; but, in the long run, their impact may be less on Israel than on the Arab governments themselves. The commandos opposed any agreement whatsoever, calling for the liberation of Palestine by force. And, as with Nasser, Hussein's declining power may limit his alternatives for a settlement with Israel. Characteristically, King Hussein was reported to have said he would consider having the West Bank made into an independent Arab state, if this would help chances for peace. Although a denial of the report was issued almost at once, the proposal may have been intended as a trial balloon to test the reaction of the parties concerned.

In Iraq a coup d'état, on July 17, brought to power an extremist Ba'athist regime, followed by a purge and the arrest of a number of officials of the former government, including its premier and defense minister. Iraq announced its intention to keep some 12,000 troops in Jordan, despite the apparent desire of King Hussein to see them withdrawn. On December 4 these troops were involved in exchanges with Israeli soldiers, injecting a new and dangerous element into the conflict there.

Arab Refugees

The Arab refugee problem, too, continued to be a source of conflict and concern. Extended debate in the United Nations Special Political Committee took place on the question of extending the mandate of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), which was to expire in June 1969. On November 11, in an unprecedented appearance before the

committee, UN Secretary General U Thant said it was imperative that the mandate be renewed, that not to do so was "unthinkable." He urged all governments to be as generous as possible in view of an expected deficit of \$5 million in 1969. The flight of refugees for camps on the West Bank of the Jordan to the East Bank (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 124-126) where UNRWA had no facilities, placed an additional burden on it. The refugees objected to the construction of concrete shelters because these would have an air of permanence. In January the refugees at Karameh threatened to destroy equipment and building material for the construction of such shelters. UNRWA finally managed to obtain agreement to build 10,000 galvanized steel, aluminum, and asbestos shelters, with floors of packed earth, edged with concrete, rather than with concrete bases. The funds for these new shelters came largely from the Near East Emergency Donations (NEED), a private American relief organization which came into existence after the June 1967 war.

On December 11 an American-sponsored resolution to extend UNRWA's mandate for three years, until June 1972, was passed unanimously, with Israel abstaining. On the same day the committee adopted another resolution, calling on Israel to take action for the return of Arabs displaced by the six-day war. In an attempt to ease the situation of the 1967 refugees, the Israel government announced in October that it would make available to refugees 7,000 permits to return to the occupied territories, which had not been used after the June war. However, by year's end, only a tiny handful of refugees had taken advantage of these permits.

On a related question, the UN Special Political Committee voted to establish a three-man committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Arabs in occupied territories. On Arab insistence, the proposal for a second humanitarian mission, similar to one conducted by Nils Goran-Gussing under United Nations auspices in summer 1967, was interpreted as including only the territory occupied by Israel; Gussing's mission had also examined the situation of Jews living in Arab countries which fought in the June war. The Israelis, opposing the resolution because it did not include the Arab states, made it clear that they would not permit the investigative committee to operate within the occupied areas. In any event, both the implementation of the resolution and the solution of the Arab refugee problem were dependent on the general political situation in the Middle East. The fate of the refugees continued to await a peace settlement in which it will play a prominent role.

Athens and Beirut Incidents

As the year drew to a close, a series of serious incidents occurred that were potentially more dangerous than any since the June war. On December 26 two Arab terrorists, operating from Lebanon, attempted to blow up an El Al airliner in the Athens airport. They were members of the Popular

Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with bases also in Lebanon, near Beirut. The attack stirred memories of the hijacking, on July 23, of an El Al plane en route from Rome to Israel. (The plane had been diverted to Algeria, and the crew and male Israeli passengers held there and released only on August 30, after extensive international efforts and the mediation of Italy. In exchange for their release, Israel returned sixteen captured Arab guerrillas.)

The plane at Athens, with 50 passengers and crew aboard, was ready for takeoff. One Israeli passenger was shot and killed, and a stewardess was injured. Only prompt action by the Greek airport personnel averted death for all on board. The terrorists were immediately apprehended to be tried by the Greek courts, and, although the relationship of the terrorists to the Lebanese government was somewhat unclear, Israel said it would hold the government responsible for the act. The Lebanese government, in a statement issued after the attack, called guerrilla activity "legal and sacred."

Israel's reprisal was swift and massive. On December 28 an Israeli force landed by helicopter on the Beirut airport, and destroyed 13 commercial planes belonging to several airlines. The Israelis were careful to evacuate everyone from the area before setting off the explosives, and there was no loss of life. According to the Israelis, the attack was to demonstrate to the Arab states that the price of terrorist activity could be very high, and to force them to curb the terrorists. Surrounded by hostile Arab states, the Israelis heavily depended on air lanes for transport and communication with the world. Any threat to this vital means of communication was therefore regarded as a grave danger.

World reaction to Israel's raid on the Beirut airport was violently condemnatory, both on the part of governments and public opinion. The United States, especially angered because the action came only a day after the announcement of its agreement to sell Phantom jets to Israel, protested to Israel in what was called "the strongest possible terms." By choosing as its target a state which had been moderate in attitude toward it, Israel had, according to some American officials, further weakened the possibilities for peace. In the wake of the raid, the Lebanese government was severely criticized by its own people. A strike was called by 25,000 university students demanding punishment of those responsible for the lack of defense at the airport, as well as the removal of restrictions on the operations of the guerrillas in Lebanon.

The United Nations Security Council was called into session on December 29 to consider complaints by Lebanon and Israel, regarding the incidents at Beirut and Athens. Speaking in defense of the raid on the Beirut airport, Tekoah said that Israel was entitled to take action against states that allowed terrorist activity to be launched from their territory. Maintaining that there could not be one law for Israel and one for the Arab states, he said that this state of affairs had contributed to "Arab intransigence and fanaticism," and that "It has encouraged the continuation of Arab aggression. There is no

doubt," Tekoah continued, "that, in the Security Council, it has given succor to Arab terror warfare. This must no longer be if the cause of peace is to be strengthened and advanced." The Lebanese representative Edward Ghorra called for sanctions against Israel under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The Security Council's unanimous adoption, on December 31, of a resolution condemning Israel, demonstrated Israel's isolation, even from usually friendly countries, such as the United Kingdom. Under the resolution, Israel was condemned "for her premeditated military action in violation of its obligations under the Charter and the cease-fire resolutions." It warned that a repetition of such an incident might lead to further steps, and stated that Lebanon was "entitled to appropriate redress." Both the United States and the USSR voted for the resolution, but the Soviets thought it too weak because it called neither for compensation for Lebanon, nor sanctions against Israel. Soviet delegate Yakov A. Malik accused certain members of the Security Council of "arm twisting" which, he said, "was used for the purpose of watering down the draft resolution and blunting its edge." United States Ambassador J. Russell Wiggins said that, while his government voted for the resolution, it wished to dissociate itself from the attacks on Israel during the debate. "Israel," he maintained, "is not on trial here for its life. Israel is not being asked here to defend its right to exist." Nevertheless, Israel and friends of Israel in the United States were disappointed at the reaction of the American government and its less than "even-handed" treatment of the Beirut and Athens events. Israel's complaint regarding the Athens incident was not taken up, although it was on the agenda.

Protests to the State Department about the United States' condemnation of Israel and failure to say anything about the Athens incident, produced a belated statement of regret regarding the latter, and a slight softening of the American position. In his last press conference, on January 3, Secretary of State Dean Rusk called on the Arab governments to do their utmost to curb terrorist activity against Israel, adding that it was time to "reverse the cycle of violence and replace it with a new impetus" toward peace.

If the attacks at Athens and Beirut seems to diminish hope for peace in the Middle East, there was a ray of light in the reports that informal talks were taking place between Israeli and Lebanese officials at a point on their common border, and that these talks were not halted by the latest outbreak of violence between the two countries.

LINDA ROSE

American Response to Soviet Antisemitism

SINCE 1964 activities among American Jews in behalf of the Jews in the USSR continued to be spearheaded by the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry. Originally created as a coordinating agency for 25 major Jewish organizations, the Conference increasingly initiated activities, especially since 1966. No other issue in Jewish community relations received such a steady focus in the last two years, except the Middle East crisis.

Following its original mandate (AJYB, 1965 [Vol. 66] pp. 312 ff), the Conference drew upon the resources of each of the national organizations. The National Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), itself a coordinator for community relations groups, was asked to integrate Conference activities. In order to insure continuity, NCRAC in 1966 assumed temporary responsibility for professional guidance, which originally had been a rotated task. This arrangement was renewed and, at the end of 1968, NCRAC was the staff headquarters for the Conference. Albert Chernin (NCRAC) served as national coordinator, Rabbi Israel Miller (Rabbinical Council of America) as chairman. In spring 1968 these duties were rotated respectively to Abraham J. Bayer (NCRAC) and Lewis H. Weinstein, a prominent Boston attorney and community leader. An estimated 10 per cent of NCRAC budget was devoted to Conference work; an equal amount was derived from agency assessments and receipts. At the end of the year, NCRAC's portion rose sharply.

Individual agencies continued to develop activities for their memberships and the general community, thus expanding Conference work or performing tasks the Conference could not undertake.

By the last quarter of 1966 a regular and sustained program had developed. Community action guides, hundreds of thousands of basic fact sheets, general educational materials, travel exhibits, special reports, and news flashes for the mass media were distributed.

In periodic, closed discussions, U.S. government officials were asked by leaders of the Conference to press their demands on the Soviet Union, to share information, and to seek ways to keep the issue on an international agenda crowded with other vital issues. Among the officials were then Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur J. Goldberg, and Walt W. Rostow, special assistant to President Lyndon B. Johnson. Similar meetings were held with such other ranking officials as American Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewelyn Thompson; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Eastern European Affairs Walter Stoessel; Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs and former Ambassador to the

Soviet Union Foy D. Kohler, and Undersecretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach.

The Conference felt that keeping its appeal before the public would help sensitize Soviet officials, and create a climate that would make them receptive to initiating changes. The use of selective public activities carried the plight of Soviet Jews beyond the confines of Jewish interest. Thus, a "Declaration of Rights for Soviet Jewry," originally adopted at an April 1966 leadership conference in Philadelphia, became the vehicle for ceremonies and activities across the country. The following September national attention was focused on a rally in Washington's Lafayette Park, attended by some Senators, and 3,000 facsimiles of the declaration were placed in institutions across the country. Early in December a call for cultural and religious freedom for Soviet Jews, signed by 90 U.S. Senators, was printed as an ad in the *New York Times* and in local newspapers. That same week, the text of the declaration was released simultaneously by Jewish communal bodies in 18 nations, in the first coordinated international expression on the plight of Soviet Jews.

Similarly, in May 1967, newspapers throughout the United States carried a Conference plea for Soviet Jews, endorsed by 315 members of the House of Representatives. Seven months later, on the anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a statement by 357 members of the House was published in the *New York Times* as a Conference project. In January 1967 the Conference urged the Soviet Union to keep a promise made by Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin in Paris a month earlier that Soviet Jews, who had relatives abroad and wished to join them, would receive permission to do so. (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], pp. 311, 360). United HIAS Service and the Conference jointly alerted Jewish communities throughout the country to facilitate exit visas for relatives in the USSR. (A trickle, which began early that year, was shut off following the June 1967 war in the Middle East.)

Tactics Shift

After more than four years of campaigning, and only some slight improvement in the plight of Soviet Jews, Jewish organizations feared that the American people, especially Jews, would no longer respond to the continuing need for public involvement. In an effort to extend its impact on Jews and non-Jews, the Conference leadership and local Jewish communities encouraged the use of significant target dates for staging dramatic public events. The plan was initiated with a single program in New York City: Simhat Torah became an opportunity to express solidarity with Soviet Jewish youth. On that day (October 28) in 1967, over 3,000 persons were massed near the Soviet Mission to the United Nations; the New York Board of Rabbis and the New York Coordinating Committee for Soviet Jewry, helped to

stage the event. The following year, simultaneous demonstrations were held in at least 30 cities in the United States and Canada.

Although some Orthodox groups felt uneasy about using religious holidays for seemingly secular activities, Passover and Hanukkah, too, were increasingly exploited. During Passover 1966, a "Geulah (Redemption) March" of 15,000 moved through the heart of New York to the United Nations. The week before, nearly 300 college-age students held an all-night vigil under Conference auspices, with the special aid of the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry. A year later, a broadscaled 24-hour vigil, involving 38 local Jewish groups and nearly 10,000 persons, was held near the United Nations, as similar events took place in 17 other cities.

The Passover "Matzoh of Hope," a brief statement added to the traditional family seder, also became widely accepted. Since its adoption in 1966, an estimated million or more copies had been duplicated, including reprints in synagogue bulletins, Jewish cookbooks, and Anglo-Jewish newspapers.

As a holiday which celebrates the struggle of the ancient Israelites to regain their right to worship, Hanukkah became a natural focus for activities. More than 50,000 persons in 37 cities took part in rallies and other public ceremonies on Sunday, December 11, 1966, which also marked the anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., addressed 12 of the rallies via telephone hookup. In 1967 observances, including a candlelight parade in midtown Manhattan and an all-night vigil at Philadelphia's Independence Hall, were held in 18 cities, with over 25,000 participants.

Realizing the great appeal of the theme of guaranteed human rights, Conference planners launched a major petition campaign in 1968, the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On Human Rights Day, December 10, a petition citing Soviet violations of the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, with a record quarter million signatures, Jewish and non-Jewish, were presented to J. Russel Wiggins, the then United States Representative to the UN, for transmission to Secretary General U Thant. Names continued to pour in for many more weeks.

Leadership Confers

The national leadership of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry regularly met in New York City to plan strategies and keep abreast of changes in the Soviet Union. The Soviet involvement in the 1967 six-day war in the Middle East, and the concomitant anti-Jewish and anti-Israel propaganda offensive unleashed in Moscow, had a direct bearing on the work of the agencies. Initially, the crisis caused a suspension of public activities but, as the atmosphere in the USSR became increasingly anti-Jewish, the Conference vigorously resumed work.

Over 400 community leaders from across the country met at New York's

Waldorf Astoria hotel on April 7 and 8, 1968. The gathering analyzed the status of Soviet Jewry, explored possible future developments with several leading academicians, and heard portions of a taped 1966 address by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., as a memorial to the slain civil-rights leader. The delegates restated their petition for the Jews of the Soviet Union who, while judged to be increasingly self-assertive, still were being forced into silence. At the conclusion of the meeting, a delegation of presidents of the participating organizations brought a White Paper on Soviet Jewry to the Soviet Mission to the UN, for delivery to Ambassador Yakov Malik. The document also was sent to the White House.

Synagogues and schools continued to sponsor their own activities and, in consultation with the Conference, the Jewish Education Committee of New York initiated an eight-month educational program among the more than 100,000 students in local institutions. This culminated, at the end of 1967, in three newspaper ads sponsored by Jewish students, stressing the lack of educational facilities for young Soviet Jews. Several cities, including Boston, Detroit, and Washington, duplicated the project.

The American Association for Jewish Education, the national Jewish education service agency for religious and educational bodies, adopted similar tactics. An open letter of October 14, 1968, addressed to Menashe Mikhailovich, president of Moscow's Great Choral synagogue, and printed in the *New York Times* on that day, received wide attention. It linked the holiday of Simhat Torah with the eliminations of Jewish education in the USSR. In 1967 the National Jewish Welfare Board (JWB) introduced for affiliated community centers across the country, a project dedicated to Russian Jewish music. During National Jewish Music Month, it provided material to educate American Jews about the musical contributions of Russian Jews. The JWB project helped focus attention on contemporary Jewish culture in the Soviet Union, especially forced deprivations, such as the closing of the successful Riga ensemble and other dramatic or choral groups.

It was difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the Conference, or of Conference-related activities, but there were signs of Soviet sensitivity to them. In a long article, on May 29, 1968, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, the weekly organ of the Union of Soviet Writers, denounced Conference chairman, Rabbi Israel Miller, and, through him, the Conference. The authors of the article, poet Abram Gontar and writer Mikhail Lev, were considered politically "safe" writers; their Jewish origin was considered a good credential. Using spurious arguments and selected data, the authors insisted that the Jewish issue had been artificially inflated and was "nonexistent in the USSR," and that the Conference represented "hostile" elements.

While the major Jewish organizations in the Conference recognized that there had been some hopeful changes in the situation of the Soviet Jews, including the increased production of *matzot* and the printing of prayer books, they remained committed to achieving more fundamental advances.

They were determined to maintain their public information activities, to continue representations to their government and the United Nations, and to expand a campaign of exposure, as long as such protestations were necessary.

Dissident Groups Expand

New groups sprang up to demand even greater efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews, while older splinter groups pressed for more commitment. Some viewed the phenomenon as an expression of grassroots anger at the Conference's failure to effect great changes in the Soviet Union; others realized that the Conference had merely stimulated increased concern.

The groups were as varied as a Denver-based Committee of Concern for World Jewry and a student-created *ad hoc* Emergency Committee for Soviet Jewry in New York City. The American League for Russian Jews, formed in 1964 to secure "the right of the Soviet Jews to emigrate to the State of Israel, if they so desire," continued a small-scale, limited program. Many of its leaders agreed, at the end of 1968, to participate in an International League for the Repatriation of Russian Jews, in Geneva.

Since 1964 the most successful of the small, specialized groups, the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) was spearheaded by Jacob Birnbaum. SSSJ's main goal was "to arouse the Jewish community to action for Soviet Jewry," including more education and "dramatic public demonstrations." It became known for its somewhat sensationalist displays, as well as highly visible student public-relations materials, much of which found its way across the country. The organization remained centered in New York City, and drew heavily from students in existing organizations rooted in traditional Judaism. While never a mass movement, SSSJ was enterprising and, in the last two years, increasingly responsive to cooperation with the older, established Jewish agencies.

One of the rather active local groups continued to be the Cleveland Council on Soviet Anti-Semitism (CCSAS). Although the council worked with some Jewish agencies, and received financial support from the local Jewish Community Relations Council, it remained critical of the "Jewish establishment" for its "inadequate response." The dynamic activists, who constitute its leadership, maintained contacts with similar local groups, including the Upstate Council of Youth for Soviet Jewry in Syracuse, N.Y., and the Bay Area Council on Soviet Jewry in Berkeley-San Francisco.

Rabbi Levin Visits

A visit from Moscow's Rabbi Yehuda Leib Levin, and the Leningrad cantor, David Stiskin, threatened to rupture the work of the Jewish organizations. Some analysts suggested it was this possibility that prompted the Soviet Union to permit him to come, after repeated refusals.

In April 1968 the major Jewish organizations reacted cautiously to reports

that a Soviet Jewish delegation would visit the United States. The first announcement came from the Soviet embassy which, however, denied any official connection. On April 16 the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry commented that "responsible American Jewish bodies have repeatedly petitioned the Soviet government to permit appropriate Russian leadership to visit the United States and establish contact with the American Jewish Community," despite the fact that no representative group of any kind existed in the Soviet Union. (Judaism in the Soviet Union has lacked a central coordinating structure since 1926, when a rabbinic conference met for the last time. Some form of centralized institutions existed for congregations and clergy of all other recognized denominations and sects.)

It was noted that, in December 1967, the Synagogue Council of America had sent an invitation, one of several by other groups, to Rabbi Levin. There was no response from the rabbi, the Soviet embassy in Washington, or the Ministry of Cults in Moscow, where copies were sent. The Soviet Union chose to accept the sponsorship of the militantly anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism of such a visit. The anti-Israel Friends of Jerusalem, supporters of the extremist Neturei Karta sect, became involved in the negotiations as well as the tour. The Conference condemned the sponsorship of the Council which "repeatedly parroted the Soviet propaganda line and has been an apologist for the USSR's policy of depriving Soviet Jews of the same rights which are granted to all other recognized religious and nationality groups."

A hoped-for "genuine communication between the Jews of Russia and the Jews of this country" did not take place. Invitations to Rabbi Levin to meet with the Synagogue Council of America, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, and the National Community Relations Advisory Council were never answered. Telephone conversations between some leaders of these agencies and Rabbi Levin were cordial, and the aged rabbi guardedly suggested that such meetings might take place. However, in the end, the Moscow rabbi did not officially meet with the heads of any of these groups; he did meet with some important individual Jews.

The highlight of Rabbi Levin's visit was an address at New York City's Hunter College. He was enthusiastically applauded when he talked of peace and the desire to build bridges between the USSR and this country. He also described the present status of Soviet Jews in terms which contradicted most of the data gathered by non-Soviet sources in the last few years. He spoke of an active institutional life for religious Soviet Jews, and insisted that "there is no antisemitism in the Soviet Union." Synagogues were closed, he said, because "Jews prefer to worship in private." In response, a few persons in the audience, survivors of the Nazi holocaust and Orthodox Jews from Eastern Europe, interrupted the meeting by shouting pointed questions. The ensuing tumult ended the meeting, and the rabbi never concluded his re-

marks. The Soviet press, in reporting this event, noted that Levin's tour of the United States was disrupted by "Zionist hooligans."

Some observers feared the claims by Rabbi Levin and the Council for Judaism, and the counterclaims by Jewish and non-Jewish groups, might give rise to confusion that could undermine the will to sustain public protests, so carefully nurtured in the last few years.

Academic and Intellectual Response

The Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews, a national organization sponsored by prominent Jews and non-Jews, continued providing information to writers, educators, religious leaders, and civil rights leaders, concerned with Soviet Jews. Early in 1966 it convened an Ad Hoc Commission on Soviet Jews as a public tribunal on Jewish life in the Soviet Union. Among the members were Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas; Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; Bishop James A. Pike; Walter Reuther, president of the United Automobile Workers; Dr. Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of the *Bulletin of the Atom Scientists*, and Norman Thomas. In December the Commission's chairman, Bayard Rustin, submitted an 11-page report of the findings to the Soviet embassy. Embassy First Secretary Igor D. Bubnov, replying for Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, characterized the findings as a "deliberate smear." Rustin, who released an exchange of letters to the press in March 1967, refuted the charge by saying that the Commission was "concerned for only two things: the truth and the establishment of full cultural, religious and communal rights to Soviet Jews."

On May 18 Robert Penn Warren, noted author and a sponsor of the Conference on the Status of Soviet Jews, addressed a letter to the Fourth All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers, with a copy to the Union of Soviet Writers, appealing to them to help save the cultural life of Soviet Jews, as a matter of human dignity. The directors of the Conference also circulated a petition, signed by nearly 200 leading public personalities, which appeared in the press on December 21, 1967.

In an effort to enlist educators, a group of academicians from 86 American universities came to New York to create a nationwide "Academic Committee on Soviet Jewry." At a national academic conference in May 1968, nearly 200 delegates agreed that the "moral internationalization" of the problem was the most effective way to protect Soviet Jewry. The conference approved a 17-point action program for "systematic efforts to bring the weight of the American academic community to bear in lifting cultural and religious discrimination against the Jews of the USSR." It also approved the text of a national academic appeal from university faculty which was to be sent to Moscow. The appeal, signed by 2,000 professors from 115 universities and colleges, appeared as a full-page ad in the *New York Times* of January 31. Initially delayed by events in Czechoslovakia and the Middle East, the ad was timed to appear 21 years after Solomon Mikhoels, chairman

of the wartime Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and a prominent figure in Jewish cultural life, was found in Moscow, allegedly murdered by Stalin's secret police. The academic committee also released a study by Moshe Decter, a specialist on Soviet and Communist affairs, on the use of anti-semitism as an instrument of Soviet policy since June 1967.

JERRY GOODMAN

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

ALTHOUGH it may not have seemed so from day to day, 1969 turned out to be the "Year of the Pause." The black "revolution" hesitated. The white "counter-revolution" surfaced officially, but less assertively than had been expected. The student "revolution" slowed down. Compared with the previous few years, the blood pressure of the nation seemed to drop. Yet the social problems in question were not demonstrably alleviated; intergroup hostility was at as high a conscious level as ever; there were no new serious expressions of reconciliation or optimism in any quarter. The segments of the population seemed to be circling each other warily, waiting, as though a little frightened by their own passions. It was impossible to tell by year's end whether this was a calm period in the same old storm, or the beginning of some new, uncharted turbulence. The Jewish community shared in this uneasiness, developing some insecurities of its own. There was a growing sense of the minority status of the Jews in America, as a new administration took office and the Middle East crisis became chronic.

BLACK AMERICA

As the 1960's came to a close, there was more than the usual amount of stocktaking. How much progress was actually made in the last decade and in the period of the black revolution? During the year certain statistical indexes were released, which pointed to relative as well as absolute advancement.

Employment

A key Bureau of Labor Statistics document¹ analyzed 1962-1967, the most recent five-year period for which comprehensive statistics were avail-

¹Clare C. Hodges, "The Negro Job Situation: Has It Improved?" *Monthly Labor Review* (Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Office of Manpower and Employment), January, 1969.

able, and reported substantial improvement in the Negro job situation. During that period, over a million Negroes moved into jobs offering higher pay and status. In 1962 about 17 per cent of the nonwhite labor force were in white-collar occupations: professional, managerial, clerical, sales. In 1967 the percentage was about 23. For the white labor force the comparative figures were 47 and 49 per cent. In five years, almost three quarters of a million Negroes moved into these middle-class occupations. The black rate of new entry into these categories of occupation was about three times that of the white working force. In other terms, during 1962-1967 the percentage of Negroes in white-collar jobs rose from 4 to 5.4 per cent, representing about one-fifth of the progress needed for blacks to grow—and the whites to shrink—to proportions which paralleled their respective representation in the total working force.

Also during that period, the number of blacks in skilled craftsmen occupations rose from about 6 per cent to about 8 per cent, while the proportions of whites remained the same, at some 14 per cent. Almost a quarter of a million Negroes entered this category, at approximately four times the rate of the white population. They made about one-quarter of the progress needed for them to grow—and the whites to shrink—to the proportions paralleling their proportions in the total working force.

Another encouraging note was the expansion of Negro employment in fields that were considered to offer the best jobs in terms of pay, advancement, security, and status. Negro employment grew especially rapidly in education, public administration, and durable goods manufacturing. The number of Negroes in these jobs rose by nearly 60 per cent, as compared to some 25 per cent for white workers.

One index of the growing economic stability among Negro workers was the decline in long-term unemployment. In 1962 about one-third of the Negro unemployed were out of a job for 15 weeks or more. By 1967 only about one-sixth were so chronically unemployed, about the same proportion as among white workers. One statistical aspect of the educational picture also improved substantially. At the beginning of that five-year period, non-white young men averaged two years less schooling than white young men. At the end, the gap was only six months. The dropout rate also dropped considerably; the percentage of Negroes in central cities who completed high school rose from 43 in 1960, to 61 by the end of 1967; but their group level of academic achievement remained much lower.

Of course, the meaning of these statistics depended in part on interpretation. There still was a substantial gap between the economic status of Negroes and whites. Since the beginning of the decade, the Negro median family income increased from 61 to 68 per cent of the white median family income in the central cities; but it still was only 68 per cent. Most significantly, increasing numbers of Negroes "trickled upwards" into better working- and middle-class occupations, leaving large pools of even more

concentrated ghetto poverty behind. In a *Washington Post* analysis of the 1969 report on Negro status, Herman Miller, director of the Census Bureau's population division and author of the report, wrote:

The figures that we have for the very poorest areas in Cleveland and Los Angeles, places like Hough and Watts, show that poverty in these places has increased, average family income has not risen, and unemployment rates have remained very high. This deterioration may reflect the migration of the more successful families from the slums, leaving behind widows, deserted wives and children, the aged and the uneducated—those least able to cope with their social and economic problems.²

At the point when the poverty programs of the past eight years were being reexamined, it was clear that the ghetto areas were continuing to deteriorate; their hard-core poverty was stubbornly resisting any mass remedy. The welfare rolls were rising, and the percentage of Negro families headed by women increased from 23 per cent in 1960, to 30 per cent at the beginning of 1969.

General Mood

Thus while, by usual historical standards for emerging groups, there was continuing and substantial economic advancement, the mood of bitterness and frustration on the part of Negroes did not abate. The corporate sense of poverty and oppression still stamped black America, and was reflected by corporate black spokesmen.

When CORE director Roy Innis was asked by Urban America to comment on the 1969 government report, he said: "I haven't seen it, but any kind of report presenting a pleasant picture of blacks in the city is almost a vicious lie." John Morsell of NAACP said: "The dilemma in commenting on a report of this kind is that one must rely on the census figures to reach his conclusion. You can't really get a feel of the way things are except by walking through the streets."³

The *Newsweek* poll of June 1969 indicated that the corporate anger of black America remained high. It is not that Negroes were unmindful of the progress that was being made: 7 out of 10 said that the blacks made progress during the past five years, and 6 out of 10 felt that they personally made progress on the job and in getting their children educated. On the other hand, about 6 out of 10 thought the pace of progress too slow, as against some 4 out of 10, three years earlier. And about one-half of black America felt that local police violated Negro rights, as against about one-third three years earlier. In statistical sum, the blacks recognized that they were making economic progress, but were still angry at the whites. The anger was especially visible among those under 30, and in the ghettos. According to the

² Reported in *Chronicle*, monthly report of Urban America, Inc., March 1969, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

Newsweek poll, over one-half of the Northern black youth believed that the white population was actively involved in keeping blacks down, and another third believed the whites were indifferent, at best. Over one-third said that Negroes could get what they wanted only by violent means.

Decline of Separatism

This all pointed up the mixed quality of the end-of-the-decade feelings in the black community. The organizational life of the black community in 1969 was similarly unstrung. Most strikingly, black separatism visibly lost some of its forward drive. For one thing, the separatist groups were pulling in somewhat different directions. CORE proposed black capitalism, and introduced a Self-Determination Act in Congress, which would make massive credit available to the black man for his own business enterprises. The National Black Power Conference in Detroit talked about going the same route, but by way of cooperatives rather than black capitalism. The cultural nationalists, such as US, emphasized the central need of black cultural unity. SNCC emphasized the importance of black political power.

The Black Panthers made the transition from a black nationalist group to a universalistic revolutionary movement. This was the one most important symbolic development which signaled, at least temporarily, an end to the virgin thrust of black nationalism. The Black Panthers had been a fiercely nationalist and separatist movement. During the 1968 elections, some of their leadership became involved in California with the Peace and Freedom Party, and they began to become politicized in the traditional radical sense. This tendency came to climax in a three-day conference held under Black Panther auspices in Oakland, Cal., July 18–20, which was billed as the birth of a “United Front Against Communism.”

The call for united political action by all radical groups displaced the black nationalist theme. Most of the several thousand participants in the conference were white. The keynote speaker was Herbert Aptheker, white Communist party theoretician. Observers noted a number of apparent ties between that section of the old Left and the Black Panthers. Progressive Labor party representatives were barred from the conference, and pro-Maoist material began to disappear from the Black Panther newspaper. David Hilliard, one of the top leaders of the Black Panthers, said in the August 3 issue of the *Black Panther* that the Communist party “actually came out and did some degree of work to put the conference over.” In the August 16 issue of *The Guardian*, he said: “We are aligned with factions within the CP who want to move forward to a better society.” As this trend developed, Stokely Carmichael, who had been a high functionary of the Black Panthers, attacked them publicly for breaking faith with black nationalism.

For the time being at least, the separatist thrust seemed to be petering out, partly perhaps because it never had massive black support. The 1969 *News-*

week poll found that only 9 per cent of black America wanted segregated schools, and only 13 per cent thought that "Negroes will make more progress by running their own schools, businesses and living in their own neighborhoods rather than by integrating." According to *Newsweek*, even among the under-30 Negroes, "the cause for perhaps three-quarters of their generation is still the old set of goals: no more and no less than an equal chance at decent jobs, housing and education—within an integrated America."

Black Business

As the more symbolic goals seemed to recede, "old-fashioned" economic goals became more important. The most dramatic theme was "black business," which gained prominence in the latter part of 1968 through the vocal support of the Nixon administration and the increased activities of the Small Business Administration (SBA). In every fairly large community a number of business development corporations, and other private coalitions and agencies were involved in stimulating black business. In Philadelphia, the Business Development Corporation, owned by 3,000 Negro shareholders at \$2 a share, helped arrange SBA-guaranteed loans for black businessmen through a consortium of banks. In Chicago, Reverend Jesse Jackson's "Operation Breadbasket" helped obtain contracts for service-oriented black business. The Rochester Business Opportunities Corporation, a mixture of community groups and banks, provided loans directly, or helped secure loans through SBA.

For obvious reasons, this in fact was the kind of activity in which organized sections of the Jewish community felt they could effectively participate. For example, an American Jewish Committee end-of-the-year report recorded that a number of its chapters helped with both financing and business counseling: In San Diego, American Jewish Committee members formed a development company to provide seed money and expertise to help Negro businessmen. In Chicago, Negroes wishing to buy neighborhood businesses from nonresident whites received management counsel and financial aid from the American Jewish Committee, in cooperation with the Economic Development Corporation. Working through the Los Angeles Chapter, a paint manufacturer arranged to establish a paint store which was to be owned and controlled by a black organization.

Certainly, 1969 was the year in which more national conferences on black business were held than ever before. But around these activities and these conferences developed some discussion and dissent about the nature and value of black business, especially in the ghetto. Reverend Jesse Jackson said:

Black people control nothing in the ghetto. The island has to exist in a capitalistic system without any capital. Any area in capitalism without a circular flow of capital is a slum, whether it's Appalachian, white or Southside black.⁴

⁴ *Business Lawyer*, September 1969, p. 12.

Roy Innis put it more ideologically:

Separation is a more equitable way of organizing the society. The important distinction is that in such a society the control of goods and services flowing through a distinct geographical area inhabited by a distinct population group would be in the hands of those indigenous to the area.⁵

Others, like Bayard Rustin, had doubts:

Most of the experiments in black capitalism thus far have been total failures, as, given the odds, they should continue to be. For one thing, small businesses owned and run by blacks will, exactly like their white counterparts, suffer a high rate of failure. In fact, they will face even greater problems than white small businesses because they will be operating in predominantly low-income areas. . . On the other hand to create large-scale black industry in the ghetto is unthinkable. The capital is not available and even if it were there is no vacant land.⁶

A side issue in the controversy over black business arose out of the aversion of some to perpetuate institutions of capitalism, when they felt that only a change of the economic system would benefit the Negro population. Thus, some black business efforts emphasized cooperatives. In April, while the prestigious and "capitalistic" American Assembly was holding a conference on black economic development in New York, the National Black Economic Development Conference in Detroit, through James Forman, issued a *Black Manifesto* demanding a half billion dollars from American churches and synagogues. Although it was not altogether clear how the money was to be used, the emphasis was on land and cooperatives rather than on capitalistic ventures.

However, the chief lines of controversy crossing the issue of black business had to do with separatism, on the one hand, and workability, on the other. James Gibson ended an article on ghetto economic development, titled "New Ways of Giving Non-Whites the Business?" with these words: "if we cannot make ours one society and one market place, we will not be able to erect two."⁷

In an era of economic domination by massive corporate structures, for some the useful black business thrust would be one that skirted ghetto business altogether, and concentrated on developing black service and manufacturing enterprises that would be satellite to the corporations; or, even more difficult but probably more important, placing black executives within that corporate structure.

Employment

Meanwhile, for most of the black population, the central problem remained that of getting more and better jobs. The end of the traditional civil

⁵ *Civil Rights Digest*, Spring 1969, p. 12.

⁶ *Harper's Magazine*, January 1970, p. 28.

⁷ *Civil Rights Digest*, Spring 1969, p. 4.

rights period was signaled, early in the 1960s, by a series of direct-action assaults by the black groups on job sites, especially in the construction industry. This arena and form of action came to the fore again in 1969. In Pittsburgh, in August, black demonstrators took to the streets in protest against the low number of Negroes in the construction unions, managing to shut down 15 construction projects.

The black interest in moving into the skilled construction trades was reflected by the Nixon administration's revitalization of the so-called Philadelphia Plan. A Philadelphia Pre-Award Plan, instituted by the Department of Labor in 1967, required low bidders on each federally-assisted contract to submit an affirmative action program for increasing minority group representation in the skilled construction trades. At the end of 1968 the U.S. comptroller general ruled the plan illegal, unless some minimal standards for "affirmative action" were set. In July 1969 a Labor Department-revised Philadelphia plan required employers to make "good faith efforts" to meet goals of minority hiring levels, ranging from 4 per cent in 1969, to 26 per cent in 1973. The comptroller general still opposed the plan as one violating the Civil Rights Act because it called for racial quotas. Under pressure from the administration, Congress refused to outlaw the plan. Black groups approved, although sometimes lukewarmly; organized labor objected; and the Contractors Association went to court in opposition, losing in the first round.

Meanwhile the black pressures—and the threat of Philadelphia plans being imposed around the country—led to different confrontations and plans in cities like Boston, Chicago, New York, and San Francisco. The Chicago plan, approved by unions, employers, and minority community groups, provided that the minority communities help recruit 1,000 skilled workers to be accepted immediately as full journeymen, and another 3,000 whom the unions and employers were to place immediately in a skill-training program. The Boston plan provided for at least one trainee for every four journeymen on public construction.

Hanging over all of these plans was the shadow of economic recession. In August the Commerce Department reported a 9 per cent decline in housing starts in July, the sixth consecutive monthly decline. And the Nixon administration called for an extensive cutback in construction as part of its fight against inflation. The problem in the construction industry highlighted the perilous dilemma facing the entire society: at a time when economic goals again were coming to the fore, and when there were clear indications of substantial economic progress by the black community, the entire economy was slipping badly. As unemployment rates rose, presumably as a deliberate function of the fight against inflation, the economic advancement of blacks, who were still the first to be laid off, began to be eroded. And the uneasiness of the white working-class population grew.

WHITE AMERICA

While the focus of the "black revolution" began to blur a bit in 1969, despite the continued level of generalized anger, it was the year for the full public emergence of the body of discontented white Americans. The mass media discovered "Middle America," and the "Other Other Americans." It was significant that the term white backlash was not used as freely as in previous years. The legitimacy of the seed discontent among the white American working and lower-middle classes was being acknowledged. Pete Hamill wrote:

The working-class white man is actually in revolt against taxes, joyless work, the double standards and joint memories of professional politicians, hypocrisy and what he considers the debasement of the American dream . . . any politician who leaves that white man out of the political equation does so at very large risk.⁸

Congressman Hugh Carey of New York said:

The average working stiff is not asking for very much. He wants a decent apartment, he wants a few beers on the weekend, he wants his kids to have decent clothes, he wants to go to a ballgame once in a while, and he would like to put a little money away so that his kids can have the education that he could never afford. That's not asking a hell of a lot. But he's not getting that. He thinks society has failed him and, in a way, if he is white, he is often more alienated than the black man. At least the black man has his own organizations, and can submerge himself in the struggle for justice and equality, or elevate himself, whatever the case may be. The black man has hope, because no matter what some of the militants say, his life is slowly getting better in a number of ways. The white man who makes \$7,000 a year, who is 40, knows that he is never going to earn much more than that for the rest of his life, and he sees things getting worse, more hopeless.⁹

In the Spring 1969 issue of *New Generation*, in an article entitled "The Other Other America: The White Working Class," sociologists William Simon, John H. Gagnon, and Donald Carns wrote about the disaffection of the working-class youth:

Part of the problem has been the failure of the society's cultural middle men, its intellectuals, even to begin to recognize this population. . . [T]hese anti-establishment intellectuals may be hard to distinguish from the establishment itself. For working-class populations, particularly the young, these anti-establishment groups have become the establishment, at least to the degree that they set the tone of the surface imagery of our times. And, for example, much is said of the crisis of the colleges and the ghetto schools, both apparently requiring growing investments of society's resources. Does anyone for a moment think that the quality of education in the working-class schools in this country—both public and parochial—is any better? That the slaughter of human poten-

⁸ Pete Hamill, "The Revolt of the White Lower Middle Class," *New York*, April 14, 1969, p. 29.

⁹ Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 28.

tial and sensibility is any less severe? Or that a crisis of identity equal in magnitude to that of the children of the affluent middle class or those of the ghetto is not going on among the youth of the working class? . . . For him [the working class youth] racial integration (and the disruption of community life that he feels, not without justification, must follow) is part of an organized effort within which agents of government, the mass media and even the church are co-conspirators. Thus he too becomes anti-establishment, but for him it is a liberal establishment, and before it he feels increasingly powerless.

Gus Tyler commented on the legitimacy of these disaffections in the July 7 issue of the *New Leader*, warning those who would simply dismiss them as racist:

To ask people to be fearless when they have every reason to be afraid is to ask normal folk to act abnormally. . . . They will seek safety—no matter what political ribbon is wrapped around the prized package of survival. Castigating these people as stupid (some are) or racist (others are) does not solve the problem. They will in the end simply conclude that the lofty lecturer who thus looks down on them is himself either stupid or a racist, or both.

Basic Discontents

There was no question that the emergence and thrust of the black population became connected to these disaffections; but more and more observers were pointing out in 1969 that the bigotry was being attached as a tail to basic discontents, rather than the other way around. A Pennsylvania steel town clergyman, Gabriel Fackre, in the May 7 issue of the *Christian Century* pointed out that "prejudice had always existed in 'seed form' among the workingmen," but something else had been added to bring that prejudice into full bloom:

. . . alienation—as severe, disorienting and thingifying as that felt by the black, the young and the poor. . . . In the mind of the blue collar worker, the black citizens had "gotten to" the effective centers of cultural change. In fact, as far as he could see from changes in his own existence, "they" were in cahoots with the blacks. As he saw it, strings were pulled that took Negroes off sweeper jobs, and put them on the line next to him, or, miracle of miracles, in foreman and executive jobs above him. He even heard rumors of preferential hiring which, according to bar room talk, would put him out on the street in favor of the black man. And when he came home from the frustrations of work what did he find? "They" were pushing black faces at him through the TV screen which was supposed to be his escape hatch from the harsh realities of daily life. Furthermore, "they" were rearranging his neighborhood so that these "outsiders" could move in, and "they" were conducting social experiments with his kids, moving things around in the schools so that the blacks could "take over" there too. In all these cultural shifts, it seemed clear to the white worker, "they" were at it again. And, of all things, "they" were giving the Negro the decision-making power and personal recognition he so desperately craved.

Newsweek's special report, "The Troubled American,"¹⁰ said, in summary, that

... the average American is more deeply troubled about his country's future than at any time since the Great Depression. The surface concerns are easy to catalogue: a futile war abroad and a malignant racial attitude at home; unnerving inflation and scarifying crime rates, the implacable hostility of much of the young. But the middle American malaise cuts much deeper—right to those fundamental questions of the sanctity of work and the stability of the family, of whether a rewarding middle class life is still possible in modern America.

The poll of white Americans with incomes between \$5,000 and \$15,000, conducted by the Gallup organization for this *Newsweek* report, confirmed the nature of the discontents: Half believed that the United States had changed for the worse over the past decade, and more than half that it was likely to get worse; two-thirds thought the police should have more power, and about 85 per cent that both black militants and college demonstrators were treated too leniently. Forty-four per cent believed "Negroes have a better chance than people like yourself to get well-paying jobs"; only 21 per cent thought Negroes had a worse chance.

This mood of apparent white anger, combined with the mood of black anger, would seem to have provided the elements of a disastrous explosion. And, indeed, there was some explosive language. "They think they've heard from black power," *Newsweek* quoted one community worker in a Slavic neighborhood in Milwaukee, "wait till they hear from white power—the little slob. . . . Boy, he's getting sick and tired of all this mess. One day he'll get fed up and when he does, look out."

Black-White Tension

But the explosion never took place. There were some ugly scenes, especially at points of direct confrontation. Notably when Pittsburgh black demonstrators took to the streets in August in protest against the low number of Negroes in the construction unions, Mayor Joseph M. Barr arranged a two day shut-down of 15 major construction projects, while negotiations took place. Over 4,000 construction workers marched in counter-demonstration, denounced the mayor, and invaded his offices. Most of the signs they carried had to do with lost wages, but others said: "We build the city, not burn it down," "White police and union unity," and "We are the majority." Confetti rained down on the demonstrators from white-collar workers in office buildings nearby. Negroes on a passing city garbage truck were booed.

The construction industry was a notorious tinderbox: Some of the craft unions were almost all white; entry was rigidly structured through apprenticeship, a long and arduous route; construction would be hit early by a reces-

¹⁰ "The Troubled American: A Special Report on the White Majority," *Newsweek*, October 6, 1969, p. 28.

sion; the unions attacked the Philadelphia Plan fiercely as a deliberate device to pit labor and blacks against each other. But 1969 passed without the serious direct confrontations that this impasse seemed to make inevitable.

But while, for the most part, massive confrontations were avoided, expressions of interracial anger were, if anything, on the increase—and the anger was indeed being acted out in smaller group settings. Federal officials reported an increase in 1969 in the number of firebombings. Also, in November, an official of the Department of Defense admitted what had already become apparent: that racial tension was “a pervasive problem throughout the armed forces.” There were scattered reports of sustained violence between black and white servicemen at various bases. At Camp Lejeune, N.C., in July, fighting between Negro and white Marines left one killed and 44 injured. The Marine Corps subsequently bent its rules to permit the use of the clenched-fist black-power salute and the Afro hair style. These conflicts also existed in Vietnam. L. Howard Bennett, deputy assistant secretary of defense for civil rights, said of Vietnam: “In World War II and Korea we had racial problems after the war came to an end, after the confrontation with the enemy. Here sometimes we’re faced with a problem at the height of enemy hostilities.”¹¹ He indicated the Army would shortly follow the Marine Corps lead in relaxing certain regulations.

However, in 1969 the “riot watch” division of the U.S. Department of Justice recorded only five incidents of civil disorder, characterized as “riots,” in Hartford, Conn.; Harrisburg, Pa.; Youngstown, Ohio; York, Pa., and Omaha, Nebr. Seven such “riots” were recorded in 1968 and 11 in 1967, and these had greater intensity than the later disorders. The *Civil Disorder Digest* of September commented that “For whatever reasons, the summer months of 1969 were definitely ‘cooler’.”

During the year there were other warnings that the now explicitly two-way tensions would explode in the political arena, with Middle America decisively asserting its power. In the spring, municipal elections took place in New York, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles, which seemed to embody the revolt of the discontented whites. In all three cases, the “law-and-order” candidates pointedly won over the liberal candidates. In Minneapolis, Charles Stenvig, a policeman, won over both Democratic and Republican candidates. Stenvig said:

People felt that nobody was representing them and nobody was listening. They felt alienated from the political system, and they had it up to their Adams apples on just about everything. So they took a guy like me—four kids, an average home, working man, they could associate themselves with. They just said: “Lookit, we’re sick of you politicians.”¹²

In the New York City spring primary (p. 217), Mario Procaccino, with a strong law-and-order image, won the Democratic candidacy; and John

¹¹ New York Times, November 29, 1969.

¹² Newsweek, October 6, 1969, p. 60.

Marchi won the Republican candidacy against the less conservative candidate, incumbent Mayor John V. Lindsay. In Los Angeles, "tough" Mayor Sam Yorty won a May run-off against Negro candidate Thomas Bradley.

These elections were generally acknowledged to be expressive of a mood of discontent in Middle America: about taxes, inflation, violence, and crime on the streets, which continued to soar. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's annual *Uniform Crime Reports* indicated in 1969 that the national rate of criminal homicide increased by 36 per cent since the beginning of the decade, forcible rape by 65 per cent, aggravated assault by 67 per cent, and robbery by 119 per cent. In Baltimore it was pointed out that a citizen had 1 chance in 49 of being the victim of a violent crime during the year.

The mayoralty elections reflected these concerns behind which certainly lurked racial tensions. However, all three electoral battles fizzled out as Armaggedons of black-white tensions. By and large, the political campaigns carefully avoided direct confrontations. And, characteristic of the year, the elections were blurred in their specific mandates, though they expressed a general mood direction. Thomas Bradley did get 47 per cent of the vote in Los Angeles, although the blacks comprised only about 15 per cent of the population, and Maurice J. Goldbloom pointed out in *Commentary*¹³ that "no other liberal has come that close to election in Los Angeles in the past half century." Goldbloom also suggested that the New York primary vote did not show a significant shift to the right, as much as it demonstrated fragmentation in the Democratic party. Procaccino, the clearest "hard-line" candidate, running against four liberal opponents, won with only one third of the Democratic vote. And Mayor John Lindsay won the run-off in November against both Procaccino and Marchi. In Milwaukee, Stenvig steered clear of any kind of racist line, and indeed split the Negro vote against his Republican opponent. He carried one of the two identifiable Negro precincts in the city. And, although Negroes made up less than five per cent of the Minneapolis population, the black director of the active local urban coalition won the spring city-wide election to one of the three vacancies on the Minneapolis board of education.

Perhaps it is part of the understanding of the confused mood of 1969 to recognize that a concern with crime was not just a white concern. John Morsell of the NAACP said in March:

There is a terrible feeling of fear in Harlem. The streets appear deserted after 7 P.M. Residents are more afraid of the criminals today than of the police. We must have more police protection and sterner measures to control crime and narcotics.¹⁴

¹³ Maurice J. Goldbloom, "Is There a Backlash Vote?", *Commentary*, August 1969, pp. 18-26.

¹⁴ *Chronicle*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

Civil Rights Legislation

In short, this was the "Year of the Pause" rather than the "Year of the Reaction," which was constantly being anticipated. Certainly there had been no wholesale breakdown of American democratic institutions. The commission on law and social action of the American Jewish Congress issued a report which said that "by virtue of the decisions of the Supreme Court during the last 15 years, Americans now enjoy a degree of constitutionally guaranteed freedom without parallel in our history."¹⁵ This judgment included the decisions of the 1968-1969 term. In three decisions, the Court interpreted the provisions of the Voting Rights Act in a manner designed to eliminate indirect, as well as direct, barriers to Negro voting in the South. The Court also struck down residency requirements for welfare recipients, unanimously invalidated the Ohio criminal syndicalism act, and ruled out punitive drafting of young men who attacked the military and the draft. The American Jewish Congress report did not see the immediate changes in the Supreme Court as presaging any serious changes in its voting pattern on such matters.

On the legislative and administrative front, the motif was characteristically mixed. During 1969, 29 laws improving protection of civil rights were adopted by state legislatures. Most of these related to fair housing. Five states—Delaware, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, and Washington—enacted fair housing laws, bringing the number of states with such laws to 26. The Anti-Defamation League reported in December that 37 states had fair employment laws, and 38 laws against discrimination in places of public accommodation, and suggested that "most of the states in which one can realistically expect the enactment of such laws have already taken such action."¹⁶ In 1969 New York adopted a pioneer state law which called for "affirmative action," reminiscent of the Philadelphia Plan, to increase the employment of any minority group having a disproportionately high unemployment rate. The State of Washington passed a law requiring admission of minority group members to state-supported apprenticeship programs in a ratio equal to their proportion in the general population. Maine became the first state to pass legislation prohibiting private clubs with liquor licenses from discriminating against membership applicants on racial, religious, or national grounds. One negative note: New York state passed a law prohibiting appointed boards of education to bus school children for purposes of racial balance.

¹⁵ Commission on Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress, *The Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Decisions of the United States Supreme Court for the 1968-1969 Term: A Summary and Analysis* (October 1969), 102 pp.

¹⁶ "State Civil Rights Legislation-1969," *Law*, December 1969, p. 1.

Administration Policy and Civil Rights

On the national front, Richard Nixon went into office under a cloud of suspicion from the black community. The *Newsweek* poll reported in June (June 30, 1969 issue) that 25 per cent of black America felt "the federal government is helpful to Negro rights," as against 74 per cent in 1966 under the Johnson administration. The mass media developed the image of Nixon's "Southern strategy," which was variously reported as an attempt to cool down the national temperature, and as an attempt to secure the South for the Republicans—indeed to wrest the South away from George Wallace. The Nixon administration appointed an apparently conservative Southern judge, Clement Haynsworth of South Carolina, to the Supreme Court; he was rejected by the Senate in November after a bitter fight. In August the administration went to the courts, asking for a delay of school desegregation in a number of deep Southern districts. In October the U.S. Supreme Court refused this request. As a result, many school districts in Mississippi and elsewhere were forced into integrated plans for the first time. In some cases, a reported mass departure of whites from the public school system was reported, but, significantly, there was not the violent physical resistance that followed earlier desegregation in the South, eliciting the use of U.S. troops by President Eisenhower.

With administration support, Congress also amended the Voting Rights Law to apply to all states, rather than to a few Southern states, bringing the charge that it was made more difficult to enforce.

On the other hand, in December, the Nixon administration successfully opposed a legislative amendment which would have prevented withholding federal funds from school districts that did not follow integration plans. As far as the black population was concerned, the Nixon administration also had on the positive side of its ledger the Philadelphia Plan, as well as its successful fight against having the anti-poverty program dismantled by congressional action and turned over to the states.

The administration's most significant positive proposal probably was the introduction of legislation substituting for the traditional welfare program a family assistance plan placing a minimal floor under all family income in America. The plan was attacked in some quarters as having too low a floor; but the basic policy recommendation was generally regarded as a progressive landmark in welfare reform. All these developments were taking place against the dark background of a promised man-made recession, which was designed to fight inflation but added a final measure of uncertainty. If America was relatively quiet in 1969, it was an uneasy quiet.

THE JEWS

State of Antisemitism

The Jews were at least as uneasy about the urban scene as other Americans. They were being told by their "experts" that they had less to fear from traditional antisemitism than from the developing general temper of extremism and violence. *The Tenacity of Prejudice*,¹⁷ a most thorough analysis of a survey of antisemitic attitudes among Americans by Gertrude Selznick and Steven Steinberg, was published as part of the University of California, ADL-funded series on antisemitism. The authors found that over one-third of the American sample rated "high" on antisemitic beliefs, and noted that while "conventional antisemitism beliefs in Jewish clannishness and unethical business practices have undoubtedly declined since the 1930's and 1940's, [they] have not declined radically and are still far from vanishing" (p. 16).

These results were not startling, and some criticism suggested that the authors placed unwarranted emphasis on the ability of education to eradicate antisemitism. But perhaps the aspect of the book most pertinent to the climate of 1969 had little to do with antisemitic prejudice per se. The authors found what they considered a more important syndrome among Americans: a pervasive lack of commitment *against* antisemitism. For example, they found that almost one-third of those Americans who were unprejudiced and ranked low on the antisemitic scale said it would "make no difference" to them in their voting if a Congressional candidate was running on an anti-Jewish platform. Selznick and Steinberg commented (p. 56):

Few antisemites now feel that a candidate's antisemitism is, by itself, an adequate reason for supporting him. However at least some non-antisemites do not feel that antisemitism in a political candidate is sufficient reason to vote *against* him. In effect, both are saying that they might buy political antisemitism as part of a package deal, provided the package as a whole was attractive to them. . . . So long as Americans fail to take a principled stand against political antisemitism, its occurrence in the future cannot be ruled out nor can other forms of anti-democratic politics.

Report on Violence

And this was a year in which there continued to be much public attention to the potential of violence, to extremism, and to the imminent fall of our civil society. After a series of preliminary reports which made front pages across the nation, the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence in December published its final report entitled, *To Establish*

¹⁷ Gertrude J. Selznick and Stephen Steinberg, *The Tenacity of Prejudice: Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America* (New York, 1969), 248 pp.

Justice and to Insure Tranquillity. Like a number of earlier government commission reports, it was doom-ridden in tone. "While serious external dangers remain," it said, "the graver threats today are internal: haphazard urbanization, racial discrimination, disfiguring of the environment, unprecedented interdependence, the dislocation of human identity and motivation created by an affluent society—all resulting in a rising tide of individual and group violence" (p. xxxii).

Although the Commission had some specific measures to suggest for the alleviation of violence, such as the regulation of firearms and mass media, its basic recommendation was a familiar one: "The way in which we can make the greatest progress toward reducing violence in America is by taking the actions necessary to improve the conditions of family and community life for all who live in our cities, and especially for the poor who are concentrated in the ghetto slums" (p. xxi).

The special Jewish concern with antidemocratic behavior and violence, however, was not academic, and was chiefly attached to two phenomena: black-Jewish relationships and campus disorders.

Black-Jewish Relations

The past year's concern about black-Jewish relations seemed to subside somewhat in 1969. That is, it received somewhat less mass media attention, partly because the dramatic focus of the New York City school conflict had diminished. However, the definable areas of special black-Jewish friction persisted. Abraham Duker described one of those areas in *Patterns of Prejudice*, referring to:

"the prevailing mood in the Yiddish-speaking and Orthodox sectors of the Jewish community. Many Jews of this type live in or near racially mixed neighborhoods, where they face attacks, robberies, chicanery, sometimes even death. They feel neglected and disregarded by the city's authorities. Their pleas for protection are in vain. Their synagogues and educational institutions are vandalized and even set on fire. Sometimes worshippers were attacked on their way to and from place of worship. Their children are molested and held up on the way to and from school. Swastikas are painted or chalked in Negro areas.¹⁸

One atypical, but nonetheless symptomatic, reaction of the Jewish community to this kind of friction came to national attention in 1969 through a militant fringe group, the Jewish Defense League (JDL; p. 225). The mainline Jewish organizations uniformly and strongly disassociated themselves from what they called JDL's "vigilantism" and "irresponsible talk," and accused it of violating the tradition of Judaism and exacerbating racial

¹⁸ Abraham G. Duker, "Negroes Versus Jews: Antisemitism Is Asserted," *Patterns of Prejudice*, March-April 1969, p. 9.

conflict. But there were some scattered vibrations of support around the country.

ISSUE OF MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

While direct confrontation between proximate black and Jewish groups occurred in certain limited sections of the large cities, another source of friction between blacks and Jews, less direct but highly charged, persisted: the Middle East crisis. Certain limited sections of black leadership continued to attack Israel and defend the Arab cause. For example, the *Black Panther* throughout the year published articles praising al-Fatah and condemning "fascist Zionist pigs," as the one in its August issue entitled, "Zionism (Kosher Nationalism) Plus Imperialism Equal Fascism." The Black Panther party did not have a mass following by any count, but it was the most publicity-worthy Negro group in America in 1969. This status was enhanced by a continual series of gun battles between police and Black Panthers across the country. Black Panthers who were killed in these battles garnered for their organization a certain amount of emotional support in both the black and white communities. Eldridge Cleaver, the Black Panther leader-in-exile, was the most newsworthy American black man in 1969; his anti-Israel statements, issued from Algeria, received wide attention in the American press.

One explicit attempt to play on these frictions, as they were felt by Jews, occurred during the heated Bradley-Yorty mayoralty race in Los Angeles. In the two-month interval between the primary and the runoff, there was a concerted attempt to stir a Jewish backlash against the black candidate. For example, "A Message of Conscience," specifically playing on Jewish concerns over black militancy, was distributed in Jewish neighborhoods with a covering letter from 21 rabbis. It featured a statement made by James Forman in Detroit in April, which called for "the use of force and the power of guns," and said that "we sit back and watch the Jews in this country make Israel a powerful conservative state in the Middle East." The message called for the election of Sam Yorty in light of the Forman statement, although Thomas Bradley, a former police officer, had no association with Forman, and explicitly spoke out against both violence and antisemitism.

Organized segments of the Los Angeles Jewish community dropped their nonpartisanship long enough to respond angrily to this piece of literature. By all precinct estimates, the Los Angeles Jewish voters were the only group of nonblacks, including the Mexican Americans, who gave clear majority support to Bradley. But it fell short of expectations. In the Fairfax area, a heavily Jewish, largely lower-middle-class district bordered by an increasingly black population, the Bradley-Yorty vote in the 14-candidate April primary split about 75-25. In the runoff, the Bradley-Yorty vote split about 55-45. Of course there were many differential factors in the runoff, such as the reduced number of candidates and larger number of voters, so there was no

sure way of determining the effect of the interim appeal to black-Jewish friction. One thing is certain: an open appeal of this kind would not have been possible several years ago.

Campus Disorders

The student revolution on the campus also was a matter of continuously expressed concern for the Jewish community. To some extent, it was part of the special Jewish concern over violence and antidemocratic behavior. But there were indications towards the end of 1969 that the movement may have lost some of its force, at least for a time. In December the *Civil Disorder Digest* reported:

In September, university administrators and students prepared for the well-advertised "Fall Offensive" by campus radical groups. But the protests never got off the ground in most places: the "Offense" never really materialized in not anything remotely resembling what the predictions had threatened.

Of course, spring rather than fall always was the peak of student activism. And, earlier in the year, there were a number of serious campus disorders. Students captured buildings, and in some cases also administrators, at colleges like Harvard, Brandeis, and Cornell. A photograph of black Cornell students brandishing rifles as they emerged from a building made front pages in the nation's press. At San Francisco State College, pitched battles took place between police and students, partly immobilizing the college for a long period. However, several developments took place during the year which suggested that the failure of the "fall offensive" was more than a seasonal phenomenon.

First of all, in keeping with the spirit of the year, a kind of counter-offensive seemed to have developed. S. I. Hayakawa, president of San Francisco State College, received national recognition of sorts as the tough man who had "won" on his campus. He banned disruptive activities, moved the police against violations, and kept the campus officially open against both a student and faculty strike; there was an almost bland return to normalcy in the fall. In November Morris B. Abram, president of Brandeis University, said that he would not allow a repetition of the January ten-day takeover of a campus building. He declared that, instead of waiting for the students to tire and then granting amnesty, as he had done, he would henceforth suspend the students immediately and call police if no other methods for eviction could be found. He said: "I do not believe we are any longer in a stage in which university rights can be violated without penalties being attached." Injunctions against student groups were obtained at MIT, Boston University, New York University, Fordham, and Tufts.

At the same time, the student movements, themselves, showed certain signs of attenuation. The heart of the white radical student movement, the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) broke into three separate and

bitterly competing groups at their annual convention in Chicago during the summer. The Worker Student Alliance, representing the doctrinal "old Left" element of the former SDS and relating to the Communist and the Progressive Labor parties, organized around renewed attention to student-worker relationships and comprehensive revolutionary activity. The Revolutionary Youth Movement retained the old SDS image, and the more eclectic New Left approach to campus protest on specific issues, such as war. The Weatherman Collective was a New Left split-off dedicated to bringing down society by urban guerrilla warfare. The Black Panther leader in Illinois accused them of "ousterism."

Black student groups became even less inclined to mingle their issues with those of other campus groups, and, by year's end, already achieved one of their major objectives: at least the initial creation of black studies programs and departments in most of the major colleges and universities around the country. It was suggested that student radicalism was coming to some kind of a pause of its own, partly because of the counteroffensive, partly because the issue of the Vietnam war was losing its potency as a specific radical issue. It seemed that the anti-Vietnam issue had been coopted by a large mass of "Middle-Americans."

But whether or not student radicalism was in fact subsiding for a time, the Jewish community's concern was heightened by the heightened relationship of that radicalism to the critical Middle East issue. There were indications that, as the Vietnam issue diminished in importance, the Middle East issue might take its place on the radical agenda. Al-Fatah could take the place of the Vietcong as the darling of American student radicals. This stance of the radical campus youth was an especial affront to the Jewish community because so many of them were its own children. As Seymour Martin Lipset put it in *Encounter*:

The task for analyzing the impact of the New Left on Israel's position is complicated by the fact that Jews play a very great role in the student-based New Left, considerably disproportionate to the number of Jewish students on the campus. Many of these Jewish Leftists exhibit familiar forms of Jewish self-hatred, of so-called "Jewish antisemitism" of the sort which were widespread within the Left before the Nazi Holocaust and the creation of the State of Israel.¹⁹

Moratorium

The proposition that the anti-Vietnam issue had forever broken student-radical bounds was signaled by the massive Moratorium day rallies on November 15. It clearly was the largest public protest of the Vietnam war and, according to historians in the Library of Congress, the largest nationally coordinated anti-war demonstration in American history. A quarter of a

¹⁹ Seymour M. Lipset, "The Socialism of Fools': The Left, the Jews, and Israel," *Encounter*, December 1969, p. 32.

million marched in Washington. There were a hundred thousand in the Boston Commons, and demonstrations in every city of size. In addition, numbers of children stayed away from school and workers away from work, and churches and synagogues held prayer meetings all over the country. What had started as a national protest by college students was now a more general protest in which labor unions, religious institutions, and city and state officials joined. Governor Francis Sargent of Massachusetts said at one rally, "This war is costing America its soul,"²⁰ and this sentiment seemed to be the sober common denominator that brought together so many from the student body, the middle class, the working class on Moratorium day. The demonstrations were, for the most part, sober, peaceful, and awesome in proportions. The issue clearly no longer belonged just to the students, nor to Left-leaning adults. Some student radical groups were dismayed by this development, seeing themselves once again coopted.

However, the events of the Moratorium day also crystallized another truth: for all those who marched and prayed in protest there were as many, and probably more, in America who wished to disassociate themselves from this protest. President Nixon made a speech defending his policies, and the response was so overwhelmingly in his favor that the entire episode was generally conceded to be a Nixon "victory." Thus, the uneasy split in the American population was again dramatically revealed.

Many felt that Vice President Spiro T. Agnew was widening, and capitalizing on, the split in America when he attacked the Moratorium supporters as "effete snobs," drawing on an anti-elitist, anti-intellectual strain which had characterized the George Wallace campaign. And, indeed, some observers felt that Agnew's approach was part and parcel of the administration's Southern strategy. In December Agnew created an even greater furor with his attack on what he felt was the bias of the mass media, and especially the national television networks. He referred to "this little group of men who wield a free hand in selecting, presenting and interpreting the great issues." He complained that television commentators "live and work in the geographical and intellectual confines of Washington, D.C., or New York City." Even some of those who were in agreement with Agnew's basic assumption of bias in the mass media were alarmed by his language which, among other things, touched an old nerve of conspiracyphobia. Gerald L. K. Smith, America's dean of professional antisemites, called Agnew's speech "a courageous address" against the "mindwashing establishment operating tyrannically by controlling the source of news in New York City."²¹ The racist and antisemitic magazine, *Thunderbolt*, wrote: "Vice President Agnew has come to grips with the Jews."²²

Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden, syndicated columnists in the *Washing-*

²⁰ *New York Times*, October 16, 1969.

²¹ *Special Bulletin*, November 21, 1969.

²² *The Thunderbolt*, December 1969, p. 1.

ton Post, headed a column: "Agnew Unintentionally Triggers Renewed Round of Anti-Semitism," and reported:

It was noticeable at once in this city where local television stations were swamped for three days after Agnew's speech with obscene phone calls protesting "Jew-Commies on the air." But now, Norman B. Isaacs, executive editor of the *Louisville Courier Journal*, reports that he has been "literally buried under an avalanche of sick mail."²³

Jews again were reminded of the dogged line connecting polarization, extremism, and political antisemitism.

Civil Status of Jews

In addition to this generic uneasiness about the apparent rise of anti-democratic sentiment and violence in America, there was some uneasiness about the possibility of deteriorating civil status of Jews in America. There was an almost, but not quite, inaudible gasp in the American Jewish community when Abe Fortas was not replaced on the Supreme Court by another Jew. For over half a century, ever since Louis Brandeis became a Supreme Court justice in 1916, there had been a Jewish Supreme Court justice, always one of the most splendid evidences of Jewish "belongingness" in American society. Retiring Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg said publicly that there was no "Jewish seat" on the Court; but the very fact that he found it necessary to make such a statement was reflective of some of the feelings in the Jewish community. So was the fact that Mayor Lindsay found it necessary to say that he did not think "any ethnic or religious or national group has any claim on any seat on the Supreme Court," and, at the same time, to lament the break in the "tradition of Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter and Goldberg," whose contribution to justice he described as "enormously sensitive and humanistic."²⁴ At a time when the black revolution dramatized the symbolic importance of such appointments in pluralistic America, and, indeed, shortly after the appointment of the first black Supreme Court justice was publicly hailed as having such symbolic importance, the break in this tradition necessarily carried some import for many Jews.

Nathan Lewin carried the matter further in an article in *Jewish Life*²⁵ by pointing out that there were not only no Jews in the Nixon cabinet, but that the number of Jews had been strikingly reduced in policy positions in those departments where they traditionally had been quite visible, e.g., the Departments of Justice, Treasury, Health, Education and Welfare. Wrote Lewin: "The President is an honorable man, and surely no one accuses him of overt antisemitism." Nevertheless, "the phenomenon which appears and

²³ *Washington Post*, December 30, 1969, p. A 15.

²⁴ Report on press conference in New York *Times*, August 15, 1969.

²⁵ Nathan Lewin, "The Vanishing Jew in the Federal Establishment," *Jewish Life*, September-October 1969, pp. 6-13.

reappears is that of a Jewish subcabinet official or a civil servant at the policy-making level leaving the government and being replaced by the stereotype Nixon Republican—a white, upper middle class Protestant who has been a politically active Republican in his State or local community.” Much of this might have been expected from the nature of the political condition. But Lewin’s point was this: “The very least that can be said with absolute confidence is that no effort is being made by Mr. Nixon or his associates to see to it that Jews—like Negroes or women—are represented at the visible policy-making level of the executive departments.” Whether or not this was properly a cause for uneasiness, it obviously was for a number of Jews. This seemed to be compounded at the end of the year when the administration’s statements of position appeared to many Jews to represent an alarming erosion of United States policy towards Israel.

Interreligious Affairs

There seemed to be continuing progress on the level of interreligious understanding and interreligious dialogue. For example, more than 70 Jewish and Baptist scholars and theologians met formally for the first time in August in a conference sponsored by the American Jewish Committee and the Southern Baptist Convention Home Missions Board. The “sense of the meeting,” drafted by conference participants, called for the establishment of a continuing interreligious committee to implement “a deep concern over the inversion of moral values in the establishment of our national priorities.”²⁶ Resolutions called for a joint defense of religious liberty for Baptists and Jews in the Soviet Union; for a greater involvement of churches and synagogues in the social problems of America; for joint efforts to end antisemitism.

But many Jews still saw a basic rift in Jewish-Christian dialogue and relations, dating from the apparent failure of the Christian religious movement during the six-day war to see the authentic relationship between the American Jew and Israel. Among the further expositions of this failure, seen also as a Jewish failure, was that of Manfred Vogel, then visiting lecturer at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who wrote:

The justification for the Jewish partner’s expectation of the Christian response is based . . . on the Jewish partner’s fully and authentically disclosing his distinct, peculiar, religious reality, that is, his membership in a community of faith which is inextricably bound to be an ethnic nationhood. The crucial fact is, however, that, in reality, the Jewish partner did not so disclose himself. The Jewish partner in the dialogue, prior to the six-day war, was pursuing a humanitarian encounter. The Jew who was present in that dialogue was the Jew *qua* human being, the Jew who suffers the inequities of prejudice and persecu-

²⁶ *Religious News Service*, August 26, 1969.

tion. The Jew in his distinct, peculiar, religious-ethnic reality, the Jew *qua* Jew, was absent.²⁷

The same question was central to developments in Catholic-Jewish relations. Dr. Joseph Lichten, director of the Anti-Defamation League's department of intercultural affairs, wrote that "the year 1969 was full of promise for interfaith relations, the most constructive since 1965, when the Declaration on Non-Christian Religions was promulgated."²⁸ This sentiment was largely based on a "working paper" on Christian-Jewish relations, which was presumably destined to become a new Vatican document on Christian-Jewish relations. Lawrence Cardinal Sheehan of Baltimore reported on it at an interfaith conference in December. The import of the document was to remove any doubts that had been raised by earlier Vatican documents about mere "tolerance" of Jews, rather than their full acceptance as a legitimate religious group in their own right. This document insisted that the Jewish religion should *not* be seen just as a stepping stone to Christianity, and that the Old Testament should be recognized for its "proper validity." It went so far as to suggest the possibility of joint prayer. Especially gratifying to the Jewish community was the recommendation that Catholics should recognize the religious significance of the State of Israel for Jews and attempt to "understand and respect" the "link between the people and the land." But the Vatican immediately warned that the version reported by Cardinal Sheehan had not yet been approved, and the Synagogue Council of America, the congregational representative body of all branches of Judaism, withheld comment amidst intimations that there had been significant changes in the text. The changes presumably had to do with the references to Israel. In a typical after-reaction, the *Reconstructionist* wrote that finally

the Bishops had eliminated from that "working paper" every reference to the State of Israel. They did not wish to appear to be siding politically with Israel in her conflict with the Arab nations, nor were they prepared yet to speak truth to the Arab world, lest it arouse Arab ire. But there can be no peace in the Middle East until the integrity of the state of Israel is acknowledged, and the Church ought to lead the way. Certainly, acknowledgement of the importance of the State of Israel is a test of Christian understanding of Jews.²⁹

Thus, the ecumenical weakness perceived by the Jewish community in 1967 seemed to persist.

²⁷ Manfred Vogel, "Some Reflections on the Jewish-Christian Dialogue in the Light of the Six-Day War," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, January 1970, p. 105.

²⁸ *ADL Bulletin*, January 1970.

²⁹ "The Politics of the Vatican Council Statement on the Jews," *Reconstructionist*, January 23, 1970.

Church-State Relations

Meanwhile, there was new concern on the interfaith front as a concentrated drive developed for state aid to the embattled Catholic schools. It was reported that Catholic enrollment had dropped by about half a million in two years.³⁰ Teacher salaries continued to rise while parochial-school funds continued to fall off. In Rhode Island, a law was passed authorizing payment of up to 15 per cent of the salaries of elementary school teachers in private schools, including religious schools where, however, these funds were to be applied only to the teaching of secular subjects. In Connecticut, the legislature authorized the payment of 20 per cent of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in private and religious schools. Higher payment to teachers—up to 60 per cent—was authorized for teachers of secular subjects in religious schools with a preponderance of children from low-income families. Similar “purchase of services” bills, or bills providing voucher payments of tax credits to parents of children attending religious schools, were introduced around the country. The general understanding was that they would be reintroduced in 1970 in states where they had been defeated. In several cases, special legislative committees were set up to study the problem of aid to religious schools. Minnesota enacted a bill providing free transportation for religious- and other private-school students, and Indiana approved the rental of textbooks for use in such schools.

It seemed clear to church-state watchers that the question of direct governmental aid to religious schools—by way of the child—was building up to another judicial crisis. There were cases in the courts challenging the use of federal funds by Catholic colleges in Connecticut, Vermont, and New Jersey. These were expected to move up to the Supreme Court, as were cases involving governmental aid to lower-grade parochial schools. The principle of child welfare, which the Supreme Court found valid in the case of parochial school transportation, was the principle around which the current government aid bills were scrupulously built. One California legislator, defending his support of “parochiaid” legislation, said to a Jewish agency: “Separation of church and state is not as important as it used to be.” Partly, he was referring to what he considered the overriding considerations of a sick urban educational system. But he also was referring to the fact that, through the back door of welfare, the wall of church-state separation had already been pretty deeply penetrated.

George R. La Noue, Columbia University professor, summed up that penetration in December:

Since World War II there has been a radical transformation of church-state relations that has passed almost unnoticed. Church and state are linked today in a whole series of federal programs. Indeed, under current laws and operating

³⁰ *New Jersey Education Association Review*, January 1970.

practices, a church institution can obtain its land from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare via the General Services Administration; its mortgage insurance from the Housing and Home Finance Agency; its food from the Department of Agriculture; its wine from the Department of Treasury; and its prospective members from the Office of Economic Opportunity. Should it encounter an act of God, the church institution can turn to the Small Business Administration for a disaster loan. This is something less than separation of church and state. There is no need for a conspiracy theory to explain this departure from the separation tradition. It is simply that many men in many programs made pragmatic and political decisions until the principle was overwhelmed. Madison and Jefferson's separation of church and state is, after all, an 18th century concept of limited government that does not fit easily into the operation of a welfare state.³¹

Also stirring on the church-state front were questions relating to the tax-exempt status of churches. With the approval of major Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish religious bodies, Congress set about to pass a tax reform bill which would gradually eliminate the tax-exempt status of church-run secular business enterprises. And, in June, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a case involving the constitutionality of exempting church property from real estate taxes. The suit was brought by Frederick Walz in the New York courts, and was denied by the highest New York state court, which held that such tax exemption was "firmly imbedded in the law of the state."³² Since the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear such cases on four different occasions since 1956, a number of lawyers were startled by its willingness to consider this case. Some momentum seemed to be developing in this direction during the year. Studies in church tax exemption were reported underway in Minnesota, Idaho, Vermont, and Pennsylvania, at least. Oregon's house of representatives voted to tax churches for fire and police protection, only to have the state senate kill the bill. The Kansas legislature repealed the state law granting tax exemption to ministers' dwellings.

Attempts in some states and localities to return some religious emphasis to the public schools were growing. There were reports of local efforts to circumvent the Supreme Court ruling on prayers in the public schools. The Illinois legislature authorized a period of silent prayer at the beginning of the public school day. In Indiana, the legislature did likewise, and also authorized voluntary Christmas and Easter religious services in the public schools.

In May the school committee of Leydon, Mass., approved prayer readings in the classrooms, an order which was rescinded at the insistence of the state commissioner of education. Three months later, the school committee voted to resume prayers, with participation entirely "voluntary," a measure which, committee member Gerald F. McCarthy held, "will stand the test of any court if we are challenged by some extremist."³³

³¹ George R. La Noue, "Church, State and the Courts, *The Nation*, December 15, 1969.

³² *Journal of Church and State*, Autumn 1969, p. 573.

³³ *Religious News Service*, August 29, 1969.

In Netcong, N.J., a nondenominational prayer was recited before the beginning of classes. The purpose of the service, according to the school superintendent, was to encourage "the love of one's neighbor, brotherhood and respect for the individual."³⁴ The schools used the prayers of congressional chaplains, as reprinted in the *Congressional Record*. Even after the state attorney general declared the Netcong procedure illegal, the local board of education, in December, voted 7 to 1 "to continue school prayer."³⁵

Congressman Richard Roudebush of Indiana applauded the Netcong procedure, and indicated he would insert daily into the *Congressional Record* children's prayers which could be read in public schools as "a legal remedy to the tragic Supreme Court decision" barring prayers. One verse inserted by the Congressman for reading in the nation's public schools read:

I, too, thanks would offer,
Jesus, Shepherd dear,
For Thy tender pasture
And Thy guiding care.³⁶

Four different school districts in Pennsylvania reportedly reinstituted school prayers. The Albert Gallatin area school district in Southwestern Pennsylvania was enjoined in December by a federal court from continuing its prayers. But here, as elsewhere, the dispute was to be extended. The school district's solicitor said: "The original error in the school prayer matter was made by the Supreme Court, and it's going to have to be corrected by them."³⁷

In California, the state board of education held that science textbooks used in California schools should include, along with Darwin's theory of evolution, other "competing theories" about the origin of life, such as the story of Genesis. At the same time, the board produced a set of "morality guidelines" for use in the schools, which Jewish organizations and some Christians called "sectarian and fundamentalist" in nature. A more moderate set of guidelines was adopted, over the strong support of the original document, by a number of groups holding that, after all, this was a Christian country.

EARL RAAB

³⁴ *New York Times*, September 17, 1969.

³⁵ *Christian Science Monitor*, December 5, 1969.

³⁶ *Religious News Service*, October 15, 1969.

³⁷ *New York Times*, December 18, 1969.

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in New York City

THE INCREASING polarization across the nation along racial, political, and economic lines was keenly felt in New York City in 1969. The mayoralty election reflected these great divisions. Mayor John V. Lindsay, supported by urban upper-middle-class liberals along with Negroes and Puerto Ricans, scored an undecisive victory over Comptroller Mario A. Procaccino and State Senator John Marchi whose "law and order campaign" attracted the middle-class ethnic voters fearing the growing violence in the cities. The "Jewish vote," said to be the key to the election, was split evenly between Lindsay and Procaccino.

School decentralization again was a potent issue. But the question no longer was whether or not decentralization would take place, but how it would be done.

On the college campuses, the cause for unrest shifted from the kinds of demands made in 1968 by predominantly white middle-class students at Columbia University to the demands by Negro and Puerto Rican students seeking greater access to the City University system.

NEW YORK MAYORALTY ELECTION

Mayor John V. Lindsay, who practically was counted out after losing the June primary, made a remarkable comeback to win reelection against Democratic candidate Mario Procaccino and conservative Republican candidate John Marchi. Lindsay received 41.8 per cent of the vote, the lowest plurality since the Fiorello La Guardia election in 1933; Procaccino received 35 per cent of the vote; John Marchi, 23.2 per cent. The voting percentage by ethnic group, based on returns in sample election districts, was reported by CBS and NBC. Voting percentages reported by WCBS-TV were:

<i>Groups</i>	<i>Lindsay</i>	<i>Procaccino</i>	<i>Marchi</i>
Jews	44	44	12
Negroes	80	13	7
Italians	15	55	30
Puerto Ricans	64	27	9
Irish	26	26	48

WNBC-TV sampling was as follows:

<i>Groups</i>	<i>Lindsay</i>	<i>Procaccino</i>	<i>Marchi</i>
Jews	42	49	9
Negroes	85	11	4
Italians	24	63	13
Puerto Ricans	63	26	11

Lindsay's Comeback

After Lindsay's defeat in the primaries, prospects for his reelection were considered very slim by most political observers. Surveys taken at the time indicated that over 70 per cent of New Yorkers would not vote for Lindsay. In July Lindsay entered the mayoralty race as a candidate of the Independent party, carrying on a modern-style market-research and media campaign, marked by a voter-attitude survey and television advertising, rather than his old-style field organization campaign of 1965. A change of strategy and image was necessary for a comeback. He had to redress the old grievances and show that he was "repentant." Most of the campaign strategy was aimed at appeasing the resentment of the white middle-class, especially the lower-middle-class groups.

The Polls

The effect of preelectoral polls again was at issue in the campaign. Mario Procaccino was particularly disturbed about the influence of the *Daily News* straw poll on the election outcome. He felt that the overestimation of Lindsay's strength tended to discourage those who might otherwise have voted for him. The poll was 6 percentage points higher than the actual vote.

The results of five surveys conducted throughout the campaign showed Procaccino gradually giving ground to both Lindsay and Marchi. Procaccino's percentage of the polled vote slipped from 33 per cent to 27 per cent, while Lindsay and Marchi gained 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively. A comparison between the polls taken by Oliver Quayle for NBC in July and October revealed a 5 point gain for Lindsay (from 30 to 35) and a 2 point loss for Procaccino (from 35 to 33), with Marchi losing 7 points (from 19 to 12). The percentage of undecided voters increased from 16 to 20.

Independent polls taken by Procaccino (telephone poll in October) and Marchi (September) predicted a victory for the candidate conducting the survey.

The Jewish Vote

The attention given to Jewish voters in the election was unprecedented. Milton Himmelfarb, writing in *Commentary*, observed that "in no other American election has the 'Jewish vote' ever been so central to the strategy and the tactics of the candidates, or so prominent in the news, commentaries, polls, and analysis, as in New York in 1969."¹

Some Jewish organizations denounced appeals by candidates to specific racial, religious, or ethnic groups on the ground that the media's focus on alleged bloc votes would increase polarization, alienation, and distrust in the city. Rabbi Marc H. Tanenbaum of the American Jewish Committee said in

¹ Milton Himmelfarb, "Jewish Class Conflict?" *Commentary*, January 1970, p. 37.

a radio broadcast, on November 2, that "ethnic or religious identification is not a controlling element in an individual's choice; it may be one element, but it is rarely the controlling one. Jews are influenced primarily by positions that candidates and parties take that affect the welfare of all Americans." However, professional politicians felt quite sure that the "Jewish vote" would determine the election.

According to Arthur Klebanoff, the Lindsay campaign strategy was aimed directly at those who were unlikely to vote overwhelmingly for or against him:

The question for the campaign, therefore, was not simply the Jewish voter; it was rather a particular kind of Jewish voter, a voter who had preferred Robert Wagner to Procaccino in the Democratic primary; who had voted against the Civilian Review Board, but not with the intensity of its staunchest critics; a voter who had all along maintained a strong tie to the political magic of Jacob Javits.²

HOW DID JEWS VOTE?

CBS's post-election poll gave Lindsay and Procaccino each 44 per cent of the votes cast by Jews; NBC gave them 42 and 49 per cent, respectively. Obviously, there was no "Jewish vote," if by that one means a bloc vote. A more interesting question is how Jews actually voted, and along what lines the votes were split. On the whole, the split was along economic lines, with the upper-middle- to upper-class Jews voting for Lindsay (about 72 per cent) and lower-middle-class Jews for Procaccino. Lindsay's victory was ascribed to the support of the majority of the center. An analysis suggesting such a split broke down the results of ten assembly districts (all Jewish or mixed white) that cast at least 42 per cent of their vote in the Democratic primary for Robert F. Wagner and/or James Scheuer. In the higher income groups, [25th, 27th, 43rd, 44th, 73rd, and 76th assembly districts] 60 per cent voted for Lindsay. The four districts with lower-income populations [39th, 41st, 45th, and 46th] voted for Procaccino.³

CAMPUS TENSION

Campus tension in 1969 reflected the increasing militancy of Negroes and Puerto Ricans. The principal issue in most of the disturbances was open enrollment; subsidiary demands were better representation and relevance of curricula (black studies programs). In April a dual track admissions policy was the major plank in a series of five demands put forth by a group of Negro and Puerto Rican students to the City College administration. The

² Arthur M. Klebanoff, "Is There a Jewish Vote?", *Commentary*, January 1970, p. 45.

³ *New York Times*, November 6, 1969, quoting the findings of Harry C. Harris, consultant for Realtronics computer programmers.

object of this policy was to redress the racial imbalance of Negro and Puerto Rican students from their present representation of 15 per cent in City College to 40 per cent, their approximate ratio in the public high schools. The plan called for the enrollment of half the freshman class from disadvantaged neighborhoods without regard to grades, while the other half would be admitted by the usual standards.

The other demands, classified as "non-negotiable," called for a degree-granting school of black and Puerto Rican studies; a SEEK (Search for Education, Elevation of Knowledge) program offering remedial help to promising students in preparation for matriculation; proficiency in Spanish and in "black and Puerto Rican heritage" for all students in the School of Education planning to teach in the public schools.

According to Professor Lloyd P. Gartner,⁴ the crisis at City College "was in itself not linked with the political and cultural revolt which has swept the campus. It was a straightforward phenomenon of black militancy."

In May, after a series of shutdowns, Dr. Buell S. Gallagher resigned as president of City College, saying that political circumstances no longer made it possible for him to function effectively. Professor Joseph Copeland was named acting president. After each shutdown, court orders were issued to reopen the school. The injunctions were prompted by individual suits against the City University, initiated by Comptroller Procaccino and Representative John Biaggi at one time, and by the Jewish Defense League on another occasion. Court injunctions became an effective means of handling campus disorders throughout the city.

Other campuses seriously disrupted by student dissent over open enrollment were Queens College, Brooklyn College, Queensborough Community College, and Pratt Institute.

Open Admission Plan

In July the Board of Higher Education, pressured by the spring campus disorders, approved a resolution advancing the target date for open admission from 1975, as stated in its 1964 master plan, to September 1970. The plan included the following features:

- 1) Admission to some City University programs of all city high-school graduates who apply;
- 2) Remedial and other supportive services for all students requiring them;
- 3) Maintenance and enhancement of standards of academic excellence in University's colleges;
- 4) Ethnic integration of the colleges;
- 5) Student mobility between various programs and units of University;
- 6) Continued admission of all students who would have been admitted to specific community or senior colleges under past admissions criteria.

⁴ Lloyd P. Gartner, "The Five Demands at New York City College, *Midstream*, October 1969, p. 35.

According to the board's policy statement of July 9, the action was based "on the most urgent considerations of public necessity and equity." Adoption of the plan would mean the admission of all New York City high school graduates applying to some program of higher education. Admission would be based on class rank or grade averages: to senior college, students in the top half of graduating classes, or having 80 per cent grade averages; all others to community colleges. Under this plan, 14,000 additional freshmen were expected to be admitted to the City University in September 1970.

Many groups, including Jewish groups for whom CUNY had been an important stepping-stone to a better life, had strong reservations about the new policy, or even opposed it, on the grounds that:

- 1) It would lower the standards and prestige of CUNY;
- 2) It would create a quota system by color and community, would bar a substantial number of minority-group high school graduates from senior colleges, and might even lead to *de facto* segregation;
- 3) It would create a problem of retaining some of the faculty;
- 4) It would create two conflicting, polarized bodies in the university, which in the end would destroy it;
- 5) There were not sufficient funds to implement such a program.

The plan was attacked by Mayor Lindsay and former Mayor Wagner, as well as by major Jewish organizations, as a "quota system" that would operate against the best interests of all concerned.

One of the problems of open admission was funding. The cost of the program for the first year was estimated at \$35.3 million. According to Dr. Albert Bowker, president of the Board of Higher Education, its implementation would require 1,000 more faculty members, new space, and facilities for remedial work.

The Board of Regents endorsed the city's request for CUNY open enrollment, and urged that the system be made statewide. In his 1970 message to the state legislature, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller set forth a "full-opportunity" program to provide access to higher education for all New York State high school graduates, and recommended expansion of all state and state-aided programs. Many believed that such a program would help distribute minority-group students, thus lessening the possibility of CUNY becoming *de facto* segregated.

Black Studies

On July 23 the Board of Higher Education approved plans for courses and departments of urban and ethnic studies at City, Hunter, Bronx Community, Richmond, and John Jay colleges. More than 100 courses in Afro-American and African studies were instituted throughout the City University. Hunter College was the first to establish a department offering majors toward degrees in black and Puerto Rican studies.

SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION

In 1969 demands for integrated city schools (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 251-52; 1969 [Vol. 70], pp. 79-82) gave way to demands for community control and/or decentralization. Decentralization, essentially an administrative reform, means that local boards run the school, but the ultimate power of quality control remains with the central board. Community control implies political reform, with responsibility of supervising as well as running the schools resting with the community. Advocates of decentralization of school administration and parental control of school policy argued that it would enable them to demand a more equitable share of the resources for education, free them of total dependence on white generosity, and force the bureaucracy to be more responsive to local problems.

According to a Harris survey, released January 30, 1969, parents of children in New York City schools were evenly divided over the decentralization issue: 37 per cent were for more local control, 34 per cent for things as they were, 5 per cent for less control, and 24 per cent were undecided. The basic division varied sharply by area and by key groups. Brooklyn and Manhattan generally tended to favor decentralization; Queens, Richmond, and the Bronx to oppose it. Negroes were overwhelmingly in favor, while Catholics were against it. The division among Jewish parents showed a slight margin in favor (43 per cent in favor, 41 per cent for the status quo, and 16 per cent for less control).

Legislation

In the spring two major bills were proposed: the Regents bill tending toward community control, and the Marchi bill for decentralization. The Regents bill called for a five-man community board which would be appointed by the mayor to replace the central board, and would create 20 to 30 local school districts empowered to hire teachers, establish curricula, and manage fiscal affairs. The Marchi bill provided for an elected seven-man board with limited powers, and left the hiring of teachers and setting the performance standard in the hands of the central board. Among the supporters of the Regents bill were the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Urban League, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Rabbis for Community Control, and the Council of Churches of New York City. Proponents of the Marchi bill included the Union of the Federated Teachers, the New York City Board of Examiners, and the committees for the election of mayoral candidates Procaccino and Marchi.

After intense negotiations, the new decentralization bill was passed on May 1, 1969. Under the new system, local boards would appoint the school superintendent and, with his assistance, the school principals. And, while

present tenured teachers were protected, local boards were authorized to hire new teachers within existing state and city eligibility rules.

Opposite reactions to the law were clearly articulated by UFT president Albert Shanker, who thought "we have a good piece of legislation here," and by Rhody McCoy, Ocean Hill-Brownsville district administrator, who called the law "a prelude to the destruction of public education."

Redistricting

Redistricting was the final step of the new plan. It originally arose in response to a state legislative mandate that no school district have less than 20,000 pupils. (The definition of districts is an important prelude to the elections of school boards.) In November the central board voted to set up 32 largely autonomous community school districts, of which the three experimental districts—I.S. 201, Ocean Hill-Brownsville, and Two Bridges—would now be a part. Isaiah Robinson, the only Negro and a newly elected board member, strongly objected to the elimination of the experimental districts as separate units, which opened old wounds, and cast the only vote against this action. He asserted: "We've broken faith with the black and Puerto Rican community."

Backers of total community control, particularly blacks and Puerto Ricans, rejected the board's plan because they felt there was insufficient proof that the demonstration districts did not work, and because the plan left the power largely in the hands of the "establishment."

On December 4 the first public hearings on the proposed redistricting plan were held. Demands were made to continue the demonstration districts. The Reverend C. Herbert Oliver, chairman of the governing board of Ocean Hill-Brownsville, charged the plan "was the most blatant example of gerrymandering in recent history." Rhody McCoy urged the retention of his unit, at least until it could be evaluated, and suggested that the study, which should take two years, be conducted by the University of Massachusetts School of Education.

Reactions

In October, at an alumni meeting of the Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary of Yeshiva University, acting New York school superintendent Dr. Nathan Brown warned that the exodus of Jews from New York could turn the city into a "series of ghettos with the police protecting one group from another." He urged rabbis to help run the school system, rather than abandon the city and their responsibilities. He said rabbis had a great stake in school reorganization because the majority of Jewish children, some 500,000, attended public schools, and that the only way to successfully fight school-power politics was to involve parents in the educational process.

According to David K. Cohen writing in *Commentary*,⁵ "a good deal has been made of the various ways in which decentralization and community control will improve achievement, but a review of what we know turns up confused, contradictory or discouraging evidence. This does not mean that greater openness, and more accountability are not worth-while goals." Cohen concluded that "if one were guided solely by the research on achievement and attitudes, one would not employ community control or decentralization as the device most likely to reduce racial disparities in achievement."

Naomi Levine and Richard Cohen saw the basic issues in decentralization as the realignment of power—economic and political—and questioned the wisdom or propriety of encouraging its redistribution along racial lines, which did not concern education as such.

Will the realignment of power along lines of color operate in such a way as to socially stratify society and thus isolate the black community even more rigidly and deny it access and free exchange with white society?⁶

JEWISH-NEGRO TENSIONS

In late November, Louis Harris and Associates, in association with the Sarah Lawrence College Institute of Community Studies, issued *Sources of Racial and Religious Tensions in New York City*, a Ford Foundation-sponsored study of Negro-Jewish tensions. It found that Negroes agreed with negative statements about Jews in larger proportion than other segments of the population. However, their attitude was interpreted as not specifically anti-Jewish, but as a special instance of anti-white feeling. The study also found a polarization within the Jewish community: the wealthier, younger, better educated, and nonaffiliated Jews were generally more sympathetic to the Negroes and less concerned with antisemitism than the older, less educated, and Orthodox Jews. The authors found that, on the whole, "The traditional reputation of Jewish support of the underdog, no matter what his color, race or national origin, has been shaken to the core among segments of the community."

VANDALISM

June: Rocks were thrown through the windows of Rockaways Temple Young Israel. Earlier, swastikas had been painted on the walls of the building.

The West Bronx Center of Religious Zionists was destroyed by fire; arson was suspected.

⁵ David K. Cohen, "The Price of Community Control," *Commentary*, July 1969, p. 28.

⁶ Naomi Levine (with Richard Cohen), *Ocean Hill-Brownsville: Schools in Crisis*. (New York: Popular Library) p. 135.

October-November: Swastikas were painted on the doors of the Congregation B'nai Jacob in Flatbush and the Rego Park Jewish Center in Queens. *November:* An estimated thousand books were destroyed in a fire at Yeshiva Marbeatze Torah. Among them was a 600-year-old edition of Moses Maimonides's *Mishneh Torah*, which the *yeshivah's* rabbi had brought with him from Poland when he fled the Nazis in 1939.

January 1970: A fire at Congregation Ahvath Torah in the Bronx destroyed five Torah scrolls valued at more than \$2,000 each. The city fire marshall confirmed the suspicion of arson.

At the Flatbush Yeshiva's Joel Braverman High School, vandals painted a Black Panther slogan on the wall and paint-sprayed "Al Fatah" across a valuable mural depicting the twelve tribes of Israel.

In February 1970, following the rash of synagogue arson and vandalism, Assemblyman Albert H. Blumenthal asked that a report be made by the special police department unit, established by the Mayor in 1968 to investigate crimes against churches and synagogues in the city. "Such a report," Mr. Blumenthal said, "would enable us to assess the seriousness of these incidents and to make a determination as to whether there is a wave of such crimes, as many believe there is."

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE

The Jewish Defense League (JDL) headed by Rabbi Meir Kahane (formerly rabbi of the Traditional Synagogue in Rochdale Village, Queens) is a militant group that has taken upon itself the responsibility for the physical protection of Jews. It was organized in the summer of 1968 in response to what Kahane discerned as an upsurge of antisemitism resulting from the New York City school crisis, for which he blamed the black militants, radical Leftist groups like Students for a Democratic Society, and public officials whom he regards as too permissive toward both these groups. Kahane was editor of the *Jewish Press*, a weekly Orthodox-oriented Jewish newspaper, until October, when its publisher, Rabbi Sholom Klass, asked for his resignation. Klass said Kahane had made of JDL a "personal political club" which he used to wage a "campaign of vilification," especially against Mayor Lindsay, and that he was asked to resign as editor because he gave more time to JDL than to the newspaper.

The organization first began to attract attention toward the end of October, after JDL members thwarted a vandalism attempt at Montefiore cemetery. In February they picketed both the Metropolitan Museum of Art and Radio Station WBAI. The first was in protest against the "Harlem on My Mind" catalogue, the second against the reading of the poem "Antisemitism" by Leslie Campbell on the Julius Lester Show (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], pp. 78, 84).

The character of the organization was most dramatically revealed in May

when James Forman, the black militant who had made the rounds of the city's churches demanding reparations for the "crimes against the black people," announced that Temple Emanu-El would be his next stop. Thereupon Kahane vowed that Forman would not set foot in the temple, and that he would provide it with protection, however unsolicited and unwanted. Forman did not make an appearance, but pictures of JDL members brandishing lead pipes in front of Emanu-El were featured on the TV news reports and in the daily press. Kahane later ran a full-page ad in the *New York Times*, June 24, featuring that photograph with the rhetorical caption: "Is this any way for nice Jewish boys to behave?" to which the answer was:

Maybe. Maybe there are times when there is no other way to get across to the extremist that the Jew is not quite the patsy some think he is.

Maybe there is only one way to get across a clear response to people who threaten seizure of synagogues and extortion of money. Maybe nice Jewish boys do not always get through to people who threaten to carry teachers out in pine boxes and to burn down merchants' stores.

Maybe some people and organizations are too nice. Maybe in time of crisis Jewish boys should not be that nice. Maybe—just maybe—nice people build their own road to Auschwitz.

Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath, president of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, commenting on the Forman incident, said:

Jews carrying baseball bats and chains, standing in phalanxes, like goon squads, in front of synagogues, led by rabbis, are no less offensive and, in essence, no different from whites carrying robes and hoods, led by self-styled ministers of the Gospel, standing in front of burning crosses. Neither Jews nor Christians nor America need such "protectors." . . . This so called "Jewish" Defense League violates every ethic and tradition of Judaism and every concept of civil liberties and democratic process in American life.

Rabbi Kahane, in response, said the Defense League was a group "that believes Jewish defense is not a thing to be ashamed of. And men like James Forman (in New York, principal spokesman for the Black Manifesto) unfortunately understand the language of bats and chains far more clearly than sermons by Rabbi Eisendrath."

In the July 25 issue of *Reconstructionist*, Marnin Feinstein, a member of the faculty of City College of New York, reported that eight members of the Jewish Defense League appeared on the campus at the request of several City College groups, to attend a rally against the rumored capitulation on the part of the administration to all the black and Puerto Rican demands. Between 200-250 students attended the rally, and were quickly surrounded by a large group of black students, accompanied by non-student Black Panthers in African garb. Rabbi Kahane, who addressed the rally, was heckled and interrupted many times. Jewish students wearing yarmulkes were mocked, shouts of "Jewish Fascists," "Jew bastards" were heard from

various directions, while members of the JDL were threatened with death. "Were it not for the presence of police, a pitched battle would have been set off. The presence of so small a group of Jewish students at the rally once again suggested passivity and timidity in the face of potential violence, I believe, in keeping with *galut* mentalities," Feinstein wrote.

In September, after the JDL had staged demonstrations in front of the United Nations headquarters of the UAR, the League claimed that since Arab terrorists had tried to intimidate American Jews, they, the JDL, would hold the Arab diplomats "responsible for any actions of terror against Jews in this country."⁷ When asked on what basis the organization took it upon itself to defend world Jewry, Bertram Zweibon, general counsel for the JDL, said: "The people . . . Jews. We know what support we're getting from the people themselves."

In October, at a press conference called by a representative cross-section of the New York Jewish community, JDL was "resoundingly denounced" after the appearance of the full-page anti-Lindsay JDL ad: "WE REMEMBER DO YOU?—The Jews of New York Cannot Afford Four More Years of John Lindsay." Arthur J. Goldberg, then president of the American Jewish Committee, deplored the injection of racism into the campaign, and compared an appeal to racial antagonism in trying to win support for opposing a candidate to "crying fire in a crowded theater." American Jewish Congress's Howard Squadron denounced the ad as conducive to a "campaign of hatred and vilification." Dr. Bernard Mandelbaum, president of the Jewish Theological Seminary, criticized JDL for its "wicked, irresponsible talk." One voice raised in mild defense of JDL was that of Rabbi Louis Newman of Temple Rodeph Sholom in Manhattan, who said that, however mistaken the League was in its tactics, it "has sought to create a different image of Jews in the United States . . . we are not an acquiescent or supine people."

In November, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, representing 82 local Jewish community agencies and nine national groups, summed up the views of the responsible and experienced Jewish leadership in the United States:

The National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council . . . is opposed to vigilantism, whatever its auspices, and firmly rejects the paramilitary operations of the Jewish Defense League as destructive of public order and contributory to divisiveness and terror.

Jewish security—indeed, the security of any ethnic or racial group—does not lie in taking the law into one's own hands. That kind of simplistic approach to the complicated problems of our time can only produce warring groups, not solutions.

⁷ Jewish Telegraphic Agency, September 21, 1969.

On November 20 JDL requested \$100,000 of the major Jewish organizations in order to help staff its widely criticized "citizen patrols," and was promptly turned down. Arnold Forster, general counsel of the Anti-Defamation League, called the request "chutzpah." Edward Moldover, president of the New York chapter of the American Jewish Committee, said:

We prefer to put our faith in Police Commissioner Leary and New York's Finest to provide protection for the residents of our city. If there are needs for additional police protection, the way to achieve that is through duly established legal authorities, not through vigilante groups.

In December JDL staged a series of demonstrations outside the Soviet mission to the United Nations in protest against the alleged Soviet persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union. The demonstrations were denounced in Moscow by Chief Rabbi Yahudi Leib Levin, who said: "You cannot talk to the Soviet Union in that way. It is too strong a country."

Efforts by JDL to enroll members in Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Boston, and Montreal have been denounced by local Jewish community organizations.

STEVEN E. FRIEDER

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

THE CHANGE of administration in Washington in January 1969 was awaited in Israel and the Arab world with a mixture of hope and anxiety. The optimists in Jerusalem could point to the Republican campaign platform which recognized the "growing menace to Israel" from Soviet arms shipments to the Arabs, pledging United States provision of "countervailing help to Israel, such as supersonic fighters," to keep Israel's forces "at a commensurate strength" for its own protection, and to help keep peace in the region. Candidate Richard M. Nixon went even further in a campaign statement declaring that an exact balance was not enough to deter a potential aggressor, and that, therefore, "the balance must be tipped in Israel's favor." Moreover, President-elect Nixon, who was the first American chief executive to visit Israel, was impressed by Israel's security needs upon inspection of the Golan Heights shortly after the June 1967 war. In view of Nixon's record of militant anti-Communism, one could argue, he would naturally favor pro-Western Israel against Soviet-backed Arab states.

On the other hand, the pessimists in Jerusalem and the optimists in the Arab world could point to the fact that Nixon was not beholden to the "Jewish vote," since the overwhelming majority of Jewish electors supported his Democratic opponent, and Republican administrations traditionally favored business interests, including oil companies with heavy investments in the Arab world. The Arabs drew further encouragement from former Governor William W. Scranton's public recommendation for a "more even-handed" United States Middle East policy (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], pp. 102-103). Although Scranton reaffirmed American concern for Israel's security, his implied criticism of the Johnson administration for allegedly undermining American influence in the Arab world by too close identification with Israel was reminiscent of similar charges against the Truman administration by the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in 1953, and the resultant active courtship of the Arab states by the Eisenhower administration, in which Nixon had served as vice president.

President Nixon made it clear at his first press conference, on January 27, that he believed "we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast." He said his administration was giving top priority, possibly second only to Vietnam, to "the Mideast problem," and was open to suggestions for reducing the possibility of another explosion, which, he thought, "could involve, very well, a confrontation between the nuclear powers—which we want to avoid."

Four Power Talks

Among the suggestions on President Nixon's desk were a French proposal for Middle East talks among the United Nations representatives of the Big Four—Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union—and a new Soviet note of December 30, 1968 setting forth Moscow's position on a solution. Roger Vaurs, spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, explained on January 17 that the objective of the Big Four discussions was to "open the door to a settlement" by an agreement among the permanent Security Council members having interests in the Middle East on the implementation of the November 22, 1967 Council resolution. This seemed necessary in view of the impasse in Dr. Gunnar V. Jarring's efforts toward agreement among the parties to the conflict. Paris also was said to be concerned that, in the wake of Israel's retaliatory raid on the Beirut airport and the increasing militancy of the Palestinian commando groups, the relatively moderate and pro-Western Lebanon regime would be shaken, and that, if Palestinian extremists overthrew King Hussein in Jordan, the prospects for a peaceful settlement with Israel would be lost. While Washington shared these concerns, some observers believed that the initiative also reflected France's uneasiness at being left out of the bilateral exchanges between the American and Russian superpowers, as well as the desire to reassert its role as a major power in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

The Soviet note was interpreted as designed to achieve several objectives. Seeking to maintain the dialogue on the Middle East initiated during the Johnson administration, Moscow sprinkled its note with some apparently conciliatory, though ambiguously worded, phrases to show that it welcomed Nixon's desire to move from an era of cold-war confrontation to one of negotiation with the Russians. At the same time, Moscow was deeply concerned lest the Egyptians, out of desperation and impatience, launch a premature attack against Israel forces in Sinai that would bring another humiliating defeat for Soviet arms and diplomacy. Thus, the Soviet note, which followed Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko's visit to Cairo, also was designed to convince Egypt to rely on Moscow diplomacy to produce Great Power pressure for achieving the Arab objective of a complete Israeli withdrawal from all territories occupied in the June 1967 war. To this end, the Soviet note explicitly stated that "the situation which existed in May 1967 shall be restored."

ISRAEL'S OBJECTIONS

The Israelis quickly and categorically denounced the proposals for both the Big Four and Big Two talks. Jerusalem raised objections of principle to great powers imposing their will on small states and to any settlement not negotiated by the parties to the conflict. Israel Foreign Minister Abba Eban called the Soviet proposal a plan for dismantling Israel, commenting that an

imposed settlement was "like a warm frost with the contradiction built in—if it's imposed it's not a settlement." In practical terms, Israel feared a repetition of the situation in 1957, after the Sinai Campaign, when combined Soviet and American pressure forced Israel to withdraw without the achievement of lasting peace. It regarded the Big Four forum as no better than the Big Two, for, while Washington and London tried to be "even-handed," Paris was tightening the embargo on arms shipments to Israel and moving ever closer to Moscow's pro-Arab position.

One of the last acts of the Johnson administration, on January 15, was to send a reply to Moscow, after consultation with Secretary of State-designate William P. Rogers. It welcomed the expressed Soviet desire to aid Jarring's mission and to continue the Soviet-American exchange of views, but was critical of the Soviet position on many key issues. According to the text, published in the January 19 issue of the Cairo *al-Ahram*, the note also declared that the United States considered it "a matter of highest priority" that the Soviet Union and other states join in using "all their influence to stop the grave increase of Arab terrorist operations in the area, since terrorist operations inevitably lead to retaliatory operations." The terrorist acts "supported or permitted by some governments, and the retaliatory acts raised by them constitute a serious violation" of the UN cease-fire resolutions and jeopardized the prospects of peace. The American note also expressed regret over Soviet refusal to reach an agreement on limiting arms shipments to the Middle East, a question that Washington said should be considered "an indispensable element in the peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis."

EGYPT'S OPPOSITION

Al-Ahram, which frequently reflects the views of UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser, denounced the American note and declared that President Johnson, "more hated than any other modern politician, has ended his rule in an anti-Arab stance, a stance that invites more than hatred." The paper highlighted reports of Rogers' stand that he merely took note of Johnson's reply to Moscow but did not go so far as to approve it. On its front page it also published a letter from Nixon reciprocating Nasser's New Year's wishes and promising to do his best to bring "justice, security and peace to all humanity."

On March 4 President Nixon indicated that he achieved "substantial progress" in his talks with French President Charles de Gaulle and other European leaders in bringing the British and French Middle East positions closer to that of the United States. He added that his talks with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin led him to be "cautiously hopeful" that the Soviet Union might "possibly play a peace-making role in the Mideast." He acknowledged that Moscow's policy was ambivalent; for without Soviet rearming of Israel's neighbors, "there would be no crisis there." Yet, while

Moscow was providing arms to potential belligerents, it also recognized that a conflict could easily get out of control. It was this fear of escalation that was giving the Russians second thoughts, since "the Soviet Union does not want a confrontation with the United States any more than we want one with them." He intended to do all he could to develop this understanding with Moscow, Nixon added, because "without the Soviet Union's cooperation, the Mideast is going to continue to be a terribly dangerous area if you continue to pour fuel on those fires of hatred that exist on the borders of Israel."

U.S. CLARIFICATION

Announcing that the United States had agreed to Four Power talks at the United Nations, Nixon emphasized that the powers "cannot dictate a settlement in the Middle East. The time has passed in which great nations can dictate to small nations their future, where their vital interests are involved." The role of the outside powers would be "to indicate those areas where they believe the parties directly involved in the Middle East could have profitable discussions" and to provide "a major-power guarantee of the settlement" reached.

When, in mid-March, Eban conveyed to Nixon Israel's concern at the prospect of a direct Soviet military role in the guise of guaranteeing a settlement, U.S. officials let it be known that the president did not necessarily mean a Four Power military guarantee, but some form of moral or political endorsement by the powers, or possibly the stationing of United Nations forces. However, Eban was unable to persuade the United States to forego the projected Four Power talks. On March 30 the Israel cabinet declared it "entirely opposes" the talks by outside powers and "any settlement and any procedure that is not agreed upon" by the parties. It noted that, only a few days earlier, Nasser reiterated Arab refusal to recognize Israel, to negotiate with it or to make peace with it, and that, consequently, the Four Power procedure "undermines" the responsibility of the Middle East states to attain peace among themselves.

The first formal session of the Big Four talks began on April 3 in New York, at the home of Armand Bérard, France's permanent representative to the UN. At his press conference on April 7, Secretary Rogers expressed regret that Israel was so strongly opposed to the idea of the Four Power talks and reiterated that the United States had made it "perfectly clear" to Israel's government that "we do not intend and will not seek to impose a settlement on Israel." He said that the United States would continue the talks in the hope of getting the parties to reconcile their differences. When a reporter asked how he expected to influence them without appearing to be imposing something on them, Rogers replied that he believed "the force of reasoning and the force of public opinion has a lot to do with influencing nations." He

thought that "if the world community should agree on a certain general formula" for a Middle East settlement, the governments in the area "would want to think long and hard before they turned it down." This answer seemed to confirm the fears of the Israelis, who saw it as a veiled hint of American pressure in the event they disagreed with whatever settlement the powers might devise. Rogers acknowledged that "somewhere down the road there will have to be some direct negotiations between the parties" to agree on the terms of the settlement; but the Israelis were far from reassured.

Hussein's U.S. Visit

It was considered by no means coincidental that Rogers gave his most explicit endorsement to the Four Power efforts at the same time that he reminded the press of the arrival of Jordan's King Hussein in Washington the following day. Calling the king "a close friend of the United States for many years," Rogers praised him for having "played a major and constructive role in the search for peace in the Middle East." On Hussein's arrival, President Nixon hailed him as a man of "courage, wisdom and moderation." Hussein replied by urging a move "within the very near future" toward a just and honorable peace, or "we might, indeed, lose the chance." In a speech before the National Press Club, on April 10, Hussein presented a six-point peace plan which, he claimed, had the support of Nasser. While his points closely followed those outlined in the November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution, he explicitly advocated for the first time "guarantees for all of free navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and Suez Canal." In return, the king said, "our sole demand upon Israel is the withdrawal of its armed forces from all territories occupied in the June, 1967 war and the implementation of all other provisions of the Security Council resolution." Nasser was more circumspect in an interview with Clifton Daniels of the *New York Times*. When asked to comment on Hussein's address, Nasser would only say that, once Israel agreed to implement fully all points of the resolution and after Israel granted all Palestinian Arab refugees the right to return, "well, so they will have free passage in the Suez Canal." Shortly before Hussein's statement, both Jordan and Egypt responded to a questionnaire from Ambassador Jarring on their peace terms by stating that the 1947 partition plan—which gave Israel one-third less land than even the 1949 armistice lines—provided the only internationally recognized formula for secure borders.

When Hussein was questioned by UN correspondents about the complete rejection by several Palestinian commando groups of the UN resolution and his peace efforts, he acknowledged that this was a problem, but he was confident that "if it is not too late, the overwhelming majority of our people will come along with us."

By emphasizing that time was running out, Hussein appealed to Washington's desire to strengthen his hand, and that of other "moderates" in the

Arab world, against the challenge of extremist elements at home and the appeal of radical, Soviet-supported states like Syria and Iraq, which refused to consider any peaceful accommodation with Israel. During his visit to Washington, Hussein also obtained American approval of his request for \$30 million in arms, including a second squadron of 18 F-104 jet interceptors, armored personnel carriers and communications equipment. Administration sources tried to minimize the military significance of the transaction by pointing out that the first squadron of planes, ordered in 1966, would only be delivered in the latter part of 1969; that Jordan was still short of pilots; that the 50 Phantom jets Israel was beginning to receive under the agreement concluded at the end of the Johnson administration were superior, and that, in deference to Israel objections, Washington declined to sell tanks to Jordan. The arms deal was regarded by both American and Jordanian officials primarily as a symbolic gesture of United States support for the king, designed to bolster his standing among his officer corps, which had been pressing for new weapons.

Foreign Minister Eban dismissed Hussein's plan as containing nothing new, and pointed out that the Security Council resolution was not self-implementing and that until direct Arab-Israel talks took place there would be only "polemics, propaganda and public relations," but no real progress toward peace. Hussein responded, in an interview in New York, that it was "now up to the Big Powers to convince the Israelis that their attitude must change."

Egypt's War of Attrition

President Nasser, too, sought to bring great power pressure to bear on Israel; but, while Hussein's tactic was to appear moderate and reasonable to the West, Nasser decided to play upon the superpowers' expressed fears of a new military explosion. Accordingly, in the beginning of April, the Egyptians began intensive daily shelling of Israel positions across the Suez Canal, using artillery, mortars, and tanks. Egyptian army commando units crossed the waterway to attack Israel positions in Sinai; Nasser announced that Egypt now felt strong enough to launch a "war of attrition" against the Israeli occupying forces, and reiterated that Egypt was determined to liberate eventually "every inch" of occupied territory; Egyptian government spokesman Dr. Mohammed Hassan al-Zayyat denounced the Suez Canal cease-fire line, explaining that the UN cease-fire decisions "cannot remain in force forever." UN Secretary-General U Thant warned the Security Council on April 21 that a virtual state of active war existed in the Canal area. Many press reports speculated on the imminence of a full-scale war. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey voiced American "concern" over Egyptian rejection of the UN cease-fire resolution as a "retrogressive" step, and Washington appealed to Cairo through diplomatic channels to restore the cease-fire along the canal.

Israel Defense Minister Moshe Dayan dismissed the Egyptian attacks as "fireworks" which could not alter the basic military and political situation. Israel responded by calling in its "airborne artillery," and successive raids by its fighter-bombers knocked out many of the Egyptian artillery positions along the Canal, thereby greatly reducing Israel's casualty rates; crippled Egypt's radar network; and struck with impunity at military targets deep in Egypt. By the end of the year, Israel's command of the skies and occasional daring commando raids against a variety of Egyptian installations convinced the outside world, if not the Egyptians, that Nasser was incapable of launching anything but a purely suicidal raid in the near future, and that the war of attrition failed to dislodge the Israelis from the June 1967 cease-fire lines.

Congressional Support for Direct Negotiations

On the occasion of Israel's 21st anniversary, Senators Hugh Scott (R.-Pa.) and Abraham Ribicoff (D.-N.Y.) sponsored a Congressional Declaration for Peace in the Middle East. The bipartisan statement, endorsed by a majority of both houses of Congress, called upon the leaders of the Arab states to meet the Israelis "in face-to-face negotiations," and voiced opposition to "any attempt by outside powers to impose halfway measures not conducive to permanent peace." It advocated United States' opposition to "all pressures upon Israel to withdraw prematurely and unconditionally from any of the territories which Israel now administers," in the absence of direct negotiations and a contractual peace settlement.

While mindful of these criticisms, the administration was not prepared to abandon its efforts to reach agreement with the other powers on the main elements of a settlement. The discussions among the four UN ambassadors in New York were paralleled by talks in Washington between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and Joseph J. Sisco, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs. On May 26, the United States submitted a set of basic principles to Moscow for acceptance by the Soviet Union and its Arab allies. They asked that peace be restored through a comprehensive agreement as a single package, not in separate phases; that the accord be "contractual" among the parties themselves, not imposed from outside; that the frontiers should not "reflect the weight of conquest," but that they must be agreed upon by the Arab states and Israel, not defined by the Great Powers. The Soviet reply received on June 17, after Gromyko consulted with Nasser, was a "disappointment" to American officials. While agreeing to maintain contacts, it emphasized Egyptian objection to any direct negotiations with Israel, any territorial concessions whatsoever, or any separate settlement not acceptable to the Palestinian refugees. The note's terms were considerably stiffer than expected after Dobrynin's alleged relative flexibility in oral discussions with Sisco. This led to speculation in Washington that either Soviet influence on the Egyptians had been overestimated and Cairo had in fact

exercised a veto over Moscow, or that the Russians were far less eager for a settlement than the optimists had anticipated. At his news conference on June 19, President Nixon conceded that "I would have to admit that I see very little defusing" of Middle East tensions.

Sisco went to Moscow in mid-July to pursue the discussions with Gromyko and other Soviet officials and to urge upon them the need to curb the supply of arms to the region, but he made little headway. The distance between the two superpowers was revealed at the UN. President Nixon told the UN General Assembly on September 18 that the United States was convinced peace in the Middle East required "a binding, irrevocable commitment by the parties," that peace, to be lasting, "must leave no seeds of a future war," and therefore "cannot be achieved on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the Middle East." Turning to the role of the outside powers, Nixon suggested that "failing a settlement," an agreement to limit arms shipments to the area "might help to stabilize the situation," but that United States efforts to induce the Soviet Union to enter discussions on such limitations had been "without result." The following day, Gromyko rejected Nixon's suggestion, telling the Assembly that discussion of arms limitation "cannot serve any useful purpose so long as the Israeli troops occupy the territories of the Arab countries."

Rhodes Formula

Hopes for a negotiated settlement were raised briefly in mid-September, when Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad told the New York press that, if Israel renounced "expansionism," the United Arab Republic would be willing to utilize again "the procedures followed at Rhodes in 1949" that led to the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement. The press immediately hailed the statement as heralding an important shift to flexibility in Egyptian policy from the intransigent Khartoum summit rejection of any negotiation with Israel. Riad's acceptance of the "Rhodes formula" was no spur-of-the-moment slip of the tongue, for he first volunteered the suggestion in a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers an hour earlier, and, finding favorable response, agreed to make it public. That evening the Rhodes formula was endorsed by Gromyko in talks with Rogers. Dobrynin and Sisco were instructed to put the understanding in writing, and they agreed to include the following clause in the draft treaty they would submit to Israel and Egypt: "Israel and the United Arab Republic agree that their representatives under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring will utilize the procedures followed at Rhodes in 1949."

Hopes for peace were shattered twenty-four hours later, when Cairo insisted that there had been no direct negotiations at Rhodes; that Jarring's shuttling back and forth between Cairo and Jerusalem was the same procedure as at Rhodes, and that this was all Riad had in mind. The Israelis responded that they would be perfectly willing to follow the Rhodes formula,

and proved by old UN documents that there had indeed been face-to-face Egyptian-Israeli talks at Rhodes. Cables from UN mediator Ralph Bunche to Secretary-General Trygve Lie revealed that Bunche had met with each delegation separately on January 12, 1949, and that the following day the first joint meeting was held, at which the head of each delegation "made a formal declaration of his government's desire for the establishment of an armistice and pledging his delegation to work persistently and in a spirit of conciliation." Bunche utilized three types of procedure: separate preliminary discussions with each delegation, informal meetings between heads of delegations and the UN representative, and joint formal meetings of the two delegations. Israel Ambassador to Washington Yitzhak Rabin, who had been a member of Israel's delegation at Rhodes, recalled that the three kinds of meetings took place concurrently, "the joint exchanges being held invariably around a single table."

To the American and Soviet diplomats the Rhodes formula seemed a good way of saving face for all: the Egyptians could say that negotiations with Israel were not direct because a UN official was present; the Israelis could point to the presence of Egyptian and Israeli negotiators in the same room and the subsequent Egyptian and Israeli signatures on any agreement reached as proof that it was negotiated by the parties directly involved. Of course, the condition for success was that both sides were in fact eager for a negotiated settlement and were held back only by the absence of an acceptable formula. On October 11 *al-Ahram* made it clear that Cairo completely backtracked from Riad's statement: Egypt would not accept "the Rhodes formula or any other formula involving direct or indirect negotiations with Israel." The paper contended that Jarring's mission merely was to set a timetable for Israel's withdrawal and the implementation of the others terms of the November 1967 resolution, and that no negotiations were necessary. Some Middle East observers questioned the sincerity of Riad's initial statement, noting that his seemingly conciliatory comment may have been intended only as a public-relations ploy to counteract the favorable American reaction to Prime Minister Golda Meir, who was due to arrive in Washington on that day on an official state visit.

Mrs. Meir's Visit

Mrs. Meir was received at the White House on September 25 with full honors, including a formal state dinner, and warm words of greeting from President Nixon. He expressed the hope that Mrs. Meir would succeed in bringing a lasting peace to the people of Israel, a "brave and courageous" people. Nixon spoke of the Israelis' "immense military burden," of "the tremendous budget they have to bear," and of their success in developing an arid land, despite all obstacles. He had personally seen Israel's technical assistance programs in other continents, he said, and "this kind of genius,

this kind of ability, is very rare in the world" and "desperately needed for the works of peace."

Mrs. Meir had two lengthy private meetings with President Nixon and a talk with Secretary Rogers. There was no official communiqué at the end of the two-day visit, and no announcement of any specific new American commitment. Mrs. Meir reportedly requested some 25 additional Phantom jets and 100 of the slower Skyhawks; long-term credit to ease the burden of paying for matériel already being delivered, and substantial new economic assistance. Mrs. Meir declared that she was going home "with a lighter heart than when I came," for she found friendship and reaffirmation that the United States "feels that the existence of Israel is important" and would help it overcome the many obstacles to peace. But she failed to convince the administration to abandon the Four Power talks. Mrs. Meir was later greeted with tumultuous welcome and enthusiastic outpouring of friendship in Philadelphia, New York, Los Angeles, and in her hometown, Milwaukee. In New York Mayor John V. Lindsay welcomed Mrs. Meir at the airport and at a City Hall reception, and hosted the most lavish dinner in the city's history for a visiting foreign guest.

Middle East and Vietnam

An attempt by Israel's prime minister to underscore the basic agreement between the United States and Israel on foreign policy principles was not completely successful. President Nixon had mentioned Middle East tensions in passing in his major speech, on November 3, justifying his Vietnam policy. "Precipitate withdrawal" of American troops from South Vietnam, he said, would set off violence "wherever our commitments help maintain peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western hemisphere. A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends." On November 7 Mrs. Meir congratulated Nixon on his "meaningful speech," noting that it "contains much that encourages and strengthens freedom-loving small nations the world over, which are striving to maintain their independent existence looking to that great democracy, the United States of America." The White House released her message and Nixon's reply that he "deeply appreciated" her "thoughtful message."

Mrs. Meir's letter drew criticism from American Jews who were active in the peace movement. They noted that the Israel government had scrupulously resisted President Johnson's efforts to obtain endorsement for his Vietnam policy, and they contended that Mrs. Meir's statement was a gratuitous intrusion into a domestic controversy that would alienate possible supporters of Israel. Mrs. Meir's defenders pointed out that she did not deal with the merits of Nixon's policy, but only expressed "her hope that he will speedily succeed in bringing about peace in Vietnam." Israel also was legitimately concerned that the anti-Vietnam war sentiment in the United States might lead the administration to adopt a neo-isolationist policy of refusing to

honor its commitment to any distant small state, such as Israel. Mrs. Meir reacted to President Nixon's reassurances on this point, rather than to his statement on Vietnam. Some political commentators saw in the note a more concrete quid pro quo. Nick Thimmesch, Washington columnist for *Newsday*, said Mrs. Meir "developed a personal sympathy" for Nixon during her Washington visit, and that she also was "shrewd enough to know that her support of Nixon's Vietnam policy is a welcome tonic for the President," which could be repaid by a delivery of even more Phantom jets.

U.S. Peace Proposals

Meanwhile, the Israelis were becoming increasingly concerned over developments in the Great Power talks, as the feeling grew in Jerusalem that Israel no longer enjoyed Washington's full confidence as it did during the Johnson administration. On October 28 the United States submitted to the Soviet Union a working paper containing detailed proposals for a draft agreement between Israel and Egypt. Mrs. Meir complained that the proposals were handed to Israel only some six weeks later. Within the framework of the Big Four talks, the United States submitted similarly detailed proposals on October 18 for a settlement between Israel and Jordan. A copy was given Israel the same day. Foreign Minister Eban expressed surprise that the document was not shown to him before, since he met with Secretary Rogers only two days earlier. State Department officials contended the Israelis were unjustifiably upset, for the proposals allegedly contained nothing that had not already been discussed with Israel representatives.

The American-Israeli disagreement might have remained unpublicized but for the fact that Secretary Rogers, in a lengthy talk on American policy for achieving peace in the Middle East (December 9), spelled out in considerable detail the main points of the still confidential American proposals. Rogers explained that the danger of a new Middle East conflict and the belief that the parties to the Arab-Israel dispute "alone would not be able to overcome their legacy of suspicion" convinced the United States of its responsibility "to play a direct role in seeking a solution." He said that, therefore, the United States accepted the suggestion of both the French government and UN Secretary-General Thant for Four Power talks to aid Jarring's efforts, and also pursued bilateral talks with the Soviets. Rogers stressed that the United States had acted "in full recognition" of four basic factors:

First, Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. The efforts of major powers can help: they can provide a catalyst, they can stimulate the parties to talk, they can encourage, they can define a realistic framework for agreement, but an agreement among other powers cannot be a substitute for agreement among the parties themselves.

Second, a durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Third, the only framework for a negotiated settlement was in accordance with the entire text of the [November 1967] UN Security Council resolution.

Fourth, . . . a protracted period of no war, no peace, recurrent violence, and spreading chaos would serve the interest of no nation, in or out of the Middle East.

Referring to the bilateral Soviet-American talks, Rogers said, "we are under no illusions; we are fully conscious of past difficulties and present realities." Despite a measure of mutual understanding achieved in the talks, he said, "very substantial differences remain." He expressed regret over the Soviet delay in responding to the "new formulations" submitted to them in the October 28 American note, and he reiterated Washington's intention to continue discussing Middle East problems with Moscow as long as there was "any realistic hope that such discussions might further the cause of peace."

Secretary Rogers denied that the United States was partisan to either side in the conflict, and insisted that its approach was "*balanced* and fair" (Rogers' emphasis). He added that the United States would "not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides."

The balanced American policy was to encourage the Arabs "to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement" and to urge the Israelis "to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured." As Rogers predicted, his proposals were quickly attacked from both sides.

Arab and Israeli Reactions

The Arabs objected to: 1) Rogers' insistence on "a binding and specific commitment" by the Arab states and Israel "to peace with each other, with all the specific obligations spelled out, including the obligation to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories"—an allusion to the terrorist activities of the Palestinian commando groups; 2) his statement that the parties themselves would be required to negotiate the practical security arrangements on the ground, and that Ambassador Jarring's role was to "engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula"; 3) his recognition that Israel's navigation rights in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran "should be spelled out"; 4) his reiteration that withdrawal of Israel forces would begin "only after complete agreement had been reached" on all aspects of the overall settlement.

Although the Arabs considered all these points as evidence of America's continued pro-Israel bias, the Israelis themselves were far from reassured. Mrs. Meir accused the United States of "moralizing" and unjustly balancing the intentions of the two sides, even though Israel sought peace and the Arabs were preparing for a new war. She objected to the detail in which Rogers spelled out the proposed terms of settlement, leaving the parties very little to negotiate and, in effect, undermining Israel's bargaining rights on matters vital to its security.

Jerusalem further contended there had been an "erosion" of the American position. On the key question of the location of the secure and recognized borders called for in the Security Council resolution, President Johnson had emphasized there could be no return to the June 4, 1967 situation, and only said the new lines "should not reflect the weight of conquest." In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 27, 1969, Rogers maintained that "rectifications from the pre-existing lines should be confined to those required for mutual security and should not reflect the weight of conquest." In September President Nixon told the UN that there should be no "substantial alterations in the map of the Middle East." On December 9 Rogers went out of his way to emphasize that "we do not support expansionism" and declared "any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security."

These mutually agreed "insubstantial" alterations were to apply only to the Jordan-Israel frontier. And while earlier diplomatic formulations of the U.S. position on the Egypt-Israel border stated that the old international frontier was not necessarily precluded from consideration, Rogers now explicitly declared that the U.S. proposed settlement "would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory to the international border between Israel [or Mandated Palestine] and Egypt." Israel and Egypt would negotiate only such questions as demilitarized zones and security safeguards relating to Sharm al-Shaykh, which controls the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. The future of the Gaza Strip was to be agreed upon among Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. The only frontier to which Rogers made no reference was the Israel-occupied Golan Heights, presumably because Syria rejected the November 1967 Security Council resolution and refused even to talk with Dr. Jarring.

The Israelis pointed to the increasingly restrictive American interpretations of border revisions as proof of their fears that, in the process of Big Two and Big Four talks, the United States would make ever greater concessions at Israel's expense in the hope of winning Soviet agreement. This, the Israel Embassy in Washington declared, would encourage the Arabs to maintain their intransigent refusal to negotiate with Israel, since they would naturally view "the concessions as a gesture of appeasement and as a license for further diplomatic and military escalation." However, State Department officials denied any fundamental shift in American policy and claimed Rogers merely gave greater precision to long established American positions.

Jerusalem and Refugee Settlement

The Israelis were also unhappy about Rogers' explicit comments on Jerusalem and the refugee problem. While he indicated that Jerusalem should remain a unified city, as the Israelis wished, he also said that the final status of the city should be determined primarily "by the governments of Israel

and Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and the international community." The Israel government had long declared its readiness to allow persons of all faiths free access to the holy places, with the respective religious authorities supervising their own sites. However, the Israel government expressed strong opposition to Rogers' proposal that there be "roles" for "Jordan in the civic, economic, and religious life of the city."

On the refugee question Rogers went beyond the Security Council resolution's general call for a "just settlement." He emphasized that the settlement "must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area." This was spelled out in the Jordan-Israel draft agreement submitted by the United States to the Big Four on December 18. Both parties would be asked to accept the principle that refugees of the 1948 war "would have the choice between repatriation to Israel and resettlement with compensation." In order to implement this settlement, the parties would agree on "mutually acceptable procedures" for repatriation and resettlement, including "the number to be repatriated and resettled annually in order to carry out the decisions of the United Nations with respect to the Palestinian refugees." The practical details were to be worked out by Jordan and Israel under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, who also was authorized to ask the participation of such other states as Egypt, should he consider it "desirable and necessary." If the parties agreed, and Ambassador Jarring considered it "desirable," an international commission would be established "to ascertain the choice of the refugees." The first group of refugees was to arrive in Israel within three months of the implementation of the final accord between Israel and Jordan.

On December 29 Mrs. Meir told the Knesset that the adoption of American proposals on borders and refugees would constitute "a grave danger to our very existence." This "return to the geography of 1967 and the demography of 1947," she charged, would give the Arab terrorist organizations the choice of deciding whether to shell Israel from the other side of vulnerable borders, or to attack it from within after having returned as refugees.

American officials considered the Israeli fears exaggerated, arguing that the great majority of refugees would choose to be resettled and that no refugees would be returned without agreement by Israel, which could exercise veto power over security risks. Israel officials countered by questioning the possibility of ascertaining the free choice of the embittered refugees; they also feared that, despite Israel's theoretical veto power, the international commission to be established would generate tremendous pressure on Israel to yield.

Fears of Imposed Settlement

Going deeper than the disagreement between Jerusalem and Washington over the terms of a peace settlement was a growing concern in Israel and

among American Jews that the United States would be tempted to use the economic and military assistance Israel requested as a lever for forcing Israel to make concessions. There were recurrent press reports that American businessmen with oil and other interests in the Arab world were urging such a course upon the administration. Concern over this was voiced to Secretary Rogers on December 22 by a delegation of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations and the American Jewish Committee. Rogers sought to reassure the Jewish leaders that the United States did not intend to impose a settlement, a point he reaffirmed the next day at his press conference. He added that there "is no linkage" between Israel's requests for additional aid and Israel's attitude to the U.S. proposals, that the United States was considering Israel's aid request carefully "in full realization that we have an obligation, as do the other nations in the United Nations, to support the sovereignty of Israel and its future security."

But, while there may have been no formal linkage, the timing and content of the Rogers speech made it apparent that the United States was very much concerned about the general political climate in the Middle East as well as the broader Soviet-American relationship. Rogers explained at his press conference that the United States decided to make public the essentials of its private diplomatic efforts "because our position was being distorted in some parts of the world." In his speech Rogers specifically mentioned, and denounced as false, the allegations that the United States sought to divide the Arab states by urging the UAR to make a separate peace.

Arab Anti-American Propaganda

Washington also was angered by the intensified propaganda drive launched by Egypt in October against the United States and pro-Western Arab states, which charged, among other things, that United States military advisers were serving with the Israel armed forces and that the United States was encouraging Americans to fight for Israel. These charges were repeated even after the State Department issued several official denials explaining that, while a recent Supreme Court decision ruled that Americans did not automatically lose their United States citizenship if they voted in a foreign election or were drafted into a foreign army, the United States government actively discouraged service by Americans in any foreign army; that persons doing so might be subject to fine or imprisonment under existing American statutes. The United States embassy in Tel Aviv estimated that only about 100 American Jews, who settled in Israel but retained their United States citizenship, were serving in the Israel Army. Nevertheless, official Arab propaganda agencies asserted that "American soldiers" were establishing a settlement near Jerusalem and were responsible for a rocket attack on the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Beirut in October. Under the heading, "Will the Middle East Turn Into Another Vietnam?", the Arab Information Center, agent of the Arab League in the United States, pub-

lished an ad in the *New York Times* on November 7, charging the United States with giving "open encouragement" to Americans to fight in Israel, and warning that this growing involvement "will lead to another Vietnam in the Middle East." The ad concluded with a question set in large bold-face: "Do you want your American boys to perish on the battlefields of the Middle East?" Some Middle East specialists believed there was an even more ominous motive behind the Arab propaganda campaign, namely, to justify to the Arab masses and the world, Nasser's decision to request several thousand more Soviet military "advisers."

Anwar al-Sadat, a top aide of President Nasser, called the United States "our enemy No. 1," told a public rally of Egypt's ruling Arab Socialist Union in October that "thousands of Americans" served in the Israeli forces, and predicted "growing U.S. aggressiveness."

Despite Cairo's hostile propaganda, Rogers was conciliatory: In his December 9 speech he declared that "whenever and wherever Arab states which have broken off diplomatic relations with the United States are prepared to restore them, we shall respond in the same spirit." The speech also was intended to shore up the remaining pro-Western regimes in the Arab world by demonstrating that the United States was balanced in its Middle East policy, thereby enabling them to justify to their own people their continued friendly relations with Washington.

Libyan Coup

The overthrow of the conservative monarchy in Libya on September 1 by a group of radical young officers friendly to Egypt was followed by a series of acts weakening American and British influence in the country. The army officers called for accelerating plans to close down the Wheelus Air Force Base outside Tripoli, the last remaining American Strategic Air Command base in the Arab world, and denounced foreign economic domination of the country. However, while the new regime adopted a militantly anti-Israel posture and moved to coordinate Libya's economic and political policy with that of Egypt and the Sudan, at the end of the year Libya's rulers had second thoughts about expropriating the foreign oil concessions, and American companies were encouraged to maintain their operations.

The Libyans also concluded a large-scale arms agreement with France under which Paris was to supply 110 supersonic Mirage jets. Washington was concerned over this new escalation in the arms race, since the number of aircraft was considered far beyond Libya's own needs, and Egyptian military advisers accompanied the Libyan purchasing mission. After an unsuccessful attempt to conceal, and then to minimize, the size of the deal, the French argued that it was preferable for the Libyans to turn to Paris, rather than to Moscow, for its arms.

Lebanon's Dilemma

Meanwhile, the increasing militancy and open activity of Palestinian commando groups in Lebanon posed a harsh dilemma for the moderate pro-Western government in Beirut. If armed commandos, who were predominantly Muslim Palestinians, were permitted to operate freely within Lebanon, they would constitute both a threat to the tenuous Christian-Muslim balance within the country and an invitation to the Israelis to retaliate against Lebanon for harboring the marauding terrorist bands. But if the small and mainly Christian-officered Lebanese army was ordered to crush the Palestinians, Lebanon faced the danger of a new civil war in which Egypt and Syria would be tempted again to back the more radical Muslim and Palestinian elements, as they did in 1958. There had already been brief but bloody clashes between government forces and Palestinian commandos and refugees in April.

When Assistant Secretary of State Sisco was asked, after a speech to the Middle East Institute in Washington on October 10, about the Lebanese situation and the possibility of Israel retaliation against commando bases in southern Lebanon, he declared that the United States attached "great importance to Lebanese independence and integrity" and that "we would view with great concern any threat to that integrity from any source." He added that the United States had "very warm friendship" for Lebanon and highly valued that country's "open and democratic society." After the Sisco statement was widely disseminated by the U.S. Information Service in Beirut, it was welcomed by conservative, Christian elements in Lebanon, and denounced as unwarranted American intervention by the Left and by Moscow, Cairo, and Damascus propaganda organs.

When, in October, a series of increasingly bloody clashes between the Palestinian guerrillas and Lebanese government forces threatened to escalate into a full-scale war that neither side wanted, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat and the Lebanese Commander in Chief, General Emile Bustani, met in Cairo and, with Egyptian mediation, concluded a secret compromise agreement on November 3. Nasser praised the agreement as "preventing a catastrophe for the Arab world." However, as the year ended, the situation was one of a tense and tenuous truce, with dispute continuing over the rights and restrictions of Palestinian commando groups. In Jordan, too, the Palestinians were increasingly obtaining quasi-official autonomy for their activities and further restricting Hussein's freedom of action.

Arab Disunity at Rabat

If the pro-Western regimes were under attack, the radical regimes had their failures as well. Syria and Iraq continued to be torn by internal turmoil, and the mid-December Arab League summit conference in Rabat broke up in open disagreement without a final communiqué. Arafat was

unable to obtain the large financial aid he had requested for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia resisted Nasser's demand that he and other oil-rich conservative Arab states substantially increase their subsidy to Egypt and the unified military command. American policy in general, and Rogers' speech in particular, were credited with, and blamed for, the Rabat fiasco. Although the conference did not formally abandon the earlier Khartoum decision barring direct Arab negotiation with, or recognition of, Israel, it also failed to endorse the extremist call for a new war and an end to diplomatic efforts for a solution.

Soviet Intransigence

The Arabs thus left the door slightly open to a political settlement; but the formal Soviet reply on December 23 to the American proposals of October 28 were a disappointment to Washington. Moscow denounced the American plan as "one-sided" and "pro-Israeli." While the Soviet note grudgingly acknowledged that the various American concessions which had angered Israel reflected "certain progress," it made no concessions on its part, and only demanded further changes for the benefit of the Arab states. American officials were particularly disturbed over the apparent Soviet "retreat" even from positions on which there had earlier been firm Soviet-American agreement. For example, the Soviet note now said that "it would not be expedient" to move toward Arab-Israeli contacts through Dr. Jarring "in view of the sharp differences which have recently emerged in interpretation by the sides of the so-called 'Rhodes formula.'" Washington saw this as distressing evidence that Moscow was unwilling to use its influence to bring the Egyptians to moderation, and instead yielded to Egyptian intransigence. There was no sign at year's end that Russia was eager for a genuine Arab-Israeli peace.

INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

If the Great Powers failed to achieve a fundamental political settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict during 1969, the United Nations was equally ineffective in preventing violations of the 1967 cease-fire agreements, in safeguarding the fundamental human rights of the Jewish minorities in certain Arab countries, or in bringing the Arab refugee problem any closer to a solution.

In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the United Nations, issued in mid-September, Secretary-General U Thant grimly noted that, despite all UN efforts to restore the cease-fire, a virtual state of war existed in the Suez Canal region, and "the prospect of even a first step towards a peaceful settlement now seems still remote." This situation, he acknowledged, created a considerable "crisis of effectiveness for the United Nations." He warned that, unless there was rapid progress toward a settlement, "there is a very real danger that this great and historic region, . . . will recede steadily into a new dark age of violence, disruption and destruction."

Jewish Minorities in the Arab World

Nevertheless, Thant assumed only a cautious and limited personal role. On January 27 he issued a statement expressing "regret and concern" at the "sentencing and hanging in Iraq of 15 persons charged with espionage, nine of whom were Jews." He noted that on January 13, he had already conveyed to the Iraqi UN representative his deep concern over the trials, and particularly their impact on "public opinion both inside and outside Iraq," declaring, "mass trials and executions are always to be deplored and are particularly abhorrent and dangerous when they are carried out in such a way as to inflame the emotions of the populace." Adnan Raouf, Iraq's acting permanent representative, responded that the executions were "entirely an internal affair," and expressed surprise that Thant should have considered it proper to comment on them. In his statement Thant in fact conceded that he did not question Iraq's right to put its own citizens on trial and that he was exercising "his good offices on humanitarian grounds." The other motivating factor was his fear lest "the repercussions from this unhappy development" impede efforts for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. When Thant was asked at a press conference, the following day, whether he intended to bring the subject of the hangings before the Security Council, he reiterated these points and then made the further comment:

Of course, if similar actions had taken place in another area, outside the region, I might not have even thought of issuing any statement. I have recognized and I still recognize that this is purely an internal affair. . . . It is of course far from my intention to bring this matter before any deliberative organ of the United Nations.

In his annual report Thant noted briefly that there were "many innocent and helpless victims" of the Middle East crisis, and singled out for mention the persistent problem of the Palestine refugees, which urgently demanded solution, as well as "the plight of another, smaller group of helpless persons," namely, "the small Jewish minorities in certain Arab states." Thant concluded that "it is clear that, in some cases at least, these minorities would be better off elsewhere and that the countries in which they now live would also be better off, given the prevailing circumstances, if the departure of those who would wish to leave could be sanctioned and arranged." Again he noted that, since these Jewish persons were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the governments of the Arab countries, the problem could be approached only from a humanitarian standpoint and a desire to lessen internal and international tension. He expressed the hope that "it may soon be possible to find sensible ways of solving this largely humanitarian problem." Nevertheless, by year's end neither the Iraqi nor the Syrian authorities had permitted a single Jew to leave, although there had been many requests for emigration. They continued to subject the Jewish minorities to arbitrary arrest and harsh discriminatory measures.

Council Condemnation of Israeli Reprisals

During 1969 the Arab states continued to wage their anti-Israel campaign in every available UN forum. With the unwavering support of the Soviet bloc and of Muslim and radical members of the Third World, the Arabs managed to score some formal parliamentary and propaganda successes. However, the adoption of one-sided resolutions condemning only Israeli violations of the cease-fire was seen by some as further weakening the moral influence of the United Nations in dealing with the Arab-Israel conflict, since this merely reinforced the prevailing Jerusalem view of the UN as a biased court from which Israel could not hope to obtain justice.

For example, after an Israeli air attack against Jordan, on March 26, in the area south of es-Salt caused the death of 18 persons and the injury of 25 others, Jordan asked the Security Council to condemn Israel for having "brutally attacked Jordanian villages and civilian centers," and to consider sanctions to check future Israeli aggression. Israel filed a cross complaint charging the Jordanian government and armed forces with aiding and encouraging armed attacks, infiltration, and acts of murder and violence against civilians by terrorist groups operating from Jordan and "the wanton shelling of Israeli villages." Ambassador Yosef Tekoah contended Israel's retaliation was "active defense" directed at disabling terrorist bases in the area, from which more than 200 sabotage raids and other attacks across the frontier were launched since mid-January, he said, resulting in 69 Israeli casualties, eight of them deaths, in the previous month alone. He added that a UN observer was among those injured in a terrorist bombing of a Jerusalem supermarket.

After lengthy debate and behind-the-scenes discussion, the Security Council on April 1 adopted a resolution sponsored by Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia, condemning the "premeditated air attacks launched by Israel on Jordanian villages and populated areas in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolutions"; deploring "the loss of civilian life and damage to property"; and warning that if such attacks were repeated, the Council would "consider further more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter" to prevent their repetition. (The sponsors originally sought an explicit reference to possible economic, political, and military sanctions.) The vote was 11 to 0 in favor, with 4 abstentions (Columbia, Paraguay, United Kingdom, United States). Israeli sources pointed out that six of the 11 votes came from countries that either never recognized, or had broken off diplomatic relations with, Israel: Algeria, Nationalist China, Hungary, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and Spain. Of the other five, France, Senegal and Zambia generally adopted a pro-Arab stance; only Finland and Nepal could be regarded as more or less neutral.

Charles W. Yost, the United States representative, said he abstained even though his government condemned all violations of the cease-fire and,

especially, air attacks, which, by their very nature, were bound to be indiscriminate in effect. Moreover, such attacks were counterproductive in achieving Israel's proclaimed objective of negotiations, for the "inevitable slaughter of innocent people" only "aggravated the bitter and uncompromising attitude towards Israel in the countries that suffered the losses." On the other hand, Yost felt it was unjust and unrealistic to consider in isolation the Israeli air attacks, which were unquestionably provoked by indiscriminate attacks on innocent Israeli civilians in markets, schools, theaters, and commercial aircraft. He rejected the argument that these Arab terrorist acts were morally justified as resistance to occupation, or that acts by irregular forces were different in character from those of regular armed forces. To the innocent victims, it made no difference, Yost said, for "death is just as final and shocking if it comes from a bomb in a supermarket or from a bomb from the air." Because the operative part of the resolution concentrated exclusively on one kind of violence and ignored the one provoking it, he said, the United States regarded the resolution as "unbalanced, unrealistic and unlikely to move the parties towards seeking a peaceful solution." The British delegate gave similar reasons for his government's abstention.

Human Rights Commission Inquiry

On March 3 the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution establishing a special working group of experts to investigate allegations concerning violations by Israel of the 1949 Geneva Convention on the protection of civilian persons in time of war in the territories occupied during the 1967 war. The group was empowered to receive communications and hear witnesses, and was to report on them to the next session of the commission. The same resolution reaffirmed "the inalienable right of all the inhabitants who have left since the outbreak of hostilities to return," and called on Israel immediately to implement previous UN resolutions. It deplored "Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories" and called on Israel immediately to end such acts as destroying civilian Arab homes, deportation, and "resorting to violence against inhabitants expressing their resentment to occupation." The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 to 1 (Israel), with 16 abstentions. Almost all favorable votes were cast by states that were either Arab, had large Muslim populations, or were members of the Soviet bloc. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and all West European and Latin American members of the commission abstained, their main objection being that the resolution prejudged the very issues for whose investigation it ostensibly was establishing a group of experts. The Israel government dismissed the "unbalanced and prejudicial resolution" as "a purely propaganda exercise lacking any moral validity." Israel further contended that any investigative committee also should look into "the vicious trampling on the human rights of the Jewish communities in certain Arab countries."

Israel maintained, too, that the resolution did not represent the views of "the responsible and impartial majority" of the 32-member Commission on Human Rights. The Arabs, for their part, argued that the 13 to 1 vote constituted "overwhelming" majority support by the commission for their charges, since abstentions did not count as negative votes. In June the group of six experts (four from pro-Arab Senegal, Yugoslavia, India, and Tanzania, and two from neutral Austria and Peru) began hearing complaints from Arab witnesses in New York and in the Arab capitals; the Israel government refused to admit or to have any dealings with the group. In September Israel adopted a similar posture toward a General Assembly investigative committee composed of representatives of Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Ceylon. Israeli officials stressed that their government had nothing to hide and that it had fully cooperated with neutral investigators, such as the Swedish diplomat Dr. Nils-Göran Gussing, who had visited Israel, the occupied territories, and the neighboring Arab states in the summer of 1967 as the special representative of the UN Secretary-General (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 34).

U.S. Condemnation of Israel Raid

On August 26 the United States joined in the unanimous adoption of a Security Council resolution condemning "the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in Southern Lebanon." It referred to a raid on August 11 by Israeli jet fighter-bombers, six miles inside Lebanese territory, on Mount Hermon sites, described by the Israelis as guerrilla encampments from which increasing terrorist forays against Israeli settlements had been launched. Israel Ambassador Tekoah denounced the resolution as another example of the UN's "double standard," for it yielded to Arab insistence and omitted a direct and explicit call to all the parties to observe the cease-fire.

The United States made a concession in accepting a text which, Ambassador Yost acknowledged, "does not deal in as balanced a fashion as we would have wished with the cycle of provocation and reprisal." Yet the United States supported the resolution, he explained, for its clear indication of Council disapproval of all violations. The text deplored "all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire," and declared that "such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated" and would prompt the Council to consider "more effective measures" to prevent their recurrence. Lebanese representative Edouard Ghorra said the Council action amounted to a rejection of Israel's countercomplaint against Lebanon. Some observers thought the American vote was motivated by a desire to counteract growing criticism of the United States by the moderate pro-Western Arab states with a demonstrative act showing Washington's opposition to Israeli reprisals.

Although the Suez Canal front saw the most intensive, and almost continuous, fighting during 1969, neither the United Arab Republic nor Israel requested a meeting of the Security Council.

STATUS OF JERUSALEM

On June 30 the Security Council began consideration of a Jordanian complaint that measures taken by Israel in Jerusalem were contrary to a Security Council resolution of May 21, 1968 and several General Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], pp. 182-83). On July 3, 1969 the Council unanimously approved a resolution, jointly submitted by Pakistan, Senegal and Zambia, deploring Israel's failure to show any regard for the earlier resolutions; censuring "in the strongest terms all measures taken to change the status of Jerusalem"; confirming that all Israeli legislative measures purporting to alter the city's status were invalid, and urgently calling on Israel "to rescind forthwith all measures taken by it which may tend to change" Jerusalem's status and to refrain from any such actions in the future. The United States abstained on this last section, calling it inconsistent and impractical, but then voted for the resolution as a whole.

Ambassador Yost said the United States always felt that Jerusalem enjoyed a unique international standing, and that no action should be taken without full regard to its special history and special place in the world community. He characterized as "detrimental to the common interests in the city" Israel's expropriation and confiscation of land, the demolition of buildings and construction of new housing on this land, and the application of Israeli law to East Jerusalem. The United States, he emphasized, regarded the part of Jerusalem taken over by Israel in the June 1967 war as legally no different from the other occupied territories. Consequently, Israel was bound under international law and the Geneva Convention to maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, which meant no interference in its customary life and no changes except for those required by immediate occupation needs. Yost noted that the American government repeatedly expressed its displeasure to Israel on this matter.

But Yost also stressed that Jerusalem was not an isolated problem. It was an integral part of the whole complex of issues in the Arab-Israel conflict. The United States continued to believe that a package solution, as envisaged in the Council's resolution of November 22, 1967, was the basis for a just and lasting one. In the context of such a solution, Jerusalem "should not again become a bone of contention among religions and nations, but an example of unity."

Soviet delegate Aleksei Zakharov denounced Israel's "illegal, criminal and arbitrary actions" in Jerusalem, which, he said, confirmed Israel's policy of "aggression and expansion." The only peaceful solution, he held, was the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the occupied territories, "including the Arab part of Jerusalem." Jordanian Ambassador Muhammad el-Farra declared that Israel's "contempt, arrogance, deceit and conceit" in defying the Council's resolution indicated sanctions as the only remaining alternative to

bring Israel's compliance with the established principle that "acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible."

Ambassador Tekoah accused the representatives of Jordan and other Arab states of turning the debate into a "bacchanalia of belligerence and abuse." The Arabs, he said, had neither the moral nor legal right to accuse Israel, since they had rejected the UN Charter requirement and numerous resolutions calling for peaceful coexistence with Israel. Jerusalem's "history, reality and destiny," he emphasized, could not be erased by Security Council votes. It was not only a religious center, but a living city—with a population of 200,000 Jews, 60,000 Arabs and 5,000 others—which always had been the capital of only one nation, "the Jewish people," and "irrevocably bound up" with its history. Tekoah then turned to Jordan's right to present a claim, describing its illegal invasion of the city, the "barbaric destruction of the Jewish quarter, of Jewish houses of worship, of ancient Jewish cemeteries," and its refusal to permit free access to the Holy Places. No state, he contended, legally recognized Jordan's right to Jerusalem. Israel found "unacceptable" the American view that the eastern part of the united city of Jerusalem constituted occupied territory, since "the expulsion of the Jordanian aggressor from Jerusalem could not have suddenly bestowed on Jordan rights which it had never possessed." Unity was Jerusalem's natural state; Israel was sovereign; Jerusalem was Israel's eternal capital, he concluded. But, Tekoah continued, Israel fully realized its international responsibility and would "ensure the universal religious interests in Jerusalem and make certain that all its inhabitants, Jewish and Arab alike, were protected in their rights, their property, their lives."

Arson at Al-Aqsa

The day after an arsonist damaged the historic Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on August 21, 25 states with Muslim populations urgently requested, in a joint telegram expressing their horror and grief at the outrage, that the Security Council meet to consider suitable action for an impartial investigation of the fire, the prevention of a recurrence of vandalism against, or profanation of, the Holy Places, and the assessment by Islamic countries of the damage and arrangements for the mosque's repair.

By the time the Council began to meet on September 9, an Australian Christian visitor with Messianic delusions, Michael Denis William Rohan, had confessed to setting the fire; the Israel government had expressed its sorrow over the fire and agreed to permit an Egyptian expert architect to inspect the mosque and a group of distinguished Moslems to supervise the repairs; a commission of inquiry composed of Arabs and Jews had been appointed by Israel's supreme court president to receive testimony (p. 501).

Disregarding these facts, the Arab states and the Soviet bloc proceeded to excoriate Israel. The UAR representative charged Israel with "original and vicarious, direct and indirect" responsibility for the mosque's destruction and

profanation. Soviet representative Yakov Malik declared the Council "must clearly state that Israel was politically and morally responsible for the arson" in the mosque, because the "atmosphere of repression, terror and arbitrariness" under Israeli occupation had led to the fire. Malik outdid Agha Shahi of Pakistan, sponsor of the resolution adopted by the Council, who stressed that it was not his intention "to prejudice responsibility for the act or to allege Israeli complicity." However, he considered the act "a by-product of the military occupation and annexation of Jerusalem," since it was "inconceivable" for such a crime to occur under normal conditions.

On September 15 the Council adopted a resolution stopping just short of explicitly blaming Israel for the fire. The resolution, adopted by a vote of 11 to 0, with the United States, Columbia, Paraguay, and Finland abstaining, said the Council "determines that the execrable act of desecration and profanation of the Holy Al-Aqsa Mosque emphasizes the immediate necessity of Israel's desisting from acting in violation of" the earlier Council and Assembly resolutions on Jerusalem and "rescinding forthwith all measures" to alter the status of the city.

Lord Caradon of the United Kingdom declared that his government did not consider Israel guilty or at fault in the fire, that it deplored the accusations made or implied, and "would never be associated with such baseless allegations or false insinuations." He said he voted for the resolution, even though he was not satisfied with its language, because it reaffirmed the Council's stand on Jerusalem and condemned "the contemptible act of arson." Ambassador Yost expressed the United States view that it saw no evidence of the suspected arson being anything but "an individual act, as demented as it was dastardly." He explained that the United States abstained because, in its view, the resolution went far afield of the ostensible purpose for which the Council had been called, and was contrary to the American objective of creating "an atmosphere of conciliation and goodwill," which was a necessary prelude to a peaceful settlement.

Recognition of Palestinian Refugees

The Special Political Committee of the General Assembly began its annual review of the work of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) on November 17. Laurence Michelmore, the agency's commissioner-general, noted that there now were more than 1,400,000 persons in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon asking for UNRWA assistance. These did not include the persons displaced by the 1967 war. About 1.25 million were eligible for some form of assistance; 840,000 of them received monthly food rations. Camps in East Jordan, established since June 1967, held some 92,000 displaced persons, both old and new refugees. Roads, schools, and health and other facilities had been provided. Improved medical care resulted in a dramatic decrease in eye diseases. UNRWA found a great increase in demand for education and

vocational training, which strained its facilities. Although some groups of refugees were better off, Michelmoresaid, the economic condition of the refugees, as a whole, had not improved. As a result of rising costs and increased needs, he anticipated a \$5 million deficit for UNRWA in 1970. He warned that stopping or reducing aid in the present atmosphere of tension in the area "could have extremely dangerous consequences," and urged that UNRWA's finances be put on a sounder basis than the current reliance on voluntary contributions by governments and individuals.

Michelmoresaid this to say about press reports that Palestinian commandos had seized control of the UNRWA camps in Lebanon: The camps were like Arab villages, or areas of larger towns, which people normally could enter and leave as they pleased. Nonrelief functions, such as maintenance of law and order, administration of justice and issuance of building permits were the responsibility of the host government. He acknowledged that, for several weeks, armed men had come into some camps from which the regular Lebanese police were absent, and they "at times . . . had exercised control over entry to and departure from the camps." Thus six UNRWA buildings were occupied, and for several days UNRWA staff was barred from entering some of the camps. Michelmoresaid he gave assurance that UNRWA continued to control distribution of its services to its intended beneficiaries and that he was satisfied "the integrity of these UNRWA operations had been maintained, and that its assistance was not diverted to other purposes." Some foreign observers noted, however, that UNRWA was overwhelmingly staffed with Palestinian refugees, and that, over the years, the agency had not succeeded in weeding out and depriving of rations and other benefits members of Palestinian liberation movements who engaged in terrorist training.

Three resolutions were approved in the political committee and then endorsed by the plenary of the General Assembly in December. The first, sponsored by the United States, and adopted by a vote of 101 to 1, with 4 abstentions, expressed regret that there had been no substantial progress toward a solution of the refugee problem through repatriation or resettlement with compensation, as provided in earlier resolutions; asked the commissioner-general to continue his efforts to rectify the rolls, and called on all governments "as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible" to meet UNRWA's financial needs. However, the Assembly failed to incorporate any part of UNRWA's costs into its regular budget, and gave Michelmoresaid no guidelines as to where to cut the program if necessary. Following the precedent of the last two years, the Assembly unanimously adopted an 18-power draft authorizing UNRWA to continue to provide as much assistance as was practicable, on an emergency and "temporary" basis, to needy persons displaced as a result of the 1967 war, and appealed for generous contributions to meet this need.

The most heated debate arose over a resolution introduced by Somalia

and 11 other pro-Arab states. It recognized that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees resulted from "the denial of their inalienable rights"; expressed grave concern over "reported acts of collective punishment, arbitrary detention, curfews, destruction of property, deportation and other repressive acts" against refugees and others in the occupied territories; reaffirmed "the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine," and requested the Security Council to take effective measures to ensure implementation of the relevant UN resolutions.

Opponents of the resolution held that it would merely exacerbate tensions; that the Assembly was not the appropriate forum for this discussion since the major powers were now engaged in efforts to find a solution in accordance with the November 1967 Security Council resolution, and that the debate should be restricted to the humanitarian problems of refugee aid. The United States representative stressed that the requirement to respect the wishes of the refugees did not give them an unconditional right of free choice. That right was limited by a second requirement to safeguard the legitimate interests of states, and the original resolution of December 1948 therefore stipulated that returning refugees be "willing to live at peace with their neighbors." Thus, he said, the UN had a clear responsibility "not to countenance any proposals which threatened the existence of Israel or of any other Member State." The representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of Canada, among others, said they could not support a text which implied the disappearance of Israel, or called into question its right to exist.

Apparently fearing that the resolution might not get the two-thirds majority required for formal approval of important questions by the plenary, Somalia moved that this resolution came within the category of "other questions" referred to in Article 18 of the UN Charter, which could be approved by a simple majority. Israel Foreign Minister Eban refused to comment on a resolution which, by definition of its sponsor, was unimportant. The substance of the resolution was approved by 48 votes in favor to 22 against, with 47 abstentions, and virtually all favorable votes coming from Arab, Islamic, or Communist states. Some of the states that voted for the Somali resolution or abstained, indicated that it did not weaken Israel's right to exist, but merely reaffirmed pre-existing "inalienable" rights of the Palestinians. Nonetheless, the vote represented a political victory of considerable propagandistic value for the Palestinian "liberation" movement. It was also an indication of the growing tendency to regard the Palestinian problem not primarily as a humanitarian one affecting individual Arab refugees, but as a political question affecting a nationalist movement.

GEORGE E. GRUEN

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

ELECTIONS • ERADICATION OF PREJUDICE • EXTREMISM AND VIOLENCE •
RADICALISM AND JEWISH YOUTH • PUBLIC OPINION AND MIDDLE EAST • BLACK
COMMUNITY • CIVIL RIGHTS • URBAN CRIME • NEGRO-JEWISH RELATIONS •
INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS

IN 1970 changes and developments in intergroup relations were viewed with mixed feelings by the various segments of the population. The Jewish community reacted to them with uncertainty, guarded optimism—and, at times, pained reappraisal. The elections saw more Jews running for office, in a climate of less antisemitism, than ever before. Progress was being made in areas in which there was discrimination against Jews, such as private clubs and executive suites of industry, largely because of pressure of legislation and public opinion.

Jews were calm or relatively unconcerned about radical right extremism; but they were much concerned over left extremist groups, black and white, young and adult, which were strongly anti-Israel and anti-Jewish. American public opinion generally remained overwhelmingly for Israel, but support had declined from a high point in 1967.

Christian-Jewish relations continued their upward movement, though with some frustrations and disappointments. While Catholic-Jewish understanding was encouraged by Catholic leaders, Protestant-Jewish relations showed little progress and, in some cases, even declined. Differences over church-state issues, notably federal aid to parochial schools, created tensions even among Jewish groups, with Orthodox leaders publicly siding with Catholic exponents of federal aid.

Negro-Jewish relations received less national attention, both in public discussion and research, than in preceding years. Though both groups were

found to be generally less prejudiced against each other, problems continued to arise in geographically and socially more localized areas, largely over antisemitic utterances by black extremist groups, crime and disorder involving Jewish victims, as well as the growing militancy of inner-city poor Jews determined to receive more attention by city administrators.

These occurrences, as well as other local, national, and international developments, among them Georges Pompidou's visit to the United States, discrimination by the Soviet Union against its Jewish citizens,¹ the militancy of Black Panthers, demonstrations by black and Puerto Rican activists in New York City's hospitals, the tactics of the Jewish Defense League, all reflected differing aspects or degrees of potential and actual antisemitism. They rekindled suspicion, anxiety, and fear in Jews about their own security, resulting in public demonstrations and protests and in initial discussions of "Jewish power," which expressed concern that Jews, by advocating everyone else's rights, would have no rights of their own unless they clearly politicized their identity.

Black status and power increased, particularly with the election of hundreds of black candidates throughout the country. A dramatic shift in public opinion, at least in the South, was the change in attitudes by Southerners toward sending their children to school with Negroes. Some black groups nevertheless hardened their attitudes towards whites, notably CORE, which officially rejected integration as an approach to achieving equal opportunity. There was also a rise in income, mostly for younger black families with children. But deep poverty continued to characterize most blacks.

Developments in the area of civil rights and civil liberties brought both satisfaction and disappointment. If the extension and expansion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was welcomed, the Nixon administration and Congress were criticized respectively for failure to enforce existing legislation and for passing what was considered anti-civil libertarian bills.

Campus unrest, particularly on the high-school level, increased, creating a widespread and volatile situation traceable to such factors as civil-rights protests, effects of slum life, impact of minority group pressures, influence of college and university disruptions, as well as dissatisfaction over dress and grooming codes.

The year also witnessed the beginning of bombings and snipings triggered by various revolutionary groups, white and black, of the left and right. The cry for safety in the streets and law and order intensified as serious crime more than doubled during the decade of the 1960's. Nationally and locally, new citizens groups formed and became concerned with drugs, prisons and courts, police, and new approaches to reform of the country's criminal justice system.

¹ For the reaction of American Jews see "American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry: Summary Report of Activity During 1970," in this volume, pp. 265-270.

1970 Elections

JEWISH CANDIDATES AND JEWISH VOTE

An analysis of the November 1970 elections² indicated that American public opinion normally preferred candidates who had a centrist rather than a leftist or rightist platform. It also found that Jews as a group, though high on the socioeconomic ladder, voted very liberal, least racist, and least anti-Negro, despite pre-election claims that the Jewish vote was moving to the right. There was only some slight movement to the right among the elderly. In all, the voting pattern of the Jews resembled that of the blacks more than that of any other white ethnic group.

Antisemitism was an almost negligible factor in the success or failure of the unprecedented number of Jewish candidates for high office. Nine Jews, eight of them Democrats, ran for senator or governor. Three of the Jewish gubernatorial candidates, Milton Shapp of Pennsylvania, Marvin Mandel of Maryland (incumbent), and Frank Licht of Rhode Island (incumbent) won; Arthur Goldberg of New York, and Sander Levin of Michigan lost. Senators Jacob Javits (Rep., N.Y.) and Abraham Ribicoff (Dem., Conn.) were reelected. Four senatorial candidates—Sam Grossman, Arizona; Richard Ottinger, New York; Howard Metzenbaum, Ohio, and Nelson Gross, New Jersey—lost by two or three percentage points.

The almost total absence of antisemitism as a tactic in a campaign with an unprecedented number of Jewish candidates for high political office was very important, as was support for Israel at a time when the Middle East crisis was becoming more complex and heated.

There were some isolated manifestations of overt and covert antisemitism: in Cleveland, an American Nazi party attack on Democratic senatorial candidate Howard Metzenbaum, and in New York, slurs on the Democratic ticket headed by four Jews and one Negro. However, the *Baltimore Sun* noted after the elections, "the notable thing . . . was that anti-Semitism was proven to be dead as a factor of importance in American politics."

ANTISEMITIC CANDIDATES

Candidates who were overtly hostile to Jews fared poorly:³ J. B. Stoner, gubernatorial candidate in Georgia and an arch-antisemite, ran fourth in a nine-man race, obtaining 2.21 per cent of the total votes cast. Dan W. Salamone, who lost the Maryland Democratic gubernatorial primary, pub-

² Amy Malzberg and Geraldine Rosenfield, *American Votes, 1970: The Center Holds* (American Jewish Committee: December 1970), 20 pp. (mimeo).

³ Milton Ellerin, *The 1970 Elections—An Analysis* (American Jewish Committee: December 1970), 26 pp. (mimeo).

licly stated there was "too much concentration of power in the Jewish and Negro minority groups." Gerda Koch, who was defeated in a Minnesota congressional district Republican primary, said that "studies show that Zionists were instrumental in starting World War I and World War II." In Nebraska, American party gubernatorial candidate Albert C. Walsh, whose declared goal was to recapture the "Holy Land of the United States in the name of Christ" by a Constitutional amendment recognizing Christianity as the national religion, received 2.3 per cent of the vote. Retired Rear Admiral John Crommelin, an outspoken antisemite who ran for lieutenant-governor in Alabama, polled less than 1.5 per cent of the vote. The one successful candidate of this type was John J. Rarick (Dem., La.), an arch-segregationist, member of the White Citizens Councils, Wallace supporter, and choice of known antisemites, ran unopposed for the House of Representatives.

ISSUE OF ISRAEL

The only major candidate opposing American support for Israel was Alabama Democrat John C. Schmarkey, who failed in his bid for Congress; incumbent Republican Congressman John Buchanan, who was strongly pro-Israel, was reelected. George Wallace supporters running on a variety of American Independent party tickets took anti-Israel positions in areas where opponents were pro-Israel. Some 84 of them ran for Congress and the governorship in 22 states. They also were against racial integration in the schools, forced busing, and civil-rights legislation. Most of them polled fewer than 3 per cent of the votes.

Advocacy of support for Israel was nonpartisan and geographically diverse. In New York, 30 congressional candidates, Democrats and Republicans, urged continued U.S. economic and military support. In Ohio, Connecticut, California, and Massachusetts all senatorial candidates were strongly pro-Israel. At times, candidates debating the issue of Israel were obviously making a bid for the "Jewish vote."

EXTREME RIGHT-WING CANDIDATES

The reaction of the electorate to the extreme right was mixed. It had some solid victories in the House elections. Two John Birch Society leaders, John G. Schmitz and John H. Rousselot, were reelected in California, as were the right-wing favorites P.M. Crane in Illinois, John Rarick in Louisiana, John Ashbrook in Ohio, and John Dowdy in Texas. Candidates of its choice lost in Wisconsin and New Mexico. Tom Foley of Washington was reelected over a John Birch leader. Equally important was the defeat of Phyllis Schlafly, an Illinois arch-conservative.

In the state legislatures, the extreme right won at least two seats, one each in Maryland and Michigan. In other elections, one of its favorites, Dr. Max Rafferty, California's superintendent of public construction, lost, as

did Congressman Albert Watson, who sought the governorship in South Carolina.

BLACK CANDIDATES AND BLACK VOTERS

Blacks scored impressive victories in the elections. Almost half of an estimated 650 black candidates for various offices throughout the country were successful, with the greatest gains on state and municipal levels. Thirty-six ran for 23 seats in the House and one seat in the Senate, which was held by John Stennis of Mississippi. Four of the congressional candidates—Roger V. Dellums, Calif.; George Collins and Ralph Metcalfe, Ill., and Parren J. Mitchell, Md.—were elected, making a total of 12 black congressmen and one black senator, Edward W. Brooke (Rep., Mass.), in the 92nd Congress. Three of the newly elected black congressmen represented predominantly white districts; Parren J. Mitchell became the first Negro ever elected to Congress in Maryland.

Significant breakthroughs occurred in the South: two blacks in Alabama and all four black candidates in South Carolina were elected to the nearly century-long all-white legislatures in those states.

Despite the record number of blacks running for political office, registered black voters failed to vote in significant numbers. The most noticeable example was Atlanta's Fifth Congressional District, where Rev. Andrew Young, a close associate of the late Martin Luther King, Jr., lost by some 8,000 votes; only some 40,000 of 72,000 registered blacks voted. In the gubernatorial races, Dr. John Cashin, Jr., the black Democratic candidate in Alabama, and Thompson D. Broadwater, the black candidate running on the U.S. Citizens party ticket in South Carolina, were defeated.

Some analysts suggested that the failure of blacks to vote was responsible also for the defeat of liberals Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio and Albert T. Gore in Tennessee, and for the election of Independent Harry T. Byrd, Jr., in Virginia, who was not favorably regarded in the black community. Explanations for the poor turnout varied: some thought blacks were so disenchanted with "the system," that they simply refused to vote even for black candidates; others felt that the failure of candidates of both major political parties to make a distinct effort to get black voter support was to blame.

KEY ISSUES

Almost as significant as the results of the elections were the manner and style in which they took place: 1) The Republican efforts to make "law and order" a key election issue generally failed; in many contests Democrats also campaigned against rioting, bombings, and campus disruptions. 2) With the exception of New England where issues of social concern appeared to be dominant, most of the electorate was concerned with economic issues.

- 3) Neither civil rights nor withdrawal from Vietnam was a campaign issue.
- 4) College youth's participation in the elections was disappointingly small.
- 5) With the exception of South Carolina's gubernatorial race, in which Republican Congressman Albert Watson continually stressed the dangers of a black bloc vote and the high incidence of Negro riots, race was not a factor in Southern elections. In fact, "candidates in the South who seemed closest to George Wallace in style and attitudes on race, did poorly."⁴

Eradication of Prejudice

PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION

Much progress was made in eliminating private club exclusionary practices based on race or religion. In January the Minneapolis City Council Committee adopted a resolution prohibiting the issuance of liquor licenses to "any club or organization . . . which denies membership . . . on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, ancestry or national origin unless the organization limits membership exclusively to one national origin or one religion."

Two other rulings recognized the obligation of a state not to abet discriminatory practices through its licensing power. In August the Massachusetts Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission ruled, in the case of alleged discriminatory membership practices of the Marblehead Eastern Yacht Club, that it would, where discrimination was proved, "withhold the granting or consider suspending or revoking an existing license." And, in *Irvis v. Scott*, in October, the Federal Court in Pennsylvania unanimously held that where the state totally controls and regulates the sale of liquor, granting a liquor license to a racially discriminatory private club constituted discriminatory state action in violation of the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

By year's end, several other suits were pending. Plaintiffs of diverse backgrounds, Jewish, Negro, Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, American Indian, claimed in *Gerber v. Hood*, in the United States District Court, Seattle, that the granting of liquor licenses by the state to discriminatory private clubs constituted state action in aid of discrimination and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. In *Pitts vs. Wisconsin*, the American Civil Liberties Union sponsored a challenge to the tax-exempt status granted to the racially exclusionary Fraternal Order of Eagles. In November the American Civil Liberties Union, acting on behalf of 21 persons, filed suit in New Jersey, asking for the revocation of both the tax-exempt status and the liquor licenses of Elks lodges in the state.

Litigation was accompanied by increased educational activities on the part of local and national groups and organizations. In Seattle, Wash., some

⁴ *Ibid.*

15 racial, religious, and ethnic groups joined together in an organization called Asian Coalition for Equality, which urged Seattle businesses and organizations not to utilize the facilities of discriminatory clubs. Nationally, the American Jewish Committee, in July, wrote to some 600 college and university presidents and chancellors, asking that the use of exclusionary clubs for fund-raising events be avoided. Over 200 responded affirmatively; many issued directives to their personnel departments and alumni leaders not to use such clubs for meetings and affairs.

EXECUTIVE SUITE DISCRIMINATION

Limited progress continued to be made toward the removal of executive suite discrimination barring minority group members from reaching the top echelons in big business, high finance, heavy industry, and even academia. Government and organizational efforts brought changes in the recruiting, hiring, and promotional practices of a number of companies in 1970. Early in the year John L. Wilks, U.S. Department of Labor deputy assistant secretary for compliance, announced that the Office of Federal Contract Compliances would investigate anti-Jewish practices on the executive level by oil companies, as well as in managerial employment by the automotive and electronic industries. In announcing the investigation, he cited an Anti-Defamation League study which revealed that only about "1.5 per cent of corporate executives employed by the oil industry in New York" were Jewish.

Business Week of January 24, 1970, reported that "the status of the Jew in United States business is a paradox. . . . In some areas of the South and Midwest, Roman Catholics seem to suffer the same disability—they do not climb the corporate ladder so fast or so high as, say, Baptists or Methodists."

Private human-relations organizations, notably the American Jewish Committee, the Jewish Vocational Service, and the Anti-Defamation League, discussed the problem with scores of top corporate executives in the insurance, banking, airline, food, petroleum, petrochemical, automotive, and aerospace industries. In some instances, local action was taken, i.e., in Cleveland, where the Jewish Community Federation, together with a number of private foundations, funded a three-year executive advisory program for the elimination of barriers based on religion, race, ethnic origin, and sex in large Cleveland based firms.

Regarding discrimination in the top administration of colleges and universities, impressive progress was made; the number of Jewish college and university presidents increased from six in 1966 to at least twelve at the end of 1970.

Image of Minorities

Protests, pressures, and programs to eliminate prejudice from textbooks and the mass media continued, chiefly by minority-group members themselves. At the same time, demands escalated for minority-group courses and curricula in colleges and universities.

In California, in July, the American Indian Historical Society complained to the State Board of Education that fourth grade textbooks failed to depict the plight of contemporary Indians and that their presentation of early California Indians was "degrading" and "inaccurate." The National Mexican American Anti-Defamation Committee complained in December that telecasts projected negative stereotypes of Mexican Americans, casting them "as sneaky, untrustworthy thieves, who did not work, who are lazy, irresponsible, and who should and could be arrested by the superior white man." Protests by Italian-Americans led Attorney General John N. Mitchell, in late July, to issue a confidential memorandum to all government division and agency heads to stop using the term "Mafia" and "Cosa Nostra" because Italian-Americans "feel that the use of these Italian terms reflect adversely on Italian-Americans generally, and there is no doubt that their concern is genuine and sincere."

Demands for minority-group studies became so general and insistent, *Civil Rights Digest* of February 1970 reported, that "literally hundreds of colleges and universities have set up Afro-American studies programs," a practice spilling over into elementary and secondary schools. Similarly, more than 80 institutions of higher learning introduced Mexican-American study programs or departments.

Two 1970 research studies investigated the treatment of minorities in social-studies textbooks: *Minorities in Textbooks*, by Michael B. Kane, sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League, analyzed 45 leading junior and senior high-school textbooks. It found that material on the Jews suffered from an overemphasis on their ancient past; that their persecution under the Nazis was inadequately treated; that the black man's struggle for equality was treated more with complacent generalizations than with hard facts; that the contemporary role of other minority groups, such as Mexicans, American Indians, Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans, Spanish-speaking people, was largely ignored.

A preliminary report in June of an American Jewish Committee study of 24 world history and 19 American history texts indicated lack of historical accuracy and adequate coverage of Jews and Judaism. In most instances, there was no discussion of the post-biblical period, and where it was included, the presentation usually was inadequate. Students were unlikely to learn from the texts about the origin of the Jewish people and their influence on Western civilization, or even the history of the Jewish community in the United States.

The need to provide understanding of one's own and other ethnic groups was recognized in a bill introduced by Congressman Roman C. Pucinski (D., Ill.) for the establishment of an ethnic heritage studies center for the preparation of materials on the contributions to America of all minority groups, which would be used in schools and the training of teachers.

Extremism and Violence

Though serious urban civil disorders declined for the second consecutive year, scattered disturbances in smaller communities and the increase in bombings kept domestic violence at a high level. The Justice Department, in September, reported that 15 riots, 38 serious disturbances, and 63 minor disorders occurred between January and the end of July. In the period from January 1969 to April 1970, the *Christian Science Monitor* of September 21, 1970, stated, there took place 4,330 bombings and 5,794 attempted bombings resulting in 43 deaths, 384 injuries, and property damage totaling \$21.8 million. Assistant FBI director William C. Sullivan cited, for the January to October 1970 period, 190 reported instances of radically-motivated attacks against policemen, including 17 ambushes, resulting in the death of 21 police officers and injuries to 159 others.

However, violence was traced also to those on the right, such as white protests against war protesters and black activists, labor disputes, and personal revenge. In October two members of the Raiders, an antiblack underground group, were found guilty of blowing up 36 school buses in Longview, Texas, in July. Police in Houston were still hunting those responsible for twice bombing the liberal radio station KPFT.

A survey by the Urban Institute in Washington, D.C., released in November, revealed that while between September 1967 and the end of April 1970 the percentage of all colleges experiencing some incidents rose from 6 to 14, it rose to 32 between May and August 1970 after American troops had been sent into Cambodia. Of 805 incidents, 36 were described as "most serious," involving personal injury or property damage.

The two most deplorable incidents occurred at Kent State University, where members of the Ohio State National Guard, on May 3, fatally shot four students and wounded eight others, and ten days later, at Jackson State College, Mississippi, where state police fired into black student groups and dormitories, killing one student and a local high-school senior. On August 24 campus militants bombed the Army Mathematics Center on the Wisconsin University campus, killing one graduate student and injuring four others in the building.

In its report on the Kent State tragedy, released in October, the President's Commission on Campus Unrest, chaired by former Governor William W. Scranton, stated that student demonstrators responsible for vandalizing the town of Kent, burning the campus ROTC building, and stoning National Guardsmen who tried to disperse the rally—shared responsibility for the

deaths and injuries. The report assailed the Ohio Guard for issuing loaded combat weapons to its men and condemned the "indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed" as "unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable."

On the other hand, a special Ohio state grand jury investigating the shooting exonerated the National Guard. It found that "major responsibility" rested "clearly" with the university administration which fostered "an attitude of laxity, overindulgence, and permissiveness." This attitude permitted "overemphasis on the right to dissent" by some faculty members which was responsible for the students' behavior and "obscene" language.

In connection with the Jackson State killings, the President's Commission report condemned as "unreasonable, unjustified overreaction" the state police's use of shotguns and other arms. It found no substantiation of police reports of sniper fire directed at them; accused them of having lied to their superiors and to the FBI about the shooting, and said their action was in part motivated by confidence that they would not be punished.

In its over-all report, in September, the commission held that government, students, and universities shared responsibility for preventing campus disorders, and pleaded with all sides "to draw back from the brink" of a dangerous division. It condemned fanatical student terrorists, complacent campus officials, brutal law-enforcement officers, and the inflammatory speech of politicians. It urged President Nixon to exercise the moral leadership of his office to bring the nation back from the brink of ominous divisions over social problems. In a December 12 letter to Scranton, President Nixon strongly rejected this imputation of responsibility for disruption. Responsibility, he said, "rests squarely on the shoulders" of some members of the academic community. Earlier, in September, Vice President Spiro Agnew called the commission's reference to the president "'scapegoating' of the most irresponsible sort," adding that the report was "sure to be taken as more pabulum for the permissivists."

As 1970 was coming to a close, extremist left groups were not only having internal organizational problems, but they also ceased to attract a large following, particularly among students. The killings at Kent State and Jackson State universities, as well as the number of bombings, appeared to have a sobering effect on many. Also by year's end, Vietnam seemed to be a dormant campus issue, as were collegiate administrative and curriculum reforms.

A late December 1970 Gallup poll of some 1,063 students representing 61 colleges and universities revealed that extremist groups had as little appeal to them as to the adult population as a whole, though students were slightly more left than the rest of the nation. Less than 10 per cent of both students and adults gave a "highly favorable" rating to the leftist Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Black Panthers; reaction to the Weathermen was overwhelmingly negative. Analysis of the socioeconomic background of the students polled revealed that college seniors and college

graduates of private institutions in the East and from upper-income homes were most likely to regard favorably radical leftist groups. Less than 5 per cent of both students and adults gave a "highly favorable" rating to the rightist John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan.

One of the disturbing findings was that for many leftist and rightist radicals on the campus extremism appeared to have appeal for its own sake. Thus a significant proportion of students, who described their political philosophy as "far left," gave a highly favorable rating to the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan; a similarly significant proportion of "far right" students gave a highly favorable rating to SDS, the Weathermen, and the Black Panthers.

By year's end, the Weathermen, whose leaders had gone underground, seemed to have renounced violence, but not their revolutionary cause. Bernardine Dohrn, one of the leaders, wrote in a December communiqué that "the future of our revolution has been changed decisively. . . . Our belief that armed struggle is the only revolutionary struggle is destroyed forever." She added that the "tendency to consider only bombings or picking up the gun as revolutionary, with the glorification of the heavier the better, we've called the military error." Some observers interpreted this change in Weathermen action as tactical rather than philosophical. Violence had not brought about the predicted repression which, the Weathermen expected, would elicit mass sympathy and support.

Responsibility for violence in ghetto disorders was examined in a study of arrest patterns in the riots of the 1960's, conducted by the Columbia University Bureau of Applied Social Research and released in early January 1970. It found that it was whites, not blacks, who were more likely to be arrested for shooting and sniping during ghetto disorders; that whites were more likely to be "outside trouble-makers" than blacks arrested in riots; that whites arrested appeared to come disproportionately from the lower socioeconomic strata, and that they were just as likely as the arrested blacks to be unemployed and to have previous arrest records.

Radicalism and Jewish Youth

There was concern in the Jewish community over the political, social, and religious attitudes and behavior of Jewish youth, particularly over the participation of the militant in peace demonstrations, in New Left organizations, and antiestablishment petitions and protests. Jewish organizations, publications, and writers discussed, studied, and analyzed the causes of such involvement.

An analysis of publications dealing with young American Jews⁵ pointed

⁵ Geraldine Rosenfield, *What We Know About Young American Jews: An Annotated Bibliography* (American Jewish Committee: April 1970), 19 pp. (mimeo).

out that Jews attended college in greater proportion than the youth of any other ethnic or religious group; that, as a result of studying more, "they were inclined to ask more questions, be more mobile, cut loose from family and community ties, be more open in attitudes toward friendship, sex, and intermarriage, be more left wing politically." They were also apt to have "less ambivalence about identifying as Jews and have less reluctance to cast off Judaism altogether."

At a National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council executive committee meeting in October, Rabbi Oscar Groner, assistant national director of B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundations, described the emergence of "a new breed" of Jewish students, whose sense of identity with Judaism was awakened by the six-day war in the Middle East, and who adopted the tactics of "the Black activist ethnic movement." Defining them more precisely, he said:

These are not Jewish radicals but radical Jews, ethnic Jews. . . . [who] are radical in and about their Jewishness. They have developed a whole series of organizations and structures, some of them duplicative, but it is, nonetheless, a very exciting development. They call themselves radical Zionists, Students for Israel, Naaseh, Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, Union of Jewish Students, National Jewish Organizing Project, and many other names.

Jack Porter theorized⁶ that when the Black-Power movement made them feel unwelcome and when black and white radicals began developing an anti-Zionist philosophy, these students felt impelled to break with them. But they also rejected the "Jewish establishment" as irrelevant and unresponsive to the needs of Judaism and Jewry, as they saw them. They therefore established their own groups reflecting their radical style and philosophy, as well as their reawakened sense of Jewishness.

The newly-formed groups made themselves heard through their own newspapers published from various campuses across the country. In Spring 1969 there had been but a handful of such Jewish student newspapers; by the end of 1970, there were an estimated 40 expressing a wide range of opinion: radical Zionist, Jewish nationalist, and religious Orthodox.

Further insight into this phenomenon was given by Nathan Glazer in a discussion of what he called "a crisis of identity and self-conception" in the Jewish community in which Jewish youth was a major factor.⁷ While the American Jewish community moved toward Jewish ethnicity and liberalism, radical Jewish youth movements were rejecting both. Glazer's solution: "new validity to ethnic attachment and to liberalism . . . by association with an old religion," and convincing youth "that we hold these commitments . . . because they do indeed provide the best pattern to organize our lives."

⁶ Jack Nusan Porter, "Jewish Student Activism," *Jewish Currents*, May 1970.

⁷ Nathan Glazer, "The Crisis in American Jewry," *Midstream*, November, 1970.

Public Opinion and the Middle East

Two major public-opinion polls conducted in 1970 indicated that while American public opinion continued heavily to favor Israel over the Arabs, it did so to a lesser degree. A Gallup poll taken between February 27 and March 2 showed 44 per cent of the sample favoring Israel, 3 per cent favoring the Arabs, and 32 per cent taking a neutral position. In August, before the wave of Palestinian guerrilla airplane hijackings (p. 431), a Harris poll indicated that 46 per cent of the sample expressed basic sympathies for Israel and 6 per cent for the Arabs; 25 per cent took a neutral position and 23 per cent had no opinion. Support for Israel was strongest among the college-educated and those in the highest income brackets. Pro-Arab sympathy was strongest among blacks. The Harris poll also found that 41 per cent of the respondents thought the United States should not send troops to defend Israel if its independence were threatened; 38 per cent disagreed.

The greatest support for the use of American troops in defense of Israel was found in rural and small-town America, particularly in the South.

Pro-Israel sentiment in rural America was also reflected in an August survey of Southern Baptist pastors and Sunday-school teachers. It found 77 per cent of the pastors and 73 per cent of the teachers sympathetic toward Israel, and only 2.6 and 1.1 per cent, respectively, expressed support of the Arab states. A March 1969 survey had shown 71 per cent of the pastors and 69.3 per cent of the teachers in sympathy with Israel.

POMPIDOU VISIT

Unhappiness among American Jews over France's anti-Israel policy and the French sale of 100 Mirage jets to Libya created a public storm during French President Georges Pompidou's official visit to the United States in February. An Ad Hoc Committee on International Affairs, representing every major American Jewish organization, held a demonstration in Chicago where Pompidou and his wife were being honored at a formal dinner reception tendered by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Alliance Française. The demonstration emphasized the protest of individual Americans, not of Jewish organizations, against French policy.

According to all reports, the predominantly Jewish gathering of some 10,000 persons was orderly, though the demonstrators crowded in when President and Mrs. Pompidou arrived. The guests entered the building less than a minute later, and the demonstration broke up immediately thereafter. The next day's Chicago press reported no violence whatsoever.

Upon returning to New York City, Pompidou abruptly cancelled a projected meeting with Jewish leaders, and angrily called the Chicago protest "a stain on the forehead of America." He charged, March 2, that the Chicago police had acted in complicity with the demonstrators by letting them

come too close to him. The furor triggered a hurried visit to New York by President Nixon, who apologized to Pompidou for any discourtesy experienced.

Black Community

In an evaluation of the 1970 status of blacks, the January-February 1970 *Crisis*, official journal of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, (NAACP), prepared a balance sheet. On the negative side were such items as President Nixon's Southern strategy; the shooting of black students at Jackson State College; continued unemployment; attacks on black children attending an integrated school in South Carolina; thwarted school desegregation; black and white racism; racial hostility in the armed services; and the death of several important black leaders.

Among the positive developments were the success of black candidates in the election; the defeat of Judge G. Harrold Carswell's nomination to the Supreme Court; the exoneration of five Texas Southern university students charged with the murder of a Houston policeman; the abandonment of Jim Crow facilities and programs at Antioch College; the extension of the voting rights act of 1965; the growth of minority construction contractors.

Of positive significance was a nation-wide March-April 1970 Gallup poll which found a drop in the percentage of white parents in the South who would object to sending their children to schools with black children. Decreasing from 61 per cent in 1963, to 16 per cent in 1970, the change was considered "one of the most dramatic in the history of opinion sampling." In the North, the percentage also declined from 10 in 1963 to 6 in 1970. Nevertheless, the Congress of Racial Equality, at its September 1970 national convention in Mobile, Ala., officially rejected integration as the approach to achieve equal opportunity, a policy stated in its endorsement of a Mobile public school plan premised on "desegregation without integration."

Census reports on the status of the blacks, which began to appear at year's end, revealed significant developments, particularly in relation to poverty among blacks, continuing migration to the North, and the problems of black families. Significant gains were reported in the North for 532,000 young black families with husband and wife under age 35; their average annual income was \$8,900, or 91 per cent that of their white counterparts, as compared to 62 per cent in 1960. But these, Census Population Studies director Herman P. Miller pointed out, were "the most stable and promising of black families."

Other categories of black families showed either modest gains, or none at all. For 1.5 million black households headed by women, there was no income gain at all, as compared to whites. Of these, 53 per cent had incomes under the officially recognized poverty line of about \$3,800. Outside the South, the number of such households rose from 400,000 in 1960 to about 800,000 in

1970, with more than 53 per cent having incomes below the poverty line. Older black families in the North and West either gained slightly or by statistically insignificant amounts. Black income in the North and West was 75 per cent of white income; in the South, it gained only slightly, averaging 57 per cent; for the nation as a whole, it was 61 per cent as compared to less than 54 per cent in 1960.

The figures, Miller said, suggested that "younger, better-educated blacks in the North have been able to get jobs, maintain stable marriages, and vastly narrow the income gap." At the same time, black female-headed households, increased sharply in the 1960's, to three times those among whites, indicating continued social deterioration and deep poverty among many black families. Successful black families were moving out of the depressed areas, leaving "a concentration of misery in the hearts of our largest cities."

On migration, the Census Bureau reported, Southern black movement to the North during the 1960's continued at almost the same rate as in the two decades before. Of the 1.4 million Southern blacks, 396,000 migrated to New York, 272,000 to California, and some 120,000 each to New Jersey, Illinois, and Michigan. The census report further indicated that as Southern blacks moved to the North and West, whites in those areas moved to the South. The result, according to a New York *Times* report, "is a clear continuation of a long-term trend toward depression of the black population throughout the country."

Civil Rights

An important gain in civil rights was extension in August 1970 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for five more years, and its amendments to make it applicable to Northern cities requiring literacy tests; to prohibit literacy and other tests and devices as qualification for voting; to establish uniform residency requirements of 30 days in all federal elections, and to lower the voting age from 21 to 18 in federal, state, and local elections. In a five to four decision late in the year, the United States Supreme Court upheld all provisions except the one lowering the voting age in state and local elections.

A second important gain was G. Harrold Carswell's failure to win confirmation as Supreme Court justice to replace Abe Fortas. Civil-rights leaders and organizations considered Carswell a Conservative of pro-segregation leanings, as well as an unhappy example of President Nixon's "Southern strategy," and launched a vigorous congressional and senatorial campaign against him. He was defeated by a Senate vote of 51 to 45.

Congress advanced the civil-rights cause by removing a restrictive appropriation ceiling on the budget of the United States Civil Rights Commission. Two bills for improving the Equal Employment Opportunities Act and advancing school desegregation were blocked.

Civil-rights leaders and supporters accused the Nixon administration of failure to advance civil rights, particularly to enforce existing legislation. In a widely publicized criticism, Bishop Stephen G. Spottswood, chairman of the NAACP board of directors, charged the administration with having a calculated anti-Negro policy, and the President with displaying "a massive indifference to the polarization which is crippling the entire nation. He is against busing to achieve racial balance in schools, and against 'forced integration' in the suburbs. He remains mute about forced residential segregation or busing to maintain Jim Crow Schools."

Urban School Unrest

A Syracuse University study of some 700 urban high schools, prepared for the United States Office of Education and released in October 1970, revealed "a widespread and volatile situation." Racially integrated schools, it found, were more likely to be disrupted than all-white or all-black schools. However, integrated schools with high percentages of black students were less likely to be disrupted if they had high percentages of black staff members. Where the percentage of black students was higher than that of black staff members, disruptions were more numerous and more racial in tone.

Among causes contributing to unrest, the report said, were the success of civil-rights protests; effects of slum life; impact of minority-group pressures on traditionally middle-class-oriented public schools; influence of college and university disruptions; "black revenge," as well as dissatisfaction over dress and grooming codes and school policies governing participation in extra-curricular activities. The study also found that the traditional punishment for disruptions by students—suspension, expulsion, police arrest, in-school detention, and referral to parental discipline—often produced "perverse and countra-productive results."

The report's conclusion that "disruption is positively related to integration" disagreed with an earlier 1970 study conducted by Columbia University for the United States Office of Education. The latter, a survey of some 7,000 students in urban and suburban junior and senior high schools in Greater New York and Philadelphia, suggested that tensions and conflicts arose over issues of school governance and individual rights.

Urban Crime

Criminal offenses in 1970, the FBI reported, were 11 per cent higher than in 1969; serious crimes, except for rape, continued to increase faster than the nation's population, and were moving to the suburbs along with the population. The incidence of crimes committed by Jews in New York City was "startlingly low," reported the Jewish Family Service in New York, in January 1970. The approximately 300 Jewish men and women annually

convicted of crime in New York City and sent to state prisons for rehabilitation represented 3.2 per cent of all New York City convictions.

Particularly hard hit were those living or conducting business in predominantly black sections of many cities. *Fortune* magazine, July 1970, reported that crime was seriously victimizing the black middle class which, it had been thought, would play a major role in rebuilding the cities:

Commercial establishments in some transitional and black neighborhoods, many of them operated by fledgling "black capitalists," are hurting. A report by the Small Business Administration last year showed that 35 per cent of the business in ghetto areas had insurance problems because of mounting vandalism, burglary and robbery—high premiums, abrupt cancellations, or inability to get any insurance at all. For a black man or woman in a big city, the chances of being robbed are about 2-and-a-half times as great as for a white, and blacks fare even worse in the case of burglaries.

Jewish merchants' fears that they were special targets of crime because they were both white and Jewish led to their steady exodus and a percentage increase of black businessmen in predominantly black sections of many cities. For example, in Philadelphia in 1970, half of the Jewish businessmen still remaining said they wanted to sell, primarily because of physical insecurity and fear of violence. A quarter of the Jewish businessmen said they had been held up at least once; one man reported 11 holdups. Fifty-two per cent said their businesses had been vandalized and 52 per cent that they had been burglarized; 54 per cent claimed shoplifting was increasing. Black businessmen, too, recognized the problem and demanded more police protection.

A special problem, the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies reported, were the city's 100,000 poor Jewish aged, who lived in or near ghetto areas, too poor or too old to move, and afraid to leave their apartments. Many Jews living in changing neighborhoods, it was noted, also felt isolated, frustrated, and abandoned by major Jewish institutions.

In 1970 Congress passed three major anticrime bills sought by President Nixon. The District of Columbia Crime Bill, passed in July, had three controversial provisions: preventive detention for up to 60 days before trial for defendants considered "dangerous" to the community; "no-knock" searches that would permit a policeman with a warrant to force his way into a home without announcing his presence or identifying himself, if there was reason to believe evidence inside would otherwise be destroyed; and wiretapping and bugging by police with court approval in certain cases. A bill extending for three years the 1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act authorized \$3.15 billion to help cities and states fight crime. It provided for up to \$650 million in block grant aid to states and cities during the 1971 fiscal year, \$1 billion in 1972, and \$1.5 billion in 1973.

The Organized Crime Control Act was signed October 15. The growing use and abuse of drugs were major contributing factors in the rise in crime. In 1970 it was estimated that there were some 200,000 heroin

addicts in the United States, half of them in New York City, most of whom had to steal to support a habit costing \$30 to \$50 a day. According to a February report by a committee on drug abuse of the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, there was widespread and growing use of drugs also by Jewish youth in the cities, of whom some 12,000 between the ages of 12 to 21 were known addicts.

In October Congress passed the Controlled Dangerous Substances Act having a "no-knock" raid provision, which was aimed at controlling the flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs and at capturing and punishing pushers. While it reduced penalties for simple possession or use of narcotics for first offenders, it increased them for pushers and suppliers.

REFORM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The upsurge in crime underscored the need to reform court procedures and prisons. Complaints from inmates and disorders in prisons across the country in 1970 brought awareness of overcrowded jails, vermin-ridden cells, and poor food. Inmate disruptions at The Tombs, in New York City, brought to light that low-income *suspects* had to wait as long as two years for trial, and that the many prisoners serving terms for such nonvictim crimes as gambling, possession of marijuana, or loitering were a substantial cause of the overcrowding, which led to violence. United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger led a drive to end court delay by requiring trial within 60 days of arraignment. He also urged courts to institute modern management techniques.

A massive new effort at reform began in May 1970 with the formation of the National Alliance on Shaping Safer Cities, which insisted the present criminal justice "system" was a "nonsystem" that did not deter, detect, convict, correct and would not improve without substantial public understanding and activity. It urged that nonvictim crimes be transferred to social-welfare and health agencies, which could better deal with them, so that law enforcement agencies would have more time to cope with violent crime.

The Alliance, consisting of 46 member agencies and groups, aimed at involving all types of citizens in determining how the streets were to be policed and justice meted out in humane, constructive ways.

POLICE AND CRIME

Another effort at a more enlightened approach to law enforcement was the creation in late 1970 of the Police Foundation, a private agency to help reform the operations and training of police departments, particularly in urban areas. It received \$30 million from the Ford Foundation. Headed by a board of directors of high city and police officials and academic experts in the fields of law and administration of justice, it was to fund

projects concentrating on freeing police from clerical jobs for criminal investigation; devising guidelines for making arrests in nonemergency situations; developing skilled management personnel, and promoting better relations with the community.

Negro-Jewish Relations

In 1970 Americans became increasingly aware of Black Panther activities through the highly publicized trials of their leaders, conflicts between Black Panthers and police, their demonstrations and speeches, and their alliances with various revolutionary groups, including Arab guerrillas. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee, J. Edgar Hoover said in November: "Arab guerrillas reputedly are heavily subsidizing the Panthers." Some 11 months earlier, Eldridge Cleaver had claimed the Panthers "fully supported Arab guerrillas in the Middle East."

The philosophy and attitude of the Black Panthers regarding American Jews, Israel, and the Middle East conflict were well reported. They equated Zionism with imperialism, and accused Zionists of representing American imperialism in the Middle East. In Black Panther literature, antisemitism and anti-Zionism became indistinguishable. The terms Zionist and Zionism, which were always used in a derogatory manner, were substituted for the word Jew, regardless of applicability. Illustrative of this equation was a New York *Post* January interview with Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver in Algeria. In it he criticized a "Commission of Inquiry" headed jointly by former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg and NAACP director Roy Wilkins, which was to study clashes between the Black Panthers and police:

The power structure is trying to take control of the situation by using a well known Zionist and appointing Uncle Tom Congressmen like [Charles] Diggs and [John] Conyers and two well known discredited Uncle Toms like Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young to erect the facade of concern and official responsibility. Here comes Goldberg investigating a group that is a threat to both Uncle Toms and Zionists.

And in the official organ *Black Panther*, April 25, 1970, the party's international coordinator Connie Matthews wrote: "It was a Zionist judge, Judge Hoffman, who allowed the other Zionist to go free but has kept Bobby Seale in jail and sentenced him to four years for contempt charges." As proof of her contention that Zionists were racists, she continued:

The white-left in the U.S.A. is comprised of a large percentage of the Jewish population. Before the Black Panther party took its stand on the Palestinian People's struggle, there were problems, but the support of the white-left of the Black Panthers was concrete. However, since our stand, the white-left started floundering and it has become undecided. This leaves us with no alternative then to believe that a large portion of these people are Zionists and are therefore racists.

Reiterating opposition to "Israeli imperialism and Zionism aided and abetted by United States imperialism," she urged that "the one-eyed bandit of Tel Aviv, Moyshe Dyan [sic] must be hunted down and killed."

However, despite their vitriolic accusations, Black Panther leaders denied being antisemitic. The May 19 issue of the *Black Panther* stated:

It must be pointed out that the Black Panther Party is not anti-Semitic. In fact we are in total support of Palestine's righteous struggle against Zionist imperialism, that works hand in glove with U.S. imperialism. We must remember the Arab people are Semitic people also and the only right that the Zionist clique, headed by Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan have to the land that they call Israel is a robber's right.

Some months later, in September, Black Panther minister of defense Huey Newton, obviously referring to Connie Matthews' earlier statement, said:

We've been charged with being anti-Semitic. As a matter of fact some statements could be cited where some member of the party has made some statement in anger in order to hurt some of our white radical friends, because we believe they did not live up to the friendship agreement, but these were internal fights. . . . But as far as our official position, we are not anti-Semitic.

But nowhere did he, or any Black Panther leader, repudiate or condemn the "some statements."

By year's end it was clear that the Black Panther party represented only a tiny part of the black community, though it evoked in the community a certain admiration and sympathy for its bold and even illegal confrontations, particularly with the police. However, trials, police searches and investigations, shoot-outs, and internal differences over philosophy, tactics, and strategy made the future of the Black Panthers appear shaky, if not bleak.

The most recent analyses of Negro-Jewish relations, published at the end of 1969, were the opinion survey by Louis Harris Associates (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], p. 224), and a revised edition of Gary T. Marx's *Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community*,⁷ based on a 1964

⁷ An appraisal of studies of prejudice, including the Marx book and Gertrude J. Selznik and Stephen Steinberg, *The Tenacity of Prejudice* (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], p. 205), was made by Lucy S. Dawidowicz in "Can Anti-Semitism be Measured?" *Commentary*, July 1970. She found fault with those who fully relied on survey analyses to measure antisemitism. Though useful for "periodic pulse-taking," she says, such analyses serve ultimately "to limit our understanding of antisemitism, which is a phenomenon marked by a high degree of multiformity and contradictoriness." In particular she charged that Marx's primary concern was not antisemitism, but the views of blacks concerning the civil rights movement and that his study actually was "an uncritical apology for black militancy."

Marx took issue with the Dawidowicz critique in a letter to the editor of *Commentary* (November 1970, which published also comments from other readers). Referring particularly to the last charge, he stated that his study applied to black militancy of 1964, not of 1970: "the most likely to be militant over civil-rights issues in 1964, rather than being the frustrated, alienated, hate-filled *lumpen* misfits . . . tended to be instead an elite group in the black community."

study which was first published in 1967 (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 45–46, 50).

Mention should also be made here of David Drew's *A Profile of Jewish Freshmen*, an American Council on Education 1970 research report, which found that a high percentage of Jewish freshmen believed the disadvantaged should have preferential treatment in college admissions.

Jewish Defense League

The Jewish Defense League (JDL; AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 206, 225–28) used a variety of tactics to achieve its major aims which, according to its chairman Rabbi Meir Kahane, were to teach Jewish pride and self-defense, and to achieve political power. Administrative director Allen Mallenbaum elaborated to the *Christian Science Monitor*, January 16, 1970: "We do whatever is necessary to protect the life and property of little Jews. Whatever is necessary may mean a speech on a troubled college campus, or a court injunction. It also may mean a raw show of force—including the use of arms."

Militantly, and sometimes illegally, JDL impressed itself on the public's mind. In January it clashed with police at a demonstration outside the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and 27 members were arrested. It mailed letters to synagogues throughout Greater Philadelphia informing rabbis that, "If Muhammed Kenyatta [leader of the Philadelphia Black Economic Development Conference] or . . . his followers attempts . . . to disrupt your services, the Jewish Defense League expects to show courage in upholding the laws of our state by calling the police." In the latter part of the month and early in February, it protested the Soviet Union's treatment of Jews by disrupting concerts by Soviet musicians and conducting a "sit-in" at impresario Sol Hurok's office.

In May JDL attacked three Arabs in their offices near the United Nations and left a flyer explaining that the attack was in retribution for the killing of Israeli school children by Arab guerrillas. JDL members occupied the Park East Synagogue opposite the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in defiance of the rabbi's request that they leave, and shouted demands and played martial music directed at the mission.

In June, during an altercation between a group of blacks and Jews after a Negro girl was killed by a truck driven by a hassidic Jew, Kahane was arrested in the Williamsburg section of Brooklyn for allegedly assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest. The Jewish community of Williamsburg asked JDL to stay away because its presence heightened existing tensions.

In July JDL invaded the New York offices of the Soviet-American trading company Amtorg, to protest the arrest of 50 Jews in the USSR.

In September, after the Arab guerrilla hijackings, two JDL members carrying firearms and explosives were arrested for allegedly planning to hijack an Arab plane.

In October JDL conducted a sit-in at the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies in New York, demanded \$6 million for Jewish education, to which the agency responded by securing a Supreme Court restraining order against JDL.

The reaction of the major Jewish organizations, particularly in New York City, was most critical. In November American Jewish Committee president Philip E. Hoffman declared JDL activities "clearly violate the laws of the city, state, and nation, . . . endanger the lives of innocent citizens and . . . serve to harm those very causes which JDL purports to advance." In November Rabbi Joseph Karasick, president of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, called JDL "destructive" and "irresponsible," and its bombings of Soviet agencies in New York the "undisciplined and unjustified action of a small group that does not represent any Jewish consensus nor any major responsible American Jewish organization." In a December interview with *Panim el Panim* Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, dean of the rabbinical seminary Mesivtah Tifereth Jerusalem in New York, discussed JDL: "Not one Jew has been saved or helped because of these demonstrations. On the contrary, they are harming very much. Hundreds and thousands in the Soviet Union have been jailed or exiled as a result of such activities."

These and many other condemnations by prominent Jewish leaders and groups had little effect on JDL. The group claimed some 9,000 members at year's end, with the largest chapter in New York City and others in Philadelphia, Cleveland, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, San Francisco, Miami, Los Angeles, and "other small cities." Judging from the size of their demonstrations, however, its membership seemed to be much smaller; or perhaps consisted of many passive supporters who refused to participate in its activities. Although JDL activists appeared to be predominantly Orthodox, the group claimed Conservative, Reform Jews, as well as non-Jewish members, including blacks.

It appeared at year's end that not all chapters were in total agreement with the national leadership. In Boston at a meeting of the Jewish Community Council, a local JDL leader stated he did not favor some activities of the New York group and that he would resign if they were carried on in the Boston area.

No doubt, JDL's slogan, "Never Again," touched a raw nerve in many Jews, particularly those who believed extremist groups like the Irgun and Stern Gang played a necessary role in Israel's fight for independence. Young JDL'ers pointed to the alleged achievements of black militants and claimed that the "Jewish establishment" was too conservative or too removed from the problems of the Jewish poor in the cities and the Jewish oppressed in the Soviet Union. At the same time, JDL had appeal for many elderly, poor and, lower-middle-class Jews, who lived in changing neighborhoods and feared lawlessness and disorder, particularly by blacks.

Some observers thought JDL sparked a sense of urgency to respond to

threats to Jews here and abroad, which, they felt, older, established organizations could not or refused to do. After attending a lecture by Rabbi Kahane, staff columnist Beryl Segal wrote in the December 18 issue of the Jewish weekly *Rhode Island Herald*:

The Jewish Defense League is far from being a bunch of Hippies or a band of Vigilants. They are concerned Jews. They are mostly students of Yeshivos and their leaders are modern Jews who refuse to bend their heads and turn the other cheek. They do not initiate violence. But they do not run away from it. They are against destruction, but they will destroy those who rise up and destroy them.

In the same general vein, but without endorsing the tactics used, were comments by this writer in the March 27, 1970, issue of *The Reconstructionist*. While JDL actions were outrageous by all traditions of organized American Jewry, he said, they were "understandable and necessary, if not commendable"; for

Jews in our urban city know the dangers . . . feel them, and live them. . . . It is they who should be listened to and responded to—and it is here where the opponents of community defense are at their most irrelevant, for their public condemnations are barren of hope, promise and remedy, and thereby certain to intensify the helplessness and desperation and militancy of the poor.

Lincoln Hospital

In New York City, Lincoln Hospital and Einstein College of Medicine were participants in a confrontation involving a year-long series of conferences, demonstrations, and sit-ins, at which charges and countercharges of racism, religious prejudice, medical incompetence, and criminal practices escalated. Similar, but less extended, activities took place in other city hospitals, such as the Metropolitan Hospital, Gouveneur Health Services Clinic, Prospect Hospital, Brookdale Hospital Center, and Harlem Hospital.

A preliminary Anti-Defamation League report in December identified three militant community groups which were threatening New York City hospitals with turmoil, disruption, instability, and lower professional standards: 1) the Health Revolutionary Unity movement claiming to have city-wide representation in hospitals; 2) the Young Lords, a Puerto Rican group espousing revolution and armed struggle to "liberate" Puerto Ricans in the United States and Puerto Rico; 3) Young Doctors and Health Care Workers, an activist, New-Left group.

Lincoln Hospital, the only hospital in the South Bronx, a dense poverty area 65 per cent Puerto Rican and 35 per cent black, has been administrated and staffed by Yeshiva University Albert Einstein College of Medicine. In March 1969 the hospital's community mental health center was "taken over" by nonprofessional workers who charged white administrators with

"racist neglect of the needs of the community."⁸ After months of intense activity, 21 Puerto Rican members of a community group, in February, occupied the hospital administrator's office for several hours protesting the refusal of the Superintendent of Hospitals to appoint as administrator, a Puerto Rican, Dr. Antero Lacot, whom he considered unqualified. Three weeks later the mayor's office announced Lacot's appointment.

A series of protest actions against the hospital began in June: a demonstration against overcrowding and filth; setting up of a patient complaint desk by the Young Lords; a strike, in July, for higher pay and improved working conditions by some 350 technicians and para-professionals; a Young Lords sit-in for improved medical facilities at the hospital, which it called a "butcher shop that kills patients and frustrates workers from serving these patients," because "Lincoln exists under a capitalist system that only looks for profits."

Two weeks later, 12 doctors (11 Filipino and 1 Korean) in the pediatrics clinic asked to be relieved of their jobs because of "harassment and intimidation" by the Young Lords and other groups, and director of pediatrics Dr. Arnold Einhorn said he could not continue to operate "under these conditions." Dr. Lacot denied these charges and promised there would be no interference with patient care by militant groups. However, in August, director of obstetrics and gynecology Dr. Joseph J. Smith was held hostage for six hours by militants who demanded his resignation for refusing to renew a contract of a black physician, and for what they claimed a "genocidal abortion program."⁹ On August 26, a court restraining order barred community groups from "interfering with patient care and medical services at the Lincoln Hospital." Continued political activities in the hospital were reported in the press a month later.

In November Einstein Medical College Dean Label C. Scheinberg, giving in to demands by Dr. Einhorn's staff physicians, removed him from the post, which he had held for 12 years, and replaced him with his Puerto Rican assistant, Dr. Helen Rodriguez. According to the *New York Post*, a November 14 "confidential memorandum" signed by Scheinberg, praised Dr. Einhorn for having been "a superb director of the pediatrics service" but that "the pediatrics department finds it essential at this time to have a director of a different ethnic background."

This resulted in such actions as a recommendation by Mayor John V. Lindsay for a compromise proposal; a City Commission on Human Rights investigation into allegations of racism in Dr. Einhorn's ouster; occupation by the Jewish Defense League of the offices of Dean Scheinberg and President Samuel Belkin of Einstein and Yeshiva University, demanding Einhorn's reinstatement. On November 22 Einstein College announced Dr.

⁸ Geraldine Rosenfield, *Lincoln and Einstein: Medicine, Ideology and Ethnicity* (American Jewish Committee, January 1971), 23 pp. (mimeo.).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Einhorn's reinstatement, to start December 1 and to last until December 15, when he was scheduled to go on vacation.

A new issue arose when an ad hoc meeting of Lincoln's professional and nonprofessional psychiatric staff voted no confidence in their department chief Gabriel Koz. Action was based on the principle that workers should select bosses and that workers, together with the community, control the program. This action was firmly rejected, on December 7, by hospital administrators who stated, "Neither the community nor the staff controls the Department of Psychiatry nor any other department in this hospital."

By year's end the *New York Times* had traced the source of the conflict at Lincoln Hospital to an administrative decision to recruit interns who were "socially conscious and politically aware," and friction between Dr. Einhorn and his interns over their support of community activists.

The reaction to these events in the general and Jewish communities was strong: The Jewish Defense League, as a *Jewish Press* editorial of March 27, 1970 indicated, felt that "The school's purpose was to bring more black and Puerto Rican doctors into being. Now we see the thanks." One of many letters in the *New York Times*, articulating the growing anxiety of Jews in the social services profession, deplored "the nefarious trend toward ethnic tests for positions where expertise and dedication transcend skin color." The President of the Queens Jewish Community Council, on December 14, wrote to the Dean of Einstein Medical College:

As a hospital and medical school run under Jewish auspices and with widespread Jewish financial support, the thought that you would not stand up and strongly defend a Jewish staff member against an unfair demand to remove him, not because of his lack of capabilities but because he was not Puerto Rican, is one which strikes us with horror.

Professor Seymour Siegel of the Jewish Theological Seminary, in an interview on December 4, quoted doctors affiliated with Einstein as saying, "If it can happen to Jews by Jewish supported institutions such as Einstein, which is Yeshiva University's baby, what can be expected of the non-Jewish world and its dealing with Jewish personnel?"

The Yiddish daily press echoed these sentiments: the *Day—Jewish Journal*, on November 27, declared that "the main reason for Dr. Einhorn's dismissal is an anti-Semitic one" and expressed fear that he was being offered as the sacrifice to the "anti-Semitic passions of Jew-hating Puerto Ricans." The *Jewish Daily Forward*, on December 25, decried the use of ethnicity as a criterion and warned that it was "extremely important to tell the whole truth—if the truth is that Dr. Einhorn was persecuted because he is a Jew."

A minority Jewish view was expressed by Henry Schwartzchild, a member of the Commission on Social Justice of the Synagogue Council of America, who felt that, under certain conditions, it was "proper for a community to assert its prerogative."

Interreligious Relations

CHRISTIAN-JEWISH UNDERSTANDING

A major breakthrough in Catholic efforts to improve relations with Jews was the November 1970 report of the Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations to the National Conference of Catholic Bishops in Washington, D.C. The Secretariat not only encouraged the establishment in each diocese of an office or process to improve such understanding, but also provided materials for this purpose. It also held regular meetings with major rabbinical and Jewish communal organizations. Some 35 dioceses now had such programs.

However, the report pointed out, some problems still existed:

1) Antisemitism, though mostly low-toned and unconscious, was still widespread and required constant effort to detect and unmask its many disguises.

2) Catholic scholars have not yet sufficiently pursued research into the renewal of theology regarding the place of Judaism in the divine plan, though the Vatican Council's statement on the Jews showed the way.

3) The State of Israel has become a serious stumbling block in Jewish-Christian relations. Since "Jews have in the vast majority identified with that State" and "see Zionism as central to Judaism itself and essential not only to Israeli but also Jewish survival," they consider it "as an ecumenical and a religious consideration which should be included in the dialogue." They have judged Christian coolness or silence regarding Israel's danger, especially during the six-day war, "as indifference toward what they considered the possibility of another genocide." Dialogue on this point has taught Christians more about the bond uniting Jews to Israel, and Jews some of the questions Christians have had on the subject.

Catholics also showed concern regarding teaching about Jews and Judaism in Catholic seminaries, colleges, universities, and high schools. One study, released in 1970 by Sister Rose Albert Thering, O.P., indicated that 40 per cent of Catholic seminaries and colleges provided courses in Jewish studies; 41.3 per cent of the seminaries and 75 per cent of the colleges treated Judaism in comparative religion courses; and 82.7 per cent of the seminaries and 68.9 per cent of the colleges offered Scripture courses which specifically dealt with the relationship of Christianity to Judaism.

It was found that not all these institutions of higher learning dealt with the theology of the Nazi holocaust, or the history or theological significance of the State of Israel. These subjects appeared to have fuller treatment in Catholic high schools; almost 70 per cent of those responding to the questionnaire reported that local rabbis were invited into the classrooms when Judaism was being discussed.

No similar structural reforms took place among the mainstream Protestant denominations.

Still, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews continued to hold a large number of conferences, institutes, lectures, scholarly exchanges, and dialogues, all designed in one way or another to improve interfaith understanding among scholars, theologians, teachers, and laymen.

Of particular significance was the new and increasing number of programs and discussions by Jews with "conservative" or Evangelical Protestant groups, which, before the six-day war, had little contact with the Jewish community. Their readiness to meet and work with Jews stemmed from their support of Israel, whose victory and growth they viewed as a fulfillment of biblical prophecy, and from opposition to the Soviet Union, especially among Baptists whose sect was persecuted behind the Iron Curtain. For example, in May 1970, the Lutheran Council in the U.S.A. and the American Jewish Committee cosponsored a major colloquium on "The Meaning of Israel for Jews and Christians." Jewish organizations helped promote Billy Graham's film, "His Land," which, though intended for Christian audiences, was considered strongly pro-Israel.

CHURCH-STATE ISSUES

Disagreement on church-state relations among Jewish organizations most clearly manifested themselves in the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC), to which practically all major national, local, state, and county agencies across the country belong. In 1970 NCRAC, except for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations in America (UOJC), reaffirmed complete separation of church and state, and opposition to the direct or indirect use of public funds for the support of religiously controlled schools, including transportation and textbooks. UOJC strongly dissented, stating that the majority position was "detrimental to the Jewish interest" and "a product of a misreading of the First Amendment." It distinguished between basically religious and basically secular courses in parochial schools and considered government support of the secular programs no more a breach of the principle of separation of church and state than government exemption of houses of worship from realty taxes.

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court decision in *Walz v. The Tax Commission of New York*, in May, was that real estate tax exemption was not aimed at establishing, sponsoring or supporting a religion, and that the effect was not an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.

However, several decisions by lower courts strictly adhered to church-state separation: In January and June, the state supreme courts of Maine and Massachusetts declared pending parochial aid bills unconstitutional. In July the Montana Supreme Court unanimously invalidated a tax levy which was to be used to pay teachers in a parochial high school.

A U.S. District Court rejected the claim of a group of California parents of children in nonpublic schools that they were constitutionally entitled to state aid. A similar suit by parents claiming aid under the Federal Elemen-

tary and Secondary Education Act was dismissed in August on procedural grounds by a U.S. District Court in Missouri. A three-judge Federal Court unanimously held in October that a Connecticut statute providing aid to parochial schools was unconstitutional. A New York judge, in November, upheld the action of a state commissioner barring aid to a sectarian college. In October the Louisiana State Supreme court declared a July 1970 state act aiding sectarian and private schools in violation of the state constitution. A Federal Circuit Court in December reversed a decision upholding Ohio's granting of textbooks and other materials under Title II of the Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and remanded the case for trial.

On the other hand, free busing for parochial school students was upheld in Minnesota and West Virginia courts. And the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously upheld the use of state credit to assist the financing of the construction of buildings for sectarian schools.

Of some 70 cases reported by the American Jewish Congress Commission on Law and Social Action,¹⁰ 30 dealt with public aid to sectarian schools and colleges, and 24 with other instances of government support of religion, such as religious practices in public facilities, prayers and Bible reading and distribution in the public schools, compulsory chapel services in service academies, tax exemptions for religious bodies, and state abortion laws.

According to the American Jewish Congress, one of the "conspicuous" features of church-state cases before the Supreme Court was the attempt to use the courts to obtain financial aid for parochial and other nonpublic schools as a matter of right. In such cases it was urged that the state had an obligation to provide aid in order to bring about "parity" in financing out of public tax funds secular aspects of instruction in both public and nonpublic schools.

The issue was widely discussed as financially troubled private and church-supported schools continued to close down across the country. President Nixon, in April, established a special panel to study federal aid to private schools.

The 1970 record of state legislatures on public aid to religiously affiliated schools included the adoption in Louisiana, Michigan, and New Jersey of "teachers' salary supplement" acts providing for state payment of at least a part of the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in some or all nonpublic schools, and the appropriation by the New York State legislature of \$28 million, to be used specifically to help nonpublic schools keep attendance and other records. Pennsylvania, which had adopted a salary supplement statute in 1968, increased its appropriation in 1970; at the same time, it

¹⁰ *Litigation Docket of Pending Cases Affecting Freedom of Religion and Separation of Church and State* (American Jewish Congress, January 1, 1971), 93 pp. (mimeo.).

limited aid under the statute to 25 per cent of the average instructional cost in public schools.

Indirect and narrower forms of aid for church-affiliated schools were adopted in several states. Georgia voters adopted a constitutional amendment authorizing the General Assembly to provide grants to students at colleges which were not part of the state university system. New Hampshire passed a measure providing financial assistance to school districts, giving certain limited services to nonpublic schools and those with a dual enrollment program. The New York State legislature voted to repeal the Blaine Amendment prohibiting direct or indirect aid to church-affiliated schools; to become effective, the repeal required a second vote by the legislature in 1971 or 1972, as well as approval by referendum.

Parochial-school aid advocates suffered some reversals in Michigan where a popular referendum approved a state constitutional amendment barring all state support for private schools, except the provision of buses, and in Nebraska, where voters rejected a proposed state constitutional amendment permitting tuition reimbursement for nonpublic school parents.

Also, tuition grant bills in California, Florida, Texas, Vermont, and Wisconsin were defeated, as were proposals in several states for teachers' salary supplements, busing, auxiliary services, and income tax credit.

Ever since the Supreme Court, in 1963, outlawed prayer in public schools, attempts have been made by school committees, state legislatures, and individual educators to return to the practice. In November the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously ruled unconstitutional a Netcong City High School plan to read a prayer taken from the *Congressional Record* to a voluntary audience of students before school officially opened each day. In a lower court ruling, New Jersey's Judge Joseph A. Stamler called "This type of subterfuge . . . degrading to all religions."

The issue of reforming state abortion laws, too, often became the subject of intense public debate. The *Religious News Service* pointed out in a review of the year 1970 in religion, that "the inability of New York Catholics to stop enactment of what was called the nation's most liberal abortion law, suggested a waning of the Church's power to make its views prevail."

PHILIP PERLMUTTER

The United States, Israel and the Middle East

THE YEAR 1970 marked a period of significant transition for the Middle East. During the first half of the year the continued intensification of the Egyptian-Israeli war of attrition brought death and devastation that became increasingly intolerable for both sides. At the same time, the deepening, direct Soviet involvement in the United Arab Republic's military establishment raised the spectre of an inevitable collision of the two nuclear superpowers if the escalating violence along the Suez Canal was not quickly brought to a halt. This prompted United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers to undertake a new initiative in mid-June to get the parties "to stop shooting and start talking." After the United States succeeded in extracting the formal acceptance of Egypt and Israel, and apparent Soviet acquiescence, the guns along the Suez Canal fell silent on August 7 and diplomatic talks began.

The fragile cease-fire continued despite denunciations by Syria and Iraq of any peaceful settlement with Israel and efforts of the Palestinian commando groups to wreck the talks and renew the conflict. A more serious challenge to the American initiative was immediately posed by massive Egyptian deployment of advanced Soviet surface-to-air missiles close to the Suez Canal, in violation of the military standstill agreement. Jerusalem denounced the build-up and said Israel would not return to the indirect discussions, begun at United Nations headquarters on August 25, until the military balance along the Canal had been restored. After lengthy, and at times heated, exchanges between Washington and Jerusalem, the Nixon administration acknowledged that Cairo and Moscow had unfairly exploited American restraint in arms shipments to Israel, and agreed to sell Israel additional planes, tanks and sophisticated electronic equipment.

The firmer American posture also moved the Russians to discourage any new Egyptian military adventure. A Soviet-Egyptian diplomatic campaign at the United Nations resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly, on November 4, of a resolution urging the parties to extend the cease-fire for three months to get UN-sponsored peace talks under way. Since the resolution also deplored "the continued occupation of the Arab territories," it provided Cairo with the needed face-saving formula to justify its agreement to extend the cease-fire. At the end of December, Israel resumed indirect talks with Egypt, while continuing contacts with Jordan under UN special envoy Gunnar Jarring's auspices.

This revived hopes for a Middle East settlement, but one that was by no means certain, because Egypt and Israel remained far apart in their demands and suspicious of each other's intentions. Would the cease-fire be only a

temporary hiatus in the established pattern of intermittent and ever more intense hostilities, or would it be the first step toward a just and lasting peace? The answer would depend in large measure on what lessons the parties had learned and what conclusions Russia and the United States drew from the developments in 1970.

Nasser's Death and Legacy

Within the Arab world an era came to an end with the death in September of UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser. He had been Egypt's undisputed ruler for more than a decade and a half, a charismatic leader for the Arab masses, and a force to be reckoned with by the nations of the world. Since there was no single Arab leader of his stature to assume Arab leadership, Nasser's death encouraged greater independence of action by the other members of the Arab League.

Within Egypt itself, the transition was remarkably smooth, at least on the surface. Anwar el-Sadat, a long-time army colleague and fellow member of the revolutionary "Free Officers," who had earlier been selected by Nasser as his vice president, was quickly nominated by the ruling Arab Socialist Union to succeed Nasser as president. He was endorsed by the Egyptian National Assembly and elected in a popular plebiscite, on October 15, by 90 per cent of the votes cast. Since Nasser had in his time received over 99.9 per cent of the vote, the fact that more than 700,000 did not vote for Sadat was taken by some observers as an indication that there existed potential sources of discontent and that the new regime would have to prove itself. Sadat pledged greater emphasis on improving life for the Egyptian people. The selection of Abdel-Mohsen Abu-el-Nur to succeed Nasser as secretary-general of the Arab Socialist Union was in keeping with this promise. Abu-el-Nur was an agronomist and former minister of agrarian reform and land reclamation, deputy premier for agriculture and irrigation, and minister for local administration. Time would tell whether Sadat was only mollifying the discontented until he could consolidate his power or whether he seriously intended to shift national priorities from an active pan-Arab policy to a concentration on Egyptian domestic reforms.

Nasser's post as prime minister went to Mahmoud Fawzi, a 70-year-old career diplomat, who had served six years at the United Nations and spoke seven languages, but neither Russian nor Chinese. He was Egypt's first non-military prime minister since September 1952. His broad experience and noncontroversial background made him an apt choice for leading Cairo's new diplomatic offensive for international support, especially in the West.

The new regime pledged to continue the foreign policies of Nasser, but his legacy was ambiguous. In the last months of his life, Nasser apparently became concerned about Egypt's heavy dependence on the Soviet Union and, in an attempt to regain his earlier advantageous position of having the two superpowers compete for Egypt's favor, he began to drop private hints

to Western visitors that he would welcome improved Egyptian-American relations if Washington would stop supporting Israeli "imperialism and racism." In a televised May Day address to the Egyptian people Nasser made this appeal public. He justified the massive Soviet military aid as necessary to withstand Israeli "aggression by American-made Phantoms," and insisted that "all this aid, brothers, has been without strings." He declared that Soviet help was not given "to commit aggression or to expand, [but] to liberate our territories and to strengthen our independence," which was Egypt's right and "indeed . . . our duty."

At the same time, Nasser declared, Egypt was prepared to "work for peace" and "to abide by all peace arrangements" provided in the November 1967 Security Council resolution. But, he added, there could be "no peace with Israeli expansionism"; Israel would have to withdraw from the occupied territory, as well as "implement the UN resolutions on the Palestinian people's rights."

Nasser then turned to Arab-American relations, declaring that "a decisive moment" had been reached: ". . . either we will be estranged forever or there will be a new, serious and definite start." Noting reports of United States discussion of a new shipment of arms to Israel, he appealed to Nixon not to give fresh support to Israel, either military, political or economic, as long as it occupied Arab territories. He was making this "final appeal," he said, "for the sake of peace in the Middle East." Israel interpreted Nasser's speech as an attempt to put it on the defensive before world public opinion and to drive a wedge between it and the United States. As for Sadat, he was left with a choice of interpreting Nasser's declaration as Jerusalem did, or as a mandate to seek peace with a nonexpansionist Israel.

Attempts at Arab Unity

Within the Arab world, Sadat could cite Nasser to justify greater emphasis on Egyptian rather than pan-Arab politics. True, Nasser had preached Arab unity and had at various times tried to subvert what he called the "reactionary" regimes in other Arab states to bring them under Cairo's "progressive" hegemony. Yet, after the bitter experience of the union with Syria, which broke up in 1961 after only three years, and the long, costly, and inconclusive Egyptian intervention in the civil war in Yemen, Nasser became wary of grandiose schemes of pan-Arab unity. Thus, while Nasser encouraged closer economic and political cooperation with Libya and the Sudan where leftist army officers had seized power in 1969, he advised proceeding cautiously on plans for formal federation at a conference with General Gaafar Numeiry of the Sudan and Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, in Khartoum in May 1970.

The question of how far and how fast to proceed with unification continued to be seriously debated in Egypt after Nasser's death. Sadat and the Sudanese and Libyan leaders meeting in Cairo in November announced their

decision to form a unified leadership committee to improve coordination and advance the integration of their three states. But by year's end, the three had not yet progressed beyond an "agreement to agree" in principle to an eventual federal union.

The concept had more to recommend it than the abortive Egyptian-Syrian union. The three states were contiguous, and they could complement each other's needs: Libya had surplus oil, the Sudan had fertile land, and Egypt could provide teachers, technicians, and surplus farm labor to its less developed neighbors. Union would increase their relative weight within the Arab world and their prestige internationally. On the other hand, in Sudan, union was regarded as "premature" by its influential Communist party. There was also no doubt that it would spur the secessionist movement among blacks in the south, who were revolting against domination by the northern Muslim Arabs. Some Libyans, too, were likely to oppose giving up a major share of their oil wealth to their much larger neighbors.

The union's long-range effect on the Arab-Israel conflict aroused some concern in Jerusalem, especially after the new Syrian regime of General Hafez al-Assad in November began to express interest in joining. The projected union, if it actually came into being, would enhance Egypt's economic resources and military potential, and the more fanatical Libyans and Syrians might push Egypt into resuming hostilities. On the other hand, a union would mean at least the theoretical possibility that Cairo would have a restraining influence on Tripoli and Damascus, and that Egypt's leaders would find economic cooperation with their Arab neighbors more productive than conflict with Israel.

Among the factors prompting Egypt to seek rapprochement with Libya and the Sudan was dissatisfaction with the eastern Arab states, which had failed to give effective military aid against Israel and were constantly bickering among themselves. In August, Iraq accused Egypt of betraying the Arab cause by accepting the Rogers proposal for a cease-fire and indirect talks with Israel. Egypt's reply was that it had borne the entire brunt of the battle at great cost, while Iraq had allowed the eastern front to disintegrate and sought cheap propaganda victories through bellicose pronouncements from the safe distance of Baghdad. War Minister General Fawzi told the Iraqis that his country suffered "20,000 military and civilian martyrs since June 5, 1967." In addition, more than 500,000 Egyptian civilians had been evacuated from the cities along the Suez Canal as part of the war of attrition.

Palestinian Extremism

The recklessness and divisiveness of the Palestinians, whose cause Nasser had been championing over the years, led Cairo to have some serious second thoughts about unqualifiedly backing their commando groups. In a June broadcast from Damascus, Dr. George Habash, leader of the radical leftist

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), demanded that Egypt and Jordan renounce their acceptance of the November 1967 UN Security Council resolution, and "cooperate unconditionally" in "fighting Israel and erasing it from the Middle East map." He warned that if any Arab leaders continued to seek a peaceful settlement with Israel, "the forces of the Palestine Revolution will have no option but to fight them and eliminate them and their regimes." Indeed, the commandos soon proved to be a more immediate threat to the Arab governments than to Israel.

When Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), denounced the cease-fire, Nasser clamped down on the Palestinians in Egypt and prohibited the use of its powerful transmitters for PLO propaganda broadcasts. The commandos then turned to Jordan, where they gradually became a law unto themselves. Intermittent skirmishes between the Palestinian guerrillas and the regular Jordanian army erupted into several days of bloody fighting in June, and a full-scale civil war in mid-September, when King Hussein finally decided that he would lose the loyalty of his army and what remained of his kingdom, unless he decisively reasserted his authority.

Meanwhile, early in September, the PFLP carried out the most spectacular of its series of hijackings of civilian aircraft, holding more than 300 men, women, and children hostage for days in the broiling Jordanian desert and blowing up four Western-owned jet airliners worth some \$50 million. The PFLP acts aroused nearly universal condemnation, with Egypt and some other Arab states denouncing them as harmful to the Arab and Palestinian cause. They were considered an attempt by the Popular Front hijackers to wreck the possibility of a peaceful agreement with Israel by setting off a chain of escalating violence in the region. Some observers saw Red Chinese influence behind all this. Lending some credence was the fact that Dr. Habash was just completing a tour of Asian Communist countries (China, North Vietnam, and North Korea) and that he had declared earlier in an interview with *Life*, published on June 12, that the People's Republic of China was the PFLP's "best friend" and that "China sees eye to eye with us on this issue." When he was asked whether the prospect of triggering a third World War did not bother him, he replied, "To be frank, it doesn't."

Whatever their intentions, these events in summer 1970 may have marked a critical turning point in the fortunes and appeal of the Palestinian commandos. Moscow, Cairo and Amman were finally convinced that unless the commandos were curbed and progress was made toward a peaceful settlement, the situation might rapidly get out of control. Nasser's last act was to sponsor a summit conference in Cairo to hammer out an agreement between the Jordanian government and the Palestinian commandos to end the civil war. Nasser died the day after the conference ended, and the agreement turned out to be only a temporary truce. Although scattered incidents continued to erupt and each side accused the other of violations, by year's end King Hussein seemed to have regained firm control and the Palestinians

were decimated, discouraged, and disorganized. But a new outbreak by embittered Palestinian fanatics remained an ever present danger.

Fear of Great Power Confrontation

If George Habash was not concerned about triggering a third World War, President Nixon certainly was. In his "State of the World" message on February 18 he elaborated on his first post-election statement on the Middle East, in which he had expressed concern lest renewed conflict in the area lead to a Soviet-American nuclear confrontation (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], p. 229). Alluding to the irrational and emotional elements in the area, Nixon pointed out that the Middle East "combines intense local conflict with great-power involvement," a combination "all the more dangerous because the outside powers' interests are greater than their control." Noting that increased Soviet activity in the Middle East and the Mediterranean in recent years had consequences going far beyond the Arab-Israel conflict and affected long-standing United States obligations to enhance the "integrity and freedom" of nations in the region, Nixon warned that "the United States would view any effort by the Soviet Union to seek *predominance* in the Middle East as a matter of grave concern" (author's emphasis).

However, Nixon weakened his warning by emphasizing throughout the message that the United States was ready to work together with the Soviet Union within the Middle East and elsewhere—a significant departure from the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of trying to keep Russia out of the Middle East. Indeed, the "State of the World" message announced a shift in America's foreign policy goal from that of policeman of the world to "a more realistic assessment" of United States interests aimed at more limited commitments and "a sharing of responsibility" for peace. Although the President acknowledged that the Middle East presented one of the sternest tests of his policy of "peace through partnership and accommodation of interests," he presumed that the Soviet Union would agree to some cooperation out of a common interest in avoiding a direct confrontation.

Nixon reiterated the American proposal for a Great Power limitation on arms shipments to the Middle East as a stabilizing step and, at the same time, reaffirmed the United States intention "to maintain careful watch on the balance of military forces and to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises." Almost immediately, however, unnamed "administration officials emphasized," according to a front-page Washington dispatch by Peter Grose in the *New York Times*, February 19, "that Mr. Nixon's warning referred to any broad efforts toward staking out a position of strategic strength in the Middle East." The dispatch further said that "the sending of MIG-23 aircraft"—which Nasser requested and which were more advanced than the MIG-21's he had previously received—"or even an unanticipated dispatching of Soviet pilots to the United Arab Republic, would be viewed in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute and not the broader strategic problems of the

area." This presumably accurate interpretative article doubtless weakened the general impact of Nixon's warning to the Russians; more ominously, it could have been interpreted by the Russians as a green light for escalating their military involvement in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Soviet-Egyptian Military Coordination

After Israel's deep penetration raids into Egypt, Nasser secretly flew to Russia in January 1970. Within weeks of the visit, the Soviet Union began to introduce its most sophisticated ground-to-air missiles, first around the major Egyptian cities and the Aswan Dam and then ever closer to the Suez Canal front. Russian missile crews and increasing numbers of Soviet advisers with the Egyptian forces were supplemented by Russian pilots, who in mid-April, began to fly operational missions.

The Russians moved step by step, pausing each time to gauge the American reaction. A key development occurred in March 1970. Since Mrs. Meir's visit to the United States in September 1969, Israel had been pressing the United States for the delivery of additional Phantom and Skyhawk jets. In January 1970, President Nixon reassured an emergency gathering in Washington of Jewish leaders that the United States "stands by" Israel and was "prepared to supply military equipment necessary to support the efforts of friendly governments, like Israel's, to defend the safety of their people." On March 23 Secretary of State Rogers announced that the President would "hold in abeyance for now" the decision on Israel's request, but that he ordered a close watch on the military balance in the area. Two days earlier Nixon had referred to recent "disturbing reports" that the Soviet Union, by deliveries of new SA-3 missiles to the UAR and "through the insertion of military personnel, may be taking actions which could change the balance." If this should occur, "then the United States would take action to deal with that situation."

The Israelis were troubled by this response, for they were convinced that the latest Russian actions had already affected the balance of power. Israeli military planners stated that Israel could not wait until the shift of balance against it became decisive for the United States to provide assistance. By then it might be too late. Secretary Rogers tried to reassure Jerusalem on this point when he added to his announcement on holding off the sale of the planes that the United States would be able "to provide additional as well as replacement aircraft promptly if the situation requires it."

The decision on the planes was deferred for a number of reasons. President Nasser privately and publicly warned the United States of serious consequences to American interests in the Arab world if the planes were sent, and American oil company executives added their voices of concern. State Department officials feared that additional arms shipments to Israel would jeopardize the American image of "even-handedness" as well as the fragile hope of Arab acceptance of the Rogers proposals for a political settlement.

Finally, it was hoped that if Washington limited arms shipments to the area, Moscow might be induced to do likewise. Warnings by the Israelis and some American political scientists that Moscow would interpret Washington's action not as an expression of restraint but merely of indecision and weakness went unheeded.

In any case, less than a month after the Nixon-Rogers announcements, Soviet pilots began to fly operational missions in Egypt. Secretary Rogers acknowledged before the House Foreign Relations Committee, on June 9, a further deterioration in the Middle East situation "largely as a result of increased Soviet involvement in the air defense" of the UAR. He noted that this was the first time since World War II that Soviet missilemen and pilots were stationed in a country outside the Warsaw Pact, but tried to minimize the significance of this event by pointing out that so far the Russians had avoided a direct clash with Israeli pilots.

Washington became alarmed when it learned a few days later that, in one week in June, Israel lost three Phantoms to the new Russian-manned missiles and that the Israelis in turn downed four MIG-21's—reliably reported to have been manned by Soviet pilots. Fears mounted that the escalating fighting along the Suez Canal would lead to a new all-out round in the Arab-Israel conflict and that the direct involvement of Soviet personnel could lead to a United States collision with the Soviet Union.

Reaction to New U.S. Peace Initiative

The main points of the new peace initiative launched by Secretary Rogers on June 19 were restoration of an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire along the Suez Canal for at least 90 days and agreement by the parties to begin indirect talks with UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring on moving forward to a peace settlement based on implementation of all parts of the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

Israel at first flatly rejected this initiative, but, at United States urging, agreed to wait until the others had responded. After the Egyptians, Russians, and Jordanians all replied affirmatively, Israel found itself in the publicly untenable position of seeming to be the obstacle to peace. Washington also applied intensive pressure on Jerusalem to accept, intimating that if it did not, its pending arms and economic requests might be indefinitely delayed.

It was thought in Washington that the USSR urged Egypt to agree to the American initiative because the Russians were concerned that the situation along the Suez Canal might get out of hand; that the White House was reasserting its authority in the Middle East crisis, and that Nixon might revert to his traditionally tougher anti-Communist stance. In a television discussion with three commentators on July 1, President Nixon explained the strategic and economic importance of the Middle East to the United States and its NATO allies, and said Soviet military aid to Egypt and other Russian moves into the eastern Mediterranean affected these American in-

terests. Charging that Israel's "aggressive neighbors—the U.A.R. and Syria" wanted to "drive Israel into the sea," and that a shift in the balance of power against Israel would therefore mean war, Nixon made it clear that the United States would give Israel aid to counter the Soviet support of the UAR because "it is in United States interests to maintain the balance of power." He again urged the Soviet Union to join with the United States "to work together to bring this particular danger spot under control."

The President's hand had been strengthened by developments in Congress. On May 23, seven senators, all notable critics of the American Vietnam policy, wrote a letter to Nixon, warning that use of Soviet pilots and men in Egypt threatened not only Israel but world peace; urging the sale of needed aircraft to Israel and calling for a new attempt by the United States and its NATO allies to restore the cease-fire as the first step toward peace. This was followed, on May 27, by a letter from a bipartisan group of senators to Secretary Rogers, warning that recent Soviet actions represented "a challenge to American strategic interests and a growing threat to world peace," and also urging that the United States announce its intention to provide aircraft to Israel. By June 24 this letter had been endorsed by 79 senators, or far more than the two-thirds majority needed for treaty approval. A majority of the House of Representatives similarly endorsed arms for Israel.

Among other factors reportedly influencing the Soviet position were resentment in some quarters at home at the economic drain of aid to Egypt, and perhaps more importantly, eagerness for a political settlement which would permit the reopening of the Suez Canal, a vital artery linking Russia's industrial heartland with its Far Eastern provinces in case of a conflict with China.

The Egyptians, it was argued, also had good reason for assuming a more moderate stand. There was considerable resentment in the army over growing Soviet domination of the country, and as already noted, Nasser, too, was unhappy about it. Besides, the war was inflicting heavy economic and physical losses; in the month of June alone, Nasser publicly admitted, his army suffered some 2,000 casualties along the Suez Canal front. There were widespread reports, fostered by Cairo, that the Egyptians were weary of war and genuinely sought a lasting political settlement.

Many Israelis were skeptical; they saw Nasser's response as merely tactical, not as a basic policy shift. They cited his speech to the Arab Socialist Union, wherein he said that failure by Egypt to agree to the Rogers initiative would give Israel "the excuse to obtain more arms from the U.S." The Israelis feared that Nasser would use the 90-day cease-fire to legitimize his resumption of fighting when it expired. More important, a cease-fire might enable the Egyptians and Russians to carry out their plan to install missiles along the canal itself, which had thus far been frustrated by Israel only through more than two months of intensive around-the-clock shelling.

The Israel government accepted the Rogers initiative only when American officials explained that they regarded the 1967 unlimited cease-fire still bind-

ing and were only reestablishing Egyptian compliance with it, and when Nixon informed Prime Minister Meir of a promise by the Egyptians, with alleged Russian endorsement, that they would observe a military standstill forbidding installation or redeployment of missiles and other new equipment within a 50-kilometer radius from the canal. At the end of July, Nixon declared that the United States considered the military standstill "an integral part" of the cease-fire; reiterated the American commitment to Israel's security and maintenance of the military balance, and expressed his belief that Israel could agree to the cease-fire and the negotiations through Dr. Jarring "without fear" that its "position may be compromised or jeopardized in that period."

"Crisis of Confidence" in Israel-U.S. Relations

The already strained American-Israel relations escalated into a major crisis of confidence when several incidents made Israel suspicious that at least some high American officials were more concerned with the success of the Rogers initiative than with Israel's legitimate security needs. Despite Mrs. Meir's insistence that Israel agreed to withdrawal "to secure, recognized and agreed boundaries," State Department officials allowed Dr. Jarring to announce that Israel had agreed to "withdrawal." Israel produced evidence of continuing major Egyptian violations of the standstill through installation of new missile sites and heavy artillery near the canal. However, American leaks to the press, including a comment by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, minimized the military significance of the violations, questioned the accuracy and conclusiveness of the evidence, and even impugned Israel's motives for bringing the charges. They created the impression that Israel was reluctant to enter into serious peace negotiations and was using the violations as an excuse to scuttle the talks.

The Israel government had in fact made several concessions by agreeing to indirect talks, a limited cease-fire, and the principle of "withdrawal." But these moves were based on the pledge of continued United States support, which had now been placed in doubt.

The American government finally acknowledged that violations of the cease-fire had occurred on the Egyptian side, and warned Moscow and Cairo that these acts endangered the peace effort. It also quietly began to make military assistance available to Israel to help neutralize the effect of the missiles. State Department officials privately acknowledged the need to "mend fences" and to restore Israel's confidence in the United States. The Israel government also was anxious that the misunderstandings be removed. Accordingly, a private visit by Mrs. Meir to open the American United Jewish Appeal and Israel Bond campaigns was made the occasion for a day of intensive meetings with the President and Secretary Rogers in Washington on September 18. In the discussions, Mrs. Meir made three points:

1. Israel would not rejoin peace discussions until the situation on the west

bank of the Suez Canal was restored to what it was before the cease-fire began. President Nixon reportedly agreed to personally take up with the Russians this demand, but did not guarantee success.

2. The Israel government would continue to reject the Rogers proposals of October and December 1969, essentially because Israel's ideas of secure and defensible borders and a just solution of the refugee problem were at considerable variance with the Rogers formulations.

3. Mrs. Meir requested large-scale economic and military assistance, but sought reassurance that action on these requests would not be made contingent on Israel's position on details of a peace settlement. The President reportedly instructed senior American officials in her presence to give these requests prompt and sympathetic consideration.

Crisis in Jordan

Mrs. Meir's visit helped clear the air and remove some of the acrimony in American-Israel relations. Whatever the outstanding differences between the United States and Israel regarding the political settlement and negotiation tactics, the chaotic events in Jordan during September resulted in an unprecedented degree of collaboration. When the PFLP hijackers took over a desert airstrip and kept the Jordanian army at bay, King Hussein launched an all-out campaign against the commando groups. For nearly ten days bitter fighting raged in the streets of Amman, in the Palestinian refugee camps, and in several northern towns which had become commando strongholds. The number of killed and wounded was in the thousands; some estimated tens of thousands. The commandos charged that the Jordanian army had inflicted more casualties on them than the Palestinians had suffered in two decades of hostilities against Israel.

At the height of the fighting, the radical pro-Soviet regime in Syria—which backed the guerrillas and long desired to remove the conservative, pro-Western Hussein—moved nearly 300 Russian-supplied tanks into Jordan. What had been an internal conflict now became a major international crisis. Secretary Rogers on September 20 denounced the Syrian move as an “irresponsible and imprudent intervention.” President Nixon later said it had created “the gravest threat to world peace since this Administration came into office.”

However, the Syrians withdrew, King Hussein reestablished his authority, and the war was contained. The United States managed to avoid a dreaded confrontation by alerting the 82nd airborne division and other American military units in the United States and West Germany, preparing military transport planes, ostensibly to evacuate endangered American civilians, and dispatching ships of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean. These well publicized moves were reinforced by President Nixon's dramatic visit to the flagship of the Sixth Fleet to underscore the continuing United States interest in the security of the Mediterranean. The determination to maintain

the necessary military strength to preserve the peace against any threat in the Mediterranean was, he declared, "one of the primary indispensable principles of American foreign policy."

Israel played a most useful role in maintaining the credibility of the firm American posture. It was later revealed that the American units were greatly below normal strength, since many of their men had been transferred to service in Vietnam, and that America's NATO allies in the area were reluctant to provide support facilities. But the Israelis had an air force ready to destroy the Syrian tanks if they did not withdraw from Jordan. A partial mobilization of Israeli armed forces left no doubt that Israel was prepared within hours to intervene if necessary to prevent a pro-Soviet and militantly anti-Israel takeover in Jordan.

Knowing that it was no match for Israel, the Syrian air force kept its planes grounded. Damascus ordered the tanks to withdraw from Jordan. The approximately 12,000 Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan, which Baghdad radio had long proclaimed would be in the vanguard of the Palestinian guerrilla struggle, remained in their barracks and took no part in the fighting.

Soviet propaganda tried to make it sound as if it had been Moscow's moderating influence on its Syrian and Iraqi allies that stopped the attack. Most independent observers gave Moscow little credit for Syria's belated moderation. On the contrary, they suspected that the Russians initially gave at least tacit approval, if not outright encouragement, to the Syrian adventure. Clearly, the Syrians could not have moved nearly 300 Russian-supplied and Soviet-advised tanks without the knowledge of Soviet officials in Syria. If Moscow recommended moderation, it was only after the United States and Israel had demonstrated that they would under no circumstances permit the Russians to enter Jordan through the Syrian back door. When the United States reinforced its Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean, the Soviet Union temporarily reduced the number of its ships near the area of conflict as a sign to Washington that Moscow wished to avoid any confrontation.

U.S. Military Aid

In the aftermath of the Syrian-Soviet challenge in Jordan and the Egyptian-Soviet missile violations along the Suez Canal, the United States provided additional military aid to Jordan and Israel. Within several days, in December, King Hussein and Israel Defense Minister Moshe Dayan visited Washington. Hussein reportedly requested \$125 million in military aid over the next five years, including M-60 Super-Patton tanks and F-104 Starfighter jets, in addition to the \$30 million the Nixon administration had already granted to Jordan to replace the equipment lost in the civil war. Hussein also urged the United States to prod Israel to agree to withdrawal from occupied territory, except for possibly minor rectifications on a reciprocal basis. Asked by reporters about his promise to grant self-determination to the Palestinians after Israeli withdrawal, Hussein said he was confident the Palestinians would

always vote to remain in "the Jordanian family." The King was reported to have urged the United States not to speak of a Palestinian entity or otherwise seem to encourage Palestinian separatism. Hussein described his meetings with President Nixon and Secretaries Rogers and Laird as "extremely satisfactory."

Dayan reportedly discussed details of the equipment Israel was purchasing under the long-term, low-interest \$500 million military credit approved by the administration and authorized by Congress. Dayan was unusually reticent about his meetings with Nixon, Rogers and Laird. He denied that he had either made any specific request or received any new promises. However, he was believed to have suggested a mutual thinning out of forces along the Suez Canal as a first step in easing tensions, reopening the canal, and laying the groundwork of confidence for a full agreement in the future.

Speaking in New York to leaders of the United Jewish Appeal upon his return from Washington, Dayan praised President Nixon for having "kept every word he told us since he came to power, and he said a number of important words." Dayan apparently was alluding not only to a promise by Nixon to maintain the military balance of power in Israel's favor, but also to his formal assurances that the United States would not require Israel to withdraw any of its forces before a contractual peace settlement was concluded. These two points were implicit in the official Israeli statement, on December 28, that "the present political and military conditions" enabled and justified Israel's decision to resume participation in the Jarring talks.

Clarification of U.S. Policy

Secretary of State Rogers helped clarify American policy and allay some Israeli misgivings in his press conference of December 23. He emphasized that when speaking of a peaceful settlement, the United States did not mean "a temporary arrangement which will permit belligerency in the area," but "a permanent contractual peace that is agreed to by all those involved, and which will have as much assurance as it is possible to give in international life." When pressed about the precise role of the United States in working out or guaranteeing a settlement, he refused either to repeat or disavow what he said in a speech in December 1969 about limiting Israel to "insubstantial" alterations in the boundaries that existed before the 1967 war (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], p. 239). He declined comment, he said, because he did not want to jeopardize prospects for a beginning of negotiations. However, he stressed that

... we have said consistently that we think the responsibility for working out a peaceful settlement for an agreement rests among the parties—the UAR, Jordan and Israel. We do not have any blueprint as such. We do not have any plan that provides security as such. We think those matters should be negotiated among the parties. They have to live with each other, and they

have to have sufficient assurance among themselves that they can protect their own countries. . . .

He went on to say that in accordance with the terms of the November 1967 Security Council Resolution, the United States was prepared "to play a role in providing guarantees," but not as "a substitute for an agreement among the parties, but as supplementary and complementary." The form of the guarantees would depend on "what the parties would want and what other nations involved would want." While the United States as yet had formed no definite conclusion on participation in a multilateral international peace-keeping force, he totally rejected press speculation that it might consider a joint, bilateral Soviet-American peace-keeping force: "We have never given any thought to that concept," he explained, because "I think that concept, with just the two of us involved, would be totally impractical." Rogers thought the climate for peace "very good" because the continuation of the cease-fire made the people in the area realize the importance of peace and might put them "in a more flexible frame of mind."

Whether the decision in Cairo, Moscow, Amman, and Jerusalem would be for resumption of hostilities or further progress toward peace would depend in no small measure on what the United States did or failed to do in the months ahead. This became clear from a review of the record of American actions in 1970. They demonstrated that Washington's vacillation and indecision during the first half of the year encouraged a spirit of adventurism in Moscow that increased the danger of confrontation between the superpowers. Conversely, the firmness displayed by the United States government during the second half of the year acted as a restraining and sobering influence on the Russians and thereby lessened the risk of confrontation.

UN and Palestinians

While the Palestinian nationalists had serious setbacks in Jordan and in Lebanon, where stringent measures were adopted against the commandos, the Palestinians scored new successes at the United Nations. A record number of nine resolutions dealt with various aspects of the question.

The November 4 General Assembly resolution calling for continuation of the cease-fire and resumption of Arab-Israel talks included a clause recognizing that "respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." This was a watered-down version of the original draft proposed by 19 pro-Arab African and Asian states and Yugoslavia, which would have recognized that "full respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, as affirmed in the General Assembly resolutions, is a prerequisite to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East." This would have meant pushing Israel back at least to the 1947 partition plan borders, if not its complete dissolution and replacement by a Palestinian Arab state. The amended ver-

sion was relatively mild; several delegations explained that they understood it as not intended to undermine Israel's existence but merely as reaffirming the UN's concern for the individual Palestinian refugees contained in previous resolutions.

Far more controversial was an anticolonial General Assembly resolution adopted on November 30, which condemned "Governments that deny the rights to self-determination of peoples recognized as being entitled to it, especially of the peoples of southern Africa and Palestine." The phrase "and Palestine" was approved by a vote of 48 to 27, with 35 abstentions. The Arabs thus succeeded in their campaign to link Israel with racist South Africa. Once the phrase had been approved, few states wanted to go on record as opposing the principle of self-determination, and the resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 71 to 12, with 28 abstentions.

There was some irony in the outcome, since Israel voted earlier that day, together with the Arab states, in favor of some other resolutions explicitly condemning South Africa's *apartheid* and calling for measures against racial discrimination. Israel, Iran, and Turkey were the only Middle East states to vote for a Western sponsored resolution which condemned *apartheid*, as well as all other forms of racial discrimination; called upon all countries to become parties to the 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and reaffirmed the intention to combat racism and promote social justice based on respect for the dignity of the individual. Most of the Arab states and the Soviet bloc voted against this resolution, presumably because it was too moderate in language or too universal in application to suit their taste.

The Arab tactic of building step by step upon previous resolutions to expand the legal basis of their case reached its culmination in a December 8 Assembly resolution. This, for the first time, explicitly "recognized" that the Palestinian refugee problem "has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The resolution recognized further that "the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-determination, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations," and declared that "full respect for the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine" was an indispensable element in the establishment of Middle East peace.

In opposing this resolution, the United States representative said that it was the antithesis of earlier Assembly and Security Council resolutions calling for a peaceful solution between the Arab states and Israel, and that it distorted the Charter principle of self-determination by applying it not to a colony or other non-self-governing territory, but to one or more sovereign members of the United Nations (Israel and possibly Jordan). He pointed out that this was in contravention of Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter, which forbids the UN from intervening in matters which are essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction. The representative of Gabon opposed the resolution on the ground that it dealt only with the rights of a single Arab

people of Palestine and discriminated against other peoples of the region, who were directly interested parties.

Not only was the resolution one-sided and of dubious constitutionality, but it was adopted by a questionable parliamentary procedure. Before the vote, pro-Arab Somalia proposed waiving the principle that all important questions required a two-thirds majority and that, instead, this resolution be decided by a simple majority. This proposal was approved by the slim majority of 49 to 44, with 27 abstentions. The resolution itself was adopted by a vote of 47 to 22, with 50 abstentions. Although "legally" adopted, the resolution was backed by less than even a simple majority of the UN's total membership, drawing its support almost exclusively from Arab, Islamic, and Soviet bloc states.

The other resolutions on the Arab refugees were essentially carbon copies of those adopted in previous years, concentrating on the humanitarian aspects of the problem and particularly on the increasing financial difficulties facing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in the Near East. During the debate in the Special Political Committee, the Turkish representative, with the support of several other European delegates, urged that the political aspects of the question be held in abeyance and that the committee consider practical measures to improve UNRWA's finances. This had a generally salutary effect, although some Arab states and spokesmen for "the Palestine Arab delegation" and "the Palestine Liberation Organization" could not resist using this forum to deliver their usual lengthy anti-Israel diatribes.

UNRWA Commissioner-General Laurence Michelmore told the committee that the agency had gone through the most difficult year in its history. Inflation and the growing number of school-age children had raised UNRWA's budget to an estimated \$47.5 million for 1971, of which 46 per cent was earmarked for education, 40 per cent for relief services, and 14 per cent for health and sanitation. He estimated a deficit of \$5.5 million to \$6 million, unless additional contributions were obtained. While the agency had already reduced some relief and health expenditures, he said, any additional reductions, especially in education, were likely to have an "explosive" effect among the refugees. The representatives of Lebanon and Jordan also expressed concern that reducing or terminating UNRWA's services would undermine stability in their countries.

UN Secretary General U Thant, in a December 2 statement, endorsed the appeal for additional funds, noting that to deprive the refugees of needed services would constitute a "shameful failure by the United Nations to live up to its moral obligations." He also pointed out that any large reduction in UNRWA's services would inevitably add to resentment and tension at a time when an improvement in the atmosphere was desperately needed for progress toward a real solution. The Assembly adopted resolutions urging increased contributions from governments and other sources, and also appointed a nine-member working group to assist in fundraising and to

prepare a comprehensive report on all aspects of the agency's financing for the Assembly's next (fall 1971) session.

In his annual report for the year ending June 30, 1970, Dr. Michelmore also acknowledged that the deterioration of the political climate in which the agency operated hampered its operations. The agency's difficulties in Jordan and Lebanon, he wrote, had their source in "the considerable growth in numbers, firepower and influence of the Palestine politico-military organizations, in the enhanced political consciousness of the Palestine refugee community, which raised basic questions of authority and identification, and in the reflection of these developments in the attitude of the Agency's locally recruited staff."

In practice, this meant that some local UNRWA officials in Gaza and the West Bank were implicated in terrorist activities, according to the Israeli authorities who arrested them. The most flagrant abuses occurred in Lebanon, where for several weeks the guerrilla groups took over the refugee camps, and in Jordan, where refugee camps were openly being used as headquarters and training centers for terrorist operations.

The tragic events in Jordan in September increased the hardships for the refugees and compounded the agency's financial difficulties. Not only was UNRWA's property destroyed in the fighting, but the clear evidence of its inability to screen out terrorists from the other refugees, or even to prevent the guerrilla groups from operating in its camps, aroused criticism in the United States and made it increasingly difficult to obtain congressional support for additional relief contributions. In an editorial, "Subsidizing Subversion," the *New York Times* on November 6 characterized UNRWA as a "noble humanitarian effort" that "has been prolonged and perverted until it has become an instrument for sabotaging the work of the world organization." The writer concluded that, in light of the year's experience, "it would be folly to carry on UNRWA's program as before." Similar criticism was voiced by Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.) and Gaylord Nelson (D., Wis.), who called for overhauling UNRWA's operations to prevent their abuse for political and military purposes.

Opposition was also expressed to UNRWA's toleration of the guerrilla groups and what appeared to be an inclination to think of legitimizing their role, as evidenced in its readiness even to consider a proposal submitted by the Arab host government in June that "representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization should take part in future meetings on education" for the refugees. The apparent purpose of such PLO involvement was to restore the anti-Israel indoctrination that had been removed from the textbooks after Israel's protest to UNRWA and UNESCO in 1967 about texts used in UNRWA schools in Gaza and the West Bank. The American delegate emphasized in the UN committee discussion that the United States believed that UNRWA should deal only with governmental authorities on questions of order and security in the camps. He "welcomed assurances" that UNRWA supplies had not been diverted to improper uses, except during

periods of actual fighting. In the course of the UN discussion, he noted that the United States had contributed over the years some \$500 million—a preponderant share of UNRWA's income.

There was general agreement that UNRWA's work would have to be continued until an over-all solution was reached. Senators Mark O. Hatfield (R., Ore.), Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) and George D. Aiken (R., Vt.) introduced an amendment to the foreign aid appropriation bill to provide an additional \$1.5 million to UNRWA for education and vocational training. This, Hatfield explained, would help more refugees acquire marketable skills so that they could leave the camps. The squalor, idleness, and frustration of camp life, he said, were major causes of refugee attraction to the *fedayeen*.

Palestinians and Peace

However, even this additional aid was no adequate solution. During the UN committee debate, the Israel representative spoke of Foreign Minister Abba Eban's 1968 proposal to the UN for an international conference of the countries contributing to UNRWA, the Arab states, and Israel to work out a five-year plan for solving the refugee problem, a proposal that was rejected by the Arab states. In the meantime, he continued, Israel undertook some modest measures of its own: Under its family reunion scheme, 18,628 Arab inhabitants, who had left the West Bank and Gaza in the wake of the 1967 war, returned by the end of August 1970. Israel also aimed at making the refugees under its administration self-supporting, and employment exchanges made no distinction between refugee and non-refugee. When Eban addressed the General Assembly, on September 28, 1970, he spoke of other programs. Israel's "open bridges" policy permitted some 55,000 Arabs from Jordan and other Arab countries to visit their relatives west of the Jordan during the summer, and thousands of Arabs from Israel and the West Bank crossed the river to Jordan and other Arab countries. And there was a growing volume of trade over the bridges, interrupted only briefly by the Jordanian civil war. Israel also sent trucks with medical supplies to Jordan for the victims of the civil war as an example of "how humane solidarities should prevail over political and military tensions."

There was growing recognition in Israel that peace required not only formal documents, but the development of personal contacts among the peoples to overcome deepseated hatred and mistrust. Reports spoke of the traumatic effect of the Jordanian civil war on the moderate Palestinians and of the disillusionment with the guerrillas of a large but silent majority of them on both sides of the Jordan, who would welcome a peaceful settlement. However, they were divided among themselves, and unwilling or unable to challenge effectively the militant commandos.

The establishment of a separate Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank remained only a theoretical possibility, though Hussein's severe meas-

ures increased the traditional resentment of many West Bank Palestinians against Jordanian rule. The idea was stalled by disagreement among the Palestinians on who was to be their leader, and by Hussein's opposition. Israelis and Americans were divided on the merits and viability of a separate Palestinian state in addition to Jordan. However, most believed that as long as Hussein was in control and willing to consider a peace agreement with Israel, one should attempt to negotiate with him and his government, rather than encourage dissident Palestinian elements. But even this was not an immediate prospect since Hussein did not dare to make peace with Israel until the Egyptians had reached an agreement with Israel.

Moreover, the relationship between the Palestinians and the Jordanians was regarded as an internal matter in which neither Israel nor the United States should interfere. Commenting on the events in Jordan, Eban formally acknowledged in his September UN address that "it is for the Arab Governments to determine their regimes and institutional structure. Israel will never move its forces in any cause except its own legitimate security." He pointed out that the "structure, name and regime" of the kingdom of Jordan "were determined not by Israel but by its Arab citizens."

Eban also acknowledged that the Palestinian question was not simply a matter of refugees. He stressed, however, that "it is in peace, not in violence, that the Palestinian Arabs will find their true destiny." Elaborating on this point, he said:

In conditions of peace, Israel's eastern neighbor would be an Arab State, a majority of whose population would be composed of Palestinian Arabs, and a majority of all the Palestinian Arabs would be citizens of that State. . . . Wherever the boundary is determined in the peace agreement, the Palestinian Arabs on both sides of the Jordan will find a better future than that which Arafat and Habash and the hijackers can offer them. . . . The original former Palestine area on both sides of the Jordan will accommodate two States, Israel and an Arab State—while the area regains its natural economic unity and advances towards new forms of economic integration.

The events in Jordan in 1970 and the discussions at the United Nations thus underscored a basic dilemma that continued to face those who sought to achieve peace in the Middle East. It was not yet possible to make peace directly with the Palestinians but there could be no lasting peace without the Palestinians.

GEORGE E. GRUEN

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

THE YEAR 1971 saw growing confusion and contradictions regarding intergroup-relations issues, once believed to have been settled in principle, if not in practice. Many liberal, middle-class whites, who had been sympathetic to the problems of minorities, now found themselves uncomfortably lined up with segregationists in opposing school busing for integration or the construction of low-income housing in their neighborhoods. In some instances, their view was shared by those minority-group members who argued that, in the face of white opposition, their position could be improved and their racial identity maintained only by some form of separation or community control. A furious debate developed over quotas and preferential treatment, once used to exclude racial and religious minorities, as an appropriate means of broadening opportunities for these groups.

The growing ethnic consciousness, or "New Pluralism," as some called it, raised a series of new questions, or at least new aspects of old questions: the validity of maintaining the ethnic, cultural, or economic character of neighborhoods and schools; the role of government in supporting ethnic or racial identity or improvement; the very real dangers of retribalization in a pluralistic society; the relative deprivation, or feelings of deprivation, of large numbers of first-, second-, and third-generation ethnic groups, which had not been seen as disadvantaged before. Involved in the last question was the growing anger and alienation of "Middle America" and the split between lower middle-class or working-class whites—the "provincials" as some dubbed them—and better-educated, more affluent Americans—the "cosmopolitans"—which was sending shockwaves through the nation's social and political life. New fronts also were opening in the effort to achieve equal rights and opportunities for minorities by means of suburbanization, court decisions on desegregation, and the financing of government services.

As Americans wrestled with these questions, it became evident that problems of intergroup relations had been viewed too simplistically. A number of social scientists were groping for a better understanding of group conflict in our society and improved methods of dealing with it. R. A. Schermerhorn had written a year earlier:

If research has confirmed anything in this area, it is that prejudice is a product of *situations*, historical situations, economic situations, political situations; it is not a little demon that emerges in people simply because they are deprived. This is not to deny that the subject of prejudice has a genuine importance, but only that it is not central to the explanation of ethnic and race relations.¹

There clearly was emerging a need to do more than root out an endemic racism and improve the attitudes of Americans toward one another: to recognize and work out the necessary adjustments and accommodations of group interests, values, and styles, and conflicts within groups. In short, intergroup relations in 1971 were in a state of flux; Americans were still learning about the nature of a pluralistic society, and how to make it work.

Ethnic Consciousness and Emergence of Middle America

The emergence of "Middle America" and the closely related growth of ethnic consciousness now rival the race revolution and the "greening of America" as major currents in American life. (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 198-204). There was growing confidence among ethnic groups that they need not disappear into the "melting pot"; that they had earned the right to define in their own terms and values what an American is. "Project Pole," a newspaper and television advertising campaign to elevate the image of the Pole in this country was launched by Edward J. Piszek in Philadelphia and the Very Reverend Walter J. Ziembra, president-rector of a Polish college and seminary in Orchard Lake, Michigan. (Piszek said it would do for Polish-Americans what black power had done for Afro-Americans.)² The Cleveland orchestra, traditionally relying for support on more affluent, upper-class elements, initiated a series of "ethnic nights," aimed at Hungarian-Americans, Italian-Americans, Czech-Americans, and other groups, which were topped off by ethnic refreshments shared with orchestra members.³ At the request of Jewish students, Temple University in Philadelphia initiated a course in Yiddish,⁴ believed to be the first of its kind in a Pennsylvania college. The number of colleges and universities offering courses in Jewish studies has been steadily increasing since the end of World War II, and, at the close of the year, the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation reported such pro-

¹ *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (New York: Random House, 1970).

² *Wall Street Journal*, October 13, 1971; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 15, 1972.

³ *Business Week*, October 23, 1971.

⁴ *Philadelphia Jewish Times*, November 11, 1971.

grams in more than 185 institutions. Utilizing the American Jewish Committee's newly published *Guidelines to Jewish History in Social Studies Instructional Material*, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council met in October with officials of the Association of American Publishers to discuss the general absence, or scant treatment, of Jews in most history textbooks.

Ethnic groups also continued to combat what they regarded as racial slurs on their antecedents. The most aggressive of these campaigns was undertaken by the Italian-American Civil Rights League, founded in 1970 by Joseph A. Colombo, Sr., who, according to federal authorities, was the head of a Mafia family of about 200 members and associates. ("We said there is a conspiracy in this country against all Italian people," Colombo said in an article under his by-line in the Gannett chain of newspapers.) Early in 1971, the league claimed it had 45,000 members, a headquarters in New York City, 25 chapters in the New York area, and new chapters opening in various parts of the country.

By the spring, the league reported a number of accomplishments: The producer of the film adaptation of *The Godfather* agreed to delete references to the Mafia or Cosa Nostra, as did the producers of "The F.B.I." television series. Attorney General John N. Mitchell and Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller muted references to Italian criminal organizations. A popular television commercial featuring the words, "Mamma mia, that's a some spicy meatball," was discontinued by Alka-Seltzer. In May Colombo appeared with Rabbi Meir Kahane in a news conference to announce that his league had joined forces with Kahane's Jewish Defense League to fight what they called harassment by the federal government.

An attempt on Colombo's life put him out of action; by year's end the Italian American Civil Rights League had dropped out of newspaper headlines. But the Mafia and its alleged activities continued to be discussed widely. Gay Talese's book, *Honor Thy Father*, called the Mafia "part of a national illusory complex."⁵ And in one of the most penetrating studies of the group's historical and sociological background, Francis A. J. Iannia reported that Italian-American criminal "families" had weakened after three generations of acculturation and were being replaced in the policy and numbers rackets by Puerto Ricans and blacks as part of the process of ethnic succession.⁶

Public interest in ethnic and working-class groups continued at a high level. The year's writings included *Newsweek* essays on the Jews (March 1) and Catholics (October 4); "The Blueing of America," by Peter and Brigitte Berger, in the *New Republic* (April 3); "White Ethnic," by Michael Novak, in *Harper's* (September), and "Are the Rules Changing?," by Russell Barta, in *America* (October 30). Social scientists who for many years had been concentrating their attention on race and racial issues were beginning to study

⁵ *New York Times*, October 5, 1971.

⁶ "The Mafia and the Web of Kinship," *The Public Interest*, Winter 1971.

the problems and implications of the rise of "ethnics" and working-class Americans. Among the books published during the year were *Why Can't They Be Like Us?*, by Andrew M. Greeley; *Over-Coming Middle Class Rage*, edited by Murray Friedman; *The Middle Americans*, by Robert Coles and Jon Erikson; *Blue Collars and Hard Hats*, by Patricia Cayo Sexton and Brendan Sexton; *Blue Collar Workers*, by Sar A. Levitan, and *Nation of Nations: The Ethnic Experience and the Racial Crisis*, by Peter Rose.

In 1971 the Bureau of the Census released 1969 sample-survey data on Americans who identified themselves by ethnic background. Altogether, 56 million Americans described themselves as being of German, Irish, Italian, Polish, or Russian (mostly Jewish) backgrounds; some 11 million were foreign-born. The survey also indicated that marriage partners continued to be selected heavily from within a given ethnic group.⁷ Of the five ethnic groups most often associated with the white working class, nearly 20 million people lived in families having annual incomes between \$5,000 and \$10,000. Six million males over 16 years of age were employed in blue-collar jobs, and another 1.5 million in sales, clerical, and service work.⁸

The growing ethnic consciousness was reflected also in the progress during the year of legislation introduced by Senator Richard Schweiker (R., Pa.) and Congressman Roman Pucinski (D., Ill.), providing for the creation of a number of Ethnic Heritage Studies centers to teach American youth pride in their ethnic background. Passed in the Senate and defeated in the House for economy reasons, the bill was headed at year's end toward a conference committee which was expected to report it out in modified form.

A measure of the interest in, and the impact of, working-class whites was the Columbia Broadcasting System television series, "All in the Family," which premiered early in 1971 and immediately shot up to top rating. *Newsweek* reported that it had some 35 million viewers.⁹ Its hero, Archie Bunker, was a beer-swilling, television-addicted, working-class type, who saw himself menaced by "spades," "spics," "schwartzes," "coons," "yids," and "black beauties," among others. The phenomenal success of the series set off considerable discussion on whether the "weekly litany of racial slurs" actually helped fight bigotry by bringing it out into the open, or whether it made prejudice respectable. Laura Z. Hobson, author of *Gentleman's Agreement*, which condemned antisemitism, sharply criticized the program. Whatever one's view, it was clear that the blue-collar stereotype portrayed by Archie Bunker was as much a product of bias, as were his own attitudes.

However, the upsurge of interest in working-class or ethnic Americans on

⁷ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Report*, Series P-20, No. 221, "Characteristics of the Population by Ethnic Origin: November 1969," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1971.

⁸ Irving M. Levine and Judith Herman, "The Life of White Ethnics," *Dissent*, Winter 1972.

⁹ "TV: Speaking About the Unspeakable," November 29, 1971.

the part of the media and "new pluralist" scholars made them appear in the main more sympathetic than, and somewhat at variance with, the prevailing "hard hat" and "white backlash" image. It was recognized that while many had racist attitudes, they also were smarting under social and economic disadvantages and community indifference to them, all of which disposed them to anger toward the blacks and other minorities at the bottom of the social scale. In 1971 grass-roots efforts got underway in ten cities—Boston, Providence, Newark, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, the Gary-Calumet area in Indiana, and Chicago—to organize them so that they could deal more effectively with these problems. Campaigns were initiated to halt an expressway that was threatening to destroy a neighborhood; to restore pride among ethnic groups, and to help make their voices heard on issues such as air and neighborhood pollution, inequitable taxes, inadequate garbage collection, and zoning.

These alliances frequently were spearheaded by civil-rights activists of the 1960s. Father James E. Groppi, leader of the 1967 and 1968 civil-rights marches in Milwaukee, helped organize the city's Italian community. ("I came back to my Italian neighborhood and it was hardly better off than some of the black areas.")¹⁰ At a national press conference held in Washington, D.C., on June 12, plans were announced for a new national coalition of inner-city, largely white ethnic community organizations spearheaded by Msgr. Geno C. Baroni's Catholic Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs. Baroni was allied with the American Jewish Committee's National Project on Ethnic America, which had been focusing public attention on the problems of low-income, white ethnic groups since the late 1960s. In 1971 community-based conferences sponsored by the American Jewish Committee were held in New Jersey, Buffalo, Rochester, and Detroit, and national consultations on ethnicity and mental health, neighborhood government, and the civil-rights implications of ethnic studies in New York.

But the "new pluralism" and discussions of the estrangement of working-class and ethnic groups from the mainstream came under sharp criticism. Mike Royko, columnist and biographer of Chicago's Mayor Richard Daley, saw this movement as an invention of college professors.¹¹ Some saw ethnic consciousness as a transitory phenomenon. Others feared that a strong emphasis on ethnic identity would turn life in America into an ethnic grab-bag and fragmentize society even more. One of the sharpest attacks came in a review of Greeley's book, *Why Can't They Be Like Us?*, by Naomi Bliven.¹² She wrote:

The philosophical implications of all this primitivism and particularism are deplorable. They are at odds with Christianity, and, for that matter, with any of the first-rate thought of the Western World, which, whether pagan or religious

¹⁰ *The Sun*, Baltimore, June 11, 1971.

¹¹ *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 7, 1971.

¹² *The New Yorker*, November 20, 1971.

or secular, is universal. Ethnicity in our time has been the refuge of the second rate; at best, nationalism; at worst, Fascism.

Supporters and analysts of the new ethnic consciousness responded that it was a deeply-rooted movement representing much more than a cover for racism. They argued that, in an increasingly depersonalized society, many Americans were searching for, and desperately needed, the stability provided by ethnic identification. In a privately circulated memorandum, Greeley wrote:

Mrs. Bliven apparently thinks I want to return to the cave man. . . . But it is not a return to the cave I am suggesting; rather it is a recognition that man is not merely pure reason. He is not an angel without place, without a network of relations, without a history and a heritage, without a language and a culture and a faith that is different from the language and culture and faith of others. . . . That man must strive to transcend these limitations I do not deny. But he does not transcend them by pretending they are not there or by writing them off as immoral. He rather transcends them by using his own particular "place" as ground on which to stand, as a base of operations out of which to work, as a home both to set out from and return to. The religious ecumenists . . . insist that only the person who knows his own heritage and is secure in his relationship with it can engage in constructive dialogue with those from other heritages. This may well be the reason for the . . . finding that those who are more involved in their own ethnic groups are less likely to be prejudiced.

The findings of a 1970 National Opinion Research Center survey concerning the attitudes of white Americans toward the position of black Americans, undertaken by Greeley and Paul B. Sheatsley, seemed to support this last conclusion, although behavior frequently differs from expressed attitudes. The data indicated that Irish and German Catholics in the North, where most live, favored integration more than the typical white Protestant Northerner. Catholics of South European origin (mostly Italian) and Slavic origin (mostly Polish) were only slightly less integrationist than Northern Anglo-Saxon Protestants. According to the study, Irish Catholics were second only to Jews in supporting integration. The survey also showed three of the four ethnic groups—Irish, Germans, and South Europeans, largely Italians—were slightly more likely than Northern Anglo-Saxon Protestants to support open occupancy legislation. Racism seemed to be concentrated among less educated ethnic groups.¹³

Crisis of Catholic Church and Its Schools

While Protestants, Jews, and even some blacks belonged to Middle America, its core has been the nation's 48 million Catholics. The year found the Catholic Church in disarray on many fronts. A nationwide Gallup survey of Catholics above the age of 17 found that more than one-third

¹³ "Attitudes Toward Racial Integration," *Scientific American*, December, 1971.

did not attend Sunday mass regularly; two out of three acknowledged they had not gone to confession in the previous two months. Diversity in theology and life style among Catholics was becoming as great as it was among Protestants and Jews. Only one out of two Catholics wanted the Church to continue its opposition to abortion, and more than two out of three expected it to abandon opposition to divorce. According to a study of the clergy in the United States which was presented to the Vatican in September, the Church was losing, through death, retirement, leaves of absence, or resignation, five priests for every two seminarians ordained. In five years, the Church had moved from a point where the late Cardinal Francis J. Spellman could bless the war in Vietnam as a struggle for "civilization," to where an antiwar Jesuit was sitting in the U.S. Congress, Father Philip and Daniel Berrigan lay in prison for burning draft-board files, and a priest served as speech writer for President Nixon.

The leadership of the Church remained largely in Irish hands. Fifty-seven per cent of the bishops, including most of the nation's cardinals, were of Irish descent at a time when Irish-Americans comprised only 17 per cent of the United States Catholic population. In the past, the Church had recognized its other ethnic constituents by appointing Polish, Italian, and Slavic-American priests as auxiliary bishops. Pressures for recognition by black and Chicano Catholics increased. At the second annual convention of Black Catholics in Detroit during the summer, delegates demanded that the United States hierarchy consecrate a new black bishop, to replace the elderly Patrick Cardinal O'Boyle, head of the predominantly black Washington, D.C., archdiocese. Militant black Catholics also were insisting on a special ecclesiastical rite for U.S. Negroes.¹⁴

A central issue in the crisis facing the Church was the future of its vast school system. While Jews, Lutherans, and smaller Protestant groups have been maintaining separate schools, the question of the constitutionality of public financial assistance to such schools affects mainly Catholic parochial schools. The future of these institutions has been of particular importance to working class Catholics, who prefer them for their children not only because of religious instruction, but also because of stricter discipline, fear of violence and the increasingly black character of inner-city schools. Wider interest has been focused on these schools also because of the growing financial crisis in the public schools which have been absorbing more parochial school students. And parochial schools in the city have been instrumental in holding a significant number of white ethnics—the largest group of whites—in the city, at a time when large numbers of middle-class families have been moving to the suburbs.

According to church officials, 800 of the 11,350 Catholic elementary and secondary schools did not have the necessary funds to reopen after the

¹⁴ "Has the Church Lost its Soul?", *Newsweek*, October 4, 1971.

summer recess. A major study of New York State's 1,900 nonpublic schools, conducted by Louis R. Gary for a special commission appointed by Governor Rockefeller and the State Board of Regents, concluded that "the state must anticipate the phasing out" by 1980 of at least 70 per cent of Roman Catholic elementary schools and 50 per cent of Catholic high schools.¹⁵ The National Catholic Educational Association predicted that, without some additional government aid, another 2.1 million pupils—nearly half the current Catholic school enrollment—would end up in already overcrowded public schools. A study of church finances by James Gollin¹⁶ underscored the financial plight of the Church and its school. While the Church appeared to be well organized and even affluent, Gollin reported, it was most inefficient in handling finances. Ninety per cent of its funds, he said, were tied up in economically non-productive assets, such as its schools.¹⁷ Church critics, however, were less sympathetic to the financial difficulties of its schools, and, in fact, said they were exaggerated. Dr. John M. Swomley, Jr., writing in *The Christian Century* on January 13, maintained that only smaller, less efficient units were closing and that the process underway was actually strengthening the system.¹⁸

The problems of the parochial schools, in fact, went deeper than the financial issue. A group of scholars working under a grant from the U.S. Office of Education pointed out that, in the last decade, many American Catholics, who had been economically deprived and socially isolated, had become highly acculturated and assimilated.¹⁹ Economically and socially more secure, many Catholics were questioning the meaning of religion, the goals and structures of the Church, and even the validity of the existence of parochial schools. ". . . I feel that parochial schools have served their exalted purposes," John Deedy, managing editor, of the Catholic lay journal, *Commonweal*, wrote in the March 13 issue of the *New Republic* "[and] that they are now a hindrance rather than help to Catholicism." This, too, was part of the crisis of the parochial schools and of the Church itself.

SUPREME COURT RULES ON PAROCHIAL-SCHOOL AID

Since World War II, Catholic groups joined by some Orthodox Jewish and a few other small religious bodies have been pressing for various forms of

¹⁵ *New York Times*, October 3, 1971.

¹⁶ *Worldly Goods* (New York: Random House, 1971).

¹⁷ *New York Times*, September 12, 1971.

¹⁸ The National Association of Laity, a 12,000-member liberal Catholic group, released a 100-page report early in 1972 charging that the financial statements of most of the country's dioceses were "incomplete" and "misleading." The group argued the Church was pleading poverty at a time when it was seeking public funds for its school system (*Wall Street Journal*, January 11, 1972).

¹⁹ John D. Donovan, Donald A. Erickson and George F. Madaus, "The Social and Religious Sources of the Crisis in Catholic Schools," paper submitted to the President's Commission on School Finance, March 15, 1971.

government aid to their private schools. These efforts and legislation enacted for such aid have been challenged in the courts by most Protestant and Jewish organizations, along with education and civil-liberties groups, as creating political controversies in various states; violating the provisions for the separation of Church and state of federal and state constitutions, and leading to the destruction of the public schools. In a series of decisions, the first of them the *Everson v. Board of Education* (330 U.S. 1) ruling in 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of various indirect forms of aid, such as the use of government-owned buses to transport students to parochial schools and the loan of state-purchased books to parochial school students under a "child benefit" theory. Encouraged by these decisions, many states enacted aid programs, ranging from busing and free lunches, books, and counseling services to direct salary supplements for parochial-school teachers of secular subjects.

These issues were brought closer to final constitutional resolution on June 28, when the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional, by an 8 to 1 vote, programs in Rhode Island and Pennsylvania²¹ reimbursing Roman Catholic and other church-related schools for instruction in nonreligious or secular subjects. (Two days later, the Court issued a brief order affirming the decision of a three-judge district court, which invalidated a Connecticut "purchase of services" statute similar to the Pennsylvania law.) At the same time, the Court upheld, by a 5 to 4 vote,²² the Federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, under which \$240 million in federal funds had been paid for the construction of academic buildings on the campuses of private colleges, including church-related colleges.²³

The decision on direct state aid to parochial schools marked the first time the Supreme Court struck down a law of this kind. The Rhode Island statute provided for paying up to 15 per cent of the salary of teachers in private schools provided they taught only "secular subjects." In Pennsylvania, the state granted \$20 million a year from taxes on cigarettes and horse racing to pay for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for courses in mathematics, modern foreign languages, physical sciences, and physical education.

Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, President Nixon's first Supreme Court appointment, wrote the majority opinion in the state-aid case and the prevailing opinion in the federal-aid decision (pp. 73-74). In dealing with the former cases, Burger laid down three conditions for testing the constitutionality of a statute: it must have a secular purpose, "a principal or primary

²⁰ *Earley v. DiCenso* (403 U.S. 602 [1971]).

²¹ *Lemon v. Kurtzman* (403 U.S. 602 [1971]).

²² *Tilton v. Richardson* (403 U.S. 672 [1971]).

²³ Joseph B. Robison, "Summary and Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court Decisions of June 28, 1971 Dealing With Government Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools," *CLSA Reports* (American Jewish Congress), July, 1971.

effect" that does not advance or inhibit religion, and does not foster "excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court conceded that the condition of purpose was met. It also agreed in principle that secular and religious education are "identifiable and separable." However, the Court did not find it necessary to judge whether the principal effect of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes was the advancement of religion, since "the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the statutes in each state involved excessive entanglement between government and religion."

Distinguishing its earlier decision upholding a textbook law in New York²⁴ the Court said that "teachers have a substantially different ideological character than books" because "a textbook's content is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not." Noting that teachers in religious schools are under the direct supervision of a church, the Court concluded that "religious authority necessarily pervades the school system." The Court further stated that the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island programs had the further defect of providing state financial aid directly to the church-related school, rather than to the student and his parents, as in both *Everson* and *Allen*. The Court also pointed out that annual appropriations to parochial schools could lead to "political division along religious lines [that] was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect."

Chief Justice Burger took great pains to point out why the "entanglement" between church and state in the state-aid program was enough to invalidate it, while the federal program could stand. A key point, he said, is that pre-college church schools are more involved than colleges in religious indoctrination, and that "college students are less impressionable and less susceptible" to such indoctrination. He also found fewer entanglements between church and state in the "one-time, single-purpose construction grant" than in continuing salary supplement programs. Finally, he said, colleges normally do not draw major support from one area, so that bitter state political battles are not likely to erupt over aid to colleges.

Justice Byron R. White, dissenting in the Rhode Island case, argued that parents have an unquestionable right to send their children to sectarian private schools; that these have both religious and secular functions, and that a possible indirect benefit to religion from government aid to a "separable secular function" does not convert that aid into an impermissible establishment of religion.

OTHER PAROCHIAL ACTIONS

The Court had put an end to two forms of state aid to parochial schools: salary support and purchase of services. Presumably, it would not back down

²⁴ *Board of Education v. Allen* (392 U.S. 236 [1968]).

on its rulings on transportation and textbooks. This left open the question whether the Court would disallow financial assistance to the parents of parochial-school children in the form of tuition grants, vouchers, and tax credits. Despite the June rulings, then, efforts continued to obtain the use of tax funds for nonpublic schools. During the year, either before or after the June 28 court decisions, statutes providing for substantial monetary aid to nonpublic schools were adopted for the first time in Illinois, Maryland, and Minnesota, and a bill providing for local option for such aid was adopted in Vermont. Operation of the Maryland law modeled on the voucher idea was suspended when enough signatures were obtained for a petition requiring the measure to be submitted to the voters in the November 1972 election. New York State, which had approved one limited form of parochial aid in 1970, enacted a purchase of services bill appropriating \$33 million.²⁵

In Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Ohio, new legislation aimed at avoiding the effect of the Supreme Court rulings was adopted to supplant earlier parochial aid measures. The Pennsylvania bill, authorizing the direct payment to parents of \$75 maximum for each child enrolled in a nonpublic elementary school and \$150 maximum for each nonpublic high-school student, at an estimated cost of \$47 million the first year, was hurried through the legislature and signed by Governor Milton J. Shapp just two months after the June decisions. These new acts were immediately challenged in the courts.²⁶

While parochial aid bills were defeated in California, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, North Dakota, and Wisconsin, measures permitting public-school districts to lend textbooks to children in nonpublic schools were adopted in California and Nebraska. Various forms of aid to colleges and universities, or to their students, were provided in Illinois, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas legislation.²⁷

A closer examination of current church-state controversies suggests that they were more than differences in legal interpretations of the First Amendment. They were closely tied in with the problem of meeting the staggering costs of both public and private education in the 1970s and with concern about whether public education can absorb large numbers of nonpublic-school children if, as Catholic and other private-school educators have warned, many of the schools should be forced to close. Underlying the debates, too, were the historical experience, and fears and suspicions with which the diverse religious groups viewed one another. These have been

²⁵ On January 11, 1972, a three-judge court held the statute unconstitutional on the basis of the June 28 court decisions.

²⁶ Early in 1972, federal court decisions invalidated tuition-grant legislation in Pennsylvania and Ohio.

²⁷ Joseph B. Robison and Beverly Coleman, *Public Aid to Religiously Affiliated Schools—The Record of the State Legislatures and the Courts in 1971* (New York: American Jewish Congress, Commission on Law and Social Action, January, 1972).

mented by the common bond of being Americans and by constitutional arguments, only to surface eventually, since basic group interests and values were involved. Finally, the growth of ethnic consciousness has given rise to the question of the government's role, if any, in group maintenance efforts. Politics and the courts provide a means for dealing with intergroup issues in a pluralistic society and for working out methods for resolving or, at least, accommodating group differences.

President Nixon made it clear that he favored some form of assistance to parochial schools. He assured the Knights of Columbus, a Roman Catholic group, in an August address that they could "count on" his help to stop the large number of nonpublic-school closings. Commissioner of Education Dr. Sidney P. Marland, too, told some 100 Catholic- and public-school superintendents from major cities at a closed meeting in November at Warrenton, Virginia, that the administration's parochiaid plans awaited recommendations by the President's Commission on School Finance and its panel on nonpublic education, scheduled to report in 1972, but that constitutional considerations and recent court decisions gave the federal government "only a limited range to work from."

Among the alternatives carefully studied by the administration was a system of educational vouchers, the so-called "Jenks plan" which would allow parents who were dissatisfied with public schools to receive a rebate on school taxes to help pay for the transfer of their children to other public or private schools. The plan was aimed at helping poor families exercise educational options open to middle-class or upper middle-class families by enabling them to choose better schools. Despite opposition to parochiaid by some educational organizations and religious groups, the Office of Economic Opportunity moved forward with voucher pilot projects in several parts of the country.

Prayer Amendment

On November 8, after intense public and congressional debate, the House of Representatives rejected by a vote of 240 to 162, just 28 votes short of the required two-thirds majority, a proposed constitutional amendment permitting "voluntary" prayers or meditation in public schools. It was a defeat of efforts by small-town, largely Republican, and more fundamentalist elements and Southerners—evangelist Billy Graham supported the amendment—to overturn the 1963 Supreme Court decision holding Bible reading and organized prayers, even nondenominational prayers, unconstitutional. Like parochiaid, the issue was tied in with the revolt of Middle America, pitting "provincials" against "cosmopolitans." Supporters of the amendment, led by Representative Chalmers P. Wylie (R., Ohio), had been successful in getting the House Judiciary Committee, which had initially refused to clear the measure for House floor action, to release it. Leaders of more than

38 mainstream religious denominations and organizations and 343 law school deans and professors had campaigned against the amendment.

The Jews

At the close of 1970, sociologist Nathan Glazer wrote that the central problems facing Jews today stem from the contradiction between their growing sense of ethnicity and the gravitational pull of liberal, universalistic goals, and the need to reconcile these forces.²⁸ While Jews have struggled with these contradictions throughout their history, in 1971 they increasingly opted for ethnicity.

In large measure this attitude seemed to be shaped by the sense of anxiety pervading many segments of the Jewish community. It was fed by the continued threat to Israel's security, the well-publicized danger to the cultural survival of Soviet Jews, and increased concern about antisemitism and other pressures felt by Jews in this country in recent years. A Gallup poll commissioned by *Newsweek* reported that 34 per cent of Jews believed antisemitism had been increasing in the last few years; another 41 per cent thought it had remained at a steady level.²⁹

In a widely discussed speech at the annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee in May, *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz noted a weakening of the long-standing "taboo" against the open expression of antisemitism, as indicated by the spread of "anti-Zionist" sentiment among some intellectuals since the six-day war; the surfacing of antisemitism among blacks since the 1968 and 1969 New York City teachers' strikes, and the frequent expressions of resentment within the American literary community over the "dominance" of Jews in American cultural life. Podhoretz reiterated a position, earlier enunciated by the veteran Jewish community-relations specialist Earl Raab, that the Jewish position in the country was threatened by a possible "alliance between the patriciate (upper class WASPs) and the underclass (blacks) against the liberal center." But, Podhoretz added, Jewish security was threatened most directly by the radical left.

Ethnic consciousness took a variety of forms, including a heightened affinity with Jews in the Soviet Union. The World Conference of Jewish Communities on Soviet Jewry, was held in Brussels in February under the aegis of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry in an effort to organize a coordinated worldwide pressure campaign to protest Soviet antisemitism and back efforts of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. "For once Jewish history everywhere coincides," Elie Wiesel, the French-American writer on the holocaust, said. "There are no more Jews of silence." The conference was followed up in the United States with a barrage of publicity in the English-Jewish and general press and numerous local and national

²⁸ "The Crisis in American Jewry," *Midstream*, November 1970.

²⁹ "The American Jews Today," *Newsweek*, March 1, 1971.

demonstrations led by Jewish community-relations, rabbinical, and youth groups. These efforts seemed to have borne fruit, as increased numbers of Soviet Jews were obtaining exit visas and leaving for Israel.

Among some Jewish youth there was a resurgence of a sense of community. While this newly found turning inward was a small movement and could not compare with the larger force of indifferentism and universalism, it was nevertheless significant. James A. Sleeper and Alan L. Mintz edited *The New Jews* (Vintage Books, 1971), a book of essays which gave this phenomenon a name. The "new Jews" founded and edited Jewish student magazines and newspapers, organized Jewish Free Universities, and pressed for courses in Yiddish and Jewish studies in colleges and universities. According to Irving Howe, at least 50 distinctly Jewish organizations have sprung up, ranging from left to somewhat left-of-center, to Zionist, but all self-identified as Jewish. "Those who have rediscovered the virtues of ethnicity through their radical or alienated social critiques have begun to converse seriously with those whose Jewish commitment is more firmly rooted in Jewish education," Sleeper and Mintz reported.

As among blacks, segments of the Jewish community also were turning to forms of separatism. The Jewish day-school movement gained in importance, with an increase from 69 schools with 10,000 students at the end of World War II, to 378 schools with 75,000 students. The Gary report on nonpublic schools in New York predicted continued growth in the 1970s. For an increasing number of Jews—17,000 since the six-day war—going on *aliyah*, settlement in Israel, was the answer to how to live a creative, Jewish life.

To some, Jewish anxieties appeared to be exaggerated. Jews, as a group, had reached high social, cultural, and economic status. As 1971 began, a majority of the New York City Board of Estimate members were Jews; the governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland were Jews, as was the mayor of Atlanta and the senior Republican United States senator from New York. While President Nixon had not named Jews to "showcase" positions on the U.S. Supreme Court or in the Cabinet, they held high posts in his administration: Henry Kissinger and Leonard Garment were among his top level advisors; Herbert Stein served as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; Arthur Burns was chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, and Jesse Steinfeld was surgeon general of the United States. At the sub-Cabinet level, Jews filled the posts of undersecretary of labor and assistant secretaries of treasury; defense; health, education and welfare; housing and urban development, and the Office of Management and Budget.³⁰

During the year, President Nixon gave firm support to Israel in its struggle with her Arab neighbors (p. 176). Both the president and Congress continued their interest in the problems of Jews in the Soviet Union. There

³⁰ American Jewish Committee *Washington Letter*, January 6, 1972.

were indications, also, that some segments of Christian leadership in this country were responding more affirmatively to international issues troubling Jews. Their past attitude had been a sore point in the Jewish community since the six-day war. In May the American Jewish Committee released a 48-page listing of "Christian Reactions to the Leningrad Trial of Soviet Jews," documenting the widespread protest elicited by the treason trial and sentencing of eleven Soviet citizens, nine of them Jews, for the attempted hijacking of a plane to take them to Israel. A survey of Christian opinion released by the American Jewish Committee in October contained an impressive listing of public statements, speeches, news articles, and editorials issued by Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Evangelical leaders and organizations opposing the internationalization of Jerusalem and urging that the city remain under Israeli jurisdiction.

EXTREMISM AND JEWS

The issue of black-Jewish relations remained on the back burner, but it simmered there. There was a general absence of large-scale rioting in black slums of which Jewish merchants had been the chief victims. Open and strident antisemitic statements by black militants, as during the New York City school strikes, and widespread media coverage which tended to inflame passions further had stopped. The decline of the Black Panthers, and the group's shift to more moderate strategies (p. 124) brought a change in the tone of their newspaper widely hawked in slums. The year before it had followed an anti-Israel, anti-Jewish line and had encouraged violence against merchants, the police, and other "oppressors."

The New Left remained a greater focal point of antisemitism than the right.³¹ However, as the movement lost ground in this country, its anti-Israel, anti-Zionist campaign with its distinct antisemitic overtones declined as well. Arab propaganda also slowed down somewhat, partly because of the "loss of face" of Arab terrorist forces, primarily al-Fatah, after being crushed in a series of encounters with Jordanian forces. *Action*, the publication of the Action Committee on American Arab Relations in New York, editorially complained in its April 19 issue about the lack of concern, and certainly of political action, by Palestinians living in this country.

OTHER PRESSURES ON JEWS

And yet, Jewish anxieties were not without foundation. As a group, they still were comparative newcomers to financial security and status. Many saw their advances, won at great effort and cost, imperiled by various contemporary currents in American life. Historically, Jews have had a stake in

³¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Socialism of Fools," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 3, 1971.

civility, and this had been eroded in recent years. Many were beginning to fear that blacks, Chicanos, and other minorities were seeking to move up in American life by tactics foreign to the Jewish temperament and style, including the use of violence and ethnic displacement. In his 1971 novel, *The Tenants*, Bernard Malamud expresses this fear in the words of black writer Willie Spearmint: "It isn't that I hate the Jews. The way to black freedom is against them."

The use of quotas and preferential treatment as a means of broadening opportunities for blacks and other disadvantaged minorities, though generally not directed against Jews, increasingly was seen as creating a special problem for them.³² A notice in November of job openings in the New York City Department of Health, which declared that "we are particularly anxious to get qualified Black or Puerto Rican staff," was attacked by the American Jewish Congress. The latter charged that the Department of Health indicated an intention to prefer black or Puerto Rican applicants "solely because of their ethnic identification over other candidates who are equally qualified or more qualified." The notice was later withdrawn. The B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation (along with the Newman Center for Catholic students) at Brooklyn College protested as "an invasion of privacy", the distribution of an official college questionnaire asking students to list their ethnic origin and religious preference, even though responses were optional. The school's president explained the survey was part of the effort to "expand educational opportunity for all persons regardless of their racial or religious or economic background."

Much of the concern felt by Jews with regard to quotas and preferential treatment applied to the field of education, which traditionally had given them the opportunity for economic and social advancements when other areas of American life had not. A move to eliminate a number of San Francisco administrative positions limited to whites, which later was cancelled by court action as prejudicial, would have hit Jews hardest. A group of Jewish faculty members at Harvard, who suspected that the number of Jewish students was being reduced, met with the dean of admissions during the year. He told them that there had been no reduction in the quota of admissions in any special area of the country, but that this did not apply to "the doughnuts around the big cities." When it was pointed out that these included such areas as Westchester County and Long Island, N.Y., suburban New Jersey, and Shaker Heights, Ohio, the *Crimson* reported, one faculty member stood up and said, ". . . those aren't doughnuts, they're bagels."³³ A group of Jewish faculty members, among them Nathan Glazer

³² Stephen Steinberg, "How Jewish Quotas Began," *Commentary*, September 1971, and Earl Raab, "Quotas by Any Other Name," *Commentary*, January 1972, pp. 41-45.

³³ Dorothy Rabinowitz, "Are Jewish Students Different?," *Change*, Summer 1971.

and Seymour Martin Lipset, denied in a letter to the Boston *Jewish Advocate* that Harvard was "discriminating against Jews in admissions." However, they pointed out that, "Since Harvard is trying to increase the numbers of student recruits from disadvantaged backgrounds, and is not expanding, very likely the number of other backgrounds will decline."³⁴

The University of Wisconsin continued to come under charges of anti-semitism, made by Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, local newspapers, and the Madison Jewish community during the year, when it was reported that Jewish out-of-state enrollment and applications for admission had dropped markedly. Following campus unrest believed to have been caused by "radical outsiders," the state regents began in 1967 to limit students from other states; initially from those with large Jewish populations, like New York and Pennsylvania. Earlier, the regents also had sharply increased tuition for out-of-state students, giving as the reason mounting costs. In a letter to the *National Jewish Post and Opinion*, on October 22, an associate vice president of the university denied charges of antisemitism, maintaining that applications for admission had not declined, that 1971 enrollment of nonresidents did not reach the quota limits, and that loss of faculty was due to low salaries. His assertions were challenged in another letter to the paper's editor by a professor of mathematics at Wisconsin, who said, "a newly respectable anti-Semitic mood is growing at the University of Wisconsin, and that the University is doing nothing about it except to deny its existence."³⁵ Masada, a Jewish youth organization, pointed out that 3,137 freshmen at the university indicated Jewish on a religious preference card in 1967, whereas only 1,150 did so in 1970.

Jews also were dismayed by anti-Jewish remarks made in the United Nations by Soviet and Arab delegates after shots had been fired into the Soviet Mission building in New York. While not condoning the shooting, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council declared, "The vicious attacks in the United Nations debate last week against the United States and Jews have shocked all decent Americans. The violent accusations made by the Soviet delegate and some Arab delegates disgraced the halls of that world organization whose forums are supposedly dedicated to seeking international peace and reconciliation."

Insensitivity to Jewish feelings, as well as historical inaccuracies, marked the "rock opera," *Jesus Christ Superstar*, by Andrew Lloyd Webber and Tim Rice. It opened on Broadway, traveled to a number of cities in various versions, and a recording of it was sold widely. Concerned that the Passion of Jesus once again had become a vehicle of anti-Jewish bias, the American Jewish Committee released an analysis of the show and its impact on Christian-Jewish relations by a Presbyterian educator and authority on

³⁴ *National Jewish Post and Opinion*, September 10, 1971.

³⁵ *National Jewish Post and Opinion*; November 26, 1971.

intergroup relations in Christian education.³⁶ It charged that *Jesus Christ Superstar* was "less than fair" in depicting the role of Jews and Jewish behavior in the Passion of Jesus by making them more sinister than the Gospel record warrants. While conceding that the play avoided some of the cruder interpretations in earlier works of its kind, the analysis concluded it was "insufficiently thoughtful, potentially mischievous and possibly a backward step on the road toward improved Christian-Jewish relations." Walter Kerr and Father Malcolm Boyd, writing in the *New York Times*, October 24, concurred in these findings.

Anxieties and pressures were felt most sharply among poorer, lower middle-class, and more ethnically conscious Jews, many of whom resented the "liberalism" of their more fortunate coreligionists. Merchants and businessmen attempting to do business in violence-prone slums, elderly Orthodox Jews living and worshipping in transitional areas, and teachers and school administrators struggling with the problems of ethnic succession in the schools were less sympathetic to efforts of blacks and other minorities to improve their position. Better educated and more affluent Jews tended to remain more sympathetic and willing to overlook, or trace to larger causes, more extreme tactics of militants.

Established Jewish organizations showed greater concern over the problems of angry and alienated Jews. An American Jewish Committee report,³⁷ which received wide coverage in the English-Jewish press, discussed the "myth" of Jewish affluence. It noted that 15.3 per cent of Jewish households, some 700,000 to 750,000 people, had incomes of \$3,000; and that, if the figures for the "near poor," those earning under \$4,500, were added, the number of Jewish poor would exceed 900,000. In December the American Jewish Committee convened a two-day National Consultation on Poverty in the Jewish community. Held in New York City, it was attended by 87 government officials, social workers, and agency heads, who came from major cities across the country to explore the dimensions of the problem and to consider programs for dealing with it.

The American Jewish Congress charged that the Jewish poor were, in effect, excluded from the benefits of the Federal Economic Opportunity Act and New York City's antipoverty program. It stated that money for these programs was designated for poverty areas and intended for young people, and many of the Jewish poor, who were mainly older persons and generally did not live in poverty areas, did not qualify for benefits.³⁸ The agency therefore called for 18 changes in the poverty programs. The criticism was acknowledged by an Office of Economic Opportunity report, which conceded that the "allegation that Jews are systematically excluded from New

³⁶ Gerald S. Strober, *"Jesus Christ Superstar": The "Rock Opera" and Christian-Jewish Relations* (New York: October 1971).

³⁷ Delivered by staff specialist Ann Wolfe in Chicago.

³⁸ *Philadelphia Jewish Exponent*, November 12, 1971.

York's poverty program participation, while imprecise, is not totally devoid of validity."³⁹

JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE

The Jewish Defense League continued to draw its members largely from angry and alienated segments of the Jewish community, for which it claimed to speak and act. On December 23, 17 JDL officials and members demonstrating against vandalism in synagogues in the Logan section of Philadelphia, where many elderly Jews live, were arrested by police for law violations. JDL members also invaded and wrecked the office of the New York Board of Rabbis for its alleged inaction on certain Jewish issues and unwillingness to provide bail for a JDL official arrested for falsifying statements in a passport application. The league also attempted to make contact with other white, ethnic groups, and announcement of an alliance with the Italian American Civil Rights League was made during the year.

The main effort of JDL, however, was given over to dramatizing the problem of Jews wishing to leave the USSR, by holding rallies, threatening violence, and harassing Soviet diplomats and their families in New York and Washington. Incidents involving the Soviets included a brick thrown through the window of Aeroflot, a Soviet airline office in New York, which also was the scene of a pipe-bomb explosion, and a bomb explosion outside the Soviet Embassy's cultural offices in Washington, D.C. Ammonia fumes disrupted a performance by the Siberian Dancers and Singers of Omsk at Carnegie Hall. JDL denied outright acts of terrorism. In Moscow, Russians retaliated by deflating the tires of cars owned by Americans.

The most celebrated incident occurred in October when four shots were fired into an apartment in the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York at a time when, Soviet officials said, four children were in it. Commenting on the incident in an interview with Walter Goodman,⁴⁰ Rabbi Meir Kahane, leader of the group, acknowledged "an escalation of this entire war between the Soviets and the Jews." Secretary of State William P. Rogers phoned Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin to express his shock and dismay in connection with the Soviet Mission episode. Several days after the shooting in a chance meeting between Kahane and the United States representative at the UN, George Bush, the latter is reported to have said, "You have damaged your country's cause, the cause of Soviet Jews and the name of American Jewry."⁴¹ Bush refused Kahane's request for a dialogue.

³⁹ Naomi Levine and Martin Hochbaum, "Jewish Poor and the War Against Poverty, Report and Recommendations," Commission on Urban Affairs, American Jewish Congress, November, 1971.

⁴⁰ Walter Goodman, "Rabbi Kahane says: 'I'd Love to See The J.D.L. Fold Up. But—'", *The New York Times Magazine*, November 21, 1971.

⁴¹ *New York Times*, October 26, 1971.

Rabbi Kahane also said in the Goodman interview that JDL was following what he called "our Soviet-Southern strategy" to alert world attention to the Soviet Jewish problem by doing "outrageous things" and getting on page one of the *New York Times*. The group hoped that such tactics might spur established Jewish groups into more aggressive action; also that in view of the detente sought by the Soviet Union and the United States, JDL actions would force the USSR to make some concessions to its Jews.

Despite widespread attention, JDL made no significant progress, either in membership or acceptance. It continued to be denounced in the sharpest terms by virtually every major Jewish organization and religious group. A Gallup poll commissioned by *Newsweek* reported, on March 1, that 71 per cent of Jews in this country disapproved of JDL efforts to help Soviet Jewry by harassing Soviet diplomats; only 14 per cent indicated approval, and 11 per cent approved with qualifications. At the close of 1971, JDL claimed a membership of a little over 10,000 in 51 chapters in the New York metropolitan area, only 14,500 nationally. It said it had groups in Boston, Philadelphia, Miami, Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, St. Louis, Houston, Albuquerque, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, as well as branches in Montreal and Toronto and even in London and Antwerp. Kahane, himself suffered a number of setbacks. He was given a five-year suspended sentence for his part in the group's attempt to make bombs. In February Belgium expelled him after he tried to crash the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry meeting in Brussels. In July, he moved his wife and four children to Jerusalem and began commuting, spending alternate months in Israel and in the United States.

As the year drew to a close a new Jewish organization, the National Jewish Community Security Committee, was launched in New York by 50 Jewish community leaders, in an effort to overcome the "crisis of confidence" in some Jewish community organizations. These, the group's statement of principles asserted, "are, to date, disturbingly unresponsive to the needs of large constituencies of Jews. It behooves Jewish organizations to be sensitive to the legitimate fears and aspirations of the masses of Jews." Prominent among its founders were Dr. Abraham Joshua Heschel, who had participated in civil rights marches in the 1960s, Prof. Fritz Rothschild of the Jewish Theological Seminary, Arthur Finkelstein, a political analyst, and Rabbi Wolfe Kelman, executive vice president of the Rabbinical Assembly of America (the Conservative branch of Judaism). The council's president was Professor Seymour Siegel of the Jewish Theological Seminary, its honorary president was Elie Wiesel. Among other specific purposes listed by the council were: to help preserve the security and character of Jewish communities and neighborhoods in the large urban centers, to oppose all quota systems which try to limit job and professional opportunities of any group, and to publish a rating system of political candidates, based on their efforts to preserve communities and on their sensitivity to Jewish rights.

FOREST HILLS CONTROVERSY

The various factors that went into the making of the Jewish community personality in 1971—a growing sense of anxiety, especially about crime and violence, ethnic assertiveness, liberal guilt, and middle-class rage—all came together in the Forest Hills controversy in New York. It resembled the Ocean Hill-Brownsville (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], p. 79) confrontation in community divisiveness and growing tension between blacks and Jews.

Following discussion and argument before the City Planning Commission, the Board of Estimate, and the courts, New York City decided to go forward with plans to build three 24-story low-income houses with 840 apartment units in the white middle-class Forest Hills area of Queens. The project would bring in approximately 3,000 persons including elderly whites. Forty per cent of the apartments were to be reserved for the aged. The decision reflected the conviction of many civil-rights advocates that housing low-income families in middle-class neighborhoods would raise their sights, improve behavior, especially of the children, and socialize them generally. Supporters of the project believed also that it would help resolve a whole array of difficult civil-rights issues, including integration of schools and jobs, a view backed by newly promulgated federal guidelines requiring low-income housing to be "located so as to provide housing opportunities for minority groups outside areas of minority concentration."

The Forest Hills neighborhood selected consisted of one- and two-family houses nestled among newer, high-rise apartments. According to the 1970 census, its population was about 38,000, only 393 of whom were blacks. The area was particularly attractive to higher-income Conservative and Orthodox Jews, who, in the comparatively short time they were living there, put down roots in the community. They established a network of special religious and cultural facilities and put up buildings, including synagogues to which they could walk and Jewish day schools. This involved considerable financial investment much of which, many residents believed, would be lost if the neighborhood changed and they decided to move elsewhere.

Opposition to the proposed low-income housing developed immediately. Many whites, who had moved to Forest Hills after long years of working for it, feared there would be an increase in crime, crowded schools, congested streets, and a breakdown of their stable, economically and racially homogeneous neighborhood. "They're transplanting a malignant tumor to a healthy, viable community," Jerry Birbach, president of the Forest Hills Residents' Association, said.⁴² Some saw the project as part of a pattern of asking lower- and middle-income groups to pay the costs of social and racial change, while more affluent groups living in more fashionable sections of the city and suburbs won moral points for standing for principle and racial

⁴² New York Times, November 21, 1971.

justice. Mayor John Lindsay, a chief proponent of the Forest Hills project, was accused by residents of failing to press for low-income housing on Manhattan's fashionable East Side or in the Riverdale section of the Bronx.

The controversy was marked by mass picketing and demonstrations, an injunction to prevent interference with construction, reluctantly obeyed by residents, and rock-throwing reminiscent of racial struggles in the South. At the time, the Board of Estimate voted down another low-income project of 559 apartments, proposed for the Lindenwood area of Queens, which it had previously approved on two occasions. Besides the mayor, the Forest Hills project was supported by Senator Jacob K. Javits, Representatives Herman Badillo, Bella Abzug, and Emanuel Celler; civil-rights groups, and a small number of residents. Standing in opposition with most of the area's whites were Conservative-Republican Senator James L. Buckley and Assemblyman Vito Batista. An initial appeal to HUD Secretary George Romney to halt the project was refused. Critics of the project urged that, at the very least, it should be scaled down to fit the character of the neighborhood. Supporters, however, noted that this would make it too costly and, in effect, cause its abandonment.

The Jewish community was sharply divided on the project. Both the American Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith supported the project, though the latter qualified that such housing should be "according to the character and needs of the community." The American Jewish Committee's New York Chapter tried to bring the parties to the dispute into direct negotiation. Opposition was led by the Queens Jewish Community Council which was joined by most Orthodox rabbis. A few Conservative and reform rabbis supported the project. Meeting in December, the Synagogue Council of America, representative body of the three wings of Judaism, adopted a resolution favoring scatter-site housing, but at the same time calling for a halt to the Forest Hills project to allow time for consultation. The political implications of the controversy came into play immediately. The Forest Hills Residents' Association took advertisements in the daily press in Miami blaming Mayor Lindsay for various problems plaguing New York City, particularly the Forest Hills project. JDL vowed a national campaign directed against his presidential aspirations.⁴³

Despite the tensions, there was no widespread and open antisemitism. When an article in the December issue of *The Voice of SEEK* at Queens College charged that "once again the white bigots are predominantly Jews" and that "Jews and other white imps from the Mayflower cannot decide where black people are to live," it was quickly denounced by six black students in the SEEK program in a two-page statement, which pointed out that the author, though a Queens College student, was not in the SEEK program.⁴⁴

⁴³ *Jewish Post and Opinion*, January 7, 1972.

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, January 2, 1972.

The Forest Hills controversy gave rise to all the questions, ambiguities, and confusion that surrounded intergroup relations in 1971. In a time of heightened ethnic consciousness, how should a neighborhood respond to the inclusion of large numbers of people from different racial and economic backgrounds? If groups have a right to preserve their identities, what about the rights of the disadvantaged and victims of discrimination to improve their condition by moving to more favored areas? Since the need for neighborhood control, especially for black, Puerto Rican, and other disadvantaged groups, has been given increased attention in recent years, does such control apply also to other ethnic and economic segments of the population? And how does government, as the voice and arm of the total community, pick and choose legally, as well as morally, among the conflicting claims?

An overriding question for many people was the degree of racism involved in the resistance to the project. The local NAACP and other civil-rights groups, put this at the center of the struggle. Others disagreed. ". . . I would no more want to live down the block from 3,000 poor whites in a city-sponsored ant hill than I would from 3,000 blacks," John P. Roche, the Brandeis political scientist, wrote in his syndicated column. "And I will lay you dollars to doughnuts that middle class Negroes of Forest Hills share my sentiments completely. There is nothing racist about it."⁴⁵ Nathan Glazer suggested that safety, not racism, was the key issue. "No one can spend any time in New York City without discovering that this is the overwhelming concern of its citizens, rich and poor, dedicated and sophisticated, Negroes and Puerto Ricans as well as Jews, Italians, the Irish and the WASPs," he wrote.⁴⁶ Glazer warned that if the decision of blacks and whites to move out of violent neighborhoods is denounced as "racist," as it so often is, the "danger is that the confusion in the minds of some, that black does equal crime, which it is in the best interest of all to unravel and straighten out, becomes only deeper." Persons confronted with a choice between jeopardizing personal safety or being called racist for seeking to escape danger will opt for the latter. According to Glazer, this will encourage black militants to see crime as a form of social protest, as Eldridge Cleaver and George Jackson have done, and, therefore, justifiable. While he believed the city could have done a better job in Forest Hills, he thought, in sum, that the government's policies were "the best we can devise in view of the city's overwhelming social problems."

As the year ended, workers at the construction site were in the initial stages of driving experimental piles into the project's foundations. But the episode had contributed to undermining group relations in New York.

⁴⁵ *Evening Bulletin*, (Philadelphia), December 5, 1971.

⁴⁶ "When the Melting Pot Doesn't Melt," *The New York Times Magazine*, January 2, 1972.

Black America

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS

Information about blacks, first made available from Census Bureau data in 1970 and later in various 1971 reports, presented a clearer picture of the black community. The movement of blacks from the rural South to industrial cities of the North and West that resumed after World War II, and accelerated in the 1950s, continued throughout the following decade. California and New York had a combined in-migration of nearly 700,000 black Americans in the decade, and New Jersey, Michigan, and Illinois attracted more than 100,000 each. Southern New England, New Jersey and Maryland also proved to be attractive, with a combined net in-migration of 272,000 from 1960 to 1970, as compared with about 200,000 in the previous decade. In all, the 1970 Census reported 22.6 million blacks, who constituted 11 per cent of the total population.⁴⁷ These figures were criticized, however, by some black leaders and others, who estimated it to be about 10 per cent higher.

While 30 years ago three-fourths of all black Americans lived in the South, mostly in rural areas, in 1970 about one-half lived there and only about a million remained on the farm. Seven out of ten lived in cities. Negroes constituted more than 50 per cent of the population in four large cities (Washington, D.C., Gary, Ind., Newark, N.J., and Atlanta, Ga.), only one of them in the South, and were approaching majorities in others. Blacks also were beginning to leave the city for suburbia. While the movement was small—only 4.5 per cent of the total suburban population in the country's 66 metropolitan areas—still, the total number was 2.5 million. Twenty-seven per cent of young black families with children under 18 now lived in suburbia, as against 17 per cent of young black couples without children.

In the 1960s, blacks scored substantial gains in health, education, employment, and income. Employment in professional, technical, and clerical occupations doubled. Median family income rose by 50 per cent, but still stood at \$5,998 as compared to \$9,794 for all white families. For young black couples living outside the Southern states, the annual median income jumped to \$8,859, or 91 per cent of the income of similar white families. The percentage of black families with annual incomes above \$10,000 rose from 9 to 24 per cent. The number of blacks who completed high school, attended college, entered professions, and won political office, all rose sharply.

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *The Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States, 1970*, BLS Report No. 394, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 38; Thomas R. Brooks, "Big City Politics, Making the Black Vote Count," *Tuesday Magazine*, September 1971.

The number of blacks entering freshman classes of the country's medical schools rose by 26 per cent in one year.

Although a considerable number of blacks had achieved working- or middle-class status, their improved condition did not necessarily relieve racial tension. "It is precisely because Black Americans have achieved so much in the past twenty years that so many of them are so dissatisfied," wrote Raymond W. Mack, director of the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University. "Real access to equality of opportunity no longer seems impossible. Perhaps worse, it seems delayed."⁴⁸

Census Bureau data showing these gains also reported that the situation of the majority of black Americans who entered the decade in poverty had not improved by year's end. They had a shorter life expectancy, lower incomes, and worse living conditions than whites. They also earned less than persons of Spanish-speaking background with poorer educations.⁴⁹ A National Center for Health Statistics report on death rates showed that young black males aged 25 to 29 died at nearly three times the rate of white males of the same age. Although this was partly due to violence in the slums, a more important factor was disease related to childhood malnutrition. At the lowest end of the socioeconomic spectrum, the position of blacks continued to remain grim.

The most ominous statistics concerned the black family, a fact Daniel Patrick Moynihan had brought to public attention in 1965 in his controversial report, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*. Families headed by women increased in the 1960s from 22 to 29 per cent. Approximately one-half of these women were separated or divorced from their husbands. These figures indicated, a *New York Times* editorial of November 28 suggested, that a disproportionate number of young black children were growing up in homes with only one parent and were therefore more vulnerable to adverse events and influences of urban life.

These figures were put into fuller context by Robert B. Hill in *The Strengths of Black Families*, a report issued by the National Urban League. He challenged the widespread view that black families were matriarchal, disorganized, pathological, and disintegrating. He rather described them as having "adaptability of family roles, strong kinship bonds, strong work orientation, strong religious orientation, and strong achievement orientation." In 1969, the report said, "about 90% of the Black babies born out of wedlock were kept by the parent and kin in existing families"; only 7 per cent of these infants, as compared with 67 per cent of the illegitimate white babies, were formally adopted or placed in foster homes. These findings reinforced what Elliot Liebow and other critics of the Moynihan report

⁴⁸ *ADL Bulletin*, October 1971.

⁴⁹ In the first national comparative study of its kind, the Census Bureau reported that the typical 1970 income for families of Spanish origin was \$7,330; for blacks, it was \$6,280. *New York Times*, October 18, 1971.

had been saying for some time: that the critical issue in the pathology of the slum was availability of decent, well-paying jobs for black fathers and young men.

The problem of poverty among blacks was exacerbated by the economic downturn. Unemployment figures for November 1971 indicated a rate exceeding 10 per cent for all blacks, and 38 per cent for teenagers, the highest since 1963. The rise in unemployment was taking place at a time when taxpayers revolted against soaring costs of welfare in a period of inflation. The national cost of welfare, according to a series in the *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, had reached \$16 billion annually, almost double what it was four years earlier. If current trends continued until 1975, it was predicted, the cost would reach \$25 billion a year. According to the *Bulletin*, 27 states had taken action in 1970 to cut welfare payments, crack down on fraud, or require welfare recipients to work for their benefits.⁵⁰ Early in May, the Brownsville section of New York City, where four out of five residents were on welfare, was the scene of two days of violence following weeks of petitioning by parent groups and the Brownsville Community Council of legislators in Albany against proposed state-budget cuts that would decrease funds for public assistance, Medicaid, education, and anti-narcotics programs. The results of the disorder were 84 fines, 25 looted stores, 46 arrests and 33 injuries.

At year's end, President Nixon signed into law a bill requiring most able-bodied welfare recipients to register for employment or job training. However, this did not take into account the absence of jobs or the problems of mothers with small children who could not go to work because of the lack of day-care centers to look after the children. The missing ingredient was an adequate minimum income for welfare families and the working poor. The Family Assistance Plan, initiated by the administration as a first step in this direction, was under attack from critics who either felt it was too modest or too socialistic. It had been passed twice in the House of Representatives, but languished in the Senate Finance Committee. And, in December, President Nixon vetoed a comprehensive child-care program that provided day-care facilities, charging it would commit the national government to "communal approaches to child rearing against the family-centered approach."

THE BLACK MOVEMENT

There was a noticeable decline in militancy, revolutionary rhetoric, and protest-type activity. Interest among black and white students in separatist Black Studies or Afro-American programs also waned. Social and economic gains by growing numbers of blacks, the increase in the number of black political office holders, and genuine progress in school desegregation in the

⁵⁰ November 14, 1971.

South no doubt played a role in this decline of militancy. A measure of the new mood were the problems facing black private and state colleges. Created in an era of segregation and lacking the means of providing a really first-class education, they now faced the possibility of extinction, as more and more blacks enrolled in white institutions.

This was not to say that revolutionary ardor was entirely missing. Angela Davis, who was scheduled to go on trial early in 1972 for murder, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy, continued to remain a household word in many slum areas. And the fatal shooting by a San Quentin prison guard of George Jackson, one of the Soledad Brothers, in August, allegedly for attempting to escape, shocked many blacks, who identified his imprisonment and death with their own life experience. Isolated acts of public defiance continued. In December, by a 5 to 0 vote (four blacks and one Puerto Rican voting yes; three whites and one black absent and not voting), the Newark Board of Education agreed to hang the black liberation flag in all schools and classrooms where black students were in the majority. Playwright Imamu Baraka (LeRoi Jones), one of the leaders of the Congress of African-American Peoples, was reported to have called for a black political party to organize the black masses for revolution. However, at a Labor Day gathering of the group, he urged that delegates elect more black candidates and exert maximum influence in the Democratic party.⁵¹

There were signs that the black movement was moving, in Bayard Rustin's words, from protest to politics and from national to local activity. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) chapters were emphasizing political action for ghetto problems, with less reliance on court action.⁵² National groups, like NAACP and the National Urban League, were drawing their membership increasingly from low-income blacks.

Dead or gone from the scene as major forces were such charismatic figures as Dr. Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, James Farmer, Stokely Carmichael, and H. Rap Brown. (At the close of the year, Brown was being held in \$200,000 bail after pleading innocent to charges of attempted murder and robbery in a bar holdup and shootout with the police.) Symptomatic of the decentralization—some called it fragmentation—of the black movement was Reverend Jesse L. Jackson's resignation from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) after he had been suspended, and his decision to create his own organization. The young and flamboyant Jackson had headed Operation Breadbasket, the SCLC's successful black business cooperative in Chicago. Local black leaders were coming into their own and black united fronts were formed in Washington, D.C., Boston, Cairo, Ill., and other cities. "We have no superstars at the moment in terms of the

⁵¹ *Currents*, Trends Analysis Division, American Jewish Committee, November, 1971.

⁵² *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1972.

civil rights . . . movement," Ivanhoe Donaldson, a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington said in summarizing the situation. "And maybe there's no need for one."

BLACK PANTHERS

Another indication of the new mood in the black community was the marked decline of the Black Panthers. They were rarely seen in the streets handing out leaflets or selling copies of their party newspaper. There was less talk of breakfast programs for children and community control of the police. Surveying the movement, the *New York Times* on March 1 reported that in Los Angeles, where the Panthers once had three offices, they no longer had a telephone listing; in Washington, D.C., too, they no longer had telephones, and in New York City the party was said to be virtually nonexistent. The Justice Department estimated its current membership at under 1,000.

Like other radical movements, the Panthers had been torn by ideological divisions. This erupted publicly, in February, in a telephone debate between Huey P. Newton, the party's highest-ranking officer, in San Francisco, and Eldridge Cleaver, the fugitive Panther minister of information, speaking from Algeria. The two men disagreed sharply and, at one point, Cleaver remarked, "the party has fallen apart at the seams." Newton, who spent two years in prison, stood trial three times, and finally, in December, won dismissal of charges of having killed an Oakland policeman, adopted a new position of moderation. He said the party had made an about-face, would avoid police confrontations, promote church attendance, and seek new support in the black community. In a speech taped by the *Oakland Tribune*, Newton said, "When we moved in the manner we did and to the extent we did we lost the favor of the black community and left it far behind . . . We cannot jump from A to Z as some thought . . . Our intention to operate with reality does not mean we accept it. We'll operate within the system so we can change it."⁵³ Newton's stock also declined among blacks when it became widely known that he was living in a \$650-a-month penthouse in Oakland, even though the Panthers said this was necessary for reasons of security.

The Panthers also lost moral and financial support from white supporters, many of whom did not condone Panther rhetoric and tactics, but had been sympathetic to the movement because of alleged "harassment" and killings of Panther leaders by the police in suspicious circumstances. An article in the *New Yorker* cast serious doubt on charges by Panther leaders that 19 or more party members had been killed by the police in a "genocide" campaign.⁵⁴ The detailed examination of each of these cases found the police

⁵³ *The Evening Bulletin*, Philadelphia, May 21, 1971.

⁵⁴ Edward Jay Epstein, "The Panthers and the Police: A Pattern of Genocide?", *The New Yorker*, February 13, 1971.

had no involvement in nine of the cases, and that in six others the Panthers were shot only after they had seriously wounded the policemen involved. The article reported only one instance of questionable police conduct, in the killing of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark by the Chicago police in December 1969. It concluded that, while even one death must be a matter of serious concern, the issue of police brutality against black and black militants "can be neither understood nor resolved in an atmosphere of exaggerated charges."

The fact that the Panthers could receive justice at the hands of a hostile "establishment" was reinforced by the dismissal of murder charges against Bobby Seale, the organization's chairman. When a jury in New Haven, Conn., deadlocked over whether he ordered the torture slaying of a suspected police informer who had allegedly infiltrated the party, the trial judge ordered the charge dismissed, saying it would be impossible to find an unbiased jury for a second trial.

VIOLENCE

Incidents that once triggered violence now were met with a new pragmatism and determined efforts by local black groups to contain the situation.⁵⁵ The various governmental and private agencies monitoring racial troubles thought the summer of 1971 the least violent in many years. The Justice Department's "civil disturbance center" reported that while there were 11 major disorders in the first eight months (through August), there had been 19 in the same period the year before. The figures for minor disorders were 32 and 49, respectively. At year's end, the Greater Newark Urban Coalition, born out of the devastating 1967 riots, stood ready to close its doors because contributions had ceased coming in.

Among the reasons given for the decline of racial disorders by the Brandeis University Lemberg Center on the Study of Violence, the Urban Coalition, and other groups were: the belief that blacks have found more constructive ways to channel their energies, including political and community action; the growth of racial pride; increased skill by police and government officials in handling incidents that might trigger violence; more sensitive media coverage, particularly by television; growing recognition by blacks of the terrible cost to them in lives and property damage, and a decrease in promises that cannot be realized easily, and result in greater frustration. However, it was clear that civil disorders (as the Kerner Commission had pointed out) remained "unusual, irregular, complex, and unpredictable events." Summing up the situation Ralph Lewis, research director of the Lemberg Center, said, "It's more apparent that the old reasons cited—unemployment, poverty, frustration—don't necessarily cause riots."

⁵⁵ *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1972.

PRISON PROTEST MOVEMENT

Violent protest moved from city streets and rural areas to the nation's prisons. Major outbreaks occurred at San Quentin, Attica, Rahway, N.J., and elsewhere. The Attica outbreak resulted in the death of 46 inmates and prison employees. As the situation in the nation's prisons was examined more closely, it was discovered that, in recent years, there had been many such disturbances that had not made headlines.

The prison protest movement was led mainly by blacks and members of other minority groups because more of them are arrested and imprisoned. In California, the nonwhite prison population was 45 per cent of the total; in Attica, it was 85 per cent. While it is widely believed that the nation's prisons hold the dregs of society, in some instances they house attractive and aggressive elements among minorities ready to buck an oppressive society. Such individuals became increasingly unwilling to tolerate the conditions in the prisons. As one Attica inmate shouted during the disturbance, "We want to be human beings, we will be treated as human beings."

Prisons also have tended to feed militant protest by providing "universities for political education" of blacks. From these "universities" have emerged some of the great documents of the race revolution, as well as important leadership, including Eldridge Cleaver (*Soul on Ice*), Malcolm X (*The Autobiography of Malcolm X*), and George Jackson (*Soledad Brother*). Prison experience, Jackson wrote in his book, had helped transform him "from a young, naively conservative thief" to a "committed revolutionary," who took upon himself "to right the wrong, lift the burden from the backs of future generations."

While the prison protest movement helped society understand the need for changing conditions both inside and outside the prisons, it also encouraged a semi-Marxist view of inmates as "victims" rather than culprits. This tended to ennoble for them and for others at the bottom of the social and economic scale what for society-at-large are simple criminal acts, and polarized even further racial tensions and divisions.

Another aspect of violence with distinct racial overtones was the continued guerrilla warfare between the police and elements of the poor. The FBI reported in October that 87 county and state law enforcement officers had been slain during the first nine months of the year, 11 more than in 1970. At year's end, 11 policemen had been killed in New York City, more than in any single year since 1930. Most were slain in the line of duty; but a considerable number met death in what the International Association of Chiefs of Police now called "ambushes." This gave rise to a belief among law enforcement officials and Congressional investigators that there was a conspiracy against policemen.

Thus crime and the fear of crime remained for most Americans a central, perhaps the central, community and intergroup-relations issue. Statistics

released by the FBI in December showed that, during the first nine months of the year, some 4,426,000 major crimes had been reported to the police throughout the country, an increase of about 250,000 for the comparable period in 1970. Street crimes, a source of much public concern, rose by 10 per cent during this time. Of the ten largest cities, Philadelphia reported the highest increase in serious crime—38.9 per cent—which, according to some observers, was a primary reason for the election of hard-line Police Commissioner Frank L. Rizzo as the city's mayor in November. Significantly, the number of crimes rose nearly three times as fast in suburban areas than in cities over one million. However, Attorney General John N. Mitchell noted serious crimes were only 6 per cent higher than in 1970, and this was the smallest percentage increase in five years.

While most civil-rights and civil-liberties groups remained on the defensive with regard to crime and violence, the National Alliance on Shaping Safer Cities (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], p. 148) made some progress in its work to bridge community fears through efforts to reform the criminal justice system. The organization now consisted of 57 national and regional groups, including the National Urban League, the AFL-CIO, the American Jewish Committee and National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice, and local alliances were being formed, or had become active, in a number of cities. The Alliance for a Safer New York was voted a one-year grant from the New York City Criminal Justice Coordinating Council. All these groups were pressing for prison reform, the elimination of victim-less crimes, such as drunkenness, from police jurisdiction, improvement of federal gun-control laws, and creation of job opportunities for ex-convicts.⁵⁶

EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

The year was one of decision for many Northern and Southern cities and for opening up new fronts regarding equal educational opportunity for minority groups. Since the Supreme Court in 1954 ruled racial segregation in public education unconstitutional, most of the pressure for change occurred in Southern and border states; desegregation in the North and West was largely voluntary and token. In the late 1960s, the Federal government moved against some Northern districts which did not comply with civil-rights laws, while civil-rights groups continued to go into the courts. This was a slower process because plaintiffs had to prove a governmental policy of segregation or exclusion.

As a result of these efforts, HEW reported, the percentage of blacks attending schools with whites in the 11 states of the Old Confederacy more than doubled, from 18 to 39, between 1968 and the fall of 1970. In the 32 Northern and Western states it remained unchanged, at 28 per cent. For the

⁵⁶ *Shaping Safer Cities Bulletin*, The National Alliance on Shaping Safer Cities, July 1971.

first time, more black students were attending all black schools in the North than in the South. Just over 9 per cent of the black pupils in the 11 Southern states were enrolled in all-black schools, as compared with 68 per cent in 1968. This, HEW noted, compared with 11.2 per cent in the 32 Northern and Western states and 24.2 per cent in the border states. Officials said that busing was one of the reasons for the desegregation gains made in the South.

In the light of resistance to school desegregation in the South over the years, the relative calm with which change took place was especially notable. Symbolic of the acceptance was the decision of Governor Linwood Holton of Virginia, where "massive resistance" to Supreme Court school desegregation edicts first began, to send his four children to mixed or predominantly black public schools. At the November Southern Governors' Conference meeting in Atlanta a resolution identical with an anti-busing statement adopted the year before was pushed through. However, the governors also said that a provision in Congress barring the use of federal desegregation funds for court-ordered busing would only place financial hardship on the states. The new attitude toward desegregation in the South was reflected in the findings of a study of how white Southern university students felt about blacks on their campuses. At the University of Alabama, 92.2 per cent of the students were willing to attend classes with blacks, and 75 per cent were willing to share dormitory facilities with them.⁵⁷

However, the *Civil Rights Digest Annual Review* (December 1971), pointed out that the figures on desegregation in the South did not take into account the still existing serious and subtle aspects of segregation and discrimination: segregation of activities and facilities within schools; racial discrimination in the use of discipline; demotion and dismissal of minority faculty and school administrators; increase of private schools where whites could escape desegregation, and growth of Northern-style suburbanization. "These problems," the *Digest* predicted, "represent forms of discrimination which almost inevitably will become the focus of legal and administrative action in the seventies."

The HEW survey also found that more than 750,000 Spanish-surnamed children, 468,000 of whom were in five Southwestern states, remained in ethnically imbalanced schools. In many of the larger, non-Southern cities, desegregation had actually declined between 1968 and the fall of 1970. In New York, the percentage of blacks in majority white schools dropped from 19.7 to 16.3; in Detroit, from 9 to 5.8; in Philadelphia, from 9.6 to 7.4; in St. Louis, from 7.1 to 2.5, and in Boston, from 23.3 to 18.

However, the fall of 1971 saw, for the first time, substantial school desegregation in cities outside the South and the border states. Integration plans stemming from court orders, voluntary action, or pressures from state governments went into effect in Northern and Western cities stretching from

⁵⁷ Donald E. Muir, "The First Years of Desegregation," *Social Forces*, March 1971.

Providence, R.I., to San Francisco. The old line of distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* segregation was being seriously challenged. Civil-rights activists charged—and their view was finding its way into lower-court decisions, as in San Francisco—that no segregation could take place without government connivance, and that failure to move against existing segregation meant, in effect, government connivance to maintain it.

School Busing for Desegregation

School desegregation during the year was accompanied by considerable controversy over the use of busing. An October Gallup survey revealed that 76 per cent of respondents opposed busing, almost as many in the East (71), Midwest (77), and West (72) as in the South (82). In fact, it was found that more blacks opposed than supported busing (47, as against 45 per cent).

On April 20, however, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld, in *Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg (N.C.) Board of Education* (399 U.S. 926 [1971]), the constitutionality of a plan calling for busing as a means to "dismantle the dual system in the South." The plan sought white-black enrollment in each school approximating the over-all enrollment ratio in the district. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said busing was appropriate as one tool for achieving integration unless "the time or distance is so great as to risk either the health of the children or significantly impinges on the educational process." He added that this decision applied only to "racial discrimination through official action" and excluded so-called *de facto*, Northern-style segregation on which the Court had not as yet ruled. On September 1, Justice Burger clarified this action further in an opinion accompanying a refusal to stay a lower-court action, explicitly stating that the decision in the *Swann* case did not require busing or even "a fixed racial balance."

In the debate over busing and desegregation, and action taken by HEW with regard to these issues, President Nixon played a critical but ambiguous role. During the year, he seemed to want to placate his important Southern constituency and other supporters, looking toward the 1972 election. In the *Swann* decision, the Supreme Court overruled arguments of the Nixon administration and the Justice Department that Southern school systems, like their Northern counterparts, should be allowed to assign students to schools in their own neighborhoods, even if this slowed the pace of desegregation. Announcing that he was "against busing as the term is commonly used," Nixon asked the Justice Department, on August 3, to appeal a federal court ruling that upheld an Austin, Tex., school-board plan providing for extensive crosstown busing to desegregate the city's public schools. In the process, he overruled a HEW-drafted plan. At the end of that month, the President also directed the Attorney General and Secretary of HEW to "work with individual school districts to hold busing to the minimum

required by law." To underscore this, he asked that the administration-sponsored \$1.5 billion Emergency School Assistance Act to help districts desegregate be amended to forbid the use of funds for busing. Early in November a coalition of Northern and Southern congressmen pushed through such an amendment, adding a rider which encouraged school districts not to comply with court busing orders until all legal appeals were exhausted, and prohibiting federal agencies from urging local officials to use their own money for busing. At year's end, the Senate had not yet acted on the House bill. More than 100 congressmen also announced their support of an amendment to prohibit busing.

At the same time, the administration backed up court-ordered desegregation. In mid-August, Attorney General John N. Mitchell indicated it was time to use HEW's statutory power to deny federal funds to school districts refusing to meet the prevailing desegregation standards. And, on December 1, after an 18-month study, HEW notified the Boston board of education that it was violating the 1964 Civil Rights Act and faced court action and loss of federal school funds unless it designed an acceptable plan for desegregating the 93,000-student system. The department had never taken such action in a large city outside the South. A New York *Times* analyst pointed out on May 23 that, by 1972, "more desegregation will have been achieved under Mr. Nixon's reign than under any of his predecessors . . ." This was disputed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which, in its November report, scored HEW's efforts in elementary- and secondary-school education as "marginal" (out of four possibilities, "poor," "marginal," "adequate," and "good").⁵⁸

The most dramatic incident involving school busing occurred in Pontiac, Mich., where a district judge ordered the busing of 9,000 of the city's 24,000 school children. On the eve of the opening of schools in September, ten school buses were firebombed; later, five members of the Michigan Ku Klux Klan were charged with the crime. A group of white parents, led by a housewife, Mrs. Irene McCabe, formed a National Action Group, which organized a boycott that kept 35 per cent of Pontiac white children home on the first school day. The group soon claimed a membership of 100,000, with 71 branches in Pontiac and new units springing up in other Midwestern states.

Attacks on busing came not only from whites. Parents in San Francisco's Chinatown, arguing that neighborhood schools were vital to their culture, sued to prevent their children from being bused. After losing the first round of the court test, they began a boycott of school buses, and eventually 30 to 40 per cent of the city's 7,000 Chinese-American children were enrolled in private schools. Many black parents also opposed busing, as indicated by the testimony of residents of the largely black South Jamaica section of Queens before the New York City Planning Commission. Some liberals, too,

⁵⁸ *The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: One Year Later*, Clearinghouse Publication, No. 34.

now viewed busing as ill-advised. In an editorial, on November 20, *The New Republic* called it "disruptive and fraught with costs that are not always offset by the benefits it brings. It is therefore foolhardy to concentrate on massive school integration, and the promise that busing can produce it, as the chief objective in public education." The editorial approvingly quoted black political scientist Charles Hamilton's view that the community should concentrate on quality education and not on mingling black and white students.

Opposition to busing was muted in some smaller cities, where the number of children involved was small, and in many parts of the South. While the Gallup survey showed over-all strong opposition to busing, the percentage was down five points from the year before. However, on the assumption that busing offers many blacks not only release from segregation but prospects of a better education, NAACP's legal defense fund announced plans to bring busing suits in at least 12 cities in each of the next three years.⁵⁹

It was clear that busing would have limited impact in major cities, such as Washington, D.C. (95 per cent black), Newark (72 per cent black), and Detroit (64 per cent black). And for this reason civil-rights activists have been looking more closely at suburbia for assistance with desegregation. In September Federal Judge Stephen J. Roth, who found that Detroit school segregation had been abetted by board of education policies, noted that all-white suburban havens had been promoted by official actions—in Detroit, by Federal Housing Administration policy. The judge suggested that suburbia would have to overcome imbalance, perhaps by a student exchange between it and the racial ghetto, and ordered the state board of education to produce a plan for a new metropolitan school district. Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff of Connecticut reintroduced legislation requiring metropolitan-wide desegregation of schools, but the Senate again voted it down.

Property Tax and Equal Educational Opportunity

An entirely new area was opened in the debate over how to achieve equal educational opportunity by a trail-blazing *Serrano v. Priest* decision of the California Supreme Court, in August. By a vote of 6-1, it struck down the state's public-school financing system, which heavily relied on property tax and, thus, the vagaries of local wealth. According to the court, this funding scheme—used in every state except Hawaii—"invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." In rich Beverly Hills, the decision pointed out, a 2.3 per cent tax provided \$1,231 worth of education per pupil in 1969-70, while in nearby Baldwin Park, a lower-middle class district, 5.4 per cent tax rate provided only \$577 worth of education per pupil. Similar decisions were handed down by a Minnesota federal court in October and by a three-judge federal panel in Texas in

⁵⁹ "The Agony of Busing Moves North," *Time*, November 15, 1971.

December. The panel ordered the Texas legislature to devise a new system to meet the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Initially, the *Serrano* and other decisions were hailed by civil-rights leaders and educators as opening the door to "revolutionary change" in rectifying inferior educational opportunities, especially for black, Spanish-surnamed, and other minority children. Former U.S. Commissioner of Education Harold Howe II noted that Middle America had much to gain, since many of the most troubled school districts were new middle-income, blue-collar suburbs whose school funds were raised almost exclusively by taxes on housing.⁶⁰ If school financing could be equalized, it was believed, there would be less need to leave the city in the first place.

Late in 1971, however, there were some second thoughts on the impact of the decision. The concern was that in some areas the poor, not the rich, will suffer most from tax reform. If reform meant uniform spending without special provision for what legal scholars call "municipal overburden," big cities like New York and San Francisco, which currently spend more than the state-wide average, would hurt quite a bit. Daniel Moynihan noted also "the extraordinarily weak influence which school 'inputs' such as per pupil expenditure seem to have on educational 'outputs.'" He quoted one scholar as having said that, given the state of our knowledge, the least promising thing we could do in education would be to spend more money on it.⁶¹

Civil Rights

Civil-rights groups and government agencies responsible for implementing nondiscrimination programs felt growing impatience in 1971 with both the pace and role of government in removing barriers. The United States Civil Rights Commission followed up its 1970 study, which found a "major breakdown" in the enforcement of federal laws and executive orders against discrimination, with further reports in June and November. The last analysis showed that, while there was improvement in some of the departments and agencies in the previous six months, performance still ranged from "poor" to "marginal," at best. "Most agencies seem determined to avoid upsetting the status quo for the sake of assuring equal rights," the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, Commission chairman, said. The report held the President responsible for this situation because he had failed to instill a sense of urgency. The Commission felt that his opposition to busing to facilitate school desegregation, "by failing to offer a realistic alternative, may well be interpreted as a sign to slow-down in the Federal desegregation effort."⁶²

⁶⁰ "Anatomy of a Revolution," *Saturday Review*, November 20, 1971.

⁶¹ "Can Court and Money Do It?," *New York Times*, January 10, 1972.

⁶² *The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort: One Year Later*, Clearinghouse Publication, No. 34.

The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, the nation's largest civil-rights coalition, accused the Nixon administration in December of subsidizing racial discrimination by handing millions of dollars to state and local law enforcement agencies without regard to equal employment practices. An Equal Employment Opportunity Commission examiner, brought in by the Civil Service Commission at the request of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), accused one of the department's own agencies, the Federal Housing Administration, of persistent racial discrimination in employment practices, going back to the 1930s.⁶³ The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported also that Mexican-American students in five South-western states were receiving an inferior education; that one of every three of such students—120,000 out of 330,000—would fail to graduate from high school. Similar deprivations were found among Indian and black pupils in the area.⁶⁴

During the year, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) held its first inquiry into job discrimination by industry, with hearings on the employment practices of gas and electric companies. On the basis of industry-supplied figures it was found that, while women held 34 per cent of all jobs in industry, only 15 per cent of these were in utilities; Spanish-surnamed Americans held 3.6 per cent of jobs in private industry, and only 1.6 per cent in utilities. Moreover, 79 of the 152 largest gas and electric companies had no black officers and managers, and 99 had no black sales people. The hearings were highlighted by the dramatic story of how Consolidated Edison increased its minority percentage from 8 per cent in 1966 to 17.2 per cent in 1971 by aggressive recruitment and work with minority organizations.⁶⁵

Considered one of the weaker government tools for obtaining equal employment opportunity because of its lack of enforcement powers, EEOC attempted to broaden its efforts by giving up its case-by-case attack and going after "target industries" and "corporate giants." Thus its report, in December, on the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the nation's largest private employer, charged widespread discrimination against blacks, Spanish-speaking people, and women, and concluded that the company was "the largest oppressor of women workers in the United States." In the latter part of the year, efforts were underway to strengthen EEOC's enforcement powers. A bill was pending in the Senate to give it cease-and-desist powers, like those of the National Labor Relations Board in unfair labor practice cases. A weaker, but still strong version permitting it to take cases to court, had been passed by the House.

In response to criticism of its civil-rights record, the administration reported a number of positive developments. Secretary of Labor James D.

⁶³ *City*, Winter 1971.

⁶⁴ *The Unfinished Education*, Report 11, Mexican American series.

⁶⁵ *Business Week*, November 20, 1971.

Hodgson released figures on the results of its "Philadelphia Plan" requiring bidders on federally-involved construction contracts of over \$500,000 to submit affirmative-action plans setting goals and timetables for employing minorities in six construction trades. Since the program's inception in September 1969, it was pointed out, average minority employment in these construction crafts was running above the second year goals set by government. Minority workers accounted for 14.2 per cent of the 287,777 total man-hours of construction work for the period June 1 through August 1, 1971. At year's end, the program was being extended to 19 other major cities.

(The U.S. Supreme Court, in October, rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the plan by refusing to review rulings by lower courts that it utilized "goals," not quotas. Since this was the first test of the controversial new concept in minority hiring, the action was widely accepted as an indication that the method is constitutional.)

In December, Attorney General Mitchell announced that 21 federal agencies had proposed regulations to strengthen federal prohibitions against racial discrimination in federally-assisted programs. One was that no recipient of federal funds may select a site for a new facility with the purpose or effect of excluding anyone on the grounds of race, color or national origin.

Countering attacks on the sincerity and scope of federal programs to combat discrimination, Nathan Glazer cited figures for 1962 to 1967 to show in the five-year period the following increase in black employment: 2.5-fold in Civil Service; 6.5-fold in the better-paid positions in the wage board group; 6-fold in the higher grades of the postal field service, which actively recruited for workers on Negro campuses in the South. Thus, Glazer argued, there had been, in fact, substantial and rapid improvement in federal employment practices. As for higher-level Civil-Service positions requiring advanced degrees and many years of experience, it was difficult to ease this situation because blacks had been deprived for so long of equal educational opportunities. Glazer urged a more realistic view both of the progress made and of remaining problems. This was necessary, he said, so that efforts to overcome discrimination would not lose credibility with most Americans and reinforce the pessimistic view in some quarters that our society does not work.⁶⁶

EXECUTIVE SUITE DISCRIMINATION

Efforts of more than a decade by Jewish agencies to increase the employment of Jews and other minorities in managerial positions in major industrial and financial organizations were beginning to yield results. A feature article by Marilyn Bender in the *New York Times*, October 31, 1971, reported that an educated, able professional manager was now capable of advancing to the top of a corporation, although he may not belong to the traditional

⁶⁶ "A Breakdown in Civil Rights Enforcement," *Public Interest*, Spring 1971.

leadership class. It cited as examples names that stood out "in ethnic solitude" in the WASP big-business, power elite, such as Iacocca of Ford, Riccardo of Chrysler, Halaby of Pan Am, Piore of IBM, and Goldman of Xerox. Among the reasons cited for this change were the race revolution, which has forced big business to lump all whites together, and "the bluing of America," as Peter and Brigitte Berger called it, which was forcing business to look increasingly to working-class and ethnic segments of the population for leadership, now that many in the traditional upper classes were turning from corporate careers and life-styles. A survey released during the year by the Philadelphia chapter of the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Employment and Vocational Service, covering their ten-year-old program, showed the percentage of Jews in commercial banking and industrial corporations in the area had risen from 0.5 per cent to 3.5 and 7 per cent, respectively.⁶⁷

Jewish agencies were now being joined in their efforts to break through at the management level of major finance and industry also by other ethnic groups. A survey of Italian-Americans in the Chicago area by the Joint Civic Committee reported that no member of the group was an officer, and only one a director in the four leading banks; that 440 officers and 457 directors in industrial companies, only 11 and 12 respectively were Italians, and only 3 of 71 officers and 1 out of 83 directors in the transportation companies belonged to that group. The Illinois chapter of the Polish American Congress, conducting a poll it called "Opening the Door to the Executive Suite," found that "one and a half percent maximum" of the officers and directors in Chicago-based companies were Polish American.

During its hearing on employment practices of gas and electric companies, EEOC and other federal agencies were charged by the Anti-Defamation League with failure to follow up on complaints of religious discrimination. ADL reported that, despite the high educational attainments of Jews, it found that of 1,111 executives and directors of 38 utilities in urban centers only 15 were Jews. It cited Consolidated Edison as an exception, with 9 Jews among its corporate officers.⁶⁸

In response to criticism voiced by Jewish agencies for several years, Labor Secretary Hodgson issued a policy statement calling the attention of all federal contractors and subcontractors to the problem of discrimination based on religion and national origin. It noted studies which showed the exclusion from the executive and managerial levels of industry "mainly [of] Jews, and to a lesser extent, Catholics," who "are entitled to attention and redress in the form of effective affirmative action programs."⁶⁹ This was

⁶⁷ Steven Appelbaum, "Eliminating Bias Against Jews in the 'Executive Suite' 1960-1970."

⁶⁸ *Business Week*, November 20, 1971.

⁶⁹ *Memorandum to Heads of All Agencies, Subject: Executive Order 11246—Statement on Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Religion and National Origin*, May 20, 1971.

followed up with publication in the *Federal Register* on December 29 of proposed "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion or National Origin" asking federal contractors to furnish proof that these groups were represented in management-level positions. However, Jewish agencies considered this a step backward, for they noted, among other criticisms, that the Guidelines replaced the mandatory requirements for overcoming barriers contained in Hodgson's statement with voluntary action.

SOCIAL CLUB DISCRIMINATION

Civil-rights groups continued to attack social-club discrimination because it was related to hiring and promotion to higher-level jobs and decision-making in the community. In April the American Jewish Committee released Terry Morris's *Better Than You*, a comprehensive analysis of the history of club bias and current efforts to overcome it. According to the study, efforts were under way in four states—Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, and the state of Washington—to revoke the liquor licenses or tax-exempt status of private clubs excluding specific racial or religious groups. In Washington, a coalition of over 20 organizations petitioned the State Board Against Discrimination and initiated a lawsuit to deprive discriminatory clubs of special liquor licenses which entitle them to large discounts in buying alcoholic beverages. The United States Supreme Court announced late in March that it would review a three-judge federal court decision that a Harrisburg, Pa., Moose Lodge was not entitled to a liquor license because it refused to serve a black man who was the guest of a member. The ruling was expected to set a precedent for the more than 2,000 Moose lodges in the country, as well as for the Eagles, Elks, and other private clubs (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], p. 136).

While Jews have been the main target of club bias, the report noted, Orientals, blacks, and Spanish-speaking Americans were "scarcely in the picture at all." Leaders of white ethnic groups also were becoming increasingly disturbed about exclusionary patterns. The William Paca Society of Buffalo (named after one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence who had been of Italian descent) surveyed the city's social clubs and bank managements, and found only token representation of Italian-Americans. Judge Joseph S. Mattina, the society's former chairman, said its members met with Buffalo business leaders in an effort to overcome barriers in Erie County, whose population is some 15 to 20 per cent Italian in origin.

An increasing number of private clubs, however, were beginning to admit Jews, white ethnics, and, in some instances, blacks. The Morris report indicated that the Duquesne Club in Pittsburgh and the Detroit Club now have Jewish members, while the Union League in Chicago has a black member. Other private clubs, including the Chicago Club; the Cliff Dwellers and Arts Clubs, also in Chicago; the Houston Club, the Union League in Philadelphia and the Canton (Ohio) City Club, all had substantial numbers of Jewish

or black members, or both. There had been less progress, however, among fraternal lodges. The Improved Order of Red Men did not accept American Indians as members; the Elks and Moose explicitly barred non-Caucasians.

Quotas and Preferential Treatment

In the course of 1971, a major public debate began over the use of quotas, preferential treatment, and other affirmative-action efforts as techniques for broadening the involvement of minorities in employment, higher level jobs, and in other areas of American life. Affirmative action had begun in the 1960s during the Johnson administration. A major article, "The Galbraith Plan to Promote the Minorities," by John Kenneth Galbraith, Edwin Kuh, and Lester C. Thurow in the *New York Times Magazine* of August 22, 1971, gave the impetus for a vastly expanded program. The plan advocated that major firms be required by law to put a stated percentage of people drawn from "minority groups" into \$15,000 a year or more jobs.

Efforts to discuss or to develop affirmative action programs provoked charges of "reverse discrimination," public protest, and legal action in various parts of the country. In Pittsburgh, a dispute broke out between the University of Pittsburgh and the local Building and Construction Trades Council over a plan to retain newly-hired black craft workers and lay off white workers with greater seniority. The black employees had been hired so that the university could qualify for \$26 million in government grants. The university later agreed to recall the white workers. In the State of Washington, a superior court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection clause barred the University of Washington Law School from giving admission preference to minority applicants over better qualified white applicants. "Policies of discrimination will inevitably lead to reprisals," Judge Lloyd Shorett said. "In my opinion, the only safe rule is to treat all races alike and I feel that is what is required under the equal protection clause."⁷⁰

In San Francisco, a furor developed over the decision of the school board to eliminate 125 administrative positions, but to exempt eight designated minority groups from the deselection process, which therefore was limited to whites. However, demotions were prevented by court action. The superintendent of schools also announced a plan "whereby no more than 20 percent of 'Other Whites' would be hired or promoted to administrative positions in the first year, no more than 10 percent in the second year, and no 'Other Whites' at all in ensuing years until ethnic and racial proportions among administrators equal the respective proportions in the school population."⁷¹

In Philadelphia, on the other hand, a Temple University Law School

⁷⁰ Washington Superior Court King County: *De Funis v. Odegaard*, September 22, 1971.

⁷¹ Earl Raab, "Quotas by Any Other Name," *op. cit.*

decision to readmit 14 black and Puerto Rican students dropped for academic reasons after a complaint charging "wholesale discrimination," and the announcement that 60 black or Puerto Rican first-year students would be admitted in the fall of 1972, passed virtually unnoticed. (The school, located in a heavily black neighborhood, indicated there were fewer than 30 black and Puerto Rican students among its approximately 1,000 students.)

Some of the sharpest controversy over preferential treatment revolved around the hiring and promotion practices of colleges and universities. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) temporarily withheld at least \$668,000 in federal contracts from Columbia University and threatened to suspend \$1,994,643 because of the university's alleged failure to comply with HEW minority-hiring guidelines and employ sufficient numbers of women and members of minority groups. At Livingston College, New Brunswick, N.J., there was strong opposition to a proposal by a faculty committee on appointments and promotions that a candidate for contract renewal or promotion to tenure have supporting letters of recommendation from "one white, one black and one Puerto Rican and one letter from someone of the opposite sex."

In an article on the Op-Ed Page of the *New York Times*, November 5, Professor Sidney Hook charged that the HEW Office of Civil Rights unfairly picked on institutions of higher learning and was proceeding to ruin them by forcing them to hire unqualified women and minority faculty. The director of the office denied this in a letter to the *New York Times*, December 18, arguing that it simply wished to compel universities, which had discriminated in the past, to permit members of minority groups and women to compete on an equal footing and that "qualifications" remained "the primary standard for hiring."

The debate over affirmative action and preferential treatment illustrated the dilemma of attempting to assure equal opportunity for blacks and other minorities and the need to protect individual rights and the merit principle. Critics of preferential treatment, many of whom supported affirmative-action programs to give minorities an edge in competition feared that a trend was under way to eliminate competition altogether. Earl Raab summed up this view:

One of the marks of the free society is the ascendance of performance over ancestry—or, to put it more comprehensively, the ascendance of achieved status over ascribed status. Aristocracies and racist societies confer status on the basis of heredity. . . . a principle of ascribed equality—a kind of perverse hereditary theory—would be as insidiously destructive of the individual and of individual freedom as a principle of ascribed inequality.⁷²

In his criticism of the Civil Rights Commission, Nathan Glazer noted that, in effect, it was asking for "a quota, based not on the total number of

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 42.

eligible or qualified black candidates but on the total number of blacks. Implicitly, the Commission's test for discrimination has become whether minority group members are found in employment, at every level, in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."⁷³ This would institutionalize group rights. He pointed out that efforts by the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League to crack the "executive suite" of business and industry were based on the number of well trained Jews available, rather than their proportion in the population.

There was also the issue of maintaining standards in American life. The open admissions policy of the New York Board of Higher Education (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 220-21) was described as a tentative success. According to one analysis however, an institution like the City College of New York was beset by problems arising from the decline in the number of high-achieving high-school graduates who selected it as the college of their first choice and the dissatisfaction of an academically distinguished faculty confronted with teaching students who were a product of ghetto schools.⁷⁴

In this respect, supporters of quotas at times have been insensitive to the interests and values of "backlashing" white groups. Galbraith and his associates explicitly excluded white ethnics from their plan. ("Although these ethnic groups [described as 'Italians, Poles, Germans, Jews'] think of themselves as minorities," they wrote "and, on occasion, believe themselves subject to discrimination, United States Census studies show that they have higher incomes than fully rooted Americans.") This, too, made for a "white backlash."

Supporters of quotas and preferential treatment, even many of those who opposed their use to achieve equal opportunities, suggested that a reexamination of "standards" was clearly in order. They pointed to the need for a clearer and fairer definition of qualifications, often used to exclude racial minorities; a review of testing systems to prevent unfair discrimination against persons coming from different cultural backgrounds, and greater focus on compensatory education and treatment. While quality and qualifications are important to the future of Americans, so, too, is the need for disadvantaged Americans to catch up. This is not only fair, but central to assuring community peace in a pluralistic society.

The controversy over quotas and preferential treatment was related, in the final analysis, to the state of the nation's economic health. In the expanding economy of the 1960s, affirmative-action programs could slip over into "ascriptive action" without too much opposition. But in the tight economy of 1971, competition for jobs made nonwhite groups regard these special arrangements with alarm and led to heightened intergroup tensions.

⁷³ Glazer, "A Breakdown . . .," *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ Robert Bazell, "City College of New York: Bearing the Brunt of Open Admissions," *Science*, January 7, 1972, pp. 38-42.

Supreme Court Appointments

Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court, since 1954, one of the nation's major weapons in the battle against discrimination, became a subject of controversy with announcements of the resignations of Justices Hugo L. Black and John Marshall Harlan. A group of names, including that of Congressman Richard H. Poff of Virginia, were initially submitted to the American Bar Association (ABA) for review. When public debate and the possibility of a negative evaluation by ABA developed because of Poff's segregationist views earlier in his career, he withdrew. Ignoring ABA, President Nixon in November submitted to the Senate for approval the names of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., a Richmond, Va., moderate, and William Rehnquist, a Western, activist conservative. Sharp debate immediately arose over Rehnquist who was accused of having a "black record on racial equality, civil liberties and the overweening power of government to coerce private individuals in the name of order and security." As late as 1964-65, he publicly opposed the passage of the Phoenix municipal ordinance and the Arizona state law requiring nondiscriminatory racial policies in public accommodation. Also, a 1952 memorandum was unearthed in which Rehnquist, then law clerk to former Justice Robert Jackson, urged the latter not to support what was to become the 1954 decision in the school cases.

Rehnquist told the Senate Judiciary Committee that his own teenage children were "better off" for attending schools with blacks in suburban Virginia, as long as they were neighborhood schools, and denied he had ever been a member of a right-wing organization. In a letter to Senator James Eastland he stated that his memorandum to Jackson merely stated the justice's views, not his own. He added that he unequivocally supported "the legal reasoning and the rightness from the standpoint of fundamental fairness of the Brown decision."

By a vote of 89-1 for Powell and 68 to 26 for Rehnquist, the Senate approved their nominations. Opponents who had successfully turned back the appointments of Judges Haynsworth and Carswell a year earlier explained their failure with regard to Rehnquist as due to bad timing. They said they were unable to dig up the facts, pass them around to potential allies, and mobilize public opposition, as effectively as they had done before.

Public Opinion

In December Andrew M. Greeley and Paul B. Sheatsley presented their third report, covering a period of 30 years of public-opinion sampling by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) on the position Americans thought blacks should occupy in American life. Despite the almost two-decade of racial turmoil and struggles, they stated, "the trend has been distinctly

and strongly toward increased approval of integration.”⁷⁵ Some of the most significant shifts had taken place among whites in the South, who now heavily favored (67 per cent) integrated transportation, so that this issue became virtually nonexistent. More significantly, the per cent now (1970) favoring school integration increased from 2 to almost 50. In the North, 8 out of 10 persons favored school integration. On the basis of these figures, Greeley and Sheatsley predicted that by 1977 a majority of the population in every region would accept integrated education, and desegregated schools would cease to be an issue. Only neighborhood integration and mixed marriages still divided white Americans almost equally. But, they noted, a majority of white Americans would accept even these before long, if current trends continued.

In summarizing the results of the NORC survey data, Greeley and Sheatsley acknowledged a considerable difference between people's expressed attitudes and their behavior. (The article took no cognizance, for example, of the strong opposition to busing to achieve integration.) They also conceded that respondents may have told interviewers what they thought they ought to say, rather than what they actually believed. However, the authors stated that mere recognition of what is thought to be acceptable behavior creates a climate which makes behavioral change possible. In short changing attitudes over a 30-year period, they said, were “a sign of progress” and created “an environment for effective social reform.”

“Battle of Suburbia”

During the year, public attention, which had focused on racial difficulties in the cities, increasingly shifted to suburbia. Census Bureau data revealed that, for the first time, more Americans (76 million) lived in suburbs than in cities (59 million) or in predominantly rural regions outside metropolitan areas (71 million). The central cities also were becoming more black. In the preceding decade, they lost 2.5 million whites and gained 3 million blacks, while suburbs gained 12 million whites and only 800,000 blacks. In addition, a sharp growth of industry, chiefly manufacturing, had occurred and was continuing on the outskirts of many American cities.

Changes in population and economic patterns tended to exacerbate urban and intergroup-relations problems. Higher income people were moving from the cities to suburbia, leaving behind those with few or no skills. Frequently, the latter were members of minorities and lower-income white ethnics. It was estimated that 150,000 of the 750,000 new jobs created between 1960 and 1970 in the New York suburbs were for blue-collar workers, but only 50,000 of them were able to find homes here. Land costs had skyrocketed and many areas were zoned for half-, one-, or two-acre housing and single-

⁷⁵ “Attitudes Toward Racial Integration,” *op. cit.*

family residential use which prevented the building of apartment houses and small homes. Thus the "white noose" had grown even tighter.

This problem was compounded by the increasingly poor results yielded by programs for low-income housing in downtown slums. "In city after city there has been set in motion a pattern of poor maintenance, defaults on rent and mortgage payments, abandonment and foreclosure to federal authorities," columnist Joseph Kraft wrote. "As a result, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney is rapidly becoming the country's No. 1 slumlord."⁷⁶ And substandard housing contributed to declining levels of education and dried-up employment opportunities.

In light of these developments, intergroup-relations activities came to center increasingly around efforts to broaden housing opportunities in cities and suburbs, in the latter by changing zoning laws and regulations. These efforts led to a realignment of forces pushing for change, among them not only blacks who were anxious to get out of the slums, but also low-income whites, suburbanites priced out of the housing market, and large developers who sought to serve this market. These elements, together with social planners and civil-rights activists, pressed forward in the courts in an effort to widen equal opportunities.

In 1971 a series of decisions were handed down by courts in Chicago, Atlanta, and Philadelphia, which appeared to move forward greater integration of minority groups. In the Fairmount Manor case involving the construction of a 110-unit garden apartment complex in a heavily black area of Philadelphia, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge John J. Gibbons ruled, on January 4, that HUD had an obligation to consider whether a program increased or maintained segregation in weighing applications for mortgage insurance or rent supplements. He said HUD could not support projects intensifying segregation, unless it found that the need for the physical rehabilitation of a slum, or additional minority housing in slums, "clearly outweighs the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuating racial concentration." In the Atlanta and Chicago cases, the courts ruled it was a denial of constitutional rights for local housing authorities to concentrate low-income housing projects only in the ghetto, and ordered the preparation of metropolitan-wide housing plans to embrace both the central city and suburbs.

President Nixon acquiesced in these rulings, and HUD followed them up with new national guidelines for opening up opportunities for non-segregated housing, effective early in January 1972. Federal criteria for assistance now included need, improved location for all lower-income families, and the creation of job or business opportunities for minorities. This was significant since the role of government became increasingly important in housing: federally-subsidized housing starts in 1970 rose to 470,000 units, whereas construction of nonsubsidized units fell to 1.4 million.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, January 19, 1972.

⁷⁷ *Civil Rights Digest*, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, December 1971.

Resistance to court and federal actions mounted. Facing an election, Chicago's Mayor Richard J. Daley refused to release the list of white neighborhoods selected for subsidized housing for the poor unless ordered to do so by a federal judge. In Philadelphia, housing officials felt Judge Gibbons' decision would lead to the end of subsidized housing in the central cities. At year's end, HUD officials admitted that very little housing for low-income families was being built in white neighborhoods of big cities. Since the suburbs remained largely closed to the poor, low-income groups, and racial minorities, it appeared that, in the near future, these groups would be no better, and probably worse off, as a result of court and federal actions. Therefore, groups like the National Tenants Organization ignored the issue of expanded housing-choice in the suburbs and sought immediate relief for minority families in the inner city. In February HUD announced the release of model lease and grievance procedures, based on required minimum standards to be adopted by local public housing authorities, which the National Tenants Organization helped draft.

The impasse in housing for the poor and racial minorities threw into sharper focus the effort to overcome restricting zoning laws, building codes, and other antidevelopment legislation. Court battles took place in suburbs as different and far apart as Madison Township, N.J.; Lima, Ohio; Troy, Mich.; New Canaan, Conn.; Lake Natomas Heights, Wash., and Black Jack, Mo. The thrust of this attack was described by Linda and Paul Davidoff and Neil N. Gold, urban planners with the Suburban Action Institute, who have been among the chief theoreticians in the development of this strategy. They argued that restrictive zoning was a form of *de jure* segregation and in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The land supply in metropolitan areas, they wrote, was being kept off the market not by private acts, but by public enactment, a situation leading to "Ivy League Socialism," a term for excessive government interference on behalf of the rich. The racial consequences of this have been well known for more than a decade. "It is a certainty," they concluded, "that the planners and public officials who draft and enact zoning ordinances restricting land development to single-family, detached structures on plots of an acre or more do so in full awareness that, as a consequence, almost all blacks will be excluded from such zones."⁷⁸

The Suburban Action Institute sought to induce federal regulatory agencies to take action against corporations planning moves to the suburbs. It filed complaints against Radio Corporation of America, American Telephone and Telegraph, and General Electric for attempting to move to the acreage-zoned communities of New Canaan, Conn., Bernards Township, N.J., and Fairfield, Conn. It argued that these companies were helping to create segregated employment because their minority employees could not find housing in the same communities. In view of this complaint, R.C.A. temporarily dropped its plan to build offices for 1,000 people in New Canaan.

⁷⁸ "The Suburbs Have to Open Their Gates," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 7, 1971.

The effort to achieve nondiscrimination in housing received a severe setback on April 26, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in *Valtierra v. San Jose*, upheld the constitutionality of a California referendum law permitting a majority of the voters in a community to block construction of low-rent housing for the poor. In the 5-3 decision written by Justice Hugo L. Black, the Court reversed a ruling by a federal district court in a case brought by 41 welfare families. He said the Fourteenth Amendment sought to outlaw legal distinctions based on race, but there was no evidence that the California law was aimed at any racial minority. The National Urban Coalition, one of the groups that had filed an *amicus curiae* brief seeking to strike down the California law, declared the decision "may have rendered meaningless" the unanimous decision of the Court a week earlier (in *Swann*) approving busing to desegregate urban schools.

Public protest against exclusionary suburban housing caused President Nixon to attempt to clarify his national housing policy. In a 15-page statement "On Federal Policies Relative to Equal Housing Opportunity," issued on June 11, he made a distinction between economic and racial discrimination. "We will not seek to impose economic integration upon an existing local jurisdiction," he said, but added, "At the same time, we will not countenance any use of economic measures as a subterfuge for racial discrimination." In other words, a community would not be punished for keeping out the poor, only for acting to keep out members of minority groups.

The statement was seen as ambiguous by civil-rights groups and by many critics of the President. Three days later, however, the Justice Department surprised the latter by bringing suit against the tiny St. Louis bedroom suburb of Black Jack. Faced with a federally-assisted, low-income, and racially integrated housing project in 1969, the town was incorporated, formed a zoning board, and banned all multi-family housing. The Justice Department charged that Black Jack's zoning action against the proposed housing project deprived prospective residents of their right to fair housing under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act. However, as the administration's housing strategy began to take shape, it became evident that it would try to open up suburbia by means of federal grants and other assistance, rather than by applying pressure and penalties. In Dayton, Ohio, HUD brought together the housing authorities of the inner city and five surrounding counties, and a plan was proposed for sharing low- and moderate-income housing on a pro rata basis. The Dayton Plan was accepted despite some controversy, and a similar arrangement for public housing was reached with Washington, D.C., and its adjoining suburbs.

On the legislative front, efforts were more aggressive. Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut reintroduced the proposed Government Facilities Location Act of 1970 providing that no federal installation may move to an area that does not provide land for the housing of its workers. While the bill did not apply to private industry, its impact would be felt in this segment

of the economy in communities bidding for federal assistance in the form of shipyards, research facilities, and other economic benefits.

The "battle of suburbia" brought forth all the confusion and ambiguity that characterized intergroup relations in 1971. Close observers debated whether racism or a desire to preserve income and social-class homogeneity was the central factor behind resistance here. A Harris poll report that the same affluent suburbs which oppose low-income housing by a ratio of more than 3 to 1, would welcome blacks by 50 to 32 per cent.⁷⁹ According to urbanologist George Sternlieb, it was more difficult to obtain a social class mix than a racial mix: "... economic integration, cheek by jowl, the rich and the poor—that's tougher than race and it's hardening the lines against middle class blacks who have made it. Now these are two substantially different struggles. I think we can win on one. I don't think we can win the second one."⁸⁰ Vigorous opposition to federally-sponsored, low-income housing in suburbia developed during the year among middle-class blacks as well in various parts of the country.

Metropolitan strategies also were affected by separatist tendencies, especially among the younger and more militant blacks. They sought to build a black economic and power base in the Bedford-Stuyvesants and Harlems of the country. Blacks in Richmond, Va., sued the municipality for annexing suburban Chesterfield County, thereby tipping the city's racial balance from 51 to 58 per cent white. Their attorneys argued the move violated the constitutional rights of blacks, as well as the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and was designed to keep political control in the hands of whites.

The role of suburbia in "rescuing" the city from a myriad of racial and other problems has been obscured by a two-decade accumulation of myths. Social scientists were beginning to point out that suburbia was more than bedroom cities and towns composed of middle- and upper-class executives, who ride commuter trains to work in the city, and wives, who carpool children to school in the morning and play bridge in the afternoon. There are older and less affluent working-class suburbs, as well as more affluent ones, and these, too, have been experiencing many pressures of modern urban life including a sharp rise in crime in 1971. Moreover, many of the modest-sized towns and cities making up suburbia no longer house transients, but people who put down roots more than a decade ago and built communities. These are Americans who, political scientist Daniel J. Elazar pointed out,⁸¹ have sought and, in many respects, have found an older and more personal way of life combining urban and rural styles. This is not unlike the decen-

⁷⁹ "Suburbia: The New American Pluralism," *Time*, March 15, 1971.

⁸⁰ Quoted by Alex Greendale, "A Position Paper on Strategies and Programs to Increase the Housing Supply for Those in Need," American Jewish Committee, October 21, 1971.

⁸¹ "Community Self-Government and the Crisis of American Politics," *Ethics*, January, 1971.

tralization for which many blacks and their white allies in the large urban centers have been pressing. In the complex process of intergroup bargaining both the needs and values of suburbia, as well as the urgent and legitimate claims of racial minorities to expand their opportunities, would have to be taken into consideration.

Extremism

Despite student and racial discontent that found expression in violence, the breakdown in traditional values, and other signs of fragmentation in our society in recent years, the majority of Americans continued to remain firmly planted in the center of the sociopolitical spectrum eschewing appeals from both the radical right and the left.

The right survived in 1971, but was much less active and affluent than in the 1960s. Isolated as it was, it sought more respectable auspices and popular issues to latch on to. The sporadically active Ku Klux Klan in the North and South received its greatest attention when six members of the Pontiac, Mich., unit, including the Grand Dragon, were arrested by the FBI in connection with the fire-bombing in August of ten school buses used to implement a court-ordered integration plan. The candidacy of George Wallace provided a rallying point for the Klan, as well as for the alive, but static, John Birch Society. The lead article in the December issue of the Society's magazine, *American Opinion*, was "What I Believe," by Wallace.⁸² But the far right was also somewhat wary of him because the growing populist character of his campaign and certain indications that he was becoming more moderate clashed somewhat with its extremist ideology. (Wallace asserted at the annual Southern Governors Conference that he was just as moderate as the so-called "new breed" of progressive Democratic governors in the Deep South.)

What little lease on life the far right had in 1971 was provided by President Nixon's projected trip to China. The John Birch Society declared that Nixon, "by openly courting if not espousing the Communism of which for many years he was thought to be a leading adversary . . . has disillusioned millions who voted for him in 1968 . . ."⁸³ Lunatic-fringe elements were particularly angered. "The whole scenario," said the August issue of *White Power*, published by the National Socialist White Peoples Party, successor to George Lincoln Rockwell's American Nazi Party, "was written by the President's 'Zionist advisor' Henry Kissinger."

The more responsible conservative side, represented by the *National Review*, *Human Events*, the American Conservative Union, and leaders of the New York Conservative party, also was critical. It was angered not only by the President's China probing and "softness" on international Communism,

⁸² Milton Ellerin, *Briefs*, American Jewish Committee, January, 1972.

⁸³ *Currents*, *op. cit.*, November, 1971.

but by his welfare plan, action on civil rights, and "excessive" spending. In May, Young Americans for Freedom announced the opening of a Houston office to build delegate strength for Ronald Reagan at the 1972 Republican National Convention, only to be quickly rebuffed by him. Conservative anger came into greater focus when, in December, Congressman John M. Ashbrook (R. Ohio), ranking member on the House Committee on Internal Security, announced his intention to challenge President Nixon in the New Hampshire and Florida GOP primaries. He warned American conservatives to "beware of those peddling anti-Semitic nostrums." Said Ashbrook, "I . . . have never said that all the un-Americans are on the left. Unfortunately many on the American right are pure and simple anti-Semitic."

The radical left was also suffering from "the cooling of America." To the degree that it remained an active force, it gave its attention increasingly to domestic problems. These included poverty, hunger, abortion reform, ecology, Women's Liberation, and the Free Angela Davis campaign. The emergence of the Christian Peace movement and the arrest and indictment of Father Philip Berrigan and his associates gave the New Left an emotional issue and a vehicle for launching attacks against the government of the United States.⁸⁴

Unlike the year before, 1971 saw an almost total absence of violence on campuses across the land. Street demonstrations were generally smaller and extremist candidates fared badly in off-year elections.⁸⁵ In a statement reminiscent of Bernadine Dohrn's comment late in 1970 that the Weathermen had made "the military error" of considering only bombings and "picking up the gun" (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], p. 141), Jerry Rubin called for a sharp reversal of tactics. He now urged everyone "from Yuppies to liberals, to further South liberals" to register to vote in an effort to defeat Nixon. Said Rubin: ". . . whereas in Chicago we had a goal of chaos [in San Diego] nonviolence is the only tactic that will be effective."⁸⁶

Despite the *Sturm und Drang* of recent years and considerable unhappiness with political processes and institutions, most Americans were not dissatisfied with their personal lives. As of August, 81 per cent reported they were satisfied with their jobs, 78 per cent with the quality of life, 74 per cent with housing, and 62 per cent with family income. Whites were more positive than blacks but the percentage of blacks who expressed satisfaction had not declined significantly since 1963, when Gallup surveys started to ask these questions. These responses pointed up the split between the large mass of Americans who were generally satisfied with their lot and segments of the intellectual community who stressed how the country was failing to live up to its promise: the clash between the "provincials" and the "cosmopolitans."

⁸⁴ Milton Ellerin and Abraham S. Karlikow, "Zionism, Israel and the New Left," Trends Analysis Division, American Jewish Committee, May 1971.

⁸⁵ Gordon D. Hall, "For the Extremists, It Was a Very Bad Year," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 17, 1972.

⁸⁶ Milton Ellerin, *Briefs*, American Jewish Committee, January, 1972.

The decline in extremism was further evidence of the "centrist" character of American society.

Politics and Intergroup Relations

In 1971 there was further evidence of long-range, political changes altering the composition and strength of the Democratic and Republican parties. These were affected by, and in turn were affecting, group relations. In an examination of 1952–1968 survey research data, several social scientists reported that the Democratic party no longer was representative of the working class; it now was competing with GOP for the "massive middle class of this age of affluence." They reported a shift in the "ethnocultural frontiers." Whereas the earlier line-up had been Protestant (old-stock West European) versus Catholic (new-stock East and South European), political issues now were revolving more around blacks versus whites.

Equally significant was the movement upward economically of Catholics, the single largest denominational group in the country, and the political implications that flowed from their needs and values.⁸⁷ (This last finding was reinforced by the fact that, for the first time in American history, Catholics, with 113 members in the House and Senate, had become the single largest religious group in Congress.) Yet, older religious-ethnic-racial political patterns remained tenacious. The same study that noted "A New Political Alignment" showed that, in 1968, Catholics continued to describe themselves as Democratic or independent; white Protestants outside the South demonstrated a substantial Republican plurality, and Southern and black Protestants throughout the country were heavily Democratic. And more than 8 out of 10 Jewish voters ended up in the Humphrey-Muskie column in 1968, although Jews were showing signs of growing conservatism.⁸⁸

President Nixon continued to bend his programs and appeals to take advantage of any new political realignment and, especially, to win over blue-collar workers and the growing Catholic population.⁸⁹ He indicated support of some form of aid to parochial schools (p. 108) and said he was opposed to abortion as "a means of population control." His public statements stressing strong opposition to busing to achieve school desegregation and to welfare recipients who could, but did not work, attempted to reassure his Southern constituency, as well as working-class and ethnic groups in the city and suburbs. He further assured the rapidly burgeoning suburban population that he would not use the leverage of the federal government to change the economic character of their neighborhoods.

⁸⁷ Everett C. Ladd, Jr., Charles Hadley and Lauriston King, "A New Political Realignment?," *Public Interest*, No. 23, Spring, 1971.

⁸⁸ Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer, *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972).

⁸⁹ Murray Friedman and Peter Binzen, "Politics and Parochialism," *New Republic*, January 23, 1971.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the Nixon administration, which, from the first, had small appeal for blacks, witnessed the departure of a number of high-level black officials, including Arthur A. Fletcher who, as assistant secretary of labor, strongly advocated the Philadelphia Plan. Black supporters of President Nixon argued, however, that his efforts on behalf of black businessmen and appointments of blacks, both in the military and government service, would increase the Nixon vote among them in 1972.

The role of suburbia in politics and intergroup relations came under scrutiny by Robert Lehne in a book review of *The Emerging Republican Majority*, by Kevin P. Phillips, and *The Real Majority*, by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg. Lehne agreed with the authors that suburbia now occupied a central place in the political arena; that, by 1972, more congressmen would come from suburban areas than from either cities or rural districts. Using ratings of Americans for Democratic Action and Americans for Constitutional Action, as well as of the *Congressional Quarterly*, he argued that suburban congressmen stood somewhere between the city representatives, with their liberal voting patterns, and the more conservative rural representatives. On issues like the family-assistance program, freedom-of-choice busing and voting rights, he wrote, their vote tended to be more like that of central-city representatives.⁹⁰

The off-year elections presented no conclusive evidence of these variously reported trends, although there were some indications that "law and order," anti-welfare appeals, ethnic consciousness, and racial polarization continued to remain powerful issues. Representative Louise Day Hicks, archfoe of school busing, was defeated in Boston's mayoral election by incumbent Kevin H. White. Earlier in the year, Mayor Richard G. Hatcher, a black, won redesignation in the Democratic primary over a black opponent, which was tantamount to reelection. In Cleveland, however, a black candidate supported by retiring Mayor Carl B. Stokes was defeated by Ralph J. Perk, who became the first Republican mayor in 30 years. Shortly after taking office, Perk, who was of Czech descent, ordered the cancellation of 18 building permits for scatter-site public housing in the "great ethnic Ward 9" and elsewhere, fulfilling a campaign pledge not to permit such housing in any area where residents do not want it. (The ethnic character of Perk's victory was one of the salient features of the election. His campaign director was executive director of the American Nationalities Movement in the city, and there were charges by his staff that Cuyahoga County, 40 per cent of ethnic descent, had no ethnic representation.)

In the Philadelphia race for mayor, former Police Commissioner Frank L. Rizzo, running as a Democrat, defeated youthful, liberal Congressman William Green and a black opponent, Hardy Williams, in the primary, and went on to defeat his patrician liberal Republican opponent, Thacher Longstreth, by a margin of 53 to 47 per cent. The primary and election,

⁹⁰ "Warming Up for 1972," *Trans-Action*, September, 1971.

which received national attention, revealed the deep racial polarization, "provincials" versus "cosmopolitan" split, and the growth of ethnic consciousness. Rizzo was the first Italian-American and only the second Catholic to become mayor of the city. He ran as an urban populist on a platform of making the city's streets safe again, holding the line on taxes, and opposing what he called excessive permissiveness in the schools and other areas of community life. In response to these appeals, he gained approximately two of every three white votes; 70 per cent of the blacks voted for Longstreth.

A study of the Jewish voting pattern in the Philadelphia mayoralty election showed Jews split almost exactly down the middle. Social class appeared to be the chief factor determining how they voted. Older, lower middle-class Jews, who lived or worked in closer proximity to the urban crisis, voted more heavily for Rizzo; their younger, better-educated, and more affluent brethren tended to support Longstreth. However, the study provided evidence that, in a period of "backlash," Jews backlashed less than other white groups. In the Democratic primary Green, Williams, and a third "liberal" candidate who later dropped out, were supported by 58 per cent of the Jewish voters, while 42 per cent supported Rizzo.⁹¹

Black Political Power

The year saw growing indications that the black community was moving from protest to politics. In the words of Congressman William Clay (D., Mo.), a member of the Black Caucus, "We are going to set the tone for the black liberation struggle in the country."⁹² Between 1962 and 1970, the number of blacks in Congress increased from 4 to 13 in the House and to one in the Senate; the number elected to state legislatures rose from 52 to 198. There were now almost 1,900 blacks in elective state and local offices, about half in the South; four years earlier, there had been 475. States with the largest number of black officials were Michigan, New York, Alabama, Illinois, and Ohio, all having at least 100.⁹³

The steady growth of grass-roots black political strength, as measured by the *National Roster of Black Elected Officials*, published by the Joint Center for Political Studies at Howard University, was especially impressive. The number of black mayors and vice mayors was now 81, as against 41 the year before. Since February 1970, representation in state legislatures

⁹¹ Henry Cohen and Gary Sandrow, *Philadelphia Chooses a Mayor, 1971* (American Jewish Committee, 1972).

⁹² *Evening Bulletin*, Philadelphia, June 6, 1971.

⁹³ Bureau of the Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics, *The Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States, 1970* (BLS Report No. 394 *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 38, July, 1971); Thomas R. Brooks, "Big City Politics, Making the Black Vote Count," *Tuesday*, September 1971).

had increased by 18 per cent; county commissioners by 34 per cent; mayors and vice mayors by 69 per cent; councilmen and aldermen, who constituted almost 35 per cent of the total of black elected officials, by 18 per cent. The number of black judges increased by 30 per cent.

The growth of black political power was a result of increased political sophistication: the ability of blacks to recognize and vote for what they believed was in their best interests. In the Philadelphia election, the 70-30 support for Longstreth marked a major break with past strong Democratic commitments. In discussing the psychological growth of black people, Alfred Poussaint, a Negro and associate dean of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, said, "We have moved from a mentality of myself, to my family, to my block, to my community, to my people, to my nation."⁹⁴

As the 1972 elections approached, therefore, blacks were flexing their political muscles. The Black Caucus, consisting of the 13 black members of the U.S. House of Representatives, together with a professional staff, was lodged in a permanent headquarters in Washington, D.C., and black state legislators in various parts of the country were setting up local counterparts. The Caucus, meeting with President Nixon in March, presented him with 60 demands for aid to minorities. (In May he issued a 112-page response rejecting some of their major proposals, but saying he agreed with several others.) One of its members, Brooklyn Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm, announced she would enter several primaries and seek the Democratic presidential nomination. Caucus members also visited ten widely separated military bases and returned to Washington to hold three days of hearings on charges of racism in the military. Although the hearings were "unofficial," they brought to public attention charges of racial discrimination and concluded with recommendations for the Pentagon.

Throughout the year, there were secret and semisecret meetings of black leaders in various parts of the country to discuss how black political power could best be exerted, particularly in connection with the 1972 presidential race. These focused on whether a single black candidate should be pushed to run for the Democratic nomination for president and whether that candidate should be Representative Chisholm; whether regional politicians should run as favorite-son candidates in various primaries, and whether a national black political convention should be held before the Democratic National Convention. During one of these sessions, Mayor Hatcher reported that the Black Caucus had made a number of requests of Democratic leadership, including expansion of the Democratic National Committee to reflect a 20 per cent minority involvement and a pledge that 20 per cent of the delegate slate in Presidential primary states would "reflect black participation."⁹⁵ The contention of black politicians, who met with Democratic party chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien, was that the 20 per cent figure reflected black

⁹⁴ *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1972.

⁹⁵ *New York Times*, November 21, 1971.

Democratic voter participation in the 1968 election, not the black population percentage. Following meetings of 200 black elected officials and political theorists in Washington, D.C., the Black Caucus issued a call in November for a national black political convention in the spring of 1972 to develop "a national black agenda" and crystallize "a national black strategy for the 1972 elections and beyond."

The growth of black political power has great symbolic as well as practical importance. It provides, for example, the ability to obtain federal monies for the needs of the black urban poor. However, this is not a cure in and of itself for the assorted ills plaguing the slum blacks. Despite his success in obtaining federal grants, Mayor Hatcher, as author Thomas R. Brooks said,⁹⁶ was no more successful than any other politician, black or white, in halting the rise of crime in his city. And Mayor Carl Stokes, along with an increasing number of white mayors, declined to run for reelection, in part because of the "ungovernability" of cities.

Moreover, the growth of black political power can be exaggerated. While some 29 major American cities are already at least one-quarter black, only six have a black majority and in only eight others do blacks approach a majority. In the 66 largest metropolitan areas accounting for half the United States population, according to Thomas Brooks, the average has grown from 18 per cent black in 1960 to only 24 per cent black in 1970. Blacks are still a minority and need allies to carry out their goals and programs. "Blacks can initiate change and provoke a reaction, as they have on several occasions with great effectiveness, but the decisive factor will be the direction of the majority," Bayard Rustin has pointed out. "The political objective . . . must, therefore, be the creation of a progressive majority in the form of a coalition."⁹⁷

The most dramatic example of growing black political strength (as well as of other forces at work here) was the "new breed" of moderate Southern governors, who took control in 1971 of state houses in Georgia, Florida, Arkansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, and Mississippi. In their inaugural addresses Governors Reubin O. Askew of Florida and Jimmy Carter of Georgia pledged to end racial discrimination and to achieve equal opportunity for whites and blacks. Carter, who succeeded segregationist Lester G. Maddox (now lieutenant governor) declared:

I say to you quite frankly that the time for racial discrimination is over. Our people have already made this major and difficult decision, but we cannot underestimate the challenge of hundreds of minor decisions yet to come. No poor, rural, weak or black person should ever have to bear the additional burden of being deprived of the opportunity of an education, a job or simple justice.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ "Big City Politics . . .," *op. cit.*

⁹⁷ Quoted in *ibid.*

⁹⁸ *New York Times*, January 13, 1971.

Governor John C. West of South Carolina appointed a black man to his personal staff. He also named to his inaugural committee the former field director of the NAACP state unit. One of the first speaking engagements accepted by Arkansas Governor Dale Bumpers, was to address the integrationist state Council for Human Relations.

When the Southern Governors Conference met in Atlanta in November, it was under the complete and undisputed control of racial moderates. Mississippi Governor William Waller, elected in November to succeed archsegregationist John Bell Williams and heir to the political tradition of Theodore Bilbo and Ross Barnett, declared that Wallace could no longer take the vote of Mississippians for granted in a national contest. "I'm not sure if [Wallace] is running from within or without the party, or if he is running on a constructive, positive platform or something that could be termed negative."⁹⁹

MURRAY FRIEDMAN

⁹⁹ New York *Times*, November 9, 1971.

Note: Quotations from statements by Professor Seymour Siegel and Henry Schwartzschild in Philip Perlmutter's article, "Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States" (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], p. 155), were taken from the November 27 and December 4, 1971, issues of the *Jewish Post and Opinion*, respectively.

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

THERE WAS much diplomatic maneuvering but no real movement toward peace in the Middle East during 1971. The energetic efforts of American and United Nations envoys failed to produce agreement on the terms of either a general settlement or a more limited agreement to reopen the Suez Canal. Despite the repeated warnings by Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat that 1971 was "the year of decision" and that he would resort to military action if there was no progress toward Israeli withdrawal, the year ended indecisively, with neither war nor peace.

The Israelis were relatively content to maintain the status quo and tended to look with skepticism on the value of "paper promises" as a substitute for continued Israeli military control over the strategic areas occupied during the 1967 war. The Arabs were bitter and frustrated, but their internal political divisions and military ineffectiveness prevented them from dislodging the Israelis.

Soviet-Egyptian Relations

The Soviet Union continued to supply modern weapons to Egypt and to support the Egyptian diplomatic campaign to achieve a favorable political settlement. However, the Russians reportedly urged the Egyptians to exercise military restraint. They warned Sadat, during his visit to Moscow in October, that they did not yet consider his forces capable of crossing the Suez Canal and pushing back the Israelis on their own. Sadat concluded that the Soviet Union had no intention of risking a confrontation with the United States on the eve of the forthcoming Moscow summit by sending in Soviet forces to save the Egyptians from another defeat. Two other reasons for postponing the "zero-hour" with Israel, cited by Sadat in a speech to the Egyptian officers and troops in Aswan in January 1972, were: the Indo-Pakistani war in December, which distracted world attention from the Middle East and kept the Soviet Union busy aiding India; the disclosure, during the same month, that the United States would supply Israel with some 40 new Phantoms and 80 Skyhawks, which, Sadat estimated, would increase Israel's Air Force by one-third and enable it to fly between 1,000 and 1,200 sorties a day against the Egyptian front.

Inter-Arab Tensions

Sadat's Arab allies were in even worse shape. The eastern front of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan was in disarray. The Iraqis quietly pulled out their forces

from Jordan after having stood on the sidelines while the Jordanian army crushed the Palestinian guerrillas in the September 1970 civil war. When the Jordanian army proceeded to mop up the remaining guerrilla outposts in the north of Jordan in the summer of 1971, Syria closed the land frontier with Jordan, barred overflights from Lebanon, and, finally, broke off relations with Jordan. While the ostensible purpose of these moves was to isolate King Hussein economically and politically and to demonstrate Syria's solidarity with the Palestinian struggle, some observers suspected the land frontier was closed primarily to prevent the fleeing guerrillas from entering Syria, or their Syrian supporters from going to their aid. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was vocal in lending moral support to the Palestinian liberation movements; but he kept a close rein on the Palestinians at home to prevent a repetition of the mistake made by his predecessor, who, in 1970, had allowed Syria to become embroiled in the Jordanian civil war, with humiliating consequences (AJYB, 1971 [Vol. 72], pp. 170-71).

One effect of the closed border with Syria was the bizarre spectacle of more than a hundred Palestinian guerrillas seeking asylum among their sworn enemies, the Israelis, in preference to falling into the hands of Hussein's army. The only nearby place where the guerrillas still maintained some operational bases was southern Lebanon, although a 1969 agreement between the Lebanese government and al-Fatah leader Yassir Arafat forbade them from launching attacks against Israel from Lebanese soil. Relations between the Palestinians and local villagers became increasingly strained when guerrilla attacks in violation of the agreement provoked Israeli retaliatory raids. The Lebanese government formally protested the Israeli incursions; but the guerrillas charged collusion between Beirut and the Israelis, because they managed with impunity to carve out new roads in the mountainous southern Lebanon and to begin regular patrols of "Fatahland," which reduced the guerrillas to a minor nuisance.

Jordanian-Israeli Relations

The apparent stalemate in Arab efforts to liberate the occupied territories led King Hussein to denounce publicly Arab bellicose statements as folly and to declare that Jordan would not again allow itself to be dragged into a hopeless battle. The Arab attempts to isolate him economically and politically also prompted Hussein to seek de facto normalization of relations with Israel. During 1971 there were scarcely any incidents along the Jordan, and the bridges across the river carried a steady and growing stream of goods and Arab visitors in both directions. Agreement was also reached on such technical matters as coordination of civilian air flights to avoid accidents in the narrow air corridor in the Negev.

However, Israel and Jordan were unable to reach a formal peace agreement because they remained far apart in their territorial demands, with Jerusalem a major issue. Israeli leaders insisted on Israel sovereignty over

the entire reunified city, although some officials hinted that they were prepared to grant Hussein a role as custodian of Moslem holy places. Hussein insisted on Jordanian sovereignty over East Jerusalem, but indicated he would not again erect the physical barriers that had divided the city for two decades; he now favored an open city, with free access to all, including the Jews.

Jerusalem

Frustrated by their inability to stop Israeli housing projects in East Jerusalem and other measures indicating Israel's intention to unify the city permanently and irrevocably, the Jordanians threatened in the spring to bring the issue before the United Nations. For several months the United States managed to dissuade the Jordanians from taking action, arguing that acrimonious debate in the United Nations might jeopardize its delicate diplomatic efforts to achieve an interim agreement on reopening the Suez Canal.

In September Jordanian Ambassador Baha Toukan brought the issue to the Security Council, demanding that sanctions be imposed on Israel to stop it from flouting UN decisions and "to prevent a *fait accompli* in Jerusalem from interfering in the just solution which must ultimately be reached." Israel Ambassador Yosef Tekoah replied that the charge of an Israeli effort to "Judaize" Jerusalem was a "gratuitous and malicious" attempt to prevent the city's normal growth and development, since Jews had constituted the majority of the city's population for generations and Jerusalem was "the center of the Jewish people's existence, civilization, unity." He accused Jordan of publicly raising the issue at this time to "divert attention from her internal and inter-Arab difficulties."

The Security Council, on September 25, adopted a resolution deploring Israel's failure to respect previous United Nations resolutions concerning Jerusalem (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 182-3; 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 251-3); confirmed "in the clearest possible terms that legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of population and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section are totally invalid and cannot change that status"; urgently called on Israel to take no further steps and, in accordance with an amendment offered by Syria, demanded that Israel "rescind all previous measures and actions." The resolution was adopted by a vote of 14 to 0. The United States abstained on the Syrian amendment, but, when it was approved, voted in favor of the resolution as a whole. Syria abstained, since it wanted a stronger resolution containing sanctions.

The resolution asked that the UN secretary-general report to the Council within 60 days on its implementation, and authorized him to set up a mission or other instrumentality of his choosing for this purpose. The Israelis let it be known that they would not welcome a mission, and U Thant reluctantly

dropped the idea. On November 15, shortly before the end of the two-month deadline, Foreign Minister Abba Eban sent a lengthy reply to the secretary-general, detailing the improvements the Israelis had made in the running of the city and declaring that the Israel policies in Jerusalem were consistent with the UN Charter and designed to further the welfare of all religious and ethnic groups in the city.

U. S. Position

During the debate, U.S. delegate George Bush reaffirmed the American position that "the ultimate status of Jerusalem should be determined through negotiation and agreement between the governments of Israel and Jordan in the context of an overall peace settlement, taking into account the interests of its inhabitants, of the international religious communities who hold it sacred and of other countries in the area." He said the United States had repeatedly stressed to Israel "the need to take more fully into account the sensitivities and concerns of others." Though he characterized the Israeli response as "disappointing," he declared that "we believe Israel's respect for the Holy Places has indeed been exemplary." At the same time he warned that an "Israeli occupation policy of unilaterally determined practices cannot help promote a just and lasting peace any more than that cause was served by the status quo in Jerusalem prior to June 1967." Bush emphasized that the United States did not advocate a return to the artificially divided city, but favored the maintenance of a unified city with free access for all.

Assassination of Jordan's Premier

If one of King Hussein's objectives in raising the Jerusalem issue at the United Nations was to reassert his leadership on the Palestine question and to distract world attention from his conflict with the militant Palestinians, his success was short-lived. On November 28 four young Palestinians carrying Syrian passports assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Wasfi Tal while he was in Cairo to attend Arab League Joint Defense Council strategy sessions. The assassins claimed they belonged to the "Black September" organizations, a commando group recently formed to avenge the September 1970 Jordanian crack-down on the guerrillas. In Beirut, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine issued a communiqué claiming credit for the assassination. Al-Fatah, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, issued a statement declaring the four assassins "represent the will of the Palestinian revolution to eliminate" all opponents, and calling on all Arab and patriotic elements to ask Sadat to release them. The Association of Palestinian Lawyers declared that the Palestinian revolution had a legal and moral right to crush its enemies and that consequently the death of Wasfi Tal "was a legal act . . . an act of political warfare and not a crime."

Jordanian officials accused Fatah of engineering Tal's assassination as well as the attempted assassination of the Jordanian ambassador in London, Zayd al-Rifai, in mid-December. They hinted at Egyptian complicity in the crime, noting that two of the assassins had been arrested upon their arrival in Cairo airport for possession of weapons, but had then been released. Jordan also was upset at indications that Egypt intended to be lenient to the accused, whom it released on bail, and that it planned to introduce the background of Jordanian-Palestinian conflict at their trial to mitigate, if not completely justify, their terrorist action. The Tal assassination effectively killed the abortive efforts of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian governments to mediate between Hussein and the Palestinian commandos.

Persian Gulf Independence

Further east, Britain's anticipated withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, after more than 150 years of preeminence in managing the defense and foreign relations of the Gulf sheikhdoms, led to the formation of new political entities and a scramble for power in this strategic and oil-rich region. The Sultanate of Oman and the sheikhdoms of Bahrain and Qatar declared their independence. Six of the smaller sheikhdoms formed the Union of Arab Emirates in December. The four new Persian Gulf states were admitted to the United Nations, although their combined population barely totalled a million. This raised to 18 the number of Arab UN members.

As the British prepared to leave, Iranian troops, on November 30, occupied three disputed islands commanding the Strait of Hormuz, the channel through which Iranian and other Persian Gulf oil is shipped. Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Iran for its "aggression" and violation of "Arab sovereignty," and broke off relations with Britain for its alleged collusion in the Iranian action. Libya, in a show of solidarity, took measures against the British Petroleum Company. Western oil companies also faced demands from the Middle Eastern producing states for higher payments, increased production, and a share in the ownership of the companies. An added concern was the emergence of the Soviet Union as a growing factor in Middle East oil competition, beginning with a partnership agreement between Moscow and Baghdad to explore a concession area previously assigned to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Mutiny in Morocco

In North Africa, several Arab countries saw themselves threatened by domestic coups and foreign-supported conspiracies. In Morocco, in June, pro-Western King Hassan II began the trial of 193 opposition leftists, who were accused of plotting to overthrow the government through a terrorist campaign inspired, financed, and directed by the Baathist regime in Syria.

On July 10 mutinous army troops attacked the summer palace and briefly held the King hostage until he was freed by loyal troops. Hassan charged that radical Libya had incited the revolt and that Cairo had harbored anti-monarchical Moroccans. Before learning of the coup's failure, the Libyan government announced that it had mobilized its armed forces and was ready to send paratroopers and aircraft to assist the Moroccan Army "against any foreign interference." Presumably, this threat was intended to prevent assistance to the royalists by other pro-Western Arab monarchs, or by the United States. Washington was particularly concerned, since Morocco was the largest African recipient of United States economic and military aid and the only remaining country in North Africa to allow the United States to maintain air and military communications facilities, after the Libyan revolutionaries had forced the closing of American bases in that country.

Two days after the unsuccessful coup, Libyan government radio broadcasts continued to urge the Moroccan people "to pursue their struggle" against the King, declaring that the attempt to depose the "feudal, reactionary and corrupt" monarchy should have been undertaken years ago. This resulted in a rupture of diplomatic relations between Libya and Morocco. The Egyptians were more pragmatic. Seeing that the coup had failed, President Sadat sent a personal envoy to Rabat to congratulate the King on his survival. Hassan pointedly kept the envoy waiting for two days. King Hussein, a like-minded pro-Western monarch, came in person and was royally welcomed. In August, Hassan appointed a new cabinet which pledged reforms in education, justice, and the economy to remove corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency.

Federation of Arab Republics

The announcement in Benghazi, Libya, on April 17 of agreement on a federal union of Egypt, Libya, and Syria appeared to usher in a new era of Arab unity and cooperation. A plebiscite was scheduled for September 1. President Sadat announced that the union would have "one president, one flag, one anthem and one federal capital." The ideology of the federation would be "democratic socialism" and the new name—Federation of Arab Republics (FAR)—implied that monarchies would not be welcome to join. It would have a federal military command, with authority to deploy troops and equipment in the three countries. The planned federation was hailed as a "blow to Israel," and, presumably in response to the prodding of his more outspokenly militant Libyan and Syrian allies, Sadat declared:

There will be no negotiations or peace agreement with Israel, no abandoning of one inch of Arab territories and no relinquishing or bargaining on the rights of the Palestine cause.

However, it soon became apparent that Egypt was not really prepared to relinquish its sovereignty in crucial decisions to its federation partners.

The provision of the draft statutes setting up a council of the presidents of the three countries with power to select a chairman and make decisions by majority vote was strongly opposed by Egypt, because its more than 34 million people could be outvoted by Libya, with less than two million people, and Syria, with fewer than six million. Besides, many Egyptians considered Libyan Premier Muammar al-Qaddafi, the prime mover behind the federation, to be impetuous, unpredictable, and given to fanatical and extremist positions. They also were mindful of the failure of the earlier union with Syria, which had lasted only from February 1958 to September 1961 and left a residue of mutual suspicion and acrimony. These concerns were voiced during the sometimes heated discussion of the proposed federation in April in the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), Egypt's only legal political organization. In consequence, Egypt got its partners to agree to amend the statutes to require unanimity for federal executive decisions and the selection of a federal president. Other amendments decreased the areas of competence of the proposed federal legislature and judiciary.

The sovereignty of the separate states was further safeguarded in the federation's constitution signed in Damascus on August 20. Major policy questions, such as making war or peace, required unanimity. Even on lesser matters, each president retained veto power for a two-year period after the constitution went into effect, upon approval by plebiscite in September. Sadat was named president of the federation, and the United Arab Republic officially returned to its pre-1958 name of Egypt. The three states maintained their separate UN memberships.

In a joint declaration on August 20, the presidents of the three states reiterated the "three nos" of the 1967 Khartoum Arab summit: "There will be no peace or negotiation with the Zionist enemy, no yielding an inch of Arab territory, no bargaining on the Palestinian cause."

Taken literally, this would shut the door to a negotiated settlement with Israel, which United States envoys had been strenuously promoting. State Department officials tended to dismiss the statement as an Egyptian rhetorical concession to the militant Libyan and Syrian leaders. They noted that, under the federation, Cairo retained control over its own foreign and defense policies, and President Sadat had privately indicated his interest in pursuing discussions with the United States on a political settlement, although he was increasingly annoyed at American failure to wring concessions from Israel. However, other observers, while conceding that Egyptian veto power could prevent Cairo from being unwillingly dragged into premature conflict by its allies, believed that, reciprocally, Libya and Syria might veto any formal peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

Crisis in Cairo

President Sadat's foreign policies during 1971 provoked the most serious challenge to his authority at home. Vice-President Ali Sabry was dismissed

on May 2, two days before U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers was scheduled to arrive in Cairo in pursuit of Egyptian-Israeli agreement on an interim Suez Canal agreement. Some saw in the timing a calculated move by Sadat to demonstrate his independence of Moscow and an effort to return to the earlier policy of "positive neutrality," when he managed to have Washington and Moscow bidding against each other for Egypt's favor. Sabry has long been regarded as sympathetic to Russia, and, when Soviet missile crews and pilots were stationed in Egypt, he was given the important post of liaison official on military matters with the Russians. Sabry reportedly opposed Sadat's acceptance of the American mediation effort. The main public focus of his challenge to Sadat, however, was over the proposed federation with Syria and Libya, since many Egyptians had misgivings about it. Behind these policy differences, there was also a personal struggle for power.

On May 13 six leading cabinet members and three high ASU officials resigned. The following day, Sadat arrested them and many of their supporters on the charge of attempting to bring about the "collapse" of his regime. In a broadcast to the nation, Sadat said that he was stunned by the "attempted coup" and especially pained by the realization that "my own house had been bugged." The bugging device was installed by the security police on order of Interior Minister Sharawy Gomaa, one of those who had resigned. Sadat announced a prohibition on arbitrary police power, election rigging, and any surveillance of citizens and recording of telephone calls, except in judicially approved criminal and national security investigations. Although there was a public burning of tape-recordings, the destruction apparently was selective, since tape-recordings were introduced by the government prosecutor as evidence in the trials against the accused plotters.

Ninety-one persons were charged with high treason and attempting to establish rival centers of power. Besides Sabry, who was accused of masterminding the plot, these included Minister of War Lieutenant General Mohammed Fawzi; Minister of State for Presidential Affairs Sami Sharaf; Minister of Information Mohammed Fayek, and Farid Abdel Karim, secretary of ASU.

Soviet-Egyptian Treaty

Since many of the accused were known for their leftist leanings and their opposition to the American mediation effort, there was considerable and scarcely veiled tension between Cairo and Moscow. The Russians denied any role in the attempt to unseat Sadat. They decided to abandon Sabry and his supporters to their fate and to concentrate instead on strengthening Soviet-Egyptian ties. Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny rushed to Cairo and, after two days of intensive consultations, he and Sadat signed a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation. It pledged the strengthening of cooperation in political, economic, scientific, and cultural affairs, based on the

principle of "noninterference in the internal affairs" of each state and respect for its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality. While such clauses are routine, they were significant for Sadat in the light of the attempted coup and the forthcoming trial.

From the Soviet standpoint the treaty was useful both because it formally strengthened the ties between the two countries for a 15-year period, irrespective of possible changes in leadership, and because of its ideological coloration. The preamble described both countries as "inspired by the ideals of the struggle against imperialism and colonialism," and, in the operative articles, they pledged unswerving battle against all forms of imperialism and colonialism. The section on cooperation in economic and social development, referred to the Soviet Union as "a socialist state," and Egypt as having "set itself the aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines."

The treaty provided for regular consultations on all important questions affecting the interests of the two states, and for consultations to "concert their positions" in case of any threat to peace or violation of peace. The Soviet Union pledged continued military cooperation to "strengthen the defense capacity" of Egypt, including specifically "assistance in the training" of Egyptian military personnel "in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as its ability to stand up to aggression in general." This provision can be seen as a Soviet attempt to assure for its personnel a continuing role in Egypt's military, and thus its foreign policy, decisions.

Among the reasons for Moscow's coolness to the American mediation effort was that a formal Egyptian-Israeli agreement, which would eliminate the likelihood of renewed fighting, would give Russia little excuse to maintain upwards of 15,000 advisers, experts, and other military personnel in Egypt. The Russians were finding, as had the British, French, and Americans before them in Egypt and other countries, that foreign "advisers" soon tended to be resented by "the natives." Indeed, the author found during a visit to Cairo in July that Egyptians were quite open and unanimous in expressing their dissatisfaction with the Soviet personnel, whom they considered arrogant and abrasive. However, most Egyptians regarded them as necessary until Egypt mastered the new Soviet equipment and produced its own, or the United States succeeded in pressuring Israel to withdraw from Sinai.

The joint communiqué accompanying the signing of the treaty condemned "Israel's imperialist aggression" and its "persistent expansionist policy," criticized the United States for supporting the Israeli actions, and pledged Soviet assistance to Egypt and Arab countries for the recovery in the nearest future of "all Arab territories occupied by Israel." However, the statement stopped short of threatening war; it emphasized instead that "Egypt's constructive policies for a peaceful settlement" had created "the

proper atmosphere for establishing a just and permanent peace in the area." In other words, Moscow was not prepared to endorse the more belligerent approach of Sadat's Libyan and Syrian allies.

The government prosecutor asked for the death penalty for ten of the plotters. In December the three-man Revolutionary Tribunal imposed death sentences on Sabry, Gomaa, Sharaf, and Abdel Karim, which Sadat commuted to life imprisonment at hard labor. General Fawzi's life sentence was reduced by Sadat to 15 years at hard labor because of the general's role in rebuilding the Egyptian army after the 1967 defeat. Fourteen of the defendants were acquitted, 14 others received one-year suspended sentences and the rest were given prison terms of varying lengths.

The Sudan

The dramatic events in the Sudan in July were another illustration of the interaction of domestic politics with inter-Arab relations and the great power rivalries in the Middle East.

A group of left-wing army officers seized control of Khartoum and deposed the government of Major General Gaafar al-Nimeiry. Major Hashem al-Ata, a leader of the group had been one of the main organizers of the military coup that brought Nimeiry to power in May 1969. Ata and several of his co-conspirators were ousted from the government in November 1970, for opposing Nimeiry's plan to bring the Sudan into a projected federation with Egypt and Libya. Opposition to the federation was centered in the influential Sudanese Communist party, which feared the effect of a union with militantly anti-Communist Libya, and among the non-Moslem black African tribes of the south. The blacks, who constituted a majority in the country had been waging a bitter civil war against the Moslem Arabs of the north who have long dominated political and economic life. The African tribesmen now feared that if the Sudan joined the federation they would become a permanently oppressed minority in the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic body. In the face of the strong opposition, Nimeiry was forced to defer participation in the Federation of Arab Republics.

The leaders of the military coup in July immediately dissolved the Sudanese Socialist Union, formed after the model of Egypt, released Communists from prison, and announced that the Sudan would become a "democratic independent republic with full sovereignty for the people." Major Ata pledged to link the Sudan more closely with Communist and Socialist countries, and indicated that he would bring Communists into the government in a coalition of "all truly progressive and nationalist forces."

However, General Nimeiry staged a countercoup and, with Libyan and Egyptian help, quickly returned to power. The leaders of the abortive coup, among them Abdel Khalek Mahgoub, head of the Communist party, were summarily tried by a military court and executed. Although Mahgoub

vigorously denied the accusation that he had masterminded the coup, Nimeiry proceeded to crack down on the Communist party, arresting many of its leaders and suspected sympathizers.

Some of the anti-Communist sentiment among Nimeiry's followers appeared to have spilled over into incidents against Soviet personnel in the Sudan. On July 25 Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny protested the anti-Communist campaign and asked Nimeiry to refrain from inflicting harsh or extreme sentences on the accused, but with little effect. The Soviet press agency *Tass* carried a statement which Soviet leaders sent to Nimeiry, expressing "grave concern over the reign of terror" in the Sudan. While denying that Moscow had anything to do with the plot and disavowing any intention of interfering in the Sudan's domestic affairs, the statement warned that unfriendly actions such as "threats and acts of violence against Soviet officials in Khartoum" and their property endangered relations between the two countries. Except for Yugoslavia, the other East European nations joined in the criticism.

Nimeiry's hand was strengthened by the efforts of the Soviet Union's great power rivals to exploit the deterioration in Soviet-Sudanese relations. It was announced in Khartoum that the People's Republic of China pledged full support for Sudan's independence "against all pressures," and in August Sudanese Foreign Minister Mansour Khaled pointedly emphasized the Sudan's "particularly good" ties with Peking, especially an imminent agreement under which China would finance development projects in the Sudan. The Sudan had previously concluded an economic and technical cooperation agreement with China providing for \$45 million in aid, but this had not yet been utilized. General Nimeiry later disclosed that the Sudan had secretly been receiving Chinese-made MIG jets, tanks and other heavy arms under an agreement he had reached with Chairman Mao in 1970.

Meanwhile, the United States quietly informed the Sudanese government that Washington was willing to resume full diplomatic relations or, in any event, to discuss new economic, humanitarian, and cultural ties. The Sudan had broken formal diplomatic relations with the United States at the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war in a show of solidarity with its Arab neighbors. However, like Egypt, it maintained diplomatic contacts through the U.S. diplomatic mission in Khartoum, which officially functioned as part of the Netherlands embassy. At a press conference on August 5, Foreign Minister Khaled said that while formal ties would not be restored as long as Washington continued to "support" Israel, "economic and cultural ties with the United States continue with the possibility of improvement." Since 1967 U.S. aid was limited to small amounts of relief supplies channeled through UNICEF.

While Soviet-Sudanese relations continued to be strained, no complete rupture occurred. Moscow limited itself to verbal chiding, and the Sudanese government, though concerned to assert its independence and crush its

domestic enemies, was also not interested in entirely cutting itself off from Soviet support. The Soviet Union had been providing more than \$20 million in economic assistance annually and the Sudanese army had relied heavily on Soviet supplies and advisers. Representatives of the Anyanya organization of the Southern Sudanese black rebels, charged that Soviet equipment and Soviet advisers in fact played a major role in the government's military campaign against them.

The events of July emphasized the need to deal with the underlying problems that had provoked them. Nimeiry quietly began efforts, with Ethiopian mediation, to settle the civil war by providing a measure of autonomy to the southern regions. At the same time, however, the Sudanese Arab Socialist Union was revived, and the Nimeiry government promulgated a temporary constitution providing for a People's Council and other institutions paralleling those in Egypt and Syria. Parliament was assigned the task of drafting a permanent constitution. Observers believed it would be exceedingly difficult to produce a document that allayed the fears of the southern blacks while keeping the door open to federation with the Arab states to the north.

Peace Efforts

On January 5 Ambassador Jarring resumed his discussions at United Nations headquarters in New York with the representatives of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel on the establishment of lasting peace. Upon the invitation of the government of Israel, Jarring briefly visited Israel from January 8 to 10, meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir and other high officials. The Israelis presented him with a paper outlining their views on the "essentials of peace." He passed these on to Egypt and Jordan and received their reactions and counterproposals.

At the beginning of February UN Secretary-General U Thant expressed "cautious optimism" over the renewal of this indirect exchange of views and appealed for continuation of the cease-fire. Israel agreed to an unlimited extension on the basis of reciprocity, while Egypt announced, on February 4, agreement to a 30-day extension, which was subsequently renewed.

Jarring soon found, however, that the parties were not only far apart in their specific demands, but that each insisted that the other side make certain commitments before it would be prepared to spell out its own final terms in detail. As Mrs. Meir told the Knesset on February 9, Israel was not satisfied with a vague general statement of Egypt's preparedness to respect the territorial integrity and independence of all states in the region, since this formula had been used in the past to exclude peace with Israel. Egypt, in turn, informed Jarring that, while it was prepared to carry out its obligations under the provisions of UN Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967

(AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 38–40) if Israel did likewise, Egypt interpreted the resolution as requiring Israel to agree to total withdrawal from all occupied territory as a prerequisite to peace. The Egyptians also complained that Israel had not committed itself to implement prior resolutions concerning a just settlement of the Arab refugee problem.

The papers received from Israel and Jordan showed a similar divergence of views. Israel stressed the importance of a Jordanian peace agreement with Israel, which would specify the direct and reciprocal obligations of each side. Jordan emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and stated that a commitment by Israel to evacuate all Arab territories occupied in the 1967 war, including East Jerusalem, was the essential first step toward peace.

THE JARRING MEMORANDUM

Jarring concluded, and Thant agreed, that the only way to break the imminent Egyptian-Israeli deadlock on priority of commitments and undertakings was for Jarring to seek from each side “parallel and simultaneous commitments,” which would serve as basis for specific agreements on all outstanding issues, including the refugee problem. Accordingly, on February 8, Jarring handed identical aides-mémoire to the representatives of Israel and Egypt. He asked Israel to give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory “to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine.” This meant Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai. The Gaza Strip was not specifically mentioned because it had not legally been part of Egypt; but Jarring made it clear to Israel that this omission was not to be interpreted as implying that it could retain the Strip. Its future, including its possible incorporation in a Jordanian or Palestinian state, would be determined during the peace negotiations. The Israeli commitment was to be given on the understanding that there were satisfactory arrangements for establishing demilitarized zones; practical security measures in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to guarantee freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran, and freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

The Israelis were critical of Jarring’s memorandum, contending he exceeded his authority by presenting his own views on the territorial settlement to be achieved. They pointed out that the 1967 Security Council resolution had carefully omitted any qualifying word such as “the” or “all” when calling for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces “from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” The resolution’s American and British drafters insisted on this wording to leave open the possibility of some adjustments in the frontier lines. Jarring, in his memorandum, endorsed the Egyptian and Soviet interpretation that the resolution called for total withdrawal.

In Thant’s view, Jarring’s action was within the framework of his man-

date to promote agreement. State Department officials in Washington agreed, and also noted that Jarring made Israel's withdrawal contingent on security arrangements in Sinai and provisions for Israeli maritime rights. It was an open secret in United Nations circles that Jarring consulted with the American government before drafting his memorandum. He let it be known privately that Israeli anger should be directed not at him but at the United States government, for the suggestion of an Israeli withdrawal to the international frontier with Egypt originated not with Jarring, but with Secretary of State William P. Rogers (AJYB, 1970 [Vol. 71], pp. 13-15). Israel decided to ignore the memorandum and to respond instead to Egypt's reply to Jarring.

GREAT POWER GUARANTEES

The Israelis were also disturbed by the resumption of talks in February by the British, French, United States, and Soviet ambassadors to the UN about great-power guarantees of an Arab-Israeli settlement. Mrs. Meir told the Knesset, February 9, that Egypt sought to endow the Big Four with authority to impose a settlement and that the Soviet Union demanded that the Big Four give Jarring instructions. This, she said, was "incompatible" with Jarring's mandate, and was designed "to sabotage his mission." She declared:

The government of Israel rejects any idea of regarding these concepts of international guarantees, or of a police force sponsored by any international authority whatever, as a substitute for a contractual and binding peace that includes defensible borders to be agreed upon in free negotiations between Israel and its neighbors. . . . The government of Israel will be prepared to discuss additional security arrangements only after agreed security borders, specified in a peace treaty, have been determined.

Premature discussion of guarantees, Mrs. Meir said, fed the illusion among Arab leaders that they could evade the necessity of making peace with Israel. Therefore, Israel would continue to "demand firmly" that the United States refrain from supporting any such evasive moves. She made it clear that Israel was prepared to resist great-power pressures, declaring that, "like any independent state of any free nation, Israel will not allow its fate to be determined by anyone but itself." She called on Sadat to declare "plainly and clearly" that Egypt was ready to make peace with Israel.

EGYPT'S REPLY

On February 15 the Egyptian government replied to Dr. Jarring that it "accepts to carry out on a reciprocal basis all its obligations" under the November 1967 UN Security Council resolution on condition that Israel carried out all its obligations contained in the resolution. It concluded, "when

Israel gives these commitments, the UAR will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel." United Nations and American officials immediately hailed the Egyptian reply as "positive" and "constructive."

ISRAEL'S RESPONSE

The Israel government, in a communiqué issued February 21, said that "Israel views favorably the expression of the readiness of the government of Egypt to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and expresses its own readiness for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries." However, Israel expressed disappointment over the many conditions attached to the Egyptian agreement, which, it said, demonstrated "the substantial gap" between Egypt and Israel on a variety of issues, particularly on borders and refugees. Moreover, it said, the Egyptian government did not simply accept the Jarring formulations but amended them in potentially significant ways.

MARITIME RIGHTS

Regarding the arrangements for freedom of navigation, the Egyptian reply stated that "it insures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal *in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention*." (Italics indicate words added by Egypt to the Jarring text.) While the UN Security Council ruled already in September 1951 that Israel had a right to use the Canal, Egypt ignored this resolution and interpreted the Constantinople Convention as giving it the right to bar Israeli shipping as long as a state of war existed. Similarly, the Egyptian reply said "It insures the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran *in accordance with the principles of international law*." (Emphasis added.) Here, too, there was a dispute. Israel, relying on the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, asserted that its rights in the Strait of Tiran were firmly grounded in international law, an assertion the Egyptians contested in the past. Consequently, while some observers saw the Egyptian amendments as mere legal niceties, the Israelis suspected they were intended to bar Israeli shipping until a formal and final Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in all its details was signed and ratified.

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The parties also were far apart on practical security arrangements in the Sinai Peninsula. While Israel favored some form of joint Egyptian-Israeli arrangement, with a definite Israeli military presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt replied that it accepted the stationing of a United Nations peace-keeping force "in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate." Egypt referred here to Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union, since Nationalist China, which was then still in the UN, had not taken an active role in Middle East affairs.

The Egyptians also proposed the establishment of "demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances." Observers noted that if all Egyptian forces were to be withdrawn from Sinai, as Israel insisted, then the Egyptian formula would require the demilitarization of all of Israel, and part of Lebanon and Syria in the north.

REFUGEES

The Egyptian memorandum also called for an Israeli commitment to the "achievement of a just settlement for the *Palestinian* refugees' problem in accordance with UN *resolutions*." (Emphasis added.) The reference to more than one resolution implied support for earlier resolutions on which the Palestinians based their claim to the right of repatriation for all refugees wishing to return to Israel, which Israel was not prepared to grant on any large scale.

The Israeli reply to Jarring noted that "both parties had claims," since there were also hundreds of thousands of Jews who had come to Israel as refugees from Arab lands. Israel said it was prepared "to negotiate with the governments directly involved" on "the payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property" and "participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region."

TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

On the crucial territorial issue, the Egyptian note called for an Israeli commitment to the "withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip." In the concluding paragraph of the Egyptian reply, this was further broadened to give support to Syria's and Jordan's claims to total Israeli withdrawal. It said the UAR considered that a just and lasting peace cannot be realized without "full and scrupulous" implementation of the 1967 Security Council resolution "and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since the fifth of June 1967."

In its reply to Jarring, Israel committed itself to "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-UAR cease-fire line to the secure, recognized, and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement." It stressed, however, that "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines." Many observers in the United States and other countries were critical of the insertion of the last sentence, which they regarded as effectively shutting the door to the continuation of the Jarring mission. They asked why Israel had not simply reiterated the earlier formula contained in the previous sentence, which left the extent of withdrawal unspecified and subject to negotiation.

Israelis offered a variety of explanations for the additional sentence: First, since Jarring demanded a commitment of withdrawal to a precise line, the Israelis now felt obligated to make it clear that they would not make any prior commitment to total withdrawal. By making such a commitment, they

would lose one of their main bargaining points. Secondly, there was strong sentiment in Israel that an Israeli presence in Sharm el-Sheikh was vital to the country's security, and that it would have been unrealistic for Israel to leave the Egyptians with any illusions that it was prepared to withdraw completely from Sinai. Thirdly, even if Israel was prepared to agree eventually to formal Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai, to say so would have been tactically unwise. Such a revelation would generate tremendous pressure on Jordan and Syria to demand total withdrawal from their occupied territories, thereby greatly complicating any possible negotiated settlement. Finally, the Israel government had to consider domestic public opinion, which, a *Time*-Louis Harris poll confirmed, was overwhelmingly opposed to withdrawal from certain areas of either strategic or national significance, such as the Golan Heights (86 per cent of Jewish Israelis supporting its retention) and the Old City of Jerusalem (90 per cent).

PEACE PRINCIPLES

Whatever the reasons, the Egyptian and Israeli replies were so at variance that Jarring suspended his activities. However, he refused to withdraw or disavow his memorandum of February 8, and Israel refused to accept it as binding. While press coverage naturally emphasized the points of disagreement, Egypt and Israel did agree on five basic principles set out by Jarring as part of a final peace treaty, though the Israeli reply suggested more comprehensive wording for some. As phrased by Jarring and accepted by Egypt, these five principles were:

1. "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency." (Israel suggested an explicit declaration by the parties to regard the conflict as finally ended and to terminate "all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the UAR.")

2. "Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's independence." (Israel offered on a reciprocal basis "respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the UAR.")

3. "Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live within secure and recognized boundaries."

4. "Responsibility to do all in their power to insure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from, or are not committed from, within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party." (This was particularly important to Israel in view of the history of Egyptian support of guerrilla attacks against Israel by *fedayeen* and other para-military groups. Consequently, the Israeli version omitted the phrase "to do all in their power" as offering a possible loophole. Instead, Israel agreed to assume absolute responsibility on condition that Egypt did likewise. Israel undertook: "The responsibility for insuring that no warlike act, or act of violence by any organization, group or individual originates from, or is committed in, the territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the UAR.")

5. "Noninterference in each other's domestic affairs."

Since Egypt was contemplating a federation with Libya and Syria, both still openly hostile to Israel, Israel suggested an additional provision that neither side would participate in hostile alliances against the other and each would prohibit the stationing of troops of states maintaining belligerency against the other. Israel also asked for an explicit Egyptian undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the termination of the boycott and other forms of economic and political warfare.

INTERIM AGREEMENT

With the Jarring talks for an over-all settlement at a standstill, attention focused on the possibility of reaching a more limited and interim agreement, which would provide for reopening the Suez Canal, restoration of civilian life in the Egyptian cities on both banks of the Canal, and a withdrawal of Israeli forces some distance from the Canal. The idea was first mentioned by Israel Defense Minister Moshe Dayan the year before. When Sadat revived the idea in February, the United States quickly began intensive efforts to bring about an agreement. American diplomats saw merit in it as a means to gain time and as a first step toward defusing the military confrontation along the Canal. If the plan succeeded it might help overcome deepseated suspicions and begin to build a climate of mutual trust, a prerequisite to achieving permanent peace.

ROGERS TRIP TO MIDDLE EAST

In May, Secretary Rogers went to Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel to explore the prospects for agreement. He was the second American secretary of state to tour the area. (John Foster Dulles had been the first, in May 1953.) Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, Rogers met with Sadat. Sadat quoted Rogers as having told him that "Egypt has done all it can," and that Washington was not asking for additional concessions from Cairo. To the Israelis Rogers said he was convinced that Sadat was sincere in his desire for peace. The Israelis countered by suggesting that Sadat demonstrate his sincerity by meeting directly with the Israelis, which Sadat said he would refuse to do as long as Egyptian territory was occupied.

There was hope of an imminent breakthrough when Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joseph J. Sisco flew back to Cairo after a meeting with Dayan. But no practical results developed from this trip or from a subsequent visit by Sisco to Israel late in July.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

Six major issues separating Egypt and Israel over the terms of an interim agreement were outlined by Secretary Rogers in an address to the UN

General Assembly on October 4. These were the relationship between an interim agreement and an over-all settlement; duration of the cease-fire; extent of withdrawal; Egyptian crossing; supervisory arrangements, and Israeli use of the Canal.

With regard to the first issue, the Egyptians were insisting on a prior Israeli commitment to total withdrawal, including a definite timetable. As reiterated by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad to the UN on October 6, the interim agreement would involve a limited Israeli withdrawal followed immediately by Egyptian clearing and reopening of the Suez Canal, and subsequent withdrawal of Israel from all territory within a period of six months. The Israeli position, as stated by Foreign Minister Abba Eban at the UN on September 30, was that the interim agreement "would stand on its own feet" and would be of unlimited duration. Israeli forces would be withdrawn to an agreed distance, but this line "would not be considered final. When agreement on a final boundary is reached in the framework of the peace settlement Israeli forces will withdraw to it."

Rogers' presentation at the UN displeased both the Egyptians and the Israelis. President Sadat complained that Rogers was giving Israel "all she wants" and that the United States was "playing on Egypt's nerves." Among the things that had annoyed the Egyptians was Rogers' statement that "neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim agreement, complete agreement on the terms of an overall settlement." In other words, he sided with the Israeli contention that no prior commitment to total withdrawal should be required to begin the interim agreement. On the other hand, he prefaced this statement with the judgment that a "Suez Canal agreement is merely a step toward complete implementation of Resolution 242 within a reasonable period of time and not an end in itself." This disappointed Mrs. Meir, who said on October 6 that she had hoped Rogers would continue to try to convince the Egyptians of the value of a self-sustaining agreement on reopening the Canal.

The parties also were unhappy over Rogers' view on the duration of the cease-fire. He declared that, while the ultimate objective was a permanent end to belligerency, "such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement." Mrs. Meir indicated that she considered this statement a disservice to the prospect for peace, since the Egyptian rulers could find in it "support for their stubborn resistance to the demand for a cease-fire of unlimited duration." The Egyptians were displeased with Rogers' next sentence that "Neither would a cease-fire of a short duration be realistic." According to press reports, Rogers was thinking in terms of an 18-month cease-fire.

Egypt and Israel were miles apart, too, on the extent of the initial withdrawal. The Egyptians feared that if the Israelis withdrew only a short distance and retained aerial control over the Canal, most of Sinai would permanently remain under effective Israeli control. Since the Russians were

eager to have the Canal reopened for both strategic and economic reasons, the Egyptians were concerned that once the Canal was open there would no longer be an incentive for the Russians to help push the Israelis back, and the Egyptians would find it militarily difficult and politically unwise to threaten to resume shooting. Consequently, the Egyptians wanted the initial withdrawal to take Israeli forces far from the Canal. Sadat declared that as the Israelis withdrew, Egyptian military forces would replace them to assume "their national responsibilities."

The Israelis naturally wanted to withdraw only a few miles from their strategic positions along the Bar-Lev line paralleling the Canal. They argued that this in itself was a major concession, since it was technically possible to reopen the Canal without any withdrawal. While they were willing to allow Egyptian civilian technicians and even local policemen to cross the Canal, they were unalterably opposed to having Egyptian armed forces do so, for their only purpose would be to add military threat to diplomatic pressure for Israel's further withdrawal.

Rogers noted that the question of an Egyptian military presence east of the Canal "is one on which the parties hold opposite views." But here too, he said, "the possibilities of some compromise are not negative." This statement angered the Israelis; as far as they were concerned, there could be no compromise on the principle of no return of Egyptian armed forces to Sinai. Indeed, Rogers himself had said that a major aim of the interim settlement was to separate the belligerents. Whereas the Israelis had welcomed the American offer of good offices to bring the parties together, they accused Rogers of not merely defining the position of the opposing sides but of injecting his own views of what was desirable. His statement, they felt, could only lead the Egyptians to conclude either that the Israelis were in fact prepared to compromise on the question of an Egyptian military presence, or that the United States believed they should agree to an Egyptian troop crossing.

In Egyptian thinking, this amounted to the same thing. Sadat declared in May that what mattered was not the position of Israel but the attitude of the United States: "If the United States wants peace, then it must squeeze Israel." The Israelis regarded Rogers' speech as a not-too-subtle means of exerting some diplomatic pressure on them. However, Sadat greatly exaggerated the American ability to force Israel to yield on matters it considered vital to its security or other national interests.

Despite repeated American declarations that United States arms supplies to Israel were based strictly on an assessment of the arms balance in the region and were not linked to Israel's acceptance of American political terms for an interim or over-all agreement, the Israelis were convinced that the two issues were in fact being linked; that the long delay in responding to Israel's arms requests was intended to influence its negotiating position. Consequently, the Israelis decided to do some linking of their own. Foreign

Minister Eban and Defense Minister Dayan both let it be known that Israel was not prepared to negotiate an interim agreement, with all the attendant risks, unless the United States first assured Israel it would be given the additional military equipment it required.

Arms Race

Buttressing the Israeli demand for additional aircraft and other military supplies were reports of continuing Soviet shipments to Egypt. According to a study by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the Soviet Union in 1970 sent to Egypt 200 pilots and 150 MIG-21 fighter-interceptors and supplied a total of \$2.5 billion in arms aid. The Institute noted that no other non-Communist state had ever received such a level of arms in such a short period. Some of the advanced equipment provided to Egypt had not yet been given by Moscow even to North Vietnam or any other country outside the Warsaw Pact. The study said that Egypt now had the most powerful air-defense system outside NATO, with some 75 to 85 SAM-3 missile complexes. The number of Soviet military personnel of various kinds was put at close to 20,000. At the end of November 1971, it was reported that Israel had only 85 F-4 Phantom supersonic jets because of the continuing U.S. embargo on additional shipments. Israel's total combat aircraft numbered 422, against Egypt's more than 900; the combined aircraft of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq numbered 1,389. Against Israel's 1,375 tanks, Egypt had nearly 2,000, and the four Arab states together had over 4,000. In addition, Libya had already received some 40 of a scheduled 110 French Mirage jets. Some State and Defense Department officials conceded the Arab numerical strength, but contended it was more than outweighed by Israel's qualitative superiority. When told that Israel's pilots were considered the best in the world, Mrs. Meir commented wryly, "Apparently they are so good, they don't even need planes to fly!"

Congressional Support for Israel

Israel's arms requests received strong backing in Congress. In the beginning of October six Republicans and six Democrats introduced a resolution in the Senate, declaring that it was the policy of the United States, as expressed by the President, to maintain the arms balance in the Middle East; that the continuing Soviet supply of sophisticated weapons to Egypt and other Arab states "seriously affected the military balance" in the Middle East and encouraged certain Arab states to resist peace negotiations and to threaten the resumption of war, and that the grave threat to peace in the Middle East was "prejudicial to the vital interests of the United States." It therefore asked the administration (1) immediately to "take affirmative action on Israel's pending request for F-4 Phantom aircraft, and provide such support-

ing equipment and assistance as are essential to maintain Israel's deterrent capability," and to (2) "oppose any attempts at the United Nations to alter the meaning and effect of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and . . . reaffirm the importance of secure and defensible borders as a vital element in a peace settlement to be negotiated by the parties themselves."

The resolution quickly obtained 78 cosponsors in the Senate and 257 in the House. The Senate sponsors included many Republican leaders and all those who had been mentioned as Democratic presidential contenders.

In November Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) introduced an amendment to the foreign military aid bill authorizing a \$500 million credit for Israel, of which \$250 million were to be earmarked for Phantom jets. In supporting the bill, Senator George McGovern declared:

The Administration's reluctance to grant Israel's request for Phantoms to counteract Soviet arms to the Arabs is unconscionable. If our foreign policy is to have any moral underpinnings we must not let that country, Israel, be crushed. I say unequivocally that even if there were no Soviet presence in the Middle East we would be morally obligated to aid Israel.

Congress finally approved \$300 million in military credits and a \$50 million grant as "supporting assistance" for Israel, this being the first outright U.S. economic grant Israel had received since 1959.

Because the public debate focused on the issue of the Phantoms, the impression mistakenly arose that there was a total embargo on American arms supplies to Israel. This was not at all the case. On the contrary, the administration had been furnishing Israel with a steady supply of modern weapons, including electronic devices to counteract Soviet missiles in Egypt, some Skyhawk subsonic jet planes, tanks, and other equipment. However, the Phantoms, aside from their obvious military value, had become for both Israel and Egypt an important symbol of American intentions.

Nixon-Meir Meeting

The issue was apparently resolved between Prime Minister Meir and President Nixon at a private meeting at the White House on December 2. Mrs. Meir refused to make a statement on the matter, replying to press questions only that Israel wanted "aircraft" and not "publicity." On her return to Israel, on December 13, Mrs. Meir said she had discussed all of Israel's problems with President Nixon and "I found him most understanding." She had found "unlimited friendship for Israel and a readiness to help us" both in the White House and Congress, she said, adding that all past presidential promises had been kept. The statement issued by White House Press Secretary Ronald Ziegler after the meeting said the President "recognized that Israeli forces must maintain a long-term program of modernization and that the United States will participate in this process."

At year's end it was revealed that the United States had agreed to furnish Israel with the Phantoms. Possibly even more significant was the signing of contracts in the following months which provided the Israel Government with all the military supplies it had requested, with deliveries scheduled into 1974. Not only did this greatly reassure the Israelis that their defense needs would be met, but it demonstrated that Mrs. Meir had won her point in her Washington meetings that the withholding of arms supplies should not be used as a means of pressuring Israel to accept American views on the terms of a political settlement.

Once the arms supply question was resolved, the Israel government announced its preparedness to enter into the close-proximity talks suggested by the United States in the fall of 1971. Under this procedural plan, the representatives of Israel and Egypt would each occupy suites in the same hotel in New York and an American official, presumably Assistant Secretary of State Sisco, would shuttle back and forth between the two sides conveying their proposals and counterproposals. It was hoped that these talks eventually would develop into direct negotiations. The Egyptians did not reject the idea in principle, but maintained their original insistence that such talks could only begin after Israel formally committed itself to total withdrawal.

United Nations Supports Jarring

While American pressure on Israel was relaxing, international pressure at the United Nations was intensifying to interpret the November 1967 resolution as requiring total Israeli withdrawal. On December 13 the General Assembly adopted an Afro-Asian resolution endorsed by Egypt and most of the Arab states. It declared that the 1967 resolution should "be implemented immediately in all its parts"; expressed grave concern over "the continuation of Israel's occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967"; reaffirmed that "the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored," and reiterated the two principles of the 1967 resolution on withdrawal and the right of every state to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. The resolution then went on to express "its full support for all the efforts" of Ambassador Jarring, mentioning explicitly his aide-mémoire of February 8, 1971. It noted "with appreciation the positive reply given by Egypt," and called on Israel "to respond favorably" to this peace initiative of the special representative. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 79 to 7 (Israel and six Latin American states), with 36 states, including the United States, abstaining.

The United States had supported a Senegalese amendment, which would have deleted the reference to the restoration of occupied territories and replaced the reference to the Egyptian and Israeli responses to the Jarring memorandum with a statement that the Assembly considered the responses

of Egypt and Israel to the memorandum of the Commission of the African heads of State "sufficiently positive" to permit a resumption of Jarring's mission. The Israelis favored the amendment as a way of getting around the prior commitment to withdrawal that Jarring demanded. (Israel had informed the African mission that it was prepared to negotiate on all issues without prior conditions by either side [p. 561]). The Senegalese amendment was defeated by a vote of 63 to 21, with 38 abstentions. Two later amendments, which would have softened the resolution and made it acceptable to Israel, were overwhelmingly defeated. The United States abstained on both. The United Nations also passed resolutions, similar to those adopted in previous years, reaffirming the rights of the Palestinians and condemning Israel for alleged violations of human rights in the occupied territories.

The Israelis were not particularly distressed by the United Nations resolutions. They tended to dismiss the UN as essentially a propaganda forum with a built-in pro-Arab bias. The UN proved ineffective except when its action had the concerted backing of the major powers. With the Soviet Union unwilling to risk a major confrontation with the United States over the Middle East, with both superpowers looking to improve relations in the forthcoming May 1972 Moscow summit conference, and with the new-found understanding between Washington and Jerusalem being given concrete form, 1971 ended with the likelihood of major conflict in the Middle East within the near future considerably lessened. Whether the absence of war would lead to genuine progress toward lasting peace, was, however, far less certain.

GEORGE E. GRUEN

The Reconstitution of the Jewish Agency: A Political Analysis

“AN EVENT of historic significance in Jewish life”—this is how its organizers and not a few among the participants described the founding assembly of the Reconstituted Jewish Agency, which took place in Jerusalem in June 1971. Only the future can either vindicate this evaluation, or consign it to the realm of yesteryear’s convention hyperbole. In the meantime, there can be no question but that the assembly and the work that preceded it represent an ambitious effort to achieve a more balanced relationship than has existed thus far between diaspora Jewry and Israel, at least on the material plane.

For the Jewish Agency is the chief instrument through which the vast sums collected on behalf of Israel by the United Jewish Appeal and similar campaigns throughout the world are expended; its reconstitution (actually, that of its governing bodies) is designed to give a meaningful role in that process to those who contribute and “raise” the funds.

Enlarged Jewish Agency of 1929

What lent heightened significance to the Jerusalem proceedings was the fact that a strikingly similar attempt was made more than 40 years earlier, when, in August of 1929, a meeting of world Jewish leaders called together in Switzerland by Dr. Chaim Weizmann resulted in the creation of what was then called the Enlarged Jewish Agency. It is inevitable that the chances for success of the new attempt should be weighed in the light of the earlier failure. In both instances, the effort aimed at overcoming ideological differences through a complex organizational arrangement, in the hope that the structure would permit the ideas held in common to become the operative ones. Yet along with the obvious parallels that can be drawn, it is also true that changes in circumstances on both sides since 1929 are so far-reaching as to rule out a simplistic comparison.

The term “Jewish agency” first appeared in the League of Nations mandate for Palestine, which incorporated Zionist proposals that “an appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine.” The World Zionist Organization requested that the British government recognize it as serving this function, and the mandate, as ratified by the League Council in 1922, explicitly granted this request in Article 4.

But it soon became apparent that the World Zionist Organization, as then constituted, was incapable of raising the funds needed to finance the development of the National Home at a pace commensurate with the vision. The WZO president, Dr. Weizmann, therefore pursued the idea, broached earlier by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis, of recruiting prominent non-Zionists for the task and making room for them within a wider organizational structure, which would transcend the framework of the financially-limited Zionist circle. It took him six years to accomplish his goal; years spent not only in negotiations with the prospective partners, but also in persuading his Zionist constituency that his policy would not result in non-Zionist hegemony over the new organization.

The Zionist Congress, the governing body of WZO, finally approved Weizmann's proposal, and the constituent meeting of the enlarged Jewish Agency took place in Zurich in August 1929. It was a brilliant occasion: "the most spectacular Jewish gathering in centuries," as one participant described it. Louis Marshall, long-term president of the American Jewish Committee and representative of the non-Zionist side in the negotiations with Weizmann, more soberly yet with unmistakable pride, characterized the meeting as "co-extensive with the Jewish people everywhere." With such luminaries as Albert Einstein, Léon Blum, Lord Samuel and Shalom Asch lending their presence and enthusiastic endorsement, it was difficult not to envisage a bright future for the new body. The Zurich meeting was technically the plenary of the council of the Jewish Agency, which was to have a membership of 224 equally divided between Zionists and non-Zionists. The same principle of parity also governed the composition of the smaller administrative committee and of the executive committee charged with carrying on the Agency's day-to-day affairs.

Zionists Better Organized

In retrospect it is clear that the parity principle, embodied in the Agency's constitution and at the time widely hailed as a guarantee of an equitable balance of influence, actually contributed to the experiment's failure.¹ For the Zionist half was bound to dominate the institution through its consistent ideology, which enabled it to present a united front regardless of party-political and geographical differences among its members. While WZO served as an effective coordinating body for its delegates, the non-Zionists functioned as individuals, with no common secretariat. A number of them were prominently associated with such bodies as the American Jewish Committee, the Anglo-Jewish Association, and the Alliance Israélite Universelle;

¹ But it was *force majeure* which dogged the new creation by a series of misfortunes, beginning with the Arab rioting, which broke out barely two weeks after the signing of the compact; followed, in September, by the death of Louis Marshall, the central personality on the non-Zionist side; and climaxed by the stock-market crash and the world-wide depression.

but none of these groups were ready to involve themselves collectively in the work. Also, in the division of the Jewish world into the two groups, Eretz Israel, like the Diaspora, was presumed to harbor both, and the non-Zionist component of the Jewish Agency comprised representatives of the Palestine *yishuv* who often saw their real community of interest with the Zionist side. This, too, adversely affected the parity principle, and among those non-Zionists who viewed it as the heart of the agreement, its infringement (if not in the letter, then in spirit) engendered resentment.

The thrust of the Zionist ideology soon came to be directed toward sovereignty, and this was unacceptable to the non-Zionists, whose rationale for joining had been philanthropic rather than political. When, in 1937, WZO appeared disposed to accept the Peel Commission's partition plan, which would have provided for a Jewish state in a part of Palestine, the non-Zionists went into vehement opposition and all but ceased participation in the joint body. True, there was a readiness to restore the shattered unity in the face of the White Paper of 1939, but the outbreak of war made further joint meetings impracticable.

Agency Reverts to Exclusive Zionist Control

No effort was made to revive the enlarged Agency after the war, and WZO once more found itself acting as the sole custodian of the Jewish Agency concept, as it did before 1929. In the course of time, it came to be taken for granted that the terms World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency were synonymous, and Israel's Knesset gave official recognition to that proposition when it enacted, in 1952, the World Zionist Organisation—Jewish Agency (Status) Law. Paragraph 3 of the law explicitly provides: "The World Zionist Organisation, which is also the Jewish Agency, takes care as before of immigration and directs absorption and settlement projects in the State."

With the attainment of sovereignty, the functions of the (WZO) Jewish Agency then had undergone a drastic reorientation. As the government of Israel understandably insisted on exclusive jurisdiction in the political sphere, the Agency was left in charge of those responsibilities—mainly the reception of immigrants and their resettlement—which the non-Zionist partners all along had seen as its proper concern. But the partnership had gone by default, and the role of the non-Zionists now consisted exclusively of providing the funds for the Jewish Agency to spend.

The Waning of Non-Zionism

This, in the simplest terms, was the situation which the reconstitution, 23 years after the establishment of the State, came to rectify. The new attempt has the advantage of no longer having to contend with the split between Zionists and non-Zionists over the question of sovereignty, which has long since been settled. Not only had the ideological non-Zionist individuals dis-

appeared from the scene, but the American Jewish organizations that had opposed the idea of a Jewish state in the 1920s and 1930s—the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee foremost among them—had undergone a profound change as well. It would be an anachronism, therefore, to see the new arrangement as one aiming at parity between Zionists and non-Zionists. At most, one can speak of a fifty-fifty division between delegates representing WZO, on the one hand, and those designated by organizations not formally part of WZO, on the other.

These organizations—the United Israel Appeal in the United States and similar drives in other parts of the world—are the ones that raise funds on behalf of the Agency. They are thus not only entirely in accord with the purposes of Zionism, but also provide the money for its projects. While the individuals chosen by these groups to represent them in the Jewish Agency technically may be non-Zionist, it would be wrong to classify the organizations themselves as non-Zionist. Indeed, the campaigns outside the United States are coordinated by the Keren Ha-yesod central office in Jerusalem, which is the fund-raising arm of the Zionist movement.

It is apparent, therefore, that there is little chance of control slipping into the hands of non-Zionists. In sum: rather than underscoring dividing lines between Zionists and non-Zionists, which are delicately balanced by parity, the new plan sets out to attenuate differences, probably with the aim of eventually blurring them altogether. In a sense, it vindicates former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's long-held thesis that in the Diaspora, "there are no Zionists, only Jews."²

The fact that WZO chose fund-raising bodies as its counterpart points to another essential difference from 1929. Then, Dr. Weizmann courted the non-Zionists in order to open up new sources of income to the sorely-pressed Zionist movement. This time, the people who were already providing the resources were being asked to join formally in the body that determines the spending. Whatever immediate material results were expected from the new arrangement, therefore, would not be immediate: the Jews of America, England, and many other countries had, for several years, been exerting great efforts without formal recognition of their role through participation in the Jewish Agency.

Both Sides Seek New Arrangement

Still another significant departure from the 1929 pattern has already been alluded to: then, the effort began as a process of unilateral wooing by the Zionist side; this time, the pressure for a new structural arrangement came from the non-Zionist side as well. Looking first at the forces at work within the Zionist movement, itself: attempts had been made since the early sixties

² In his address to the preparatory meeting, the chairman of the Agency Executive, Louis A. Pincus, put it somewhat differently: "Soon all the non-Zionists will also be Zionists."

to instill new vigor into the Jewish Agency by broadening its base. This took two forms: (1) the opening up of the World Zionist Organization to "territorial" (i.e., nonparty) Zionist bodies and to non-Zionist organizations which subscribed to the Zionist program; and (2) through the co-optation of some non-Zionist individuals to the Executive. But neither of these moves had much practical effect. The constitutional dilemma—how non-Zionists could function as part of a body which was totally responsible to the World Zionist Organization—was not resolved.

What, then, did WZO-Jewish Agency—which at the time was headed by the late Moshe Sharett, as Jewish Agency chairman, and by Dr. Nahum Goldmann, as WZO president—seek to accomplish by these moves? Permitting nonparty-affiliated Zionists to join WZO had a two-fold aim: it was meant to break the stranglehold of the Zionist parties on the movement, dominated as they were by their Israeli branches, and also to give individuals an opportunity to be "unhyphenated" Zionists, i.e., without being, at the same time, adherents of Mapai, Mapam, or Mizrahi. Goldmann, in particular, had for some time been intent on prying loose the Zionist movement from its traditional tie to the party structure, and thereby from the control of the Israeli power center. Indeed, one gathers from a careful reading of his speeches and policies that one of his goals was the creation of a counterweight to the Israeli establishment, which would be capable of exerting some influence on the shape of Israel's development.³

The co-optation of non-Zionist individuals to the Executive had the additional purpose of restoring a more general Jewish complexion to the Jewish Agency Executive than came with being merely the executive arm of the World Zionist Organization. It was to counteract the impression, widely prevalent in Israel, that the Zionist movement was neither representative of diaspora Jewry numerically, nor primarily responsible for raising the money. This led to a pronounced decline in the prestige of the WZO-Jewish Agency, particularly after the pace of immigration had slackened and questions were being raised as to the function of the organization and its considerable bureaucracy. Goldmann and others were wont to blame Ben Gurion's vendetta against the Zionist movement for the decline in its prestige. It is more likely that Ben Gurion was only giving expression to a disenchantment that was quite deeply rooted in public opinion and stemmed from the attrition of the movement's functions in the wake of independence, and the emasculation of its once substantial political role.

Levi Eshkol, who succeeded Ben Gurion as prime minister in 1963, came in with a more sympathetic attitude toward the Zionist movement and its

³ Goldmann's efforts in that direction have not been confined to the Zionist movement, of course. They no doubt played a role—as did his unorthodoxy regarding Israel's foreign policy—in the controversial position he occupies among leading Israeli politicians.

executive body. (He had, for a number of years, served concurrently as finance minister in the government and as chairman of the Agency's land settlement department.) Nevertheless, it was during his incumbency that the government decided to establish a new body charged with conducting relations with the Diaspora—on the nonmaterial plane. Although officially under the joint auspices of the government and the WZO-Jewish Agency, the *Merkaz le-Tfutzot* (Center for the Diaspora) clearly constituted a bypassing of the latter's area of competence as defined in the Status Law. It was, from the first, unwelcome to the Agency, and it was the Agency's passive resistance, coupled with the government's subsequent loss of interest, which led to its demise by the end of the decade.

One may conclude, then, that a main consideration for broadening the base of the Zionist movement was to implement the provision of the Status Law, which made it incumbent upon the WZO-Jewish Agency to become more representative of world Jewry as a whole in its relationship with Israel, and thereby to strengthen the Agency's position vis-à-vis the government. For it had become clear that nonfulfillment of the Agency's mission, as provided for in the law, would lead the government to seek other channels of contact with diaspora Jewry.

Ben Gurion, himself, had opposed the Status Law. In his concept of *mamlakhtiyut* (a difficult-to-translate expression signifying the supremacy of the state over factional interests) there was no room for a competing power center that did not derive its influence from factors within the state. There was also a party-political aspect to his coolness toward WZO: while in Israel the preponderance of the Labor parties was unchallenged, diaspora Zionism had traditionally been dominated by the bourgeois parties. Therefore, control at the source by diaspora Zionists of monies raised for the Jewish Agency could lead to an unwelcome influence in Israel's affairs. Indeed, in a brief contest for key positions in UJA in the early fifties, Ben Gurion had intervened to prevent this from happening.

Thereafter, the Labor party leadership—including its representatives on the Agency executive—was content to see the direction of UJA in the hands of non-Zionist lay leaders and professional executives, rather than of ideologically-committed but party-affiliated Zionists. Since the United Jewish Appeal was, in effect, a contractual arrangement between its two beneficiaries, the United Israel Appeal representing the needs of the Jewish Agency through the latter's financial arm, the Keren Ha-yesod; and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, a partnership in which the UJA-Jewish Agency side had the majority "interest," the Israelis felt assured against any undue interference on that level.

Role of Welfare Funds

But if the UJA, itself, was not likely to demand a say in the disbursement of funds, where then did the pressure for reconstitution originate on the

American side? Behind UJA in the local communities stood the Jewish federations and welfare funds, and it was here that the mainspring of the drive for greater participation was to be found. It expressed itself in the attempt to bring the operations of the Jewish Agency within the scrutiny of the Large Cities Budgeting Conference (LCBC), an instrumentality of the welfare funds designed to review the budgets of agencies receiving allocations. This attempt was resisted vigorously by the WZO-Jewish Agency leadership, to whom it represented a throwback to an earlier welfare funds initiative called "national budgeting," which had been abandoned due to opposition by both Zionist and non-Zionist beneficiary agencies. Other unpleasant memories of conflicts between the Zionist fund-raising bodies and local philanthropic interests in the twenties and thirties also colored the Zionist apperception of the role of the welfare funds which, in the fifties, continued to be basically negative, approximately as follows:

1) The federations and welfare funds in fact represented the interests of their local institutions, and retained an undue proportion of the funds they collected for distribution locally.

2) Even though these campaigns were being conducted by local welfare funds, most of the giving was motivated by the needs of Israel.

3) Through their nationwide association, the welfare funds were intent on creating a powerbase from which to standardize the local allocations procedure—a domain which was not legitimately theirs.

4) The welfare-fund leadership was concerned only with the "philanthropic" aspect of aid to Israel, and was opposed to allocating funds to the Zionist side of the Jewish Agency's program, such as Jewish education in the Diaspora.

As a result of this analysis, and the attitudes it engendered, a relationship which was in essence based on cooperation toward a common goal, namely the maximizing of income from the welfare-fund campaigns on behalf of both local causes and UJA—was in actuality shot through with tensions. And it was further complicated by the awareness of the Zionist organizational leadership in the United States of its own marginal role in the fund-raising effort, with resulting feelings of frustration and antagonism.

Origins of United Israel Appeal

This marginality was the result of a process of mergers and consolidation which had begun in the 1930s, when the various funds active on behalf of the Zionist movement in United States combined to form the United Palestine Appeal (later United Israel Appeal).⁴ With the outbreak of World

⁴ The principals in the merger were Keren Ha-yesod (Palestine Foundation Fund, already mentioned as the financial arm of the Jewish Agency), and Keren Kayyemet, or Jewish National Fund. Lesser partners were the funds conducted by political parties in Palestine for their so-called "constructive enterprises." These

War II, the United Palestine Appeal and the Joint Distribution Committee overcame their long-standing ideological differences and rivalry for the contributor's dollar to join together in the United Jewish Appeal. UJA, in turn, concluded agreements with the federations and welfare funds for a percentage of the campaign proceeds in each community.

As the receipts of the campaigns increased dramatically in response to the growing needs, most of the donors responsible for the increments were non-Zionists, as was the professional personnel in the local and national fund-raising bodies. Inevitably, the emphasis in the campaigns was on humanitarianism and rescue work, rather than on Zionist ideology. Simultaneously, the Zionist funds, which had been at the core of the process, became submerged and their identities blurred. Although this produced dismay among Zionist leaders, the financial results made an alternative structure unthinkable.

Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc.

However, a breakthrough affecting the Zionist-welfare fund relationship occurred in 1960, with a structural reorganization that was the first step leading to the reconstituted Jewish Agency, and to greater harmony. To comply with a new interpretation of U.S. government regulations on tax-deductible gifts to charitable organizations, a new body was created in the United States to supervise disbursement in Israel of funds raised by the United Jewish Appeal. The new group, called the Jewish Agency for Israel, Incorporated (JAFI, Inc.), had a 21-member board of directors (later enlarged to 27) on which, for the first time since the enlarged Jewish Agency of 1929, Zionists sat with non-Zionists, who were active in fund raising, to decide on the use of funds in Israel. The new group designated the Jerusalem Jewish Agency as its agent for implementing the programs for which UJA funds were allocated and, to monitor these expenditures, it opened a representative office in Jerusalem, with the prominent economist Isador Lubin as consultant.

The Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds enthusiastically endorsed this development. At its 1960 General Assembly, one of the local welfare fund executives summed up the feeling of many delegates with his statement that "the era of the blank check" was at an end; that communities now insisted on detailed information on and participation in the spending of the funds.

However, the actual changes brought about by this new development were

received allocations from the United Israel Appeal until the early 1960s, when objections to their political complexion brought about their exclusion from UIA in the United States. It is worth noting that the Labor parties had traditionally conducted their own Histadrut campaign in the United States and were therefore not a partner in the United Israel Appeal. This ties in with the earlier preponderance of the "bourgeois" Zionist element in the UJA leadership, discussed above.

not far-reaching. The "Inc.," as it came to be called, by and large accepted the principles by which the Jewish Agency had been operating and allocating its funds. The composition of the new group ensured that, in case of serious disagreement, the Zionist and pro-Zionist element would be determining. After an initial flurry, in part sustained by the welfare funds, which anticipated innovative approaches within the new structure, public interest in the reorganization declined. The Jewish Agency had insisted that the new body retain the old nomenclature, and the resulting multiplication of agencies bearing similar names was confusing to all but the initiates.

JAFI, Inc. Into UIA, Inc.

To the contributor and man-in-the-Jewish-street this meant little more than the addition of still another body to the already arcane roster of organizations; the more so, since the Jewish Agency Executive continued to maintain a branch in the U.S., known as the Jewish Agency—American Section, Inc., which bore no relationship to the Jewish Agency for Israel, Inc. The United Israel Appeal, now shorn of meaningful function, continued a somewhat shadowy existence until, in 1966, JAFI, Inc., changed its name to United Israel Appeal, Inc. This somewhat cleared up the semantic confusion by letting the Jewish Agency title revert to its original holders exclusively. It also filled the all but empty shell of the United Israel Appeal with new content.

UIA was endowed with a board of trustees of 210 members, of whom 100 were drawn from names submitted by the federations and welfare funds and 100 designated by American Zionist organizations (ten were chosen "at large"). The board of trustees, in turn, designated two-thirds of the 27-member board of directors, with the remaining one-third appointed by the Jewish Agency-American Section. Severed from the Keren Ha-yesod, UIA now became an autonomous American body.

The United Israel Appeal, Inc., later was given a key function in the Agency's reconstitution, in addition to its role as the group authorized to determine the manner in which UJA funds are spent by the Jewish Agency. Under the reconstitution agreement, the UIA designates the 30 per cent of the Jewish Agency assembly, allotted to non-Zionists from the United States.⁵

Louis Pincus's Role

Two events gave the needed impetus to progress from the plane of UIA, Inc. to that of the Reconstituted Jewish Agency. One was the selection of Louis Pincus to succeed Moshe Sharett as chairman of the Executive upon the latter's death in 1965; the other was the June 1967 war.

⁵ To ensure broad representation among those prominent in fund raising, both on the community and national levels, UIA made up the list in close consultation with the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds.

Pincus, a lawyer from South Africa and former managing director of El Al Airlines, had joined the Jewish Agency as its treasurer in 1960, at about the time the "Inc." was brought into being. While his predecessor and others on the Executive had viewed the reorganization as a necessity foisted upon the Agency by the income-tax laws of the United States, Pincus took a positive attitude toward the JAFI, Inc., in his role as ex-officio member of its board. Frequent trips to the United States gave him the opportunity to gain a realistic picture of the constellation of forces within the American Jewish community. His conclusions doubtless were similar to those of Weizmann in his day: that much useful energy was being wasted by confrontation, and that co-optation of a wide range of factors in the community would make it possible to harness more resources in Israel's behalf. In the workings of JAFI, Inc., he was able to note that differences with those active in the local welfare funds were marginal rather than substantial, and that the adaptation of the existing machinery could give sense of participation to all involved.

Effects of 1967 War

But it took the 1967 war and the accompanying upsurge in the Diaspora's contributions to Israel to provide the decisive leverage toward reconstitution. Two figures will suffice to mirror the impact in financial terms: in 1966, the net amount made available to the Jewish Agency from worldwide campaigns was \$60 million; in 1967, it was \$346 million.

Paradoxically, the initial effect of the war was to jeopardize, rather than buttress, Jewish Agency autonomy. Its role in handling the flood of volunteers during the crisis had given rise to dissatisfaction; the fact that most of these young people soon returned to their countries of origin was seen as a wasted opportunity for tapping a ready reservoir of potential immigrants. Once again, it appeared to some Israeli officials that the government should become more deeply involved in the Agency's policies and operations. Since the early 1960s, the Agency's programs in the areas of immigrant absorption, agricultural settlement, etc., already had been closely coordinated with government policy through a joint standing committee. The Ministries of Housing, Health, Education and Welfare had carried much of the responsibility for immigrant integration in their respective fields, with financing from government budgets.

Ministry of Immigrant Absorption

In June of 1968 the government also decided on the creation of a new Ministry of Immigrant Absorption (*Klitah*) with which the Agency would henceforth have to share its central function. The *modus operandi* provided for continued Jewish Agency responsibility for the staging of immigration abroad, while the new ministry was to deal with most areas of reception and

integration within the country. The first incumbent was Yigal Allon, and it was anticipated that his ministry would eventually unite under one roof the "absorption" functions not only of the Jewish Agency but also of the various government ministries—and to do so more effectively. But this was not to be, for two reasons. First, the service ministries affected, having been unwilling to cede any of their functions to the Jewish Agency, were now equally reluctant to turn them over to the Absorption Ministry; and, second, the Agency was able to marshal a potent argument in support of its continued independent existence: the fact that contributions of American Jewry (and of some other communities, as well) must be disbursed by a nongovernmental, voluntary organization in order to enjoy exemption from income taxes. The UJA-UIA leadership in the United States also protested vigorously to the officials involved against any plan to transfer additional responsibilities from the Agency to the government, arguing that it would jeopardize the fund-raising structure in the United States. Their reasoning proved convincing, above all to Minister of Finance Pinhas Sapir, and the integrity of the Agency was maintained.

The Israel government later transferred some of its own activities to the Agency, rather than the other way round. Among the programs which had previously been financed by government and which now became the responsibility of the Jewish Agency was the subsidizing of Israel's institutions of higher learning. Other programs in the fields of health, welfare, immigrant housing, and education, which involve substantial outlays for immigrants, also became the Agency's financial, but not operational, responsibility.

Separation of WZO from Jewish Agency

While the reconstitution thus measurably strengthened the position of the Jewish Agency, it also called for a major concession by the Zionist organization: to separate once and for all WZO from the Jewish Agency, in both structure and function. Under the reconstitution agreement, WZO was to give up its status of virtual identity with the Jewish Agency, that had been granted legitimacy by the 1952 Status Law, and to become once again a limited partner in the Agency.

With the establishment of the Jewish Agency, Inc., in 1960, a *de jure* separation already had taken place on the budgetary level. Since the JAFI Inc. (later UIA, Inc.) could make allocations only for those activities of the Jewish Agency which were entitled to tax exemption under United States law as interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service, it was decided to separate out those activities which were ineligible or doubtful from the tax point of view and to group them in a separate World Zionist Organization budget. These were mainly programs not specifically aimed at new immigrants, some of them for countries other than Israel, such as education in the Diaspora, organization and information, and youth work. Together,

the cost of these activities amounted to about 10 per cent of the Agency's expenditures.

With all JAFI, Inc. funds earmarked for the Jewish Agency proper, the WZO budget was financed by contributions to Keren Ha-yesod in other countries, as well as by miscellaneous sources of income. Under this arrangement, though the budgets were separate, the same Executive directed the programs of both Agency and WZO. Thus, for the general public at least, the identity of the two bodies continued as heretofore. But in the negotiations leading to the reconstitution, effective separation of the Jewish Agency from WZO was a *sine qua non* for many of the leading non-Zionists. The Zionists conceded the point in principle, but were deeply concerned about the funding of the WZO budget. Eventually, a formula was agreed upon whereby the financial needs of WZO were to be met from funds that did not come under the restrictive provision of tax-exempt gifts in the United States and elsewhere. At the same time, WZO would not have to conduct a campaign of its own, which would have represented an undesirable interference with fund raising for the Jewish Agency. The fact that the Zionist leadership was able to persuade the non-Zionists to accept this arrangement would indicate that it was able to make a strong case for the legitimacy of Zionist work.

1967 War Brings Change in Attitudes

No doubt the drastic change in non-Zionist attitudes that occurred in the wake of the 1967 war played a role in this. The wave of enthusiasm engulfing everything related to Israel broke down traditional attitudes to the extent that even the notion of *aliyah* from the United States had become acceptable to many non-Zionists.

During the crisis itself, the results of the campaigns on behalf of Israel had been such that there was enough credit for everyone, and past organizational rivalries gave way to close cooperation. The much-disputed ratio between local and overseas allocations became a thing of the past as the Israel Emergency Fund tipped the scales overwhelmingly in Israel's favor.⁶ There was no quibbling by the welfare funds over the principle that all monies collected over and above the regular campaign proceeds should go to UJA. Consequently, a Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds delegation, which visited Israel in September 1967, was able to report that "we found the warmest of welcomes, based upon new recognition of the extraordinary work our federations and welfare funds

⁶ The welfare funds raised \$145 million in 1967 through their regular campaigns, of which UJA received about 50 per cent. An additional \$173 million in pledges was raised through the Emergency Fund, all of which was earmarked for UJA. In 1968 the respective amounts were \$153 and \$80 million. (Figures from the AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK, Vol. 71 [1970], p. 182.)

had accomplished for the Israel Emergency Fund (in cooperation with UJA) and, even more fundamentally, a new understanding of the continuing central role of our community organizations in American and worldwide Jewish life."

It was in this atmosphere of mutual good feeling that the plans for the reconstitution of the Jewish Agency gathered support.

The Conference on Human Needs

Indicative of the spirit of cooperation seeking an outlet in tangible form even before the new structure was worked out was the Conference on Human Needs (COHN), which took place in Jerusalem in 1969 under joint government-Agency auspices. The delegates were professional and lay specialists in such fields as housing, agriculture, education, and welfare, who held several days of discussions on Israel's problems and programs in those areas with their Israeli counterparts. The latter apparently came away from the conference convinced that here was a model for future association with diaspora Jewry.

The new symbiotic relationship was perhaps best exemplified by the fact that a single individual, Max M. Fisher of Detroit, was both president of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds and chairman of the United Israel Appeal. Later, he was also chosen chairman of the board of governors of the reconstituted Jewish Agency. Finally, Fisher was also chairman of the executive committee of the American Jewish Committee, whose leading member in the 1920s was Louis Marshall.

In his speech to the planning committee in August 1970, Pincus said that he had "warned Max Fisher that the day will come when I shall call him a Zionist too, when that gap is closed completely, and we will be unable to differentiate in the approach to the problems of Israel between those who come from here or there." But in the same address Pincus made it clear that the Zionist organization did not intend to take a back seat under the new arrangement: "We are now entering a joint and equal partnership; fifty-fifty on the organizational basis. In the discussions it was clear to everybody that if we had to count card-carrying Zionists as it were, versus non-card-carrying Zionists, there is a Zionist majority—that must be in the nature of things. I hope that the fact there is a majority or a minority will play no role beyond what I have just said." Pincus left no room for doubt that the WZO saw in the separation a necessary evil, and not a *desideratum*, as did some of the non-Zionists. He concluded, "I also know that nothing will be done by any responsible Jewish leader, in the creation of the expanded Jewish Agency, that will denigrate or derogate, not only from the past of the world Zionist movement, but from its ongoing activities, in the role that it still has to play in Jewish life, and in seeking the realization of our ultimate dream."

Three Tiers Retained in New Structure

The planning committee, which met in Jerusalem in August 1970, initialed the agreement for the reconstitution, which was later approved by the founding assembly in June 1971. At that time, the planning committee, itself, was named as the board of governors of the Agency, the centerpiece in the tier of governing bodies retained from the 1929 structure (although with somewhat different nomenclature). By all indications, the board will be the effective policy-making group. The agreement stipulates that it "shall manage the affairs of the Agency and control its activities." It also is empowered to elect the members of the Executive. Its members are to be elected by the assembly as follows: 50 per cent from among the members of the assembly, designated by WZO; 30 per cent from among those designated by the United Israel Appeal, Inc.; 20 per cent to be designated outside of Israel and the United States. (An annex to the agreement specifies that, among the latter, two are to be from England; one each from Canada, Western Europe, and South Africa; two from South America, of whom one is to be from Argentina and the other, in rotation, from one of four other countries.)

The number of members of the board of governors was augmented from 38, as stipulated in the draft agreement, to 40, apparently in order to preserve a delicate balance and also to accommodate more individuals and localities. It is noteworthy that the 50-30-20 ratio is operative as regards Zionist-non-Zionist relationship, as well as geographically. There are 20 Zionists, 12 American non-Zionists, and eight non-Zionists from other countries. But among the Zionists there are also eight Americans, so that the total number of Americans on the board is 20, as compared to 12 Israelis, and eight from other countries. Without analyzing the Board's composition in detail, the names of the American unit will be of interest. The non-Zionists (some prefer to be called non-WZO members) are Albert Adelman, Milwaukee, Wisc.; Victor Carter, Los Angeles, Calif.; Melvin Dubinsky, St. Louis, Mo.; Max M. Fisher, Detroit, Mich.; Edward Ginsberg, Cleveland, Ohio; Morris Levinson, New York City; Joseph Meyerhoff, Baltimore, Md.; Robert Russell, Miami, Fla.; Louis Stern, Essex County, N.J.; Dewey D. Stone, Brockton, Mass.; Jack Weiler, New York City, and Paul Zuckerman, Detroit, Mich. Those representing Zionist organizations in the United States are Arthur Hertzberg, Englewood, N.J.; Richard Hirsch, Washington, D.C.; Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson, New York City; Israel Miller, New York City; Allen Pollack, New York City; Emanuel Rackman, New York City; Kalman Sultanik, New York City, and Jacques Torczyner, New York City.

The board of governors is to meet not less than three times a year, one of the meetings to take place in conjunction with the annual meeting of the assembly.

Aside from appointing the board of governors, the functions of the

assembly are described in the agreement as follows: to receive reports from the board of governors and the Executive; to review needs and programs; to determine basic policies; to consider and act upon budgets submitted by the board of governors. However, the main purpose of the assembly would seem to be that of constituting a forum for discussion. The 50-30-20 ratio also applies to the composition of the assembly, whose 296 members are to be designated by the signatory organizations.

As for the Executive, the agreement states that it "shall be responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Agency, subject to the control of the board of governors." It further stipulates that the Executive shall consist of persons elected *ad personam* by the board of governors, so that the 50-30-20 formula does not apply in this case. Further, according to the agreement, the chairman of the Jewish Agency (who also shall be chairman of the assembly), as well as the heads of its four major departments and the chairman of Keren Ha-yesod, shall be members of the Executive, as are three members of the board of governors not designated by WZO (two of them to be designated by UIA, Inc.). Since the heads of Agency departments will in all likelihood come from Zionist ranks, this provision would appear to ensure a Zionist preponderance on the Executive. The principal offices of the Executive will be located in Jerusalem, which makes it unlikely that the non-Israeli members will participate in day-to-day business.

The actual makeup of the first Executive shows, however, that four, rather than three, non-Zionists were appointed: Dubinsky, Fisher, and Ginsberg of the United States, and Michael Sacher of Britain. In addition, Gottlieb Hammer, executive vice president of UIA, and Philip Bernstein, executive vice president of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, were designated associate members without a vote (the agreement states that up to three associate members may be appointed).

Decision-making Consensus

In its actual functioning so far, the reconstituted Jewish Agency has borne out the expectation that decisions would be arrived at by consensus, rather than by vote. A mood of comradeship and optimism pervaded the planning sessions in 1970, the founding assembly in 1971, and the meeting of the board of governors held in London in February 1972. It was a mood shared by all the participants, regardless of the camp to which they belonged. While the non-Zionists showed understanding of the limitations imposed upon their own role as well as on that of the Jewish Agency in the larger institutional structure of Israel, they were nevertheless eager to utilize the opportunities for exerting influence, which the new framework offered. The influence—if the present pattern continues—will not flow from the weight of their numerical representation, but rather from their own stature and authority. This will be so even in areas where the Jewish Agency must share

control with the government, as the new structure opens up regular channels of communication with policy-makers in the various ministries. An example is public housing, on which strong (and expert) American views on the applicability of novel construction methods to the conservative Israeli housing industry have already made their impact.

To the extent that the leading non-Zionists succeed in impressing their stamp upon the Jewish Agency, it is inevitable that the future role of the World Zionist Organization will be put to the test. In the short run, the buttressing of the Agency's position through reconstitution has, by indirection, strengthened WZO as well. But in the longer term, WZO will have to evolve a new image for itself, both as far as its relationship to the Agency and its own independent tasks are concerned; it will not be able to maintain its accustomed stance of identity with the Jewish Agency. At the World Zionist Congress, which took place in Jerusalem in February 1972, only perfunctory notice was taken of the new development, and of WZO's changed status vis-à-vis the Jewish Agency. An observer at the Congress could have gained the impression that the reconstitution was but another in a series of modifications, which left the basic structure unchanged.

This is certainly not the view of most American non-Zionist delegates to the Agency's governing bodies. Through their conscientious approach to the Agency's problems, their vigorous insistence on information, and their incisive questioning, they showed that they take the new structure and their task in it seriously.

ERNEST STOCK

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES

OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Politics and Intergroup Relations in the United States

POLITICS in this country, particularly in an election year, always has reflected ethnic, racial, and religious cleavages.¹ However, it is unlikely that any national election in American history saw such blatant appeals by candidates to ethnic group interests and widespread public discussion of these interests as were used in 1972. As a result the election largely turned on ethnic issues, although these usually dealt with differences in morality and life styles rather than with more traditional income or class divisions.

The election returns revealed a major change in the way minorities and the less advantaged have responded politically for almost two generations. The coalition of Southern whites, Jews, white ethnics, blue-collar workers, and campus-oriented intellectuals, that had felt comfortable in the Democratic party since the advent of the New Deal, was shattered, at least nationally with the landslide reelection of the Nixon-Agnew ticket.

According to an extensive postelection survey conducted for CBS, Roman Catholic voters for the first time in the country's history selected a Republican candidate, by a margin of 53 to 46 per cent.² And, for the first time since reliable election survey data became available in the mid-1930s, 54 per cent of labor-union families voted the Republican ticket.³ Jewish voters gave the Nixon-Agnew slate an estimated 35 per cent, double the 1968 percentage. Even voters earning less than \$7,000 annually—the traditional bulwark of

¹ See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, "Prejudice and Politics in the American Past and Present," in Charles Y. Glock and Ellen Siegelman, *Prejudice U.S.A.* (New York, 1969).

² *New York Times*, November 9, 1972.

³ *Gallup Opinion Index*, December 1972.

Democratic strength—gave Nixon 42 per cent of their votes, a jump of 18 per cent over 1968, an NBC survey showed.

The CBS survey also found that, contrary to earlier predictions, the President narrowly won the youth. He carried the rural areas, the suburbs, and even some of the cities, including Cleveland and very nearly New York City.⁴ Even among academics, who generally have been found on the liberal-left side of the political fence, there was only a slight lead by Senator McGovern of 51 to 48 per cent.⁵ Finally, President Nixon completed the process begun in 1948 by sweeping all 11 Southern states—in 1968 the Democrats had taken Texas—thereby completely reversing the role that had made these states a consistent source of Democratic majorities.

In the battle for the George C. Wallace vote, and the anger and alienation it represented after Wallace had been disabled in an assassination attempt, Nixon was the primary beneficiary. The President's 1972 percentage was the sum of his 1968 vote (43.4 per cent), Wallace's 13.5 per cent, and as he, himself, suggested "about five points" for the assorted misfortunes that befell the Democratic ticket. However, the Wallace vote probably was not crucial. Had Wallace run and gained 15 per cent of the vote, Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab estimate, Nixon would have ended up with 50 per cent and Senator McGovern 35 per cent of the ballots cast.⁶

Blacks maintained their overwhelming support of the Democratic party. However, their vote for Nixon increased from about 10 per cent in 1968 to 13 per cent, according to a November 10 release by the Joint Center for Political Studies; other sources put it as high as 21 per cent. The Center indicated it may have underestimated his vote slightly, since it did not include information from suburban areas.

The apparent victory for conservatism and the Republican party, however, was somewhat less clear than the actual presidential vote indicated. The GOP failed to carry the House or Senate despite the Republicans' presidential 60.7 per cent of the votes. Republican governors declined in number from 31 in 1968 to 19. Liberal Republicans, such as Senator Edward W. Brooke (Mass.), Clifford P. Case (N.J.), Mark O. Hatfield (Oreg.) and Charles H. Percy (Ill.) were reelected. Conservative Senator Jack Miller of Iowa was replaced by a Democrat, and another conservative, Senator Gordon Allot of Colorado, was defeated by an ex-Republican who had abandoned his party over the unsuccessful attempt to nominate Judge Harold Carswell to the Supreme Court.

⁴ New York Times, November 12, 1972.

⁵ A national pre-election opinion survey reported by Everett Carl Ladd and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Poisoned Ivy—McGovern's Campus Support," *New York*, October 16, 1972.

⁶ "The Election and the National Mood," *Commentary*, January 1973.

Since the election was neither a personal endorsement of the President nor a clear-cut victory for conservatism, its meaning was fiercely debated. Some observers argued that the electorate appeared to be rejecting social change as projected by a coalition of "new class" intellectuals, an elitist youth culture, and an underclass led by militant blacks. In contrast to the ambiguities of Senator George McGovern's ideas, it was said, Nixon offered an escape into nostalgia and familiar values, such as the work ethic and strongest-nation doctrine. By doing so, he managed, as Governor Wallace earlier and Senator McGovern briefly in the primaries, to emerge as champion of the alienated, white underdog rebelling against the elitism of the "new politics." That the election outcome indicated no racial backlash was seen by some in the fact that a majority of 2 to 1 of both Nixon and McGovern supporters said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who would improve opportunities for blacks.⁷

The American Jewish Committee's executive vice president, Bertram H. Gold, declared that the voters had opted for "a progressive centrism, built firmly on a foundation of positive social content," rather than reaction.⁸

However one interpreted the meaning of the election, it seemed to signal for the 1970s the access to power of a new alliance between low- and moderate-income white ethnics, mostly Roman Catholic, and a broader base of Evangelical Protestants and some Jews. The question was whether this alliance was a temporary phenomenon or the "new majority" President Nixon had boasted of having created. In any case, it was clear that this would have a profound impact on intergroup relations in this country.

Ethnic Consciousness and Middle America

The revived interest in ethnic identification continued as a major current in American life. When World Publishing Company issued an "Ethnic Prejudices in America" series, it explained that it did not include material on the blacks because there were enough publications on this group. Other books published included Michael Novak's *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics: Politics and Culture in the Seventies*⁹ and Mark R. Levy and Michael S. Kramer's *The Ethnic Factor: How America's Minorities Decide Elections*.¹⁰ *New York* magazine had a special issue on the Irish (March 13), and the *New York Times Magazine* (April 30) carried Richard Gambino's article,

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ "Progressive Centrism, Mandate For the Seventies," address before the American Jewish Committee's National Executive Council Meeting, December 1, 1972, Hollywood, Fla.

⁹ New York, 1972.

¹⁰ New York, 1972.

"Twenty Million Italian-Americans Can't Be Wrong." NBC featured a Polish private eye, Banacek; CBS did a one-hour documentary on Italian American culture; the film "The Godfather" played to packed houses. There were signs, too, that "the ethnics" were organizing politically. New figures like Barbara Mikulski and Stephen Adubato had been elected to city councils in Baltimore and Newark, respectively.

However, this growing affirmation of the value of ethnicity and the "new pluralism" (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], pp. 98-102) did not go unchallenged. Critical reviews appeared of Murray Friedman's *Overcoming Middle Class Rage*¹¹ and Novak's, *Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*.¹² Colin Greer said the "new pluralism" was "soil as fertile for group hatred and violence as it might be for social strength."¹³ A revived ethnicity, Norman Podhoretz warned, could pose a threat to "the idea of a common culture."¹⁴

Regardless of the intellectuals' debate, political parties and national candidates made strenuous efforts to harness the forces of ethnicity. The GOP had been moving aggressively into this field since 1968, when it established a Republican National Committee ethnic office. Its allocation to win ethnic voters in the 1972 election campaign was estimated at half of its \$40-million budget; target states included New York, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas, and New Jersey, where ethnics constituted half of the population.¹⁵ In 1972 the ethnic press gave wide publicity to a constant stream of presidential appointees having ethnic names. The White House committed itself to sending a representative to 13 separate ethnic functions in Chicago alone. Mrs. Nixon attended a Lithuanian folk festival, while the President, himself, appeared at an Italian folk festival in place of his daughter Patricia Cox, who could not attend.

Italian-Americans were a special target. In 1972 they seemed to be the most angered white ethnic group seeking political recognition. In 1968 they had been crucial in bringing New Jersey into the Republican camp.¹⁶ Levy and Kramer¹⁷ also reported that Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller had been

¹¹ Harold R. Isaacs, "The New Pluralists," *Commentary*, March 1972; Friedman's response *ibid.*, June 1972.

¹² Gary Wills in *New York Times Book Review*, April 23, 1972; Novak's response *ibid.*, June 18, 1972. Robert Alter, "A Fever of Ethnicity," *Commentary*, June 1972, p. 68; Novak's response *ibid.*, October 1972.

¹³ "Remembering Ethnicity, Forgetting Class," *Social Policy*, November/December 1972, January/February 1973.

¹⁴ *Commentary*, June 1972.

¹⁵ *New York Times*, September 24, 1972.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, December 12, 1972; Joseph Kraft, "The Italian Connection," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, September 27, 1972.

¹⁷ Levy and Kramer, *op. cit.*

reelected in 1970 with 65 per cent of the Italian vote. Two years earlier, they said, Nixon's 49 per cent plurality among New York state's Italians had made him the first Republican presidential candidate to capture a major ethnic group. In the 1972 election Mayor Frank L. Rizzo of Philadelphia, who had been elected a year earlier on the Democratic ticket, announced his support for Nixon. With other Italian-American political figures, such as Representative Mario Biaggi of the Bronx, N.Y., and Mayor Joseph Alioto of San Francisco, on the rise, the vote of this group was in a state of flux.

The President carefully planned his efforts to appeal to the sensitivities and values of "the ethnics." He put a presidential ban on the use of the word "Mafia."¹⁸ On the eve of Columbus Day he paid tribute to the nation's Italian immigrants, noting that they came "not asking for something, asking only for the opportunity to work."¹⁹ When he visited the Soviet Union, Nixon publicly noted in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, that many Ukrainians lived in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and other parts of the United States. He also went to Warsaw, and on his return to the White House met with some Polish-Americans who burst into appreciative song²⁰.

In the campaign for the "ethnics" Senator McGovern seemed strangely out of place, despite the traditional Democratic affinities of these groups. "The prairie personality," one observer wrote, has "a sense of justness and uprightness but not so much of family and community."²¹ During their national convention in Miami Beach, the Democrats planned a two-day ethnic fair, replete with organ-grinders, mazurka-dancers, lasagna, baklava, and kolaches; but this was ethnic politics of yesteryear. Reported James P. Gannon in the June 12 issue of the *Wall Street Journal*: "Planners of folk fairs do not seem to understand that there is a new ethnic politics developing that has little or nothing to do with tacking a -ski on the end of your anglicized name. It is an issue-oriented politics based on the real-life concerns of white ethnic voters rather than the sentimental massaging of homeland memories." And Michael Novak, who enlisted in the Shriver campaign, explained that the new ethnic politics means you have to "look at the world, the way they do," and not necessarily be a part of an ethnic group.²²

"The ethnics" seemed to be less attracted to the Republican national ticket than repelled by McGovern's mainstream liberalism mixed with evangelical Protestant style and the elitist, overly ideological forces that supported him. It was symptomatic of the McGovern forces' lack of identification with ethnic

¹⁸ *Wall Street Journal*, June 1, 1972.

¹⁹ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 9, 1972.

²⁰ "Catering to Azerbaijanis," *Time*, September 18, 1972.

²¹ George R. Sullivan, "Better That George Lost Big," *America*, December 9, 1972.

²² *Wall Street Journal*, June 12, 1972.

groups that the ethnic division of the Democratic party was abolished in July, when Mrs. Jean Westwood, who had been supported by McGovern, became national chairman of the Democratic party. An urban ethnic office was opened in McGovern campaign headquarters only after Shriver became the vice-presidential candidate, whose major role was to try to woo back ethnic voters.

The Rise of Evangelical Protestant Movements

In 1972 there emerged into clearer focus an important parallel movement to the ethnic surge: the rise of 30 million Protestant fundamentalist evangelicals. The movement was described in a number of books published during the year, including *Religion and the New Majority*, by Lowell D. Streiker and Gerald S. Strober,²³ and *Why Conservative Churches Are Growing*, by Dean M. Kelley.²⁴ Kelley pointed out that in recent years most liberal Protestant denominations, like the United Methodist Church and the Episcopal Church, either lost members or barely maintained themselves. To the degree that the Roman Catholic Church moved to a less absolute posture, its membership, too, was leveling off, and 1970 saw the first decrease since the Church's founding in this country. Groups showing steady gains were the Mormons, Southern Baptists, and Jehovah's Witnesses who held on to old-time beliefs, shunned compromising contact with other churches or secular causes, and maintained that they alone possessed the truth. Churches which had diluted their traditional purpose of providing meaning in personal life in favor of "extraneous goals such as changing social structures," Kelley noted, were losing ground. There also was developing an "ecclesiastical fundamentalism" or "populism" among liberal and conservative Protestant groups. This prompted Presbyterians and others to emphasize and spend money on local rather than national programs.²⁵

There were signs, mainly outside of the cosmopolitan centers but even within them, that the values and life-styles of Protestant fundamentalist groups were taking hold in reaction against the counter-culture. A bagpipe and military-band version of the 200-year-old hymn, "Amazing Grace," made it into *Billboard's* "Top Twenty." Cat Stevens's "Morning Has Broken," an old English school hymn, reached number eight.²⁶ In addition, the Jesus People movement spawned an estimated 25 to 50 fairly stable monthly publications not unlike the underground press of the Left. Like the

²³ New York, 1972.

²⁴ New York, 1972.

²⁵ New York Times, May 29, 1972.

²⁶ Kevin P. Phillips, Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, July 1, 1972.

latter, they were beginning to penetrate the college campus.²⁷ Campus officials in various parts of the country also reported a sharp increase in the demand for religious studies.

During his four years in office President Nixon carefully cultivated these currents which perhaps embodied many of his own values and experiences. Under him, "evangelical Protestantism had gone about as far as it was possible to go toward achieving official establishment," religious columnist Louis Cassels suggested.²⁸ The President's statements on patriotism and the work ethic moved Charles P. Henderson, Jr., to label him the "theologian" of the new American civil religion. Nixon had formed a close personal and political alliance with moderate evangelist Billy Graham whom Strober and Streiker described as "the quintessential Middle American." He was a frequent visitor to the White House, not just to lead Sunday prayer services. Leaders of the more liberal Protestant denominations publicly complained that they were unable to get an appointment with the President to present official policy statements adopted by their groups.

Republican leaders campaigning for Nixon sought to capitalize on these conservative or more traditional currents. Republican Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott called McGovern the "Triple A candidate—Acid, Amnesty and Abortion." Clearly, McGovern's cause came to be identified with social issues that set on edge the teeth of evangelical fundamentalists and ethnics. Symbolically, Mayor Frank Rizzo and Billy Graham emerged as the two most important political figures in 1972.

Working-Class Alienation

Another political target group in the campaign, overlapping the ethnics and fundamentalist Protestants, was labor, mainly the blue-collar and, to a lesser degree, the white-collar workers. Traditionally allied with the Democratic party, organized labor was courted by the Nixon administration during the turmoil surrounding the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970, when thousands of "hard-hats" marched on Wall Street to demonstrate their support of the Vietnam war. Recognizing that Democratic workers normally viewed American life much as he did, Nixon began to woo them assiduously. Whether coincidentally or not, former Teamster president James R. Hoffa was let out of prison. The construction unions were the beneficiaries of special treatment by the administration under a separate wage-control board. These unions also were pleased with modifications of the Philadelphia Plan which had been designed to increase the number of minority workers in the building

²⁷ New York Times, November 5, 1972.

²⁸ Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, December 9, 1972.

trades (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 134). As a result of these efforts and the lack of confidence in McGovern among working-class whites, unions representing five million members, among them the Teamsters, endorsed the President in October.²⁹ At the conclusion of the Democratic National Convention, the executive council of the AFL-CIO, following the lead of its president, George Meany, agreed to remain officially neutral in the campaign. Earlier Meany had said about McGovern, "This man's ideas aren't liberal. This man's ideas are crazy."³⁰

In 1972 American workers, especially the young, were at a peak of dissatisfaction. While industrial America had recovered from a two-year recession and hard-hat cities like Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Buffalo were humming again, many workers seemed to become dissatisfied with their daily job experience and the quality of their lives. A number of social-science investigations in 1972, some of them government-sponsored, documented this development. Among them were HEW's massive study, *Work in America*; *America's Young Workers*, the American Jewish Committee's National Project on Ethnic America survey of attitudes of young workers of Polish, Irish, and Italian extraction in Chicago and Hartford; Irving Howe's *The World of the Blue-Collar Worker*; *The Hidden Injuries of Class*, by Richard Sennett and Jonathan Cobb, and *Where Have All the Robots Gone?*, by Harold L. Sheppard and Neal Q. Herrick.

The feeling on the part of workers of being trapped and dehumanized by monotonous jobs offering little opportunity to use their skills, lowered their productivity, increased absenteeism, raised turnover rates, and gave rise to industrial sabotage and wildcat strikes. The "Lordstown syndrome"—as the strike by young workers against a General Motors plant in Lordstown, O. because of an alleged speed-up on the assembly line was called—received considerable public attention.³¹ Sheppard and Herrick reported that workers with bad jobs and little opportunity of change were less likely to vote, and when they did, they tended to support George Wallace.

As the political campaign progressed, it became increasingly evident that the McGovern forces, who had had high hopes of capturing a major proportion of the 25 million young first-time voters, were encountering the deep dissatisfaction of many young workers who represented two-thirds of the youth constituency. The other third was college students. In interviews of voters under 25 years of age, conducted between October 11 and 15 in 24 locations across the United States, Peter Hart Research Associates of

²⁹ New York Times, October 12, 1972.

³⁰ Kevin Phillips, "How Nixon Will Win," *New York Times Magazine*, August 6, 1972.

³¹ "The Spreading Lordstown Syndrome," *Business Week*, March 4, 1972.

Washington, D.C., found that they preferred Nixon to McGovern by a margin of 52 to 36 per cent. However, McGovern led on college campuses.³²

Nixon concentrated on the various elements that made up the Middle America of 1972. One Democratic worker described his technique: "Nixon gnawed around the edges of a worker's life. He hasn't touched the central trade union part. But he gnaws a little at the Catholic part, a little at the Polish part and a little at the anti-hippie part. After a while, he has an awful lot of workers."³³ Underlying the specific tactics or strategies used by Nixon and McGovern was a profound difference of opinion on where the country was going, or wanted to go. Conservative columnist and former Nixon political advisor Kevin Phillips, summed it up on the eve of the campaign:

While it is oversimplistic to divide "alienation" into just two categories, there would seem to be a basic cultural difference between "new value"-oriented indignation—the elitist McGovern brand—and the "Middle American" anger of trod upon tradition and spurned Levittown societal beliefs and values. Perhaps the real pivot of the election is this: Just how much have people—or human nature—really changed? If there is an all-pervasive new morality-cum-alienation that cuts across previous ethnic and chronological lines, then McGovern, the clear beneficiary, could win. But if the real frustration is with the trampling of traditional values, and if major chunks of the old Democratic coalition are angry at the cultural upheaval represented by McGovern, then Richard Nixon will come out on top.³⁴

The results of the election seemed to bear out the latter alternative. According to a Gallup poll, 54 per cent of labor-union members and their families voted for Nixon. Four years earlier, 56 per cent of the labor vote went to Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, 29 per cent to Nixon, and 15 per cent to George Wallace. Even in the 1956 Eisenhower sweep, 57 per cent of the voters in union families voted for Adlai E. Stevenson, the Democratic candidate.³⁵ Angered by McGovern's stand on welfare, busing, and other civil-rights issues directly affecting their neighborhoods and jobs, as well as his position on abortion, drugs, proposed "surrender" to Communist Vietnam, and amnesty for draft dodgers, ethnic groups shunned the Democratic national ticket. In Cleveland's 23rd ward, which was 80 per cent Slovene and blue-collar, Nixon won a clear majority of 57 per cent over McGovern's 41. In 1968 Humphrey captured this ward with 53 per cent, to Nixon's 24 and Wallace's 23.³⁶

³² Richard Harwood and Haynes Johnson, *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, October 29, 1972.

³³ *New York Times*, October 12, 1972.

³⁴ Kevin Phillips, *op. cit.*

³⁵ *New York Times*, December 14, 1972.

³⁶ "Splintering the Great Coalition," *Time*, November 20, 1972.

After the election the "hard hats" and organized labor received their reward: Peter J. Brennan, president of the New York City and New York State Building and Construction Trades Council, who had led the famous "hard hat" parade in New York in 1970, was appointed Secretary of Labor. The President was reported to have offered to put a labor-union representative also in a high level post in every department of the federal government.³⁷

However, there was no indication that any of the problems that gave rise to ethnic, working-class, and middle-class rage were being dealt with by either the administration or Congress.

Broader questions, such as improving the nature of work so that a worker can feel pride and satisfaction in the job, went unaddressed. General Motors moved to the offensive on the issue. Top executives dismissed boredom and unhappiness among workers as exaggerated and emphasized high salary scales and generous fringe benefits.³⁸ The HEW study's findings and proposals seemed to conflict with administration thinking and policy, particularly with Nixon's view that the "work ethic" was giving way to a "welfare ethic." Outgoing Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson, whose department would be responsible for carrying through the study's major recommendations, said that the issue of job dissatisfaction had been overblown; that it was largely a creation of "pop sociologists" and their media sisters-under-the-skin.³⁹

At year's end, influential senators, including Edward M. Kennedy (Dem., Mass.), Birch Bayh (Dem., Ind.), and Charles H. Percy (Rep., Ill.), were beginning to address themselves to the issue. Kennedy indicated in an interview with the Los Angeles *Times* that alienation of blue-collar workers was a key issue for the Democratic party, which would have to "more effectively express concern for keeping elements that have been friendly in the past."⁴⁰

Roman Catholics and Church-State Relations

A special target of the "ethnic" strategies of the Republican and Democratic candidates was the country's largest religious group, the 48 million Roman Catholics who were estimated to constitute one-fourth of the total electorate.⁴¹

³⁷ New York *Times*, December 31, 1972.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, December 24, 1972.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, December 22, 1972.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, December 24, 1972.

⁴¹ 24 per cent Italian-Americans; 16 per cent Irish-Americans; 16 per cent German-Americans; 12 per cent Polish-Americans; 32 per cent other Catholics.

Andrew M. Greeley and other social scientists were demonstrating that Catholics no longer fitted politicians' image of an unwelcome immigrant population that related closely only to their Church and unions. After a slow start, considerable numbers of Catholics had "made it" by the beginning of the 1970s. Those under 40 years of age were as likely to be college graduates and economically successful as comparable American Protestants. In 1970 one-third of the nation's college students were Catholic, compared to one-fourth in 1960.⁴² Many were moving to the suburbs. Much of the sharp increase in the Long Island population in the last decade resulted from the exodus of Italians from New York City.⁴³ Despite their socio-economic success, however, Catholics had not "made it" in terms of broader acceptance of their cultural values and traditions which continued to be ignored and resented by many leaders in American culture.

Contrary to the widespread belief that Vatican Council II inspired changes in the American Catholic Church in the 1960s, it was the social and economic changes of that decade that in fact heavily influenced both the Church and laity. The latter were somewhat to the "left" of comparable groups in the population on a number of political and social questions. In the first of a planned series of yearly reports on attitudes and behavior of United States Catholics, based on statistics gathered by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, Greeley and William C. McCready indicated Catholics seemed to have become "virtually indistinguishable from Protestants" in their views on moral and religious issues. The report charted a rapidly shifting outlook on such matters as church attendance, sexual morality, and even abortion under certain circumstances, although official church teachings remained essentially unchanged.⁴⁴ Tensions persisted on such matters between younger and older Catholics and between the younger and older clergy. Only 40 per cent of the priests in the United States still supported the Church's official teaching on birth control, while 83 per cent of the bishops did.⁴⁵

Like generals who fight this year's war with last year's strategies, both Nixon and McGovern responded to Catholic voters in traditional political terms. The former entered the campaign riding a growing Republican tide among Catholic voters, which had been interrupted only by the Kennedy and Johnson elections, probably because of the increasingly suburban and "have" character of this group since the 1950s.

⁴² Andrew M. Greeley, "American Catholics—Making It or Losing It?", *The Public Interest*, Summer 1972.

⁴³ *Newsday*, August 2, 1972.

⁴⁴ "The End of American Catholicism?", *America*, October 28, 1972.

⁴⁵ Andrew M. Greeley, *Priests in the United States: Reflections on a Survey* (New York, 1972).

Estimates based on Gallup poll election surveys indicated that the Catholic vote for the Democratic presidential candidates was as follows: Stevenson received 56 per cent in 1952, but only 51 per cent in 1956; it rose to 78 per cent for John F. Kennedy in 1960, decreased slightly to 76 per cent for Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964, and dropped again to 59 per cent for Hubert H. Humphrey in 1968 (8 per cent of the vote went to Wallace).

Nixon courted the Catholics in a variety of ways. He jetted to Philadelphia in the spring to tell a cheering crowd of nuns, priests, and lay educators gathered at the annual meeting of the Catholic Education Association that he was "irrevocably committed" to proposing measures to preserve parochial schools. He praised these schools for offering "spiritual values" and a "moral code." In a radio speech, on October 25, he promised to seek tax credits from Congress for parents of children attending parochial schools.⁴⁶ In May he wrote a widely publicized letter to Terrence Cardinal Cooke of New York personally supporting a church-led drive to repeal the state's liberal abortion law, which was later passed by the legislature and vetoed by Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. In rejecting his own population commission's recommendations for liberalized abortion, planning services, and contraceptives for minors, he appealed to family-centered, ethnic Catholics.⁴⁷

In return John Cardinal Krol, head of the National Conference of Bishops and, since the death of Cardinal Spellman, perhaps the leading Catholic prelate in the country, delivered the invocation at the Republican National Convention. The Cardinal also was photographed with the President on the eve of the election after his return from Poland where he commemorated the martyrdom of a priest who had died in Auschwitz. The photograph, which appeared in newspapers around the country, aroused criticism by liberal Catholics. To some Cardinal Krol seemed to be the religio-political Catholic counterpart to evangelist Billy Graham.

Besides economic issues including his stand on tax reform, McGovern heavily banked on traditional Catholic loyalties to the Democratic party to work in his favor. On September 19 in Chicago, as polls showed his strength among Catholic voters eroding, he endorsed a tax-credit system of providing federal aid to parochial and other nonpublic schools. In a statement issued later in the day he said he favored something along the lines of a bill before the House Ways and Means Committee, pushed by Wilbur D. Mills of Arkansas and other Democratic congressmen, calling for a \$200 annual tax credit for each child attending a qualified nonpublic school. The bill was supported also by the Nixon administration. On September 23 the *New York Times* editorially attacked McGovern's stand as "a threat to the principle of

⁴⁶ *New York Times*, October 26, 1972.

⁴⁷ *Wall Street Journal*, June 1, 1972; *New York Times*, September 24, 1972.

the separation of church and state, no less real for being an indirect subsidy." Early in October the Ways and Means Committee reported the bill out, but Congress adjourned without acting on it.

Abortion, too, became a hot political issue during the campaign in a number of states. In contrast to Nixon's clear-cut support of the campaign to repeal New York's liberal abortion law, McGovern's repeated assertions that the federal government should not get involved; that the matter should be left to the states, hurt him politically. In Michigan and North Dakota the issue of liberalizing abortion laws was on the ballot: it was turned down in both states by a margin of 2 to 1 and 3 to 1, respectively.⁴⁸ The Pennsylvania legislature passed a strict anti-abortion bill, which was killed only because the lower house could not muster the necessary two-thirds vote to override Governor Milton Shapp's veto. McGovern was contending against a Nixon-led national current against "permissiveness," with the implicit view that child-bearing be made mandatory as penalty for sexual indulgence.

The election demonstrated that, at least on a national level, Nixon's "Catholic strategy" had been successful: for the first time in American history slightly more than half of all Catholic voters supported the Republican presidential candidate. McGovern split the two most predominantly Catholic states, carrying Massachusetts and losing Rhode Island by a narrow margin.

Catholic sociologist Andrew M. Greeley stated that, insofar as Catholic voters were concerned, the message of the election was that the "New Politics" had lost it, not that the President had won it. He argued that by rewriting the rules of the Democratic National Convention and insisting Catholic ethnics were "racists" and "hawks," the "reformers" lost a substantial number of Catholic votes for the top of the Democratic ticket. Greeley also felt that the "New Politicians" were eager to dump the Catholic ethnics and Middle Americans because "there is a strong—and frequently quietly explicit—strain of anti-Catholicism in the liberal-left wing of the Democratic Party."⁴⁹

This clearly was an exaggeration. However, there was little doubt that many Catholics, along with other voters, rejected the ideological, moralistic, and evangelical qualities of many McGovern supporters and the personality of the candidate, himself. On the eve of the election, Hart Research Associates reported that had Edward Kennedy been his party's nominee, Catholic voters would have selected him over Nixon.⁵⁰ It was not so much change they resisted and resented, Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab pointed out, but "extremism" and "change that takes place in a non-traditional manner".⁵¹

⁴⁸ Philadelphia *Catholic Standard and Times*, November 16, 1972.

⁴⁹ "New Politics Drove Catholics From Democratic Party," *ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, October 26, 1972.

⁵¹ Lipset and Raab, *op. cit.*

As in the case of the ethnics, there was no serious effort to deal with social, economic, and even moral issues on which Catholic voters were wooed. Despite Nixon's explicit statements of support for aid to parochial schools, critics noted, he had introduced no legislation on this subject during his previous four years in office. His endorsement of tax credits for parents of nonpublic-school children was accompanied by off-stage warnings by his budget and Treasury Department advisors, who pointed out that the enactment of such legislation would mean a billion dollar loss in revenues. And this loss would have to be made up some other way, possibly by cutting other education expenditures.⁵²

As the year came to a close, the Catholic Church continued to find itself in serious difficulties. The decline in parochial-school enrollment continued, although at a slower rate than the year before.⁵³ A report by a committee of businessmen and community leaders in Philadelphia on the financial crisis in archdiocesan schools early in the year was presented personally to the President by John T. Gurash, the group's chairman and head of the INA Corporation, and Cardinal Krol. It described an impending disaster for public as well as parochial schools unless government aid was forthcoming shortly, but made no specific recommendations. To relieve the situation statutes providing for tax credits or for monetary reimbursement to parents for tuition paid to nonpublic schools were enacted in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, and Ohio.⁵⁴

A number of Supreme Court and lower court decisions in 1972 added fresh difficulties to the serious defeats suffered by proponents of aid to parochial schools the year before (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 105). On October 10 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down by a vote of 8 to 1 a 1971 Ohio law for direct tuition grants to parents of children in nonpublic schools. In doing so, it let stand the opinion of a three-judge federal court which held, "One may not do by indirection what is forbidden directly." In the lower court's view, the Ohio law violated the First Amendment's prohibition of any public "establishment of religion" because the "effect of the scheme is to aid religious enterprises."⁵⁵

This action endangered systems of tuition grants to parents of private-and parochial-school children which a number of states adopted when, in 1971, the court in *Lemon v. Kurtzman* and *Earley v. DiCenso* (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.

⁵² "The School Aid Issue," *New York Times*, September 22, 1972.

⁵³ *Catholic Standard and Times*, November 2, 1972.

⁵⁴ American Jewish Congress Commission on Law, Social Action and Urban Affairs, *Public Aid to Religiously-Affiliated Schools—Developments in the 1972 Legislatures* (New York, January 1973).

⁵⁵ *New York Times*, October 11, 1972.

73], pp. 73-74, 105) ruled out direct grants to these schools. It also seemed to some that in their legal effects tuition grants more closely approximated tax credits now advocated by parochial proponents than did "purchase of services arrangements" barred by the Supreme Court a year earlier. In New York, a federal appeals court struck down two sections of a law enacted in May, providing for private-school tuition refunds to poor parents and state-supported maintenance allowances to inner-city private schools, but upheld an income-tax benefit plan for parents. In Ohio, however, a three-judge federal court invalidated that state's tax-credit statute during the last days of the year.⁵⁶

Critics of proponents of government aid to private and parochial schools were irked by efforts to find some way around the 1971 Supreme Court decisions. Leo Pfeffer, who for many years had played a leading role in arguing against parochial aid before the Court, called the proposals "a chess game with the Constitution," comparable to efforts in the South to circumvent school-desegregation decisions.⁵⁷

Nor was parochial aid supported by voters in several states in 1972. A ballot proposition to establish a \$12.1 million fund for scholarships to nonpublic-school students was rejected in Maryland. Idaho voters defeated a measure allowing nonpublic-school students to use public-school buses to go to school, and in Oregon a proposal to amend the state's constitution, with possible benefit to proponents of aid to nonpublic schools, was turned down.⁵⁸

The difficulty of liberals, most of whom opposed parochial aid, was that they had won a series of court decisions and several referenda and, as a result, failed in their attempt to get the political support of urban Catholic voters. Adam Walinsky was one of the few liberal voices endorsing some form of aid to parochial schools. (McGovern's support of tax-credits received little attention.) He recommended, in the October issue of the *New Republic*, tax deductions for all charitable contributions, including those to church and parochial school fund-raising drives. Efforts of this kind might have helped liberals regain some credibility with Church leadership and many of the laity. "To do otherwise," Walinsky concluded, "is to risk the worst political sin of all, which is not failure, but irrelevance to the concerns of our people; and as well to all of those children, black and white and Puerto Rican, Catholic and non-Catholic, for whom the parochial schools are one of the few bases of stability in the difficult and often menacing urban world."

⁵⁶ American Jewish Congress, *op. cit.*

⁵⁷ "Aid to Parochial Schools," *Reform Judaism*, October 1972.

⁵⁸ *Catholic Standard and Times*, November 16, 1972.

The Jews

THE ELECTIONS

Although the Jews numbered just under three per cent of the total United States population, their concentration in six important states—New York, Florida, California, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Illinois—their proportionately large turnout at the polls, and their generosity in supporting causes they believed in have made them special targets for politicians in recent years. The 1972 election year, however, saw an unprecedented concentration on, and at times an almost obscene public discussion of, the alleged “Jewish vote.” A sampling of articles and headlines in the news media included “Will Jews Dance to Nixon’s Tune,” a special section in *New York* magazine (August 14); “Wooing the Jewish Vote,” in *Newsweek* (August 21); “The Jewish Swing to Nixon,” in *Time* (August 21); “Is There Really a Jewish Vote?,” in The Philadelphia *Inquirer* (October 1); “Nixon Accused of Backing Israel to Woo Jewish Vote,” in the New York *Times* (October 1); and “Nixon Stronger Among Jews,” in the Detroit *Free Press* (October 23). It was widely assumed that Jews would vote as a group on such Jewish issues as Israel, Soviet Jewry, and racial quotas, rather than on a broad range of concerns, as would other Americans.

Both political parties organized “Jewish desks” to move in aggressively on Jewish voters. The Nixon forces believed the Jews offered an unusual opportunity for significant political gains over the approximately 17 per cent received in 1968. McGovern could only hope to maintain the high proportions of the Jewish Democratic vote in national elections since the New Deal era—according to Levy and Kramer, 90 per cent in 1940, 1944, and 1948; 64 per cent in 1952; 60 per cent in 1956; 82 per cent in 1960; 90 per cent in 1964 and 83 per cent in 1968.⁵⁹

For more than a year before the election, presidential advisors had been suggesting that it would be a mistake to “write off” the Jews. They pointed out that the safety of Israel was a central Jewish concern, as was the safety of Soviet Jewry. They also argued that, as a relatively prosperous community, Jews should be turning more conservative and should support Nixon’s economic views, his strong stand on law and order, and his opposition to quotas in affirmative-action programs.

⁵⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

ISSUE OF ISRAEL

In connection with the role of Israel in the campaign and Nixon's strategy to capitalize on this issue, a major controversy had developed even before the presidential nominating conventions over alleged intervention in American politics by the Israel government. In a speech over the Israeli state radio on the occasion of the anniversary of the six-day war, Israel's ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, was quoted as saying, "We have to differentiate between aid in the form of action and aid in the form of words. While we appreciate support in the form of words, we are getting from one camp, we must prefer support in the form of deeds we are getting from the other camp." Rabin reportedly said on another occasion that no other American had made such a far-reaching statement committing the United States to support Israel's existence as President Nixon in his address to Congress upon his return from Moscow.⁶⁰

The speech was seen in newspaper stories and editorial interpretations as expressing Israel's preference for Nixon. Among some of the strong condemnations it called forth was Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s assertion that no foreign envoy since British Ambassador to the United States Jackville-West (who publicly stated in 1888 that the election of Grover Cleveland to the presidency would be to the advantage of Britain) "has intervened so mindlessly in American politics" as Rabin; that "unless his Government recalls him, one must assume that he is executing a premeditated policy."⁶¹ Rabin said that he had been quoted out of context and that his remarks had been misinterpreted.⁶² Several days later Senator Ribicoff (D., Conn.), a key McGovern advisor, released a statement by Prime Minister Golda Meir asserting Israel's neutrality in the United States presidential campaign.⁶³

From the very outset, McGovern was on the defensive with Jewish voters, a position that remained essentially unchanged during the campaign. He had won the nomination over Humphrey and Jackson, who, over the years, had built solid support in the Jewish community as a result of efforts on behalf of Israel and other issues important to Jewish voters. Arguments that McGovern was weak on the issue of Israel, which first surfaced in the California primary where McGovern defeated Humphrey, were given wide publicity. At the height of the California primary, Los Angeles Anglo-Jewish papers carried a

⁶⁰ *Washington Post*, June 11, 1972.

⁶¹ "How McGovern Will Win," *New York Times Magazine*, July 30, 1972.

⁶² *Washington Post*, June 12, 1972.

⁶³ *New York Post*, June 16, 1972.

series of advertisements calling McGovern's support of Israel questionable. The ads, which bore no imprint of Humphrey sponsorship, contained excerpts from earlier McGovern speeches in support of reparations for Palestinian refugees, and pointed to his having voted against military credits for Israel and his inclination to support the internationalization of Jerusalem.

In addition, McGovern's campaign manager Gary Hart said in the question period following his address to students at George Washington University on September 9⁶⁴ that McGovern "should have condemned Israel" for its attacks on Lebanon following the murder of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympiad (p. 451). Another aide, Richard Stearns, signed pro-Arab advertisements carried by the *Washington Post* and *New York Times* on June 23 and November 22, 1967, respectively. While McGovern disavowed these positions, the statements were widely reported in the press, and reprints turned up in Nixon campaign packets circulated in the Jewish community.

The McGovern-Shriver forces fought back as best they could on issues that were known to be of importance to Jewish voters; but they could not deal with the undercurrents. They struck hard at Nixon's credibility. In a speech on October 30 in a West Los Angeles synagogue, vice-presidential candidate Sargent Shriver pictured Nixon as historically cold to Israel and insensitive to the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union. He criticized the President for having "an insufficient number of Jews and ethnics on his personal staff." Said Shriver: "Nixon just became friendly [toward Israel] this year. Are you confident that on November 8th Nixon won't revert back?"

Earlier, on August 30, McGovern stressed in a talk to members of the New York Board of Rabbis his long-time commitment to Israel, asserting that the security of Israel was not a partisan issue. On September 21 he told leaders of 25 major national Jewish organizations that he would vote in favor of a plan to withhold "most-favored-nation" trading status from the Soviet Union until it abolished its "slave tax" on Soviet-Jewish emigrants and ceased its "arming of Arab terrorists."⁶⁵

Within the Jewish community the maneuvering for votes and statements by leaders identified with major Jewish organizations for or against national political candidates aroused concern. Newspaper reports late in August indicated that the formation of a Jewish committee backing the Nixon-Agnew ticket, co-chaired by William A. Wexler, the immediate past president of B'nai B'rith, and Samuel Rothberg, chairman of the Israel Bond organization, was to be announced after the Republican convention. Criticism came immediately from the board of governors of B'nai B'rith. This was followed by the release, on September 1, of a statement by eight major Jewish

⁶⁴ *Hatchet* (George Washington University student publication), September 21, 1972.

⁶⁵ *New York Times*, October 22, 1972.

organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, and the United Synagogue of America, deploring appeals to Jews based on the single issue of United States support of Israel. It declared that it was an "error to assume that political endorsements by individuals identified as officers or members of an organization reflect the views of that organization or its membership," and it noted further that the record of both major parties was supportive of Israel. Simultaneously, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council released guidelines on political campaigns, adopted in June 1971, to help its constituent organizations avoid even the appearance of partisanship.

These reactions seemed to have some effect. The announcement in October of the formation of Concerned Citizens for the Re-election of the President—the original Jews for Nixon organization—which contained the names of major Jewish organizational leaders like the Detroit philanthropist Max Fisher, omitted the names of their organizations and mentioned only their home cities.⁶⁶

The campaign was remarkably free from antisemitism; but there was some discomfort among Jews about the emergence of a number of stereotypes. Newspaper stories referring to Jewish "fat cats," "Jewish financiers," and "Jewish money" began to appear during the early days of the Democratic primaries. For example, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak wrote in their column, "GOP's Belling of Fat Cats," in the July 27 *Washington Post*, that Nixon campaign workers had enlisted "every major contributor to Humphrey's 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns," and described the contributors as "these Jewish businessmen." The syndicated columnist Nicholas von Hoffman commented on what he called the competition among politicians for the Jewish vote by their support of Israel "the valiant little country," which is also "a very truculent one, the Prussia of the Middle East," whose "combative desire for *Lebensraum*" could "drag us into disaster."⁶⁷

ISSUE OF SOVIET JEWS

One of the most significant issues on which Jewish interests cut across the political campaign was the Senate debate over a bill to ratify President Nixon's opening of trade channels with the Soviet Union. Along with 74 other senators, Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) introduced an amendment to the bill which sought to block the trade agreement, scheduled to be voted on in 1973, unless the Soviet Union stopped harassing Soviet Jews wanting to emigrate and rescinded the education tax. The *Christian Science Monitor*, in an

⁶⁶ *Jewish Post and Opinion*, October 20, 1972.

⁶⁷ *Washington Post*, July 5, 1972.

October 6 story, "U.S.-Soviet Trade and Jewish Issue," described Senate resistance as partly preelection tactics. *Time* was even more critical, asking in an article, "Catering to the Jewish Vote," in the October 26 issue, "at what point the desire to bring justice to persecuted minorities in other lands should override the clear U.S. national interest." On this question, Nixon was politically on his weakest grounds with Jewish organizations. He urged them not to force a harsh confrontation with Russia in view of the administration's policy of quiet diplomacy. Pressures in the United States appeared to have forced some relaxation of the emigration tax, which, however, was reportedly reinstated after the election.

The election bore out earlier predictions of a significant rise in Jewish votes for Nixon. An American Jewish Committee study of neighborhoods on the East and West coasts, and Florida indicated about 35 per cent of Jewish voters who actually voted for a presidential candidate, voted for Nixon. This figure was about 25 per cent of all registered Jewish voters.⁶⁸

VOTING PATTERN

The heaviest volume of Jewish votes for the Nixon-Agnew ticket was in areas of racial tension. In Michigan, with busing for greater desegregation a key issue in Detroit, Flint, and Pontiac, the Jewish vote for Nixon increased markedly. In Brooklyn's heavily Jewish Canarsie district, which also was in the throes of a busing controversy, the President received 54 per cent of the vote, compared to 23 per cent four years earlier. It was estimated that in Ohio McGovern won between 52 and 54 per cent of Jewish voters, down heavily from 81 per cent in 1968 (AJYB, 1969 [Vol. 70], p. 100).

As noted earlier in mayoralty elections in New York, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, there were political divisions among Jewish voters along class lines. Wealthier, upper-class Jews tended to vote for the more liberal candidate regardless of party label, whereas a larger percentage of poorer, less-educated Jews voted for the conservative candidate. While there was a moderate decline in the Democratic vote among the more prosperous Jews between 1968 and 1972, the drop was sharp in the Democratic vote among the less prosperous.⁶⁹

Even so, the election demonstrated how difficult it was for Jews to vote for a conservative political candidate, though many disliked McGovern, in the high rate of their abstention and boycott of the presidential-line on the ballot. In the Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn, a low income area of elderly

⁶⁸ Milton Himmelfarb, "The Jewish Vote (Again)," *Commentary*, June 1973, p. 81.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

people, many of them foreign-born, the physical and presidential abstention rate was 24 per cent, compared to 8 per cent in 1968.⁷⁰ Among Americans generally, according to the *Gallup Opinion Index*,⁷¹ 45.5 per cent did not cast ballots. This represented the lowest voter turnout since 1948. The high percentage of votes McGovern received among Jewish voters cast doubt on the "turn to the right" noted in so many discussions of Jewish voting patterns. Had the rest of the electorate voted as the Jews did, McGovern would have been sent to the White House in a landslide majority larger than Nixon's.

Nevertheless, the decline in Jewish votes for the top of the Democratic ticket was significant. In an important article, "Why Jews Turn Conservative," in the *Wall Street Journal* for September 14, Irving Kristol argued that the Left had moved further left, thereby "disinheriting Jews . . . of their traditional political loyalties. . . . Jews have not become 'reactionary'," he wrote, "as a result of affluence or [Israel's] military victory. But they are certainly reacting against the new politics of the Left." He concluded that Jews, both in the United States and Israel, were moving toward a concern for conserving the kind of liberal society that prevails in both lands.

The election demonstrated that much of the discussion of the "Jewish vote" and Jewish issues had been misleading. Jews voted on the whole range of issues affecting America.

Twelve Jews were elected in November to serve in the 93rd Congress, the same number as in the 92nd Congress, two less than in 1967, and six less than in 1966. "Jews have depleted their potential political strength almost for the next ten years," Representative Benjamin Rosenthal of Queens told an interviewer before the election. "There will not be an increase in major Jewish officeholders during this period of time."

ANTISEMITISM

While antisemitism was not an important factor in the election campaign, it was found to persist in a number of areas. In August the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress filed a formal charge with New York City School Chancellor Harvey B. Scribner, seeking an investigation of the appointment of Luis Fuentes as community superintendent of School District No. 1, Manhattan. They asked for Fuentes's dismissal on the grounds that he allegedly made antisemitic remarks when he was acting principal in the Ocean Hill-Browns-

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 81 note.

⁷¹ "1972 Election Turnout Lowest Since 1948 Presidential Election," December 1972.

ville demonstration school district, and for the removal of the school board for having failed to investigate his conduct.

Late in the year, the Anti-Defamation League released a survey noting "a marked increase during the previous two years in the scope of American anti-Jewish activities, incidents, organizations and publications," accompanied by diminishing public concern. The dimensions of the threat were not negligible, the ADL said, and came from the far Left as well as the right, "from otherwise respectable sources and from extremist segments of other minority groups."⁷²

At the same time, ADL also released the preliminary findings of a study of teenagers in three integrated East Coast public school districts, conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of California, which showed a high incidence of anti-Jewish and anti-black prejudice. Blacks were held to be less antisemitic than whites.

An analysis of teaching material published by 12 denominational and independent Protestant groups, undertaken by Gerald Strober for the American Jewish Committee,⁷³ found that they continued to "perpetuate outdated stereotypes and prejudices [about Jews] in daily life," and thereby to "hamper the growth of mutual respect between Christians and Jews."

THE JEWISH DEFENSE LEAGUE

A very pessimistic view of antisemitism was taken by Rabbi Meir Kahane, international chairman of the Jewish Defense League, who now lives in Israel (p. 505). Declaring that the dangers to American Jews were mounting at an alarming rate, he urged in an article on the Op-Ed page of the *New York Times* of May 26 that the American Jewish communities and organizations convene an emergency conference to develop a campaign for explaining this threat and planning for mass emigration to Israel. The JDL in this country continued to be the subject of public controversy throughout the year largely in connection with its efforts to dramatize the plight of Soviet Jewry. Three members pleaded guilty in a federal court in Brooklyn to charges related to bombing incidents in 1971 at two offices and property of the Soviet Union in New York. Three teenagers identified by police as members of JDL were arrested in connection with the bombing of impresario Sol Hurok's office on January 26, in which a secretary was killed and 13 persons, including Hurok, were injured.

⁷² *New York Times*, November 20, 1972.

⁷³ *Portrait of the Elder Brothers: Jews and Judaism in Protestant Teaching Materials* (New York: American Jewish Committee and National Conference of Christians and Jews, 1972), 56 p.

Christian Evangelism

Jewish anxieties were aroused by intensified nationwide campaigns of Christian evangelism. Plans were developed during the year for Key '73, a year-long effort for the first time involving mainline Protestant denominations, as well as Roman Catholic and Evangelical bodies, "to saturate the entire nation with the claims of Jesus Christ in 1973." Jewish leadership worried about a possible revival of the prepluralistic ideology of a "Christian American" nation. While the campaign, as such, was not directed specifically at Jews and involved no antisemitism, there were during the year stepped-up efforts to proselytize among Jews, spearheaded by old-line evangelical groups like the American Board of Missions to the Jews.

A well-financed media campaign was developed in 1972 utilizing nationwide television programs ("The Passover") and full-page advertisements ("So Many Jews are Wearing 'That Smile' Nowadays") in major daily newspapers around the country.

A special target of some evangelical groups was Jewish youth, whom they tried to reach through the "Campus Crusade for Christ" chapters at colleges and universities and "Youth for Christ" organizations. *Time* magazine, on June 12, quoted Rabbi Samuel Cunin of the Lubavitch House at the University of California, Los Angeles, as saying "young Jews are converting to Christianity at the rate of 6,000 to 7,000 a year." Richard Gelwick, chairman of the department of religion at Stephens College, warned in *Christian Century* of the "threat of anti-Semitism emanating from the 'Jesus revolution' as a result of the dogmatism stemming from biblical literalism."⁷⁴

There was little indication, however, that these efforts were very successful. A B'nai B'rith survey of 80 major colleges found that only a "negligible percentage" of Jews were responding to appeals of the Jesus Freaks, the Campus Crusade for Christ, and other fundamentalist groups. The year, in fact, saw the continued upsurge of Jewish identity following the six-day war. Jewish studies had become a new campus favorite, with more than 300 colleges offering such courses. And Charles Berlin, bibliographer in Judaica of the Harvard College library, estimated that, not counting seminary faculties, there were 250 major academic posts in the field, about twice as many as a decade ago. The writings of Elie Wiesel, Isaac B. Singer, Chaim Potok, as well as other fiction dealing with Orthodox and hasidic life, found a ready market. A group called Jewish Nostalgic Productions even began an

⁷⁴ "The Jesus Revolution: A Memorandum to the Jewish Community," NJCRAC, The Synagogue Council of America, and other organizations, December 13, 1972; Solomon S. Bernards, "The Jesus Movement," *ADL Bulletin*, November, 1972.

effort to revive the Yiddish theater with a new production of "Yoshe Kalb" on Second Avenue in New York. While the depth and significance of the "Jewish revival" was open to question, an increasing sense of identity was clearly developing among Jews.⁷⁵

A special issue emerging for Jews in 1972 was a growing insensitivity on the part of the general community with regard to their feelings and concerns, as for example the invitation by the National Council of Churches in Dallas to black militant Imamu Baraka (LeRoi Jones) to address its members in December, despite his record of antisemitism. The June issue of the Anti-Defamation League publication *Facts* contained an analysis of the increased use of anti-Jewish slurs, stereotypes, and insulting innuendos in various media. The report noted the "callous indifference on the part of public figures and public officials to incidents of raw anti-Semitism."

Of special concern, Robert Alter felt,⁷⁶ was the appearance of birthday cards, allegedly comic posters, and "party books," representing the Jews as "prickly bearded, hideously hook-nosed, money-grubbing, sordidly scheming slobs." Alter was particularly critical of what has emphatically been called "the age-old self-mockery of Jewish humor" which in the case of Roger Lamanski's pamphlet, *It's Fun To Be Jewish*, was nothing so much as the kind of material contained in the classic literature of European antisemitism. (Lamanski: "Q. What's the difference between a German Jew and a Russian Jew? A. Nothing—it depends on what language you want to get gyped in.")

Another favorite of the caricaturist was the Jewish woman who has been receiving clinical analysis for a number of years.⁷⁷ The archetype of the destructive "Jewish Mother," Sophie Portnoy, was a central figure in Philip Roth's novel *Portnoy's Complaint* and of the film released in 1972. Fred Hechinger, reviewing the film in the *New York Times* of July 16, labeled it antisemitic and strongly objectionable: "All that emerges is a vulgar and offensive portrait of an unpleasant cast of Jewish characters." The fact that some of this material was written by Jews made it no less disturbing. ADL, taking a serious view of this cultural phenomenon, said it was "acceptable" because it relied upon "deep and ancient wellsprings of anti-Semitism in the Western and American experience." Alter saw it as an indication that the "tacit moratorium on vocal anti-Semitism after the Holocaust is now definitely over." Another interpretation might be that "jokebook" Judaism

⁷⁵ See Bill Miller and Martin Salowitz, "The New Jews: A Reality," *Congress Bi-Weekly*, September 8, 1972; for a negative assessment, see M.J. Rosenberg, *ibid.*, May 19, 1972.

⁷⁶ "Defaming the Jews," *Commentary*, January 1973.

⁷⁷ See, for example, "The Persistence of the Jewish American Princess," *New York*, March 22, 1971.

was an indication that Jews have lost their minority and victim status and no longer required sensitive treatment.

Black America

THE ELECTION

A growing sense of black group identity continued as a powerful force, often turning into a quest for separatism. Black fraternities made significant gains at a time when white fraternities were slipping. Increasingly, black economists, journalists, ministers, teachers, accountants, lawyers, psychiatrists, and even nuns were leaving integrated professional organizations to form their own groups. Professor Charles L. Sanders of Atlanta University and Hunter College reported to the National Association of Black Social Workers the formation of at least 22 all-black national professional organization.⁷⁸

Nationalist and integrationist factions and viewpoints sharply divided the black community. This split, together with a growing white backlash on issues of concern to blacks, kept the latter from playing a major role in the election outcome. By and large, voters were not responding sympathetically to either faction, so that there was no meaningful discussion of, or action on, issues of vital concern to this normally important segment of the electorate by either presidential candidate.⁷⁹

The landslide reelection of Nixon was keenly disappointing to most blacks. Roy Wilkins, head of NAACP, wrote in his syndicated column that the "secret issue" in the campaign was race. Mayor Richard G. Hatcher of Gary, Ind., also felt that the election was a victory for racism: the big losers were blacks and other minorities. To many, therefore, the election was still another manifestation of racial retrogression in line with the pullback on commitments to open housing, appeals against "forced integration" and "forced busing," and the "no quotas" directive of the President. The fear persisted, as a study of 1,890 blacks living in Philadelphia and Charlotte, N.C. by Dr. Castellano Turner, a black psychologist at the University of Massachusetts, reaffirmed, that whites would try to decimate future generations of blacks through birth control, sterilization, and other planned programs of genocide.

However, a closer look at the situation suggested a more complex picture. A 1972 Harris poll reported that whites were more acutely aware of discrimination against blacks than in 1969; and blacks, themselves, felt that there had been substantial gains in reducing discrimination. The poll also

⁷⁸ New York Times, April 16, 1972.

⁷⁹ Charles Hamilton, "The Nationalist vs. The Integrationist," *New York Times Magazine*, October 1, 1972.

reported that the percentage of whites who thought blacks were "moving too fast" had declined from 70 in 1966 to 52. Three new black congressmen and congresswomen were elected—Andrew Young in Atlanta, Mrs. Barbara Jordan in Houston, and Mrs. Yvonne Brathwaite Burke in Los Angeles—and all 13 black congressmen were reelected, including Washington, D.C.'s nonvoting delegate, Walter Fauntroy. Young and a number of others had significant white support. Republican Senator Edward W. Brooke won reelection in Massachusetts, which had only a small black population.

While the November election indicated a weakening of political strength by blacks on the national level, their gains were striking at state and local levels. The Joint Center for Political Studies reported in March that there were 2,264 black elected officials in the country, an increase of 21.7 per cent over 1971. After the 1972 election, the Center reported there now were 222 black state legislators, a gain of 22. For the first time, blacks were elected in Arkansas, Minnesota and Oregon legislatures. Black lawmakers in California and Michigan were described by a *New York Times* survey conducted earlier in March, as wielding considerable influence, both individually and as a group. And in 22 other states, where there was only a single black, their presence affected the way legislative business was done.

Blacks made significant showings in elections in the South, according to the Voter Education Project, with some 598 blacks voted into office, to make a record high total of 1,144.⁸⁰ (Arkansas had been the last Southern state without black representation.) The greatest advances were made in Alabama. In Selma, where black demonstrators in 1965 were assaulted by state police as they sought to march to Montgomery to petition for the right to vote, black registration had risen from 2.3 per cent in that year to 67 per cent in 1972, and half of the 10 city council seats were won by blacks. Blacks were elected, for the first time, to the city councils of Brunswick, Ga., Natchez, Miss., and Seguin, Tex. and to the Orange County, N.C., board of supervisors. More significantly, in recent years the growth of Negro suffrage and the success of Republican candidates in replacing Democratic incumbents in the South made for a major decline in the power of Dixiecrat congressmen.

There also had been an increase in black influence in the Democratic party, which was crucial in keeping a number of cities Democratic, among them New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. After the election, blacks received more representation on the Democratic National Committee, and Basil Patterson of New York was reelected as vice-chairman.

At the same time, blacks were becoming politically more sophisticated. Although Illinois went to Nixon, Democratic candidate for state's attorney Edward V. Hanrahan, campaigning with the support of the Mayor Richard J. Daley machine, was defeated. His defeat was in part the result of a carefully

⁸⁰ *New York Times*, February 13, 1973.

targeted campaign of blacks to topple him because he had been charged with, though later acquitted of, obstructing justice in connection with a police raid in 1969, which took the lives of two Black Panther members. Hanrahan, the incumbent, also tried to capitalize on the crime issue by announcing the capture of alleged members of a black terrorist band called "De Mau Mau," charged with nine random murders of whites. For days newspapers printed articles about a "3,000-strong" murder band, which several days later retracted in apologetic editorials.

In Mississippi many blacks split their vote to support McGovern and the Republican foe of segregationist Senator James Eastland, though without success. Two months earlier, blacks provided nearly half the votes for the man who unseated Representative John McMillan (D., S.C.), chairman of the House District Committee and longtime foe of home rule for the heavily black District of Columbia. They also helped defeat conservative Congresswoman Louise Day Hicks in Boston and Congressman Earle Cabell in Texas.

Citing black political gains in recent years, some with the aid of whites, Bayard Rustin denied in his column, which appeared in a number of black newspapers, that race was the predominant issue in the election. Those asserting the contrary were writing off the possibility of "a vibrant interracial political party," and this was both dangerous and defeatist.⁸¹ A study prepared by the National Urban League's Research Department, however, found claims of growth of black political power to be exaggerated. Black elected officials represented only 0.4 per cent of the total, and black congressmen, 3 per cent. There was only one black senator and no black governor. Only 1.6 per cent of all elected state officials, 0.7 per cent of all elected municipal officials, and 0.2 per cent of all elected county officials in the nation were black.

The study also found continued barriers to voting or representation by blacks, including inaccurate census data, one-year residency requirements in more than 30 states, and disqualification of convicted felons and ex-convicts in most states.⁸² The fact remained that only 41 per cent of the black voting-age population went to the polls, 14 below the national percentage.⁸³

MIDDLE CLASS

A significant aspect of the 1972 election was the continued evidence it provided of the emergence of a black professional and suburban middle class

⁸¹ *Philadelphia Tribune*, January 2, 1973.

⁸² Vernon E. Jordon, Jr., "Barriers to Black Political Participation," *Civil Rights Digest*, October 1972.

⁸³ *Focus*, December 1972.

which tended to vote more conservatively. On the basis of returns from black wards in 22 cities, the Joint Center for Political Studies estimated that the black vote for Nixon had increased from 10 per cent in 1968 to 13 per cent. The Nixon vote was probably understated since information was not yet available from suburban areas, at the time of the center's release on November 10. Black columnist Lu Palmer reported an increase from about 5 or 6 per cent in 1968 to 15, while columnist Marianne Means said the President received 21 per cent of the black vote.⁸⁴ According to Lipset and Raab, over 90 per cent of the black vote in slum areas was for McGovern; but it was 80 per cent in other city areas and only 67 per cent in suburbia.⁸⁵

When Nixon began on his first term of office, Daniel P. Moynihan advised him of the existence of a black middle class and urged that their values and needs be considered. The Nixon administration responded with contracts and grants to encourage black enterprise and increased the number of blacks employed in the federal government and federally funded programs. U.S. Commissioner of Education Sidney P. Marland, Jr., reported in the summer of 1972 that federal assistance to predominantly black colleges and universities had increased by 58 per cent, from \$108 to \$171 million in the previous three years and the preliminary estimate for the 1972 fiscal year was \$200 million. Also, the number of black families with annual incomes of \$10,000 or more, particularly from 1965 to 1970, increased sharply, although their number was proportionately lower than whites.

Much of the President's new black support came from holders of federal contracts and grants, federal employees, or persons working in federally funded programs and projects. Among them were some former civil-rights activists, such as Floyd McKissick, former director of CORE and founder of Soul City, N.C., and Albert Sampson, former aide to Ralph Abernathy, president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Among Nixon supporters were also several black entertainers, including former football-star-turned-actor Jim Brown, soul singer James Brown, and actor-singer Sammy Davis, Jr. Their endorsement of Nixon stirred deep resentment among many black leaders. "The President has bought them, and they have sold out," Congressman Louis Stokes (D., Ohio) declared. Davis, of whom a picture embracing Nixon at the Republican National Convention in August was carried in newspaper and other publications across the country, was booed at the annual Black Expo in Chicago early in October.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Philadelphia *Inquirer*, November 14, 1972; February 13, 1973.

⁸⁵ Lipset and Raab, *op. cit.*

⁸⁶ New York *Times*, October 17, 1972; "Blacks for Nixon," *New Republic*, October 7, 1972.

NATIONAL BLACK POLITICAL CONVENTION

Blacks strived for unity during the year, but the effort only underlined existing sharp divisions. This was dramatically demonstrated at the National Black Political convention, held in Gary, Ind., on March 10-12, and attended by over 4,000 delegates from across the country. The meeting was convened on the premise that blacks were beginning to hold the balance of power in a number of states; that it therefore was possible for them to form a political entity through which black political and economic demands could be realized or maximized. A key issue was whether blacks should continue working on their agenda within the two major political parties, or develop an independent black politics. Militants like Imamu Baraka, one of the three convention co-chairmen, wanted to set up a Black Political party, but initially agreed not to press the issue since this would polarize the convention.⁸⁷ Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm (D., N.Y.) indicated she was available as a candidate around whom blacks and others might rally.⁸⁸

NAACP entered the convention with a public attack on the proposed preamble to the National Black Political Agenda which preached racial superiority.⁸⁹ The platform finally adopted called for "a permanent political movement, the reshaping of American institutions, proportional representation in political office, full employment, local control over police, reparations, and a guaranteed annual income." In a separate section passed in the closing hours when many delegates had already left, the convention adopted two resolutions that created widespread disagreement within the black community: one condemned the forced busing of school children in the name of integration and called for "supreme quality education for all our youngsters"; the other called for the cessation of all American economic aid in "supporting the fascist government of Israel"; advocated Israel's "dismemberment" and "self-determination for Palestinians."

In releasing the agenda to the press, the convention's two other co-chairmen, Gary's Mayor Hatcher and Representative Charles Diggs (D., Mich.), publicly dissented from the two controversial resolutions, as did Walter Fauntroy, the District of Columbia delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives. After the convention, NAACP announced its total withdrawal from, and disassociation with, the convention. It attacked the two

⁸⁷ Imamu Baraka, "Black Nationalism: 1972," *Black Scholar*, September 1972.

⁸⁸ "A look behind and beyond the Gary convention in an interview with Mayor Richard Hatcher," *City*, March-April, 1972.

⁸⁹ *New York Times*, March 12, 1972.

resolutions as "not only repugnant to our basic principles, but which we must vigorously and unqualifiedly oppose." The 13 black members of the U.S. House of Representatives, too, condemned the resolutions and released their own set of demands in a "Black Bill of Rights."

A steering committee charged with shaping all resolutions into final form released on May 19 a Black Political Agenda which somewhat softened the two controversial resolutions. The one on busing rejected as false the notion that black children were unable to learn unless they attended school with whites, and set as its goal "supreme quality education for all our children." The other resolution, essentially unchanged, condemned Israel's "expansionist policy" despite sharp criticism from Jewish leadership.⁹⁰

The black unity sought at the convention therefore proved paper thin. In its aftermath, most nationally prominent blacks declined to support the candidacy of Mrs. Chisholm; blacks opposed other blacks in local contests, and there was little willingness to submerge differences for maximum black political effectiveness. However, the effort to keep alive the convention's political aims and its theme, "Unity Without Uniformity," continued at the first meeting of the National Black Assembly in Chicago, October 21-22. It was intended as a permanent body consisting of 427 members, who were chosen every two years. Less than half that number, among them only one black congressman, attended. NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference stayed away. Imamu Baraka emerged as the key figure and was later named the Assembly's secretary general, with responsibility for day-to-day detail. He had written an article that appeared in the October issue of *Black World*, denouncing most members of the Congressional Black Caucus and other black leaders. The Assembly did not endorse any political candidate, and it was unclear whether any resolutions were passed. By this time, too, the earlier enthusiasm of the black press for the Gary convention had evaporated. The Assembly came under criticism by the *Chicago Defender* and *Jet* magazine for failure to bring blacks together.⁹¹

The use or misuse of black power was sharply condemned during the year by a number of black leaders. Bayard Rustin continued to criticize "the growing tendency to apply 'black solutions' to social problems that cut across racial lines" and the "'infection' by black power of the rest of society with a 'new tribalism' that prevents development of a progressive movement."⁹² The most significant comment, however, came before the election from

⁹⁰ Milton Ellerin, *The Gary, Indiana, Black Political Convention and the National Black Political Agenda* (New York: American Jewish Committee, June 1972) (mimeo).

⁹¹ New York *Times*, October 23, 1972; Milton Ellerin, *National Black Assembly, October 21-22, 1972* (American Jewish Committee, December 4, 1972) (mimeo).

⁹² "Black Power's Legacy," *Newsweek*, November 13, 1972.

Arthur A. Fletcher, former assistant secretary of labor in the Nixon administration and now executive director of the United Negro College Fund. Commenting on the clearly impending Nixon landslide and the sense of failure it engendered among black leaders, he criticized these leaders for playing "very poor politics" at a time "when sophisticated pragmatic politics should have been the order of the day." He contrasted the black role during the previous four years with that of organized labor and the Jewish community, two groups, he wrote, which disagreed on a number of administration policies, but which acted as groups in backing the President on issues they could support. Many blacks, Fletcher said, refused to take jobs in the administration. And those who did not isolate themselves politically were rendered powerless by criticism.⁹³

Perhaps symbolically, former President Lyndon Johnson, at a symposium on civil rights at the University of Texas, in what was his last public appearance, interposed in a dispute between rival black ideological factions. Johnson, who had won his early political reputation as a congressional mediator, urged the participants to unite behind a "program of objectives" and take them to the President.⁹⁴

BLACK EXTREMISM

In recent years a number of black groups and individuals dedicated to separatism or revolutionary violence, or both, gained national attention; but by 1972 virtually all were in sharp decline. Stokely Carmichael returned to the United States during the year after four years of self-imposed exile. He called for an All African Peoples Revolutionary party, but found no support in the black community. Angela Davis, who was tried for murder, kidnapping, and criminal conspiracy, was found innocent. After her release from prison, she made personal appearances around the country, but, though a striking figure, her popularity was not translatable into political strength.⁹⁵

The Black Panthers continued in decline and to the degree they were active, it was in electoral politics rather than revolutionary violence. During the summer Erika Huggins and Bobby Seale, Panther leaders who had been on trial for murder 16 months earlier in Connecticut, sought public office. Huggins was elected a member of the Berkeley (Calif.) Community Development Council, the city's anti-poverty agency, and Seale became a candidate for mayor of Oakland.

⁹³ Arthur A. Fletcher, "The Black Dilemma if Nixon Wins," *Wall Street Journal*, September 25, 1972.

⁹⁴ *New York Times*, December 13, 1972.

⁹⁵ Claude Lewis, "Angela's Politics Seem Irrelevant," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, November 5, 1972.

Only the Black Muslims, viewed with disfavor by the major black civil-rights groups, continued to remain influential with segments of the black community. Early in the year, a violent internal struggle appeared to be underway after a shoot-out in Baton Rouge, La., in which two policemen and two young Muslims died. The conflict revolved around the reaction of the growing Muslim youth movement to the distribution of wealth within the organization. The American Jewish Committee charged that the Muslims encompassed "a significant strain of anti-Semitism." Its official publication, *Muhammad Speaks*, on July 7 headlined a story on the political campaign, "Zionist Ring in Politicians' Nose." Because of its influence in the slums, AJC felt, it posed a greater problem for Jews than when it first came into prominence a decade earlier.⁹⁶

DEFEAT OF WELFARE REFORM

The defeat of the Family Assistance Plan (FAP) as a welfare reform measure and the growing movement to cut back on welfare in the states were further evidence of conservative trends working against the relief of the plight of the minority group population. A new version of FAP, originally proposed by President Nixon in 1969, had passed the House in 1971. As it came before the Senate in an election year, the bill set \$2,400 as the minimum income for a family of four, but did not require states to maintain food subsidies for the poor. Also, to keep down government costs it raised to 67 per cent the tax of 50 per cent on earned income above \$720. This meant that a person on federal relief would take home only 33 cents of every dollar earned above \$720, and this would reduce the incentive to work. Besides, the new plan required all welfare mothers with children over the age of three to register for work, but did not guarantee a job or provide funds for day care.

The measure became caught in a squeeze between liberals, who wanted to make the plan more generous to the poor, and conservatives, who resented the increased cost of doing so and were worried about dangers of a guaranteed income to the traditional "work ethic." The President, himself, reinforced the latter view in his Labor Day speech. "We are faced this year," he said, "with the choice between the 'work ethic' that built this nation's character—and the new 'welfare ethic' that could cause that American character to weaken." The one, he argued, represented the traditional American ethic of striving and sacrifice and the other, a new and alien ethic of indulgence and passivity.

During spring 1972 Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.) and HEW Secretary Richardson had hammered out a compromise for a \$2,600

⁹⁶ Milton Ellerin, *Currents*, No. 2, February 1972 (American Jewish Committee).

minimum income, annual cost of living increases, and a 60 per cent tax on earnings. But the President, who was about to depart for Moscow, put the matter off until June 16, and by this time McGovern had put forward his own costly welfare-reform proposal. On his return the President chose to go with his less costly \$2,400 "middle ground" plan, thereby creating an election issue. This angered liberal FAP supporters who, together with conservatives, voted to kill the measure in the Senate on October 4.⁹⁷ In addition, on July 1, a "workfare" law (Talmadge Amendment) forcing welfare recipients to take jobs or face loss of benefits went into effect. Many welfare and employment officials believed that the current lack of jobs and the failure of training programs hampered the success of workfare.

BLACK CULTURE

If blacks met setbacks at the polls on a national level and from an economy-minded Congress, they were increasingly penetrating the culture as dancers, painters, poets, playwrights, and film producers. This came into focus at a four-day Black Exposition in San Francisco, which featured black poets who read their work; a drama festival that reflected the black experience of the 1960s, and a film festival offering nearly 60 presentations featuring the widely known work of Melvin Van Peebles and Gordon Parks, as well as younger film makers not yet seen on the commercial screen.

In a sense, 1972 saw an explosion of black films, many of them among the industry's top money-makers, such as Parks' *Shaft* and Van Peeble's *Sweet Sweetback's Badass Song*. There were black Westerns (*Buck and the Preacher*), black horror films (*Blacula*), black documentaries (*Malcolm X*), black social films (*Sounder*), black biographical films (*Lady Sings the Blues*), and numerous black exploitation films (*Slaughter, Hammer, Trouble Man*). Criticism of many of these productions by black organizations mounted during the year. It was charged that the "shuffling" menial black stereotype had been replaced by another demeaning stereotype, the "Supernigger," who possessed great physical strength but little brain power. Parks and others responded that the films were a success among blacks because they were portrayed, for the first time, as "winners."

There was worry, too, that many of these films presented pimps, pushers, and prostitutes as role models. *Super Fly*, one of the few technically superior films, featured a narcotics dealer as the hero. There was also danger that films designed to show the triumph of black good over white evil, often in a volley of bullets, would exacerbate racial tensions. "Only in wartime," Pauline

⁹⁷ New York Times, October 5, 1972; James Welsh, "Welfare Reform: Born, Aug. 8, 1969; Died, Oct. 4, 1972," New York Times Magazine, January 7, 1973; Abe Ribicoff, "He Left at Half Time," New Republic, February 17, 1973 (review of Daniel P. Moynihan's *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income*).

Kael of the *New Yorker* observed, "have Hollywood movies used this primitive power to encourage hatred of race." In a number of theaters around the country these potential dangers moved managers to hire armed guards; but no outbreaks of violence were reported. Some black leaders asked that black review boards censor all black-theme films before production and preedit them before release. Roy Innis, national director of CORE, demanded that producers turn over part of their profits to the black community for scholarships and film education. During the winter Harlem leaders halted filming of *Come Back, Charleston Blue* until money was donated to black improvement funds.

Quotas and Preferential Treatment

The debate over the adoption of quotas to increase the number of women, blacks, and other minorities in jobs and other areas of American life to make our political processes more representative, which began in 1971 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 137), became, in *Newsweek's* phrase, "the sleeper issue" of the election.⁹⁸ The Democratic party entered the year with a new set of presidential convention rules, narrowly approved in 1969, calling on every state party to take "affirmative steps" to encourage participation by members of minority groups, persons between the ages of 18 and 30, and women "in reasonable relation to their presence in the state."⁹⁹

As a result of these reforms of the Democratic party's Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, chaired by Senator McGovern, control of the Democratic convention and its outcome were taken out of the hands of traditional party forces and turned over to elements more representative of "new politics" liberalism. The Miami convention included far higher proportions of women, blacks, and youth. The political strength and influence of the lower-middle and working classes depending for representation on regular party leadership and labor officials were weakened.

The anti-Mayor Daley delegation from the ethnic stronghold of Chicago, which was approved by the convention as representative, included only three Poles and one Italian; New York's delegation had only three representatives of organized labor, but had nine persons publicly identified with the Gay Liberation movement.

"New Politics" elements were frequently drawn from more affluent, leisured, and suburban elements, especially housewives and students. A *Washington Post* survey found that 39 per cent of the delegates had taken some postgraduate work, as compared to 4 per cent of the general population.

⁹⁸ "Quotas: The Sleeper Issue of '72," September 18, 1972.

⁹⁹ Walter Goodman, "The Return of the Quota System," *New York Times Magazine*, September 10, 1972.

The annual incomes of 31 per cent of the delegates exceeded \$25,000 while those of another 31 per cent fell between \$15,000 and \$25,000. In place of blacks from NAACP chapters or Democratic party organizations, there was a heavy infusion of militant leaders like Jesse Jackson.¹⁰⁰

Concurrent with these developments in the party, the year saw continued frustration with the results of a decade's effort to broaden the involvement of minorities and the victims of discrimination in American life. That women were disadvantaged was quite obvious. For example, the annual salary of 62.7 per cent of women on college faculties was less than \$10,000, compared to 28 per cent of men.¹⁰¹ However, there were indications throughout 1972 that efforts were being made to rectify the situation. Many colleges and universities were broadening minority representation and hiring more women, frequently by the use of quasi-quota systems under HEW guidelines threat of withdrawal of federal funds. In September Columbia University received HEW approval of a 326-page affirmative-action plan indicating it would make "every effort" to add about 900 women and members of minority groups to its academic and nonacademic staffs by 1977. This followed HEW's freezing of \$138 million in federal research contracts because of the university's failure to come up with an acceptable plan. In June City University of New York was threatened with loss of \$13 million because it refused to make data on salary, sex, race, and "source of referral" of employees by name available to HEW's Office of Civil Rights.¹⁰²

Aside from pressures of this kind, the message from the federal government early in the year seemed to be to hire and promote more minorities and women, even if this meant some relaxation of standards. The State University at Stony Brook, N.Y., announced plans to fill 100 faculty vacancies in the next three years with blacks, of whom half would be women. The University of California, Berkeley, law school agreed to reserve 30 per cent of its fall admissions for minority group members. There were indications that HEW was hesitating to denounce universities for reverse discrimination because of the possible reaction by women and minority groups.

Standards and testing for hiring and promotion also sparked controversy. Minorities charged that civil-service tests were inherently discriminatory because they were culture-bound, not job-related, and therefore favored middle-class applicants. The courts seemed to be moving toward the interpretation that, once a statistical case of low employment of minorities was made, the test-giver must demonstrate that the test used was reasonably

¹⁰⁰ Penn Kemble and Josh Muravchik, "The New Politics & the Democrats," *Commentary*, December 1972.

¹⁰¹ *New York Times*, October 8, 1972.

¹⁰² Goodman, *op. cit.*

job-related. Civil service examinations came under attack in San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Atlanta. In a case involving the Minneapolis fire department, whose hiring practices had effectively kept out blacks, the Court of Appeals, while not setting a definite quota, suggested that a lower court might properly order the department to fill 20 of its next 60 vacancies with black firemen.

In the spring the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld a lower court which had ruled in favor of an NAACP contention that the New York City Board of Examiners be deprived of its authority to pass on school principals on the basis of written and oral tests. It found insufficient proof that the examinations were related to performance on the job. The lower court had found, also, that "white candidates passed at one and one-half times the rate of black and Puerto Rican candidates." The ruling froze appointments from existing "eligibility" lists and barred further tests for supervisors. "Acting" appointments were made by the Board of Education and community school boards.

The intergroup problems and conflicts in the New York situation were evident from the following: of 937 fully licensed principals, only 11 were blacks and one was Puerto Rican (another 40 were without license, tenure, or full principal's salary). While student enrollment in the city was 55 per cent black and Puerto Rican, only 4.2 per cent of the principals and 9 per cent of the teachers belonged to these groups. At stake were—in addition to principalships—money, 1,851 assistant principalships, 943 department chairmanships and, possibly, 62,000 teaching posts. At one point in the controversy, 80 black and Puerto Rican Fordham University trainees for principalships asked the Board of Education to give them a special examination so that they might step right into these posts. The Board refused.

Underlying this situation was black-Jewish conflict. The New York school system was 60 per cent Jewish, with a high proportion of Jewish educators in higher-level positions. Regardless of the outcome of court tests, it was clear that in big-city school systems throughout the country the opportunities were expanding for minorities and contracting for whites in the historic pattern of ethnic succession in American life.¹⁰³

To many Americans, particularly to blue- and white-collar workers, however, a quota system was anathema. Beyond the immediate question of who got what jobs and promotions, some worried that the principle of quotas might become a permanent part of American life; that this would mean positions and promotions would be allotted on the basis of proportional representation of groups in the population, rather than in some reasonable relationship to qualifications or merit. Social critic Norman Podhoretz had

¹⁰³ Bernard Bard, "The Battle for School Jobs," *National Jewish Monthly*, October 1972.

been warning of the danger of quotas to the viability of American society in a series of articles in *Commentary* in 1971 and 1972.

Quotas and the Jewish Community

The issue aroused deep anxieties among Jews in particular. Quotas had been used as a form of discrimination against them, a means of placing a ceiling on their opportunities and aspirations. Two specific developments moved the organized Jewish community to assume leadership during the year in an attack on the quota movement. For months HEW had been debating revision of its guidelines on the hiring practices of colleges and universities who received federal grants or contracts. These guidelines, according to numerous complaints addressed to Jewish agencies, encouraged or permitted the development of rigid quota systems for hiring minority or female employees.

In May six Jewish agencies met with HEW Secretary Richardson and Stanley Pottinger, director of the department's Office of Civil Rights, to discuss the issue. There was agreement, in principle, that affirmative-action programs, which the groups supported, were not intended to establish quotas prohibited by civil rights laws, and that the guidelines should be revised to make this clear. The agencies were invited to submit case material illustrative of what they believed to be dangerous trends resulting from misinterpretations of HEW contract compliance and affirmative-action programs by college, university, and some government officials.¹⁰⁴

The second development occurred at the Democratic National Convention in July. At a meeting of Jewish delegates and alternates concern was voiced about a story in the *New York Times*, quoting Walter Fauntroy as having said that Senator McGovern had pledged 10 per cent of federal patronage jobs to blacks, if he was elected. McGovern sent to the group a message repudiating the story—as did Fauntroy—but this never received news coverage. McGovern aides expressed concern that the public would believe the senator favored a quota system.

Early in August Philip E. Hoffman, president of the American Jewish Committee, wrote letters to both presidential candidates, urging them to “reject categorically the use of quotas” in “implementing vitally essential affirmative action programs.” President Nixon responded that quotas were not an “appropriate means of achieving equal employment opportunity” and that “numerical goals, although an important and useful tool to measure progress which remedies the effects of past discrimination, must not be allowed to be

¹⁰⁴ *Washington Letter* (American Jewish Committee), October 20, 1972; Naomi Levine, “Quotas and Affirmative Action: Where We Stand.” *Congress Bi-Weekly*, November 10, 1972.

applied in such a fashion as to, in fact, result in imposition of quotas, nor should they be predicated upon or directed towards a concept of proportional representation." Nixon indicated he had asked all departments for a review of programs "to insure conformance with these views." McGovern replied: "I share the concerns you have expressed and reject the quota system as detrimental to American society."¹⁰⁵

The exchange of letters between the American Jewish Committee and the two candidates produced an intense public debate, especially when the Civil Service Commission, on August 18, sent to every federal agency a memorandum in which the key sections of the President's response to Hoffman were included as a statement of governmental policy. A number of black leaders feared that the presidential ban on quotas would slow down affirmative action and the hiring of blacks and other minorities, at a time when the government seemed to be pulling back on other civil rights fronts.

The American Jewish Committee came under sharp attack from Congressman Stokes, chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. He called the letters "high handed at best and racist at worst," and voiced deep concern because the American Jewish Committee believes that "by crossing our fingers, closing our eyes and hoping for the best, minority poor and disadvantaged Americans will receive a fair share of opportunity." In an effort to insure that there would be no slowdown on legitimate affirmative-action programs, the American Jewish Committee Washington office sought, and received, assurance in a letter from Robert Hampton, chairman of the Civil Service Commission, that "there will be no letup in efforts to eliminate discrimination and assure equal opportunity for all persons under the Federal merit system."

In the course of the continuing public discussion the claim was made in September that the Philadelphia Plan and similar programs designed to place minority-group members in jobs in the construction industry were about to be scrapped. This was flatly denied by the administration. However, officials of civil-rights and women's organizations released a memorandum issued by Secretary of Labor James D. Hodgson on September 15, clarifying President Nixon's policy on goals or quotas in hiring minorities and women and reminding department heads that the administration's policies "do not provide for quotas or proportional representation." It was possible, the memo said, that in some cases policy directives may have been misinterpreted and misapplied. Goals based on a percentage of an area's population, it added, were not to be used in determining the hiring of minorities and women.¹⁰⁶

Despite denials, it was clear that the administration was pulling back from earlier plans based on proportional representation. There were indications,

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *New York Times*, September 26, 1972.

too, that this decision had been taken before the American Jewish Committee letter was written.¹⁰⁷ A *New York Times* story, on December 19, on Office of Federal Contract Compliance officials, whose job it was to insure fair hiring practices by companies receiving federal funds, indicated the agency was receiving virtually no support or direction from the administration.

The administration's position during the year on quotas and preferential treatment was equivocal at best. Leonard Garment, special consultant to the President, argued that there was a practical difference between affirmative-action programs, which included numerical goals and timetables as to what was "realistically and reasonably attainable," and quotas, which required fixed results.¹⁰⁸ "This ignores the fact," *Newsweek* wrote on September 18, "that such targets effectively put ceilings on the hiring of other workers not defined as minority-group members—as a quota would do."

As the 1972 election neared, the administration began to retreat somewhat on this front. The phrase "affirmative action" was dropped from the party platform because it would be widely interpreted as another way of saying quotas. In a Labor Day radio address, the President said: "In employment and in politics, we are confronted with the rise of the fixed quota system—as artificial and unfair a yardstick as has ever been used to deny opportunity to anyone." However, Nixon was not alone in political jockeying on the quota issue. In an interview with the *National Journal*, Senator McGovern was quoted as boasting about the changes in the Democratic party convention rules: "The way we got the quota thing through was by not using the word 'quotas.'"¹⁰⁹

President Nixon's tough new line on quotas and growing criticisms of their use brought new HEW guidelines on university hiring on October 4. They stressed the need to avoid discrimination, placed greater emphasis on merit, stressed good-faith effort rather than rigid, numerical goals, and related affirmative-action results to availability of labor pools rather than to gross percentages of various groups in the population. A month later Pottinger announced that his office was investigating 15 allegations of discrimination against white male faculty members. He felt that action taken in a few cases of such "reverse discrimination" might quiet fears among white male teachers that their careers were jeopardized by the federal guidelines. At the same time he warned the federal program to enforce equal hiring and promotion opportunities was "losing ground" to a growing rhetorical backlash from male faculty members and administrators, and called for greater support of the program from the academic community.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ *Washington Letter*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁸ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 6, 1972.

¹⁰⁹ Kemble and Muravchik, *op. cit.*

¹¹⁰ *New York Times*, November 30, 1972; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 22, 1972.

Equal Educational Opportunity

SCHOOL BUSING FOR DESEGREGATION

The election of 1972 may have been the first presidential race in the nation's history where education was a central issue. Much of the debate was on school desegregation and busing to achieve racial balance in the schools, despite the fact that most Americans, including a majority of blacks, were opposed to busing. Polls of white Nixon and McGovern supporters indicated opposition to "busing children to achieve race balance." Governor Wallace's landslide victory in the Michigan primary earlier was achieved largely because of his strong stand against busing.

In a check in 1972 of a number of communities, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found "widespread acceptance of desegregation" by students and teachers.¹¹¹ More students were to be bused in only four sizeable cities—Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Jacksonville, and Augusta—as a result of desegregation plans. According to Secretary Richardson, only about 3 per cent of the nearly 20 million American public-school children were bused in 1971 because of desegregation plans, and the figure was about the same for 1972. New busing was ordered under the Swann decision in 1971 as a means to "dismantle the dual system in the South" (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], p. 129). Civil rights proponents were encouraged that Supreme Court Justices Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist had denied requests for delays of busing in Augusta and Oklahoma City, respectively. Twelve of the 20 largest urban centers, with a total population of over 31 million, however, faced desegregation including the possibility of busing.¹¹²

On June 14, a month after Governor Wallace's victory in the Michigan Democratic primary, Federal District Judge Stephen J. Roth ordered the busing of 310,000 Detroit children for desegregation in the fall, with blacks from the city going into the suburbs and whites from the suburbs moving to city schools. The order was stayed pending appeal to the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, thereby preventing implementation of the plan in the midst of the election campaign. The Roth decision broke the coalition between black Detroiters and white suburban automobile workers that had been the basis of liberal Democratic victories in the state for years. Senator Robert P. Griffin, a Republican who emerged during the year as a leading opponent of busing in the U.S. Senate, was reelected, in part on this issue. The year before, he had opposed Nixon's choice of Clement Haynesworth, considered a segregationist by civil rights leaders, for the Supreme Court.

¹¹¹ *Five Communities: Their Search for Equal Education* (Clearinghouse Publication 37, December 1972).

¹¹² *New York Times*, May 28, 1972.

On June 6 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth District stayed the January action of a federal district court ordering the predominantly black Richmond, Va., school district merged with two largely white suburban districts. It held the district judge had overstepped his authority in giving the suburban counties a share of responsibility for inner-city segregation. At year's end, the Detroit and Richmond cases, together with suits in Indianapolis and Denver, were moving toward the Supreme Court. The Denver case, argued on October 12, was the first to come before the High Court appealing a busing order in a northern school system. The issue here was whether a city must desegregate all of the schools when discriminatory actions by school officials caused segregation only in certain schools (*de jure*) and others were racially segregated due to neighborhood residential patterns (*de facto*). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had affirmed a district court ruling only as to *de jure* segregated schools, reversing as to the *de facto* segregated ones. The case was seen as having broad implications for determining how much desegregation was required in communities that had never had dual systems.

The approach by the presidential candidates and their parties to busing was a matter of concern to many voters, although about the same percentage of white Nixon and McGovern supporters said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who would improve opportunities for blacks.¹¹³ The Democratic party platform said busing "must continue to be available according to Supreme Court decisions to eliminate legally imposed segregation." Psychologically more attuned to the public mood, the GOP platform flatly declared that the Republican party was "irrevocably opposed to busing for racial balance." Refusing to join the anti-busers, McGovern worked hard to neutralize the issue, but did not succeed. In a speech before union shop stewards, in Detroit on September 22, he argued that the matter should be resolved by the courts. Emphasizing the need for "quality education for all children," he stressed throughout the campaign that busing was one of the legitimate tools to achieve desegregation.

President Nixon sought to minimize the federal government's role in desegregation, which had reached a peak during his first four years in office, and to shift responsibility to the courts and voluntary compliance. HEW, which in 1970 stopped enforcing the federal cut-off provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, was ordered by a U.S. District Court shortly after the 1972 election to resume enforcement of the law.

In a message to Congress on March 17, the President proposed legislation calling for a moratorium on all court and government orders requiring additional busing until July 1, 1973, or until Congress set up permanent desegregation standards. He suggested, instead, additional funds for upgrading minority schools, indicating a continuation of the shift away from

¹¹³ Lipset and Raab, *op. cit.*

government supported desegregation to compensatory education programs. The evidence cited by the President in support of such programs was quickly disputed by a number of education experts in and outside of government.

Lawyers for the Nixon administration argued during the year for a reversal of the lower court ruling in the Richmond case. However, they were denied permission to enter the Detroit case on the side of the defendants. Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold filed a "friend of the court" brief in the Denver case opposing the transfer of students as overturning "long standing neighborhood school" policy. The brief argued that achieving equal educational opportunity required elimination of disparities in the schools rather than the dispersal of students. To some, however, the cure he advocated brought back memories of the "separate but equal" concept which the Supreme Court had struck down in 1954.

In his stand-in role for the President during the campaign, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew made a number of references to busing in his speeches. He told a Nashville audience that the administration wanted to put an end to all school busing for desegregation, and that the President's proposal for a moratorium would do just that. However, as the election campaign progressed, the issue seemed to diminish in political importance, except for areas directly involved, and it was rarely mentioned by the presidential candidates. The reason for this was court delays in implementing busing orders and little new integration as school opened in the fall.¹¹⁴

In Congress, however, the matter remained a hot issue. On August 18 the House passed by a vote of 282 to 102 a tough anti-busing bill, somewhat stronger than the President had asked for. It prohibited court and federal agencies from requiring that any student be assigned to a school other than the one "closest or next closest" to his home that provided the proper grade level. It also permitted the reopening of school cases already settled by the courts, to make certain that they conformed to the restrictions in the legislation. Senate liberals and civil-rights groups called the measure "terrible and destructive" and "one of the most far-reaching and ill-conceived pieces of anti-civil rights legislation to come before Congress since Reconstruction."¹¹⁵ Although the bill had the support of a majority of the Senate and the Nixon administration it was unable after three attempts to marshal the necessary two-thirds vote to break a filibuster by northern senators of both parties, and it died on October 12.

In a major radio address on October 25 President Nixon reaffirmed his anti-busing stand and said he would press the next Congress for passage of legislation to end "arbitrary, court-ordered busing of children out of their

¹¹⁴ New York Times, October 27, 1972.

¹¹⁵ Alexander M. Bickel, "Untangling the Busing Snarl," *New Republic*, September 23 and 30, 1972.

neighborhoods." He reiterated his earlier position that the answer to inequities in the education system was to spend more money on learning and less money on busing. But civil-rights activists believed that, once the election was over, pressures for such legislation would be less intense.

SCHOLARS DEBATE EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

During the year social scientists sharply debated the busing issue, as well as the usefulness of school desegregation for improving the opportunities of minority children. Several furnished scientific corroboration of the administration view. Harvard Professor David J. Armor, who had done research in the Boston METCO program, concluded from his findings and from data in reports on integration programs in four other Northern cities throughout the country that: "The available evidence . . . indicates that [mandatory or induced] busing is not an effective policy instrument for raising the achievement of black students or for increasing interracial harmony,"¹¹⁶ though it does lead to higher black-student enrollment in colleges. But he suggested that voluntary integration programs like METCO and the Hartford, Conn., Project Concern be continued and encouraged on an experimental basis by federal and state grants for "symbolic" and possibly long-range benefits.

Nathan Glazer launched a broader attack on school desegregation strategies.¹¹⁷ He criticized court decisions requiring large-scale busing for desegregation because it meant that white children were . . . being conscripted to create an environment which, it had been decided, was required to provide equality of educational opportunity for black children." The burden of integration, he noted, often was borne by the lower middle class; the more affluent could flee to the suburbs or send their children to private schools. In his view, recent lower-court decisions on busing only tended to deepen alienation, for they made impossible community participation and community control.

Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan edited a collection of scholarly papers¹¹⁸ which reevaluated the Coleman Report (AJYB, 1967 [Vol.68], pp. 86-87). While the original findings were reaffirmed, the educational benefits of integration were found to have been somewhat less than was first reported. In a letter to the *Public Interest*, Summer 1972 issue, Coleman, himself, held that the courts "had used inappropriately" the findings of his report—that academic achievement of children from lower

¹¹⁶"The Evidence of Busing," *Public Interest*, Summer 1972.

¹¹⁷"Is Busing Necessary?" *Commentary*, March 1972.

¹¹⁸ *On Equality of Educational Opportunity, Papers Deriving from the Harvard University Faculty Seminar on the Coleman Report* (New York, 1972).

socio-economic backgrounds benefited from being in schools with children of higher socio-economic backgrounds—to order racial balance in the schools. Equal educational opportunity, he wrote, could not be provided by the state, for inequality originates in the home. This did not mean, of course, that state actions leading to increased racial or socio-economic segregation should not be corrected by the courts; but they should not do so on the mistaken assumption that this would create equal educational opportunity.

The most widely reported discussion, *Inequality*, by Christopher Jencks and seven other Harvard scholars,¹¹⁹ argued that, while school reform was not useless, it would not eliminate inequality in cognitive skills, nor economic inequality and poverty among adults. It could not change the economic social conditions outside the school. Schooling is important for the acquisition of basic knowledge and skills, they wrote, but spending more money on improving schools does not raise achievement or increase the likelihood that students will attend college. Desegregation, the authors declared, was somewhat more effective than raising revenues, but not much. (In an article, "Busing—The Supreme Court Goes North," in the *New York Times* for November 19, Jencks summarized the data from research studies on busing as a means of improving test scores of blacks. He wrote that even if six years of busing could cut the test-score gap between blacks and whites by 20 or 30 per cent—and the evidence here was not conclusive—this was "statistically insignificant" when spread over one or two years. Nevertheless, he concluded, the average effect was a gain.) Troubled by the possible effects of his analyses and conclusions, Jencks later said that his research did not justify cutting school expenditures, abandoning desegregation, or giving up efforts at school reform. The basic mistake, he again stressed, was the expectation that equality of educational opportunity could eliminate problems like poverty and injustice.¹²⁰

The "sobriety" and "second thoughts" about educational reform (to use Irving Kristol's terms) brought sharp rejoinders from integrationist scholars, civil rights leaders, and educators. Social psychologist Thomas F. Pettigrew of Harvard, who had helped provide the social science basis for many desegregation efforts in the 1960s, attacked Armor's research for its "methodological defects"; presenting an incomplete list of research findings on busing and emphasizing negative results Armor, he said, failed to mention at least seven controlled investigations that reported positive findings.¹²¹ Harold Howe 2d, former U.S. Commissioner of Education, argued that Coleman, Mosteller, Moynihan, and Jencks "present no clear case for or

¹¹⁹ Basic Books, 1972.

¹²⁰ Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, December 4, 1972.

¹²¹ *Psychology Today*, November 1972.

against integration of the schools as an important social goal, although they suggest its limited usefulness as far as certain measurable outcomes of schooling are concerned." He held that, while these analysts made a worthwhile contribution to social-science methodology, their findings should "not supersede the moral and legal basis on which we have determined that segregated education denies equal protection of the laws."¹²²

Noting that the reforms under attack by some social scientists were developed specifically to deal with the special problems of slum schools, Bayard Rustin declared that the schools have not completely failed the black child. An indication was that between 1965 and 1970, a period when many innovative ideas were introduced, black college enrollment nearly doubled.¹²³

The small or no gains—depending on which social science views one accepted—of busing to achieve greater integration were purchased at a high price in 1972. The issue helped divide further an already strongly polarized society and open the door to reversing important desegregation gains made since 1954. Besides providing some politicians with the opportunity to capitalize on inflamed feelings, busing gave rise to some violence in the North. Late in October in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn, mainly Jewish and Italian parents, who shortly before had fled declining neighborhoods and schools, locked the doors and blocked the steps to the John Wilson Junior High School for three days and brought about an area boycott of schools in protest against the enrollment of 31 black and Puerto Rican seventh-graders who were bused to the school from nearby Brownsville. Pontiac, Michigan, the scene of violence in 1971 in a busing dispute, saw renewed violence on November 27, when five students were shot and wounded, one seriously, in a high school courtyard after a confrontation between black and white students.

PROPERTY TAX AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Second thoughts were being had, also, on the value of equalizing educational expenditures for local school districts as a means of assuring equal educational opportunity, following court decisions in California, Texas, Minnesota, and other states in 1971 and 1972 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], p. 131). The Supreme Court agreed on June 7 to consider whether 49 of the 50 states violated the Fourteenth Amendment by relying largely on local property taxes to finance their school expenditures, thereby discriminating against children, often minorities, in poor communities.

Property tax reform, seen in 1971 as a bright hope for the poor and

¹²² "Intergration: The Lost Momentum," *New York Times*, December 10, 1972.

¹²³ *New York Times*, December 31, 1972.

oppressed, and included as a plank in the Democratic party platform in 1972, was attacked by Chester E. Finn, Jr., and Leslie Lenkowsky as putting "more money into the pockets of the largest group of college-educated, state certified, middle class professionals."¹²⁴ They repeated the arguments drawn from the Coleman Report and Jencks that variations in academic achievement of schools could not be attributed to such "inputs" as facilities, teachers, and curricula. They pointed out, too, that the effect of lower-court decisions, like the *Serrano* case in California, might mean less money for schools in poor districts. Many central cities with large numbers of banks, factories, and other economic institutions, they indicated, provided a higher tax base and funded their schools more heavily than those in suburbia, so that suburban schools would be more likely to benefit from property tax reform. Daniel P. Moynihan made many of the same points in urging the courts to stay out of this issue. If they felt they must enter it on the side of the *Serrano* case, he argued, their ruling should be accompanied by an order that total expenditures not be increased, so that the people could decide whether to spend more money on education.¹²⁵

Suburbs, too, were worried about equalization formulas. They feared that, once money no longer was raised locally, control of the schools would be taken out of their hands. If property taxes were struck down, or modified in some way, money would have to be found elsewhere. A major factor in the political reaction in 1972 to educational expenditures was rising public resentment against high taxes. In the election, voters in four states—California, Colorado, Michigan, and Oregon—resoundingly defeated proposed state constitutional amendments that would have killed, or sharply limited, the property tax as a source of funds for public education. This threw the issue to the Supreme Court, which was expected to rule on it in the spring of 1973.

The arguments in support of equalization were marshaled most comprehensively by Robert Lekachman, professor of economics at the Stony Brook campus of the State University of New York. Although "equal dollars" for each child was not the same as genuine equality of opportunity, much less equality of outcome, he declared, the schools should not add to the environmental and genetic handicaps of children. "It is surely a nonsequitur," he concluded, "to suggest that because money alone does not guarantee literacy . . . attempts to rectify the legal and practical inequities that currently disgrace school finances are therefore unimportant."¹²⁶

¹²⁴ "'Serrano' vs. the People," *Commentary*, September 1972.

¹²⁵ "Equalizing Education—In Whose Benefit?," *Public Interest*, Fall 1972.

¹²⁶ "Schools, Money and Politics: Financing Public Education," *New Leader*, September 28, 1972.

SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION

In a year of intense political discussion and reexamination of educational reforms, school decentralization, too, came in for its share of criticism. In an effort to deal with the low achievement of poor and minority children, New York City had been experimenting for three years with a decentralized school operation of 31 school districts. In East Harlem Community School District 4, a boycott by Puerto Rican and black parents shut down, or virtually emptied, more than half the area's schools early in December to protest the inadequate education they felt their children were receiving. In May Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, a member of the State Board of Regents and one of the architects of the school decentralization movement, said in a radio broadcast that school decentralization failed to improve education, charging that local school boards were more interested in power than in better schools. In testimony before the City Charter Revision Commission on November 10, he indicated willingness to scrap the entire idea. He asserted that the "selfish forces" responsible for failure included the "racial politics" of small groups and the United Federation of Teachers that protected teachers regardless of their quality. This could "only be at the expense of teaching . . . children to read and write and to speak correctly, and to think."¹²⁷

A more mixed response to community control was Leonard J. Fein's in *The Ecology of the Public Schools: An Inquiry into Community Control*.¹²⁸ He argued that alongside community public schools should be established state-subsidized black parochial schools which could provide the values of black consciousness. Blacks would then have the choice of going to either school. However, Fein raised the question of whether, at a time when so many educational reforms were being challenged, it would be wise to fragmentize further educational effort to insure equal opportunity.

The reexamination of old premises by many of the new critics coincided with, and confirmed, the views of many Middle Americans that they were being forced to bear unduly the social and economic costs of programs devised by social scientists and intellectuals that did not work or, in fact, did harm. The new critics also provided a rationale for the Nixon administration to limit education and welfare expenditures and abandon efforts to achieve greater desegregation. In a highly publicized pre-election interview with Garnett D. Horner of the *Washington Star-News*, which was released only later, President Nixon said: "What we have to realize is that many of the solutions of the 60's were massive failures. They threw money at the problems and for the most part they have failed. . . ."

¹²⁷ New York Times, November 30, 1972.

¹²⁸ New York, 1971.

A number of liberals were emerging with similar views. A distinguished group of Brookings Institution economists, including some of the Johnson administration's social engineers, reported in May that many of the reforms of that era had failed. In a book-length analysis of national priorities they concluded that the multiplication of dollars and programs brought no solutions for welfare reform, day care, and city finance, but multiplication of problems. The underlying reason, these scholars contended, was lack of knowledge.¹²⁹ Others, however, were worried that this "crisis of confidence" would hinder efforts to find new ways of dealing with severe problems in intergroup relations and remedying racial inequities.

Civil Rights

In response to criticism by the Congressional Black Caucus and other groups, the Nixon administration, early in 1972, issued its first official report on progress in civil rights and related social programs. Among its highlights were: the percentage of black students in all-black schools had dropped from 40 per cent in 1968 to 12 per cent in the fall of 1971; the Internal Revenue Service had halted tax deductions for contributions to segregated public schools; government aid to minority businesses will have risen from \$200 million in 1969 to \$505.8 million for 1973, and housing starts for low and moderate-income families under federally subsidized programs stood at 156,000 in 1969 and were expected to reach over 566,000 in 1973. In 1972 Congress also passed an Equal Employment Opportunities Act giving the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) enforcement powers it never had before. Under the Act, EEOC stepped up enforcement of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; its case-load rose from 33,000 in 1971 to 52,000 total entries in 1972.

The self-image of the Nixon administration in civil rights was one of "doing" rather than "talking." This estimate was challenged, as the year progressed and the administration campaigned against "forced busing," "forced economic integration," and eased its support of the Philadelphia Plan. The *Washington Post* for December 18, in its own evaluation of the civil-rights progress report, concluded that most of the achievements were small and grudging. It said Nixon did not assert leadership and encouraged "decent people and the middle" to turn away from the difficult civil-rights problem, thereby causing despair for minorities.

Symbolic of the position of strong civil-rights advocates after the election was the resignation of the Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh as chairman of

¹²⁹ *New York Times*, May 25, 1972; see also Geraldine Rosenfield, *Social Science and Social Policy: A Crisis of Confidence* (American Jewish Committee Information and Research Services, February 1973).

the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Since its inception in 1957, the Commission, which has no enforcement powers, had been a major civil-rights watchdog and gadfly. Perhaps the foremost "conscience" in the nation with regard to civil rights, Hesburgh had been openly critical of the Nixon administration in this area.¹³⁰

Social-Club Discrimination

Civil-rights groups actively seeking to curb social-club discrimination received a setback during the year. Representative K. Leroy Irvis, the black majority leader of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, had been denied admission as a guest at Moose Lodge No. 107 in Harrisburg. He brought action against the club, charging that it had violated the equal-protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argued that this violation of his constitutional rights called for "state action," since the club held a Pennsylvania liquor license. On June 12 the case came before the Supreme Court, which ruled, by a vote of 6 to 3, that it was constitutional for a state to grant a liquor license to private social clubs, even though they practiced racial discrimination. It did not, however, make the issuance of such a license mandatory (*Moose Lodge v. Irvis*, 407 U.S. 163 [1972]).

On July 31 the same Moose lodge was barred by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from denying admission to Representative Irvis as a guest based on race, for by opening its facilities to Caucasian guests, the court held, the club became, to that extent a place of public accommodation and therefore was in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an appeal of this decision on December 11.

The meaning of the two rulings by the Supreme Court appeared to be that fraternal organizations may practice racial discrimination in choosing their members, but may not in deciding whether or not to serve food and drink to guests. In developing the law on this issue, the Court left it to the discretion of a state to grant or deny a liquor license to a racially discriminatory club. The Maine Supreme Court, on December 11, upheld the validity of a state law which denied liquor licenses to clubs practicing discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. At year's end, the case was awaiting a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Violence

The period under review saw the growth of a "politics of crime," as well as continuing widespread fear of crime. Much of the political discussion

¹³⁰ New York Times, November 17, 1972.

involved angry charges by candidates around the country and claims by the administration that it was winning the war against crime, rather than efforts to illuminate a complex social problem. In a radio address on October 15, President Nixon said he had fulfilled his 1968 pledge of law and order. "We have fought the frightening trend of crime and anarchy to a standstill." He cited as evidence the FBI crime index, which showed an increase of only one per cent during the first half of 1972, the closest the nation had come to registering an actual decline in 12 years. Senator McGovern and his advisors, however, denied the administration's claims. McGovern charged in October that the administration had brought pressure on police departments to falsify crime figures. James Vorenberg, who headed his panel on crime and justice, said at a press conference in October that the most significant aspect of the statistics was the steady increase of crime in 1972. He pointed out that, despite the President's promise to stem the tide, crime had grown considerably in the last four years.

Efforts to win the "law and order" vote continued at all levels. In October Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst told the International Association of Chiefs of Police at Salt Lake City that he did not like to see a major party's presidential candidate refuse to recognize their accomplishments in controlling crime. There were indications at the end of the year that politicians were beginning to prepare "law and order" campaigns for 1973 mayoralty elections in New York, Los Angeles, and other cities. "You know what a conservative is?" asked former Police Commissioner and new Philadelphia Mayor Frank L. Rizzo, "That's a liberal who got mugged the night before."¹³¹

The facts on crime continued to be grim. While there was a drop in the increase of serious crime during the year, there was more violent street crime in such cities as New York, Boston, Memphis, and Denver. According to the FBI, 112 policemen lost their lives in 1972, down somewhat from 125 in 1971 but above 1970 and 1969 figures. Especially disturbing was the upsurge of crime and violence in the schools. During a 16-day period in the fall, at least 14 New York City teachers were robbed or assaulted inside their schools. There was a sharp increase, too, in suburban crime—5 per cent in the first half of the year. In February the U.S. Department of Commerce published a report estimating the national cost of ordinary crime at \$16 billion. Small business suffered more severely than big business.¹³²

The statistics were barely indicative of the seriousness of the problem, since the method of collecting them varied in different parts of the country, and "victimization" studies showed that less than one-third of all crimes were reported. As serious as crime, itself, was the fortress mentality it engendered

¹³¹ "Living With Crime, U.S.A.," *Newsweek*, December 18, 1972.

¹³² *The Economic Impact of Crime Against Business: Preliminary Report.*

among many Americans, with the resultant reduction in personal freedom and quality of life. A Gallup Poll survey published in January 1973 showed that half of all persons interviewed thought crime had gone up in their neighborhoods in 1972.

Inevitably, crime continued to drive a wedge between disadvantaged blacks and other minorities constituting a disproportionately large part of the prison population, and whites seeking protection in any way possible. There was some indication that part of crime and criminal violence—no one seemed to know how much—represented guerrilla warfare by some black militants. Early in the year, the police in New York announced they were hunting members of a small group calling itself the Black Liberation Army in the slaying of two policemen in the East Village on January 27. The New York *Times* of February 9 carried the story on the front page with a headline, "9 in Black 'Army' Are Hunted in Police Assassinations." And at the height of the election campaign, an October 17 Philadelphia *Inquirer* headline covering most of the top of a page read, "Nationwide Link Sought in Chicago 'De Mau Mau' Slayings" (p. 165).

Yet blacks clearly remained the major victims of criminal and even official violence. A sharp reminder of this was a report late in the year by a 12-member investigation commission on the deaths of two black students on the Baton Rouge, La., campus of Southern University after a confrontation with the police in November. The commission, headed by the state's attorney general who had been appointed by a liberal governor, laid the responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the police, and turned its findings over to the local district attorney for possible criminal prosecution.

Violence involving largely black prisoners that had erupted in 1971, notably at Attica in New York, was analyzed by a nine-member commission headed by Robert B. McKay, dean of the New York University School of Law. It reported that the riot did not stem from a revolutionary conspiracy, but was rather a "spontaneous burst of violent anger" of a new breed of prisoners unwilling to accept the "petty humiliations and racism that characterize prison life." Going beyond its instructions, the commission came up with a seven-point program to restructure the state's prison system, with emphasis on prisoners' rights. The official report, together with several other analyses published during the year, indicated that the decision to crush the "revolution" at Attica, rather than preserve the lives of the inmates and hostages, was based on the belief that a strong stand had to be taken on the issue of law and order. As such, this too was a political decision based on "the politics of crime."¹³³

¹³³ Russell G. Oswald, *Attica: My Story* (New York, 1972); Herman Badillo and Milton Haynes, *A Bill of No Rights: Attica and the American Prison System* (New York, 1972).

Accompanying public anger about crime was growing discontent with efforts to make the streets safe. Since 1969, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the Department of Justice dispersed over \$2 billion in anti-crime grants. Despite public statements announcing progress, there were indications within the Nixon administration in 1972 of dissatisfaction with the program. A report on *Law and Disorder*, prepared by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for the National Urban Coalition and released in November, indicated that most of the grants went to criminal-justice agencies for traditional purposes; few agencies had used the money to experiment with reforms.

The most promising sign of possible change, or at least improvement in public morale, was the rapidly developing movement of citizen involvement in the war on crime. It ranged from "courtesy patrols" in the black wards of Washington, D.C., and mothers of the child-safety patrol on Manhattan's East Side, to the 13 concerned fathers in Clear Lake City, Tex., who formed the unpaid Company N of the Harris County Sheriff's Reserves. On the whole, these were not vigilante groups, although there was concern that some might be.¹³⁴ These groups sought to restore a sense of community through programs utilizing neighbors and inexpensive communication and lighting equipment. There was some evidence that in well organized neighborhoods efforts of this kind were cutting down on thefts.

Extremism

GEORGE WALLACE

The radical right found itself with no place to go in 1972 as a result of the President's "Middle America" and "Southern" political strategy. And in the process of emerging as a full-scale presidential candidate on the Democratic ticket until he was crippled by an assassination attempt, Governor Wallace moved closer to the political center. His candidacy in 1968 (AJYB, 1969 [Vol.70], pp. 97-100) had been backed by funds and the political organization of a coalition of racists, political extremists, and various antisemitic elements. By 1972 he and his key supporters attempted to put a wall between him and these groups.

In campaigning around the country, Wallace was less bellicose and much more moderate on the race issue. The "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever" theme was now replaced by a broader, populist appeal. In his Florida campaign he attacked some senators who, he said, took the nation into a "no win" war and permitted the U.S. to become a

¹³⁴ Gary T. Marx and Dave Archer, "The Urban Vigilante," *Psychology Today*, January 1973.

secondary power, as well as "welfare giveaways" and high taxes, which brought the average taxpayer to his knees and permitted the rich to enjoy tax loopholes. Wallace skillfully played on the dissatisfactions and resentments of the little man and the working man, who were angered by government policies and disturbed by certain directions American life was taking.¹³⁵

He emerged from the Florida Democratic primary in March with 42 per cent of the statewide vote. Humphrey, who came in second, had only 18 per cent and Senator Jackson 13 per cent, according to the *Miami News*. Two months later Wallace won 51 per cent of the Michigan primary vote, as compared with 27 per cent for McGovern and 16 per cent for Humphrey. A survey conducted by Daniel Yankelovich for the *New York Times* (May 17) of a cross-section of Democrats, Republicans, and independents who voted for Wallace in the open primary in Michigan indicated they did so largely because of his opposition to busing, welfare, and high taxes.

At the end of May the *New York Times*' tabulation of Democratic delegate strength gave Wallace 317 votes to McGovern's 503. He was ahead of Humphrey (305) and Muskie (160). However, it was generally conceded by this time that his support had peaked even before he was wounded. Thereafter he maintained silence regarding his choice of presidential candidate; but most political observers believed the bulk of his supporters threw their votes to President Nixon. At year's end Wallace, now fully disassociated from the American Independent party, was operating as a Democrat and presumably readying himself for a presidential bid in 1976. In a four-page letter to the Democratic National Committee on December 9, he urged the group to "listen to the people" and "unite on common ground to avoid another Presidential defeat."

JOHN SCHMITZ AND THE AMERICAN PARTY

Even before Wallace's Democratic party primary bid right-wingers found themselves without a leader. For a while some rallied around Republican Congressman John Ashbrook of Ohio, but he aroused little interest in the primaries. Right-wing promoters also created a paper organization called Americans for Agnew in an effort to keep Agnew from being dropped from the Republican ticket. *Group Research Report* wrote on September 18 that Agnew was used by the Nixon administration as liaison with dissident conservative Republicans dissatisfied with the President's leadership.

With Wallace out of the picture, the American party in its first national convention nominated lame-duck Congressman John Schmitz of California and Thomas Anderson as its presidential and vice-presidential candidates,

¹³⁵ Milton Ellerin, *The George Wallace Candidacy: An Interim Report* (American Jewish Committee, March 1972) (mimeo).

respectively. Both were members of the John Birch Society's National Council, and many of the 2,000 delegates gathered in Louisville, Ky., on August 3 were Birchers. In effect the Birch Society, which always had denied being a political party, was now running a presidential slate. Schmitz's followers, according to a *New York Times* analysis, were a "dedicated, generally affluent group of white Americans who deeply believe that the Republic is threatened by a conspiracy masterminded by fat cat international financiers in league with China and Russia and protected from public view by a Com-symp American press."¹³⁶ The Anti-Defamation League charged the American party and Schmitz with "approving and distributing anti-Semitism." The American party had adopted also a plank at its convention calling for prohibition of the sale of arms and of private banking loans to the State of Israel, and of the sale of Israeli bonds in the United States.¹³⁷

Although an election year provided an opportunity for both the extreme right and left to insinuate their ideas into the campaign, it was remarkably free of antisemitism. The right-wing press and anti-Jewish publications, such as *Thunderbolt*, *Common Sense*, *Herald of Freedom*, *Washington Observer*, and *The American Mercury*, together with the John Birch Society and Liberty Lobby (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 166-67), kept up a steady attack on Henry Kissinger, the President's chief foreign-policy advisor. Kissinger was at times erroneously described as the son of a rabbi. The wooing of the "Jewish vote" was seen as reaffirmation of the bigot's view that both major political parties were controlled by Jews and were lackeys of Israel.

Both the American Communist party and the Socialist Workers' party ran presidential candidates whose campaigns were strongly anti-Israel. The latter called for the outright destruction of Israel, while the former stopped just short of this. The Anti-Defamation League charged both with having "crossed the line into outright anti-Semitism."

The election results showed little success for extremist groups. Schmitz, who was on the ballot in 32 states, received only 1,200,000 votes, sharply under Wallace's 10 million in 1968. However, a number of right-wing congressmen, including John M. Ashbrook (R., O.), John R. Rarick (D., La.), and John H. Rousselot (R., Calif.), the latter an avowed Bircher, were reelected.

In addition, the respectable Conservative party of New York, which elected Senator James L. Buckley in 1970, got twice as many votes on its line of the ballot for Nixon as the Liberal party obtained for McGovern.¹³⁸ Summarizing

¹³⁶ Stephen Lester, "John Schmitz is no George Wallace," *New York Times Magazine*, November 5, 1972.

¹³⁷ Isadore Zack, "Old Story, New Twist," *ADL Bulletin*, September 1972; *New York Times*, November 20, 1972.

¹³⁸ *Group Research Report*, November 20, 1972.

the situation of the radical right in 1972, veteran observer Milton Ellerin said that antisemitism was not marketable in America today, nor was it a lure for mass membership. On the whole, he noted, the right has been a staunch defender of Israel since the 1967 six-day war. "More affluent and more numerous than the followers of the hard core anti-Semites," Ellerin concluded, "the radical right . . . became an aborted phenomenon—a negligible force in contemporary America with little if any real potential for growth."¹³⁹

MURRAY FRIEDMAN

¹³⁹ "Is Anti-Semitism on the Rise?", *Reform Judaism*, October 1972.

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

THE YEAR 1972 was generally one of consolidation of both Israel's position and American interests in the Middle East. Bilateral relations between the United States and Israel remained on the high plateau attained in the meeting between President Richard M. Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir in December 1971, when agreement was reached for the continuing supply of American Phantom jets and other military equipment to Israel, various forms of economic assistance, and American assurances that United States peace efforts would not be accompanied by attempts to impose a settlement to which the parties had not agreed.

Although the continuing strong American support for Israel drew vocal criticism from the Arab world, 1972 witnessed a marked improvement in American relations with several Arab states. On July 1, during the visit of Secretary of State William P. Rogers to Sana, capital of the Yemen Arab Republic, it was announced that diplomatic relations with the United States would be resumed. Yemen thus was the first of the six Arab states that had broken off relations with Washington after the Arab-Israel war of 1967 to restore formal ties.

U.S. Resumes Relations With Yemen and Sudan

Yemeni Premier Moshen al-Ayni emphasized that his country was in need of development assistance and looked forward to reestablishing "strong relations and fruitful cooperation" with the United States. Cairo's semi-official *al-Ahram* called for Arab League intervention against Yemen and the Sudan for "selling out the Arab cause for several million American dollars." Yemeni President Kadir Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani declared the decision had been based on national interest, charging that the Arab states had done nothing to help with Yemen's serious financial problems whereas the United States had offered to resume aid.

The Egyptian threat of Arab League action also failed to deter President Gaafar al-Nimeiry of the Sudan from resuming diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level with the United States, ostensibly in gratitude for an American donation of \$4.45 million for the resettlement of Sudanese refugees who had been displaced during the country's long, just ended civil war. Formal announcement came on July 25. The act also reflected Nimeiry's growing disenchantment with the Soviet Union and his continued annoyance with Egypt and Libya for their involvement in the abortive coup against him (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], pp. 163-64).

Toward the end of the month it was announced in Washington that two American diplomats would be stationed in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, to open an American "interests section" under the aegis of the Belgian embassy. While this was a step short of restoration of normal diplomatic relations, State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray said the United States hoped this would "begin the process of re-establishing a direct diplomatic channel to the Iraqi government," in keeping with the "general pattern of the improvement of our relations" with Arab states. The improved relations with Yemen, the Sudan and Iraq, he said, were the fruits of the very patient efforts "inspired by Secretary Rogers' own view that the United States had compelling reasons to reopen, where possible, and maintain where it exists, direct diplomatic dialogue with as many of the states in the area as possible."

Direct Negotiations Supported

In a move that would have been dismissed as "counterproductive," if not unmentionable, in the State Department a few years earlier, Secretary Rogers took the occasion of a press conference in Kuwait on July 4 to recommend direct negotiations between the Arab states and Israel "if a Middle East settlement was to be achieved." Rogers cited President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow, the discussions between East and West Germany, North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam, India and Pakistan, and between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus as examples of the value of direct talks between adversaries in settling longstanding disputes. He said all of them had felt obliged "to meet and start a dialogue." Why, then, "should not these talks be direct" in the Middle East? Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat rejected the American suggestion as "unthinkable" as long as Egyptian territory was occupied. Nevertheless, in later speeches Secretary Rogers continued to stress that the Middle East today "is the only major exception to the trend toward dialogue" and to urge "serious negotiations" seeking solutions to "the complex and emotional problems involved" in the Arab-Israel conflict.

Soviet-Egyptian Discord

While the United States benefited from improved bilateral relations with various Middle East states, the major improvement in its strategic position in the region resulted from the sharp setback in Soviet-Egyptian relations following the withdrawal in July of nearly all Soviet military personnel from Egypt at President Sadat's request. Although various domestic and foreign policy considerations prompted Sadat's decision, there is little doubt that, to a significant extent, it can be traced back to the firm stance adopted by the Nixon administration in mid-1970 with regard to Soviet encroachment in the

Middle East (AJYB, 1970 [Vol.71], pp. 229–55; 1971 [Vol.72], pp. 160–78). The tough and coordinated American and Israeli postures during the Syrian-Jordanian crisis of September 1970 may well have had a major influence on the Soviet decision to be more cautious and not to provide the additional offensive equipment the Egyptians requested. President Nixon, in his 1972 “State of the World” message (*U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: The Emerging Structure of Peace; A Report to the Congress*), issued on February 9, as “I prepare to set out on my summit trips to Peking and Moscow,” he explicitly warned the Russian leaders:

The Soviet Union’s effort to use the Arab-Israeli conflict to perpetuate and expand its own military position in Egypt has been a matter of concern to the United States. The USSR had taken advantage of Egypt’s increasing dependence on Soviet military supply to gain the use of naval and air facilities in Egypt. This has serious implications for the stability of the balance of power locally, regionally in the Eastern Mediterranean, and globally. The Atlantic Alliance cannot ignore the possible implications of this move for the stability of the East-West relationship.

U.S. Warning to Russia

In measured but firm diplomatic language Nixon made it clear that the Soviet Union could not exploit tensions in the Middle East for its own strategic advantage if it hoped to reach understandings with the United States on the improvement in East-West relations and progress on strategic arms limitation; mutual phasing out of forces in central Europe; increased trade relations, and other areas of common interest. Nixon concluded:

The U.S. and the USSR can contribute to the process of settlement by encouraging Arabs and Israelis to begin serious negotiation. The great powers also have a responsibility to enhance, not undermine, the basic conditions of stability in the area. Injecting the global strategic rivalry into the region is incompatible with Middle East peace and with detente in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Russians got the message and acted accordingly. In June the Beirut weekly, *al-Rayah*, published comments allegedly made two months earlier by high-ranking Soviet officials on the draft political program drawn up by a militant faction of the Syrian Communist party. It quoted Soviet military experts as telling the Syrians that the Egyptian and Syrian armies could not possibly defeat the Israeli armed forces and that renewed warfare would “bring fresh catastrophes to progressive Arab regimes.” The Russians reportedly cautioned further that Moscow would not support the Arabs in actions that could lead to a confrontation between Russia and the United States. Western sources accepted the report as genuine, since *al-Rayah* speaks for a pro-Soviet faction of the Syrian Baath party and the contents were consistent with other sources.

The Russians also disassociated themselves from the Syrian Communist group's support of the Palestinian guerrillas' call for the dissolution of Israel. The Russians reportedly stressed that "the Israeli nation exists; calling for its liquidation is wrong both tactically and as a matter of principle." The Russians advised the Arab Communists to focus their struggle on "strengthening the progressive democratic regimes and enabling socialism to triumph." As for the conflict with Israel, the only practical course was the one being pursued by the Soviet Union: "The struggle for a just peaceful settlement." As Sadat was to reveal in July, the Egyptians were getting the same advice from the Soviets.

Moscow Summit

Soviet-American relations in the Middle East were discussed at the Moscow summit. The two sides stated their respective positions on the Arab-Israel conflict, but failed to reach agreement on the specific terms of a settlement. All they could agree on, as indicated in the joint communiqué issued on May 29 by President Nixon and Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, was to "reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242." This in itself was significant because, despite the disagreement on the extent of Israeli withdrawal required by this resolution and the details of its implementation, the communiqué ruled out active Soviet support for an Arab military solution and implicitly supported Israel's right to live within secure and recognized boundaries. The communiqué further said that the Soviet Union and the United States confirmed their desire to contribute to the success of the mission of the UN Secretary-General's special representative Gunnar V. Jarring, who had been appointed to help the parties reach agreement under Resolution 242. They also declared "their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East."

Despite this formal endorsement of Ambassador Jarring, his mission made no progress during 1972, and the stalemate continued. The Israelis agreed to an American proposal for close-proximity talks, under which Egyptian and Israeli negotiators would occupy separate suites in the same hotel and an American or other chosen diplomat would serve as go-between for discussions on a special Suez Canal agreement. The Egyptians refused to participate without a prior Israeli commitment to eventual total withdrawal.

Limiting Superpower Confrontation

Although the Moscow summit brought no immediate results in the peace-making area, it did appear to signify Soviet acceptance of the basic ground rules for limiting Soviet-American competition and avoiding

confrontation in the Middle East, as set forth in Nixon's State of the World message. The declaration of "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations," signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow, contained several points directly relevant to their relations in the Middle East:

First. They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. . . .

Second. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. . . .

Both sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. . . .

Third. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. . . .

Egyptian Reaction

Egyptian President Sadat correctly concluded that owing to Israel's strength and Moscow's fear of a confrontation with the United States the Russians were not prepared to give him the military support he needed to force the Israelis to withdraw. He had known this earlier; but before the Moscow summit the 15,000 to 20,000 Soviet military personnel in Egypt had been an unknown quantity with which Israel and the United States had to reckon. As such they had at least been a political card Sadat could threaten to play.

After the summit, as Sadat later indicated, the Russians became a liability rather than an asset. The Israelis were able to garner American popular support and governmental military assistance by pointing to the Russians in Egypt as proof that Israel was confronting not simply its Arab neighbors but the vanguard of Soviet Communism. Since Sadat was convinced that effective political pressure on Israel could be exerted only by Washington, he wanted to improve Cairo's standing in the United States by removing the Soviet military.

The Russians had become a liability domestically as well. They were highly unpopular among the Egyptians generally, and the friction between the Soviet advisers and the Egyptian military was an open secret. Egyptians were beginning to wonder aloud whether they had struggled for 80 years to get rid of the British "temporary" occupation only to become subservient to the Russians. Sadat, an old-time conspirator and member of the young Free

Officers who had successfully plotted the overthrow of King Farouk, was no doubt uneasy about the presence of Russian advisers in all sectors of the Egyptian army. After his purge of pro-Soviet elements, Sadat may well have feared that the Russians might secretly be grooming a group of disgruntled young Egyptian officers to overthrow him.

On July 18 Sadat announced that he had decided immediately to "terminate the mission of Soviet advisers and military experts who came at our request" and that all military equipment and installations built after June 1967 were to become the property of Egypt and be manned by Egyptian forces. He "invited" the Russians to discuss more effective cooperation in the future, emphasizing rather lamely that his decision would not mean a postponement of "our battle against Israel, since it was never our intention to make our friendly Soviet experts fight with us." The Russians responded with unexpected alacrity, pulling out their men and taking with them the more sophisticated missiles and other equipment they had not turned over to the Egyptians. The Russians also stopped using Egyptian bases to fly surveillance missions over the United States Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

If Sadat hoped his dramatic move would bring the West running into his arms, he was mistaken. His expeditions to obtain alternative weapons from Britain and other Western states proved largely unsuccessful; for in the climate of East-West detente they had no ideological interest in fanning the arms race. Some European powers like Britain and France may have been interested in selling arms for hard currency; but the Egyptians, still heavily in debt to the Russians for past military and economic aid, were in no position to pay. Consequently, the Egyptians in desperation turned back to the Russians, who agreed to provide Egypt with some advanced SA-6 surface-to-air missiles. These were superior to the Egyptian-operated SA-2 and SA-3 missiles in that they were effective as low as 100 feet from the ground and thus could intercept low-flying Israeli fighter-bombers. By mid-November some 60 missiles were being turned over to the Egyptian forces, and with them reportedly came several hundred Russian technical advisers and training specialists to teach the Egyptians to operate and maintain the new missiles and other Soviet equipment that had been left in Egypt. The Russians made it clear, however, that they would not return in any fighting role, and by year's end the Soviet Union had not provided Egypt with any new offensive weapons.

American Elections and the Middle East

If Sadat also hoped by his ouster of the Russians to convince the United States to put pressure on Israel, then his move was particularly poorly timed. He acted at the height of the American presidential campaign when the major parties were vying with each other in issuing pro-Israeli statements.

Democratic candidate George McGovern emphasized that his opposition to American involvement in Vietnam and his proposed cutbacks in defense expenditures would not mean a new isolationism. In his speech accepting the Democratic nomination, he pledged to keep America militarily strong and its defenses "fully sufficient to meet any danger." He explained that "we will do that not only for ourselves but for those who deserve and need the shield of our strength—our old Allies in Europe and eslewhere, including the people of Israel who will always have our help to hold their Promised Land."

POSITION OF DEMOCRATS

The Democratic party platform, as strengthened in a floor amendment by supporters of Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) and accepted by Senator McGovern, provided that the United States would "maintain a political commitment and a military force in Europe and at sea in the Mediterranean ample to deter the Soviet Union from putting unbearable pressure on Israel." The platform also pledged to make a long-term commitment to provide military assistance to Israel; to seek to bring the parties "into direct negotiation" toward a permanent political settlement based on agreement on "secure and defensible national boundaries"; to "recognize and support the established status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, with free access to all its holy places provided to all faiths," and to move the United States embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem "as a symbol of this stand." It also called for the world community to recognize its responsibility "for a just solution of the problems of the Arab and Jewish refugees."

POSITION OF REPUBLICANS

The Republican platform supported "the right of Israel and its courageous people to survive and prosper in peace." Specifically, the Republicans pledged "to help in any way possible to bring Israel and the Arab states to the conference table, where they may negotiate a lasting peace." They declared they would continue "to prevent the development of a military imbalance which would imperil peace in the region and elsewhere by providing Israel with support essential for her security, including aircraft, training and modern and sophisticated military equipment." At the same time, the Republican platform supported continuation of programs of economic assistance, including special aid to help Israel resettle Russian immigrants. The support of Israel was balanced by an offer of help to "friendly Arab governments and peoples, including support for their efforts to diminish dependence on outside powers."

Regarding the balance of power, the Republicans pledged to "maintain our

tactical forces in Europe and the Mediterranean area at adequate strength and high levels of efficiency." The Republican platform went on to characterize as "irresponsible" McGovern's proposals to cut back the number of aircraft carriers from 16 to 6 and to undertake unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe. It flatly rejected these "dangerous proposals," charging that they "would increase the threat of war in the Middle East and gravely menace Israel." This was denied by McGovern.

The platform made no mention of Jerusalem. At a press conference in Miami, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew supported the GOP decision not to recommend transfer of the United States embassy to Jerusalem at this time, calling the Democratic plank "counterproductive" and liable to lead to "much misunderstanding among the parties" in the Middle East.

AID TO ISRAEL

Aside from this, there was little difference in the declarations of support for Israel by the two major parties. The main dispute centered on who had been the more consistent friend of Israel and which party had given Israel the greatest practical support. The Republicans noted that, under defense contracts signed in 1972, the United States had agreed to sell Israel all the planes, tanks, sophisticated electronic equipment, and other military hardware that Mrs. Meir had requested, with deliveries continuing through 1973. To help Israel pay for the equipment, Congress had in the past two years approved, and the administration had provided, more than \$825 million in long-term credits. In addition, in 1971, for the first time in more than a decade, the United States gave Israel an outright grant of \$50 million in supporting assistance to help its economy meet the extraordinary pressures of defense and immigration absorption. Israel was also expected to receive the bulk of \$85 million voted by Congress for resettlement of Soviet Jews.

This was aside from the ongoing program of loans for Israel's purchases of United States surplus food under the Public Law 480 Food for Peace Program, which has been running at a rate of some \$55 million per year, and a variety of smaller grants to schools and hospitals in Israel and a loan guarantee for immigrant housing. On September 27 Secretary of State Rogers and Israeli Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir signed an agreement in New York to establish a United States-Israeli Binational Science Foundation to promote cooperation "in research in science and technology for peaceful purposes on subjects of mutual interest." Each side agreed to contribute \$30 million in Israeli pounds, with the United States share consisting of allocation of the Public Law 480 loans, which Israel would otherwise have had to return for United States use.

The Committee for the Re-election of the President claimed that in the four years of the Nixon administration Israel was receiving more American assistance than "during the previous nineteen years." (A table issued by the

committee, however, gave the total of military and economic assistance to Israel by the administration as \$1,175.8 billion, compared with \$1,285.9 for the period from 1949–1968. Precise comparisons are difficult because the earlier period included a greater percentage of outright grants; the purchasing power of the dollar has declined, and some still classified military credits in 1969 and 1970 were omitted.) While conceding that current United States aid to Israel was running at unprecedentedly high levels, Democratic supporters pointed out that aid to Israel has long received widespread bipartisan support in Congress and that in many instances it was Democrats, such as Senator Jackson, who took the initiative or pressed for higher sums than the administration had requested.

Israeli leaders from Prime Minister Meir on down made no secret of their "appreciation" for President Nixon's economic aid and political support. Some American Jews considered these statements inappropriate during an election year, since they could easily be interpreted as endorsements of the President's reelection, notwithstanding Israeli disclaimers that the Israelis did not intend to interfere in American domestic politics.

The Israeli sentiments were less blatant than the formal August 19 endorsement of McGovern by the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations. Dr. Mohammed T. Mehdi, the Iraqi-born leader of the group, called on all Arab Americans to support the Democratic ticket. He explained that he considered the Republican platform plank on the Middle East more "pro-Israeli" than the Democratic and that he had "confidence in the essential integrity of Senator McGovern who, as President, will reduce American military aid to Israel." Earlier in the year Mehdi had supported Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm's unsuccessful campaign for the Democratic nomination. McGovern repudiated Mehdi's endorsement, terming it a cynical attempt "to embarrass or discredit me with Americans of all creeds who believe, as I do, that the cornerstone of American policy in the Middle East must be the survival of an Israel that is militarily secure and economically sound." He charged the Arab group with "a calculated attempt" to win support for Nixon. (For an analysis of the issues and the vote in the presidential election, see pp. 155-57).

Any Arab hope that a new Nixon would emerge after his landslide victory in November and put pressure on Israel was not fulfilled in the months immediately following the election. While 1972 witnessed a consolidation of American-Israeli friendship and an improvement in the United States position in the Middle East, there also emerged long-range trends that threatened to undermine this position unless it was supported by appropriate policies. Among these destabilizing trends was the Chinese-Soviet rivalry for Arab support reflected in the heated United Nations debates and in the search for positions of influence along the Middle East air and sea routes to the Indian subcontinent. Related to this and to the question of access to, and assured

supply of, oil was the incipient Soviet-American rivalry for influence in the Persian Gulf in the wake of the British withdrawal.

Quest for Oil

In April the Soviet Union and Iraq signed a 15-year treaty of friendship and cooperation pledging to "continue their determined struggle against imperialism and Zionism." The treaty spoke of "cooperation in the field of strengthening each other's defense ability," and stipulated that neither country would join any alliance hostile to the other. The treaty, similar in its general terms to those concluded earlier by the Soviet Union with Egypt and India, was expected to enable the Soviet Union to expand its role in the Iraqi oil industry and to utilize the Iraqi port of Basra for increased naval activity in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin marked the occasion by attending ceremonies opening a Soviet-financed oil field seized by Iraq in a dispute with Western oil companies. The United States countered by selling increasing quantities of modern arms to pro-Western, non-Arab Iran, Iraq's leading rival in the Gulf, and to Saudi Arabia. The United States maintained only a small naval task force of its own in the area, in the calculated hope that a small United States presence with reliance on friendly regional states would help restrain the Soviets from introducing a large-scale naval force of their own into the Gulf.

Also of growing concern to the United States were the economic forecasts that rising energy demands would make the United States increasingly dependent on Middle East oil in the coming decade, with possible far-reaching political and economic consequences. In recent years, Western Europe and Japan, already dependent on the Middle East and North Africa for most of their oil and gas, have shown greater caution in being identified with Israel and have gone out of their way to avoid antagonizing the Arabs. Some Arab spokesmen have already suggested using oil as a means to force the United States to modify its policy toward Israel.

So far, however, the Arab states have concentrated on improving their economic position. Increasing demand and the slow progress of the West in developing nuclear power plants and alternative sources of energy made it possible in 1971 for the Arab states in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries to conclude agreements to substantially raise the price of their oil. This was followed in October and December of 1972 by a series of new agreements under which four Arab Persian Gulf countries—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi—were to obtain immediately a 25 per cent "participation" in the oil companies operating in their countries, with the host government's share rising gradually to 51 per cent in 1983. Although the companies were unhappy about the prices they were paid in these forced sales, they regarded the demand as a lesser evil, since the alternative was

nationalization by decree that had hit Western companies in Libya, Iraq, and Algeria.

The pattern of participation agreements was expected to spread to the other major oil producers as well. Middle East analysts were anxiously watching to see whether the Arab states would follow the example of Iran, which used its expanded oil revenues to embark on an ambitious program of economic and social development at home, or the example of Libya, whose flamboyant leader boasted of utilizing his oil wealth to "persuade" Uganda and several other African states to cut their ties with Israel, and to subsidize terrorist "liberation" movements against Israel and Northern Ireland.

The UN and Arab Terrorism

While the Palestinian liberation movements failed to dislodge Israel from any part of the territory it has held since the June 1967 war and Israel appeared militarily stronger than at any time in the recent past, terrorist groups in 1972 made several spectacular and wanton attacks. These were against civilians in Israel, including Christian pilgrims at Lod airport, and hijackings and murderous assaults in places as far distant from the scene of the Middle East conflict as Munich and Bangkok. The terrorist tactics of sending letter bombs to Zionist and Jewish leaders throughout the world and the indiscriminate killing of noncombatants clearly showed that the problem of terrorism was global in scope. However, the response of the international community, as represented in the United Nations, was far from adequate and continued to show the application of a double standard.

The pattern was already set in February. After terrorists based in southern Lebanon had fired a bazooka point-blank into a truck carrying a young Israeli couple home from a *bar-mitzvah* celebration, killing both and leaving three small orphaned children, the Israelis launched land and air raids against guerrilla encampments in the Lebanese border region that had come to be known as "Fatahland." Upon Lebanon's complaint, the UN Security Council on February 28 adopted by a vote of 14 to 0 a brief resolution calling on Israel to "immediately desist and refrain" from military action against Lebanon and "forthwith withdraw" all its forces from Lebanese territory. The United States abstained after an American-sponsored preambular sentence deploring "all actions which have resulted in the loss of innocent lives" failed to be adopted. The implicit American criticism of the Arab terrorist acts gained eight votes, one less than the required majority of nine. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were among the four states voting against the preamble. Three members abstained.

When on May 30 three Japanese extremists working for Arab terrorists attacked Lod airport, killing 27 civilians and wounding more than 70 others, the UN Security Council failed to adopt a resolution condemning this mass

murder. However, after Israel again launched a raid against terrorist bases in Lebanon, the Council, in a resolution sponsored by Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, condemned the "repeated attacks of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory and population," and called on Israel to release five Syrian officers and four Lebanese military personnel "abducted" in the raid. Arab terrorism was criticized only implicitly in a preambular clause "profoundly deploring all acts of violence." The resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 to 0, with the United States and Panama abstaining. Ambassador George Bush explained that the United States could not support a resolution that was neither fair nor balanced, and did not condemn Arab terrorist acts as well as the Israeli attacks. He supported Israel's proposal for an over-all exchange of prisoners, urging "all governments concerned to repatriate all military prisoners in their custody." (Besides the five Syrian officers, Israel reportedly was holding 40 Syrian military personnel, four Lebanese prisoners and 60 Egyptians. Egypt was said to be holding 10 Israeli pilots and Syria, three.)

The double standard of the United Nations was even more glaringly displayed in the aftermath of the Munich massacre on September 5, in which eight Arab terrorists of the Black September group, disguised as athletes, invaded the Olympic compound and kidnapped and eventually killed 11 Israeli athletes and trainers (p. 451). President Nixon branded the murders "a senseless tragedy" and a "hideous perversion of the Olympic spirit." Among the Arab leaders, however, only King Hussein of Jordan condemned the terrorists' act as a "despicable crime" against humanity committed by "sick minds" against the interests of "the Palestinian people and the real Arabs." The UN Security Council took no action on the Munich incident.

FIRST U.S. VETO ON MIDDLE EAST

A few days after Munich the Israelis launched air strikes in Syria and Lebanon on ten bases of al Fatah, the reputed sponsor of the clandestine Black September terrorists. The following day, in a Syrian-Israeli air clash, three Syrian bombers were shot down over the Golan Heights. This prompted Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Guinea to introduce a resolution in the Security Council, calling for the immediate end of all military operations by "the parties concerned." Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium submitted amendments also deploring all acts of terrorism, but they were defeated by Soviet and Chinese opposition. Finally, 13 states including the Europeans voted for the resolution; only Panama abstained. At this point the United States exercised its veto right to prevent adoption of the resolution. This was the first time the United States used its charter power to veto a resolution on the Arab-Israel dispute; it was only the second American veto in the history of the UN. Some Arab delegates charged the Nixon administration took this historic step to court the Jewish voters in the United States.

In a statement on the American veto, Ambassador Bush told the Council that "Munich was so horrible, so vicious, so brutal, so detrimental to order in the world and to peace in the Middle East that we simply must not act here as if it did not exist." He had earlier introduced a resolution of his own condemning "the senseless and unprovoked" Munich attack and calling upon the states harboring and supporting terrorists to cease their aid and to "take all necessary measures to bring about the immediate end of such senseless acts." The American resolution was never put to a vote when it became obvious that it had no chance of adoption.

Bush noted that the Council instead chose to discuss Syria's complaint, "that stands out for its unreality. It makes no reference to the tragic events at Munich." The government of Syria, he declared, had not issued a single word of outrage or condemnation "for this despicable act." On the contrary, it "continues to harbor and to give aid and encouragement to terrorist organizations which openly champion such acts." Bush insisted that each member of the Security Council and of the international community "has responsibility to make clear that those who practice such acts, or aid and abet them in any way, are the ones deserving a censure and condemnation. Only then will we begin to eliminate this scourge from the earth, and with it the acts of counterviolence to which history inevitably proves it gives rise."

ROGERS INITIATIVES ON TERRORISM

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim asked the General Assembly, when it convened in September, to consider international measures to protect "innocent victims" such as airline passengers from acts of political terrorism. Secretary Rogers devoted a major portion of his address to the Assembly on September 25 to the issue of terrorism. He noted that the UN Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 affirmed that every human being has the right to life, liberty, and "security of person." Yet in 1972 alone, he noted, 25 airliners from 13 countries were successfully hijacked and 26 other attempts frustrated; 140 passengers and crew were killed and 97 wounded in terrorist acts. In the past five years, he noted, 27 diplomats from 11 countries had been kidnapped and three assassinated. There were also threats against various missions and embassies around the world, including Arab and Soviet missions to the UN, and the mailing of letter bombs to Israeli diplomats.

Secretary Rogers then proceeded to spell out specific actions to be taken by the international community. In addition to urging all states to ratify the existing conventions that impose severe penalties for the hijacking and sabotage of aircraft and require states to extradite or prosecute hijackers and saboteurs, Rogers called for 1) completion and approval of a draft treaty to prosecute or extradite those who kidnap or attack diplomats or officials of international organizations; 2) accelerated consideration by the International

Civil Aviation Organization of a treaty providing for suspension of all air service to countries that fail to punish or extradite hijackers or saboteurs of civil aircraft to make it clear that "a nation which is a haven for hijackers should be outlawed by the international community," and 3) convening of an international conference to conclude a new treaty for the prevention and punishment of acts of international terrorism. He concluded by challenging the General Assembly to "be the driving force for the specific and vigorous steps that are required. Let it prove that the United Nations can meet this test." Rogers circulated at the session a 14-article draft convention providing for the universal condemnation of acts of terrorism and requiring the prosecution or extradition of persons who kill, seriously injure, or kidnap innocent civilians in a foreign state for the purpose of harming or forcing concessions from a state or international organization.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSION

Despite strong Arab and African opposition, the General Assembly voted 66 to 27 to discuss the issue of international terrorism and "its underlying causes." Half of the Assembly's members abstained, including the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc. Some of the African opposition stemmed from fear that antiterrorist measures would be utilized by colonialist powers to undermine national liberation movements against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal. Most Arab states charged that the American antiterrorist campaign, despite its general terms, was really intended against the Arabs.

Rogers had attempted to forestall these criticisms by noting in his speech that "the issue is not war—war between states, civil war, or revolutionary war. The issue is not the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and independence." He acknowledged that many criminal acts of terrorism "derive from political origins" and that the international community must seriously consider questions of self-determination. "But political passion, however deeply held," he insisted, "cannot be a justification for criminal violence against innocent persons." The real and crucial issue, he said, was "whether the vulnerable lines of international communication—the airways and the mails, diplomatic discourse and international meetings—can continue, without disruption, to bring nations and peoples together."

The terrorism item was referred to the Assembly's legal committee where the Arabs and their Soviet and Chinese supporters formed a coalition with many of the Afro-Asian states to deflect the Assembly from taking immediate action. On December 11, after lengthy debate, the committee adopted an Algerian resolution which called only for a study to determine the underlying causes of terrorism. The resolution indicated where its backers thought the blame should be put by explicitly condemning "the continuation of repressive

and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien regimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-determination and independence and other human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 76 to 34—well over the two-thirds necessary for General Assembly approval—with 16 abstentions and six absent. The United States voted against the resolution, as did most of the West European and Latin American states and some members of the British Commonwealth. The only Middle East states to vote against the resolution were Israel, Iran, and Turkey, which was only recently plagued by foreign-trained and -financed urban terrorist groups. When the General Assembly plenary passed the resolution a week later, by a similar vote, Ambassador Bush said it was “tragic” that the United Nations had failed to formulate “an adequate response to the deadly menace of international terrorism.”

OTHER MIDDLE EAST ISSUES

The Assembly dealt with the political issues of the Middle East conflict in a resolution reflecting Arab and Soviet efforts to have the Assembly condemn Israel and to give Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 a largely pro-Arab interpretation. The Assembly resolution deplored Israel’s noncompliance with its 1971 resolution calling on the state to respond favorably to Dr. Jarring’s peace initiative, which the Assembly fully supported. The resolution further invited Israel “to declare publicly its adherence to the principles of non-annexation of territories through the use of force,” declared null and void changes “carried out by Israel in the occupied territories in contravention of the Geneva Convention of 1949,” and called on Israel forthwith to rescind all such measures and to “desist from all policies and practices affecting the physical character or demographic compositions of the occupied Arab territories.”

The Arab states had been pressing for compulsory economic sanctions against Israel by all UN members. To gain majority support for the resolution, the Arab states agreed to amendments which toned down the demand. The resolution, as adopted,

Calls upon all States not to recognize any such changes and measures carried out by Israel in the occupied Arab territories and invites them to avoid actions, including actions in the field of aid, that could constitute recognition of that occupation; . . .

The resolution won overwhelming support and was approved on December 8 by a majority of 86 to 7, with 31 abstentions and 8 absent. Only six Latin American states joined Israel in voting against the resolution. The United States abstained. Ambassador Bush, who had argued against the resolution, expressed regret at its adoption. The United States, he explained, believed

such a resolution "cannot render constructive assistance to the processes of diplomacy," since several paragraphs "appear calculated to upset the careful balance of Security Council Resolution 242" which linked Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories to agreement between the parties on a just and lasting peace.

The American refusal to support the Assembly resolution clearly indicated that there would be no change in United States aid to Israel. In any case, the Assembly resolution was of a recommendatory, not mandatory, character. Only the Security Council can adopt decisions formally binding on member states. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority supporting the resolution represented a further erosion of Israel's position in the international community. It reflected not only moral opposition to Israel's continued occupation of Arab territory but also the practical reality of the unwillingness of many states to oppose the Arab states, based either on their dependence on Arab oil or their desire for improved political and economic relations with the Arab states.

GEORGE E. GRUEN

American Response to Soviet Anti-Jewish Policies

THE FULL IMPACT of the resurgence of Jewish consciousness in the Soviet Union, and especially the growing demand of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel, was felt throughout the world in 1971-1972. This awakening of Soviet Jews was a long-delayed reaction to Soviet antisemitism and the systematic strangulation of Jewish institutions, spurred by Israel's victory in the six-day war of June 1967. What began with surface signs of Jewish identity, such as the Simhat Torah manifestations in Moscow and in one or two other Soviet cities developed into a widespread movement, especially among young people, to leave for Israel. The outside world learned of this movement among Soviet Jews when reports began to appear in the Western press of petitions demanding "repatriation" to their "ancient homeland," often accompanied by a rejection of Soviet citizenship.

The Soviet crackdown on Jewish activism started with a wave of arrests in Leningrad, Riga, and Kishinev in June 1970 following the attempted hijacking of a Soviet airplane at Leningrad's Smolny airport, in what was reported as preparation of a show-trial of a group of "Jewish Zionist traitors." In the first Leningrad trial in December two of the twelve defendants accused of the hijacking were sentenced to death (AJYB, 1971 [Vol.72], p. 407). News of these convictions outraged the free world. A fresh group of trials of Jewish activists and some who had applied for emigration to Israel took place in Leningrad, Riga, Odessa, and Kishinev between January and June 1971 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], pp. 541-42). One of the nine defendants in the second Leningrad trial in May was sentenced to up to ten years in a strict-regime labor colony; the other sentences were between one and seven years.

Protest demonstrations and news coverage of the trials throughout the United States over a period of many weeks, from the end of December 1970 through April and stretching into May 1971, no doubt helped moderate the sentences imposed on the three men and one woman, the 24-year-old nurse, Ruth Alexandrovich, who were tried in Riga in June. Ruth Alexandrovich's mother Rivka, who was allowed to emigrate to Israel before the trial, came to the United States in the hope that a vigorous campaign to marshal American public opinion on her daughter's behalf would help avert a severe sentence. She traveled throughout the country, speaking at dozens of meetings and rallies, as well as to the press, interfaith groups, and gatherings in New York,

Boston, Washington, Chicago, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and many other cities, with extensive coverage in the press. She was given a standing ovation by the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church which she addressed in May 1971 for the defendants.

American Jewish Response

Throughout 1971 and 1972 American Jews responded to the trials and the increasing flow of petitions and demonstrations by Russian Jews with an outpouring of concern and support not seen since the six-day war. The response was spontaneous, widespread, and deeply emotional, especially among Jewish youth. Public concern generally was stimulated by the news media, which looked upon the airplane incident in Leningrad, the death sentences, the spate of "show trials" and the demonstrations in response to them as a fresh story. For the first time the *New York Times* and dozens of other newspapers in cities of different sizes gave it consistent front-page treatment. At the same time Christian groups, labor organizations, leading personalities, and others sent thousands of messages to Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and other Soviet leaders, protesting the convictions and demanding that the prisoners be set free; Jewish communities elicited similar statements from state legislatures, governors and other public officials.

The Organized Community

In the past, and ever since its creation in 1964, the largely New York-based Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry has been a mainstay—certainly in the East and before the establishment of a funded New York Conference on Soviet Jewry—in sustaining interest in Soviet Jews. It has succeeded in doing so, despite severe limitations of budget and staff, under its director Jacob Birnbaum and New York coordinator Glenn Richter. The group formally became a member agency of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry only in 1971.

The momentum of the popular response finally moved the Jewish communities and national Jewish organizations to give the issue top priority treatment in staff and funding. This made possible a dramatic increase in educational and protest activities, notably in Los Angeles, Cleveland, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and Minneapolis. Demonstrations and protests by Jewish and non-Jewish groups were conducted in well over one hundred cities throughout the country.

By the end of 1972 the majority of community member agencies in the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council and the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds had formed special committees on

Soviet Jewry. At the same time national agencies, including the American Jewish Congress, American Jewish Committee, B'nai B'rith, and the Anti-Defamation League, greatly increased their budgets for developing interpretive and educational materials, as well as for sponsoring conferences, symposia, meetings, demonstrations, direct contact programs, and a host of other efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews.

Illustrative of the change was the general evaluation, by Jerry Goodman, of attitudes in the mid-1960s:

With few exceptions, notably Jewish defense organizations in the United States (American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, B'nai B'rith, National Community Relations Advisory Council), Jewish opinion had previously remained unconvinced of the special nature of anti-Jewish discrimination in the USSR. Most Jewish organizations in the United States had been content to employ "quiet diplomacy" and to restrict their activities to meeting with low-echelon Soviet officials who had assured them that there was no Jewish problem in the USSR. (AJYB, 1965 [Vol.66], p. 312).

NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

In the late spring of 1971 the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, which had been housed, staffed, and largely financed by the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC) since 1964, was reorganized. The reason was that the work for Soviet Jewry had become of such importance that national programming required the exclusive attention of an independent board and staff. Relieved of this responsibility, NJCRAC could now devote itself to the over-all task of coordinating the work of the local communities. This author served as the coordinator of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry from 1968 to 1971 and Rabbi Hirschel Schacter served as its chairman in 1970-1971. Jerry Goodman was appointed executive director of the newly-organized group, the National Conference on Soviet Jewry; Richard Maass, chairman of the American Jewish Committee's Foreign Affairs Committee and a vice-chairman of the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, was elected its chairman.

The plenum of the National Conference now included all members of the American Jewish Conference and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, and a stipulated number of representatives of welfare funds and community relations councils designated jointly by the NJCRAC and the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds which became a member agency in 1971.

After many years of prodding, the effort in New York City was finally given the funding adequate for a city with the largest Jewish population in the United States. In August 1971 the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry, too, was reorganized and Malcolm Hoenlein became its first full-time executive director.

UNION OF COUNCILS OF SOVIET JEWS

There had evolved in a dozen or so communities local Soviet Jewry groups not representative of the organized Jewish community. Considering themselves more militant, they were unwilling to work under the jurisdiction of local Jewish community relations councils and federations, and developed their own individual programs and styles. For the most part, these groups did not conduct mass protest activities, except for a few well-attended "candlelight walks" and Simhat Torah rallies in Los Angeles and San Francisco. However, some of them—notably in Cleveland, the San Francisco Bay Area, and Los Angeles—developed the first person-to-person programs with Soviet Jews, by mail and phone, which were later adopted by the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry. The wide activities of these groups were largely uncoordinated until 1971 when ongoing, though loose, contacts were established between about 12 of them. In that year they were federated into a national organization, the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. Louis Rosenblum, head of the Cleveland Council on Anti-Semitism, the first local group on Soviet Jewry to be formed, was elected chairman.

BRUSSELS WORLD CONFERENCE

A major effort on behalf of Soviet Jewry was the World Conference of Jewish Communities on Soviet Jewry, which met in Brussels, Belgium, in February 1971. It drew some 800 delegates from 38 countries on all continents. The United States delegation of over 200, the largest, represented the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the two major organizers and American sponsors of the meeting.¹

On the last day of the meeting, the delegates proclaimed the Brussels Declaration,² which was a firm commitment by organized Jewry throughout the world to escalate the protest movement in support of Soviet Jewry. On the day the conference opened, Jewish activists in the Soviet Union cabled to Brussels directly to express their solidarity with its aims. A panel of recent Soviet emigrants to Israel also issued strong statements calling for continued action. One of the most poignant of these was by Grisha Feigen, a much

¹Jewish Defense League leader Rabbi Meir Kahane, who attempted to present to the conference a 10-point program focusing on confrontation and personal harassment of Soviet diplomats all over the world, was denied entry since he was not an appointed delegate. His subsequent deportation by the Belgian government received world-wide publicity.

²Full text appended; for a more complete report of the conference see *Congress Bi-Weekly*, March 1971, Richard Cohen, ed., *Let My People Go*, (New York, 1971), pp. 119–229. Cohen served as chief press officer of the conference.

decorated former army major from Riga, who had been committed to an insane asylum as punishment for his demands to leave for Israel.

For weeks before the opening of the conference, the Soviet government, through its diplomats and in the Soviet news media waged a campaign of vilification against the conference sponsors and the host country. Failing to pressure the Belgian government into withdrawing permission for the conference, the Kremlin used every possible propaganda device to discredit the assembly. It even dispatched a group of "representative" Soviet Jews, headed by General David A. Dragunsky, one of the "official Jews" and propagandists for the Soviet Union, to hold a competing "conference" in Brussels (AJYB, 1972 [Vol.73], p. 499). These ploys only served to focus world attention on the conference.

In the weeks following the World Conference, Soviet authorities granted exit permits to Jews in markedly increasing numbers. Because many of those allowed to emigrate to Israel were leaders of the Jewish activist movement, there was conjecture that the move had a two-fold purpose: to eliminate the leadership of Jewish assertiveness and, at the same time, assuage public opinion in the United States, the seat of the United Nations where the question of human rights was a sensitive one, especially among the emergent African and Asian nations. Perhaps the increase in exit permits and the suspension of trials also reflected the Soviet wish to avoid criticism from Communist parties in other countries (some of which had protested in the past) during the Communist party congress held in Moscow in April 1971. No doubt, the global attention received by the Brussels conference was a factor.

INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATION ON SOVIET JEWRY

A follow-up to the Brussels Conference was the International Consultation on Soviet Jewry held in London in March 1971. It was attended by top echelon Jewish leadership from many nations, including a delegation from the United States. In a formal declaration, the conference observed the "more realistic" emerging policy of the USSR, especially the increase in emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union since the Brussels Conference. It noted, however, that those allowed to leave "represent only a fraction of the number who have applied to emigrate" and that "the basic condition of Soviet Jewry remains unchanged." Reaffirming the determination of world Jewry to work for the freedom of Soviet Jews "to choose their own destiny," the statement condemned all Soviet discrimination against Jews and reasserted the principle that "the Jewish people of the Soviet Union are entitled to develop their culture, Hebrew and Yiddish languages and literature, to practice their religion and in all ways to preserve their historic heritage, as are other nationality groups."

AMERICAN PROTEST INTENSIFIES

The new priority given by American Jewry to the Soviet Jews resulted in nation-wide activities. Jewish holiday themes were often transformed into programs on their behalf. During Passover of both years their plight received prominent treatment in news reports of synagogue services and outdoor *sedorim*. A "Matzah of Hope" dedicated to the Soviet Jews—with a relevant passage written in Hebrew, English, and Yiddish—was incorporated into the *seder* services in tens of thousands of Jewish homes. In 1971 alone, more than a million copies of the text were distributed in communities and to synagogues and community centers through the Conference on Soviet Jewry and NJCRAC. Tishah be-Av was the occasion for Freedom Fasts for Soviet Jews.

The High Holy Days, and the traditional Rosh Ha-shanah greetings, were also co-opted on behalf of the Soviet Jews. Member organizations of the National Conference encouraged communities to send tens of thousands of letters, cables, and telephone greetings to individual Soviet Jews. On Simhat Torah, when Russian Jews demonstrated their Jewishness by dancing and singing outside the synagogues in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities, more than a hundred simultaneous gatherings were held in America to express solidarity with them.

In December 1971 over 25,000 persons jammed Madison Square Garden in a "Freedom Lights for Soviet Jewry" Hannukah celebration, which was addressed by Ruth Alexandrovich, who had been freed in November.

The subsistence diet on which prisoners in Soviet labor camps were forced to live was the focus of special protests during Human Rights Week observances. In 1971 over 30 communities conducted programs on behalf of the POCs, the Soviet Jewish "prisoners of conscience." These were sponsored by the Leadership Conference of National Jewish Women's Organizations in cooperation with NJCRAC and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. In 1972 such programs were conducted in more than 50 cities by coalitions of Jewish and non-Jewish women's organizations. Several times during the two years POCs in the Potma prison complex in the Soviet Union conducted hunger strikes; simultaneous sympathy demonstrations were held in several northern and western cities in the United States.

As part of the over-all effort, recent Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel, many of whom spoke fluent English, continued to be brought to the United States to tour communities and university campuses, giving personal testimony before Jewish and non-Jewish audiences and at meetings with federal officials, members of Congress, and White House staff. Several spoke movingly of close relatives from whom they had been separated by the

arbitrary issuance of exit visas, and many spoke of husbands and wives who had been imprisoned because they wanted to emigrate.

SOVIET VISITORS TO UNITED STATES

Another method of expressing solidarity with Soviet Jews was to confront Soviet artists, performers, intellectuals, academicians, and diplomats visiting American cities with protests against Soviet anti-Jewish policies. At the same time, their audiences and listeners were reminded that Jewish culture was being strangled in the Soviet Union. In more than 40 cities that were toured by the Osipov Balalaika orchestra, a Russian hockey team, and other groups, as well as by Soviet Minister of Health Boris Petrovsky, newspaper advertisements "welcoming" the Russians also expressed concern for Soviet treatment of Jews; flyers were distributed, and meetings with the Russians were arranged. High Soviet officials on diplomatic visits abroad were greeted with outpourings of protests by impressive crowds of demonstrators.

Evidence of Soviet Sensitivity

The Soviet Union's sensitivity to world-wide reaction, as noted earlier in connection with the Brussels Conference, became evident from a number of defensive moves. Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin in Montreal, Communist Party Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev in Paris, and Soviet diplomats elsewhere mouthed the customary clichés about the freedom of "the people's democracy" from antisemitism. A mission headed by General Dragunsky toured a number of United States cities to persuade Americans that Soviet Jews enjoyed equality with other Soviet citizens. The effort was largely negated when publicity by local Jewish host organizations on the occasion of his visits to Jewish and secular educational institutions, centers, social service agencies, and other installations, took issue with the palpable apologetics of the Russian.

Yevgeny Yevtushenko returned to the United States for a tour of readings, including one on national television, of his work *Babi Yar*, a memorial to the nearly 100,000 Jews murdered by the Nazis in a Kiev ravine. Wherever he appeared, however, he also made a statement deploring what he called "isolated" instances of antisemitism in the Soviet Union. In a South American appearance Yevtushenko deprecated those Soviet Jews who wished to go to Israel.

At the same time Soviet authorities exploited the departure from Israel of a few disgruntled Soviet Jews who had failed to adjust to the unfamiliar way of life as evidence of the foolhardiness of emigration. But this had no visible

effect on the determination of Soviet Jews to emigrate. As for American public opinion, the impact of such departures was negligible, since these represented just a fraction of one per cent of the ever-growing number of Russian emigrants to Israel.

Violence Condemned

Some young people and adults resorted to violence, molestation, disruption, and similar tactics in the belief that such actions would more effectively call attention to the situation of Soviet Jews and secure better results. Such tactics were used especially by the Jewish Defense League (JDL) with increasing frequency in 1971 and 1972. Leaders and members of the JDL were indicted and some convicted of unlawful conduct.

The organized Jewish community, especially the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry and its constituent organizations, disassociated itself from the threat or use of violence by American Jews as a means of forcing an amelioration of the situation of Soviet Jews, and denounced it as "inimicable to the true interests of both American and Soviet Jews."

Some of these acts had tragic consequences, as the death of a young woman employee in an explosion set off in the offices of impresario Sol Hurok. In late May several young Jews carrying JDL membership cards were allegedly caught in the act of assembling explosive devices in the washroom of a Long Island synagogue. The arresting officers found on their persons directions for reaching the suburban estate of the Soviet delegation to the United Nations. Though JDL has denied knowledge of these acts, many felt that the organization has probably contributed toward violence by condoning them, thereby encouraging further violence.

In a statement adopted at its June 1972 plenary session, NJCRAC, representing nine national Jewish organizations and 93 local community groups, said "violence gives grist to the mill of Soviet propaganda, both in the Soviet media where it is used to support the myth of Jewish or Zionist terrorism and in other parts of the world where it serves to alienate Russian intellectuals who are sympathetic with Soviet Jews." It condemned "the use of violence in any cause, whether it be one that we endorse or one that we oppose. . . . Employed in the cause of Soviet Jewry it is conspicuously destructive of the very objective it seeks to promote and turns public sympathy away from Soviet Jewry to the victims of violence."

Mikhail Zand, Soviet Jewish scholar-activist who, after waiting several years, was finally granted permission to emigrate to Israel, denounced the violent tactics of JDL at the convention of the Zionist Organization of America in late 1971. He revealed that the Kremlin exploited reports of anti-Soviet violence in America to brand all Jews barbarians; that prominent

Soviet Jews were being pressured into signing denunciations of such violence, and that these were distorted into repudiations of all activity in support of Soviet Jewish rights and freedom.

Appeals to the World

Soviet Jews increasingly addressed appeals for help to the outside world. Many letters were sent to the United States, particularly emotional pleas for assistance to President Nixon (to his wife from women activists), to Senators George McGovern and Hubert H. Humphrey, and to many other leading political figures in the 1972 election campaign. Throughout this period hardly a week passed without reports of a new confrontation between the Soviet authorities and Jews, or the publications of a petition, signed sometimes by a few, sometimes by hundreds of Jews. One such petition, dated September 20, 1972, was signed by nearly a thousand Jews in several Soviet cities. One petition from Georgian Jews, which called for "Israel or death," was indicative of the intensity of feeling that prompted these petitions.

Just before Rosh Ha-shanah and again on Yom Kippur, thousands of Jews from many parts of the Soviet Union gathered at Babi Yar near Kiev, at Rumbili near Riga, and at Ponari near Vilna—all sites of mass murders of Jews by the Nazis—to mourn the many thousands of martyrs buried there and to protest the official Soviet attempt to suppress the fact that they were murdered because they were Jews. Jewish students expressed solidarity with the Soviet Jews by simultaneously conducting memorials at the Isaiah Wall facing the United Nations in New York City.

Jewish protests and appeals found support in the liberal intellectual movement that has surfaced in the Soviet Union in recent years. In fall 1971, for example, the outstanding non-Jewish Soviet physicist Andrei Sakharov, who headed the Committee on Human Rights in the Soviet Union, addressed an open appeal to the Supreme Soviet to permit both Jews and non-Jews who wished to leave the country to do so (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 545).

Increasingly throughout 1972, Soviet Jews heavily relied on American intercession with the Soviet authorities to help their cause, as indicated in letters smuggled out of the USSR and in the many telephone calls which, despite interruptions and interdictions, were routinely put through from American to Soviet Jews. Some spoke freely of their desire to emigrate and gave news of harassments and arrests of relatives and friends. It was through such a phone call from a Hadassah leader in Chicago to the Moscow activist Lydia Kornfeld that news came of the expulsion in January 1972 of Congressman James H. Scheuer for allegedly having "incited" Soviet Jews to seek emigration to Israel. He and other Congressmen visiting the Soviet Union had privately met with Jewish activists. Eight governors who toured the USSR in the spring insisted on making public visits to synagogues in

Moscow and Tiflis and repeatedly queried Soviet officials about their policies with regard to the Jews. Such visits to the Soviet Union by American officials gave moral support to the Soviet Jews and also helped publicize their plight.

Nixon Visit to Moscow

Programmatic efforts by the organized Jewish community to bring about official United States intercession with the Soviet authorities at the highest levels was pressed on the eve of President Nixon's departure for summit negotiations with the Russians in late May 1972. A campaign for signatures on petitions asking the President to make the emigration of Soviet Jews a priority agenda item in his meetings gathered more than a million and a half names. On Sunday, April 30, a National Day of Solidarity was observed in more than 100 American cities with parades, marches, rallies, and other events. Outstanding was the parade down Fifth Avenue in New York City, sponsored by the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry, in which close to 100,000 persons participated. These observances were given extensive coverage by the nation's news media. Soviet Jews heard about them from the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Kol Yisrael. Although there was no definite announcement that the question of Soviet Jewish emigration was on the officially announced agenda of items to be discussed between Nixon and Brezhnev, the President's foreign policy advisor, Henry Kissinger, indicated at a press conference after Nixon's return that the subject had been "mentioned" in the course of the talks. In later months the President, himself, told Jewish leaders that it was discussed.

In a move apparently calculated to remove Jewish activists from the scene during the Nixon visit, many younger Jews in Moscow and other cities were ordered to report for military service in late April and early May; others, anticipating such calls, went into hiding. A number of prominent activists were arrested and detained for as long as 15 days without charges. American Jews made hundreds of telephone calls to the Soviet Union during the Nixon trip in attempts to focus attention on these activists. Many of these calls were interdicted, and the American media expressed strong concern over the interference. Several American journalists who accompanied Nixon engaged Soviet authorities in well-publicized dialogues on the question of antisemitism in the Soviet Union and the expressed desire of many Jews to emigrate. The wire services, and particularly the press, gave extensive coverage to the departure of James Michener from a press conference when a Soviet editor made disparaging remarks about Jews.

Besides the many petitions sent to the President before he left for Moscow, there was wide participation of elected officials and other public figures in rallies. In at least 35 states, legislative actions, gubernatorial proclamations, denunciations of Soviet persecution of Jews, and appeals asked that the

President raise the question of the Soviet Jews on his visit. Hundreds of cities joined with municipal enactments or mayoral statements. A caucus of six black Congressmen addressed a similar letter to Soviet Ambassador Anatole Dobrynin, and on March 19, 1972, a National Interreligious Consultation on Soviet Jewry was held in Chicago with 600 participants, mainly Christian clergy joining in a statement of conscience. Later in 1972 a permanent Secretariat of this Interreligious Task Force was set up to work with national Christian groups on behalf of Soviet Jewry. R. Sargent Shriver, former director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, and Sister Ann Gillen, executive director of the National Council of Nuns, were appointed honorary chairman and executive director, respectively.

Official U.S. Action

The United States repeatedly condemned the Soviet Union's treatment of its Jewish citizens through official representatives in various United Nations agencies, particularly the Commission on Human Rights. However, the most notable altercation occurred between Ambassador George Bush and Soviet Ambassador Yakov A. Malik in 1972 after the latter had unleashed a blatantly antisemitic attack in a Security Council debate. Earlier, at a press conference on the occasion of the Riga trial, official State Department spokesman William Bray denounced the arrests and trials as "totally unjustified and indefensible."

After several years of discussions by the American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry, and later by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, with the State Department and the United States Information Agency, strong public pressure was exerted for the Voice of America to add to its broadcasts to the Soviet Union programs directed especially to Soviet Jewry. Finally, in 1972, Voice of America initiated a regularly scheduled one-minute broadcast of this kind, which was repeated three times weekly, but this was criticized as wholly inadequate by Jewish organizations.

In 1972, following Nixon's publicly stated concern, officials of the National Conference, joined at times by the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, met with members of the White House staff for further consideration of the question.

Koch Bill

In March 1971 Congressman Edward Koch (D., N.Y.), who had been involved in activities on behalf of Soviet Jewry for some years, introduced a bill in Congress to set aside 30,000 visas for the immigration of Soviet Jews. A number of national Jewish organizations, ranging from the Workmen's Circle to the Religious Zionists of America (Mizrachi), supported Koch's

move which appeared to be designed to build up official United States pressure against restrictive Soviet emigration policies. The bill created a good deal of public discussion. There was a difference of opinion among Jewish organizations on whether the bill should be passed, since the issue here was for the Russian government to ease curbs on emigration rather than for the United States to ease further its immigration policy which had become considerably liberalized in the last decade. In evident agreement with that view, Koch later withdrew his bill. However, the interest created by the publicity given the Koch Bill was extremely helpful in eliciting a promise from the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to make full use of existing immigration statutes and to expedite procedures for Russian Jews who would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union for the United States. In 1971 close to 300 were admitted; in 1972 the number was almost 500. Major assistance to these immigrants was given by United HIAS.

Emigration to Israel

Under rising pressure, the Soviet government permitted some 13,000 Jews to leave for Israel in 1971, and well over 32,000 in 1972—a large number compared to the total of 5,675 who had been permitted to do so in the preceding four years.³ No doubt, many more Soviet Jews would have registered for emigration but for the very high visa fee of approximately \$1,100. Applicants were also beset by delay, hostile interrogation, harassment, and economic and social sanctions. Among the most onerous requirement for emigration was a character reference (*harakteristika*) from employer, housing superintendent, and others. Those asking for such reference were at once exposed to mistreatment, hounding, and the contempt of fellow employees and neighbors, and often suffered the loss of employment and expulsion from schools and other institutions.

“Ransom” Tax

Concomitant with the dramatic rise in emigration was the imposition on August 3, 1972, of an additional, exorbitant exit fee scaled to the educational attainments of the applicants and ranging up to \$35,000. American public opinion reacted strongly in scores of editorials denouncing the odious practice

³Of the Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel during 1972, one-third were from Georgia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and some from Tashkent, Bokhara, and Samarkand and areas under Soviet control since the end of World War II. It seemed clear that it was in the Russian heartland, where most Soviet Jews were living and where the most rigorous restraints were being placed upon Jewish religious and cultural activities and the greatest pressures exerted for assimilation, that visas for Israel were most difficult to obtain.

of putting "a price tag on human beings," an act reminiscent of the Nazi holocaust. A resolution "not to pay blackmail" was passed overwhelmingly at an emergency conference of world Jewish community leaders, called in London in September 1972. Many Soviet Jewish activists concurred in messages and appeals sent to the conference. The decision not to pay was also buttressed by resolution at the assembly of the Jewish Agency meeting in Jerusalem at the same time. Although there was a significant decrease in the number of Jews with higher education as well as academicians and scientists arriving in Israel after the imposition of the new tax, immigration remained fairly stable at a 2,000 monthly average. However, Israeli authorities put the number of applications for visas to Israel which were being held up at about 100,000. At the same time, harassment of activists and applicants for emigration increased with several arrests and trials of individuals that began in July and August, and continued throughout 1972 into the spring of 1973 (p. 487).

Jackson Amendment

Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) initiated legislation that took issue with the Soviet government's new policies by linking trade privileges sought by the Soviet Union with an easing of emigration restrictions. At an emergency conference convened by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry in Washington, D.C., on September 26, 1972, in which Jewish communities and national agencies around the country participated, Jackson outlined his proposed amendment to the East-West Trade Act that barred non-Common Market countries from having most-favored-nation (MFN) status if they denied their citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate, or imposed more than a nominal tax on emigration, until such time as the President determined the country was no longer in violation.

The Jewish community traditionally favored a relaxation of tensions and détente between the United States and the Soviet Union and the encouragement of trade in the hope that this would afford greater opportunity to influence the Soviet Union with regard to its treatment of Soviet Jews. However, the Jewish leadership now fully backed the Jackson amendment's rationale that the pressure of linking trade with the question of Soviet Jews must be employed in the struggle to alleviate their plight. Support came from many other sectors of American society. More than 70 Senators cosponsored the amendment, and close to 200 Congressmen sponsored a similar bill in the House of Representatives under the leadership of Congressman Charles A. Vanik (D., Ohio). Significantly, the chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills, later joined in leading the sponsorship.

During the 1972 election campaign many statements supporting the

Jackson Amendment were made by leaders of both parties and by candidates for various offices. Against this background, the Soviet need for developing trade with the United States became increasingly clear as Soviet trade delegations fanned out throughout the country in July, August, and September in a search for upgrading Russian technology and industrial know-how. Many important American firms announced exploratory talks with their Soviet counterparts and, indeed, several banks and important companies began opening offices in Moscow. In a coup scored by a Russian trade mission several huge grain purchases were made during the summer of 1972 with no fanfare and awareness of massive crop failures in the Soviet Union.

Although the grain purchases were not affected by the Jackson Amendment, it assumed importance when suddenly, in late October, large numbers of well-known Jewish activists were allowed to leave the Soviet Union without paying the education tax—a clear nod to President Nixon and an attempt to win over Congress. (The proposed amendment would have had to be reintroduced after the November elections.)

Russian Jews seized upon Soviet vulnerability by stepping up demands for the right to emigrate. Sit-ins and demonstrations were conducted with regularity outside the Kremlin, at the Supreme Soviet, at visa headquarters, and at central telephone and telegraph offices in several Russian cities. The authorities struck back by arbitrarily cutting off telephones, threatening induction in the armed forces, and a variety of other bullying tactics that sought to dampen the spreading movement for emigration.

Nevertheless, toward the end of the year, arrivals in Israel continued at the rate of 2,500 or more per month. Among them were representatives of what still remained of the Jewish life-style in the Soviet Union: the sister-in-law of Vladimir Jabotinsky, founder of the Zionist Revisionist movement; the widow and son of Peretz Markish, the Yiddish writer who had been killed in the wholesale executions of Jewish intellectuals in August 1952, and the daughter of the late Rabbi Yehuda Leib Levin of Moscow.

As 1972 ended, coordination of programmatic activities on behalf of Soviet Jews in America rose to new heights. This was evident in mid-December, during Human Rights Week, when dozens of new coalitions of Jewish and non-Jewish women's organizations focused protest activities on the more than 40 young men and women who were serving harsh prison terms. Demonstrations took place in more than 50 cities, again under the sponsorship of the Leadership Conference of National Jewish Women's Organizations with the staff assistance of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council.

APPENDIX

Brussels Declaration By the World Conference
of Jewish Communities on Soviet Jewry

We, the delegates of this Conference, coming from Jewish communities throughout the world, solemnly declare our solidarity with our Jewish brothers in the Soviet Union.

We want them to know—and they will take encouragement from this knowledge—that we are at one with them, totally identified with their heroic struggle for the safeguarding of their national identity and for their natural and inalienable right to return to their historic homeland, the land of Israel.

Profoundly concerned for their fate and future, we denounce the policy pursued by the government of the Soviet Union of suppressing the historic Jewish cultural and religious heritage. This constitutes a flagrant violation of human rights which the Soviet Constitution pledges to uphold and which is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To cut them off from the rest of the Jewish people, as the Soviet authorities are attempting to do, is a crime against humanity.

Soviet spokesmen claim that there is no need for Jewish culture and education, that there is no Jewish problem in the Soviet Union and that there is no anti-Semitism. These assertions have been proven false by the Soviet Jews themselves. The entire world has heard their protest.

Tens of thousands of Jews have petitioned the Soviet authorities for the right to settle in Israel and raise their children in the Jewish tradition and culture. Letters, messages and petitions, sent at the signatories' peril from the Soviet Union to individuals, to governments, to the United Nations and other international organizations, all demand recognition of these rights.

The reaction of the Soviet authorities to this Jewish awakening has been to mount a campaign of harassment, arrests and virulent anti-Jewish propaganda. The Leningrad trial, shocking to the world, was but one manifestation of such persecution. Far from being crushed by such intimidation, Soviet Jews today demand their rights with ever greater courage and determination.

This conference urgently calls upon the civilized world to join with us and with the Jews of the USSR in urging the Soviet authorities:

To recognize the right of Jews who so desire to return to their historic homeland in Israel, and to ensure the unhindered exercise of this right.

To enable the Jews in the USSR to exercise fully their right to live in accord with the Jewish cultural and religious heritage and freely to raise their children in this heritage.

To put an end to the defamation of the Jewish people and of Zionism, reminiscent of the evil anti-Semitism which has caused so much suffering to the Jewish people and to the world.

We assembled in this Conference commit ourselves, by unceasing effort, to ensure

that the plight of Soviet Jewry is kept before the conscience of the world until the justice of their cause prevails.

We will continue to mobilize the energies of all Jewish communities. We will work through the United Nations and other international bodies and through every agency of public opinion.

We will not rest until the Jews of the Soviet Union are free to choose their own destiny.

LET MY PEOPLE GO!

February 25, 1971

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Intergroup Relations and Tensions in the United States

IN 1973, as in any given year, there were innumerable cross-currents flowing simultaneously between the diverse racial, religious, and ethnic groups comprising America; advances as well as setbacks; harmonies as well as discords. From the wealth of material and reports, at times contradictory, there emerged a number of major trends.

It was evident that the concept of equal opportunity in higher education and employment had been supplanted by one of "affirmative action." Mere nondiscrimination was found insufficient to erase the cumulative effects of discrimination based on color and sex. Special help for the disadvantaged became the order of the day. While some advocated limited affirmative-action measures, such as expanded recruitment, test validation, remedial education, apprenticeship training, and financial stipends—provided others weren't deprived in the process—many went appreciably further in supporting quotas, preferential treatment, and artificially imposed proportional representation based on race, ethnicity, or sex. Endeavors of the latter kind, perceived as discrimination in reverse, engendered considerable acrimony among white males.

Tension developed between whites and economically and culturally disadvantaged minority groups—Chicanos, Indians, Puerto Ricans, Asians—in a variety of conflict situations. Frequently partial accommodations of competing group interests occurred; but rarely, if ever, were the underlying problems—the disparities of wealth, power, status, and life style—resolved. An increasingly important factor in intergroup relations was the heightened group consciousness and assertiveness of the so-called "white ethnics"—Italians, Poles, Slavs,

Greeks, and others—whose needs and aspirations had remained unfulfilled. Still another complicating element was the emergence of women as a distinct group with distinct grievances and goals. But despite the multiple configurations of rights in conflict, there was intergroup cooperation on many levels, and even coalition-building around particular common causes, for example, the fight against crime of the diverse groups welded together in the National Alliance for Shaping Safer Cities.

It was apparent that black people, the largest disadvantaged minority group, continued to make progress in 1973 in economic, educational, and political status, as well as human dignity. There was much debate, however, about how substantial these gains actually were in relation to the depth of black deprivation.

Racial integration in public schools presented a contradictory picture. While some formerly largely segregated school districts particularly in the South became integrated, numerous others, which had been largely desegregated, became reseggregated when white parents moved away because the growing number of black pupils became unacceptable to them. The underlying reasons were latent racism, concerns about their children's safety, discipline, or scholastic achievement, or a combination of these factors.

Closely linked to the possibilities of school integration was the ongoing problem of integration in housing, where relatively little progress was made despite legal sanctions. Some of the reasons were the same as those impeding school integration (the fear of many whites that a black influx would mean a rise in the violent crime rate and a decrease in property values being paramount), compounded by lack of the necessary money on the part of most blacks. Still, there was continued limited movement of inner city blacks into predominantly white suburbia.

Relations between the various faith groups had their share of cooperation and controversy. The emotion-laden issue of financing with public funds impoverished, mainly Roman Catholic religious schools continued as a bone of contention between Catholics, Jews, and Protestants, despite U.S. Supreme Court rulings invalidating various state efforts to provide public aid to such schools. There were sharp divisions on this issue within each major faith group, as well as among them. The same was true, to a degree, of the persistent proposals to amend the Constitution to permit organized prayer in public schools, as well as of the battle over abortion reform, although on these issues the divisions were of a somewhat different nature. And the major Christian evangelical drive, Key '73, was seen by many Jewish leaders as a potential threat to religious pluralism in general,

and to Judaism in particular. This was distinguishable, however, from traditional antisemitism, which was generally considered to be no major problem for American Jews. On the whole, the differences between the faith groups on various moral and political issues, while serious and frequently troublesome, did not destroy their healthy relationships.

Goals, Quotas and Preferential Treatment

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

The year 1973 witnessed the continued use of goals and timetables, quotas, preferential treatment, and artificially imposed proportional representation in employment, as well as in higher education.

A 1970 Department of Labor administrative regulation mandating all government contractors to establish written "affirmative action" programs covering blacks, Spanish-surnamed persons, Orientals, and American Indians, and amended in 1971 to include women as a separate category, required contractors to report on their utilization of employees from these groups in each job classification. Wherever it appeared that such minority group members or women were underutilized in terms of their available numbers in the geographic area, goals and timetables had to be established to augment their representation.¹

In 1973 the institutionalization of goals and timetables proceeded rapidly. While government officials sought to distinguish goals from outright quotas in that no penalty attached to an employer who failed to meet a goal, provided he had made a good-faith effort to do so, the pressure to achieve numerical results led many to conclude that hiring practices designed to attain goals were little different from mandatory quotas. In either case, it was argued, there was a built-in potential for granting preferential consideration to those from the targeted groups. A radically different perspective was presented by Herbert Hill, national labor director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), in an article in which he asserted,

¹Stated Daniel Seligman in "How 'Equal Opportunity' Turned Into Employment Quotas," *Fortune*, March 1973: "In practice, contractors are encouraged to assume that they are underutilizing women and minorities and, accordingly, they have goals and timetables just about everywhere. For example, International Business Machines Corp., which has long been a model employer so far as fair-employment practices are concerned, has goals and timetables today at every one of its 400-odd establishments in the U.S."

"What is really involved in the debate over hiring quotas is not that Blacks and other minorities will be given preference over whites, but rather that a substantial body of law now requires the elimination of discriminatory systems that operate to favor whites at the expense of Blacks."²

Illustrative of the impact of "affirmative action" was the settlement of a job discrimination suit brought by the government against the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. On January 18 the company agreed with negotiators for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Labor Department's Office of Federal Contract Compliance to award \$15 million in back pay and \$23 million in annual increases to women and minority group males against whom it had allegedly discriminated in job assignments, pay, and promotions, as well as to make an effort to place specified proportions of women and minority-group men in certain jobs from which they had formerly been excluded. For example, the agreement established a goal of 38 per cent of all inside craft jobs and 19 per cent of outside craft jobs, such as lineman, for women.

In a similar case (*Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co.*, 365 F. Supp. 87), in October, a federal judge ordered the Detroit Edison Company to pay \$4 million in punitive damages to blacks who, according to his findings, had been victims of deliberate racial discrimination by the utility. He further ordered the company to promote workers to skilled jobs at the rate of three blacks for every two whites, until 25 per cent of the employees filling those jobs were blacks, and to promote one black employee to foreman or supervisor for every white employee so promoted. In still another employment case (*U.S. v. Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers International Union, Local 46*), a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that while quotas merely to attain racial balance in employment were forbidden by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, quotas to correct discriminatory practices were not. Therefore the Court approved a requirement that the union grant work permits to nonwhites on a one-to-one basis with whites for a limited period of time. The background of the case included a finding by a U.S. District Court of a history of job discrimination by the union.

Other decisions rendered by courts in 1973 also decreed employment quotas as a remedy. In all the cases the court found a pattern of discrimination in employment based on race, and resistance to eradicating such discrimination and establishing genuinely equal job opportunities. The same approach was used in a number of cases

²"Preferential Hiring: Correcting the Demerit System," *Social Policy*, July/August 1973.

throughout the country involving police and fire departments. In both the private and public employment sectors, the imposition of racial quotas generated considerable resentment among white employees.

ACADEMIA

Six Jewish organizations³ continued to submit to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) capsule summaries of instances of alleged preferential treatment or other improper procedures, based on race or sex, in admissions and employment at colleges and universities. They contended, in essence, that the cases cited were merely the "tip of the iceberg" of wide-ranging discrimination in reverse practiced by academic officials. While HEW acted on some complaints in which the evidence was conclusive, the Jewish groups generally felt that the Department was considerably less responsive to this type of complaint than to legitimate complaints of traditional discrimination. In fact, it was widely believed, HEW policies and pressures had actually fostered reverse discrimination because universities feared the loss of government funds for noncompliance. In any event, the Jewish organizational stance of opposition to quotas and other forms of racial preference angered many black spokesmen.⁴ Typical of prevalent preferential treatment was a memorandum of March 5 to the Liberal Arts department chairmen at Drake University, suggesting the following: "As you recruit and select graduate assistants (if any) for next year, do not overlook the Affirmative Action policy. Make every endeavor to obtain a minority or female if they approach the necessary quality level. Look to a minority person to be added providing they are not too far below the minimal level."

Elsewhere, the Old Westbury College of the State University of New York, in an effort to narrow the gap in the enrollment between white and disadvantaged minority students, established admissions "guidelines" that would achieve a desired racial and ethnic student mix: 30 per cent white, 30 per cent black, 30 per cent Hispanic and 10 per cent other (mainly Oriental and American Indian). This policy resulted from a calculated decision by the college administration and

³Agudath Israel of America, American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Jewish Labor Committee, Jewish War Veterans.

⁴"If Jews are not prepared to accept a quota system as a means of quantitatively evaluating the eradication of racism in America, when then?" stated Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett, president of the National Newspaper Publishers Association, in the *New York Amsterdam News*, September 29, 1973.

faculty to concentrate on the education of those who in the past had no access to higher education. The curriculum, too, was geared to this central objective. In evaluating applicants for admission, conventional screening standards—high school averages and College Board scores—were sharply downgraded as indicators of academic potential in favor of such other criteria as apparent motivation, past employment, and community service.⁵

On November 19, 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review a most important State of Washington Supreme Court decision upholding preferential admission based on race to the state university law school. The case arose when a white applicant for admission, Marco De Funis (who happened to be a Sephardi Jew), a Phi Beta Kappa, *magna cum laude* graduate of the University of Washington, was denied admission to its law school.

He filed suit in which he charged that he was wrongfully rejected because other applicants whose grades and test scores were lower than his were accepted because of their race. (All black, Chicano, American Indian and Philippine American applicants admitted had received special consideration.) After a trial, the court held that the university had in fact discriminated against De Funis on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered the university to enroll him. The court found that of 44 applicants from the stipulated minority groups who had been offered admission, the great majority had poorer credentials than De Funis and some of them, had they been white, would have been summarily rejected.

In compliance with the trial court order, the university enrolled De Funis, but appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Washington. That court, in a 6-2 decision, reversed the lower court ruling and upheld the university's right to consider race as one factor in selecting students for its law school because of a "compelling state interest" in turning out more minority-group lawyers. Enforcement of the judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington was stayed by Justice William O. Douglas, pending review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Although civil-rights groups overwhelmingly endorsed the university's position and prepared to file briefs *amici* accordingly, most Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, and Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, supported De Funis. Two Italian-American and one Polish-American organizations joined in the American Jewish Committee brief.

⁵Bernard Bard, "Old Westbury: New Ethnic Mix," *National Jewish Monthly*, October 1973.

Ethnic Consciousness

On January 19, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance of the U.S. Department of Labor issued a set of "affirmative action" guidelines on discrimination because of religion or national origin which called for special "outreach and positive recruitment" by federal contractors to hire and promote more Jews, Italians, Greeks, Slavs, etc. This development was the culmination of a host of political and societal pressures resulting from a heightened awareness that members of those groups also had been victimized, or at least hindered, by discrimination and that, therefore, something more than the traditional equal-opportunity approach was needed to rectify the consequences of such discrimination. As stated by one ethnic spokesman, "What Poles and Italians are asking [is] 'What about our civil rights? After all, the Civil Rights Act outlaws discrimination . . . also on the basis of ethnic origin. Why does the problem of civil rights . . . especially in employment, have to be defined almost exclusively in black terms, and . . . ethnic discrimination completely overlooked?'"⁶

The enactment of the Ethnic Heritage Studies Programs Act by Congress in 1972, termed by its chief sponsor, Senator Richard S. Schweiker (R., Pa.), "an important new Federal commitment to ethnicity and pluralism as positive forces in America,"⁷ had given further impetus to public recognition of the significance of ethnicity. The Act authorized federal grants to public and private nonprofit educational agencies and institutions for developing programs and materials relating to the history, culture, and traditions of the various ethnic groups in America for use in schools and colleges. As noted in its introductory Statement of Policy, the Act sought "to afford to students opportunities to learn about the nature of their own cultural heritage, and to study the contributions of the cultural heritages of the other ethnic groups of the Nation." In 1973, \$2.5 million was appropriated for this pilot project. On the state level, progress continued in the issuance of curriculum guides, teaching supplements, bibliographies, and audio-visual aids on ethnicity for distribution to local school boards. Twenty-six states had policy statements on ethnic

⁶Reverend Paul Ascioolla, "Ethnic Renaissance in America," *The Journal of Intergroup Relations*, Spring, 1973.

⁷*Congressional Record*, Vol. 118, 92nd Congress, Second Session, June 14, 1972.

studies and thirteen had laws mandating the inclusion of ethnic studies in the curriculum.⁸

The year was marked too by an expansion of the developing consciousness around the meaning and psychological implications of ethnicity. As Michael Novak⁹ put it:

Such differences as we have, apart from race, are mainly internal. And not so much in our ideas or even in our words, but in our *affections* and *imaginings* and *historical* experiences: in those concrete networks in which ideas and words are given concrete reverberation, rootage, and meaning. . . . Our personal likes and dislikes, our signals of delight and our warning signals, our inhibitions and expressiveness—these are developed in us not only by our individual effort, but also by the social and cultural traditions in which we were reared.

Books on particular aspects of the subject, such as *The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics*, by Perry L. Weed (Praeger), and *Ethnic Diversity in Catholic America*, Harold J. Abramson (John Wiley and Sons), continued to be published. Proof of the growing acceptance of the concepts of ethnic group interests and of neighborhood development was the allocation of federal anti-poverty funds to neighborhood ethnic organizations in New York City, Newark, and Philadelphia.

On June 11 the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review a case involving the issue of bilingualism for non-English-speaking public-school children. Chinese parents in San Francisco claimed that their children were being denied equal educational opportunity by the failure of the school district to provide instruction for them in a language they could understand. Lower federal courts had found no discrimination, in legal terms, in the existing system. The American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress and The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith filed a joint brief *amici* in the Supreme Court in support of the Chinese, urging that the district be required to develop an appropriate plan for compensatory instruction in English for all affected pupils.¹⁰

Much of the interest in the situation of the white ethnics derived, as before, from their frequently negative attitudes toward the growing

⁸Nancy Seifer, *Education and the New Pluralism: A Preliminary Survey of Recent Progress in the 50 States*. American Jewish Committee, National Project on Ethnic America, May 19, 1973.

⁹"The New Ethnicity," *Humanist*, May-June, 1973.

¹⁰On January 21, 1974, the Supreme Court held unanimously that the school district's failure to deal with the language problem violated federal law or implementing regulations. *Lau v. Nichols*, 39 L. Ed. 2d 1.

aspirations of blacks and other people of color. Said Andrew M. Greeley: "One could argue that as new members of the middle class, the ethnics are most likely to be the victims of 'status anxiety' and hence most likely to react unfavorably to those beneath them on the status ladder."¹¹ Indeed, there was much conflict between white ethnics and other minorities in urban areas around the country, but there were also efforts at depolarization and accommodation. For example, in July in the ethnically mixed Greenpoint section of Brooklyn, street fights between Puerto Ricans and Poles, triggered by incidents in a bar, led to a meeting between Puerto Rican and Polish community leaders during which both sides agreed to seek an amicable resolution.

Clashes of this kind, it was felt by specialists in the field, could be at least moderated, if not averted, by cultivating a constructive sense of ethnic identity among more members of different groups:

Indeed, the "new ethnicity" in America offers promise—of building community in an anonymous society, helping each individual define himself in terms of a past and a future, delivering services equitably and according to people's needs and styles and in general leading toward a new openness implied by pluralism. Out of a focus on the individual and the ethnic component of his identity will emerge a more positive climate for intergroup relations and social change, for security on one's own ground is a prerequisite for cooperation with others.¹²

MEXICAN-AMERICANS IN SOUTHWEST

In the November 1972 election, La Raza Unida, a new political party deriving its name from Mexican-American organizations in the Southwest, drew 200,000 votes in Texas as part of its drive to force political concessions to Mexican-Americans from the largely "Anglo" establishment. The party continued to be active in 1973, urging the predominantly Mexican-American labor force at the nonunion Farah Manufacturing Co. in El Paso, one of the country's largest manufacturers of men's pants, to join the Amalgamated Clothing Workers in its continuing strike against Farah. While 3,000 workers were out on strike, some 5,000 others remained on the job.

In a move designed to reflect the broadening scope of its efforts, the

¹¹"Making It in America: Ethnic Groups and Social Status," *Social Policy*, September/October 1973.

¹²Irving M. Levine and Judith Herman, *Pieces of a Dream: The Ethnic Worker's Crisis With America*, edited by Michael Wenk, S.M. Tomasi, and Geno Baroni (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1972).

former Southwest Council of La Raza changed its name to the National Council of La Raza. Its director Henry Santiestevan explained that "Chicanos are coast to coast now and their problems predominantly are urban problems that deserve national attention." To strengthen its operational capacity, the Council set up three subsidiary corporate entities—La Raza Housing Development Corporation, La Raza Investment Corporation, and La Raza Educational Development Center. Throughout the year La Raza continued its work in developing urban *barrios* and rural *colonias* through projects aimed at improving income, housing, education, health, and cultural opportunities for Mexican-Americans.¹³

In a 68-page report, "Teachers and Students—Differences in Teacher Interaction with Mexican-American and Anglo Students," the U.S. Civil Rights Commission declared that public-school teachers in the Southwest, both white and Mexican-American, favored white students in classroom discussions and thus "seriously hinder educational opportunity" for Mexican-American students. The Commission found, among other things, that teachers praised or encouraged Anglo children 36 per cent more often than Chicanos, built upon ideas and suggestions from Anglos 40 per cent more frequently than from Chicanos, and asked questions of Anglo students 21 per cent more often than of Chicanos. The report was based on firsthand observations by the Commission staff, centering on verbal interaction between teachers and students, in 429 elementary- and secondary-school classrooms in California, New Mexico, and Texas. "It is the schools and teachers of the Southwest, not the students, who are failing," the report concluded.¹⁴

Although political violence involving Mexican-Americans was relatively rare in 1973, in one episode in Denver in March one Chicano was shot to death and 19 persons, including 12 policemen, were injured in shooting and an explosion touched off by police gunfire hitting ammunition in an apartment. The police had responded to a complaint of disturbance at the apartment, which was owned by the Crusade for Justice, a Chicano activist group. Thirty-six persons were arrested.

INDIANS AT WOUNDED KNEE

On February 28 some 200 armed Indians of the militant American Indian Movement occupied a trading post and a church in the settlement of Wounded Knee, on the Pine Ridge Sioux Reservation in

¹³Religious News Service, May 29, 1973.

¹⁴New York Times, March 29, 1973.

South Dakota. They seized ten hostages, exchanged gunfire with federal officers, and vowed to maintain their occupation until the government acceded to their demands.

Behind the confrontation lay the long and tangled history of Indian defeat, subjugation, resource theft, and treaty violation by the dominant whites, along with bitter divisions among the Indians themselves on how best to serve Indian interests and, in fact, on what was best for Indians: integration into white society, restoration of their traditional culture, or some kind of synthesis of the two.¹⁵ Among the demands of the militants at Wounded Knee were a full-scale Senate investigation of government treatment of the Indians and removal of the predominantly mixed-blood elected Pine Ridge tribal council which, they claimed, was dictatorial, corrupt, and subservient to white interests.¹⁶

In addition to a 50 per cent unemployment rate among the 8,000 Oglala Sioux, a study of the Pine Ridge Reservation by the U.S. Public Health Service found "an alarmingly high rate of suicide attempts, chronic alcoholism, an 81 per cent school dropout rate by the 12th grade, disintegrating family structures, and feelings of inferiority and futility,"¹⁷ a classic picture of a people in despair.

After extended negotiations between the insurgents and officials from the Justice and Interior Departments, with ministers from the National Council of Churches serving as mediators, an agreement was reached on May 6 to end the occupation. Unlike an earlier agreement in April, which had foundered on questions of interpretation, this accord was buttressed by detailed, written procedures for the disarmament and evacuation of Wounded Knee. Its main provisions included a meeting with White House representatives to listen to Indian grievances on the reservation, a thorough audit of reservation finances and protection by the government of the legal rights of individual Indians against abuses by the tribal governing authorities. At the time the accord was signed, Ramon Roubideaux, an Indian lawyer

¹⁵"Ideologies are so much up for grabs right now that any *Indian* faction that brings sense out of the present confusion may well determine how Indian people will view themselves for decades to come." Vine Deloria, Jr., in "Religion and Revolution Among American Indians," *Worldview*, January 1974.

¹⁶According to Joseph Muskrat, director of Mountain States regional office, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in, "Thoughts on the Indian Dilemma," *Civil Rights Digest*, Fall 1973: "With some notable exceptions, the inefficiency and promotion of self-interest on the part of tribal governments matches or exceeds that of the BIA and other Federal agencies dealing with tribes."

¹⁷New York Times, March 24, 1973.

for the American Indian Movement, warned, "There will be more Wounded Knees unless it is realized that current Indian government is a failure that must be corrected."¹⁸

A Harris poll in March revealed that most Americans felt guilty about the treatment received by American Indians, with 62 per cent of those polled agreeing that "American Indians have been mistreated by the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs," and 59 per cent agreeing that "the U.S. government has not lived up to the treaties signed with them." In the Wounded Knee episode, 51 per cent sympathized with the Indian dissidents, 21 per cent with the government, and 28 per cent were not sure.¹⁹

Black America

HOW MUCH ECONOMIC PROGRESS?

A major article in the April 1973 issue of *Commentary*, "Black Progress and Liberal Rhetoric," by political analysts Ben J. Wattenberg and Richard M. Scammon, triggered a sharp controversy among civil-rights leaders. While acknowledging that the economic gap between blacks and whites was "still a national disgrace" and that "black unemployment rates have been twice as high as white rates," the authors reported that in recent years blacks nevertheless had made massive economic progress, to the point where a bare majority may now be characterized as middle-class. They said, too, that growing numbers of employed blacks had gained access to middle-class occupations, such as white-collar and craft jobs, coupled with "a great break-through in the area of education" which, of course, is closely tied to economic prospects. The authors concluded that there were "fewer blacks in poverty" and that those who continued to be poor were "far more likely to be receiving help than was formerly the case." They also cited a 1972 Gallup poll finding that blacks were the only group among 31 subcategories which believed that, on the whole, "things were getting better."

In light of their overall assessment, Scammon and Wattenberg challenged what they perceived as the prevailing posture of liberal whites and blacks regarding black progress, which was either to ignore or to minimize it. In their view, stressing failure was the wrong strategy, for it played into the hands of the opponents of further progress by fostering an attitude of hopelessness. Instead, they urged,

¹⁸New York Times, May 7, 1973.

¹⁹New York Post, April 2, 1973.

by "acknowledging those successes that have in fact been achieved, demanding the means and the money for the completion of the job, liberals might legitimately hope for action, and an extension of their political writ."

In an angry rebuttal, John A. Morsell, assistant executive director of NAACP, attacked the Scammon-Wattenberg statistical analysis as well as their recommendations.²⁰ He advanced a radically different interpretation of the black condition in America, according to which the family income "black-white gap in cash terms" was widening (Scammon and Wattenberg had noted, apparently correctly, that the percentage gap was narrowing). He also charged the two authors with having painted a far prettier picture of urban ghetto employment than the facts warranted.

While Morsell conceded that, by dint of hard work and sacrifice by blacks and many whites, some gains had been achieved in education and employment, he stressed the gross disparities which persisted. He denied the Scammon-Wattenberg implication that Negro leaders had failed to acknowledge the achievements to date. At the same time, he said, "so much more remains that is evil that we cannot slacken the pace of our protest by the merest fraction."

Employment opportunity for blacks rose significantly in 1973, according to Andrew F. Brimmer, the first black member of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System. Blacks, he reported, had made marked gains in participation in the labor force as a whole and had benefited from expanded opportunities in higher-paying blue-collar and professional jobs. There was also a moderate decrease in black unemployment, he said. In 1972 jobs held by blacks increased by 400,000, or 4.6 per cent, to 9.3 million. The gains occurred among both teenagers and adults, with those by black men attributable to the strong performance of the manufacturing sector. Black women and youths also registered substantial gains. Unemployment among blacks dropped by about 7.5 per cent, from 957,000 in 1972 to 884,000 in 1973. In summary Dr. Brimmer said, "While blacks made real progress in obtaining higher-paying jobs, their occupational concentration remained in the relatively low-skill, low-paying jobs."²¹

POLITICAL POWER

In May 1973 Thomas Bradley, a black, scored a solid victory over Mayor Sam Yorty in mayoral elections in predominantly white Los Angeles, despite Yorty's appeals to racial fears. Bradley won almost

²⁰"Black Progress or Illiberal Rhetoric," *Crisis*, June-July 1973.

²¹*New York Times*, February 8, 1973.

half of the white vote, running exceptionally well in Jewish districts and even gaining a narrow majority of Mexican-Americans, who had backed Yorty four years earlier. Bradley's victory marked the first time a black candidate was elected mayor of a major city with the help of so many white votes.

In October Maynard Jackson became the first black mayor of a major Southern city, predominantly black Atlanta, winning nearly 60 per cent of the vote over the incumbent, Sam Massell, and drawing better than one-fifth of the ballots in white precincts. This was followed by the election of black mayors in a number of cities: by narrow margins in Detroit, where the electorate was almost evenly divided between blacks and whites, and in Raleigh, N.C., where the population was only 30 per cent black; in Dayton, O., and Grand Rapids, Mich.

These results were encouraging to analysts, who interpreted them as an indication that growing numbers of white voters were willing to choose the candidate they deemed to be superior, irrespective of race. They were hailed also as a sign that black voters were becoming politically more mature. Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, stated in his syndicated column: "The growing ranks of black mayors are important not only because they are symbolic of black participation in politics and black acceptance of the responsibilities of citizenship but also because the greater the demonstration of black political muscle the greater the possibilities are for constructive change in our society."²² Yet despite the 1973 election results, less than one-half of one per cent of all elected officials were blacks (they constituted some 12 per cent of the American people). Specifically, in the U.S. Congress, Edward W. Brooke (R., Mass.) was the only black senator, and about 3 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives were black. Underrepresentation of blacks, in proportion to their numbers in the population, was the prevailing pattern in state and local governments as well.

SCHOOL INTEGRATION

There were a number of significant developments in 1973 relating to the ongoing national endeavor to racially desegregate public schools, all adding up to a very mixed picture. Jack Greenberg, director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, observed that "modest gains" were achieved despite bitter disputes over busing, in the North and South, and efforts to "hinder and negate the law."²³ On the other

²²White Plains *Reporter Dispatch*, November 23, 1973.

²³New York *Sunday News*, January 6, 1974.

hand, evidence grew that many urban school districts in the North became more segregated than they had been. In Chicago, for example, the Board of Education's 1973 annual racial census revealed that 259 of 537 elementary schools had black enrollments of 90 per cent or higher, with the percentage of black students in the total system up to 57.6 per cent, as compared with 56.9 per cent the year before. The Board's survey indicated, too, that when neighborhoods began to change racially, integration was short-lived. As black families moved into white areas, the rate of white departure increased so rapidly that the schools became from 90 to 100 per cent black.

Atlanta was typical of once racially segregated school districts that were desegregated and have become reseggregated. In April 1973 the city adopted a controversial plan which provided for minimal busing, leaving most of Atlanta's 21,000 white pupils in predominantly white schools and most of its 75,000 black pupils in predominantly black schools. The trade-off for this virtual acceptance of the status quo, approved by the local NAACP and other black spokesmen, such as U.S. Representative Andrew Young (D., Ga.), was an agreement to give blacks half of the key jobs in the school administration. Behind this signal development was a growing black middle class, desirous of avoiding racial turmoil (which, regrettably, was not infrequent in integrated schools); a measure of disenchantment with the purported educational benefits to black pupils of attending integrated schools, and a pragmatic interest in augmenting black power within the school system.²⁴ Said Benjamin E. Mays, president of Atlanta's Board of Education: "But 20 years or so ago, when school desegregation was just starting in the South, Atlanta schools were 70% white and 30% black. Now they're 80% black and 20% white. It's a matter of white flight and private schools, the old story. Massive busing would be counterproductive at this point. We'd end up with no whites to bus."²⁵ The most vocal opposition to the Atlanta plan came from outside the city, from the national offices of NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which took the matter to court.

One of the crowning ironies of the drive to desegregate public schools is that almost 20 years after the watershed Supreme Court Decision in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*, a new suit was initiated in Topeka in October 1973, which claimed that Topeka "is still 'systematically' discriminating against Negro students

²⁴Cf. Walter J. Shapiro, "Black and White Together is Still the Point," *Washington Monthly*, June 1973: "But the Black leadership conspicuously did *not* support an ACLU suit calling for metropolitan desegregation which would create schools with roughly a 70-30 white-black racial balance."

²⁵New York Times, April 25, 1973.

by relegating hundreds of them to dilapidated, poorly equipped and inadequately staffed schools that continue to be predominantly black in a city whose population of 130,000 is more than 90% white."²⁶ Topeka school officials contended that the current segregated situation was a result of housing patterns (*de facto*), rather than governmental action (*de jure*).

In the *Brown* case (AJYB, 1955 [Vol. 56], pp. 195, 197), the Supreme Court ruled that government enforced racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet during the past year there were still countless thousands of public school classrooms which were not integrated. Hard questions were raised in numerous law suits, particularly in the North, as to whether or not the existing segregated situations were brought about by any government actions. (Government action, to be sure, is not restricted to the kind of officially separate school systems that formerly existed in the South. Any action by government which in any way promotes racially segregated schools is vulnerable to constitutional attack.)

While in 1973 schools in the South were by no means fully desegregated, especially in cities such as Atlanta and New Orleans, many Southern school districts were considerably more desegregated than some in the North. In rural districts of the South, even in Mississippi, white and black children in significant numbers were attending the same schools, despite the segregated private academies which had sprung up to prevent this condition. The fall of 1973 was acknowledged by educators to be "the quietest and most peaceful in the South in years."²⁷

The classic explanation for the situation in the North, as in Topeka, was that government had no responsibility for, or control over, where parents of school-age children chose to live. In 1973, however, a number of non-Southern school districts were found guilty of discriminating against black students by gerrymandering attendance zones, assigning black teachers to predominantly black schools, and spending more money on white than on black students.

In an important, though somewhat confusing decision in the case of *Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado* (413 U.S. 189), the Supreme Court in June ruled that the Denver school board would have to prove it did not deliberately segregate students by race in any part of its district. If it failed to do so, it would have to desegregate the entire system. Returning the case to the U.S. District Court to resolve the matter, the Court said: "proof of state-imposed segregation in a

²⁶New York Times, "Week in Review," October 28, 1973.

²⁷*Ibid.*

substantial portion of the district will suffice to support a finding by the trial court of the existence of a dual system." Such proof was promptly found by the District Court.

As the board, in compliance with the Court's order, prepared to submit a desegregation plan, feelings ran high, particularly among white parents who feared having their children bused into largely black schools.²⁸ Superintendent Louis J. Kishkunus was admonished by the only black member of the Denver board of education for a series of "inflammatory statements" about the problem, including one in December that "we may end up without any people to desegregate—all the whites may be living in the suburbs."²⁹

In June 1973 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled, in *Bradley v. Milliken* (484 F. 2d 215) that black children from Detroit must ride buses out to the suburbs and that white suburban children must ride them into Detroit to achieve racial balance in the area schools. The decision set the stage for a Supreme Court ruling on how far state and local governments were required to go in breaking down racial barriers in education. In approving the principle of metropolitan area busing, the Sixth Circuit Court set itself in direct opposition to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which had invalidated a similar metropolitan busing plan in the Richmond, Va., area. A 4-4 Supreme Court vote (*Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond*, 93 S.Ct. [1952]) let the Richmond decision stand.

Apprehension over federal court decisions mandating busing to achieve racial balance, such as the Detroit decision, kept alive congressional sentiment in favor of proposed antibusing constitutional amendments. Congressmen continued to report a heavy volume of mail from their constituents, which was overwhelmingly opposed to "forced" busing. Both the House and Senate Judiciary Committees held hearings on the proposed amendments—most of them simply prohibiting pupil assignment or transportation to public schools on the basis of race—during which testimony was submitted by groups and individuals on both sides of the issue. On April 16 nine major Jewish organizations³⁰ placed on record their opposition to all antibusing

²⁸William L. Taylor, former staff director of the U.S. Commission on Human Rights, stated in "The Legal Battle for Metropolitanism," *University of Chicago School Review*, May 1973: "Many white parents are afraid of sending their children to inner city schools. It will not do to label their concerns racist. Often they are not."

²⁹*Denver Post*, January 18, 1974.

³⁰American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Jewish Labor Committee, Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., National Council of Jewish Women, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, and United Synagogue of America.

amendments essentially on the ground that they were in reality antidesegregation amendments.

HEREDITY-ENVIRONMENT CONTROVERSY

In the deepening controversy over the reasons for the disparity between the mean intelligence test score of blacks and of whites, there were a number of developments which continued to affect somewhat black-white relationships.

Ten black scholars sharply criticized noted educational critic Christopher Jencks, among other things, for reviving in his book, *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America*, published in 1972, what they considered to be the discredited hypothesis of Dr. Arthur R. Jensen of the University of California that there may be a genetic basis for the differences in black-white average IQ scores.³¹ The authors assumed that the genetic argument had been effectively refuted and they strenuously objected to Jencks' attempt to resuscitate it as inimical to solving the problems of educational inequality: "Jencks is part of a chorus of nay-sayers seeking to disparage educational intervention intended to improve pupil performance—especially for children who are poor and of color," they charged.³²

The University of California at Berkeley took action to ban any academic research that might jeopardize "the reputation or status of a social group or an institution."³³ A debate which was scheduled to have taken place at Harvard between Dr. William Shockley of Stanford University, a Nobel Prize winner in physics and leading exponent of the view that the current situation of blacks is linked to inherent deficiencies in intelligence, and Roy Innis of the Congress of Racial Equality was cancelled due to pressure from the Black Law Students Association. However, Shockley was able to speak at Princeton, despite similar protests.

Seven hundred professors and students from campuses across the country met at New York University for a conference convened to "fight the academic racism" of several professors—Jensen, Shockley, and Dr. Richard Herrnstein of Harvard—who have been outspoken

³¹Cf. Seymour B. Sarason, "Jewishness, Blackishness, and the Nature-Nurture Controversy," *American Psychologist*, November 1973: "The one thing we can say with assurance is that our concepts of intelligence are value laden, culture and time bound, and deficient in cross-cultural validity."

³²Ronald Edmonds et al., "A Black Response to Christopher Jencks's *Inequality* and Certain Other Issues," *Harvard Educational Review*, February 1973.

³³*Wall Street Journal*, December 20, 1973.

exponents of theories linking intelligence to race by heredity. Such theories, the assembly was told, were unfit for college classrooms because "they are as untrue as 'the world is flat' ". Many student participants were members of local college organizations called Committees Against Racism. When asked if he believed that censoring theories would jeopardize the university as a forum for the free exchange of ideas, Dr. Garland Allen of Washington University, who addressed the conference, said he believed in academic freedom, but only in conjunction with the ideas of the local community. "It should be like what goes on in China," he said. None of the participants took the position that a free exchange of ideas on this subject should be encouraged.³⁴

In a challenging article in *Change* magazine, black academician Thomas Sowell offered a basically critical, yet balanced, appraisal of Jensen's thesis, coupled with criticism of his detractors for having failed to respond effectively to his learned research and analysis which, Sowell felt, deserved to be taken seriously. He noted that Jensen's own work "contains some of the best evidence against his theories," for example a finding of a rise of eight to ten points in the IQs of black poor children after only several days of allowing them to become acquainted with him in a play situation. Yet Sowell strongly defended the continued use of IQ and college entrance tests as the best available means of measuring scholastic aptitude. "Moreover," he said, "it is precisely the black students who need IQ tests most of all, for it is precisely with black students that alternative methods of spotting intellectual ability have failed."³⁵

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

In a March 21, 1973, decision in the case of *Rodriguez v. San Antonio School District* (411 U.S. 1), the U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time, dealt with discrimination by wealth in the distribution of public educational resources (AJYB, 1973 [Vol.74], p. 183). In upholding the constitutionality of the Texas school finance system under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court ruled that states could finance their schools with property taxes which provided more money and better facilities for pupils living in richer districts. (School districts in Texas with valuable property to tax spent up to three times as much per pupil as did poorer districts and, in some instances, did so with lower tax rates than in the poorer districts.)

³⁴New York Times, November 18, 1973.

³⁵"The Great IQ Controversy," *Change*, May 1973.

The majority (in the five to four decision), including the four justices appointed by President Nixon, concluded that state laws for financing public services should not be declared unconstitutional "merely because the burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly, depending upon the relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens live." In dissenting, Justice Thurgood Marshall called the decision "a retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity and . . . unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest years of the chance to reach their full potential as citizens."

Basically, the majority decided that education is not a fundamental constitutional right; that the disparities between the Texas districts did not constitute "invidious discrimination," and that there is not the same "compelling state interest" in providing comparable education for rich and poor districts as there is, for example, for black and white children. The Court did not say, however, that the existing system of school finance was a good one. In fact, it called for changes in the system, which Justice Potter Stewart called "chaotic and unjust." But, the Court said, this is a matter for the states, not for the federal government, to solve. Said one education writer, "It was less a defense of the present system of school finance than a ringing declaration of states' rights."³⁶

If a single justice had shifted his vote, the school system of every state except Hawaii would have been drastically affected, with residents of wealthier districts having to pay higher taxes to help support equal standards in poorer districts, or else submitting to lower standards in their own districts. Irrespective of the Court's decision, residents of some states still faced this eventuality. In April 1973 the New Jersey Supreme Court, in a determination based solely on the state constitution, struck down that state's school financing system, which relied primarily on local property taxes, and ordered the legislature to establish a more equitable one. Similar judicial rulings in several other states, such as Florida and Kansas, impelled legislatures to enact equalization reforms. But this was the exception rather than the rule. John E. Coons, professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, and an authority on public school finance, observed, "Unfortunately, there is little reason to expect most state legislatures spontaneously to take up serious consideration of the problem."³⁷

³⁶William Grant, "School-Finance Reform Remains a Must," *Detroit News*, March 30, 1973.

³⁷"Financing Public Schools After 'Rodriguez,'" *Saturday Review-World*, October 9, 1973.

In the wake of the *Rodriguez* decision, debate continued over the actual importance of school finance equalization to pupil achievement. If the findings of Christopher Jencks and James Coleman were correct, i.e., that learning differences were only minimally a function of teachers and facilities, then equal funding could not be regarded as the optimum means of upgrading achievement. Yet, as others repeatedly noted, the wealthier districts usually chose to spend more on their own schools. Said one proponent of equalization: "Perhaps what is being suggested, although only covertly, is that children of the affluent somehow are entitled to what we have called an intrinsically satisfactory educational experience while the children of the less advantaged are not."³⁸

HOUSING INTEGRATION

People who live in single family homes in suburbia want to preserve the quality of their neighborhoods and the value of their property. They therefore usually look with disfavor on any proposals to build apartments in such neighborhoods and, with particular horror, on plans for public housing apartments for low-income families, many of whom are apt to be black. It has also been obvious that, increasingly, suburbia is where the jobs are, and that it is impossible to achieve both integrated schools and neighborhood schools without residential integration. In 1973 there were few signs of change either in prevailing white suburban attitudes or in the housing patterns which tended to mirror them.

According to Roy Wilkins, "Suburbia and the 'walls' that separate it from the inner city will be the next, most immediate civil rights battleground." He predicted "a massive fight by blacks to be included in the suburbs of this country."³⁹ A Census Bureau survey, released in February 1973, noted that 18 per cent of blacks lived in the suburbs, a 2 per cent increase over the 1970 count. Anthony Downs, housing economist and chairman of the Real Estate Research Corporation in Chicago, observed, "Blacks are moving from the city for the same reason whites are—they're afraid of crime and they want better schools—and they want to live in good black middle-class neighborhoods. If given a free choice, I think most blacks will choose small, predominantly black clusters."⁴⁰

A major debate on suburban integration, which reflected much of the

³⁸Robert L. Simon, "Equal Opportunity and the Serrano Decision," *Intellect*, October 1973.

³⁹*Christian Science Monitor*, December 19, 1973.

⁴⁰*Washington Post*, April 8, 1973.

problem, was presented in the pages of the real estate section of the Sunday New York *Times*, November 4, 1973. It focused on a proposal for a housing development in the Candlewood Lake area of Fairfield county, Conn., made by Paul Davidoff, executive director of the Suburban Action Institute, which had been working assiduously since 1969 to open the suburbs to all, particularly the poor and nonwhite. The opposing viewpoint was articulated by literary critic Malcolm Cowley, a local resident.

Davidoff described the typical rhetoric at local zoning hearings on proposed developments in terms of the World War I song, "Over There," meaning that somewhere else is always a better location. He observed that "opposition to residential development increases geometrically with the rise in the percentage of nonwhite and poorer families the proposed project would house." The New York State Urban Development Corporation's minimal plan for 100 units in each of nine Westchester towns caused such an uproar as to lead one to believe that the Bronx was to be relocated to Chappaqua." The Suburban Action Institute's plan for Candlewood Lake called for the rezoning of land, then restricted to single-family homes on one-acre or two-acre lots, to allow townhouses and garden apartments at densities of six to ten units an acre, for families of every income and background.

Cowley strongly opposed the plan to house some 8,000 people on a 253-acre lakeshore tract, "hilly, difficult of access, well adapted for vacation homes on large plots, but miserably adapted for a crowded urban community." He argued, too, that building costs would be so high that very few blacks could afford to live there, even if they were subsidized, and he disputed Davidoff's suggestion that the surrounding area afforded ample job opportunities. Cowley implied that the real issues in the zoning battle had to do with land speculation and the net profits to be derived from development, along with destruction of precious open countryside and environmental pollution.

The town of New Fairfield rejected the proposed development and Suburban Action Institute filed suit against it. In Westchester county, N.Y., as a result of a related situation, the Institute began litigation challenging the legality of federal grants to the town of New Castle for construction of sewer and recreational facilities on the ground that such grants to a community which maintained exclusionary zoning practices violated federal laws and regulations. Chris Jensen, an Institute lawyer, said that "by building a sewer that only serves the existing population you lock in the pace of development and perpetuate the discriminatory practice."⁴¹

⁴¹New York *Times*, August 9, 1973.

The trend toward the expansion of inner city ghettos into adjoining suburban communities, as well as within city limits, continued unabated. Black neighborhoods in Washington, D.C., for example, were overflowing into Prince Georges county in Maryland. The Cleveland ghetto began to extend into De Kalb county. There was a similar movement into suburbs like Darby near Philadelphia and Maywood near Chicago. Invariably as blacks began to trickle in, whites began to trickle out, and the trickles often became torrents. Neighborhood turnover continued to bring loan foreclosures and housing abandonment, predominantly black schools and, in some areas, new slums. Concerning Kansas City, Mo., one reporter wrote, "Whites who might have been willing to accept integration were never offered a choice. They could flee or prepare to live in a virtually all-black neighborhood."⁴² In most areas, neighborhood racial stabilization remained an elusive target.

Dayton, O., and its suburbs, however, did take an apparently successful step toward creating neighborhoods which would be reasonably balanced, both racially and economically. The Regional Planning Commission had proposed construction of 14,000 federally subsidized housing units for low- and moderate-income families to be dispersed throughout the city and its surrounding communities. The Commission's member communities unanimously approved the plan. The key to its acceptance evidently was the understanding that each community would receive its specified share of the subsidized units—and no more.⁴³

Predominantly black Newark, N.J., was confronted with a different kind of housing problem, which intensified racial polarization. The Temple of Kawaida, a black nationalist organization led by Imamu Baraka (LeRoi Jones), had planned to construct a 16-story low- and middle-income housing project (Kawaida Towers), to be financed with state funds, in the predominantly Italian-American North Ward. Opponents of the project claimed that it would bring crime and violence, cause problems in the schools, and destroy the character of the neighborhood. Vehement protests by residents, coupled with picketing and attempts to physically halt construction work, culminated in a violent confrontation on February 22, in which two policemen were injured. North Ward political leader Assemblyman Anthony Imperiale charged black supporters of the project with deliberately baiting white demonstrators. Subsequently, a Superior Court judge dismissed all legal challenges to the construction of the project. The

⁴²Charles Hammer, "Basically Changing Neighborhoods," *New Republic*, September 15, 1973.

⁴³*Ibid.*

Kawaida Towers controversy cast into sharp relief an observation by John Cardinal Dearden, Archbishop of Detroit: "The Negro-white confrontation in American cities is in greater part a Negro-Catholic confrontation because Catholics traditionally have been concentrated in urban areas."⁴⁴

The Jews

While antisemitism had by no means disappeared from the American scene in 1973, most Jews did not view it as a major problem affecting their daily lives. Lunatic fringe elements, to be sure, such as the National Socialist White Peoples Party and the Liberty Lobby, continued to irritate Jewish communities in different parts of the country. But the influence of these hatemongers on the whole appeared to be negligible. By and large, concerned American Jews worried less about their own status and security as Jews than they did about their oppressed coreligionists in the Soviet Union (p. 500) and, following the Yom Kippur war, the beleaguered and relatively isolated Israelis (p. 531).

Still, though antisemitism lacked respectability, there were signs that a fair proportion of non-Jews, white and black, were not anti-antisemitic either. For a variety of reasons—religious, economic, political—a good many Gentiles continued to maintain an essentially negative image of Jews. At least partly because of this, indifference to issues of Jewish concern, such as Soviet Jewry, for example, was not infrequent, nor was insensitivity to the feelings of Jews with regard to Israel.

FOREST HILLS CONTROVERSY

In 1971-72 the conflict over the construction of a low income public housing project in the predominantly Jewish middle-class neighborhood of Forest Hills in Queens commanded nationwide attention (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], pp. 117-19). Passions on both sides ran high. To its advocates (including some Forest Hills residents and Jewish groups) the project represented a fine opportunity to hasten the breakup of poverty-ridden black and Puerto Rican ghettos and to promote both economic and racial integration in housing, as well as in public schools. To its opponents it symbolized yet another potentially disastrous adventure in social engineering which, by importing the crime and

⁴⁴James L. Hecht, "A Catholic Challenge: Open Housing," *America*, February 10, 1973.

pathology of the ghettos into a hitherto stable middle-class neighborhood, would accelerate white flight from New York City and destroy another such neighborhood. There was little question that the controversy had an adverse effect on relations between blacks and Jews, though middle-class blacks in comparable situations had responded not very differently from many of the middle-class Jews in Forest Hills.

Though 1973 was a year of negotiation and compromise, there were few indications that the underlying resentment of many residents had disappeared. The lessening of public protest was seen by observers as symptomatic of widespread resignation to the inevitability of the project, rather than a change of heart. Protest leaders, conceding that the earlier noisy opposition had somewhat abated, claimed that in the course of negotiations with the New York City Housing Authority, with all of the proposals and counterproposals, many residents had come to believe "that they had somehow avoided having a low-income project in their neighborhood."⁴⁵ There were, however, some protests; for example, about 50 members of the *ad hoc* committee against the proposal attempted to "sleep in" at Queens Borough Hall, but were barred by police from entering the building.⁴⁶

While the initial community protests failed to halt construction, they succeeded in reducing the size of the project and in converting it into a cooperative. Scheduled to be completed at the end of the summer of 1974, it was to consist of three 12-story buildings and two community buildings, with a total of 432 apartments for about 1,300 people. This was nearly a 50 per cent cut in the original project's three 24-story towers and 840 units. As originally planned, 40 per cent of its units were to be allocated to the elderly and 60 per cent to low-income families. Other problems, still unresolved as the year drew to a close, had to do with the exact nature of the cooperative arrangement and whether the project's board of directors or the Housing Authority would have the ultimate say in the vitally important questions of tenant selection and eviction for cause.⁴⁷

In 1973 the American Jewish Committee, which from the inception of the Forest Hills dispute had encouraged mediation, began a community social services program designed for present residents, as well as for those who would be moving into the new project. As a

⁴⁵New York Times, March 27, 1973.

⁴⁶Long Island Press, September 7, 1973.

⁴⁷To make public housing viable, it is imperative to " . . . screen the tenancy and weed out as painlessly as possible the hard-core delinquent and anti-social families. . . ." J.S. Fuerst, "Survival Kit for Public Housing," *Commonweal*, September 7, 1973.

result of its efforts, a senior citizens program was begun in Forest Hills High School (to be relocated in the project upon completion) and construction was begun on a day-care facility within the project, which was not in the original plans. The Committee also worked with city officials to make them aware of the needs and concerns of the present residents, and helped organize tenants in a garden apartment development adjacent to the project site, which was deteriorating, to compel the landlord to do a proper job of repair and maintenance.

HASIDIM IN BROOKLYN

The Hasidic movement, founded in the late 18th century in Eastern Europe and preaching intense religious devotion manifested through joy and mysticism, considers itself the distinctive surviving form of traditional Judaism. After World War II, many Hasidim came to New York and settled in the Williamsburg, Crown Heights, and Borough Park sections of Brooklyn.

Because of their unique culture and appearance, Hasidim tended to maintain tightly knit relationships with each other and to shun intimacy with outsiders. With the influx of blacks to Crown Heights and Puerto Ricans to Williamsburg came intergroup conflict. The Hasidic neighborhoods were plagued by street crime, the perpetrators being mainly black and Puerto Rican youths, and the Hasidim began to fight back. According to Puerto Rican leaders in Williamsburg, however, their resistance and retaliation were not confined to the actual culprits but were directed at innocent Puerto Ricans too, thereby exacerbating tensions between the two groups. Father Byron J. Karvelis, whose parish is largely Puerto Rican, charged that there had been numerous "mob beatings" of Puerto Ricans by Hasidim, and that complaints to the police were futile. The police claimed that the complaints had been investigated and that action was taken where warranted.⁴⁸

An incident in Crown Heights in June, involving Hasidic Jews and a black physician, touched off a melee. The service road in front of the Lubavitcher Hasidic headquarters on Eastern Parkway was normally closed to traffic on the Sabbath, but residents of the block had been allowed by the police to pass through. When the physician, who lived on the block, attempted to do so to escort a patient out of the area, Hasidim in the streets stopped his car, damaged it, and threatened him and his patient. Two policemen, who had been at the scene, intervened and were then set upon by the crowd. They thereupon summoned help and 30 police cars responded. According to the police, eight officers

⁴⁸New York Times, May 3, 1973.

were hurt in the ensuing fracas; one of them was knocked unconscious. The Hasidim claimed that two of their number had been injured but, more importantly, that club-swinging police had waded into the crowd shouting anti-Jewish obscenities.

Following the clash, a black clergyman, Reverend Clarence Norman, president of the interracial and interfaith Crown Heights Clergy Council, announced that an agreement had been reached to end the dispute over access to the service road on Saturdays. "We have received assurances from Jewish leaders that no traffic will be interfered with in traveling through this area," he reported, urging drivers to "bear in mind the safety of those children and adults entering and leaving services" at the Lubavitcher Synagogue.⁴⁹

LUIS FUENTES AND LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD

School District 1 on the lower East Side is one of New York's 32 decentralized local school districts. In 1973 about 68 per cent of the enrollment in its 20 elementary and junior high schools was Puerto Rican, 17 per cent black, 8 per cent Chinese and 7 per cent white. Its teaching staff was about 90 per cent white, most of them Jewish. In citywide reading tests, a substantial majority of the pupils consistently scored below grade level.

The dispute over the appointment in 1972 of Luis Fuentes as superintendent of District 1, which brought forth charges that he had made a number of antisemitic remarks during the Ocean Hill-Brownsville controversy over his dismissal of teachers and a formal request for his dismissal by several Jewish groups (AJYB, 1973 [Vol. 74], pp. 159, 234), continued. In April 1973 a hearing officer, former New York City Police Commissioner Vincent L. Broderick who was appointed by School Chancellor Harvey B. Scribner to weigh the charges against Fuentes, recommended that he not be dismissed. Shortly thereafter, State Education Commissioner Ewald B. Nyquist declared the local board had followed proper procedures in selecting the superintendent, but sharply rebuked him for some of his earlier conduct.

The United Federation of Teachers (U.F.T.) contended that Fuentes aimed to purge the white principals in the district; that he was abetted by his supporters, who were accused of threatening and harassing principals out of office. He responded that of eight new principals appointed during his first year, four were white, and of these two were Jewish.

In the local school board election in May 1973, a slate of six

⁴⁹*Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, June 10, 1973.

candidates, most of them white, supported by U.F.T. which had made the removal of Fuentes a major campaign issue, was elected to the nine-member District 1 board. None of the six had children in the public schools. Backers of Fuentes, including the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and at least the more vocal elements in the Puerto Rican community, charged that irregularities had deprived many minority group voters of their franchise and initiated a law suit to obtain a new election.

Meanwhile, the anti-Fuentes majority on the new board first moved to limit the superintendent's powers and dismiss some of his appointees whose qualifications were questioned and then, on October 16, suspended him from his post for alleged insubordination and misconduct. Fuentes denounced the charges, claiming that they were inspired by U.F.T., which resented him for educational improvements he had introduced, such as bilingual programs for Spanish- and Chinese-speaking pupils and involving parents in the school decision-making process. He accused U.F.T. of defending everybody in their ranks, including incompetents, at the expense of the children.

The superintendent's supporters called a boycott to protest his suspension, during which some two-thirds of the 17,000 pupils in the district were absent. It was ended only after a court ordered him temporarily reinstated.⁵⁰ The chairman of the school board claimed that many parents kept their children out only because they had been intimidated and told that their children would not be safe if they went to school.

OTERO V. NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY

The Seward Park Extension Urban Renewal Area is a federally-assisted project on the lower East Side of Manhattan. Two buildings with 360 apartments were built on the site. Their construction involved the demolition of slum housing and the relocation of former residents, many in public-housing accommodations, as required by federal and local regulations. They were given explicit assurances by Housing Authority officials that, as former "site residents," they would be entitled to top priority in the new public housing.

It soon became evident that many applicants who did not have "first priority" were obtaining apartments in the new buildings, and that the proportion of nonwhites, mainly Puerto Ricans, but also some blacks

⁵⁰Richard Davis, a member of the District 1 board, who had argued against reinstatement, reported that his life had been threatened. *New York Times*, October 20, 1973.

and Orientals, was significantly lower than that among the former residents of the area. Some of these groups, believing that the selection of new tenants constituted racial discrimination, filed suit in federal court.

In February 1973 U.S. District Judge Morris E. Lasker, upholding an earlier decision of a different judge in that court, ruled that the Housing Authority must honor its promise of first priority to nonwhite former site residents (354 F. Supp. 941). He enjoined the Authority from leasing apartments in the new buildings to whites who were not former site residents, even though this would have improved racial balance. It would also have enabled Jews selected for occupancy in these buildings to be closer to a particular synagogue, thus doing away with the harassment and abuse to which they were exposed on their way from their present apartments to the synagogue. Judge Lasker held that religious favoritism in the assignment of public-housing accommodation violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Reversing the U.S. District Court decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals ruled in September 1973 (484 F. 2d 1122) that the city had not necessarily violated the constitutional rights of blacks and Puerto Ricans by giving preference to Jews and other whites. It agreed with the Housing Authority's contention that its regulation giving priority to displaced residents was superseded in this case by a duty to maintain a reasonable racial balance in the project.

However, the Court ordered new hearings to resolve certain points of factual dispute on the ground that the Authority had not proved it needed to bar the black and Puerto Rican residents to maintain such balance. The new proceedings were ordered to determine the racial and ethnic mix of the urban renewal area surrounding the project to see if the project itself would cause a shift in that mix.

Energy Crisis

While the Arab oil embargo in the wake of the Yom Kippur war was designed to cripple United States support of Israel, fears were expressed by many that its painful impact would result also in deep anger and resentment toward American Jews, who overwhelmingly had identified themselves with the Israeli cause. Indeed, such fears were far from groundless. Feeding upon traditional undercurrents of hostility toward Jews, as well as upon a new willingness on the part of many Americans to reexamine the Arab case in the light of Arab objectives ostensibly limited to recovery of their conquered territories,

hard questions were raised as to the wisdom of ongoing United States backing of Israel and, more importantly, the apparent role of American Jews in bringing it about and perpetuating it. The old accusation of dual loyalty was raised once again, for example, by the conservative commentator, Jeffrey St. John, on CBS radio. According to a respected trends analyst, "the plain fact is that expressed anti-Semitic sentiment, spontaneous and unorganized, has increased a hundredfold since the outbreak of the fighting in the Middle East."⁵¹

Yet, it was also true that despite a conglomeration of pressures—domestic hardship and dislocations due to heating oil and gasoline shortages, powerful world support for the Arabs, Arab-American and New Left activities against Israel, Arab government propaganda, conventional antisemitic agitation—the last quarter of 1973 did not witness any massive popular upsurge of bitterness or hatred toward American Jews.⁵² Most people tended rather to place the blame for energy problems on the oil companies, the federal government, the ecologists, or even the oil-producing Arab states for driving prices sky-high.

As for the Middle East conflict, although public opinion polls in December continued to reflect far more sympathy for Israel than for the Arab countries,⁵³ they reflected simultaneously a strong disposition against United States involvement in the conflict, indicating perhaps fear of another Vietnam. As interpreted by one Jewish observer, "Americans sympathize with Israel, but not so intensely that they are ready to sacrifice a great deal to save her." But he concluded that, "If the leadership continues to insist on the crucial connection between Israel's survival and basic American interests, then the American public will support, however reluctantly, the perceived imperatives of American foreign policy."⁵⁴

Another important facet of the effect of the energy crisis on intergroup relations was its cumulative effect on blacks and other disadvantaged minority people. Members of these groups, disproportionately poor, tended to suffer disproportionately from scarcer resources and rising prices. Black workers, for example, frequently with low seniority, were concentrated in those sectors of the labor force which were most vulnerable to energy shortage-induced layoffs

⁵¹Milton Ellerin, "The War, the Oil Embargo, A New Anti-Semitism?" *Reform Judaism*, February 1974.

⁵²"The Arab use of oil as a weapon to modify Israel's stance is only beginning." (Malachi B. Martin, "The Dialogue is Over," *Worldview*, January 1974.)

⁵³Gallup found 54 per cent pro-Israel, 8 per cent pro-Arab; the remainder undecided.

⁵⁴Earl Raab, "Is Israel Losing Popular Support?", *Commentary*, January 1974.

and shutdowns. According to Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, a nationwide unemployment rate of 6 per cent would likely mean a black unemployment rate of at least 15 per cent. Nevertheless, said Jordan, "the high-level committees dealing with the crisis are lily-white."⁵⁵ In addition, poor minority group people in rented inner city apartments, who often received inadequate heat from indifferent landlords in the best of times, bore the brunt of heating oil shortages and soaring costs which provided a convenient excuse for such landlords to cut back further.

An interesting sidelight of the energy problem was the proposal of a number of Congressmen, chiefly from the South, to help save gasoline by terminating all bussing designed to promote racial integration in public schools. It was not widely acclaimed.

Civil Rights

EXECUTIVE SUITE

While it is impossible for anyone to say definitively that discrimination in any given year was less or more than in the year before, it is not impossible to discern longer-term trends. It can be asserted, for example, that, in general, discrimination against Jews was considerably less evident in 1973 than was the case a decade earlier. The cumulative impact of the civil rights movement and the drive for equal opportunity, with the concomitant legislative sanctions, made discrimination based on religion, race, and national origin less acceptable. Almost certainly there was more discrimination in employment against Jewish women because they were women than there was against Jewish men because they were Jewish. But some discrimination existed against both Jewish women and men for no reason other than religion.

For example, the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Attorney in Manhattan filed suit in the U.S. District Court against the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, charging it with "unlawful employment practices which discriminate against Jews and other minority group members." The government alleged that Metropolitan Life's hiring policy limited employment opportunities for Jews and that it failed to make reasonable accommodations in certain work assignments, as required by law, to enable Jews to observe their Sabbath.

⁵⁵New York Times, February 9, 1974.

A number of studies had definitely established that discrimination against Jews in executive positions of major United States corporations was the rule rather than the exception. Although, in 1973, there continued to be isolated instances of Jews being promoted to top management jobs in such companies, the dominant pattern persisted. Given the number of Jews whose educational credentials and professional experience highly qualified them for such positions, they were grossly underrepresented in corporate executive suites. When confronted with charges that discrimination against Jews was deeply rooted and systemic within their organizations, company presidents almost invariably denied that such was the case. In one such instance, however, Acme Supermarkets in Philadelphia agreed after extended discussion with the Philadelphia Chapter of the American Jewish Committee to take affirmative action to remedy the relative absence of Jews on its management team.

A capsule summary of discrimination against Jews in Florida was furnished by Arthur N. Teitelbaum, director of the Anti-Defamation League's regional office in that state.⁵⁶ He reported that "Discrimination in employment and housing against Florida's estimated 256,000 Jewish citizens is a reality—and at the same time a virtually invisible phenomenon." While, according to Teitelbaum, some victims of discrimination are willing to press complaints, many are not "because they don't want to make an issue of it, because they don't have sufficient proof or because they feel nothing can be done."⁵⁷ Many were not even aware that they had been victimized.

Among several illustrations cited by Teitelbaum was the case of a Jewish man who was about to purchase a condominium apartment in Fort Lauderdale from a willing seller, but found the sale blocked by the condominium board. He had been required to reveal his religion, nationality, and his wife's maiden name on the condominium's application form. The owner of the apartment said that the rejection was due to religious discrimination. During the initial stages of an investigation by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the condominium board reversed its position, claimed there had been a "misunderstanding," and approved the application.

In the field of employment, according to Teitelbaum, most private employment agencies in Dade County were still willing to accept discriminatory job orders which expressly excluded Jews from consideration. Although this account was limited to Florida, informal

⁵⁶"Clouds in the Sunshine State," *ADL Bulletin*, April 1973.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*

reports indicated that similar practices were prevalent elsewhere in the country.

DISCRIMINATION BY PRIVATE CLUBS AND FRATERNAL ORDERS

In recent years discrimination against minority groups in access to public accommodations, such as restaurants, hotels, and recreational facilities, has been all but eliminated largely because Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made such discrimination illegal. But Title II explicitly exempted from its reach *bona fide* private clubs. The rationale for this exemption was the right of free association. As stated by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg:

Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable but it is the constitutional right of every person to choose his social intimates and business partners solely on the basis of personal prejudices including race. These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private association are themselves constitutionally protected liberties. (*Bell v. Maryland*, 378 U.S. 226 [1964]).

Yet many have questioned the legitimacy of exclusionary practices based on race or religion by private clubs or fraternal orders because of their societal consequences. It has been claimed, for example, that many such clubs actually are quasi-public because they frequently are the setting for important business and political decisions that may affect the entire community. Evidence has accumulated, too, of a positive correlation between advancement of corporation executives and their acceptability for membership in prestigious city and country clubs. Jews have been particularly hurt by this.

No matter whether or not private clubs or organizations should have the right to discriminate, strong sentiment has developed that government should neither condone nor support discrimination by granting privileges like liquor licenses or tax benefits to groups guilty of such practices. In 1969 Maine enacted a law barring any organization which is licensed to dispense liquor from withholding membership from any person on account of race, religion, or national origin. Exempted were only religious or ethnic organizations. The State Supreme Court upheld the validity of this statute when it was challenged by 15 Maine Elks lodges whose national constitution restricted membership to whites only. On April 16 the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the Elks. In the same month, the Idaho Elks were stripped of their property tax-exemption when the state attorney general held that it was illegal for the state to grant tax exemption to organizations with racially discriminatory membership policies.

As a direct result of mounting pressures, the racially exclusionary Loyal Order of Moose, with one million members throughout the country, voted in May to delete all references to race from its constitution and by-laws. And in October, in a referendum among their 1.5 million members, the Elks voted by a four to one majority to strike the word "white" from their constitutional requirements for admission. (Just three years earlier, the national organization had suspended its lodge in Madison, Wis., for doing precisely the same thing.)

In November Eleanor Holmes Norton, chairman of the New York City Human Rights Commission, declared that she would "strongly lobby" for passage of legislation introduced in the state senate, which would require revocation of the liquor license of any private club discriminating in its admission policies on the basis of race, religion, or sex.⁵⁸

For the year as a whole, progress toward the elimination of private club discrimination proceeded at snail's pace. With rare exceptions, clubs which traditionally had excluded blacks and Jews from membership continued to do so. In the area of sex discrimination, however, an Associated Press sampling of some two dozen men's clubs across the country revealed a gradual opening up to women in actual membership as well as in use of athletic facilities.

WOMEN AS A GROUP

At its convention in Miami the AFL-CIO, after years of solid opposition, endorsed the Equal Rights Amendment. The U.S. Department of State announced that it was actively recruiting women for the Foreign Service to represent the United States abroad. Rabbis in the Conservative branch of Judaism voted to authorize women to be counted as part of a *minyan*. A bill was introduced in Congress to establish a national center for the prevention of rape. Two all-women law firms opened offices in New York City and an all-women bank was in the process of formation. These were but a few of the many developments in 1973 which, considered as a whole, signified the continuing emergence of women as a distinct group and the growing awareness of people of both sexes of the unmet needs and unfulfilled aspirations of many women in our society.

According to the results of a survey of 120,000 women, reported in the January 1973 issue of *Redbook* magazine, nine out of ten believed that women were treated as second-class citizens. Although the percentage of women who belonged to activist women's organizations

⁵⁸New York Post, November 14, 1973.

was relatively small, the impact of the women's movement was a powerful and pervasive one. During the year, feminist thinking influenced countless thousands of women who considered themselves anything but radical in other respects, and who were repelled by much of the extremist ideology and imagery of the militants in "women's lib." Writing about the new feelings and attitudes prevalent among working class women in Brooklyn, one reporter concluded, "The feminist movement is responsible in large measure for their belief that they can change the course of their middle-aged lives."⁵⁹

Six days of hearings conducted in July by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, chaired by Representative Martha W. Griffiths (D., Mich.), marked the first time that any congressional committee had attempted to take a comprehensive look at the economic status of American women who constituted 40 per cent of the permanent labor force. The Committee listened to expert testimony about sex discrimination in virtually every aspect of economic life—jobs, taxes, insurance, mortgage loans, pensions, and Social Security for housewives. It heard a Census Bureau statistic that three-fourths of working women either have no husband, or a husband who earned less than \$7,000 a year, thus negating the common notion that most women work only for "pin money." A parade of witnesses charged the federal government not only with failure to enforce the laws prohibiting sex discrimination, but also with practicing such discrimination within its own agencies. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance, for example, whose job it is to see that firms receiving government contracts do not discriminate against women, was itself accused of employing no women in professional posts in any of its field offices.

In 1973 the number of women serving in state legislatures was 441, up 28 per cent from the preceding year. As the year drew to a close, 30 states had ratified the Equal Rights Amendment, a top priority of the feminist movement.

Another significant event was a U.S. Supreme Court ruling (eight to one) in May that women in military service must be granted the same dependency benefits for their husbands that military men receive for their wives (*Frontiero v. Richardson*, 36 L.Ed. 2d 583). The Court invalidated federal laws requiring a servicewoman to prove that she provided more than one-half of her husband's support before she could collect housing and medical allowances for him while asking no such proof of married servicemen. This far-reaching decision cast a

⁵⁹Susan Jacoby, "Feminism in the \$12,000-a-year Family: 'What Do I Do for the Next 20 Years?'"', *New York Times Magazine*, June 17, 1973.

constitutional shadow over other laws which, for whatever reasons, differentiated in their treatment of men and women.

Within the Jewish community there was continuing tension between women's rights activists and what they perceived to be the "male-dominated Jewish establishment." Expressing concern that some Jewish organizations had been in the vanguard of the drive against goals and timetables for women and minorities in employment on the ground that these led to reverse discrimination, Dr. Pauline Bart, a psychiatrist at the University of Illinois medical school, announced the formation of the Committee of Jewish Women for Affirmative Action.⁶⁰ Others commented on the traditional status of women in Judaism: "While the Jewish woman was respected and treated well by comparison with parallel cultures from Biblical times to the 20th Century, circumstances, custom and ritual law made of her a second class citizen. Exemption from the obligation to perform time-bound 'mitzvot' (commandments), and divorce regulations may have been motivated by the desire to protect women . . . yet, the ultimate result was exclusion from participation in major religious and communal functions on an equal footing with men."⁶¹ It is noteworthy too that disproportionate numbers of women of Jewish extraction continued to play leadership roles in the women's movement, e.g., Gloria Steinem and Betty Friedan, as well as in its rank and file.

On the other hand, grave concern was raised by many Jews over the adverse implications of the feminist ethos for Jewish group survival. In this view the dynamics of the women's movement, with its stress on career options, its hostility to prescribed sex roles of any kind and, most importantly, its downgrading of motherhood and child-rearing, constituted a major threat both to the size and the cohesiveness of the Jewish family.⁶² Since, even before the advent of feminism, American Jews were barely reproducing themselves and since historically the mother's place in the Jewish family structure was central to Jewish continuity, these concerns were scarcely frivolous. In partial response to this critique, one measure suggested was to increase the number of Jewish-oriented day-care centers for young children of career women.

In a reaction to the feeling that the somewhat amorphous women's movement was insufficiently responsive to particularistic concerns,

⁶⁰ *Women Today*, July 9, 1973.

⁶¹ Gladys Rosen, "New Perspectives on the Role of Women: A Background Paper," American Jewish Committee, May 16, 1973 (mimeo).

⁶² "The Jewish Family: Institution in Crisis," Sanford N. Sherman, *Sh'ma*, December 28, 1973.

1973 witnessed the actual formation of the National Black Feminist Organization and the National Conference of Puerto Rican Women, while the groundwork was laid for the creation of separate labor union and white ethnic women's groups. Reflecting the broad impact of the feminist movement throughout our society, the development of these new groupings was seen by its leaders as a force for women's coalition-building, which in time would exert even greater influence on American economic, political and cultural institutions.

ABORTION AS MORAL ISSUE

On January 22, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled seven to two that all state laws prohibiting or restricting a woman's right to obtain an abortion during the first three months of pregnancy were unconstitutional. The Court ruled, too, that abortions after the first three months, while also legal, were subject to limited state regulation. The decision in effect overturned laws in all but four states—Alaska, Hawaii, New York, and Washington—which already had liberalized laws. (*Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113).

Justice Harry A. Blackmun, writing for the majority, declared that the constitutional right of privacy, developed by the Court in a long series of decisions, was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." He rejected, however, the argument of women's rights groups that this right was absolute. Justice Byron R. White, dissenting, called the decision "an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review which the Constitution extends to this court."

Reaction to the Supreme Court decree was swift and predictable, since the battle lines had been drawn years before. Civil libertarians and women's rights activists applauded it. Roman Catholic Church spokesmen excoriated it. Reflecting the Catholic conviction that legalized abortion was legalized murder, John Cardinal Krol of Philadelphia characterized the decision as "an unspeakable tragedy for this nation"⁶³ On the other hand, Reverend Dr. Howard E. Spragg, executive vice president of the Board for Homeland Ministries of the United Church of Christ, said: "The decision is historic not only in terms of women's individual rights but also in terms of the relationships of church and state."⁶⁴

The Court's decision appeared to remove much of the stigma previously attached to abortion; the result was tens of thousands of

⁶³New York Times, January 23, 1973.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

legalized abortions throughout the country during the following year. The Harris Poll found a reversal of public opinion, which now supported liberalized abortion by a margin of 52, against 41, per cent; a previous poll had indicated opposition of 46, against 42, per cent. Catholics remained opposed to legalized abortion by a 56, against 40, per cent margin.⁶⁵

Antiabortion forces, however, were not admitting defeat. The National Right to Life Committee, consisting predominantly (but by no means exclusively) of Roman Catholics, made plans to press for a constitutional amendment to guarantee the rights of a fetus, which, if adopted, would nullify the Court's decision. As a counterweight to this move, 16 religious organizations, including Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, United Church of Christ and Jewish groups, organized a National Religious Coalition for Abortion Rights "to safeguard the right of women to use individual freedom of conscience in deciding whether to seek an abortion."⁶⁶

Church-State Issues

PAROCHIAL

Religious elementary and secondary schools, approximately 90 per cent of which are Roman Catholic, on the whole continued to experience acute financial difficulties. Why this was so has been a subject for lively debate, in which such factors as cost inflation, declining numbers of teaching nuns, personal crises of faith, shifting parental attitudes toward denominational schools, improved suburban public schools, and the declining Catholic birthrate were each accorded varying weights. At the same time, the controversy over supporting such schools out of public funds continued unabated. The National Council of Churches, as well as eight major national Jewish Organizations, submitted testimony to Congress in opposition to legislation which would have allowed tax credits for parents of religious school pupils. Catholic and Orthodox Jewish groups supported it.

Those in favor of public subsidy, whether through direct aid to the schools or indirect aid to parents of religious school pupils, stressed the enormous contribution of such schools in providing quality secular education for almost five million American children, as well as the

⁶⁵New York *Post*, April 18, 1973.

⁶⁶New York *Times*, December 31, 1973.

healthy pluralism of parental option to have children educated outside the monolithic public-school system. They noted, too, that religious schools that close down for lack of funds, necessarily thrust their pupils upon the public schools, and that it would be cheaper for government to provide the needed partial aid than to bear the full cost of educating these pupils in the already overcrowded public schools. "Every day," it was held, "one and a half non-public schools close their doors."⁶⁷

Opponents of such aid argued that, according to the First Amendment, it would be improper for government to subsidize schools whose chief purpose is to propagate a religious faith; that the partial aid being sought was merely a prelude to demands for total public support, and that most public schools were ready, willing, and able to accept former religious school pupils.

On June 25, 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court in three cases handed down far-reaching decisions proscribing government aid to religious elementary and secondary schools, while sustaining a limited form of aid to sectarian colleges. Coupled with similar rulings issued by the Supreme Court in 1971 (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], p. 105), these decisions seemed to indicate that the Court majority has closed the constitutional door on any possibility of substantial public assistance to sectarian schools in whatever shape or form.⁶⁸

Specifically, the Court in an eight to one decision invalidated a 1970 New York law under which nonpublic schools were paid specified sums per pupil for providing certain services "mandated" by the state (*Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty*, 93 S.Ct. 2814), and one provision of another New York law, enacted in 1972, providing for payments to nonpublic schools to cover cost of maintenance (*Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist*, 93 S. Ct. 2955). The Court also invalidated, 6 to 3 (*Sloan v. Lemon*, 93 S.Ct. 2982), a Pennsylvania law providing for partial reimbursement to parents for tuition paid to nonpublic schools; the second part of the 1972 New York statute providing similar reimbursement to such parents with annual incomes below \$5,000, and

⁶⁷Thomas R. Mullaney, "Tax Credits and Parochial Schools," *Commonweal*, April 27, 1973.

⁶⁸"For the now well defined three-part test that has emerged from our decisions is a product of considerations derived from the full sweep of the Establishment Clause cases. Taken together these decisions dictate that to pass muster under the Establishment Clause the law in question, first, must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose second, must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion . and third, must avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.

"(*Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist*, 93 S.Ct. 2955.)

the third part of the same law giving tax benefits to such parents with annual incomes above \$5,000. In the college aid case, the Court, in a six to three decision, upheld a South Carolina law aiding colleges, including church-related institutions, through the issuance of revenue bonds (*Hunt v. McNair*, 93 S.Ct. 2868).

While Protestant, Jewish, and public-education groups generally hailed the Court's decisions, official Catholic reaction was one of keen disappointment. Thus Terence Cardinal Cooke of the Archdiocese of New York described the rulings in a pastoral letter as "tragic and misguided."⁶⁹ In an article in the Jesuit weekly, *America*, Father Charles M. Whelan, professor of law at Fordham Law School, observed that while these decisions were a severe blow to hopes for significant public assistance to religious schools, the Court did not outlaw all such assistance. "Buses, books, health services, lunches and the traditional institutional tax exemptions remain constitutional."⁷⁰ Further, tens of millions of dollars in federal aid flowed to religious schools throughout the country in 1973 for "remedial, therapeutic and welfare services" to disadvantaged children under the provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the constitutionality of which had yet to be examined by the U.S. Supreme Court.⁷¹

Despite the discouraging Supreme Court rulings, proponents of educational vouchers for children in all schools, public and private, continued their efforts to win support for this broad form of tuition grant, lending credence to Father Andrew M. Greeley's assertion: "The battle over aid to parochial schools may go on as long as there are parochial schools."⁷² In apparent agreement with this thesis, anti-parochial groups, spearheaded by the American Civil Liberties Union, National Education Association and American Jewish Congress, and building on state and local PEARL (Public Education and Religious Liberty) coalitions, prepared to organize a national consortium of such groups.

The American Jewish Committee, while generally opposing public aid to religious schools, continued to endorse "dual enrollment" or "shared time" programs already successfully operating in a number of states, under which students pursued secular studies in public schools,

⁶⁹James E. Wood, Jr., "The Impermissibility of Public Funds and Parochial Schools," *Journal of Church and State*, Spring 1973.

⁷⁰"The School Aid Decisions: 'Not Dead but Sleeping,'" *America*, July 7, 1973.

⁷¹*Church and State*, January 1974.

⁷²"Catholic Schools are Committing Suicide," *New York Times Magazine*, October 21, 1973.

in tandem with religious studies in denominational schools, as a partial and putatively constitutional means of alleviating the financial plight of the denominational schools.⁷³

PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Few national issues have so persistently remained in the public spotlight as the dispute over prayer in public schools. Since the U.S. Supreme Court rulings in 1962 (*Engel v. Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421) and 1963 (*Abington School District v. Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203), which banned organized prayer, Bible-reading, and religious exercises in public schools, every session of Congress has seen resolutions to amend the Constitution so as to nullify the effects of these decisions. The year 1973 was no exception. Twenty-six bills were introduced in the House of Representatives and seven in the Senate, proposing amendments in varying forms which would permit "voluntary" or "non-denominational" prayers in public buildings, including schools.⁷⁴

Advocates of school-prayer amendments continued to stress the overwhelming popular support (as evidenced in public opinion polls) for restoring prayer in public schools, invoking also the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to buttress their argument that religious liberty, as well as public morality, was at stake. Opponents responded by asserting that nothing in the Supreme Court decisions barred any child from uttering a prayer in public school (provided he did not obstruct the normal school program) and that the Supreme Court prohibition was aimed solely at school-sponsored, organized religious practices. They argued, too, that the dynamics of the school situation precluded genuinely "voluntary" organized prayer and that "nondenominational" prayer, which lacks a distinctive religious commitment, is a meaningless exercise.⁷⁵

A new element was added to this highly emotional controversy in September when the U.S. Catholic Conference administrative board, consisting of 28 bishops, recommended a model amendment which would not only allow organized sectarian prayer in public schools (which the board considered inadequate), but would also permit religious instruction in these schools if "provided under private auspices." The latter clause sought to nullify a 1948 U.S. Supreme

⁷³See Rev. Richard U. Smith, "Now is the Time for Dual Enrollment," *Religious Education*, March-April 1972.

⁷⁴St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, October 20, 1973.

⁷⁵For an exposition of both sides of the issue, see "The Question of a 'School Prayer' Amendment to the Constitution—Pro & Con," *Congressional Digest*, January 1974.

Court decision prohibiting such instruction on public school premises (*McCullum v. Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203). "Since the Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to forbid genuine religious freedom in public education, the people of the United States have no recourse but to amend the Constitution," the board said.⁷⁶

There was much speculation as to the motivation for making this proposal just then, since it represented a distinct shift in the Catholic position. "The reason may be tied to the fact that more and more Catholic children are attending public school due to the financial bind of the parochial schools," suggested one religion editor.⁷⁷ Others conjectured that one factor in the attitude of at least some of the bishops may have been an abiding resentment at the apparent direction of Supreme Court decision-making in the religious sphere generally—not only its decisions in *Engel*, *Schempp* and *McCullum*, but also its pro-abortion and anti-parochial rulings.

In 1971 a prayer amendment failed by only 28 votes in the House (AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], pp. 108-109). Supporters were optimistic that the new Catholic stance would sway enough congressmen to win the next time it came up for a vote. This failed to happen in 1973, however, although the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments did hold hearings at which prayer amendment advocates testified. Among the proponents were representatives of the American Legion, Citizens for Public Prayer, and the ultra-Orthodox Lubavitcher movement.⁷⁸ Although hearings to receive testimony of prayer-amendment opponents were postponed, spokesmen for the mainstream Protestant and Jewish bodies were prepared to reiterate their opposition, previously expressed, to any proposals which, in their view, would tamper with the First Amendment.

Interreligious Relations

KEY '73

While most of the developments in the field of intergroup relations and tensions during the past year dealt with problems and issues that were not new, one phenomenon, Key '73 (AJYB, 1973 [Vol. 74], p. 161), may be characterized as fresh, perhaps unique. Inaugurated with considerable fanfare in January, this evangelical campaign by a

⁷⁶Religious News Service, September 19, 1973.

⁷⁷George R. Plagenz, "A New Drive for Prayer in the Schools," *Cleveland Press*, October 27, 1973.

⁷⁸Washington Post, October 5, 1973.

coalition of 140 Protestant and Roman Catholic groups (including 43 dioceses) was designed to confront every person in the United States and Canada with "the gospel of Jesus Christ" through the use of the mass media, mass rallies, and door-to-door canvassing. Although this ecumenical venture drew participation from a broad spectrum of Christian groups, its predominant orientation was a religiously conservative one. Three major denominations, the United Church of Christ, the Episcopal Church, and the United Presbyterian Church withheld official endorsement.⁷⁹

Shortly after its launching, Key '73 encountered serious questions from Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, the American Jewish Committee's director of interreligious affairs, as well as from other Jewish leaders who were concerned about its potential impact on Jews. In an attempt to allay such fears, Reverend Theodore Raedeke, the campaign's executive director, wrote to Rabbi Tanenbaum that there is "no anti-Semitism in either the ideology or the thrust of Key '73."⁸⁰ But tensions persisted. The American Jewish Congress, for example, protested a memorandum written by the U.S. Navy chief of chaplains, which had urged Navy chaplains to participate in Key '73, on the ground that "proselytization is not one of their responsibilities."⁸¹ Others voices, including those of non-Jews, joined in the criticism. Reverend Malcolm Boyd, Episcopal priest and author, characterized Key '73 as "high-powered hucksterism," and Reverend Christian Raible of the Unitarian Universalist Association accused it of "merely peddling piety as it attempts mass manipulation."⁸² Rabbi Balfour Brickner, director of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations' interfaith department, said:

What really worries me about Key 73 is the confluence of two streams I see emerging in the country now. The political and social conservatism and religious conservatism. . . The threat of Key 73 is really not to Jews. The threat is to the fabric of American society itself.⁸³

Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R., Ore.), a devout Evangelical, warned that efforts to "Christianize the nation" could severely damage the integrity of the church.⁸⁴

⁷⁹New York Times, January 1, 1973.

⁸⁰Jewish Telegraphic Agency, January 18, 1973.

⁸¹Religious News Service, March 7, 1973.

⁸²Michael Putney, "Key '73: 'Devout Witness' or Holy Hucksterism?". *National Observer*, February 17, 1973.

⁸³*Ibid.*

⁸⁴"The Week In Review," *New York Times*, January 20, 1974.

On the other hand, Reverend Billy Graham, a staunch supporter of Key '73, expressed his disapproval of any "proselytizing that is coercive, or that seeks to commit men against their will," noting his understanding of the purpose of Key '73 to be "to call all men to Christ without singling out any specific religious or ethnic group."⁸⁵ And on March 2 the governing board of the National Council of Churches, while advocating Christian dialogue with Jews about Jewish fears of evangelical pressures, refused to condemn efforts to convert Jews to Christianity.⁸⁶

Dr. Arnold T. Olson, president of the Evangelical Free Church of America, discussed several aspects of the Key '73 controversy in an article published in his denomination's bimonthly.⁸⁷ With reference to Jewish criticisms of Key '73, Olson acknowledged that "some of this opposition is the result of the announced plans by some missionary organizations to use Key '73 as a launching pad for intensive evangelism among 'their own people.'" Despite this, he maintained that "the leaders in the Jewish community are over-reacting." Noting the broad-based nature of Key '73, involving more than 150 Christian groups, Olson commented: "Certainly these do not intend to concentrate upon one small segment of our society, representing less than three per cent of the nation's population." He suggested that "the burden therefore rests upon the leaders in Judaism to increase the knowledge and strengthen the religious faith of her youth."⁸⁸ In a development which was related only tangentially to Olson's article, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations distributed to its 710 member synagogues kits of materials containing responses to questions frequently posed by representatives of groups like Key '73 or "Jews for Jesus," and designed particularly to counteract such missionary efforts directed at Jewish youth.⁸⁹

Key '73 was the brainchild of evangelical theologian Dr. Carl F.H. Henry, who first spoke of it in 1967 in an editorial in *Christianity Today*. In the same periodical, Henry more recently took issue sharply with what he called Jewish "efforts to discredit Key 73 as anti-Semitic even before the nationwide evangelistic campaign got underway."⁹⁰ Since Rabbi Tanenbaum was castigated by name in this article, he responded in a letter to the publication in which he acknowledged that

⁸⁵ *Religious News Service*, March 2, 1973.

⁸⁶ *Washington Post*, March 3, 1973.

⁸⁷ "New Seeds of Anti-Semitism," *Evangelical Beacon*, March 5, 1973.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, March 9, 1973.

⁹⁰ "Jews Find the Messiah," *Christianity Today*, April 13, 1973.

some Jewish spokesmen may have been guilty of "excessive zeal" in reacting to Key '73, but also chided Dr. Henry for making "a number of sweeping generalizations that are unsupported by facts" and for using "both a polemical tone and terminology" to describe the rabbi's position.⁹¹

At the annual plenum of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council in Washington, D.C., in June, a policy statement adopted by the 300 delegates representing nine major Jewish organizations and 93 local groups, declared that "the current wave of evangelistic proselytizing was not a major threat to the American Jewish community or to Judaism." It went on to say that concerns that Jewish-Christian relations might be damaged "by the aggressive missionizing intent of Key 73 appear to have abated"; that, "by challenging Jews to a reaffirmation of faith," it may in fact "give impetus to a strengthening of their Jewishness and Judaism."⁹²

While it is difficult to assess exactly the overall impact of Key '73, the prevailing view seemed to be that this widely heralded campaign had been considerably less than a resounding success. On the positive side, many church leaders believed that the project gave new impetus to evangelism. It also proved that religious conservatives, no less than liberals, could coalesce in an ecumenical movement to "call the continent to Christ."⁹³ But because of financial problems, neither the national nor the local drives could make extensive use of the mass media. Other factors in the negative column appear to have been a lack of proper organization and failure to articulate clearly defined goals. As for the Jewish response to Key '73, Reverend Raedeke remarked, "I think their reaction helped our cause."⁹⁴

MOTION PICTURES AND TELEVISION

"Jesus Christ Superstar"

Reaction to the film version of "Jesus Christ Superstar," in terms of its religious implications rather than its artistic or entertainment value, ranged from mildly favorable to sharply critical. This stylized "rock" opera, filmed in Israel and depicting the last seven days in the life of Jesus, was seen by some as deeply offensive to Christians and/or Jews,

⁹¹Religious News Service, April 11, 1973.

⁹²New York Times, June 25, 1973.

⁹³"The Week in Review," New York Times, January 20, 1974.

⁹⁴New York Times, September 2, 1973.

not to mention the portrayal of Judas (duped by the Jewish priests) by a black actor. While many questioned the wisdom of showing the film in its present form, few called for boycott or outright suppression. The predominant disposition was to censure rather than censor it. Other viewers of both faiths found in it little, if anything, that was objectionable.

Jewish reaction to the film was mainly hostile. Benjamin R. Epstein, national director of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, said the movie's "sharp and vivid emphasis on a Jewish mob's demand to kill Jesus" could have an impact on the large numbers of young people who were expected to see it.⁹⁵ The American Jewish Committee released a detailed eight-page analysis by Gerald Strober, a Presbyterian educator and staff member, which charged the film with falsifying history and fostering vicious antisemitic stereotypes. The journal of the American Jewish Congress published an article which accused the filmmakers of "unbelievable naïveté" in once again painting the Jews as "Christ killers." "History, they appear to be saying, never happened. There never were any anti-Jewish laws, crusades, inquisitions, blood accusations, desecrations of synagogues, pogroms."⁹⁶

A number of Christian spokesmen supported the predominant Jewish view that the film had an antisemitic impact. A statement by the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Secretariat for Catholic-Jewish Relations, which was sent to Catholic dioceses throughout the United States, called the film's "caricaturing of Jesus" offensive to Christians, but emphasized that "important portions of the film defame and deprecate Jews and Judaism."⁹⁷ Six Protestant leaders in Philadelphia sharply criticized the portrayal of Jews in the film, urging clergymen, in a letter to nearly 2,000 colleagues, "to counteract the negative impact the film can have on Jewish-Christian relations."⁹⁸ And the Church Council of Greater Seattle issued a statement declaring that the film distorted the New Testament message. "These materials," it asserted, "translate to the screen in 'Superstar' as gross anti-Semitism. . . . We feel, in particular, that children and youth viewing this film should be aware of these distortions."⁹⁹

There were those in whose judgment the film was not harmful to the Jews. Ben Kayfetz, executive director of the central region of the

⁹⁵New York Post, August 8, 1973.

⁹⁶Enid Dame, "Jesus Christ, Superstar: Hippie Passion Play," *Congress Bi-Weekly*, October 26, 1973.

⁹⁷Religious News Service, September 21, 1973.

⁹⁸Jewish Telegraphic Agency, August 6, 1973.

⁹⁹Religious News Service, August 21, 1973.

Canadian Jewish Congress, wrote that it was "not overtly anti-Jewish in content" in a memorandum to CJC's Joint Community Relations Committee.¹⁰⁰ A movie critic for the London *Jewish Chronicle* observed that "stage productions of 'Jesus Christ Superstar' have been running all over the world without provoking any pogroms, and I do not think the screen version will do any harm either."¹⁰¹

The *Christian Century*, an influential ecumenical weekly, also maintained that the production was not antisemitic. This view was echoed by an editorial in the *United Methodist Reporter*, a national weekly, which declared, "That's not anti-Semitism; it's Christian history."¹⁰² Somewhat similar was the view of religion columnist for the *Washington Post*, who, in criticizing the American Jewish Committee's critique of the film, maintained: "The way to combat anti-Semitism, it seems to me, is not to re-write the Bible or to challenge those popularizers who fail to do so, but simply to reiterate repeatedly the indisputable fact that Jesus and all his followers were Jewish."¹⁰³ Writing in *The Pilot*, official organ of the Boston diocese, the Reverend Monsignor Matthew P. Stapleton and the Reverend Neil Cronin, chairman and executive secretary, respectively, of the Archdiocesan Ecumenical Commission, took a middle position: "We sincerely believe that the ordinary Christian today will not be turned against the Jews because of this picture, but if in his heart there is any trace of anti-Semitism an individual might feel his animus is confirmed in the attitude of the chief priests who are presented as selfish, callous, cruel and blood-thirsty."

Elmer L. Winter, president of the American Jewish Committee, suggested that, in a possible television adaptation of the film, its "hostile caricature of the Jewish people, their priests and their temple be eliminated" and that TV as well as foreign versions include both a prologue and epilogue stating clearly that the film "has no pretense to theological or historical authenticity."¹⁰⁴

An interesting footnote to the controversy was provided by an interview with Carl Anderson, who played the role of Judas in the film and who was asked whether Jews are, as some have claimed, the real killers of Christ. "I can't say yes and I can't say no," he replied.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰*Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, August 2, 1973.

¹⁰¹Pamela Melnikoff, "Superstar Super-show," *London Jewish Chronicle*, August 24, 1973.

¹⁰²*Religious News Service*, July 16, 1973.

¹⁰³William R. MacKaye, "Attack on 'Superstar' Won't Stand Gospel Test," *Washington Post*, July 6, 1973.

¹⁰⁴*New York Times*, August 9, 1973.

¹⁰⁵*New York Amsterdam News*, August 25, 1973.

"Bridget Loves Bernie"

Had the closely watched Nielsen ratings been the only determining factor, it is hard to believe that "Bridget Loves Bernie," the Saturday night situation comedy dealing with a Jewish-Catholic intermarriage, would have been dropped by the Columbia Broadcasting System in the 1973 fall season. According to Nielsen, this program was the seventh most popular on the TV networks. Yet the series, which from its inception had rabbis and priests as consultants in an effort to avoid being offensive to either faith, was cancelled.

"Bridget Loves Bernie" did in fact encounter criticism from some Catholic spokesmen. For example, one critic, writing in a diocesan newspaper, commented: "The Catholic father emerges as a pompous ass; the mother as a simpering nincompoop whose religious formation apparently stopped in the second grade. . . . Some video viewers may find the show amusing. But can they honestly say it does not smack of 'religious indifference' condemned by the Popes over the long centuries?"¹⁰⁶

By far the heaviest attacks on the program came from Jewish sources. Although traditionally American Jews have espoused freedom of expression for all and have fought vigorously against attempts at censorship from whatever quarter, there were numerous protests against this particular series from representatives of all segments of the religious community, Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. The Synagogue Council of America, the organization of rabbinical and synagogal bodies of all three branches, was in the forefront of the campaign.

While the show was accused of mocking the teachings of Judaism, the chief reason for the overwhelming Jewish opposition was that intermarriage, which has been perceived as a growing menace to Jewish group survival in America,¹⁰⁷ was presented in a largely favorable light. According to Allen S. Maller, a Reform rabbi, who cited the disproportionately high rate of divorce among Jewish-Gentile couples, the producers

. . . were doing a great disservice to the audience, especially the teenage audience, by glossing over the serious problems that a Catholic-Jewish

¹⁰⁶Charles Oxtan, "Ecumenism Suffers in New TV Series," *The Wanderer*, January 11, 1973.

¹⁰⁷In February of 1973, the New York Board of Rabbis adopted a resolution strongly condemning those of its members who performed mixed marriages.

marriage entails. For the sake of a laugh, this program encouraged ridicule of traditional religious values that are rooted in experience and fact. It also encouraged young people contemplating a mixed marriage to avoid facing hard decisions that will only become more difficult when there are children to be raised.¹⁰⁸

Not all Jewish reaction to "Bridget Loves Bernie" was of the same kind, however. Writing in *Sh'ma*, a biweekly journal which is open to diverse viewpoints, a teacher of synagogue youth inquired:

Do we seriously believe that removing such a show will stem the tide of intermarriage? Do we have the right to determine that which is directed at the entire country? My class and I submit that we do not, and that it is high time to stop playing with words and to take the term "freedom" seriously.¹⁰⁹

George Johnson of the Synagogue Council of America analyzed the problem of intermarriage in terms of a declining sense of Jewish identity among American Jews. "Jewish behavior among non-intermarried families is so minimal," he noted, "that intermarrieds are in many cases equally Jewish, or perhaps even more Jewish, than the non-intermarried".¹¹⁰ In essential agreement with Johnson's perspective was the following observation in an article about the series:

That Jews and non-Jews marry each other is an unavoidable side-effect of living in a predominantly Christian country where the mores make for direct, free socializing between people of all religions. But those who intermarry know and care so little about what they are doing, they are so "de-Judaized" that whether or not to intermarry is not even a meaningful question for them. This is the real tragedy, and it bodes ill for the future of Jewry in America.¹¹¹

The decision to eliminate "Bridget Loves Bernie," according to CBS president Robert D. Wood, was "absolutely removed, independent, and disassociated from criticism of the show from some Jewish groups."¹¹² Echoing this disclaimer was the following comment of a network official: "We probably only received 300 letters from the

¹⁰⁸"Bridget and Bernie Love Baloney," *Christianity Today*, September 28, 1973.

¹⁰⁹Richard L. Wagner, "Defending Ecumenism: Bridget Loves Bernie," *Sh'ma*, March 30, 1973.

¹¹⁰"The Week in Review," *New York Times*, February 11, 1973.

¹¹¹Robert J. Milch, "Why Bridget Loves Bernie," *Jewish Spectator*, December 1972.

¹¹²*New York Times*, March 30, 1973.

viewers on 'Bridget Loves Bernie.' We received between 3,000 and 4,000 letters over the cancellation of the daytime serial, 'Love Is a Many Splendored Thing,' in the last week.'" ¹¹³ The producer of the cancelled show, however, widely disseminated its Nielsen rating results for the two weeks after its cancellation was announced, showing it ahead of the Mary Tyler Moore program (also on Saturday night) which, of course, was not cancelled. ¹¹⁴

SAMUEL RABINOVE

¹¹³New York *Post*, March 30, 1973.

¹¹⁴*Variety*, April 18, 1973.

U.S. Middle East Policy and Diplomacy

THE MASSIVE October 1973 attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria had been code-named by them "Operation Spark." It set off an explosion which not only rocked the Middle East, but caused severe economic repercussions throughout Western Europe and Japan and triggered a confrontation between the nuclear superpowers, unparalleled in its gravity since the Cuban missile crisis more than a decade earlier.

In the process long-held stereotypes about Arabs and Israelis were shaken and some popular illusions about the new era of Soviet-American détente were smashed. But if the cold war appeared revived and virulent in the Middle East, the over-all consequences were not unfavorable to the United States. The new situation created by the fighting, although fraught with danger, unfroze the political and psychological stalemate in the Arab-Israel conflict that had frustrated UN and United States mediation efforts since 1967.

Washington seized the diplomatic initiative. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger had previously been reluctant to become involved in the emotion-charged Middle East for fear that his Jewish background might hamper his effectiveness by raising doubts about his objectivity. But now Kissinger turned his full attention to the conflict and, in a dazzling display of shuttle diplomacy, managed to win the admiration of both the Egyptian and Israeli leadership. While his success was widely attributed to his unique personal style and negotiating skill, an equally important factor was the Arab realization that the United States held the key to obtaining concessions from Israel. Although it was Russian arms and Soviet training that had made the attack possible, it was the American resupply airlift to Israel in the second week of the war that enabled Israel to counter successfully the tremendous flow of sophisticated new weaponry Moscow was providing the Arab belligerents. Moreover, the firm diplomatic posture of the United States, backed up by a global alert of the Strategic Air Command, deterred Moscow from unilaterally intervening with its own troops and tactical nuclear weapons to bail out the encircled

Egyptian Third Army and prevented the Russians from imposing a political settlement on Soviet and Arab terms.

U.S. Relations With Arab States

Paradoxically, the clear demonstration of direct American political and military support for Israel during the Yom Kippur war accelerated the recent trend among Arab states to seek improved relations with Washington. This was in marked and ironic contrast to the situation following the 1967 six-day war when Egypt and five of the other, more radical and ostensibly Socialist, Arab League states had broken relations with the United States (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 148-49). Their action had been prompted by false Egyptian charges that the U.S. Sixth Fleet had flown sorties for the Israelis during the conflict. Even though Nasser subsequently acknowledged that he had been mistaken and that the United States had not intervened militarily, it was only in 1972 that the Sudan and Yemen resumed formal diplomatic relations with Washington, and Iraq allowed the opening of an American interests section under the aegis of the Belgian embassy (AJYB, 1973 [Vol. 74], pp. 194-95). Similarly, only a small staff of United States diplomats had continued to work in Cairo after the 1967 war under the flag of the Spanish embassy, while a few Egyptians operated in Washington as part of the Indian embassy.

At the beginning of November 1973, only days after the cease-fire on the Egyptian-Israeli front and following Kissinger's trip to Egypt for talks with President Anwar al-Sadat, the two governments announced their intention to resume full diplomatic relations. President Sadat explained that he was now convinced that the United States had embarked on a more positive policy toward the Arab states and that he had confidence in the objectivity and helpfulness of the new American secretary of state, to whom he subsequently referred as "my friend and brother, Dr. Henry." United States Ambassador designate Herman F. Eilts, a career diplomat with previous service in the Arab world, arrived in Cairo on November 5.

Following Kissinger's visit to Damascus in December, the Syrian Ba'athist military régime headed by General Hafez al-Assad, also indicated a willingness to resume full diplomatic relations with the United States. However, the formal ceremonies in Cairo, Damascus, and Washington were to take place only after the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreements. The rapid improvement in Arab-American relations aroused misgivings in Israel, despite Washington's assurances that the United States remained committed to Israel's security.

Ascendancy of the Moderates

The war also accelerated a realignment of forces in the Arab world. The year 1973 marked the ascendancy of the more pragmatic, less ideologically fanatical elements in the Middle East. The Egyptians successfully resisted close relations with Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, the mercurial Libyan leader who had resorted to such flamboyant tactics as arriving unannounced in Cairo, and sending a large truck convoy of Libyans to Egypt to demonstrate for implementation of the long-projected merger between the two countries, which was to have been concluded on September 1. The Egyptian authorities turned back the convoy at the frontier. Qaddafi went on the air to charge the Egyptian régime with being soft on Zionism, lacking in Islamic purity, and having been corrupted by bourgeois tastes. Qaddafi's fundamentalist views on the traditional role of women in society, his encouragement of reactionary Islamic and extremist Palestinian groups, and his meddling in the internal affairs of strife-torn countries as far apart as the Sudan, Ireland, and the Philippines, all served to convince the more educated Egyptians that Qaddafi's shortcomings more than outweighed the lucrative oil revenues to be expected from a merger with Libya.

Sadat successfully outmaneuvered Qaddafi by mending his fences with other Arab states. A mini-summit conference, in Cairo in early September, with Syrian President Assad and Jordanian King Hussein led to a resumption of Egyptian relations with Jordan, which had been severed because of Hussein's suppression of the Palestinian guerrilla groups. The summit conference also made vague declarations about improved coordination in the continuing Arab military struggle against Israeli aggression and expansionism. Hussein later claimed that his new Arab allies had failed to confide in him as to the timing of their impending attack on Israel.

Of greater importance was the economic and political support Sadat managed to extract from Saudi Arabia's King Faisal. Egyptian-Saudi relations had improved markedly since the low point in the mid-1960s, when Nasser, in the name of Arab revolution, socialism, and progress, had called for the overthrow of reactionary Arab monarchies and had dispatched more than 50,000 Egyptian forces to Yemen to aid the republicans against the Saudi supported royalists (AJYB, 1967 [Vol. 68], pp. 97-98). Sadat abandoned, or at least shelved, Nasser's grandiose pan-Arab and pan-Islamic ambitions, concentrating instead on an Egypt first policy.

Faisal, who was almost as rabidly anti-Communist as he was anti-Zionist, had encouraged Sadat to end his dependence on the Soviet Union and had allegedly assured Sadat that if he expelled the

Soviet advisers, Washington would show its gratitude by pressuring Israel to withdraw from all of Sinai. When, in 1972, the United States failed "to squeeze Israel like an orange," as Sadat had demanded, he complained to Faisal and reportedly obtained his pledge of financial support to pay for the arms required in the Egyptian cross-Canal attack and also to bring the Saudi oil weapon into play.

The Oil Weapon

The Saudi-Egyptian reconciliation thus proved to be a mixed blessing for the United States. On the one hand, it helped make Saudi Arabia's conservative, pro-Western régime less vulnerable to attack by the Arab socialists. On the other hand, to silence criticism by Palestinians and the "progressive" Arab camp of his unholy alliance with the United States, Faisal finally agreed in 1973 to use his oil as a weapon to influence American Middle East policy. On several occasions before the outbreak of the October war, Faisal and his oil minister, Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani, had publicly warned that Saudi Arabia would cut back its production unless the United States modified its support of Israel and adopted a more evenhanded policy. The Saudis enlisted the help of such American oil companies as Mobil and the Standard Oil Company of California, both partners in ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company), to pressure the United States government to support the Arab position in the conflict with Israel and to win over American public opinion to the Arab cause through advertising campaigns and letters to their shareholders. After the outbreak of the October war and the American resupply of Israel, Saudi Arabia joined in the oil embargo against the United States and its Western allies. It even ordered ARAMCO to stop its supplies to the U.S. Navy. (The response of the American government and public is discussed more fully below.)

Essentially and on balance, the policy backfired politically, arousing more resentment than sympathy for the Arab cause; but economically it has thus far proven a success, enabling Saudi Arabia and the other major foreign oil producers to triple, and even quadruple, their oil revenues.

However, the trend of rising prices and greater national control of Middle East oil resources had already been predicted before the war (AJYB, 1973 [Vol. 74], pp. 203-204), and, indeed, non-Arab Iran, which refused to join in the oil embargo and continued to ship oil even to Israel, was a prime mover in the campaign to increase oil prices.

Although the embargo caused some isolated economic dislocations in the United States, it did not result in 1973 in the major disruption that had been feared. However, there was the long-range danger that, unless massive development of alternative energy sources was rapidly achieved, or unless the Middle East oil producers moderated their economic policies, even after the embargo was lifted the exorbitant price of oil would exacerbate the inflationary tendencies in the industrial nations, add to the misery of the oil-poor developing countries, and possibly precipitate a global depression.

Renewed Emphasis on Palestinians

On October 22, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, which linked the cease-fire to the immediate and concurrent start of negotiations "between the parties concerned," with the aim of "establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East." Support of the resolution by Egypt, Syria, and Israel aroused fears among the Palestinian guerrilla groups that they would be frozen out of the negotiating process and that the war-weary Arab states would make a deal with Israel, accepting its right to exist within secure and recognized boundaries in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories. Extreme groups, such as George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which was notorious for its hijackings and civilian massacres, denounced the cease-fire resolution and maintained their opposition to any solution other than the total elimination of Israel and its replacement by a Palestinian Arab state. Some of the more moderate elements, both in the neighboring Arab states and among the Palestinians, feared that wanton terrorist acts by PFLP and other extremist groups might wreck the prospects for a political settlement, and with it dash any hope in the foreseeable future for Palestinian self-determination.

Others argued that the Vietnam experience had shown it was possible to fight and negotiate at the same time. Only by stepping up the guerrilla war against Israel, they felt, could they force the Israelis and the Great Powers to acknowledge that no lasting settlement was possible unless the Palestinians were brought into the negotiations at Geneva.

Debates raged among the Palestinians, recalling to veteran Middle East observers similar soul-searching among the Zionist leaders in 1937, when the Peel Commission under the British Mandate recommended partition of Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish

states, and again in 1947, when the United Nations General Assembly made a similar recommendation. The moderates within the *Yishuv* and the world Zionist movement prevailed and agreed to accept partition on the practical grounds that half a loaf was better than none. Within the Arab camp, however, the extremists had won out, partly because the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini, had systematically assassinated Palestinian Arab leaders who had been willing to compromise with the Jews.

After the Yom Kippur war more and more voices began to be heard among the Palestinians arguing that, since the super-power détente would not permit the destruction of Israel at this time and since Israel's Arab neighbors were determined to work out some form of accommodation with Israel, the Palestinians should shift their tactics and demand the establishment of an independent, or autonomous, Palestinian state to be created, at least initially, on territory to be evacuated by Israel. However, by year's end the moderates had failed to take effective action to curb the terrorists, and the various "resistance" groups comprising the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had not yet reached agreement on a common policy toward Israel.

ALGIERS ARAB SUMMIT

To reassure the Palestinians that they were not being sold out, the Arab League Summit Conference in Algiers, at the end of November, declared that Arab demands in the projected negotiations under UN auspices at Geneva would be not only full Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war, but also "restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people." Moreover, despite objections by Jordan's King Hussein, the Algiers Summit designated the Palestine Liberation Organization, headed by al-Fatah leader Yasir Arafat, to be "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

Arafat met with Sadat and visited Moscow in December. Both the Russians and the Egyptians were reported to have encouraged him to create a government-in-exile, which would send a delegation to Geneva to participate in discussions on the disposition of the Israel-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip and the claims of the Palestinian refugees. But to gain admission to a UN peace conference, he was told, the PLO would have to moderate its rhetoric calling for the destruction of Israel, which was a member state of the United Nations.

When asked by a Lebanese paper in November whether the

"Palestinian resistance" would eventually participate in the Geneva peace conference, Arafat replied: "Is there an alternative as long as the Arab situation is as it is?" In contrast to earlier maximalist demands, Arafat did not categorically reject a Palestinian state on the West Bank, nor did he call for the reemigration of Israeli Jews. He even allowed interviewers to gain the impression that the projected West Bank Palestinian state was prepared to settle its differences with Israel by political rather than military means, although he did not explicitly speak of recognition of Israel.

The optimists contended that this marked a fundamental shift in the position of the so-called moderates in the PLO, and that if Arafat did not elaborate on this in public, it was for fear of assassination by extremists in his own ranks. The pessimists responded that Arafat had merely changed his rhetoric to suit the needs of his Soviet and Egyptian mentors; that his ultimate aim still was the destruction of Israel. Arafat now began to echo the statements of Sadat, who spoke of the struggle against Israel as one of several stages. In early December Arafat was quoted in the Paris daily *Le Monde* as explaining that his was a "phased policy, which makes us hold back various projects and formulas, and impels us to reconcile what is currently possible with our ultimate strategic objective."

Speaking to an Arab audience on the *Voice of Palestine* from Riyadh on December 10, Arafat's right-hand man, Abu-Iyad, was even more explicit about the PLO's ultimate intention:

If at certain times we have maintained silence over certain matters, this does not mean we will stop at this point, concede our historic rights, and stop our struggle and fighting. Our adherence to our historic right to liberate Palestine and establish a democratic Palestinian state on *all* Palestinian territory is a basic principle from which we cannot depart.

ISRAELI AND U.S. REACTION

The Israel government's reaction to the possible participation of the PLO at Geneva was that UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, whose implementation was called for under Resolution 338, spoke of agreements among the existing states of the region; that it did not recognize the Palestinians as a separate party and referred to them only indirectly in speaking of "a just settlement of the refugee problem" (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 181). Noting that intelligence reports had confirmed clandestine ties of Black September, which brutally killed two senior American diplomats and a Belgian in Khartoum in March, with Arafat's al-Fatah, the Israelis further insisted that they would have no dealings with terrorists.

The United States officially maintained a low profile on the Palestinian question, for it did not wish prematurely to complicate the negotiations, or to offend both Israel and Jordan, which contended that Palestinian interests might best be represented as part of the Jordanian delegation.

The issue remained academic during 1973, since the Palestinians themselves had not yet decided to make a formal application to attend the Geneva conference. The initial two-day session in mid-December was largely ceremonial and limited to formal statements of position by Israel as well as by Egypt and Jordan, which at the time were the only Arab states prepared to sit in the same room, but not at the same table, with Israel. By general consensus the Geneva conference adjourned pending the conclusion of quiet diplomatic efforts to achieve military disengagement agreements along the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights. It was becoming increasingly clear, however, that the peace conference ultimately would have to grapple with the Palestinian issue.

EGYPTIAN AND SOVIET SUPPORT

Opinion was divided on why Egypt and Russia were backing the PLO. The pessimists saw in Sadat's October 16 pledge to the Egyptian Assembly that he would continue to fight "to restore and obtain respect for the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine" a commitment to Israel's ultimate destruction, to be implemented whenever he felt strong enough to do so. Sadat's comment, in the same speech, that "our enemy has persisted in this arrogance not only in the past six years but throughout the past 25 years—that is *since the Zionist state usurped Palestine*," (emphasis added) supported this view.

The optimists dismissed these utterances as mere rhetoric. They pointed to signs that Egypt was turning inward, that it was fed up with serving as "the blood bank of the Arab world." If the PLO became a party to the Geneva negotiations and accepted a West Bank state, they contended, this would provide Egypt with an honorable way out of its commitment to champion the Palestinian cause. As an editorial in the semi-official *al-Ahram* of November 29 noted, restoration of Palestinian rights "would remove the causes of explosions, instability, and recurrent military confrontations."

The growing Soviet support, in 1973, for the Palestinian guerrillas has also been subject to varying interpretations. One view was that the Russians were basically conservative and preferred to deal with existing states, but that fear of being outbid by the Chinese in their strategic and ideological struggle has prompted the Kremlin to

maintain a facade of support for such militant liberation movements as the Palestinian. Others thought that the Soviet uneasiness over recent American diplomatic successes in the Middle East has prompted the Russians to keep PLO in reserve as a potential minefield on the road to peace, to be detonated if the Geneva negotiations should go counter to what the Soviet regarded as their interests.

Or the Russians may have decided that, for reasons of global strategy, they did not at present wish to risk another nuclear confrontation with the United States over the Middle East and that, therefore, some form of negotiated Arab-Israel settlement was desirable. The creation of a small, Soviet-backed and potentially irredentist Palestinian state could provide a strategically located new base for Soviet long-range ambitions in the Middle East, especially since the Soviet position in Egypt was in serious danger of being eroded by American offers of political, economic, and technical aid.

An unstable Palestinian state, it was noted, could serve as a new focus for tension and a possible pretext for Soviet intervention in support of future irredentist Palestinian demands against either Israel or Jordan. Should radical Palestinians succeed in overthrowing the pro-American Jordanian monarchy and establishing themselves on both sides of the Jordan, this might help create an expanded Soviet sphere of influence linked to the neighboring Arab states of Syria and Iraq, with potentially serious consequences for the balance of power in the region. The pessimists cited the mischievous role of the Soviet Union before and during the Yom Kippur war (p. 530) as further evidence that, despite their formal commitments to détente, the Kremlin leaders had not abandoned their imperialist ambitions in the Middle East.

PRE-WAR PEACE EFFORTS

The United States did not wait until after the Yom Kippur war to try to get some progress in Arab-Israel negotiations. During King Hussein's visit to Washington in early February, President Richard M. Nixon reaffirmed that the Middle East would have "very high priority" in his second term of office. Hussein received a pledge of "firm U.S. support" for Jordan's new economic development and military modernization programs. In fiscal 1972 Jordan had received a total of \$110.9 million in United States economic and military aid, of which \$55 million was in general supporting assistance, \$38 million in military grants, and \$11.4 million in military sales. During the visit, the President promised Hussein two squadrons of F-5E jet fighters and

some additional equipment. (In fiscal 1973 Congress voted \$32.7 million for military grants and \$50 million for supporting assistance for Jordan. For fiscal 1974 these figures were raised to \$65 million for supporting assistance and \$36 million for military grants.)

Noting that Hafez Ismail, a special envoy of Egyptian President Sadat, and Prime Minister Golda Meir were expected in Washington shortly after Hussein, Nixon jokingly declared "this is sort of Mideast month." In a more serious vein he announced that the United States was determined to move the Middle East stalemate "off dead center." However, the Washington talks failed to reveal any significant change in the position of any of the parties. Mrs. Meir reiterated that Israel was "prepared to talk seriously and honestly to our neighbors any time, any hour, any place." She denied that there was any need for Israel to come up with "new ideas," since the old ideas had never been put to the test.

Ismail, who was described as Sadat's Kissinger, told newsmen that his visit had produced "more relaxed relations with the United States," and Secretary of State William P. Rogers stated that, as a result of the talks, "we developed a good rapport with Egypt." But while the atmosphere may have improved, there was no real progress on substance. Ismail reportedly conveyed to the United States government Sadat's readiness for a peaceful settlement. At the same time, he repeated Cairo's longstanding insistence that Israel sign a formal commitment to total withdrawal from Sinai as a precondition for talks, even on an interim agreement for an initial pullback of Israeli forces from the Suez Canal, which was to precede the return of the evacuated area to Egyptian civilian control and the clearing and reopening of the Canal. Israel had agreed in February 1971 to discuss such an interim agreement either directly with Egypt or under United States auspices. However, Jerusalem refused to accept the Egyptian precondition, insisting that the extent and timing of Israeli withdrawal in the over-all final settlement was something to be negotiated by the parties. Ismail failed in his effort to convince President Nixon that the way to normalize American relations in the Arab world was to pressure Israel to accept the Egyptian demands.

Mideast Arms Race

While Hafez Ismail's ostensible peace mission to Washington received most of the headlines in the American press, there was only scant mention of the nearly simultaneous mission to Moscow of General Ahmed Ismail, Egypt's minister of war, as follow-up to the

arrival of an important Soviet military mission to Cairo in February. He met with the Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, presumably to discuss additional Soviet arms shipments to Egypt. The official Soviet press agency *Tass* said that they had had a "friendly talk" about "matters of mutual interest," without giving details.

It was disclosed in mid-March that Mrs. Meir, on her visit, had received from the Nixon administration a commitment to sell Israel four squadrons of combat jets and an offer to help Israel set up production of its own fighter planes modeled on the French Mirage and powered by a General Electric engine. Tentative plans involved the sale of about 24 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers and 24 A-4 Skyhawk light attack planes, with deliveries extended over two years, starting in January 1974. They were to insure a continuing flow of equipment to Israel upon completion of deliveries under the previous contract signed in 1971. However, the total supplies under the new agreement were to be less, and at a somewhat lower rate of delivery.

Sadat later charged the 1973 agreement convinced him that the United States was not going to pressure Israel into making territorial concessions and he consequently concluded that he would have to go to war to achieve his aim. Other, reliable sources indicated that the basic Egyptian decision to embark upon a cross-Canal attack had been reached earlier, but its implementation was postponed several times. For example, Major General Sa'ad al-Din al-Shazli, Egyptian chief of staff in the October war, disclosed (*al-Ahram*, December 6, 1973) that active planning had been going on for nine to ten months before the outbreak of hostilities.

United States officials said the additional shipments of matériel to Israel were in response to recent and anticipated shipments of Soviet aircraft to Egypt and Syria, and of French aircraft to Libya. American analysts noted that in the past year the Soviet Union provided Egypt with more than 120 MIG-21-J fighters and 12 Sukhoi-17 fighters, and that Syria received 40 MIG-21's since January, as well as numerous SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles. Meanwhile, intelligence sources confirmed that Libya received some 60 French Mirage-5's which it made available to Egyptian pilots for training.

U.S. View on Negotiations

The military aid to Israel, United States officials explained, was also intended to serve as a symbol of continuing American determination to maintain the military balance of power in the Middle East. It was also hoped that if Israel felt militarily secure, it would be more likely to be

flexible in negotiations. Gerald R. Ford, then House Republican leader, declared on May 7 that the United States aid was providing Israel with the means of deterring aggression, adding that "the United States must continue to give Israel the backing necessary to maintain the credibility of our friendship." While the "ultimate and overriding objective" of United States policy was a "permanent and just peace in the Middle East," he emphasized:

In the Congress, our bipartisan policy in the Middle East is committed to a peace that must emerge from the parties directly involved. We reject any diplomatic concept that would call upon our friends the Israelis to negotiate with the United States rather than with Egypt on the territorial question.

This did not mean, however, that the United States unequivocally endorsed the Israeli negotiating position on specific issues. If the United States was not applying material pressure, it was beginning to prod the Israelis, as well as the Arabs, to modify their thinking.

This view was elaborated by President Nixon on May 3 in his fourth annual Report to the Congress on *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's*. After stating that the United States objective was still "to help move the Arab-Israeli dispute from confrontation to negotiation and then toward conditions of peace as envisioned in UN Security Council Resolution 242," he declared:

But a solution cannot be imposed by the outside powers on unwilling governments. If we tried, the parties would feel no stake in observing its terms, and the outside powers would be engaged indefinitely in enforcing them. A solution can last only if the parties commit themselves to it directly. Serious negotiation will be possible, however, only if a decision is made on each side that the issues must be finally resolved by a negotiated settlement rather than by the weight or threat of force. This is more than a decision on the mechanics of negotiation; it is a decision that peace is worth compromise.

He added that it should be possible to enter such negotiations "without expecting to settle all differences at once, without preconditions, and without conceding principles of honor or justice." At the same time, he acknowledged that "urging flexibility on both parties in the abstract seems futile."

The President's Report, which was said to have been largely drafted by Kissinger, made the following additional points regarding the potential negotiations: Neither side was willing, "without assurance of a satisfactory quid pro quo," to sufficiently modify its basic positions to get a concrete negotiating process started. "A step-by-step

approach" still seemed the most practical. The United States was "open-minded" on how the first step was to be related to subsequent steps leading toward a broader settlement, but emphasized that the relationship could not be ignored. Moreover, "all important aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be addressed at some stage, including the legitimate interests of the Palestinians." The United States also remained open-minded with regard to its own role in the negotiating process.

Noting that the issues were "formidable, interlinked, and emotion-laden," the President's Report concluded that solutions could not be found in general principles alone, but would have to be embodied in "concrete negotiated arrangements." Peace, it maintained could not be achieved by clever gimmicks, for "the parties will not be tricked into compromise positions by artful procedures." Nevertheless, "there is room for accommodation and an overwhelming necessity to seek it."

CRITICISM OF ISRAEL AND RESPONSE

While the President's Report refrained from explicitly blaming either Israel or the Arab states for the lack of progress in negotiations, its studied even-handedness implied that Israel was at least partially responsible for the stalemate. This point was made strikingly explicit by Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joseph J. Sisco, in an address to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee on May 7, on the occasion of Israel's 25th birthday. It was an opportunity for him to "speak frankly" to his audience of Israeli officials and American supporters of Israel and to "caution" Israel not to allow "myths of the past" to obscure "the realities of the present." The speech was evenhanded in that he also called upon the Arab states to abandon what he called various myths clouding their perceptions, notably that the six-day war was sparked by unprovoked Israeli aggression; that the U.S. Air Force aided Israel in the war; that "peace can be achieved by going to war," a view currently circulating in the Arab world, and that "peace can be made by proxy."

Sisco chided Israel for failing to respond adequately to the change in Arab attitudes since 1967. He contended that while there were still some Arab voices calling for the disappearance of Israel, "there are many others in the Arab world who now perceive their national interest as compatible with the existence of a sovereign Israel"; that "for most Arabs Israel's existence is no longer the principal issue." He regretted that despite the narrowing of the gap on the question of coexistence, the two sides were further apart than ever on the issue of boundaries,

with the Israelis calling for substantial changes from the 1949 armistice lines (i.e. the pre-June 5, 1967 lines) and Sadat refusing to concede "an inch of territory." Another myth, in Sisco's opinion, was Israel's view that the six-day war was the result of a calculated Arab plan to launch a war of destruction against Israel. The "most plausible explanation," he contended was that it resulted from "improvised actions and reactions by each side," which the cumulative weight of mutual suspicion escalated until war became inevitable. Equally illusory, he thought, was the notion that "security is solely a function of the physical location of territorial boundaries."

According to Sisco, the principal lesson of the last 25 years of Arab-Israeli relations was that it "is a history of lost opportunities"; that this has been especially so since adoption of the 1967 Security Council Resolution, which provided the principles for a lasting peace, because "neither side, Arab or Israeli, has collectively defined its goals in terms of the 'opportunity costs' of achieving those goals. . . . There is no broadly agreed consensus on either side as to what the acceptable trade-offs might be."

Sisco believed "it is time for the parties to begin to choose options, to establish priorities, to decide what is most important and what it will cost, and to decide whether it is worth the price." He warned that the cost of each missed opportunity in the Middle East was becoming progressively higher. Alluding to the pre-October feeling of complacency in Israel that time was on its side, that it could continue to live with the status quo, and that eventually the Arabs would realize the futility of their position and come to terms, Sisco warned:

We see a situation that every rational person knows in his innermost thoughts is not normal, not stable and not durable. True . . . such situations can last for a surprisingly long time. But need they? And isn't the cost in the end often greater than it would have been if both sides had seized the opportunities and taken the risks necessary to resolve conflicts sooner?

ROLE OF "ENERGY CRISIS"

Sisco denied that he had any ulterior motive in urging the Israelis to make concessions. Referring to the widespread speculation that the "so-called energy crisis is going to lead to changes in our Middle East policy," he contended that this was "the wrong way to pose the question. The question is whether our policy of seeking to promote a peaceful settlement through negotiations between the parties is going to succeed, so that there will be no temptation for some to seek to politicize the energy problem." This was not reassuring to the Israelis, for it implied that the need of the United States to maintain good

relations with the Arab oil producers was an added incentive for it to push actively for a settlement that included Israeli concessions.

Sisco stated explicitly that the United States would "continue to press" for a negotiated solution. Alluding to the talks with Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli officials in Washington in February and March, in which all had given assurances of their desire to keep the doors of diplomacy open, Sisco said, "we intend to take them at their word." Since the immediate problem was to "reconcile Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli security needs," the United States would make a new attempt to achieve step-by-step progress on an interim Suez Canal agreement "with some Israeli withdrawal in Sinai, the reopening of the Suez Canal and an extended cease-fire."

Simha Dinitz, recently appointed Israel ambassador to the United States and previously political advisor to Prime Minister Meir, departed from his prepared text on Israel's accomplishments during the past 25 years to respond to Sisco's speech. Dinitz stated categorically that "no opportunity for peace was ever missed by Israel"; that Israel had always been, and still was, prepared "to enter immediately into peace negotiations with the Arab countries on an overall settlement without any preconditions on either side." He reminded the audience that Israel accepted the offer of an interim Suez settlement, but that Egypt refused to attend the American arranged proximity talks. He charged that Arab hostility was not a myth but a somber reality, and that after every war "the Arabs converted the situation from a platform for meaningful negotiations into a jumping board for preparation of a new war."

DEBATE ON ISRAELI POLICY CONTINUES

With the hindsight of the Yom Kippur war, which began only five months after the Sisco-Dinitz exchange, there has been much debate both in the United States and in Israel as to who was right. It is one of the tragic ironies of that war that partisans of both views have found confirmation for their position. For some there remained nagging uncertainty that if Israel had only displayed greater diplomatic flexibility, taken some unilateral initiatives, and refrained from "establishing facts" in the occupied territories, perhaps Sadat would not have felt impelled in frustration to go to war, and thousands of lives would have been saved on both sides.

For others, the perfidious Yom Kippur attack, launched at a time when Sadat's emissary to the UN was deluding the Americans into thinking that he was seriously considering their latest proposal for an interim agreement, proved that Arab declared intention of peace could

not be trusted. Moreover, the Israeli maximalists were pointing to the extravagant war aims proclaimed by Sadat and the semiofficial *al-Ahram* in the early days of the war, when it seemed that the Egyptians and Syrians were about to score a great victory, as evidence that the ultimate Arab intention to destroy Israel had not been abandoned even by the allegedly more moderate Egyptian government. In their view, Israel's refusal to relinquish any territory in the absence of real peace was not intransigence but essential for survival. They argued that had Israel withdrawn from Sinai to the 1949 armistice lines, as it had after the 1956 Sinai campaign, Egypt would have been even more tempted to attack Israel's nearby population centers and thereby threaten its very survival as a state.

For the minimalists, or "doves," the war confirmed Sisco's thesis that even the far greater territorial buffer provided by Sinai and the Golan Heights did not provide absolute security for Israel and failed to deter an attack. Therefore, true security ultimately depended on a reconciliation between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This view found increasing support in the United States among former foreign service officers, defense officials, and others in the foreign policy establishment. Typical was an article in the October 21, 1973, issue of *New York Times Magazine* by former Assistant Secretary of State Lucius D. Battle, who argued that while the United States had a commitment to Israel's survival, this did not mean it should endorse Israel's conquests. He considered the Egyptian attack not the start of a war of annihilation, but a limited and possibly necessary tactical move designed to restore Egyptian pride and prestige as a prelude to achieving a negotiated settlement with Israel.

Soviet-American Détente

The search for peace in the Middle East had long been complicated by great power rivalries in the region. During most of 1973, the United States sought to encourage the application of Soviet-American détente to the Middle East. President Nixon's May 3 report to Congress noted that the "mix of local animosities and external power still makes the Middle East a most dangerous threat to world peace." The President declared that the United States had no desire to interfere in the development of political relations between Middle East states and outside great powers. He noted that "we have our close ties with Israel, which we value, and we also have a strong interest in preserving and developing our ties with the Arab world." While acknowledging that other powers had the same right, he warned that "attempts at

exclusion or predominance are an invitation to conflict, either local or global."

Concerning the possibility of direct involvement by the great powers in the Arab-Israel conflict, Nixon noted that "a significant Soviet presence and substantial military aid continue in the area." He cited recent shipments of Soviet military equipment to Syria, Iraq, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The crucial question, he said, was whether the Soviet presence was paralleled by a Soviet interest in promoting peaceful solutions; for the major powers had a continuing obligation to refrain from steps which would again raise the danger of their direct engagement in military conflict.

The President's evaluation of the effects of Soviet-American détente on the relations between the superpowers in the Middle East was optimistic. He felt that the danger of immediate U.S.-Soviet confrontation, which had been very real in 1970 and 1971, was "reduced"; that the "Moscow Summit and the agreement on the Basic Principles of our relations contributed to this, *not only for the present but also for the longer term.*" (Emphasis added; AJYB, 1973 [Vol. 74], pp. 197-98). Nixon concluded that "neither side at the summit had any illusions that we could resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but there was agreement that we could keep it from becoming a source of conflict between us." He added that the United States had no interest in excluding the Soviet Union from contributing to a Middle East settlement or from "playing a significant role there." He recalled that, at the summit, "we agreed that we each had an obligation to help promote a settlement in accordance with Resolution 242."

SAN CLEMENTE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUÉ

At the conclusion of the second summit conference, held at San Clemente on June 25, Nixon and Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev issued a joint communiqué emphasizing "the great importance each side attaches" to the Basic Principles agreed upon in Moscow and reaffirming "their commitment to the continued scrupulous implementation and to the enhancement of the effectiveness of each of the principles of that document."

Although the Middle East had been discussed at length, Secretary Kissinger confirmed that no agreement on a Middle East settlement had been reached. This was reflected in the communique, which noted that each of the parties "set forth its position on this problem," and that all they agreed to was "to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East." The communiqué specified:

This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states in the area, be consistent with their independence and sovereignty and should take into due account *the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people*. (Emphasis added.)

The last clause was significant in that it marked a further step in the evolution of American official thinking on the status of the Palestinians. There now was acknowledgement that "the Palestinian people" constituted a distinct political factor to be considered, rather than just individual refugee claimants to be dealt with by the existing states. The communiqué neither indicated how the Palestinians were to be represented in the peacemaking process, nor defined their legitimate interests.

BREZHNEV'S PLEDGE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

In a television address to the American people, on June 24, Brezhnev expressed the hope that détente would spread throughout the world. "Mankind," he declared, "has outgrown the rigid Cold War armor which it was once forced to wear. It wants to breathe freely and peacefully." Among the remaining "hotbeds of dangerous tension," he conceded, was the "still very acute" situation in the Middle East, where "justice should be assured as soon as possible" and "a stable peace settlement reached that would restore the legitimate rights of those who suffered from the war and insure the security of all peoples of that region."

Brezhnev emphasized that peace in their area "is important for all the peoples of the Middle East, with no exception. It is also important for the maintenance of universal peace." In short, he concluded, "the ending of conflicts and the prevention of new crisis-fraught situations is an essential condition for creating truly reliable guarantees of peace. And our two countries are called upon to make a worthy contribution to that cause."

In retrospect, these words had a cynical and hollow ring in light of the provocative and inflammatory actions of the Soviet Union during the Yom Kippur war less than four months later.

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

During 1973 the Arab states, particularly Egypt and Lebanon, sought to use the United Nations Security Council as a vehicle to impose sanctions on Israel, to publicly embarrass or intimidate the United

States into ending its support of Israel, and to win UN support for an imposed political solution on Arab terms.

Libyan Plane Crash

However, the first condemnation of Israel during the year was issued not by the Security Council, but by the UN's International Civil Aviation Organization which, by a vote of 105 to 1 (Israel), condemned Israel for downing a Libyan civil airliner over Sinai on February 21, and called for an immediate investigation of the cause of the tragedy, which took the lives of 106 men, women, and children. The Libyan airliner, on a flight from Benghazi to Cairo, had lost its bearing, strayed over Israel-held Sinai, and ignored the signals of Israeli interceptors to land. When the plane made suspicious maneuvers, the Israelis, who claimed not to have seen any passengers and who had received warnings of an Arab terrorist plan to smash an explosive-laden plane into an Israeli city, tried to force the plane down; it crashed in the process. The Israel government expressed "the profound sorrow of Israel over the death of the passengers" but noted, in mitigation, that the "terrible disaster" had occurred under circumstances of Arab "belligerency and incessant threats of acts of terrorism from the air." While not acknowledging legal liability, Israel announced that it would make *ex gratia* payments to the families of the victims "in deference to humanitarian considerations."

Prior to the ICAO vote, the United States had introduced an amendment to have the aviation organization simply "deplore" rather than "condemn" Israel's action. It withdrew its amendment under prodding from Britain and Belgium to avoid unnecessary controversy.

Battle Against Terrorism

The UN readiness to condemn Israel was not matched by eagerness to condemn Arab terrorist acts. This once again became apparent in April, when the Security Council met to consider a Lebanese complaint against Israel, which, on the night of April 9-10, conducted a commando raid against Palestinian "resistance" groups operating in Lebanon. Israel confirmed that it struck against terrorist bases, headquarters, and hideouts in the Beirut area, including the headquarters of al-Fatah and the Popular Democratic Front. Three prominent leaders of the PLO and of al-Fatah/Black September, including Mohammed Yussef al-Najjar (Abu Yussef) who had

participated in the terrorist murder of Jordanian Premier Wasfi Tal in Cairo, were killed during the attack.

Israel Ambassador to the UN Yosef Tekoah defended the Israeli actions as necessary to protect the lives of its citizens and to "end the sanguinary assaults deliberately directed against guiltless men, women and children." He claimed that in recent weeks numerous terrorist operations were launched from Beirut. These included: the kidnap-murder of the American and Belgian diplomats in Khartoum, during which the terrorists had been in constant radio communications with their Beirut offices; an unsuccessful attempt to blow up a Cyprus passenger ship with 250 Christian pilgrims bound for Haifa while it was in Beirut harbor; a Black September attempt to bomb the El Al offices at Kennedy Airport and two Israeli banks in midtown New York, narrowly averted by the discovery of time-bombs at these locations; a series of attacks against Israelis and El Al airliners in Cyprus, Paris, and Rome.

Chinese-Soviet Recriminations

The Security Council engaged in a long and bitter debate, marked by the usual Arab-Israeli counteraccusations and Soviet tirades against Israel, as well as by vitriolic ideological polemics between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Huang Hua, the Chinese delegate, declared the Palestinian actions to be a "perfectly just" response to the "atrocities" and continuing aggression of the "Israeli Zionists" who had driven the Palestinian people from their homeland. He charged that "connivance and encouragement by the two superpowers" enabled the Israeli Zionists to refuse to withdraw from occupied territories. The two superpowers, he further asserted, were deliberately maintaining a situation of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East in order to make political deals at the expense of the Palestinians and other Arabs and "to facilitate their contention for strategic points and oil resources in the Middle East." And while one superpower was supporting the Israeli aggressors with arms and economic aid, the Chinese tirade went on, the "other was pouring a steady flow of manpower into Israel [an allusion to Soviet Jewish emigration] to supply the aggressors with sources of troop recruitment and technical specialists."

Soviet delegate Yakov Malik responded in kind. China and Israel, he maintained, were "united by anti-Sovietism" and a desire to slander the Russians, and then proceeded to match the Chinese delegate in

anti-Israel rhetoric. More disturbing, however, was Malik's statement, on April 13, calling on the Security Council to "decisively condemn the latest piratical acts by Israel" and to take effective steps to halt the "acts of aggression by the unbridled Israeli militarists." He ominously declared, "The USSR would support in the Council effective sanctions against Israel up to and including its expulsion from membership of the United Nations as a State that had made aggression the main purpose of its foreign policy and that systematically violated the basic principles of the Charter." However, while this indicated the extent of Soviet hostility to the Jewish state, it did not really pose an immediate serious threat to Israel. It was essentially a grandstand play for Arab support and an attempt to outbid the Chinese and embarrass the Americans in the Arab world; for a move to expel Israel from the UN would have almost certainly been vetoed by the United States.

Anti-American Charges

Anti-American elements also used the Israeli counterterrorist attack on Beirut to spread rumors throughout the Arab world accusing the United States embassy in Lebanon of connivance, collusion and participation in the Israeli attack. Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat charged that former United States Ambassador to Lebanon Armin Meyer, who now headed the interdepartmental United States task force against terrorism, provided Israel with intelligence information for its successful attack. State Department Spokesman Charles Bray dismissed the charges as "irresponsible" and "ludicrous." When they did not cease, then Secretary of State Rogers summoned Arab envoys to reject as "absolute falsehood" allegations of United States involvement, and asked them to convey his authoritative denial to their governments. United States representative to the UN John A. Scali called the Arab charge "a massive untruth—the Big Lie," which had been "an art form of the totalitarian mentality" used by the dictatorships in psychological warfare before and during World War II. Should this latest Big Lie succeed in inflaming new violence in the Middle East, he warned the Security Council, responsibility would rest "on the shoulders of those who listened impassively to it and did nothing to speak the truth."

Scali said that the United States opposed violence and terror "from whatever source and whatever kind." He reiterated United States recognition that Middle East peace could only be achieved "by taking into full account the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians." He

warned, however, that unless the Council could move "from recrimination to even-handed condemnation of all violence, there would be no progress towards peace."

UN Condemns Violence Against Civilians

While the Israelis were not particularly pleased with the United States statements, which seemed to equate their measures to counteract terrorism with the wanton Arab terrorist attacks themselves, the majority of the Security Council did not even display this degree of evenhandedness. The Anglo-French resolution, which was adopted by the Council on April 21 by a vote of 11 to 0 with 4 abstentions (China, Guinea, USSR, United States), contained only a veiled and implicit condemnation of Arab terrorism. This was limited to a preambular paragraph "deeply deploring all recent acts of violence resulting in the loss of innocent individuals and the endangering of international civil aviation," and to an operative paragraph expressing "deep concern" over, and condemning "all acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives." The words Arab or Palestinian terrorism appeared nowhere in the resolution.

By contrast, the Council was quite explicit in condemning "the repeated military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon and Israel's violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty," and in calling "upon Israel to desist forthwith from all military attacks on Lebanon." Yet for some of the Council members the resolution was not strong enough in its condemnation of Israel. The Chinese delegate abstained on grounds that the resolution had failed to draw a distinction "between right and wrong and between the aggressor and the victim of aggression." He said China supported "just wars" and thus feared that Zionists and imperialists might use the resolution to oppose the Palestinian and Arab peoples in their "just struggle" to recover their territories and national rights. The Soviet delegate abstained because the resolution did not provide for sanctions against Israel or take other positive measures to end "such piratical acts by Israel" in the future.

On the other hand, the United States abstained, as Scali explained, because the resolution was "inadequate" and "focused too much on the meaningless exercise of trying to parcel out blame." Nevertheless, he considered the resolution a step forward in that it marked the first time the Council "rejected the cycle of violence and counterviolence" by condemning both violence and terrorism.

Egypt Seeks End of U.S. Aid to Israel

The Egyptian delegation used the Council debate over the Lebanese complaint to press for an end of United States aid to Israel. Foreign Minister Mohammed Hassan el-Zayyat stated it was "unbelievable that Israel continued to receive ever-increasing massive military and economic assistance" in view of the Council's condemnations of the Israeli incursions, and, even more, that this was so while Israel occupied the territories of three UN member states, continued to colonize these territories, made a mockery of UN principles, and flouted UN resolutions. He stressed that a ban on military supplies and financial aid to Israel was essential for the attainment of peace in the Middle East. The least the Council could do, in el-Zayyat's opinion, was to call on all states, particularly the United States, to suspend their economic assistance and military supplies to Israel.

Scali's response was that United States aid was limited to meeting Israel's "legitimate defense needs." Noting the omission of any reference by Egypt to the major arms shipments to the area by other powers, he made it clear that the United States had no intention of sitting idly by "while others pour arms into the Middle East for one side, thus inevitably tempting some governments to believe that they can risk another round in the war."

Soviet Representative Malik contended that there was a moral difference between American and Soviet aid. While the United States provision of arms to an aggressor was in flagrant violation of the UN Charter, the Soviet Union's assistance to "the victims of aggression, including the delivery of arms, is a legitimate and just matter, fully in keeping with the Charter." (This, of course, ignored the fact that after the six-day war in 1967 the United Nations rejected the Soviet Union's strenuous attempts to have the UN brand Israel an aggressor.)

Reading this Soviet statement together with Malik's earlier call for sanctions against Israel and its expulsion from the UN as an aggressor leaves one with the chilling thought that the Soviet Union was laying the legal groundwork for the defense of the Arab Yom Kippur attack. The same arguments would no doubt have been used to justify direct Soviet intervention in support of the Arab armies had not the United States effectively deterred such action.

Egypt also made calculated use of the United Nations to buttress its position internationally. Egyptian delegate Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid accused the United States of supplying Israel with arms not for

legitimate defense, as Scali stated, but to maintain the fruits of aggression. If the United States really intended to be "evenhanded" it should not sit idly by while Israel continued its policy of "expansion and absorption of the occupied territories." To be evenhanded, he said, was to encourage the international community to implement the "unanimously agreed" solution for a lasting and just peace.

There was, of course, no such total agreement; but Egypt was now determined to obtain United Nations endorsement of its version of the controversial and ambiguously worded Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. Accordingly, Egypt proposed, and the Security Council on April 20, 1973 unanimously approved without formal vote, a resolution calling on the UN secretary-general to submit a comprehensive report on UN efforts in the Middle East since June 1967, to be followed by a full-scale discussion of the Middle East situation by the Council. The Soviet delegate warmly endorsed the Egyptian initiative. Scali questioned the usefulness of yet another lengthy debate, noting that in the "present emotional circumstances, new discussion might produce contention" and create difficulties for those seeking peace in the Middle East. However, the United States decided to raise no formal objections to the Egyptian resolution.

Secretary-General's Report

Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim submitted a detailed report on May 18; his conclusion was that "the basic deadlock remains." He stated that since, to his knowledge, the Security Council was the only forum "where all the parties to the conflict have been able to meet together in the same room" he hoped this advantage would be used in the forthcoming debate for constructive moves toward a settlement. Responding to Waldheim's appeal, Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyat declared that Egypt was placing its case "squarely inside the framework of the United Nations." He claimed that, in deference to the international community's will, Egypt accepted all Council and Assembly resolutions and was eager to end the costly war still being imposed on Egypt. But he warned that "the only way to end it is to end the military occupation."

Millions of Arabs in Egypt and elsewhere, he declared, had been waiting for six years for tangible results from the UN's Middle East efforts; and "those hopes, unfulfilled," he warned "were giving way to disillusion and scepticism." As a result, "many Egyptians doubted the usefulness of Egypt's coming to the Council." They questioned what the Council could do while "the aggressor was digging more

fortifications and creating more so-called new facts in the conquered territories, all the time acquiring more armor to silence resistance and to terrorize Egypt into surrender."

Egypt's Territorial Demands

Zayyat recalled that, in February 1971, Egypt had given Gunnar Jarring, the UN secretary-general's special representative, "serious commitments," including "readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel if Israel also carried out all its Charter obligations." However, Zayyat quickly made it apparent that Egypt's view of what the Charter required of Israel went far beyond simple withdrawal to the June 5, 1967, borders. The UN General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, he stated, partitioned Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state, and UN member states "gave it [the Jewish state] recognition within the frontiers allotted to it in the 1947 resolution."

This was no offhand remark; it was part of the carefully calculated Egyptian strategy of a two-stage campaign against Israel. Zayyat proceeded to quote from a statement made by Soviet Ambassador Malik in the Council on March 4, 1949, that Israel's territory had been defined by the General Assembly's partition resolution. Of course, Zayyat failed to mention that, at the time, Egypt and the other Arab states had denounced the partition resolution as illegal and sent their armed forces into Palestine to prevent the creation of Israel, and that the Soviet Union had condemned the Arab invasion as aggression and a violation of specific Security Council and Assembly resolutions.

Later in the debate, Egyptian delegate Abdul Meguid again raised the issue of the borders. Responding to the Israeli delegate's reference to Israel's right to "safe and recognized boundaries," the Egyptian asked:

Of what boundaries is he talking: those of 1947, 1948, 1949, 1956 or 1967? When certain States recognized the State of Israel they recognized it with boundaries that were defined in the partition plan—in other words within a territory that had been allocated to it by a United Nations resolution, and nothing more.

Ambassador Tekoah commented that these repeated Egyptian references to 1947 "strengthened Israel's doubts and suspicions regarding Egypt's ultimate objectives." Moreover, while Egypt demanded for itself only total Israeli withdrawal from Sinai to the international frontier between Egypt and Mandatory Palestine, Egypt

also championed the rights of the Palestinians. Zayyat, on June 6, called on the Council to:

Resolve that all the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian nation be respected, including their right to live in peace within the secure and recognized boundaries in their homeland of Palestine as it was under the Mandate.

On June 14, before the Council adjourned for one month, Zayyat said that the debate had answered Egypt's two main questions. To the first, dealing with Israel's military occupation of Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian lands, he said, "the world's answer is that the occupation is inadmissible and intolerable." The second question concerned the right of the people of Palestine "to live in peace, free and independent, in the homeland of their fathers and grandfathers." Here, too, he said, the world's answer was clear: no peace was possible without respect for the "inalienable rights of the Palestinians."

Zayyat distinguished between "the international frontiers between Egypt and Palestine," which were "clearly recognized" by the League of Nations when it approved the Palestine Mandate and therefore not open to renegotiation, and the armistice agreement of 1949. (The latter set the line between the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip and Israel-held territory.) The armistice line was not to be construed as a final political or territorial boundary, and according to the agreement, was to be without prejudice as to the parties' position regarding the "ultimate settlement of the Palestine question." The purpose of that saving clause, he contended, was to "avoid any prejudice to the rights of the Arab people of Palestine."

Resolution of July 26

The debate resumed in mid-July, and on July 26 the Council voted on a draft resolution essentially supporting the Egyptian position sponsored by eight nonpermanent members of the Council. While reaffirming Resolution 242, the new resolution was quite partisan in many of its features. For example, it strongly deplored "Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict, contrary to the principles of the Charter"; expressed "serious concern at Israel's lack of cooperation" with Dr. Jarring, and supported resumption of his mission based on his controversial memorandum of February 8, 1971 (see AJYB, 1972 [Vol. 73], pp. 166-71); declared that "the rights of the Palestinians have to be

safeguarded," and that a just and lasting solution could be achieved only if there was respect for "the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians."

U.S. VETO

The resolution received 13 favorable votes, but was defeated when the United States vetoed it. China refused to participate in the voting on the ground that the resolution was not forceful enough in demanding immediate Israeli withdrawal or endorsing the just liberation struggle of the Arabs and Palestinians.

The reason for the United States veto, Ambassador Scali said, was that adoption of the "highly partisan and unbalanced" resolution could only have added another obstacle to the start of serious negotiations between the parties. Its adoption would have fundamentally changed and overturned Resolution 242 of 1967, thereby undermining "the one agreed basis on which a settlement could be constructed." The new draft spoke of "the" territories, thereby ignoring the significance of the intentional omission of the definite article by the drafters of Resolution 242, he said. Moreover, it disregarded other "fundamental and inseparable elements" of the 1967 resolution, namely: that the ending of occupation must be achieved in the context of peace between the parties; that it must be based on the right of all States in the area to live within secure and recognized boundaries; and that it must be reached through a process of agreement between the parties. Consequently, Scali concluded, the new resolution was contrary to the entire concept of Resolution 242 and its basic principles and provisions.

Egyptian Objectives at UN

The question was asked why Egypt insisted on going through with this apparently futile exercise at the United Nations. One reason was that Egypt wished to capitalize on the erosion since 1967 of Israel's international position, due partly to the growing dependence of many states on Arab oil, the voting strength of the Arab and Communist blocs in the UN, and the general concern of many newly independent states in Asia and Africa that acquiescence in Israel's occupation of Arab territory might serve as a precedent for their own irredentist neighbors. When Australia cast its vote for the resolution, Zayyat declared that its provisions now reflected "the will of five continents."

The erosion of Israel's position was most marked on the African

continent. Israel had, over the years, developed close ties of technical cooperation and commerce with the newly emergent black African nations. Yet at the end of May 1973, the heads of state and the governments of 41 of these countries unanimously approved a strongly anti-Israel resolution at the behest of Egypt, in the name of African solidarity. The main sections of the resolution were read to the Security Council by Okoi Arikpo, Nigeria's commissioner for external affairs, who contrasted the Egyptian foreign minister's "most moving" reaffirmation of his country's loyalty to the United Nations with Israel's record of "despisal and defiance" of UN resolutions. In the name of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), he "appealed to the friendly [*sic*] State of Israel to pay more heed to the UN resolutions and to show some consideration for the legitimate concerns of Africa." The OAU resolution called, *inter alia*, for "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied African and Arab territories"; pledged not to recognize any changes likely to jeopardize the territorial integrity of the countries which were "victims of the Israeli aggression"; called upon the big powers to refrain from supplying Israel with arms and military equipment or from granting it moral and political support. The most serious threats in the OAU resolution were contained in paragraphs 6 and 7:

6. Reaffirms in the name of African solidarity its active and total support for the Arab Republic of Egypt in her legitimate struggle to recover entirely by *all means* her territorial integrity. (Emphasis added.)

This in effect gave Egypt in advance OAU legal sanction to use armed force to push the Israelis out of all of Sinai.

7. Draws the attention of Israel to the danger threatening the security and unity of the African continent as a result of its continued aggression and refusal to evacuate the [occupied] territories and declares that the attitude of Israel might lead OAU member States to take political and economic measures against it,

This foreshadowed the successful Egyptian move to get virtually all black African states to break diplomatic ties with Israel, either before or during the October war. The evidence of Israel's international isolation emerging during the Security Council debates in June and July may have helped to embolden the Africans to take this step.

Another likely reason for Egypt's UN initiative was to demonstrate to world public opinion that Egypt's military attack was not undertaken lightly, but only after efforts to have the UN press Israel failed. This was also useful in convincing war-weary elements within

the Egyptian establishment that a new offensive, despite its questionable chances of military success, was necessary to unfreeze the political deadlock.

Another major Egyptian objective was to put pressure on the United States. Had Washington been intimidated into voting for the resolution, or at least into abstaining, Egypt could have formally claimed that the UN legally changed its 1967 position and now endorsed the Egyptian demand for total Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory. But this was not likely to happen. Indeed, the Egyptians purposely rejected compromise language that might have been acceptable to the Americans. Zayyat clearly anticipated another United States veto on April 20, when he castigated the United States for encouraging Israel's occupation and noted that "a fearful new development" appeared to be the extension of American support for Israel "beyond the physical to the moral, beyond the region to the United Nations, beyond using Phantoms to using the veto."

A United States veto was in fact an important ingredient in Sadat's prewar strategy. It served to demonstrate to the Egyptians and to the rest of the Arab world the extent of American support for Israel, thus justifying Sadat's turning again to the Russians for massive arms. This was especially important with regard to Saudi Arabia because Sadat was finally able to convince King Faisal to use the oil weapon against his American allies, as well as to underwrite much of the cost of Sadat's Soviet arms purchases.

U.S. Joins in Condemnation of Israel

In reality, however, the United States was not uncritically backing all Israeli actions. On August 15 the United States voted for a Security Council resolution, making unanimous its condemnation of Israel for intercepting a Lebanese commercial airliner and forcing it to land in Israel. The Council warned that the Israeli act constituted "a serious interference with international civil aviation and a violation of the Charter" of the UN, and "solemnly" warned Israel that a repetition of such acts would move it to consider "taking adequate steps or measures to enforce its resolutions."

U.S. Representative Scali noted that Israel released the plane and its 81 passengers and crew unharmed after two hours of questioning; that Israel had hoped to seize Arab terrorist leaders, including George Habash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who had been scheduled to be on the plane but had changed their flights. Scali observed that the United States has been "second to

none" in its condemnation of terrorism and in the search for new instruments in international law to counter terrorism, but insisted that effective action to control terrorism must "go forward within and not outside the law" and civil air travel "must no longer be a pawn in international conflicts."

(Israel's action was criticized as unwise in Israel and the American Jewish community. The Israel Pilots Association declared it could not condone the action "even though it was for the purpose of capturing the world's Number One criminal against civil aviation." *Ha'aretz*, Israel's leading independent daily, noting that Israel had for years been waging a strenuous political campaign against plane hijacking, warned that this incident would undermine Israel's public relations efforts because it "had lost its image as a country which respects the freedom of international civil aviation." Nevertheless, Israel's Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General David Elazar, warned on August 15 that "more operations" like the Lebanese plane interception "may be expected." In his view, there was no effective way to get to the terrorist murderers "within international law, but we have the right to existence and the right of self-defense.")

At the United Nations, China and the Soviet Union expressed regret that the Council's resolution did not call for specific sanctions against Israel. Arab states, particularly Egypt and Iraq—the Lebanese plane had been chartered by Iraqi Airlines and was headed for Baghdad—had pressed Lebanon to hold out for a resolution calling for economic sanctions against Israel. The compromise text, introduced by Britain and France, was worked out in negotiation between the Lebanese and United States delegates when the United States made it clear it would veto sanctions against Israel. After the vote, Scali publicly declared that United States endorsement of the resolution did not represent a change in its policy on Middle East problems and how to solve them; "nor should it be interpreted as endorsing the principle of sanctions as a means of dealing with this problem."

UN Assembly Fails to Curb Terrorism

The United Nations made no significant progress in 1973 in dealing with the general problem of international terrorism. When, on December 7, the General Assembly decided to put off until the following year debate on the issue, Israel protested the action as a demonstration of UN helplessness and lack of will to deal with it. At the concluding session of the Assembly on December 18, W. Tapley Bennet Jr., the deputy chief United States delegate, noted the latest

killings by Palestinian hijackers at the Rome and Athens airports the week before. Declaring that "revulsion and disapproval are not enough," he rebuked the inaction of the UN members:

To the shame of us all, we representatives of the world community have failed to find common ground which would enable us to take adequate measures to prevent these offenses against mankind.

The instinct of self-preservation and the common interest within the diplomatic fraternity, however, proved strong enough for them to agree on the text of a treaty that provided for the prosecution or extradition of those guilty of attacking diplomats.

Reaction to U.S. Veto

As expected, the United States veto of the pro-Arab Security Council resolution in July aroused Arab animosity and criticism by some European states. In the months following, American officials made several attempts to underscore that their government did not completely identify with the Israeli position. For example, when the Israel Labor party published a provisional election platform proposing the acquisition by the government of more land for development in Jerusalem, the establishment of additional settlements in occupied territories, and the appointment of a cabinet committee to consider approval of sale of land in the occupied territories to individuals and private companies, State Department spokesman Paul J. Hare told reporters, on August 23, that the United States continued to oppose changes in the status of Israeli-occupied Arab territory.

Earlier in August Sisco granted interviews to *Ma'ariv*, the largest circulation Israeli paper, and to Israel television in which he urged that Israel "prime the pump of negotiations" with new ideas. He told the Israelis—and indirectly the Arabs, since they watched Israeli television and monitored its press—that while American interests "in many respects are parallel to the interests of Israel, they are not synonymous with the state of Israel. . . . [They] go beyond any one nation in the area." He emphasized that the United States had important "political, economic and strategic interests in the entire area" including the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. Noting the growing American concern over the energy question, he said, "it is foolhardy to believe that this is not a factor in the situation."

Saudi Arabian officials had been declaring publicly that they could not increase oil production unless there was a change in United States

policy. And they reportedly were telling the State Department and oil company executives privately that the oil wells were subject to sabotage by Palestinian terrorists, and that Saudi Arabia could not resist pressure by its Arab neighbors to cut back production, unless the United States adopted a more "even-handed" posture and made progress on a settlement acceptable to the Arabs.

Oil-company Involvement

It was probably no coincidence that on July 26, the day the United States vetoed the pro-Arab Security Council resolution, O.N. Miller, board chairman of Standard Oil Company of California (SOCAL), sent a letter to the company's 262,000 stockholders and 41,000 employees, asking them to urge the government to show greater understanding of "the aspirations of the Arab people," and to "give more positive support" to Arab "efforts toward peace." Miller recalled that in 1933 SOCAL, a partner in ARAMCO, concluded "an historic agreement" with Saudi Arabia to develop its oil resources and for 40 years has maintained a "continuous and cordial relationship with the Arab people." There was a growing feeling in much of the Arab world, he said that "the United States has turned its back on the Arab people." Because of the growing dependence of the United States and other Western industrialized nations on imported oil and the location of almost two-thirds "of the Free World's oil reserves" in the Arab/Persian Gulf area, Miller argued, it was in the best interest of all United States citizens to "urge our government to work towards conditions of peace and stability." To this end, "we must acknowledge the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the Middle East and help them to achieve security and a dependable economic future." Israel was nowhere mentioned by name.

The letter aroused indignation among individual shareholders and customers in the Jewish community, and among members of Congress. Senator Alan Cranston (D., Calif.) wrote he did not share Miller's inference that "what is good for Standard Oil is necessarily good for the United States." Senator John V. Tunney (D., Calif.) charged the SOCAL letter was "counterproductive" to peace in the area.

Responding to protests, Miller wrote to Richard M. Kaplan, chairman of the Jewish Community Relations Council of San Francisco, clarifying that his reference in his July 26 letter to the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the Middle East "included the legitimate interests of Israel and its people." He categorically denied he had meant to imply that peace and stability could be established

“without regard to the existence of Israel or its legitimate interests.” He emphasized, however, that United States national interests required a peace agreement “fair and equitable to *all* states in the area and consistent with their independence and sovereign integrity.” He did not spell out what he meant by “sovereign integrity,” which could be interpreted as endorsement of the Arab demand for total Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 lines, if not of the Egyptian proposal to revert to the 1947 partition lines.

NIXON REACTION TO OIL PRESSURE

Asked at a press conference, on September 8, whether the Arab threat to limit the supply of oil would lead to a moderation in American support of Israel, President Nixon said it would be “highly inappropriate” to suggest that “we are going to relate our policy toward Israel, which has to do with the independence of that country to which we are dedicated, to what happens on Arab oil.”

He then emphasized, however, the need to move toward a settlement:

Israel simply can't wait for the dust to settle in the Mideast. Both sides are at fault. Both sides need to start negotiating. We're not pro-Israel; and we're not pro-Arab. And we're not any more pro-Arab because they have oil and Israel hasn't.

The United States was “pro-peace,” the President continued, and would use its influence with both Israel and the Arabs “to get those negotiations off dead center.” He had instructed Dr. Kissinger to give “the highest priority” to making progress on a settlement. Of course, one of the dividends of success in this direction he concluded, would be “to reduce the oil pressure.” Administration officials the following day indicated that Israel was being urged to take some new initiatives, but that no fresh diplomatic moves were being planned until the Israeli elections, then scheduled for October 31.

THE OCTOBER WAR

On the Eve

Neither the prospect of a new United States peace initiative after the Israeli elections, nor the tangible signs of American concern for Arab aspirations—among them State Department acknowledgment that negotiations for the sale of jet fighters to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

were under way—could convince Cairo of a fundamental change in United States policy. On September 26 Sadat told his parliament:

The United States is still under Zionist pressure and is wearing Zionist spectacles. . . . The U.S. will have to take off those Zionist spectacles before they talk to us. . . . If I want to reopen the canal, I do not have to ask the permission of the United States or of Israel. But the problem is not that of the canal. . . . There is the issue of Palestine, the issue of liberating the occupied lands.

Speaking on the occasion of the anniversary of Nasser's death two days later, Sadat was remarkably reticent about a confrontation with Israel, which he so often threatened as imminent in the last three years. "I have deliberately not broached the subject of the battle because there has been enough talk," he said, but reaffirmed that liberation was Egypt's first and main task and asked his people to have confidence that, *inshallah*, Egypt would soon achieve its aim.

The Israeli press reported that, on October 2, the Egyptians declared a state of alert in the northern and central sections of the canal "due to Israeli concentrations." Similarly, the Syrians were redeploying their forces, ostensibly to counter an impending Israeli attack from the Golan Heights. But Syrians were said to be naturally jittery after the air clash along the Mediterranean Sea on September 13 in which Israeli jets had shot down 13 Syrian MIG-21s. And, since Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had just concluded their Cairo summit conference, the Israelis tended to dismiss the Arab military moves as the normal sabre-rattling punctuating such events. They were also regarded as a flexing of muscle to serve as backdrop for the new round of talks to begin between the Egyptian foreign minister and Secretary Kissinger on October 5 in New York.

There seemed to be other signals from Egypt to indicate that, despite Sadat's rhetoric, it was seeking a rapprochement with the United States. Thus only days before the war, Cairo announced that the American Bechtel Corporation was awarded the contract to construct a giant \$397 million oil pipeline from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean west of Suez, bypassing the Suez Canal.

At a press conference on October 12, Kissinger noted that, in the week before the outbreak of hostilities, the United States was aware of additional concentrations of Syrian forces and of the engagement of the Egyptian forces in "what was interpreted both by our intelligence as well as by Israeli intelligence as their regular fall maneuvers." During that week he asked United States and Israeli Intelligence three separate times for their assessment, and "the unanimous view" was that "hostilities were unlikely to the point of there being no chance of

it happening." Neither was the possibility of hostilities mentioned in any of the discussions he had at the time with Arab or Israeli officials at the United Nations.

Last-minute U.S. Efforts to Avert War

By Saturday morning, October 6, it was quite clear to the Israelis that the Egyptian and Syrian armies were being massed for imminent attack. Prime Minister Meir called in United States Ambassador Kenneth Keating to ask him to urge his government to use all its influence with Egypt, Syria, and the Soviet Union to call off the attack. She assured Keating that Israel would not launch a preemptive strike as it had done in 1967. Kissinger was awakened at 6 a.m. (New York time) and promptly called President Nixon, who instructed him to call the Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers in New York and urge "restraint." He then appealed to Soviet Ambassador Anatole F. Dobrynin in Washington to do everything possible to prevent war; the latter promised to do his best. Kissinger also cabled Faisal and Hussein, the two Arab heads of states with closest ties to the United States to use their good offices with their Arab neighbors. Kissinger then alerted Secretary-General Waldheim.

To make sure that Israel was not planning a preemptive strike, Kissinger asked Keating to repeat the American warning that if Israel struck first, the United States would feel no moral obligation to help. But before Keating could do so, Mrs. Meir had rejected the urgent appeal by Chief of Staff David Elazar, who contended that a preemptive strike was vital to disrupt the Arab war plans. The Cabinet members who were with Mrs. Meir at the time agreed to go along with her decision to await the initial Arab attack. The regular army had been alerted, and the call-up of reserves was now accelerated. Kissinger informed Zayyat and Dobrynin of the Israeli decision. The Egyptian-Syrian answer was a massive, coordinated attack at five points across the Suez Canal and against the Golan Heights (pp. 529-31). The onslaught began at 2 p.m. (8 a.m. New York time). The Arab attack had originally been planned to begin later in the day, shortly before sunset. This would have given the Egyptians and Syrians the cover of darkness to consolidate their positions. It also would have meant that they would have caught the Israelis when they were physically weakened by 24 hours of fasting. Once the Arabs realized that the Israelis were aware of the impending attack, the decision to start the war was advanced several hours.

The Syrian delegation to the UN dutifully ground out a complaint

charging that the "aggressive" Israelis had attacked Syria, while Zayyat called Kissinger within minutes of the outbreak of fighting to charge Israel with having provoked the Arab moves by sending her naval forces against the Syrian port of Latakia and an obscure Egyptian point south of the Suez Canal. Kissinger found it hard to believe that Israel would make such seemingly irrelevant naval attacks, rather than use its powerful air force to strike at the major Arab concentrations. The reason for the Arab invention of these particular "attacks" was that these were places not normally patrolled by the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and that, therefore, there would be no independent source to refute the Egyptian allegation.

However, UNTSO observers quickly provided independent confirmation of Israel's charges. Eleven UNTSO posts along the Suez Canal reported that "intense artillery fire by Egyptian forces" began at 2 p.m. and that, ten minutes later, "Egyptian forces crossed the Canal from West to East." At the same time, on the Golan Heights, the Syrians began "intense artillery and tank fire" and, within the next half hour, six UNTSO observation posts reported that "Syrian forces tanks, vehicles and infantry crossed" the cease-fire lines.

Soviet Role and Détente

A question that has aroused intense debate since the war has been whether the Soviet Union actively encouraged the Arab attack, or whether the decision to go to war was Sadat's and Assad's, with the Russians only reluctantly going along. While evidence one way or the other has not yet been conclusive, it has become abundantly clear that the Soviet Union had advance notice of Arab intentions. Moreover, the Soviet Union provided the Arab forces with training and strategy for their attack, as well as with an impressive panoply of war matériel, ranging from bridging equipment to cross the canal, to the most modern offensive weapons in the Soviet arsenal including T-62 tanks and MIG fighters and Sukhoi bombers, Frog and Scud ground-to-ground missiles, as well as vast numbers of mobile SA-6 and SA-7 missiles and Sagger anti-tank weapons, which took a heavy toll of Israeli pilots and tank corpsmen. Some of the equipment the Russians supplied had never before been seen in combat and had not even been supplied to Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies. Western military analysts were to compare the scale of the tank battles in Sinai to the North African desert campaigns and the Nazi invasion of Russia during World War II. They noted that the great number of Soviet tanks, heavy artillery pieces, and missiles on the Golan Heights made this the

heaviest concentration of firepower on a battlefield of this size in the annals of warfare. There is thus no doubt that Russian arms made the October war possible.

But did the Russians know war was imminent? After all, preparations had been going on for years. And, as noted above, the Russians justified their military aid to the Arabs as intended to provide pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. It might be argued that the Russians gave their arms to achieve a long-term political objective and did not anticipate that the Arabs would act so soon. There was a cooling in Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1972 and most Soviet advisors were withdrawn. Moreover, Brezhnev pledged at two summit conferences with Nixon to work closely with the United States to prevent the eruption of precisely such local conflicts as the Yom Kippur war. Thus it was possible that the Egyptians did not explicitly tell the Russians precisely when the attack was to be launched.

It has been speculated that Sadat informed the Russians of the date of the attack in a letter to Brezhnev, handed to Soviet Ambassador to Egypt Vladimir Vinogradov on September 22. Some Egyptian officials have indicated that the Russians were informed less than a week before the war. In any case, the hundreds of Soviet advisors in Egypt and approximately 3,000 advisors in Syria clearly knew in advance, because their civilian dependents were hastily evacuated 48 to 72 hours before the war. Moreover, just before the Arab attack, the Soviets launched two spy satellites whose path took them over Israel at noon each day—the ideal time for space photography. It also was reported that massive quantities of ammunition were shipped to Cairo and Damascus in the weeks before the war and that Soviet ships, carrying Scud guided missiles capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads and having a range of 185 miles, entered the Mediterranean bound for Egypt on September 25. The timing of one of these actions might have been a coincidence, but not all three.

When Kissinger was asked on October 12 whether the Russians, who evidently had advance knowledge of the attack, had not been under an obligation to inform the United States, he replied that “in an ideal world, one would expect closer consultation but, given the particular volatility of the Middle East, it would have been a heavy responsibility to make known certain advance information.” He indicated that the Russians obviously did not wish to rupture their longstanding relationship with Egypt and Syria. “Nevertheless,” he stressed, “we would consider it consistent and, indeed, required by the principles that have been signed between the United States and the Soviet Union” that either side having certain knowledge of imminent

military operations wherever an explosive situation existed in the world would give an opportunity "to both sides to calm the situation."

Kissinger was not yet prepared to condemn publicly Soviet actions. However, in his address to the *Pacem in Terris* conference, on October 8, he stressed that détente meant not only avoidance of nuclear war between the superpowers; it also precluded the use of relaxation of tension "as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots," for "détente cannot survive irresponsibility in any area, including the Middle East." The Soviet Union, he warned, "cannot disregard these principles in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the United States."

How did Moscow respond to the clearcut United States warning? Far from working with the United States to restore peace, the Soviet Union fanned the conflict. It spurned American efforts in the United Nations on October 8 and 9 for an immediate cease-fire, with a return to the lines before the fighting broke out on October 6. The United States decided not to go through the formal motions of introducing a resolution in the Council, once it became apparent that the Egyptians and Syrians, flushed with their initial successes, refused to consider even a nonaligned draft which would have called for Israel's withdrawal to the June 5, 1967 lines. The Russians and Chinese, while excoriating each other, denounced the Israelis as "gansters" and aggressors. No one was prepared to condemn the Arab attack. The French, who imposed an arms embargo on Israel in 1967 when the Israelis failed to heed General Charles deGaulle's warning not to fire the first shot, now closed their eyes to the UNTSO reports that Egypt and Syria started the latest hostilities. Asked to comment on the Arab attack, French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert said: "Is it necessarily unforeseen aggression to try to go back home?" The United States decided that, under the circumstances, a formal UN vote would only harden the opposing positions.

But the Soviet Union went much beyond merely thwarting United States efforts for a UN cease-fire. It also rejected appeals to limit arms shipments: on October 9 it increased the number of its military supply ships to Syria and Egypt, and on October 10 supplemented them by a large-scale around-the-clock airlift, using the giant Antonov-22 transports to pour in additional missiles and other military equipment. Meanwhile, Soviet diplomats in the area were exhorting other Arab leaders to join in the battle, an activity that was reinforced by appeals from top Soviet leaders, such as Brezhnev's message to Algerian President Houari Boumediene, urging the Algerian people to "use all means at their disposal" to support Egypt and Syria in "the difficult struggle imposed by the Israeli aggressors." (Nine Arab states

provided such support: Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sent contingents to Syria; Sudan and Tunisia sent contingents to Egypt; Algeria, Iraq and Libya made available military aircraft to Cairo.)

At the same time, the Soviet Union stepped up its earlier exhortations to the Arab states to use their oil as a weapon against the United States and other supporters of Israel.

Kissinger's Public Response

Kissinger was asked at his October 12 press conference whether the latest Soviet actions constituted the "irresponsibility" which, he had warned, would threaten Soviet-American détente. In the understatement of the year, Kissinger mildly noted that the United States "did not consider helpful" the Soviet statement to Algeria's president and its military airlift. In contrast to Kissinger's public cool, one American diplomat recalled that when the reports of Soviet actions were received by the State Department, "Henry hit the roof." In public, however, Kissinger contended that while the Soviet airlift was "fairly substantial," it was still "moderate"; that the Soviet public media had shown "relative restraint"; that, in comparison to Soviet conduct during the 1967 war, it was "less provocative, less incendiary and less geared to military threats than in the previous crisis."

Kissinger's critics argued he had so staked his reputation on the success of détente that he was prepared to overlook the most glaring Soviet violations. A more charitable explanation was that he concealed his real feelings in public in the hope of exerting a moderating influence on the Russians in private. Indeed, he cautioned his questioners at the beginning of the October 12 press conference that the United States was in the midst of a "delicate phase" of efforts to end the hostilities and to lay the basis for a more permanent peace in the Middle East and that he therefore would have to be "somewhat guarded" in his answers.

Nevertheless, repeating that the United States did not wish to exacerbate relations "to an unbearable point," Kissinger again warned that once the United States made the judgment that Soviet actions had reached the point of irresponsibility, "we will in this crisis, as we have in other crises, not hesitate to take a firm stand." Three days later, at a White House ceremony honoring Vietnam veterans, President Nixon stressed that the United States stood for the "right of every nation in the Mideast to maintain its independence and security." He said the United States role was that of "peacemaker in the area," and hinted

the United States might consider military intervention when he added that its policy was like the one "we followed in 1958 when Lebanon was involved" and in 1970 "when Jordan was involved." (The United States sent marines into Lebanon and threatened military intervention during the 1970 Jordanian-Syrian crisis.)

The President's statement was no doubt intended to give the Russians pause, for both earlier American actions had been within the framework of the Eisenhower Doctrine under which Congress had granted the President authority to provide United States military aid to any Middle East country threatened by international Communism. The law was still on the books. State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey emphasized later that the President had merely intended to reaffirm the broad policy objectives of the United States in the Middle East, not to spell out any "specific tactic."

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), who shortly after the outbreak of the war cosponsored a resolution calling on the United States to use its good offices "to urge the participants to bring about a cease-fire and a return of the parties" to the lines and positions they held before the October war, told reporters on October 11, before a White House briefing for Senate and House leaders, that the United States should "under no circumstances" intervene directly with United States armed forces on the side of Israel. "When I say no more Vietnams," he emphasized, "I include Israel and Ulster—where my parents came from." This was reminiscent of a similar statement by him opposing unilateral United States action to break the Egyptian blockade on the eve of the 1967 six-day war (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], p. 170).

U.S. Resupply Airlift to Israel

The unexpectedly heavy losses Israel suffered in the early days of the war, largely due to Soviet anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, moved Israel to make urgent appeals to the United States for the replacement of aircraft, tanks, and electronic jamming equipment. On the afternoon of October 8, Kissinger informed Ambassador Dinitz that the President had given his "approval in principle" to replace Israeli plane losses. An Israeli request to allow Israeli planes to pick up ammunition and spare parts in the United States was reportedly initially rejected by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, but was approved upon Kissinger's intercession on condition that the Israelis paint over Israeli identifying marks on their planes. It soon became apparent, however, that this makeshift arrangement was inadequate to

cope with Israel's heavy battlefield losses and to counter escalation of Soviet supplies to the Arabs.

In Congress, sentiment favoring American resupply of Israel was growing. Senator George S. McGovern (D., S.D.) praised Israel's "remarkable restraint in entailing the risk of greater casualties in order to continue observing the 1970 cease-fire," and called for the transfer of military supplies to Israel to enable it to deter aggression. Senator Walter F. Mondale (D., Minn.) also noted the great sacrifice Israel had undergone by not launching a preemptive attack. Senator Hugh Scott (R., Pa.) compared the Arab attack on Yom Kippur to the Japanese attack "at Pearl Harbor on a Sunday." Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) and Senator Charles H. Percy (R., Ill.) also condemned the Arabs for attacking Israel on the holiest of Jewish religious holidays.

Senators Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.) and Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) introduced a resolution noting that the Soviet Union "heavily armed" the Arab states and "is continuing a massive airlift of sophisticated military equipment to Egypt and Syria," and asking for the implementation of the announced United States policy of maintaining Israel's deterrent strength "by continuing to transfer to Israel, by whatever means necessary, Phantom aircraft and other equipment in the quantities needed by Israel to repel the aggressors." The resolution was cosponsored by 68 senators. A similar measure in the House, sponsored by Majority Leader Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D., Mass.), received 260 signatures.

It was not until October 13, after Nixon assembled his top advisors and demanded full compliance with his order to resupply Israel, that a large-scale American airlift to Israel was initiated. There were conflicting versions as to the reasons for the delay. Initially, the Israelis themselves gave overly optimistic reports on the course of the war. Then, once their need was clear, the United States was desperately eager to maintain a low profile. The oil companies, the career diplomats, and the Pentagon all were aware of the intense pressures on Saudi Arabia and other Arab oil producers to turn the oil weapon against the United States. Any visible sign of American military support for Israel was bound to reinforce the Arab and Soviet charges that the United States was blindly backing Israel. This would torpedo Washington's calculated diplomatic efforts in the preceding months to appear as a friend of the Arabs and as an evenhanded peacemaker.

Once it became obvious that the few available Israeli planes would not be sufficient to transport the needed matériel, attempts were made to charter private cargo planes. This quickly proved impractical; charter companies, because of war-risk insurance and fear of terrorist

attack quoted rates at 95 per cent of the purchase cost of the planes. It was then suggested that American planes fly some equipment to the Azores, where it would be picked up by Israeli planes; again the intention was to avoid the spectacle of American military cargo planes flying Middle Eastern skies. Bureaucratic red tape, interagency complications, and the reluctance of the armed services to part with certain items in short supply also were said to add to the delays.

As the first week of the war ground on, the Israelis became increasingly frantic and irritated at the seemingly unending delays and obstacles in Washington. Dinitz reportedly complained to Kissinger that while the Russians were pouring in new sophisticated weapons to the Arabs, he had to spend his time "painting Jewish stars off Israeli planes." Kissinger was said to have responded that he was doing all he could, implying that he was fighting a one-man battle against the Pentagon and the oil lobby.

There is good reason to believe that the difficulties Israel encountered in Washington were not all bureaucratic and technical in nature. Nor was the initial reluctance to provide additional arms to Israel solely due to oil company pressures. For one thing, there was the hope, at least initially, that the American efforts to get the Russians to limit their own involvement would be more likely to succeed if the United States demonstrated restraint and moderation in its support of Israel. There was, too, a widespread feeling among foreign affairs analysts, both within the government and outside, that another sweeping Israeli victory, as in the 1967 war, would not be conducive to a negotiated settlement. It would merely intensify Arab bitterness and frustration, on the one hand, and Israel's confidence that it could indefinitely live with the status quo, on the other. A measure of Arab military success, this argument held, was essential to restore Arab pride and self-confidence. The trick was to achieve sufficient Arab success to enable Arab leaders to go to the conference table with Israel without fear of humiliation or overthrow by their own people, but not to allow the Arabs to win so overwhelming a victory as to reinforce their intransigence by arousing false hopes of an eventual total destruction of Israel in the next round.

It has been suggested by Kissinger's critics that such calculations played a significant role in his own handling of the crisis. Charges by Marvin and Bernard Kalb in a *New York Times Magazine* article (June 23, 1974) that Schlesinger was the major source of opposition to resupplying Israel were dismissed by him as "poppycok." He told a Jewish Telegraphic Agency correspondent on June 30 that "there was a cover story during that period [the first week of the war] that the source of resistance was to be the Pentagon," but that "this story was

basically only to protect the realities of national policy.” Foreign correspondent Tad Szulc, in a critical article on Kissinger in *New York* magazine (July 1, 1974), elaborated the theme that Kissinger himself drafted the White House policy directive ordering a hold on major resupply operations for Israel, with the Pentagon assuming the official blame. Szulc charged, too, that for two weeks Kissinger refused to launch serious diplomatic efforts at a cease-fire “on the theory, according to insiders that a long-range political settlement would be facilitated if both the Arabs and the Israelis made each other suffer.” Israeli diplomats have prudently refused to comment on the Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy.

According to the Kalbs, the airlift did not begin moving until after President Nixon convened his top advisors at an emergency White House meeting on the morning of October 13. Nixon wanted to know why there had been delay in implementing his orders for supplies to Israel. When Schlesinger mentioned the difficulties in chartering civilian transports, Nixon reportedly exploded: “To hell with the charters! Get the supplies there with American planes! Forget the Azores! Get moving! I want no further delays.” At 3:30 p.m. Dinitz was informed that a fleet of C-5 Galaxies, the largest American transport plane, had left the United States for Israel. In response to the Kalb report, Schlesinger has insisted that once he became convinced on Friday evening that Israel was in danger of running out of munitions, he ordered the start of the airlift around 1 a.m. Saturday morning and that before 3 a.m. the supplies were already on their way.

WHY A U.S. AIRLIFT?

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey explained to reporters the following Monday that the United States had begun resupplying Israel to prevent the Soviet Union’s “massive airlift” to Egypt and Syria from upsetting the military balance in the Middle East. He added that the decision to reequip Israel was in keeping with the “firm stand” Kissinger warned the United States would take if the Russians acted irresponsibly. The United States, McCloskey added, was equally firm in its diplomatic contacts with the Russians, but he refused to be drawn into a public condemnation of Soviet actions.

The decision to go ahead with a dramatic and highly visible airlift of supplies to Israel was apparently based on a variety of factors, which finally outweighed the expected unfavorable reaction from the Arab oil producers. Allowing Israel to be defeated would upset United States-Israel relations, causing domestic problems for the administration and seriously undermining the credibility of American commitments to its

allies. Further, an Arab battlefield victory achieved with modern Soviet weapons would seem to confirm that the Russians had outdistanced the Americans in the conventional arms race, and this would raise Soviet prestige around the world and arouse anxieties among countries allied to the United States and relying on American weapons. Finally, the United States would lose its influence as potential peacemaker and a major factor in the Middle East if the Russians could obtain for the Arabs a settlement on their terms.

Indeed, there were ominous signs that the Russians may have been planning to raise the stakes and push for a major Arab "success." On October 10 Kissinger received intelligence reports that three Soviet airborne divisions in Eastern Europe were placed on alert. Meanwhile, the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean was increased by 15 ships, to a record number of nearly 70 surface ships. In response, the United States took "precautionary" steps to augment its Sixth Fleet from the normal 40 to 50 ships by dispatching a third attack carrier and a second helicopter carrier.

Kissinger and the President were convinced that the Soviets' duplicity in the first week and their military moves made a massive American resupply of Israel crucial not only to save Israel, but to obviate the danger of a Soviet-American confrontation in the event the Russians underrated the seriousness of the American commitment to prevent them from upsetting the balance of power in the Middle East. Consequently, if the Russians were unwilling to reduce their arms supplies to the Arabs and seemed intent on waging a war by proxy, Kissinger later explained, then the United States would start "pouring in equipment" to the Israelis "until we create a new reality."

CONGRESS SUPPORTS AID TO ISRAEL

The United States decision to send arms to Israel, including new jet fighters, won strong Senate support; but this was qualified by virtually unanimous opposition to sending in American military personnel. While Senator Mansfield backed the resupply "in order to keep a semblance of an arms balance in the area," he repeated his view that "one Vietnam is one Vietnam too many" and emphasized that United States forces should only be used where "our national interests and security are at stake." He expected no need for direct United States intervention; but if the President should wish to intervene "he should come to Congress first." Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.), a strong supporter of Israel, also believed direct American armed intervention to be unnecessary; he too "would advise the President to come to Congress first for a special resolution" if he ever found that United

States forces must be moved into the Middle East. Javits was among the sponsors of a war powers bill, which would forbid the President to wage undeclared war for more than 60 days without congressional consent. Other statements expressing this view were issued by Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho), Senate Democratic Whip Robert C. Byrd (D., W. Va.), Senate GOP Whip Robert P. Griffin (R., Mich.), Senator James Eastland (D., Miss.), and Senator Robert T. Stafford (R., Vt.).

U.S. MILITARY AID GRANT

On October 19 President Nixon asked Congress to authorize \$2.2 billion in emergency military aid to Israel "to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance" as a result of Soviet arms to Egypt and Syria. The magnitude of the conflict and the scale of Soviet supplies, he said, "created needs which exceed Israel's capacity to continue with cash and credit purchases." Defense Department sources indicated that Israel already owed the United States \$1.7 billion for earlier American arms sales. Consequently, the President said, the only practical alternative was for the United States "to provide Israel with grant military assistance."

This marked a significant change in United States aid policy to Israel. In a speech urging prompt congressional approval of the aid bill, Representative Robert F. Drinan (D., Mass.), a Roman Catholic priest, noted that "it is astonishing that between 1946 and 1972, according to the Agency for International Development, the United States provided to foreign countries grants and military assistance totaling approximately \$55 billion," yet "none of this grant military assistance ever went to Israel." Under the Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973 the President asked for congressional authorization to appropriate a sum "not to exceed \$2,200,000,000 for emergency military assistance or foreign military sales credits, or for both as the President may determine, for Israel," and \$200 million emergency military assistance for Cambodia. This was an obvious administration attempt to secure approval of the controversial Southeast Asian appropriation on the coattails of the popular aid to Israel.

It was also charged by some that the unusual discretion requested by the President to determine how much of the aid to Israel was to be an outright grant and how much a loan indicated that the administration wished to use the aid as political leverage to assure Israeli flexibility in the forthcoming negotiations. Administration spokesmen denied this allegation, pointing out that the bill was drafted in the midst of the war, when it was not possible to determine exactly Israel's needs and that therefore the discretionary phrasing was included. Nevertheless, as

one Pentagon official pointed out, "the bill was not designed for leverage purposes, but the American hold on Israel is implicit in the whole diplomatic and aid situation."

The House version of the bill specified a ceiling of \$1 billion in grant aid to Israel; but on the initiative of Senator Humphrey the Senate raised the ceiling to \$1.5 billion and Congress adopted the higher figure. The President initially authorized only \$1 billion, and the additional \$500 million was not granted until June 1974, after the conclusion of the disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria. However, before the end of 1973 Congress had approved under its Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act, and independently of the \$2.2 billion emergency aid, \$300 million in military credit sales to Israel, \$50 million in general supporting assistance, and \$36.5 million for the resettlement of Soviet Jewish refugees, the bulk of the money to be spent in Israel. On the motion of Senator James Abourezk (D., S.D.), the Senate agreed to raise its appropriation for Arab refugees to an equivalent \$36.5 million.

CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON AID

The Emergency Security Assistance Act was approved in the House by a decisive 364 to 52 vote and in the Senate by an even larger majority of 66 to 9. While the legislation was strongly endorsed by 31 major American Jewish organizations and by the American public generally, there was articulate and increasingly well-organized opposition by Arab-American and pro-Arab American groups. On October 25, members of Congress received a telegram from 18 Arab-American and pro-Arab groups claiming to represent "millions of American citizens from all over the United States," urging them to "vote absolutely no arms and advisors to Israel." (The pending legislation made no mention of advisors, since Israel had made it clear it neither needed nor wanted them. The reason for including them in the telegram presumably was to play upon public fears of a repetition in the Middle East of the gradual escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.) The telegram asked the legislators to "prevent the diversion of massive funds from American needs to a foreign state's military expansionism," and to vote against "further harm to the U.S. economy and the American people," an allusion to the announced Arab oil embargo against the United States in response to its resupply to Israel. Exploiting the growing unpopularity of foreign aid in general, the telegram asked Congress to "turn your attention to the needs of the millions of Americans who need our dollars here at home." The Middle East, it concluded, "needs peace with justice, not Phantoms. The U.S. Congress, not Israel, repeat not Israel, should decide how American tax dollars should be spent."

The last point echoed the allegation made on television on October 7 by Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that "Israelis control the policy in the Congress. The emotional and political ties are too strong. On every test on anything the Israelis are interested in the Israelis have 75 to 80 votes in the Senate." Needless to say, numerous senators declared that they voted only for what they considered to be in the American national interest; that if Fulbright found himself consistently in a minority on various issues, it was highly improper for him to question the loyalty of those who disagreed with him.

The various themes raised in the pro-Arab telegram and in testimony by pro-Arab groups before congressional committees also figured in the congressional debates preceding the approval of the military aid to Israel. Thus, for example, Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D., Wis.), a long-time opponent of American involvement in Vietnam, said he would vote against the military aid because the "United States ought not to encourage the perpetuation of war . . . by sending arms and other military assistance to foreign countries, whether it be Israel, the Arab nations, or Southeast Asia." In response, Representative Michael Harrington (D., Mass.), who was elected to Congress as an anti-war activist, argued that approval of the emergency aid to Israel would further the objective of a durable peace. "No peace will be achieved if either side in the conflict has the perception that the other side is negotiating from a position of weakness," he declared.

Citing the tight domestic economic situation, Representative H.R. Gross (R., Iowa) said he opposed the aid which, he calculated, would provide "a \$900 windfall for every man, woman and child in Israel," while "our people are standing on line waiting for the funds the White House has impounded." Representative Clarence Long (D., Md.) responded that the Israeli worker was not getting any windfall, that he already was the most heavily taxed in the world and, as a result of the war, "is suffering the greatest reduction in his standard of living" suffered by any other person in a comparable situation. Contrasting the demands on the United States by Southeast Asia and Israel, he continued:

We have given billions and billions of dollars and sent men to fight in country after country for people who would not fight for themselves. Israelis are willing to fight. This itself is something new in our foreign aid experience. . . . Can we deny Israel the means to defend itself?

Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Ind., Va.) said he supported the bill despite its cost: "As deeply concerned as I am about our nation's

financial situation, I am even more concerned about a possible explosion in the Middle East." Noting that "the Russians have heavily armed the Arabs," he concluded that "a balance can only be maintained if the United States provides some assistance to Israel."

Fulbright did not change his long-standing position. He charged that the "Senate has taken leave of its senses," and the emergency-aid package for Israel, he said, was "the ultimate in irrationality."

Kissinger-Brezhnev Cease-Fire Talks

Although Israel managed on its own to halt the Arab advances, the American resupply airlift provided the Israel Defense Forces with sufficient munitions to press a successful counteroffensive on both fronts. In the Golan Heights they reached Sassa, within artillery range of Damascus. Most spectacular, however, was the Israeli success in establishing a bridgehead on the African side of the Suez Canal. Within three days the Israelis penetrated to within 50 miles of Cairo and widened their beachhead to the point of threatening to cut off two Egyptian armies.

The dramatic shift in Egyptian military fortunes brought intensive Soviet diplomatic activity. On October 16 Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin secretly flew to Cairo in an attempt to convince Sadat to accept a cease-fire. After three days of talks, according to Egyptian sources, Sadat extracted a pledge from Kosygin that the Soviet Union would help enforce the cease-fire, unilaterally if necessary, if Egypt agreed to a cease-fire in place and Israel refused to comply. To make the terms more palatable, the Russians included in its proposal support for the Arab political objectives. The Soviet draft of a UN cease-fire was presented by Ambassador Dobrynin to Kissinger on the night of October 18. It called for total Israeli withdrawal in stages from "all" occupied territory, including the Old City of Jerusalem. Kissinger rejected it as unacceptable.

Meanwhile, the day after Kosygin returned to the Kremlin with reports of the rapidly deteriorating Egyptian military position, Brezhnev invited Kissinger to Moscow for "urgent consultations on the Middle East." Kissinger arrived in Moscow on October 20 and began intensive talks with the Russian leaders less than two hours after landing.

Kissinger's critics have asked why he was in such haste to go to the Soviet Union precisely when the Israelis were beginning to achieve a substantial military victory. After all, the Russians had turned a deaf ear to American cease-fire efforts at the beginning of the war when it

seemed their Arab protégés were winning. Could Kissinger not have delayed his departure a bit and then pleaded jet lag and fatigue when he arrived in Moscow? Kissinger's response was that had he not gone to Moscow, the Russians would have sent Gromyko to Washington. There was also the likelihood that the Russians would immediately have taken their case to the UN Security Council, where the cease-fire proposal would have been unanimously approved. This, of course, was technically not correct, since the United States could have vetoed formal adoption of the resolution. However, Kissinger reportedly believed that the Russians were getting very anxious and upset, and might have considered "unilateral military action to stop the fighting." A virtually unanimous UN resolution, despite an American veto, might have been used by them as moral, if not technically legal, justification for intervention. Despite his public disclaimers of confrontation, Kissinger was privately reported to have regarded the situation as "murderously dangerous." By going to Moscow he could personally control the negotiations with the Soviet leaders and bring his diplomatic skills to bear. Moreover, he later contended in conversations with Israeli and American Jewish leaders that his trip, in effect, gave the Israelis an additional 72 hours to improve their military position.

According to Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, then editor of the Cairo *al-Ahram*, Dr. Kissinger told him that the first American call for a cease-fire on the day after hostilities broke out was a pro-Egyptian act. In the article, published in *L'Express* on December 2, 1973, Heykal quoted Kissinger as telling him:

I did not take Israel's side as you believed. On the contrary, all our experts thought that you would be exposing yourselves to a decisive blow by the Israeli armed forces if you renewed the war. That is why I proposed a cease-fire and a return to the lines before this new outbreak. I thought that this measure would favor you more than Israel.

Kissinger's major fear, according to Heykal, was that Egypt, faced with a new defeat, would turn to the Soviet Union for intervention, and this would pose "a frightening" dilemma for the United States and have unpleasant consequences for Egypt in either case. While there may be some question as to the accuracy of Heykal's reporting, other sources, including Kissinger's own public comments (press conference of October 25) tend to support the view that he was opposed to another smashing Israeli military victory on the grounds that this would merely perpetuate the conditions that were "clearly intolerable to the Arab nations" and produced the latest war. He told the reporters that,

throughout the crisis, "the President was convinced we had two major problems: first, to end hostilities as quickly as possible, but secondly, to end hostilities in a manner that would enable us to make a major contribution to removing the conditions that have produced four wars" in the past 25 years and to make "a contribution to permanent peace in the Middle East."

In the process of negotiations, he added, "it will be necessary for all sides to make substantial concessions." Negotiations were essential to tackling the basic problem of relating the Arab concern for "sovereignty over the territories—to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries."

UN Resolution 338

At the Moscow meeting Kissinger won Soviet agreement to introduce jointly a resolution in the Security Council, which the Council approved on October 22 as Resolution 338. Its text was as follows:

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

The resolution met certain basic Soviet and Arab requirements in its call for an almost immediate cease-fire, a ban on further Israeli advances, and the direct start of implementation of all parts of Resolution 242. However, compared to the Egyptian demands in the Security Council the preceding summer and the Dobrynin note to Kissinger a few days earlier, Resolution 338 was significantly more favorable to the Israeli position. There was no explicit call for Israeli withdrawal as a precondition to, or separate from, implementation of the other elements of the 1967 resolution. The third operative paragraph, inserted at Kissinger's insistence, marked an important

step forward, since it represented, in Kissinger's words, "the first international commitment to negotiations between the parties in the Middle East conflict." The Arabs had previously interpreted Resolution 242 as either self-implementing or as something to be imposed upon Israel by the United Nations. Acceptance of the October 22 cease-fire resolution constituted a formal Arab commitment to negotiations with Israel "under appropriate auspices."

The resolution was approved by a vote of 14 to 0; China refused to participate on the grounds that the resolution failed to condemn Israel and was being imposed upon the Council by the two superpowers. However, since the Arabs obviously wanted the cease-fire resolution, China would not obstruct them by vetoing it. (Syria's formal acceptance was contained in a cable to Waldheim sent only on October 24 and stating that the Syrians understood the resolution to require "complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all territories occupied" in 1967 and 1973.)

Israel formally accepted the cease-fire resolution on October 22. Mrs. Meir, explaining her government's decision, cited three basic reasons: 1) the State of Israel, "by its nature, has no wish for war, does not desire loss of life"; 2) the cease-fire proposal came at a time when Israel's position "is firm on both fronts" and Israel had achieved gains of great value "despite the enemy's achievement east of the Suez Canal," and 3) Israel "responded to the call by the United States and its President out of appreciation and esteem for its positive policy in the Middle East at this time." Kissinger had in fact sent an urgent appeal in President Nixon's name to Mrs. Meir to accept the cease-fire.

CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS

Israel's military commanders were unhappy at being denied the chance to demolish the Egyptian armed forces, which, they felt, was within their grasp. Consequently, when the Egyptian Third Army sought to fight its way out of the Israeli encirclement after the cease-fire deadline, the Israelis took advantage of the initial Egyptian violation to enlarge their positions on the western bank of the Canal. The major objective was the city of Suez on the southern end of the Canal; for control of the city and the roads leading to it would enable the Israelis to cut off supplies to the Third Army and force its eventual surrender. Kissinger reportedly was furious at the extent of the Israeli violations. He had been assured by Mrs. Meir, on his stopover in Israel on the way back from Moscow, that Israel would observe the cease-fire, and he had relayed that information to the Russians and Egyptians. He sent word to Mrs. Meir through Dinitz that the United

States expected Israel to observe the cease-fire "scrupulously." Some Israeli sources said their impression during Kissinger's visit was that he did not mind if they improved their position a bit. He reportedly did not expect instant total compliance, but indicated that he anticipated a repetition of the pattern in the Vietnam cease-fire, with some violations continuing after the deadline as fighting gradually diminished.

SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION

The Soviet Union and the United States jointly sponsored a second Security Council resolution (339) on October 23, reaffirming its earlier cease-fire decision and urging that "the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective." The Council also asked the UN secretary-general immediately to dispatch UN observers to supervise compliance with the cease-fire. Moments before the second cease-fire went into effect, on the morning of October 24, Israel announced that its forces had reached the outskirts of Suez and that the Third Army was effectively surrounded.

Soviet-American Confrontation

Israel won a *military* victory, but, as in previous rounds in the Arab-Israel conflict, battlefield successes were to be counterbalanced and outweighed by international political pressures. Sadat radioed an urgent appeal to Brezhnev and Nixon to send a joint Soviet-American peace-keeping force to the Middle East. The Egyptian proposal was supported by some of the so-called nonaligned nations in the UN and by Soviet UN Ambassador Malik. Both Kissinger and President Nixon flatly rejected the idea. As Kissinger explained in his October 25 press conference, it was "inconceivable" that the forces of the great powers should be introduced in sufficient numbers to overpower both of the belligerents. It was equally "inconceivable" to transplant great-power rivalry into the Middle East or, alternatively, that "we should impose a military condominium by the United States and the Soviet Union." He warned it would be "a disaster if the Middle East, already so torn by local fighting, would now become, as the result of a UN decision, a legitimized theater for the competition of the military forces of the great nuclear powers."

Meanwhile, evidence was mounting of Soviet intention to undertake a unilateral intervention, if necessary. On October 23 the Soviet government charged that Israel's acceptance of the cease-fire was

"pure falsehood" and threatened Israel with the "most serious consequences" if it did not immediately withdraw to the lines of October 22. One problem was the absence of an impartial source that could determine precisely where those lines were, since the first cease-fire resolution had not provided for UN observers.

More ominous than the Soviet Union's public diplomatic support for the Egyptians were the secret Soviet military moves. By October 24 Kissinger learned from American intelligence that the Russians had alerted four more divisions, bringing the total to some 50,000 men; that the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean had been increased to 85 ships, and that about a dozen Antonov-22 planes had been sighted flying toward Cairo, raising the possibility that they were carrying Russian troops rather than additional supplies to Egypt. Two further pieces of information caused the gravest concern in Washington. One was the interception of Soviet military orders which suggested the Russians might be preparing to intervene in the Middle East. The other was the evidence that a Soviet ship carrying tactical nuclear missiles had entered the Mediterranean and stopped at an Egyptian port. This, together with the fact that the Soviet Union had provided Egypt with several batteries of Scud ground-to-ground missiles which could be fitted with these nuclear warheads, escalated the crisis into a potential superpower confrontation. While there was no evidence that the Russians had turned over the nuclear weapons to the Egyptians, the mere presence of the weapons in Egypt raised the somber prospect that the Soviet Union intended to hold them in reserve either to protect the Soviet troops against Israeli or American attack, or to intimidate the Israelis into withdrawal.

Had the Russians succeeded in landing their troops in Egypt, they would have achieved a *fait accompli* that would have changed the balance of power in the region and severely limited American options of response. As former Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene V. Rostow told this author, there was a tacit understanding in the Soviet-American nuclear balance of terror that "we don't shoot at the Russians and they don't shoot at us." Consequently, one lesson to be learned from the various cold-war crises was that it had become crucially important "who got there first."

The need to deter unilateral Soviet intervention became more imminent on Wednesday evening, October 24, when Dobrynin relayed a "very urgent" message from Brezhnev to Nixon. The message, which was never officially released, was described as "brutal" by Senator Jackson and as "unmistakenly tough" by the Kalb brothers. After denouncing Israel for "brazenly challenging both the Soviet Union and the United States" by "drastically" violating the cease-fire

agreement, Brezhnev proposed: "Let us together . . . urgently dispatch Soviet and American contingents to Egypt." Then came the warning: "I will say it straight," he said, "if you find it impossible to act together with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally." He concluded that "Israel cannot be allowed to get away with the violations" and that the cease-fire had to be restored "without delay." Implicit in the statement was the Kremlin's judgment that it could not afford another humiliating defeat of its Egyptian allies, with devastating consequences for the Soviet position in the Middle East. Coupled with this essentially defensive objective there was also the suspicion that the Russians were prepared to exploit Egyptian vulnerability as a means of reestablishing a predominant position in Cairo.

American Alert

Kissinger, Schlesinger, and other members of the National Security Council considered it highly probable that Soviet airborne troops would soon be on their way to the Middle East, if they had not already begun to move. They therefore recommended, with the President's approval, an immediate full-scale alert of American military forces—ground, sea, and air, both conventional and nuclear-armed, including the global Strategic Air Command, the Sixth Fleet and the fleet of Polaris submarines, equipped with nuclear missiles. This alert was an unequivocal message to Moscow that the United States would resist Soviet efforts to shift the military balance against Israel.

At the same time Kissinger operated on the diplomatic level to defuse the crisis. He drafted a presidential response to Brezhnev reaffirming United States readiness to cooperate with the Soviet Union in working toward peace in the Middle East, but warning that unilateral Soviet intervention could jeopardize Soviet-American détente. The communication denied that the Israelis had "brazenly" violated the cease-fire and said that most fighting had already stopped. On a constructive note, the Nixon message suggested American-Soviet cooperation in establishing UN observer and peace-keeping forces to be composed of the nonpermanent members of the Security Council, i.e., excluding the great powers. At the same time, Kissinger exerted pressure on the Israelis to agree to allow food, medicine, and water to be supplied by UN convoys to the beleaguered Egyptian Third Army.

Establishment of UNEF II

What helped defuse the impending Soviet-American confrontation was the use of alternative means to achieve the Egyptian objective of effectively enforcing the cease-fire. Thus the Security Council on October 25 adopted a resolution (340), sponsored by eight of its nonpermanent members, which asked UN Secretary-General Waldheim to increase the number of UN military (UNTSO) observers on both sides; and also contained a provision to "set up immediately" under the Security Council's own authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from UN members "except the permanent members of the Security Council."

The French, who had long sought to reestablish France's role as a major Mediterranean and Middle East power, were unhappy over this wording. The French delegate argued that exclusion of the permanent members might weaken the impact of the Council's decision, while their participation would represent a "formal commitment by the permanent members and thus an effective guarantee of the cease-fire." The other Council members, however, were persuaded by the American warnings of the dangers of injecting superpower military rivalry into the Middle East. The French proposal to drop the exclusionary clause failed to receive any support, and the resolution was adopted by a vote of 13 to 0, with France abstaining and China not participating.

Two days later the Council approved by 14 to 0, with China not participating, the secretary-general's report on the establishment of UNEF II. It further specified (Resolution 341) that the force shall be established "for an initial period of six months, and that it shall continue in operation thereafter, if required, provided the Security Council so decides." (Members had in mind the unhappy fate of the first UNEF, established by the UN General Assembly in 1956, whose personnel were withdrawn when Egypt summarily ousted them in 1967 (AJYB, 1968 [Vol. 69], pp. 160-63). At the time, Egypt contended the Assembly had no legal power to compel compliance and the force could only be maintained as long as it enjoyed the consent of the host country.) Scali, the U.S. delegate, noted with approval the provision in the secretary-general's report establishing UNEF II that "all matters which may affect the nature of the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the Council for its decision." That, he

said, assured an orderly agreed withdrawal of UNEF, "but only when the Council so decided."

While Resolution 341 prevented Egypt or Israel from summarily dismissing UNEF, its continuation was not invulnerable to future great-power disagreement. In theory, the Force's legal authority could come to an end if one of the permanent Security Council members chose to veto a resolution extending its mandate. For the moment, however, it enjoyed the support of both the Soviet Union and the United States. To gain Soviet approval, the United States reluctantly consented to the inclusion of a Polish contingent upon Soviet insistence that the principle of "equitable geographic representation" required the inclusion of a Warsaw Pact member. Since Canada, a member of NATO, had long experience in serving on various UN peace-keeping operations, a compromise was reached whereby such functions as supply, maintenance, communications, sanitation and medical assistance, would be divided between the Canadian and Polish contingents. Neither was to man front-line military observation posts.

Since the Soviet Union was barred from participation in UNEF, it announced its intention to send about a hundred civilian observers to augment UNTSO. The United States offered to do likewise. The Russian move was seen largely as a face-saving gesture in compliance with the initial Egyptian request for a joint Soviet-American force. The crucial point was that Russia backed down from its consideration of unilateral military intervention. Ambassador Malik, of course, denied any such Soviet intention and on October 27 read to the Council a statement issued by *Tass* earlier in the day denying that Soviet military moves had justified the American alert. *Tass* was "authorized to declare that these are absurd statements since the actions of the Soviet Union are directed strictly towards helping the implementation of the Security Council decision" on the cease-fire and the restoration of peace in the Middle East. It charged that the American alert was "obviously undertaken in an attempt to intimidate the Soviet Union."

General Ensio Siilasvuo was appointed UNEF commander, and under his chairmanship Egyptian and Israeli officers signed a new cease-fire agreement on November 11 at Kilometer 101 of the Cairo-Suez road. This agreement sidestepped the issue of determining the precise location of the October 22 cease-fire line. The question itself was superseded and resolved by the Disengagement of Forces Agreement concluded on January 18, 1974. By the end of the 1973, UNEF had received contingents from 11 countries and its numbers exceeded 5,500. It was expected to reach its authorized strength of 7,000 by February 1974.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION

The Yom Kippur war confirmed the extent of Israel's international isolation. Even the United States' NATO allies were so concerned over unfavorable Arab reaction that they refused American resupply planes the use of their facilities. Portugal alone made available its bases, but only after strong American diplomatic pressure and promises of increased United States assistance. In an effort to placate the Arabs and assure continued oil supplies, the European Economic Community issued a basically pro-Arab declaration. Of the Western European nations, the Netherlands was conspicuously alone in its public refusal to retreat from its support of Israel.

The war thus revealed how crucially dependent Israel had become on one country—the United States—for military supplies, economic aid, and the political support necessary to deter Soviet intervention on behalf of the Arabs. While there was continuing dispute among social scientists as to the extent to which government policy options were influenced and limited by public opinion, the fact remained that in a political democracy like the United States, public sentiment was a factor both in shaping American policy and in projecting abroad the measure of American commitment to particular foreign policy issues.

The overwhelming bipartisan Congressional support of the American arms resupply effort, and of economic aid grants to enable Israel to pay for these supplies, has already been discussed. An examination of the public response indicated that the legislators' action was buttressed by the support of their constituencies. Naturally, the Jewish community was overwhelmingly for aid to Israel, and individual manifestations of concern, ranging from public rallies to emergency fund raising, donations of blood, and volunteering for civilian service in Israel, surpassed the high level of involvement reached in the six-day war of 1967. Whatever reservations American Jews may have had as to the wisdom of some of Israel's policies, they outspokenly rallied to Israel's side during the Yom Kippur war.

Indicative of the position of the well integrated American Jew was an editorial in the October 12 issue of the Scottsdale, Ariz., *Progress*, written by Jonathan Marshall, the paper's publisher and scion of an illustrious American Jewish family. This was, he noted, only the second time in his 11 years as publisher that he used the editorial page for a personal statement, which reflected his views "as an Arizonan, an American, and a Jew." He had never been a Zionist, he said, and had supported the proposal for a binational state in Palestine before

Israel was created. More recently, he has defended Israel's right to exist, but felt "it had to make some compromises," and suggested it relinquish the Sinai Desert. However, the Arab Yom Kippur attack, "an act of infamy comparable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor," convinced him he was wrong. He was shocked at the hypocrisy and callousness reflected in the United Nations debates, in which totalitarian states branded democratic Israel as the aggressor, while Western nations remained silent.

"What chiefly horrifies me," wrote Marshall, "is that most nations of the world are so afraid of oil blackmail, so callous of the aspirations of a people to be free, and so oblivious to Arab threats of genocide that they have turned their backs," leaving Israel's three million people "virtually alone to fight for survival against more than 100 million Arabs." He concluded:

If the world is willing to sacrifice Israel, it seems to me that mankind has not come far from the days of the cave men or the dark ages. Perhaps as never before the human conscience is being tested. But I am proud to be an American, for only our country has had the courage and integrity to support Israel against this overwhelming and immoral attack.

Solid Labor Support

The group of Americans most outspokenly and virtually unanimously for Israel was organized labor. The labor press viewed the Middle East crisis as "a test of the world's conscience." In contrast to some of the foreign-policy analysts, career diplomats, and Pentagon officials who saw the Arab attack as no more than a tactical move with a limited objective, labor leaders supported Israel's view that its very existence was being threatened.

AFL-CIO

Thus, on October 8 AFL-CIO president George Meany wired Secretary Kissinger that the "ignominious Egyptian and Syrian aggression launched on the holiest Jewish holiday has but one purpose—the destruction of Israel and, with it, of democracy in the Middle East." At so critical a moment, he warned, no nation must be allowed to doubt "even for one second, where the United States stands." Referring to the role of the Soviet Union, Meany declared that "failure of our government to act upon its commitment to insure the survival of Israel will not advance the détente you and the President seek." On the contrary, it would raise "in the minds of

millions this question: Is anything worth having that bears such a bitter fruit?" In a message of support to Histadrut, Israel's General Federation of Labor, Meany reiterated the AFL-CIO's "strong belief that the only way for achieving a settlement of the conflict, with the establishment of secure and defensible borders, is through direct negotiations."

Vice President Edward V. Donahue of the Graphic Arts Union emphasized that Israel "is the only democracy in the Middle East and if there is anything worth preserving in this world" and worth a "continued commitment" by the United States and its labor movement it was that "little democracy, a trade union democracy." He urged that the cause of Israel was "strong enough and worthy enough" not to be confused with such questionable situations as Vietnam and Cambodia. Representing the view of an ethnic minority, Cesar Chavez, president of the United Farm Workers of America, reaffirmed "our wholehearted support for Israel in its struggle to be free," and urged the support of "all people who believe in an end to racial persecution, and a democratic and free labor movement, as represented by the Histadrut."

However, the labor movement did not base its support for Israel only on moral arguments, nor did it limit its support to rhetoric. On October 11 Meany contacted the Secretary of Defense to push for urgent military assistance to Israel. Again, on October 18, Meany told the AFL-CIO convention that "it is in our national interest" to see that Israel got American military equipment "as rapidly as is humanly possible." He criticized President Nixon's "relaxed new détente policy" toward Russia, which he scornfully described as manifesting itself in "Russian-made tanks relaxing on the Golan Heights; Russian missiles relaxing into Israeli planes; and Russian shells relaxing in Israeli *kibbutzim*."

On October 20, as Russia stepped up its military supplies to the Arabs and was contemplating direct intervention, the AFL-CIO maritime unions warned the Nixon administration they would halt all United States shipments to Russia. Thomas W. Gleason, president of the International Longshoremen's Association, speaking for his union and six other maritime unions, noted that the Soviet Union "provoked and supported" Arab aggression against Israel, "the only democracy in the Middle East." He threatened: "Should the Soviet Union either directly or indirectly through its satellites persist in aiding and abetting aggression in the Middle East, we will take appropriate steps necessary to halt the use of our labor in handling of cargoes and vessels involved in trade with the Soviet Union." This announcement no doubt strengthened Kissinger's bargaining position while he was then

negotiating the cease-fire in Moscow. The State Department prevailed on Gleason to hold off implementation of his threat to give Kissinger's delicate diplomatic efforts a chance.

AFL-CIO Resolution

On October 23 the AFL-CIO convention unanimously adopted a strongly worded resolution supporting Israel and condemning the Soviet Union. Soviet behavior in the Middle East crisis, it declared, dealt "a fatal blow to the course of détente which Moscow has pretended to champion in order to secure the huge American and other western economic and technological assistance it so badly needs." It has also "jeopardized the balance of power, so vital to the maintenance of peace, in the Middle East." This threat, in so "highly strategic an area," the resolution continued, "seriously menaces world peace and the most vital national interests of our own country."

The AFL-CIO therefore urged the United States government to "carry out a massive airlift and maritime shipments" of military supplies to Israel; offer Israel and any other Middle East country ready to end hostilities and enter into direct peace negotiations "a guarantee of its national independence and sovereignty," and cease all economic, technological, and military assistance to any Middle East country "that persists in military aggression, or resorts to any economic measures against our economy." It also called for NATO cooperation, as well as UN help in setting up an Arab-Israeli peace conference. AFL-CIO was not oblivious to Arab concerns as witness the recommendation that a peace conference consider not only the 1967 UN resolution "but also the refugee problem, as well as a plan for utilizing the vast material and human resources of the embattled nations for the benefit of their people."

The AFL-CIO resolution called on all free trade unions to support Israel and appealed to all its affiliates and to "all the working people of the United States," and Americans generally, to give it generous financial support, particularly contributions to the American affiliate of Histadrut for the care of the wounded and other vital services, as well as "increased investment in State of Israel bonds," to show "our continued support of Israel and our confidence in her future." Even before the convention adopted the resolution, many labor unions had begun emergency fundraising campaigns for Israel, spearheaded by the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, whose officers on October 12 pledged a week's salary to Histadrut.

RESISTANCE TO OIL PRESSURES

The labor movement also generally refused to be swayed by the Arab oil embargo and the potential economic dislocations it might cause. Arnold Miller, president of the United Mine Workers of America, spoke out forthrightly in a letter to President Nixon: "We must not permit oil producing nations to blackmail us into changing our foreign policy. Stand firm in support of Israel." While the mine workers had a vested interest in increasing domestic coal production as an alternative to Middle East oil, even such groups as the independent truckers, who were upset at the shortages of fuel, directed their wrath not at Israel but at the oil companies, the service stations, and the government for failing to provide adequate supplies and an equitable system of distribution.

Reaction of Blacks

The threat to Israel's survival and the moral issue involved was stressed in a message of full moral and material support for Israel, sponsored by the A. Philip Randolph Institute and signed by its executive director Bayard Rustin and 72 other black trade-union leaders. Mankind, it declared, must never forget the Nazi genocide of the Jews, and "as Black Americans we have a special responsibility to recall this crime, for we have a special intimacy with the scourge of racism." The signers had "no doubt whatsoever that the defeat of Israel in battle would mean the destruction of Israel as a state and the annihilation of its population." And this, they concluded, "must not happen."

The democratic character of Israel was also a recurring theme. Velma Hill, vice president of the American Federation of Teachers, said that black workers could especially identify with Israel because it was a "truly democratic nation and trade unions cannot survive without democracy." The enemies of Israel, she said, were also "the enemies of labor and the enemies of Blacks." While many black newspapers, among them the *Chicago Defender*, voiced similar arguments, some radical black leaders, such as Imamu Baraka (LeRoi Jones) echoed Third World rhetoric and the Arab charges that Israel was expansionist and an ally of racism and imperialism. More widespread, however, was the view of William Lucy, secretary-treasurer of the State, County and Municipal Employees, who expressed "wholehearted" support for Israel "as a Black, as a trade

unionist, as a man." Thirteen of the 15 black members of Congress had cosponsored the resolution urging the United States to resupply Israel.

Ethnic Leaders Support Israel

According to a survey released by the American Jewish Committee on October 17, statements of support for Israel's right to live within defensible borders were issued by various ethnic groups, including Polish, Italian, Irish, Greek, Ukrainian, Puerto Rican, Lithuanian, and Japanese Americans. Typical was the statement sent to Secretary Kissinger by Barbara A. Mikulski, a Polish-American leader who chaired the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party Structure of the Democratic National Committee. She expressed her "strong, unequivocal, and heartfelt support for the Israeli position" and her firm belief that "Israel needs to have defensible borders" to survive as a homeland for immigrants fleeing religious persecution. "I say this as a woman whose family origins are from Poland," she explained, "another country that had no defensible borders, has been surrounded by overpowering enemies for over 1,000 years. . . . Because the world did not care that Poland had no borders that it could defend, Poland is now a captive nation." She pledged her support so that Israel should not suffer Poland's fate.

Similarly, Andrew T. Kopan, president of the Hellenic Council on Education, regretted the renewal of hostilities, called for a solution of the "vexing problem confronting Arabs and Jews" in the Middle East, but insisted that the solution "must be premised upon the right of Israel to survival with defensible borders."

The Christian Community

In a comprehensive 122-page study of "Christian Responses to the Yom Kippur War," Judith H. Banki of the American Jewish Committee found "a substantial outpouring" of comments by Catholic and Protestant spokesmen for national and local groups throughout the United States, which in its "overwhelming majority" was "supportive of Israel on issues critical to her defense and survival." Many of the statements addressed themselves to the longstanding Christian concern over the plight of the displaced Palestinians; some expressed fears of a superpower confrontation. But these concerns did not preclude a clear position on Israel's right to exist within secure borders and on current issues. Mrs. Banki summed up that position:

Syria and Egypt had deliberately started the war; their act of aggression was identified as such and denounced. For a number of Christians the fact that the war was initiated on the highest of Jewish holy days made it all the more abhorrent. The Arab nations had been armed to the teeth by the Soviet Union; Israel was underequipped by comparison and should be resupplied with arms to defend herself.

The study indicated, however, that national or denominational structures were either more reticent or more ambivalent in their comments than the popular groundswell for Israel in the local communities. While clergymen were naturally reluctant to advocate the shipment of weapons of destruction, the contrast between some local and national groups was significant. A group of Seattle, Wash., Christian leaders put it poignantly:

It is with agony and moral pain that we support the policy of the United States Government to maintain Israel's deterrent strength by continuing to transfer to Israel such military equipment and other aid as needed by Israel to repel her aggressors.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES STATEMENT

The governing board of the National Council of Churches passed a seemingly balanced and evenhanded resolution on October 15. It deplored the outbreak of renewed hostilities and the casualties on both sides, but gave no indication of how they started and assessed no blame. It urged the United States to use its influence to achieve a cease-fire under United Nations auspices, and called for a peace that affirmed the "acceptance" of the State of Israel by "the entire international community"; at the same time it called for the "recognition of the right of Palestinian Arabs to a home acceptable to them that must now be a matter of negotiation."

On the crucial question of arms shipments, the NCC resolution said, "the great powers, particularly the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have contributed to the present conflict, especially through arms supplies to the belligerents." Disturbed over the reports of continuing arms supplies, NCC called on the United States government "to use the spirit of détente existing with the U.S.S.R. to effect an immediate mutual cessation of arms shipments and other military assistance, either directly or indirectly, to the belligerents." The statement was immediately denounced by two American Jewish Committee observers at the session. Criticizing NCC's "total inability to morally condemn" the Arab attack, Rabbi James Rudin and Gerald Strober, a Presbyterian consultant, assailed the church group for its failure to

deal with the "realities" of the war, since the Arab belligerents had already been fully supplied by the Soviet Union, and to impose a halt just as the American resupply was beginning would, in effect, have favored the Arabs. Rabbi Rudin charged NCC with being a "forum for militant, pro-Arab opinion."

Mrs. Banki noted that both the World and National Council of Churches had among their constituencies Christian Arab groups, "whose spokesmen, overwhelmingly committed to the Arab cause, sit on their boards." Moreover, some of NCC's professional staff members and several mainstream Protestant denominations "are hostile to Israel" either because of missionary experience in the Arab world, commitment to a "third world ideology," or "Christian theological presuppositions about the mission of Judaism." One consequence, she said, was that Israel was judged against a standard of absolute perfection, while Arab deficiencies were overlooked. This was typified by Father Daniel Berrigan's scathing attack on Israel's society in a speech before the Association of American Arab University Graduates.

The study suggested that another reason for the relatively more restrained tone of statements by national organizations and their greater hesitance and delay in issuing them might be due to the bureaucratic difficulties of clearing, and agreeing on, a text, whereas individuals and some local groups had simpler procedures.

REACTIONS IN 1967 AND 1973

The American Jewish Committee survey found that the response in 1973 was much greater than in 1967, and that "most of it came from local, regional, and community groups in every part of the country." Rabbi Henry Siegman, executive vice president of the Synagogue Council of America, commented that in general Christian reaction to the latest conflict was "more generous and spontaneous" than in 1967. Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, interreligious affairs director of the American Jewish Committee, termed the development of Christian support "most encouraging, since it reflects a growing sensitivity by the Christian world to the importance of Israel's survival to all Jews." Mrs. Banki attributed this groundswell of support for Israel in local communities in part to the fact that over the years, since the six-day war, Christian-Jewish dialogue expanded into almost every corner of the United States, opening channels of communication. "Whatever the differences and disagreements that still exist," she concluded, "it seems that Jews have communicated to Christians their passionate concern for the survival and security of the State of Israel, and have struck a responsive chord."

Public Opinion Polls

Public opinion polls taken during and after the October war produced five major findings: 1) sympathy for Israel was still widespread among the American public, and the ratio of support for Israel as against the Arabs reached a high of 8 to 1 during the war; 2) although about half of the American people declared they were sympathetic to Israel, some 40 per cent either remained uncommitted or had no opinion; 3) despite their sympathy for Israel and their recognition that Israel had a right to defend itself, the overwhelming majority of non-Jewish Americans were strongly opposed to any direct United States military involvement in the conflict, even if Israel's survival was threatened by the Russians (the majority of Jewish Americans favored intervention if essential to save Israel); 4) the American public generally approved of the actions by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger to resupply Israel and to work with the Russians to arrange the cease-fire; and 5) the American public did not hold Israel responsible for the energy crisis, with popular support for Israel in fact increasing after imposition of the Arab oil embargo.

In the years since 1967 there had been some erosion of American support for Israel from the high of 55 per cent, registered in a Gallup poll during the six-day war of June 1967, to 50 per cent in February 1969, and 44 per cent in March 1970. However, as the Yom Kippur war progressed and public awareness of the hostile Arab and Soviet actions became widespread, sympathy for Israel again rose. In a Gallup poll conducted on October 6-8, some 47 per cent of the public sympathized with Israel and only 6 per cent with the Arabs. In the period October 19-22, support for Israel increased to 48 per cent, while support for the Arabs remained at 6 per cent. On December 7-10, after the imposition of the total Arab oil embargo against the United States, 54 per cent of the American people expressed sympathy for Israel, while support for the Arabs increased only to 8 per cent. This latter poll also revealed a greater crystallization of American sentiment, for the percentage expressing no opinion went down from 25 per cent in each of the October polls to 14 per cent in the December poll.

When asked by the Harris poll to assess blame for the energy crisis, the Americans tended to blame, in decreasing order of importance, the oil companies, the federal government (President and Congress), wasteful consumption practices, and foreign governments. More persons blamed the Arabs than the Israelis, especially as the oil shortages began to be felt. In a poll conducted for the *Boston Globe* by Decision Research Corporation in the last week of November 1973, a

cross-section of 999 Massachusetts adults were asked which of five alternatives was "most responsible for our present fuel and energy situation." Thirty-seven per cent blamed "the major oil companies"; 37 per cent blamed the Nixon administration; 19 per cent, Congress; 16 per cent, "the public itself, by using and demanding too much oil and electricity," and only 9 per cent blamed "our support for Israel against the Arab countries." Outright blame of the Arabs was not listed as an alternative reply.

By a margin of nearly two to one, Americans said they were unwilling to sell out Israel to get more oil. A *Newsday* (Long Island) poll on the question, "Do you favor reducing aid to Israel in order to increase the supply of oil?" elicited 51 per cent "no" against 26 per cent "yes" answers. Similarly, a nationwide Harris poll, conducted at the end of October, found that the public disagreed by a ratio of 50 to 26 per cent with the statement that "we need Arab oil for our gasoline shortage here at home, so we had better find ways to get along with the Arabs, even if that means supporting Israel less." Louis Harris concluded that a major reason for this stand was a realistic awareness by the American public of the national interest, as evidenced in the decisive 58 to 20 per cent majority agreement that "if we yield to Arab restrictions over oil now, we will soon find the Arabs dictating much of U.S. foreign policy, and that is wrong."

An overwhelming 68 to 10 per cent majority agreed with the statement that "the Arabs still want to destroy Israel, so the Israelis have no choice but to stay militarily strong to defeat any Arab invasion." Nevertheless, the respondents to the Harris poll opposed, 68 to 14 per cent, sending United States troops to the Middle East, even if Israel were threatened by Russian armed force, which seemed a possibility in the tense days of alert and near confrontation preceding this poll. Similarly, by 67 to 19 per cent, respondents agreed that "we should not become overcommitted to Israel, or we could find ourselves involved in another Vietnam, and that would be wrong."

The message conveyed by the American public at the end of 1973 was clear: Israel might continue to enjoy American sympathy, but this sympathy would not save Israel unless Israel maintained the ability to defend itself. The practical value of American popular sympathy was that it made it easier for Israel to obtain congressional support for the economic and military aid increasingly needed to buttress its struggle for survival against great odds.

The Struggle Over Jackson-Mills-Vanik

THE FOCUS of the American Jewish community's efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry shifted in 1973 from a broad, multifaceted public-relations and social-action campaign to emphasis on legislative action. The critical issue of Jewish emigration from the USSR to Israel came to center in the House of Representatives on the Jackson-Mills-Vanik amendment,¹ which linked trade benefits to the USSR with the question of the right to emigrate. The legislation, perceived by the Nixon administration as a direct challenge and threat to its policy of détente, inevitably produced an extraordinarily intense and complex year-long battle. Complicated by events affecting Israel's survival during the October war, that battle was to test the commitment and unity of the American Jewish community to a degree rarely experienced in recent years. The climax of the contest was the House vote of 319 to 80 in favor of the amendment, on December 11, 1973.

Principle of Right to Leave

When Senator Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) formally introduced his amendment on the Senate floor on March 15, 1973, he specifically referred to Article 13/2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which holds that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country," as the principal source of inspiration for the proposed legislation. The crucial importance ascribed to this right was evident from the conclusion of a three-year study by the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (published in 1963) that it is "a constituent element of personal liberty" which should be subject to "no other limitations" than the requirements of morality, public order, and general welfare. The study's author, Judge José Inglés, considered the right to leave a precedent for the exercise of other human rights. Denying it to the persecuted, he noted, "may be

¹At times more simply referred to as the Jackson amendment. Officially, it was called the Mills-Vanik bill in the House and the Jackson amendment in the Senate.

tantamount to the total deprivation of liberty, if not life itself." Indeed, the principle this right upholds has been the cornerstone of international law since the beginning of history.

During the debate on Article 13 of the draft Universal Declaration in the Third Committee of the General Assembly in the fall of 1948, there was overwhelming support for rejecting any meaningful limitation on the right to leave. An amendment to the article, proposed by the Soviet delegate, which would have made the exercise of the right to leave in any country dependent on "the procedure laid down in the laws of that country," was regarded by the majority as too restrictive. This despite the delegate's insistence that his amendment "in no way modified the basic text of the article." Only Poland and Saudi Arabia spoke in support of the Soviet proposal, which was defeated by a vote of 24 to 7. The Committee then adopted Article 13 by a vote of 37 to 0. Even the Soviet delegate voted in favor.

On December 10, 1948, the General Assembly unanimously voted approval of the entire Universal Declaration (with the USSR and several others abstaining in the final balloting). Today, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is regarded by international legal specialists as an authoritative interpretation and extension of the UN Charter and, therefore, as part of customary international law. The extremely important UN Declaration on Colonialism, which was vigorously championed by the USSR and adopted by a unanimous vote of the General Assembly in 1960, required all states to observe "faithfully and strictly" the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The General Assembly unanimously reaffirmed this obligation in 1961 and 1962. Another significant United Nations document, the 1963 Declaration on Racial Discrimination, again adopted with strong Soviet endorsement, specifically called upon "every state" to observe "fully and faithfully" the articles of the Universal Declaration.

Relevance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the Jackson-Mills-Vanik amendment was critical. Andrei D. Sakharov, the great Soviet physicist and humanist, who headed the dissident Committee on Human Rights in the USSR, was to underscore it in an "open letter" to the U.S. Congress (p. 217). In it he spoke of the appropriateness for legislative action that would attach a "minimal condition" for the consummation of détente agreements involving trade. The U.S. Congress, after all, reflected "the traditional love of freedom of the American people." And it is this "love of freedom," which obligates the Congress to assume "its historical responsibility before mankind."

Senator Jackson went beyond this general point to a specific

attribute of American tradition, the country's basic character as "a nation of immigrants," which justified the introduction of the amendment. For it is precisely because of this character, he insisted, that freedom of emigration is "an American issue." Jackson reminded his colleagues in a major speech on the floor of the Senate that "I would not be in this Chamber today if Norway, the country of my parents' birth, had practiced the sort of emigration policy that the Soviet Union has today."

Precedents for Intervention

There was yet a second attribute of the American tradition that provided the Jackson-Mills-Vanik amendment with a powerful inspirational source. Concern over the plight of Russian Jewry was by no means a recent phenomenon. As early as 1869, President Ulysses S. Grant, upon learning from American Jewish petitioners of a contemplated expulsion of 20,000 Jews from an area of southwestern Russia, intervened with the czarist authorities. That expulsion was halted, one chronicler of the episode noted, as a consequence of American concern.

In the last 100 years, at least ten American presidents, from Grant to Richard M. Nixon, have intervened directly or indirectly on behalf of Russian Jewry. A prominent secretary of state, James G. Blaine, formally justified diplomatic intervention in the internal concerns of a foreign country on grounds that "the domestic policy of a State toward its own subjects may be . . . at variance with the large principles of humanity." ² Humanitarian intervention on behalf of persecuted Irish and Armenians, as well as Jews, remained a distinctive feature of the American diplomatic landscape.

Frequently, the Congress acted to spur administration action. In 1879, for example, the House adopted a resolution criticizing a czarist policy that denied Jews the right to own real estate. In 1883 a House resolution called upon the administration to use its influence with Russia to stop anti-Jewish discrimination and persecution. A decade later, in 1892, the House refused to allocate funds for food transports to Russia because, as Tennessee Congressman Josiah Patterson put it, the czarist regime's treatment of Jews has shocked the moral sensibilities of the Christian world.

Especially significant was the legislative effort in 1911 to abrogate an

²House of Representatives, 51 Cong., 1 sess., Exec. Doc. 470, 4.

80-year-old Russian-American commercial treaty—virtually a dress rehearsal for the Jackson-Mills-Vanik congressional drive. Behind the move, sparked by a proclamation by President William Howard Taft, extending to Russia minimum tariff rates despite opposition by the U.S. Tariff Board, was a determination to relieve the desperate plight of Russian Jews. Technically, the battle was fought over the more narrow issue of passport discrimination against American Jews seeking to visit Russia.³ Then, as now, the secretary of state argued that “quiet and persistent endeavor” (quiet diplomacy, in modern parlance) would be more effective than treaty abrogation in changing czarist policy. And a series of State Department memoranda buttressed this view with arguments that found a remarkable echo in 1973: America’s commercial and industrial interests would be harmed; antisemitism in Russia would increase; America had no right to intervene in the internal affairs of foreign countries; intervention would bring an eruption of antisemitism in the United States.

Much of the American public saw the issue differently. Congress was bombarded with massive numbers of petitions and resolutions; mass meetings were held, and innumerable speeches condemning Russian barbarism were made in Congress. When Congress overwhelmingly voted to abrogate the trade treaty, Russian officials reacted with astonishment, for they failed to comprehend, as a historian observed, “how a moralistic crusade could dictate diplomatic action.” The same feeling no doubt pervaded the Kremlin leadership at the end of 1973.

“Diploma Tax”

The “moralistic crusade” of 1973 was sparked by an extraordinary decision of the Soviet government: the enactment, on August 3, 1972, of a decree (No. 572) requiring would-be emigrants who had acquired a higher education to pay a “diploma tax” (AJYB, 1973 [Vol. 74], pp. 487–88). On August 14 the decree was reaffirmed by an “order” of the USSR Council of Ministers, directing appropriate Soviet agencies to establish a scale of fees. These were so exorbitantly high that payment by those holding advanced degrees was virtually impossible. Soviet Jewish activists, at an August 15 press conference, warned that the effect of the decree would be the creation of “a new category of human

³For a full discussion see Naomi W. Cohen, “The Abrogation of the Russo-American Treaty of 1832,” *Jewish Social Studies*, January 1963, pp. 3–41.

beings—the slaves of the twentieth century.” Significantly, neither the decree nor the “order” was at the time published in the Soviet Union.

The diploma tax was but the latest of a massive series of devices created by the Kremlin to stop the drain of talent. Even as the barrier to emigration was lifted in March 1971, and the flow of 13,000 Jews to Israel in that year was increased to 32,000 in 1972, the highly educated and technically trained were compelled to run an obstacle course of prolonged torment. But neither repeated refusals, nor various brutally arbitrary techniques and endless harassments imposed to intimidate, could stymie the determination of the Soviet Jewish intellectuals to leave.

The Kremlin, too, had not reckoned with the revulsion the tax would generate in the United States, as elsewhere in the West. Especially shocked were the scientific and academic communities. Twenty-one Nobel laureates issued a public statement in the fall of 1972 expressing “dismay” at the “massive violation of human rights” by the imposition of “exorbitant head taxes.” They were joined by 6,000 professors of the Academic Committee on Soviet Jewry, which, in a two-page advertisement in the *New York Times*, demanded the withdrawal of “this benighted decree” and the removal of “all arbitrary bars to the free movement of people.”

The American Jewish community’s response to the harassments and arbitrary refusal was a change in tactics. At an emergency meeting of the leadership of national Jewish organizations, called for September 26 in Washington by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, it was decided to move from a largely public-relations campaign to a predominantly political one focusing on a particular piece of legislation. Senator Jackson, who had asked to be invited to the gathering, outlined to the 120 participants a legislative proposal tying trade benefits to removal of curbs on emigration. With emotions running high, the Jewish leaders endorsed the proposal in principle, though they yet had to agree to its language.

JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

In part, the Jackson proposal was a response to negotiations for a comprehensive trade agreement that had been carried on between American and Soviet officials since the beginning of August. The provisions of the agreement, as finally signed by the two powers in October, were: the United States was to receive from the USSR a fixed portion—\$722 million—of the enormous lend-lease debt owed the United States since World War II, to be paid in several installments; in

return, the administration pledged to seek congressional authorization for extending to the Soviet Union most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, which would allow it access to the American market at the lowest possible tariff rates.

The first public reference to the idea of linking trade benefits to the specific problem of Soviet Jews seeking exit visas, and particularly to the newly-imposed head tax, was made by Senator Jacob K. Javits (R., N.Y.) at a rally in New York. Once out in the open, the idea began to take on substance. In September, staff members of Jackson and Javits, and of two other key senators who had consistently supported Jewish causes—Abraham A. Ribicoff (D., Conn.) and Hubert H. Humphrey (D. Minn.)—together with the aides of several congressmen—began to formulate an over-all strategy. Of particular importance were Ribicoff's aide, Morris J. Amitay, and Jackson's aide, Richard Perle, who maintained direct contact with the Jewish leadership.

By early October, Senators Jackson and Ribicoff had gathered 32 sponsors for their proposal, which they offered as an amendment to an East-West trade bill. Senator Javits, who had been reluctant to support the initial Jackson-Ribicoff draft because he thought it "unnecessarily irritating" to the Nixon administration, joined when it was somewhat modified, bringing with him 30 more senators. Shortly thereafter, when the number of sponsors had grown to 76, or more than three-quarters of the Senate, Jackson formally introduced his amendment.

The amendment would refuse a "nonmarket economy country"⁴ most-favored-nation treatment, as well as credits, credit guarantees, and investment guarantees, if that country denied its citizens the right to emigrate, or imposed more than a nominal tax on emigration or exit visas. Responsibility for determining a country's eligibility for MFN would rest with the President of the United States, who would be required to make a report of compliance to Congress at the time MFN was granted, and semiannually thereafter. This periodic reevaluation was considered the key element of the amendment.

At the time, a number of informed observers viewed the Senate action as a show of strength and a warning to the Russians, rather than a serious legislative move. Their reasoning was based on the fact that time was too short for the East-West trade bill to reach the floor of the Senate before the end of its session. Besides, there was no intensive activity in the House of Representatives to gather support for a similar amendment.

⁴A country which, as of October 15, 1972, had not been granted MFN status. Some 100 countries, including Poland and Yugoslavia (but not Rumania and China, among others), had been accorded such status.

It was precisely because the Jackson amendment was initially perceived as no real challenge to emerging American-Soviet relations that neither the Kremlin nor the Nixon administration apparently felt it warranted more than a nominal response. The Russians evidently thought the matter could be handled by two related moves. Soviet Deputy Minister of Interior Boris Shumilin announced on December 29 that the Kremlin had modified the diploma tax by exempting from payment all who had reached the age of 55, and by reducing the tax payment to correspond with the number of years the would-be emigrant had worked for the state. Secondly, the Soviet authorities finally ordered the publication of the diploma tax decree in the December 27 issue of the *Bulletin of the Supreme Soviet*, thus signalling that, having made concessions, they would go no further; that, indeed, a fixed *public* decision had been reached from which there could be no further retreat.

The Nixon administration, perhaps believing that the Soviet concession would reduce the drive behind the Jackson amendment, took only limited steps early in 1973 to prevent its introduction in the Senate. Peter M. Flanigan, the President's assistant for international economic affairs, privately talked with only a few key senators. The same tactic was followed by Henry A. Kissinger, then the President's national security adviser. Both argued that the Soviet Jewish emigration problem could be solved more readily by "quiet diplomacy" than by legislation. Their limited efforts at face-to-face persuasion were accompanied by State Department pronouncements, such as Charles Bray's that "I simply must repeat on our behalf that this matter can most efficaciously be pursued through diplomatic channels." Significantly, no effort was made to talk with Jackson or Ribicoff, and no attempt was made to persuade rank-and-file legislators. The administration apparently assumed that these tactics, together with the Soviet concessions, would deter the reintroduction of the Jackson amendment.

The miscalculation with regard to the country's mood was enormous. Early in January Congressman Charles A. Vanik (D., O.) had assembled a list of 144 representatives who agreed to sponsor in the House legislation similar to Jackson's amendment. A massive letter-writing campaign by the Jewish community, begun shortly thereafter, was to evoke a powerful response. Support for the amendment also came from various other sources, including the trade-union movement, several religious groups, and conservative elements. By early February 238 representatives—more than a majority of the House—had decided to become cosponsors of the proposed legislation.

The immediate reaction to the formal disclosure by the Kremlin of the modified version of the decree was strongly negative. Jackson, on January 23, called it "totally unacceptable as a response." Soviet emigration policy, he insisted, "remains one of great and capricious cruelty," and "so long as emigration is prevented by ransom taxes and other measures, we will use the votes we have to amend the appropriate trade bill." Vanik responded in the same vein, reminding his colleagues that the "unsavory" Soviet policy "is not new in our relations with Russia"; that the action of the House of Representatives in 1911 had demonstrated "our abhorrence of that officially condoned policy of terror." He emphasized that the United States "as a nation cannot overlook denigration of human rights for the sake of commercial gain"; that, therefore, the House would not grant most-favored-nation treatment until the USSR "ceases its discriminatory emigration policies."

Far more important than Jackson's and Vanik's responses was the comment of Congressman Wilbur D. Mills (D., Ark.), chairman of the powerful House Ways and Means Committee. He announced, on February 7, that he had become a principal sponsor of the Vanik amendment and proceeded to introduce formally the legislation that linked trade concessions to the USSR with free emigration. At a news conference in the Capitol, Mills read the following statement on behalf of himself, Jackson, and Vanik:

We hope our action today will be understood by responsible Soviet authorities as our answer to the official publication in Moscow last month of the so-called "education tax" schedule—an outrageous price list on human beings that reduces trained and educated men and women to chattel. The promulgation of that decree is, in our view, a profoundly disappointing response to the world-wide concern with which an oppressive and capricious Soviet emigration policy has been followed.

The signal sent out to the administration could not have been clearer.

Soviet Reaction

The Soviet authorities initially sought to meet congressional resistance head-on. The major target was to be big business in the United States, which was thought to be most susceptible to Soviet blandishment. A high-level 15-member Soviet delegation arrived to participate in an American-Soviet trade conference sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). At the opening session in Washington on February 27, which was attended by 800

businessmen, no less than three powerful Soviet delegates served as panel members: Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade V.S. Alkhimov; G.A. Arbatov, director of the Institute for U.S. Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and N.N. Inozemstev, director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Academy.

The Soviet panelists quickly learned where Congress stood. Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D., Me.) told them that Soviet emigration policy constituted a "major road block" to expanded East-West trade, and warned that "Soviet leaders would be profoundly mistaken if they underestimated American feelings on the exit visa question. Americans properly perceive the exorbitant tax on Jewish emigrants as being in violation of fundamental human rights and freedoms."

An official Soviet response came the very next day. Arbatov, reportedly the Politburo's principal adviser on American questions, said at a briefing session for both press and trade conferees that if "normalization of trade relations between the U.S. and the USSR is frustrated by the Congress," it would prove "a harmful thing for Soviet-American relations as a whole," leading to "serious political repercussions." Should the Jackson-Mills-Vanik legislation be adopted, Arbatov warned, it would, among other things, "revive antisemitism in the Soviet Union" because it would give "Soviet Jews a special status and treatment." Citing undocumented estimates, he added: "We have to think not only of that part of the Jewish population that wishes to go to Israel—three or four per cent—but also of the more than 90 per cent who want to stay. They would not feel good if they were put in an unfavorable light." Why the alleged 90 per cent would be put in an "unfavorable light" was not made clear. But this was not necessary; the overt threat was deliberate and calculated.

Arbatov went beyond this threat to warn of the possibility of a growth of antisemitism in the United States itself, should the Soviet-Jewish emigration question "become really insurmountable."

Arbatov's threats evoked an outraged response from Senator Ribicoff, who received word of them while holding hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade (of which he is chairman). "I am using this platform to tell Mr. Arbatov to mind his own damned business," he said. Another member of the Subcommittee, Senator Clifford P. Hansen (R., Wyo.), immediately endorsed the Ribicoff retort: "I join with you on that, Mr. Chairman." Ribicoff, his anger rising, continued: "To have Mr. Arbatov come to the United States of America and before an audience of American businessmen, then tell them to use their influence and pressure on the Congress of the United States against a legislative proposal, the Jackson Amendment, which is a very alive proposition, and threaten the Jews

of the United States will be subjected to anti-Semitic actions by the people of the United States, is presuming upon the good will of the United States." Ribicoff demanded that Arbatov leave the country, for it is he who "is causing harm to détente, not the Congress of the United States."

Ribicoff took the occasion to tell Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent who then happened to testify before the committee that, "I recognize the importance of East-West trade for developing relations between nations. But I am also concerned with the basic moral issue presented when exorbitant ransom fees are now being levied against Soviet citizens, and particularly a segment suffering from discrimination, as a condition for permitting them to emigrate from the Soviet Union." Ribicoff knew that his own credentials were impeccable; he had just filed a special report advocating increased East-West trade and most-favored-nation status for Communist countries. The report was prepared after a visit to Rumania and Hungary, where he had addressed a major conference on East-West trade.

The Russians by no means relied exclusively on the Arbatov-type threats. They also focused the softer line of economic inducements on congressmen, with NAM providing the required link to the Hill. On March 12 Deputy Minister Alkhimov and two Soviet embassy economic officials, K.G. Tretiakov and E.V. Bugrov, met with 15 congressmen, among them key Republicans, at a luncheon requested by the Soviet embassy and arranged by NAM officials to explain the advantages of increased United States-Soviet trade. NAM president E.D. Kenna was host; other NAM officials were William Pollert, vice president for international affairs; Eugene Hardy, vice president for government relations, and Nicholas Hollis, director of the international affairs staff. Among congressmen present was Gerald R. Ford, Jr., then House Minority leader and Representative Peter H.B. Frelinghuysen (R., N.J.) chairman of the Republican party's Congressional Task Force on International Economic Policy. Frelinghuysen, reportedly told the Russians "of the close connection between the most favored national treatment for the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government's emigration tax"; that "Mr. Alkhimov's trip and the meetings he has had should have given him solid evidence that members of Congress are much concerned with Soviet emigration policies and that we tend to link them with the granting of most favored nation status."

A critical part of the "solid evidence" was to come to Alkhimov directly from Congressman Mills, who said in a private meeting that 350 House members would vote to block the trade measure if the exit tax was still in force. Alkhimov admitted to Mills that he saw no

chance of getting most-favored-nation out of this Congress, and that he would so inform Moscow. On March 15 Senator Jackson bolstered the Mills warning by formally reintroducing his amendment on the Senate floor. Initially, Jackson had intended to wait until the administration presented its trade bill to Congress. He apparently changed his mind in light of the strenuous efforts of the USSR, particularly the trade delegation, to mobilize opposition to the amendment, especially in the business community. Referring to Arbatov's threat, Jackson noted:

The Soviets have gone to some lengths to convey the impression that the question of free emigration is essentially a Jewish issue. Their representatives, even as guests in this country, have resorted to the cruel incitement of antisemitic sentiments, in an effort to scare off support for our amendment. Their broadcast out of Moscow, their English language publications intended for publication here and their diplomatic representatives have been pressed into service for this odious purpose.

American Response

Introducing his amendment, Jackson said its "heart" was the provision making MFN status and credits contingent on periodic presidential reports to Congress on compliance with the free emigration requirements by the country in question. The Soviet Union, he added, can meet those requirements "without altering its laws or statutes." The amendment does not prevent the American businessman from buying or selling to the USSR, Jackson pointed out; at issue are United States trade concessions to Moscow. Senator Javits then appealed to the Soviet Union, as "a great power," to help advance détente on "a sound moral basis." The amendment, he said, was not drafted "in a spirit of defiance, confrontation or heedlessness." It is predicated on "deep moral convictions" and is "advisedly accepted" by its sponsors "with no illusions as to its consequences" on Soviet-American relations. He pressed hope that the moral aspects "will appeal to a great power like the Soviet Union."

At this point, Senator Ribicoff put the issue sharply and clearly, warning that Congress was not "bluffing" and that "the next move is up to the Soviet Union." At the same time he advised the Nixon administration of its responsibility to explain to the Soviet leaders the unshakeability of congressional determination. "We hope," he said, "that our diplomats—at the highest levels—are conveying this message to Moscow."

Moscow no doubt got the "message," when large majorities in both

houses of Congress—75 senators and 272 congressmen—agreed to cosponsor the amendment. Clearly rejected was an appeal by Secretary of State William P. Rogers on the March 11 television program “Face the Nation” that no “conditions” be attached to the trade legislation to be introduced by the administration. This, he said, would be the “wrong way” to deal with the situation; the right way was the use of “quiet diplomacy,” which “has accomplished a good deal” in greatly increasing emigration of Soviet Jews. The USSR, Rogers added, considers exit fees “an internal matter” and “we have to deal with the situation as it exists.”

Administration officials explained the implications of the congressional action in direct talks with Soviet leaders. As early as February, top White House aide Charles W. Colson, while on a visit to the USSR, reportedly advised Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov of the difficulty the trade agreement would encounter if Soviet emigration procedures were not eased. Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz was sent to Moscow in mid-March to vigorously underscore this point. On the very day Mills was meeting in Washington with Alkhimov, Shultz met with Deputy Premier V.N. Novikov, Deputy Minister of Trade Mikhail R. Kuzmin, and Chairman of the Soviet State Bank M.N. Sveshnikov. (He later met with Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev.) Although the talks dealt chiefly with how to augment three-fold American-Soviet trade, Shultz used the occasion for an elementary course in the American constitutional system of separation of powers. The President of the United States, he explained to the Soviet leaders, cannot simply issue edicts on trade, as Brezhnev could. And Soviet trade was not so important to the American economy that Congress was likely to be swayed by businessmen wanting to profit from increased trade. At a press conference following the Kremlin meetings, Shultz stated: “I tried to explain the nature of the problem as we see it and to be sure that people were generally informed about that aspect. I also tried to explain the character of the American political process involving interaction between the President and the Congress.”

Washington must have received assurances that the USSR would alter, at least in some degree, its emigration procedures. The New York Times correspondent in Moscow was told that, at the March 14 meeting with Brezhnev, Shultz gave assurances of President Nixon’s determination to overcome congressional opposition to the trade agreement—a commitment that hardly could have been made unless a *quid pro quo* on Jewish emigration had been extracted. Shultz described his talk with Brezhnev as “very warm and forthcoming.”

Soviet leaders, he said, had shown "willingness to tackle [the emigration problem] in very real terms."

Diploma Tax Waived

Indeed, only four days after the Shultz visit, Moscow signalled a clearly positive, if limited, response to the pressure of Congress. On March 19-20 the USSR allowed 44 Soviet Jews who had obtained a higher education to leave without paying the diploma tax. The publicity given to the waivers was unusual: an American television company was permitted to film a meeting at which two of the prospective emigrants were told by the director of the Soviet visa office that they would not be required to pay the tax. On March 21 the Tel Aviv evening paper *Yediot Aharonot* published an article by Victor Louis—a Soviet journalist with close KGB (secret police) connections, who has often been used to give public expression to official Kremlin leaks—which said the diploma tax "will no longer be enforced." Acknowledging that the Soviet decision was the result of congressional pressure in the United States, he observed: "It seems that the Soviet citizens who have decided to emigrate from the Soviet Union have won a victory in the six-month war against the education tax." Louis noted, however, that the tax "will not be cancelled, nor will any changes be made in the law." The decree had simply ceased to be operative.

That an impressive result was achieved by American public opinion, expressed by means of congressional pressure and partly interpreted by United States diplomacy, could not be denied. While Soviet officials, in their public posture, would continue to insist that (as one put it during the Shultz visit) "a great country like the Soviet Union is not going to let the United States dictate what our internal policies should be," unofficially they were prepared to make certain accommodating changes.

Anxious to deepen the détente to which it was committed, Washington reacted quickly. At the very moment the exit-visa tax waivers were disclosed, the U.S. Export-Import Bank extended to Moscow the first grant of sizeable credits—\$200 million—for the purchase of industrial equipment. And on the day Louis's article appeared, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a protocol establishing a series of joint scientific and technological projects.

The Soviet concession did not elicit as enthusiastic a response from Senator Jackson. Speaking at the National Press Club in Washington on March 22, he welcomed the Moscow developments as "encourag-

ing signs," but also made it clear that he would continue to press for his amendment to insure that Moscow did not "relapse into the old patterns" of harassment and taxation to limit emigration. Referring to the Victor Louis article, he said:

I have heard it said that the Soviets are going to keep the ransom tax on the statute book but they won't apply it in practice.

I say that we are going to put the Jackson amendment on the statute books, but in the hope that it won't apply to the Soviet Union because they will be in compliance with the free emigration provision.

For Jackson, the issue was not a mere matter of trade. He emphasized that "we ought to use our vast economic power to help bring freedom and dignity to thousands of individuals who have been willing to stand up and fight for their right to leave Russia." The issue, it was clear, remained the right to leave a country. So long as harassment and intimidation of would-be emigrants continued in the USSR, the fundamental problem was by no means resolved, even though, for the time being, the exit tax was not enforced. And there was much evidence that the harassment, especially of Soviet Jewish intellectuals, had not been ended; indeed, in some respects, it had been stepped up. As Richard Maass, chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, pointed out, the Victor Louis story had failed to deal precisely with "the more fundamental problem of the denial of the basic human right to emigrate without arbitrary restrictions or procedures."

Push for Trade Act Support

The Nixon administration now shifted to the political offensive at home. It felt it had won a sufficiently substantial Soviet concession to convince Jackson, Mills, and Vanik to either drop or modify their proposed amendment. As part of this offensive, it also sought to neutralize or weaken the Jewish community's support for the amendment, thereby isolating congressional opposition should persuasion fail.

The offensive was launched on March 29 by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth D. Rush (Secretary Rogers was ill) in an address to 600 leaders of the American mass media attending a State Department foreign policy conference for editors and broadcasters. He indicated the Kremlin had displayed "commendable flexibility" on the issue of

emigration, thus clearly implying that progress was achieved by "quiet diplomacy." Admittedly, unhindered emigration had not been realized, and it remained an American objective, he declared, "to do whatever we can to create free emigration of Jews—educated or poor or uneducated." But this, he insisted, could not be done by imposing conditions on trade legislation; on the contrary, conditions like those of the Jackson-Mills-Vanik amendment would constitute a "grave danger" by "bringing about a counterproductive reaction in Russia, producing antisemitism." Rush formally announced that the administration would now "go forward with the proposed MFN treatment for Russia"; at the same time it would continue to seek free emigration by diplomacy.

On April 10 President Nixon sent Congress a comprehensive Trade Reform Act with the stated goal of "creating a new international economic order" by "building a fair and open trading world." The 124-page omnibus trade bill authorizing the President to lower and raise tariffs to facilitate expansion of trade would have enabled him to grant MFN treatment to the USSR and other nonmarket countries, provided neither the House nor the Senate vetoed such a move within 90 days. While the bill contained no provisions dealing with the Soviet emigration problem, the presidential message sent with the proposed legislation recognized "the deep concern which many of the Congress have expressed" over the Soviet diploma tax. He added, however, that he did not believe "a policy of denying most-favored-nation treatment to Soviet export is a proper or even an effective way of dealing with this problem."

On the heels of the submission of the trade bill, prominent segments of big business moved to complete deals which had been in negotiation for some time. On April 12, for example, Occidental Petroleum Corporation signed the most extensive agreement in the history of Soviet-American trade—a multibillion-dollar chemical and fertilizer barter arrangement. Next day it was announced that the Soviet government had agreed to grant American businessmen multiple visas permitting them free movement. "This is mighty handy to have," said the representative of the Chase Manhattan Bank in Moscow.

However, Congress continued to be the obstacle. On April 18 Nixon called in six key senators: Jackson, Ribicoff, Javits, Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), Minority Leader Hugh Scott (R., Pa.), and George D. Aiken (Vt.), ranking Republican of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. According to reports drawn from interviews with participants, the President and Dr. Kissinger attempted to persuade them not to impose restrictions on Soviet trade, arguing that the administration's "quiet diplomacy" was proving productive. To

indicate the effectiveness of the Nixon approach, Kissinger read from two unsigned Soviet "communications," dated March 30 and April 10, which indicated that the exit taxes had been waived and that there was no time limit on the waivers. (Apparently, the "communications" were messages sent by Moscow to the Soviet embassy in Washington, and then relayed to the White House.)

The reaction of the senators varied. Mansfield and Aiken, who had consistently opposed aid to Soviet refugees, reportedly told the President that he had their full support. But Ribicoff, a prime mover of the Jackson amendment, was said to have shocked the President by telling him bluntly: "Mr. President, there's nothing new in this. We have known about the suspensions for several weeks. But that in no way diminishes the need for passage of the Jackson amendment." Jackson later told the press that the reports about the waivers were "old hat and not the heart of the emigration issue." Javits firmly held to support of the amendment. Only Scott, a cosponsor of the amendment but apparently weakening, hoped that compromise language would be worked out by enabling Congress to express concern about Soviet Jews without "endangering" the administration's efforts for better relations with the USSR. One of Scott's aides later said the senator had not changed his view that "the Jackson Amendment is still necessary to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union."

The Jackson forces could count on the solid support of the labor movement. Shortly after the White House meeting with the senators, George Meany, chief of AFL-CIO, issued a statement urging the Senate not to weaken "in the face of the White House campaign." Referring to the Soviet "communications," he warned that the USSR "has an unbroken record of breaking her word every time she gives it."

While the prime movers of the amendment in the Senate could not be budged, a key figure in the House was won over. On the day the President met with the senators, one of his assistants showed Congressman Mills the two Soviet "communications," which persuaded Mills that "any number [of Soviet Jews] will now be able to leave the Soviet Union except for national security reasons." Mills had been under the impression that the major obstacle to free emigration was the diploma tax—and not the arbitrariness of Soviet decision-making that used "national security" as the principal justification for the rejection of exit visas, even if this was without foundation or irrelevant. Therefore, since the head taxes were suspended, Mills saw no valid reason for not granting the USSR most-favored-nation tariff treatment. (Later, he realized that he had received the wrong impression.) Recalling his conversation with Alkhimov, Mills commented: "He's

delivered on his end of the understanding and I intend to deliver on mine." The "understanding," he explained, was that if the Kremlin suspended the tax, he would support MFN for the Soviet Union.

Administration Woos Jewish Leadership

The loss, at that time, of Mill's support was a serious, though not decisive, blow to the Jackson-Vanik coalition. The administration now followed up with an approach to the Jewish community. At Nixon's invitation, 15 prominent Jewish leaders met with him on April 19. The event was extraordinary and aptly described by the participants as "historic." For American Jewish leaders had long sought a meeting with the President of the United States to discuss the totality of the Soviet Jewish problem, but, with one exception, had been unsuccessful. The exception was a meeting in late December 1970, when a worldwide effort was being made to halt the execution of two Soviet Jews found guilty of the attempted airplane hijacking in Leningrad. That conference was brief and limited to the issue of commutation for the convicted Jews.

Now it was the President who sought the meeting, which lasted 70 minutes and ranged over central aspects of the Soviet Jewish problem. Inevitably, the impact on the Jewish participants was powerful, especially since Nixon showed sympathetic understanding of the problem. He asked Kissinger to share with the leaders the contents of the "communications" that had been brought to the attention of the senators and Congressman Mills the day before. Most important, he explained to them the profound moral dilemma in which he found himself. On the one hand, he had made a commitment to the Kremlin to obtain for it most-favored-nation treatment, which was perceived as integral to his search for détente. On the other hand, there was the Jackson amendment which, he forecast, would negate that commitment. Were it to be voted on at this point, the President was reported to have said with a snap of his fingers, "I know the amendment would go through like this."

Delivered in an indirect and delicate manner, the message was clear. The White House hoped the Jewish community would reconsider its adamant support of the Jackson amendment. A keen awareness of Nixon's problem, together with a warm appreciation of how committed he had been to helping Soviet Jews, could not but encourage the Jewish leaders to place their trust in him, which seemingly diminished the firmness of their commitment to the amendment.

The strategy appeared to have temporarily succeeded. After the

meeting, Jacob Stein, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; Charlotte Jacobson, vice-chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, and Max Fisher, former president of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, issued a statement on behalf of all participants, which was as revealing for what it did not say as for what it said. It noted the contents of the Soviet documents read by Kissinger, reported that the leaders "asked the help of the President" for the 100,000 Soviet Jews who had been refused exit visas, and concluded with the following paragraph:

We reaffirmed the commitment to Soviet Jews and our determination to continue maximum efforts in their behalf. We expressed our sincere appreciation to the President for the meeting which we regarded as a historic event. The President reaffirmed his concern for the plight of Soviet Jews and pledged his continuing personal efforts on their behalf.

The statement's failure to include any direct or indirect reference to the Jackson amendment raised doubts on Capitol Hill and among the press about the firmness of the Jewish community's position. It gave rise to the question of whether the Jewish organizations had abandoned or softened their support of the amendment. And, given the highly political atmosphere in Washington, it was not surprising that this type of question was actually encouraged for partisan reasons. Merely raising it was certain to weaken and possibly erode the commitment of numerous senators to the amendment. Moreover, the very ambiguity of the statement itself stirred a grass-roots backlash whose effect was not foreseen by White House policy advisers. Pressure for clarification rapidly mounted among the organizations comprising the National Conference on Soviet Jewry. Parallel and interlocked with this pressure were demands by the amendment's leading sponsors for a strong statement of support, without which their ability to hold the supporters in line was open to question.

Jewish leaders were now faced with a dilemma that they had sought to avoid. Until their meeting at the White House, they had made every effort to present publicly their support of the Jackson amendment as in no way directed against the President and his policy. On the contrary, they had argued, support of the amendment aided the President's "quiet diplomacy" by strengthening his hand in negotiating with the Russians. If concessions, such as the suspension of the diploma tax, were obtained from the Kremlin by *diplomatic* means, it was only because the administration could demonstrate to the Soviets the sheathed legislative weapon.

Now, the leaders felt, they were being pressured into making a choice between support of the White House and support of the Jackson amendment. They were keenly aware that Nixon had been a warm friend of Israel, and continued aid to the Jewish state, whether diplomatic, military, or economic, was of most vital concern to the American Jewish community. They also recognized that the executive, not the legislative, branch of the government conducted negotiations with the Russians and that, therefore, only the President could extract the desired Soviet concessions. Moreover, a number of Jewish leaders who were strongly committed to détente took seriously the White House warning that the Jackson amendment threatened the achievement of a détente.

On the other hand, the Jewish leaders understood that the Jackson amendment was a unique weapon which perhaps could be forged only once. Its coming into existence, and the powerful coalition of support it managed to create, constituted an exceptional circumstance in American history, with only the 1911 episode providing a genuine precedent. It had already had a strong impact on the Kremlin, and its potential for obtaining a fundamental change in Soviet emigration policy was still to be tested. To dissipate support for it before this potential could be fully realized and exploited was to expose oneself to a historical judgment of premature capitulation, if not overt cowardice. Such fears weighed heavily upon a generation that had experienced the Holocaust and the terrible pangs of guilt associated with survival.

Soviet Jews Speak Out

A decisive consideration in resolving the dilemma was the attitude of Soviet Jewry. Just as Soviet Jews played the key role in sparking the extraordinary American Jewish mass movement in late 1970 on behalf of their immigration rights, and just as their courage and inspiration was largely responsible for sustaining that mass movement, so, too, was their opinion of critical importance at this juncture. A preliminary expression of their opinion was provided on April 12, a week before the White House meeting. It took the form of an "open letter" to Congress, signed by 105 leading Jewish activists in Moscow. Warning against being misled by the Kremlin's suspension of the diploma tax, the communication asserted that "nothing like free emigration" existed in the USSR; that "everyone's fate is determined by unknown people acting on unknown considerations in a totally arbitrary way." The implication was clear: the need for the Jackson amendment was by no means gone; indeed, its value was greater than before.

When rumors about an apparent ambiguity concerning Jewish support for the Jackson amendment reached Moscow, Soviet Jewish activists decided to intervene directly. On April 23 they sent an appeal bearing more than 100 signatures to American Jewish leaders, urging them to continue backing the amendment. Their language was impressively strong and obviously designed to remind American Jewry of the Holocaust. They urged that Soviet Jews who are refused exit visas under the pretext of "national security," or for any other reason, "must not be sacrificed"; that acceptance in principle of the USSR's right to select arbitrarily who can or cannot leave "would have a tragic, irreparable effect and would mean a complete collapse of all hope of repatriation for many thousands of Soviet Jews." The closing paragraph was particularly poignant:

Remember—the history of our people has known many terrible mistakes. Do not give in to soothing deceit. Remember—your smallest hesitation may cause irreparable tragic results. Remember—your firmness and steadfastness are our only hope. Now, as never before, our fate depends on you. Can you retreat at such a moment?

Jewish Community Reaffirms Amendment Support

Clarification of the Jewish community's position was pressed at an enlarged executive committee meeting of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry on April 26. It reached the decision that a prompt public statement of support for the amendment was essential, but implementation had to wait for endorsement by the President's Conference, scheduled to meet the following week. (The understanding between the two organizations was that major policy questions required approval by both.)

The Conference meeting was marked by much tension. Jacob Stein resisted a renewed endorsement of the Jackson amendment lest the links of the President's Conference with the White House be compromised. He was supported by a small minority which, from the very beginning, had raised a principled objection to the wording of the amendment. For one thing, it was argued, the legislation was couched in general rather than in specifically Jewish terms. By demanding that the USSR open its doors for any and all of its nationalities to leave, the argument went, the amendment tended to revive the "cold war" and was thus antithetical to détente. Secondly, the requirement that the President must report, both initially and subsequently, on the status of Soviet emigration before MFN can be granted burdened the executive

with a totally unacceptable responsibility, if the policy of détente was to be pursued. Finally, it was argued privately, the liberals in Congress would ultimately desert the struggle, since they were more interested in free trade than in the problem of Soviet Jews. Therefore, from a tactical point of view, it was safer to ride with a friendly administration than with the uncertain support of the liberals in Congress. By alienating the administration over the Jackson amendment, the Jewish community jeopardized its relationship with the one instrumentality capable of producing effective pressures on the USSR.

None of these objections were supported by the overwhelming majority of the representatives of Jewish organizations. The minority which, accepting the discipline of the Jewish community in the interest of unity and maximum effectiveness, had thus far refrained from public expression of its dissenting position, now supported Stein in resisting a public reaffirmation of the Jewish community's position on the amendment. A clash bordering almost on insurrection developed between the opposing factions, after one organizational leader announced his intention to keep the meeting in continuous session unless a statement responsive to grass-roots demands, nurtured by the powerful reaction of the Soviet activists, was accepted. The chair finally capitulated, and a statement of reaffirmation, hammered out after the meeting, declared the Jackson amendment had "contributed" to the "effort to alleviate the plight of Soviet Jewry and we continue our support for this legislation." It also expressed "appreciation" for the "initiatives of President Nixon." The text was released to the press only on May 2 because it was thought appropriate to advise Kissinger, with whom Jewish leaders were to meet on May 1, of the planned release.

At the meeting, Stein, Maass, and Fisher frankly told Kissinger, who was about to leave for Moscow, that the organized Jewish community stood solidly behind the amendment; but that, at the same time, they welcomed the maintenance of "the channel of communication" between the White House and the Jewish community. They then spoke of the Kremlin's cruel harassments and intimidations of Soviet Jewish activists and asked Kissinger to intercede on behalf of some 800 hard-core cases whose applications for exit visas had repeatedly been refused. While Kissinger was "sympathetic," he also made it clear that granting MFN status to the USSR was essential for détente. The next day, the White House released its annual report on foreign policy, in which it emphasized that "extension of MFN was a logical and natural step in the emerging relationship" with the Soviet Union.

A further indication of the Jewish community's strengthened commitment to the amendment was the May 1 statement by Jerry

Goodman, the National Conference executive director, at the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee's hearings on the status of Soviet Jewry, that the "arbitrariness" of Soviet emigration policy made essential the enactment of Jackson-Mills-Vanik. Professor Hans J. Morgenthau, chairman of the Academic Committee on Soviet Jewry, equally emphatically stated that the "basic policy of the Soviet Union was not changed at all by the assurances President Nixon received" from the Kremlin.

Thus, the President's effort to win over the Jewish community had collapsed. Indeed, the solidarity between the Jackson forces and the Jewish community was strengthened by the successful grass-roots insistence on a more determined and militant stance. The first consequence was the return of Congressman Mills to a leadership role in sponsoring the amendment in the House. He now realized that, contrary to the White House view, enactment of the amendment was required to deal with the pressing problem of Soviet Jews. A strong statement to this effect was promptly dictated and released to the press.

The administration continued to sharpen the focus of its conflict with the Jackson coalition, and the Jewish leadership tried to avoid being caught in the crossfire. Its leadership scrupulously eschewed overt acts which might alienate the President. The heads of the President's Conference and of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry publicly insisted that there was "no contradiction" in the simultaneous support of President Nixon and Senator Jackson. Jacob Stein, at a press conference in Israel on May 6, went out of his way to deny the existence of a paradoxical situation, and his statement was followed almost immediately by pronouncements of a number of major Jewish organizations praising both the President and the Jackson forces.

Moscow Pressure

While the administration was unable to sway Congress, an alternative means of persuasion became available in the person of Leonid I. Brezhnev. His scheduled trip to the United States in mid-June was expected to be decisive in the developing American-Soviet relationship. The advancement of détente agreements in areas of arms control, scientific cooperation, and trade were at the center of Washington concern, especially in view of the unfolding Watergate scandals. Conceivably, the prestige of the administration might be partially, or even fully, restored if there was significant progress in détente. To avoid embarrassing incidents during the Brezhnev visit,

the administration urged the Jewish leadership to organize no hostile public demonstrations. Therefore, instead of a mass demonstration, regional assemblies were held, including a Washington "freedom assembly" on June 18 that attracted some 12,000 persons.

When Brezhnev arrived, he used his not inconsiderable charm and diplomatic tact to soften resistance to trade in Congress. He had tried to do so, with some success, on April 23, in Moscow, when he granted a surprise and rare audience of three and a half hours to seven members of the Senate Commerce Committee, then visiting the Soviet Union. On that occasion, he "confirmed" the information, given to President Nixon earlier, that the diploma tax had been suspended, and left the senators with the strong impression that Moscow intended to do what was necessary to eliminate the Jewish emigration issue as an obstacle to trade. A vision of 30 to 40 years of rapid and substantial increase in trade with the United States was enticingly held out. As Senator Vance Hartke of Indiana reported, Brezhnev was "prepared to go a practically unlimited route."

Four of the senators who had met with Brezhnev were cosponsors of the Jackson amendment. Two of them, J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R., Md.) and Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R., Tenn.), appeared to be convinced of Brezhnev's good faith. Senator Frank E. Moss (D., Utah) later told reporters that the Jackson amendment "is going to have a tougher time" in view of Brezhnev's assurances. And Senator Robert P. Griffin (D., Mich.), the minority whip, expressed the hope that "in the light of these developments, the Jackson amendment will not be offered on the floor." It was not made clear whether tough questions were asked about the likelihood that the USSR would lift arbitrary measures used to refuse the granting of visas. Furthermore, only one of the senators, Howard W. Cannon (D., Nev.), who was sympathetic to restrictions on emigration if they served legitimate national security, made the effort to meet with Jewish activists in Moscow. They advised him that the national-security label was used arbitrarily to stifle the emigration drive.

One reason for Brezhnev's June visit to the United States was his intention to duplicate the magic spell he had cast on the Senate Commerce Committee members. This time, the audience would be a broad segment of congressional leaders as well as the American people. However, two days before his arrival on June 14, he damaged the image of candor which had so impressed the seven senators in a more than three-hour-long interview with American Moscow correspondents, the very first he had ever granted them. He spoke eloquently about his talks with President Nixon, which could set in motion "a new impulse" toward "large-scale trade worthy of the scale

of our two big countries," but responded to the newsmen's pointed questions on Jewish emigration with disturbing disingenuousness.

When asked what steps the USSR was taking "that might satisfy" Senator Jackson, Brezhnev questioned the validity and integrity of the senator's amendment. Then, after asserting that no Soviet law prohibits the emigration of a citizen, "if that departure is justified" (!), he argued that all nations had laws preventing "certain categories of people connected with what is called national security from leaving their country." He was certain, he said, that even Israel and the United States had such laws on their statute books. But, as everyone knew, it was precisely the definition of "national security" that was at issue. In what way did national security apply to the case of Kirov ballet star Valery Panov, which, at that point was fully known in the West? Or how did the case of Vitaly Rubin, a specialist on ancient China, fit the category? Or how could it apply to the cases of many scientists who had never been connected with security matters, or had severed such connections years ago?

Brezhnev stated that "countless documentary materials," prepared by Deputy Minister of the Interior Boris Shumilin and to be forwarded to President Nixon, proved that Soviet Jews could emigrate freely. He proceeded to compound this distortion by insisting that, in most cases, Jews chose to leave because they wished to be reunited with their families, "not [because of] the existence of the so-called Jewish problem in the Soviet Union." With a rising voice, Brezhnev boasted that Jews were well integrated in the USSR, "working in very good faith together with all the other peoples in the Soviet Union." He cited the usual set of statistics about Jews in science and the arts that have been paraded by Kremlin apologists.

Two days after Brezhnev arrived in Washington, he met with 17 members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and eight members of the House. Here, as at the Moscow meeting with the senators, he assumed a demeanor of modesty and openness; his presentation was soft-spoken. Once again he outlined the prospects for vast Soviet-American trade, but this time he emphasized rather vigorously that the condition for such trade was MFN status for the Soviet Union. Expecting questions on emigration, he came fully prepared. He pulled from his pocket a red notebook and ran through emigration data which, he said, showed that 97 per cent of all exit visa applicants were allowed to leave. David M. Blumberg, president of B'nai B'rith, called the figure "statistical make-believe," for reports had it that some 110,000 applications "are buried somewhere in the files of the Soviet bureaucracy."

But it was not only the accuracy of Brezhnev's data that was central

to the issue. There was the prolonged torment would-be emigrants knew they would have to face: ostracism, discrimination, job dismissal. Such harassments and intimidations were as much, if not more, of an obstacle to emigration than open refusal. Senator Javits raised this point rather sharply, noting that "figures don't tell the whole story." If the ensuing discussion became "grim and serious," Brezhnev offered no new information other than more data on the number of permissions and refusals, and these turned out to be incomplete.

Brezhnev received a far more enthusiastic reception from 40 of America's top industrial and banking executives, invited by Secretary Shultz "in behalf of Mr. Brezhnev" to a meeting at Blair House on the morning of June 22. They were enormously impressed by the broad picture Brezhnev painted of the potential of trade relations between the two countries. He was, according to one of the participants, "one of the world's great supersalesmen." Later, at a luncheon sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Nikolai Patolichev, who came to the United States with Brezhnev, summed up the Kremlin's message to American capitalism: "I am a devout supporter of more contacts, contacts, contacts which would bring more contracts, contracts, contracts."

America's corporate executives were excited over the trade prospects. Their reaction, as one of them described it, was: "We got a look at the future, and the future holds considerably more trade with Russia." Patolichev's challenge to them was: "We on our part will do anything and everything to help you develop your trade with us and we *hope you will do the same*" (emphasis added). NAM promptly picked up the challenge, announcing the very same day that it would work with other United States trade associations to gain congressional approval of most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union.

Yet, for all his lobbying, Brezhnev failed to achieve his primary objective of winning over Congress for the administration's trade bill. The large majority in both Senate and House had not retreated from its support of the Jackson amendment. Significantly, Brezhnev chose to lobby mainly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which had virtually nothing to do with the trade measure. Its fate initially depended on the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Their members, and particularly their respective chairmen, Wilbur Mills and Senator Russell B. Long (D., La.), who had become a cosponsor of the Jackson amendment in May, were in no way involved in discussions with the Soviet leader. Whether this was due to an error on the part of the Soviet embassy in Washington, or whether the Brezhnev party hoped to bypass them, is not known. In

any case, the Kremlin delegation returned to Moscow with no genuine commitments on the key trade issue before Congress.

New Factors Emerge

Thus, at the beginning of summer, the Jackson-Mills-Vanik forces had withstood a variety of maneuvers and a host of pressures from different directions. The amendment had 77 sponsors in the Senate and 285 in the House.

The legislative session, which resumed in September, was marked by a strong intensification of the struggle between the White House and Congress over the trade bill. The locus of the conflict was the House Ways and Means Committee, from where it shifted to the floor of the House. Two new factors now emerged, which were to have a major impact on the character of the struggle by shaping and defining the central issues. The first was Henry Kissinger's appointment as secretary of state. The formulator of the policy of *détente* with the USSR now was responsible for its implementation, and would have to deal directly with the Jackson-Mills-Vanik forces.

Dr. Kissinger necessarily had a vital stake in steering the administration's Trade Reform Bill through Congress without any restrictions on trade with the Russians. The 1972 negotiations with the Kremlin had been his primary responsibility, and the Soviets were given a firm commitment that they would be granted most-favored-nation status. More importantly, *détente* with the USSR was an essential ingredient of the structure of peace he had projected; and he saw the agreements with Moscow as an indispensable element in *détente* policy. To compromise them was to challenge the very structure of peace, of which he was the architect.

Over and over again, Kissinger made it clear that *détente* transcended human-rights issues; that the most pressing danger to mankind was nuclear confrontation; that, therefore, all energies must be used to eliminate the possibility of confrontation. And by forging various links in a chain of commitments to one another through *détente* agreements, the United States and the USSR created vested interests in avoiding confrontation and in jointly working for peace. He insisted that any one human-rights issue, no matter how sympathetic or concerned he or the United States government might be with it, must not be allowed to jeopardize the striving for *détente*. The fact that Dr. Kissinger was of Jewish origin and a refugee from Nazi Germany lent greater force to his ideological perspective, since the assumption was that he certainly would be sensitive to persecution and oppression. If,

therefore, he considered human rights as less paramount a concern than détente, this view was bound to carry certain weight in liberal and humanitarian circles.

Finally, the fact that Kissinger, as secretary of state, would now articulate the administration's position could not but strengthen opposition to the Jackson-Mills-Vanik amendment. Aside from his renowned talents as an analyst and advocate, he was among the few in the inner circle of the administration who remained unscarred by the Watergate scandals. Indeed, his authority was enhanced, even as the power of the administration to affect Congress was diminishing. He therefore could be expected to exert considerable influence on congressional action.

The second new factor of equal importance for the fate of the amendment was Andrei Sakharov's decision to enter directly into the controversy. Like the Soviet Jewish activists earlier, his "open letter" to the Congress, dated September 14, appealed for support of the Jackson amendment. Its passage, he said, was an indispensable first step to assuring détente. Noting decades-long development of the USSR "under conditions of an intolerable isolation bringing with it the ugliest consequences," Sakharov argued that détente could have meaning only if Moscow's isolation was ended by its acceptance of basic international principles of conduct. Without adherence to international law, he emphasized, "there can be no mutual trust" and, he clearly implied, no assurance that the Kremlin would not break the agreements reached.

Therefore, from the very "outset" of negotiations for "new and friendlier relations," it was essential to establish "the proper direction," which would include the "minimal right" of emigration. That "minimal right," a key provision of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, constituted a "policy of principle," whose abandonment would be nothing short of "a betrayal of the thousands of Jews and non-Jews who want to emigrate, of the hundreds in camps and mental hospitals, of the victims of the Berlin Wall. Should the Jackson amendment fail, he warned, the USSR would feel free to engage in "stronger repressions on ideological grounds."

The amendment, Sakharov's comment suggested, provided a powerful lever to oblige the Soviet Union and other nonmarket countries to observe norms of conduct in matters of human rights, extending far beyond the right to emigrate. He was later to spell out this point, namely that an open door policy could lead to unlimited emigration and, therefore, depopulation, unless other human rights were granted simultaneously. For, it was precisely the absence of such rights that spurred the desire to emigrate. The denial of the "policy of

principle" would therefore be "tantamount to total capitulation of democratic principles in face of blackmail." Failure to enact the Jackson amendment, he predicted would have serious consequences "for international confidence, détente and the entire future of mankind."

Sakharov rejected the Kissinger thesis that passage of the amendment would harm Soviet-American relations and détente. He brushed aside the argument that it represented interference in the internal affairs of the USSR. Especially contemptuous was he of the threat that the legislation would result in outbursts of antisemitism in the USSR:

Here you have total confusion, either deliberate or based on ignorance about the USSR. It is as if the emigration issue affected only Jews. As if the situation of those Jews who have vainly sought to emigrate to Israel was not already tragic enough. . . . As if the technique of "quiet diplomacy" could help anyone, beyond a few individuals in Moscow and some other cities.

The appeal had especially powerful overtones in view of the extraordinarily vicious and threatening propaganda campaign the Kremlin had unleashed against Sakharov in late August and early September. That campaign coincided with a general KGB crackdown on Soviet dissenters, nonconformists, and critics. The response of the American scientific and intellectual community was pointed. The National Academy of Sciences warned that continued harassment of Sakharov would bring an end to its participation in joint American-Soviet scientific ventures. The 6,000-member Federation of American Scientists, known for its vigorous liberalism, asked all scientists to review their long-held position favoring détente with Russia. The result was an unexpected broadening of the Jackson coalition. Many militant doves, who had been suspicious of Senator Jackson's hawkish record, now urged support of his amendment. The coalition took on an increasingly humanitarian edge; no longer could it be challenged as merely hardnosed and antidétente.

Congress Acts

The impressive range of political support brought about by the Soviet Union's campaign of repression was reflected in the Senate. A resolution was introduced by Senator Walter F. Mondale (D., Minn.), a strong liberal, with the support of two other liberals, Edward M. Kennedy (D., Mass.) and Birch Bayh (D., Ind.), denouncing the Soviet

campaign against dissenters as a matter that "profoundly offends the conscience of a free people." It also urged the USSR to permit the free expression of ideas and free emigration in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Senate, on September 17, adopted the resolution by a unanimous vote—an indication of what Senate reaction to the Jackson amendment would be.

The immediate test of strength between the administration and the Jackson coalition was in the House Ways and Means Committee. The 25-member panel, under Acting Chairman Al Ullman (D., Ore.)—Mills was recuperating from back surgery—had of late been under pressure from business circles, including Donald M. Kendall, chairman of the newly-formed Emergency Committee on American Trade. He asked leaders of the business community to remind the House Committee members of the commercial and political importance of MFN. But the heavily charged moral-political atmosphere flowing from the Sakharov issue all but neutralized these arguments.

A so-called "compromise" formula, then proposed by two sponsors of the Mills-Vanik bill—Representatives James C. Corman (D., Cal.) and Jerry L. Pettis (R., Cal.)—would have permitted the President to grant MFN status to a country, provided he found "that such nation is evidencing reasonable progress in the observance of internationally agreed upon principles of human rights." If the administration welcomed the "compromise," it was severely criticized by Vanik for failing to deal with the vital question of withholding credits and credit guarantees, as well as with how "reasonable progress" was to be measured. How incongruous, he caustically commented, to speak of "reasonable progress" at a time when harassment of dissidents was at its peak in the USSR. "At what point is the Soviet Union not demonstrating 'reasonable progress'?" Vanik asked. The proposal made no inroads among the principal supporters of the Jackson amendment: Jewish organizations rejected it. AFL-CIO chief George Meany sent a telegram to Committee members on September 17, which said that granting MFN status to Soviet Russia would mark the abandonment of America's principles.

The key vote on MFN was scheduled for September 19. Dr. Kissinger was to have appeared before the House Ways and Means Committee a day earlier to outline the administration case. His scheduled testimony, he had said in a press interview on September 15, would explain that the granting of MFN was "a very important aspect of our over-all foreign policy." MFN, he elaborated, was essential for maintaining a momentum in relations with the USSR and should not be conditioned on the Kremlin's emigration policies. It was well that he took the occasion to outline his views publicly, for he never did appear

before the Committee. Acting Chairman Ullman, anxious to avoid an outburst of emotional tempers and aware that the Senate was considering the Mondale resolution, decided to discourage action on the Jackson amendment until the following week, "on the chance," he said, "that we can get more reason interjected into the discussion."

The Committee voted on MFN status on September 26. The fundamental attitude of its members, 18 of whom were sponsors of the Mills-Vanik bill, had not changed. Indeed, it probably had been reinforced by the events surrounding the Sakharov case. By a voice vote, the Committee agreed to deny MFN status to nonmarket countries restricting emigration. However, the administration succeeded in seriously weakening the bill through an unexpected parliamentary maneuver. Before the vote was taken, ranking Republican member of the Committee Congressman Herman T. Schneebeli of Pennsylvania suddenly, on a point of order, asked that the provision barring credits and credit guarantees be eliminated. He contended that this section fell under the jurisdiction of the House Banking and Currency Committee and was inappropriate for action by the Ways and Means Committee. Ullman upheld the point of order. Vanik appealed from the chairman's ruling, but his motion lost by a 12 to 12 tie vote.

The Committee decision on the bill, while not completely to the liking of the Jackson coalition, was an important setback to the administration. Two days before the Committee vote, Kissinger reportedly advised Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko that trade efforts were endangered by the outcry over the Sakharov case, as well as by continuing Soviet restraints on Jewish emigration. Despite the forewarning, Gromyko reacted to the Committee vote by lashing out at the supporters of the Jackson amendment as "blind instruments operated by the forces opposed to international détente."

Even before the House Committee action, the administration indicated that it was determined to reverse it. Dr. Kissinger deliberately chose the hour before the vote to hold his very first press conference as secretary of state. (He had been sworn in five days earlier.) The expected Committee vote, Kissinger said, would raise "the most serious questions" not only by Soviet Russia, but by other countries as well, about the ability of the United States to fulfill its pledges. (The reference was to the October 1972 United States pledge to grant the Russians MFN status in return for payment of \$722 million in lend-lease debts.) Kissinger further observed that, at the time of the agreement, "there was no reason" for the administration to suppose that "it could be the subject of conditions in Congress," since conditions had never been introduced in previous instances of MFN requests from a Communist country. Once again Kissinger stated the

administration's basic policy position, namely that, while it had "deeply held" views about human-rights problems in the USSR, over the long run it could accomplish much more to ease the plight of Soviet Jews and others by "quiet diplomacy" than by "overt acts." He warned that the détente thus far achieved was so delicate and fragile that it could easily be impaired by "overt acts" of external pressure.

Another, equally powerful, cabinet member, Secretary Shultz, who then was attending the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Nairobi, Kenya, issued a statement sharply critical of the Committee's vote. The issue of Soviet dissidents, he declared, was "essentially a matter of the internal affairs of the Soviet Union" and should have "no direct connection with arrangements to buy or sell something." Denying Soviet Russia MFN status, he warned, would deleteriously affect trade.

Administration Seeks Reversal

The day after the House Ways and Means Committee voted on the amendment, the administration openly launched its campaign to overturn the decision. President Nixon, with Kissinger at his side, met at the White House with the Republican leaders of Congress and urged a determined effort to eliminate or modify the restrictions now placed on granting to the USSR most-favored-nation status, a crucial ingredient in American-Soviet relations.

The very next day, the President and Kissinger met for two hours with Gromyko. According to a White House spokesman, the discussion was devoted entirely to MFN: "the current status of the Administration effort to get most-favored-nation treatment . . . and . . . the Congressional situation," as well as a reiteration of the administration's "commitment to seek MFN for the Russians." The President said he would make a "diligent" effort to overcome congressional opposition.

Credit Restrictions

The Jackson coalition was equally determined to restore the provision on credits and credit guarantees. In a speech on the Senate floor on September 27, Jackson called the House Committee vote "a most welcome affirmation of the commitment of this country to the cause of human rights," but expressed regret that "a vital part of the Jackson Amendment," had been dropped on grounds of "a

jurisdictional question." Like the President, he made a public promise: "I am certain it [the full House] will move to include the full Jackson amendment in the Trade Bill by adding the credit restrictions to those on MFN."

The fact is that the MFN issue was largely one of prestige. It would affect only Soviet manufactured goods, which, in the immediate future, were most unlikely to find a market in the United States for a variety of economic reasons. Most Soviet exports to this country are raw materials, and not subject to tariffs. The USSR has been seeking MFN status since the Khrushchev period because it looked upon the mere statutory provision imposing higher tariffs on Soviet manufactured goods as discriminatory. The Kremlin sought equal treatment with all other trading partners of the United States. Still, prestige was a matter of considerable, sometimes critical, importance to governments, especially to the big powers.

Credits, on the other hand, involved the very hard reality of trade. Since the Soviets were anxious to import, and were already importing, quantities of American products, including advanced technological equipment, even entire factories, and since the Soviet Union had little that the United States was interested in purchasing from her, large-scale transactions could be completed only with the use of credits, private or government (through the U.S. Export-Import Bank or Eximbank). By October Eximbank had already extended to the USSR several hundred millions of dollars in credits. Estimates of credits to be extended were in the billions. To put restrictions on credits, therefore, was to strike at the aspiration of the Kremlin for the virtually unlimited purchase of American technology.

Jackson and his backers pointed out that Eximbank credits were a kind of government subsidy, since they were extended at a 6 per cent interest rate, while normal bank interest rates to American borrowers were between 9 to 10 per cent. In his speech on the Senate floor, Jackson therefore contended that "it would be financially foolish as well as morally mistaken" to extend 6 per cent credits to "countries that close in their people behind barbed wire."

Congressman Vanik indicated that he would offer an amendment to Title IV (the former Mills-Vanik bill) of the Trade Reform Act when it came up for a vote in the House of Representatives, which would restore the excised section of the original bill. To do so, however, Vanik needed approval from the House Rules Committee, which sets the conditions under which legislation is considered by the House. Normally, trade bills are considered in the House under a closed rule that does not permit amendments. Vanik therefore was required to obtain an exception from the Rules Committee, and this needed the approval of the Ways and Means Committee, especially of its acting

chairman, Ullman. Thus Ullman's support became a major hurdle. The Nixon administration, on its part, was intent on denying Vanik the parliamentary opportunity to amend Title IV.

Impact of Yom Kippur War

Before the bill came up for final vote in the House (scheduled for October 17 or 18), fighting had broken out in the Middle East. The war significantly affected the character of the debate and the strategic maneuvering behind the scenes. For one, the Jewish community, the principal public backer of the Jackson amendment, was now chiefly concerned with Israel's survival.

At the same time, a major objective of American foreign policy was to bring about a cease-fire in the Middle East, which, in turn, required the cooperation of the Soviet Union. Kissinger felt that the time was not opportune for a House vote on the Trade Reform Act; that passage of the Jackson amendment would jeopardize Soviet cooperation in ending hostilities. On October 11 he urged the House leadership to postpone the vote in the "best interests of the country." The administration request for a delay in the vote was approved by House Speaker Carl Albert and other House leaders. Consideration of the trade bill was now rescheduled for October 24 or 25. But as the time for the vote approached, Middle East tensions had not been resolved; the two cease-fires reached on October 22 and 24 appeared threatened, and the possibility of a superpower confrontation became more serious. Kissinger again sought delay.

At this point, a curious episode took place. On October 23 Kissinger, who had just that day returned from his whirlwind trip to Moscow, Tel Aviv, and London, met at the White House with Jacob Stein, Richard Maass, and Max Fisher. Toward the end of the meeting, which mainly focused on Middle East matters, Kissinger raised the issue of the Jackson amendment. He reiterated that the President favored the elimination of Title IV from the Trade Reform Act, and then surprised his listeners by asking whether, in the event Jackson and Vanik agreed to the elimination of Title IV, the Jewish leadership would condemn them. Since the Jewish leaders did not know whether Jackson or Vanik had been approached by the White House, their answer was evasive. If indeed Jackson and Vanik agreed with Kissinger, they said, they would have to go to their constituency for instructions on how to proceed.⁵

⁵As they understood the situation, Kissinger would speak to Jackson and Vanik about the proposed deletion, and if the latter agreed, the Jewish leaders would then respond to inquiries from the legislators about the Jewish community position.

The time element was the administration's key problem. The intensity of the Middle East crisis had abated by the end of October, and House leaders were becoming increasingly irritated with the continuing administration delaying tactics. An angry Carl Albert commented on October 30: "I'm still waiting for the Administration to say what they want." The White House then decided to try a new tactic. Peter Flanigan, chief adviser on international economic policy, appeared before the Senate Banking Committee on October 29 to say that the administration was temporarily withdrawing its proposal for MFN for the USSR. He asked that Title IV be dropped from the Trade Reform Act. However, sending up this trial balloon in a Senate committee compounded the administration's difficulty; it could not but call forth criticism by House members jealous of their prerogatives.

With pressure on the administration from the House leadership mounting, the focus shifted to the Jewish community. Would it accept the proposal that Title IV be dropped? Flanigan sought to persuade Jewish leaders to convey to Senator Jackson their awareness of the importance of the trade bill and the delicacy of the Middle East situation. Several Jewish leaders, meeting privately on November 2, felt that support of the administration's new tactic was essential in the interest of Israel. It was proposed that the leadership meet with Vanik and Jackson to request that Title IV be eliminated for the time being.

Before that meeting took place Jewish leaders had been scheduled to see Jackson on November 5. During the preceding weekend, word of the November 2 proposal leaked out and quickly generated a chorus of criticism among the rank and file and officials of Jewish organizations. Demands for resignations accompanied denunciation of conduct that appeared to violate the Jewish community's basic position. The executive committee of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, meeting in emergency session, rejected the proposal for Jewish leadership support of eliminating Title IV. Maass was instructed to report to Jackson on the White House position, and to seek his counsel.

The November 5 session with Jackson was the turning point in the year-long campaign. The senator chose to invite to it, in addition to Maass, Stein, and Charlotte Jacobson, his principal legislative partner, Senator Ribicoff, and B'nai B'rith president David M. Blumberg. After Maass reported on the conversations with administration officials, Jackson and Ribicoff addressed themselves to the source of the Jewish community's anxiety: that continued support of the amendment might undermine or weaken United States support of Israel. In their view, the linkage was spurious; indeed, enactment of Title IV in the House would not only serve to ameliorate the condition of Soviet Jewry, but,

contrary to Kissinger's prediction would also provide the United States with an effective lever in negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Middle East.

After the meeting, Stein and Maass immediately went to the White House to advise Flanigan that the organized Jewish community would continue to back the Jackson amendment. The following week, Maass issued a public statement to this effect. It made clear that backing the amendment did not mean the Jewish leadership had cut its ties with the Nixon administration, or did not appreciate its "quiet diplomacy" on behalf of Soviet Jewry and its massive aid to Israel. What the leadership rejected, Maass emphasized, was the attempt to use it to weaken or remove the Jackson amendment. "The Jewish community," he said "cannot be put in the middle again," which was "a very awkward position." A resolution of the conflict between the administration and the Jackson coalition would have to be accomplished by the opposing principals themselves in direct negotiations.

Since the proposal to drop Title IV had not won the necessary support, Kissinger at this point sought to postpone action on the over-all trade reform bill. But three other top administration policymakers who were especially concerned with economic matters, Shultz, Flanigan, and William D. Eberle, the President's special representative for trade negotiations, feared that any further delay would kill the trade bill. In their view, it was an indispensable tool for economic negotiations with Europe and Japan, aimed at reducing frictions that had arisen in recent years, and for maximizing trade. Their anxiety was especially aroused by the lobbying of AFL-CIO which advocated defeat of the entire measure. The President's chief economic advisers, now with the backing of House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Wilbur Mills, warned Nixon that support for the bill might very well crumble.

At first, Nixon was inclined to seek further postponement. At a November 7 meeting with House leaders, he passed to Speaker Albert a note asking him to delay the bill indefinitely. In the course of the succeeding weeks, however, his economic advisers, especially Flanigan, persuaded him that there was just as much foreign policy "risk" in delaying the trade bill as in approving it with the Jackson amendment. On December 4 Nixon gave his approval to call for the vote, but with the important caveat—which he noted in a communication to Speaker Albert—that he would consider the bill "unacceptable" if it ultimately reached him with the provisions of the original Jackson amendment. This clearly was a threat of a presidential veto.

On December 10 the trade reform bill was finally called up for action. The key vote came a day later on a motion by Charles Vanik to

refuse credits, credit guarantees, and investment guarantees to nonmarket countries denying their citizens emigration rights. The overwhelming 4 to 1 ratio in the voting (319 to 80) testified to the massive support enjoyed by the Jackson coalition in the House. Then, by a ratio almost as large—298 to 106—the House defeated an administration-sponsored motion to delete Title IV from the bill. Finally, the entire Trade Reform Act was approved 272 to 140, the lower vote here testifying to the support labor enjoyed in its opposition to the administration's liberalized trade objectives.

Congressman Vanik immediately commented that "the tremendous vote" for Title IV was a "clear mandate on the part of the Congress in the United States in support both for human rights and decency." Senator Jackson issued a statement that ended the historic year-long struggle:

I hope the loud and clear message of the House will be heard in Moscow and that the Soviet Government will come to realize that the American people, above all, are committed to a human détente—to the free movement of men and ideas on which a more stable and lasting peace must be based.

It was a sentiment with which the organized American Jewish community agreed.

WILLIAM KOREY

Review
of
the
Year

UNITED STATES
OTHER COUNTRIES

Civic and Political

Politics and Intergroup Relations

THE YEAR 1974, observed the *New Republic* (December 28), was an "incredible year." For the first time in the history of the United States a president, facing certain impeachment and possible criminal prosecution, resigned. He subsequently received a "full, free, and absolute" pardon before he could be convicted of wrongdoing. For the first time, too, the president and vice-president were not elected by the people. The impeachment hearings on the Watergate scandal in the House Judiciary Committee—the immediate cause of Richard M. Nixon's resignation—were widely hailed as proof that "our system" works. While this was reassuring, Americans had come to feel a deep distrust of politicians and political institutions. According to an April report by public-opinion analyst Daniel Yankelovitch, they saw the great institutions of society in the United States as having "an excess of power, and abusing it by using this power to serve their own selfish ends rather than the country."¹

The year began with the country struggling to adjust to what the vast majority of Americans held to be naked blackmail, the Arab-imposed oil embargo. It was lifted in March, but the quadrupling of oil prices by the Arab-dominated OPEC countries severely dislocated the world economy and aggravated an already serious inflation and recession in the United States, while it brought undreamed-of wealth to the oil producers. Unable to absorb domestically their wealth, Arab countries and nationals invested in the United States in real estate, industry, and short-term bank notes. American businessmen sought out such investments. Some visited the Middle East, seeking to sell or provide goods and services needed to transform the underdeveloped Arab countries into modern industrial societies. This gave rise to increasing apprehension among non-Jews and Jews alike about the political and economic implications of Arab acquisition of a piece of America. Reports of discrimination against Jews working for, or seeking employment with, companies and institutions doing business with Arabs became widespread.

The simultaneous "double digit" inflation and an unemployment rate of some seven per cent contributed to the grim mood of most Americans. Federal and state unemployment compensation, augmented by union benefits and labor-management

¹Address at American Jewish Committee New York Chapter annual meeting, April 2, 1974.

agreements, helped cushion the shock. Neither the Nixon and Ford administrations, nor the Congress, were able to devise a plan or program to stop the growing economic decline. At the close of the session, however, Congress approved additional public-service jobs and extended unemployment benefits. According to a Congressional Joint Economic Committee survey for 1974, the poor were affected most severely. "Not only are they less able to cope with inflation because of their limited discretionary income," it noted, "but low income families and individuals have also suffered price increases significantly greater than those experienced by upper income consumers." Blacks, women, and other minorities were particularly hard hit, since those hired in recent years because of affirmative-action programs were the first to be released as industry cut back. In October the unemployment rate for black workers jumped to almost 11 per cent, compared to an approximate 6.5 per cent for the nation as a whole.

All these factors gave rise to fears that new intergroup tensions were likely to erupt, unless there was an upturn in the economy. The current situation, Elmer L. Winter, president of the American Jewish Committee, warned a White House Summit Conference on Inflation in September, could "exacerbate intergroup conflicts, provide inflammable tinder for scapegoating, and pit race, ethnic and class groups against each other." As the job market diminished, illegal immigrants became the special target of public resentment and official concern.

The condition of urban America worsened. A sharp drop in revenues, the result of a shrinking tax base and reduction of federal grants, aggravated such chronic problems as crime,² mass transit, middle-class flight to the suburbs, housing, and substandard schools.

When the year came to a close, there were some who were pessimistic about the future; they felt that we had come to the end of an era of affluence and that it was necessary for America to adjust to changed world economic conditions. Few, however, would agree with Joseph Alsop's evaluation in the *Washington Post* (December 23, 1974) that "the American situation . . . is the most dangerous . . . faced by this country since the Civil War."

Elections

As anticipated, Democrats made substantial gains in the 1974 elections. They increased their representation in the House by at least 43 seats, considerably more than preelection predictions of 30 to 35. In the Senate, they gained at least three seats, giving them a three to two majority. (The outcome of the Senate race in New Hampshire is still undetermined.) There were Democratic governors in 37 states comprising 74 per cent of the nation's population, and Democrats controlled both houses of the legislatures in 36 states, the greatest degree of Democratic control at

²FBI statistics for 1974 revealed a 17 per cent increase over 1973, the largest in 45 years, in serious offenses: murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

the state level since 1936. According to the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly* of November 19, there was a high degree of ticket-splitting. Voters in 10 of the 25 states electing both senators and governors voted for a senator of one party and a governor of the other.³ The electorate turned to the Democrats with no great enthusiasm. The low voter participation—only 38 per cent of registered voters—did not indicate apathy, but rather a feeling that the electorate could bring about no real change or a solution to the country's problems. If anything, the elections were a classic example of negative voting, with Democrats perceived the lesser of two evils.

A preelection Gallup poll, released on November 4, indicated that a majority of Americans were liberal on such issues as health, education, and welfare programs, establishing relations with Cuba, and gun registration, and conservative on such issues as busing to achieve better racial balance, reinstitution of the death penalty, and unconditional amnesty for draft evaders.⁴

The elections brought to a halt Republican gains in the South. In many southern states, there were no Republican candidates for the U.S. Senate or the House. In Texas, where the Republicans had contested every House district in 1964, eight Democrats ran unopposed in 1974.

CAMPAIGN ISSUES

While major concerns of the electorate appeared to be inflation, unemployment, the Watergate scandal, and taxes, the election campaigns generally lacked serious discussion of substantive issues. Democrats were reluctant to use Watergate as a direct weapon and concentrated on so-called "integrity" issues, such as financial disclosures, release of personal financial data, limitations on amount of contributions and expenditures—all of which called Watergate to mind.

Inflation was discussed in almost every campaign, but not as an issue, and suggestions of specific remedies were usually avoided. There was agreement that an energy problem existed, but here too, no one offered a solution, except perhaps to imply that it would disappear once "Project Independence," a plan to make America self-sufficient, got underway. Taxes were an important issue, for lower-income and middle-class voters felt that the tax laws favored the wealthy. With some exceptions, Democratic candidates for the Congress urged increased spending for programs that would create more public jobs, increase benefits to welfare recipients, and give relief for those hardest hit by inflation—the elderly and those on fixed incomes. Other widely discussed issues were food shortages, consumerism and housing; abortion replaced busing as the most talked-about social issue. While law and order virtually disappeared as an issue, there was considerable sentiment for the reinstitution of capital punishment. Regionally, trade restrictions, subsidies, and the sale of wheat

³ *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, November 19, 1974.

⁴ Milton Ellerin, *Jewish Concerns and the 1974 Congressional Elections*, American Jewish Committee, November 27, 1974.

to the Soviet Union, low beef prices, failure to anticipate the fertilizer shortage, excess profits of corporations, oil depletion allowances, and prayer in the public schools were key issues.

MINORITIES AND WOMEN

Of the 91 newly-elected congressmen, nine were Jews, one was black, five were of Italian, one of Japanese, and one each of Lebanese and Polish origins. Michael S. Dukakis, a Greek by birth, was elected governor of Massachusetts, and for the first time since 1919, New Mexico voters elected a governor of Spanish-American origin, Jerry Apodaca.

According to Frances Farenhold, head of the National Women's Caucus, 1974 was the year of the breakthrough for women. There was a significant increase in the number of women candidates, with a total of 113 running for the U.S. Senate, the House of Representatives or governorships, as compared to 70 in 1972 and 47 in 1970. Of the candidates, 47 were major-party nominees for Congress—three of them for the Senate—with the remaining 63 minor-party or independent candidates. They ran on the tickets of the American Independent, Communist, George Wallace, Socialist Workers, U.S. Labor, and Conservative parties. There were now 18 congresswomen in the House, a net gain of two. None of the three major-party candidates for the Senate were elected.

THIRD-PARTY MOVEMENT

Ultra-conservatives, disenchanted almost from the beginning with the Ford administration's "liberalism," called for a new, conservative political entity after the elections. Interpreting the Republican defeat as a direct result of the failure to enunciate clearly and delineate conservative dogma, they made serious efforts to organize a third-party movement. There was persistent talk of a Reagan-Wallace presidential ticket for 1976 which, despite any overt encouragement from either man, seemed to grow in momentum.

While pollsters disagreed on the actual percentage of independent voters, they did agree that their numbers were increasing due to disenchantment with the political system and a deep apathy for politics. This was confirmed by a mid-1974 Gallup poll, which found that 44 per cent of respondents considered themselves Democrats, 33 per cent independents, and 23 per cent Republicans. George Gallup concluded from his data that "there is a fairly good chance that [independent] groups could be grabbed by a 'man on a white horse' if the economy slipped enough." Pollster Daniel Yankelovich, in October, maintained that the growing national anxiety, resentment, and a loss of confidence in institutions swelled the ranks of conservatives, with a "serious potential drift toward authoritarianism" that would work to the disadvantage of "many minority groups who fare badly when democratic processes are threatened."

EXTREMISTS

Presumably because of the growing disenchantment with existing political parties, the ultra-right, represented by the John Birch Society and the American party, ran an unprecedented number of candidates for national, state, and local office. (The American party, whose membership was 35 to 40 per cent Birchers, claimed a total of more than 600 candidates running for elective office nationwide.) Nevertheless, no known member of the American party was elected to office.

Its most successful candidate appears to have been Dr. John Grady, a member of the John Birch Society's National Council, who ran for the U.S. Senate in Florida but polled only 16 per cent of the total vote. In Massachusetts, Birch Society member Leo F. Kahian, running for governor on the American-party ticket on an anti-busing platform, polled over 3 per cent of the total votes, thereby establishing the American party as an officially recognized political party with the right to hold primaries, register voters, and enter candidates without securing petitions. Almost one-third of Kahian's votes came from Boston and Springfield, the two cities affected by court-ordered busing.

Several prominent members of the Birch Society ran for public office on major-party slates. C. R. Lewis was defeated as Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate from Alaska. Dr. Lawrence McDonald was elected Democratic congressman from Georgia. H. L. Richardson, who had been prominent in the Birch Society, was defeated as Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate in California, while Floyd Paxton lost on the Republican ticket in Washington's 4th Congressional district. Republican John Rousselot, a life member of the Birch Society and the only Bircher in the 93rd Congress, was reelected in California's 24th Congressional district. The Birch Society strongly opposed senatorial candidate Mike Gravel of Alaska, Alan Cranston of California, and Frank Church of Idaho, all of whom were reelected.

Politics

For the first time in its history, the Democratic party, in December, held a convention between presidential elections. It produced a party charter, whose prime provisions focused on insuring full participation by all groups in party proceedings. Potentially far more important was the resolution, however temporary, of the vexing problem of how to insure fair representation in party deliberations and conventions without "quotas" for blacks, women, youth, and minorities, which had once threatened party unity (AJYB, 1973 [Vol. 74], p. 172).

After much acrimonious debate, threats of walkouts by the Black and Women's Caucuses, a vague threat by some trade unionists and Southerners to bolt the party in 1976, and astute and skillful maneuvering by party chairman Robert Strauss, article 10 of the new charter was adopted. It provided, among other things, that the Democratic party be open to all who desire to support the party and wish to be known as Democrats. It prohibited "discrimination in the conduct of Democratic Party affairs on the basis of sex, race, age (if of voting age), religion, economic status

or ethnic origin." It further mandated an affirmative action program on the national and state level "to encourage full participation by all Democrats, with particular concern for minority groups, native Americans, women and youth in all the delegate selection process and in all party affairs as defined by the bylaws."⁵

Interreligious Relations

Although the spirit of ecumenism moved steadily forward, aid to parochial schools and abortion continued to be tension-producing issues. Catholics remained deeply concerned over what they regarded as the failure of other religions to appreciate and understand their perspectives.

In fact, so widespread was the feeling that anti-Catholic prejudice was growing that a group of Roman Catholic priests and laymen organized the Catholic League for Religious Rights to combat it. In January it filed an *amicus curiae* brief for a review of *Wheeler v. Berrera* by the U. S. Supreme Court, arguing that the denial of remedial reading, hearing, and speech services to nonpublic-school pupils was part of an effort "to suppress the exercise of First Amendment liberties by supporters of religious schools upon the pretext that such exercise is divisive."⁶ The League's Executive Director, Rev. Virgil C. Blum, in a June statement urging greater unity among American Catholics to achieve their objectives, declared that, compared to American Jews, they were "political pygmies" when it came to creating public understanding of Catholic positions on vital questions affecting Catholic interests, and that much of the mass media treated "Catholics with total disrespect, indecency, and unfairness." At the October convention of chief administrators of Catholic education, Blum again urged Catholics to greater political action, calling them "politically simplistic" for voting "the party, not the issues." In a December statement to the Washington, D.C., *Star News*, he charged the U. S. Supreme Court with "religious hostility," of scuttling "rules of law because the predominant beneficiaries of the legislation are Catholics."

Even in situations where the Catholic stand received some measure of support from other faiths, friction developed. After the much-publicized March testimony on abortion by four Cardinals before a Senate subcommittee, representatives of other religious groups, who had also given testimony, remonstrated about the lack of publicity given to non-Catholics opposed to legalized abortion, who were seeking to dispel the impression that abortion was a Roman Catholic issue.⁷ During these hearings, too, interfaith divisiveness surfaced when representatives of the 200-member Board of the American Baptist Churches accused Catholics of attempting to coerce the conscience and personal freedom of Americans favoring abortion.

Jewish attitudes on abortion continued to distress many American Catholics. Typical was a May 26 editorial by Father Albert J. Nevins in the influential *Our Sunday Visitor*, a nationally circulated diocesan paper, which called for understand-

⁵New York Times, December 9, 1974.

⁶Religious News Service, January 7, 1974.

⁷Washington Post, April 17, 1974.

ing and sensitivity by American Jews with regard to the Catholic position on abortion. Wrote Father Nevins: "What I am appealing for Jewish groups to understand is that for millions of us, our feelings are just as deep, as sincere, as horrified, and as despairing as was theirs for the genocide perpetrated on their own people."

As in the past, the Jewish and Catholic agendas differed. The "liberal left" segment of the Roman Catholic community resented the preoccupation of American Jews with Israel, which, it felt, diminished the social consciousness of Jews.⁸ Mainstream Catholics were primarily concerned with domestic issues such as abortion, birth control, involuntary sterilization, and euthanasia, matching in intensity Jewish feelings over Israel and Soviet Jewry.⁹

Despite differences, however, there were encouraging signs of harmonious relations between Jews and Christians. The formation by the National Council of Churches of an Office on Jewish-Christian Relations in February was a major step in increasing Protestant-Jewish understanding. Commenting on the new office, Dr. Claire Randall, general secretary of the National Council of Churches, expressed the hope that it would overcome the "lack of understanding by most American Protestants of either the interrelation of Christianity and Judaism or the relationship between the Holocaust and the State of Israel."¹⁰ In June the Presbyterian Churches in the U.S. made public a proposed new "Declaration of Faith" that repudiated prejudice against Jews.

While in domestic affairs Protestants worked closely with Jewish leaders and many spoke out in defense of Israel and condemnation of Arab terrorists, there were significant differences of opinion on the Palestinian question. David Hunter of the National Council of Churches, for one, contended in November that, in view of developments at the Rabat Conference, Israel must recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization "as the legitimate representative of the Palestine people." The World Council of Churches maintained in February that the legitimate rights of the Palestinians must be recognized and implemented for the achievement of a lasting peace in the Middle East. *Christian Century* of November 7, 1974, printed an editorial by James M. Wall, declaring America's Christians have a responsibility to demand that the rights of Palestinians be respected, but not at the price of Israel's destruction. The National Council executive, which in December affirmed "the right of Israel to exist as a free nation within secure borders," also endorsed "the right of Palestinians to self-determination."

Among the more prominent pro-Israel Christian voices was that of David Hyatt, president of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, who, in a Thanksgiving sermon, urged "men and women of goodwill throughout the world, and particularly my fellow Christians, to speak out with courage and force and defend Israel's right to exist and to live in freedom and peace forever."

Christian concern for the distress of Soviet Jewry was expressed by demonstra-

⁸*Religious News Service*, March 19, 1974.

⁹Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum, "Major Issues In The Jewish Christian Situation Today," *New Catholic World*, January-February 1974.

¹⁰Address at American Jewish Committee annual meeting, May 15, 1974.

tions, protests, and other public functions. Interfaith meetings in ten major American cities were sponsored by the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry, directed by Sister Ann Gillen, a Roman Catholic. Sister Margaret Ellen Traxler, another Catholic, testifying before the Senate Finance Committee in April, urged passage of the Jackson Amendment,¹¹ and asked the Senators "not to sell your brothers and sisters [in the Soviet Union] for a few pieces of silver." On Easter Sunday, some 200 members of six downtown Washington, D.C., churches conducted a 15 minute vigil on behalf of Soviet Jews in front of the Soviet Embassy. In New York in April, a strong plea for freedom for Soviet Jews was issued by a group of prominent Christian leaders, who asked all New Yorkers to speak out against the growing repression of Soviet Jews. Calling for Christian support of a Solidarity Day Parade on behalf of Soviet Jews, M. L. Wilson, chairman of the National Committee of Black Churchmen, said: "Wherever the rights of the Jewish community or others are at stake, the black community must be there not only as silent partners. . . . We must speak out . . . to make our voices heard for Soviet Jews."

Children of God

Forecasting doom for America, extolling the virtues of Libya's President Muammar al-Qaddafi, and preaching antisemitism and anti-Catholicism, hatred of parents and of previous religious affiliation, a bizarre cult familiarly known as the Children of God undertook mass distribution of literature in the streets of American cities and on college campuses. An offshoot of the so-called Jesus Freaks movement, the Children of God are led by one David Brandt Berg, also known as Moses David. The movement now has some 2,500 members, living in communes, mostly in Texas and the West. They are required to surrender all personal belongings, including bank accounts and cash, to leaders of the communes, who, in turn, are to transfer assets to Berg.¹²

Since the Yom Kippur war, widely distributed Moses David tracts have kept up steady anti-Israel and pro-Arab propaganda, frequently replete with ancient antisemitic canards.¹³

Jews for Jesus

The Jews for Jesus, sponsored by the Beth Bar Shalom Christian Fellowship, continued to proselytize among Jewish students on college campuses. Calling themselves "fulfilled Jews, not Christian converts," a hard core of some 25 missionaries traveled to various college campuses and churches seeking converts, primarily

¹¹For a full discussion see William Korey, "The Struggle Over the Jackson Amendment, II," in this volume.

¹²Final Report on the Activities of the Children of God to Hon. Louis Lefkowitz, Attorney General of the State of New York, submitted by the Charity Frauds Bureau, September 30, 1974.

¹³Irwin Suall, "The Children of God," ADL Bulletin, April 1974.

through the medium of rock concerts and the distribution of leaflets and flyers in the streets of cities with large Jewish populations. The literature suggests that rabbis and parents keep young Jews in ignorance of the fact that Christianity is the logical extension of Judaism. Despite considerable efforts, however, Jews for Jesus remain a fringe group, with little prospect of significant growth.

The Jews

For many American Jews, 1974 was a year of misgivings, insecurity, and anxiety. To a large degree, Israel's isolation among the nations of the free world, its expulsion from UNESCO, the welcome given Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat in the UN General Assembly, the possible outbreak of a new war in the Middle East, and fear that American support of Israel was weakening were largely responsible for the widespread unease among Jews. Many also feared that the rise of unemployment and the rate of inflation, as America attempted to cope with a serious recession, could lead to Jewish scapegoating. Some were particularly concerned that heavy Arab investments in the United States may lead to economic and political influence, which could ultimately be used against Israel and American Jews.

Despite the prevailing pessimism, there were indications that these fears were baseless. Polls reflected strong support for Israel by the American people, that Israel was not viewed as being responsible for the energy crunch or the high price of oil, and that there was no discernible inclination to blame Jews for America's economic malaise.¹⁴

ELECTIONS

For the first time in recent history, four Jewish candidates ran for the U.S. Senate; Abraham Ribicoff (D., Conn.) and Jacob Javits were reelected; Richard Stone (Dem., Fla.) was the first Jewish Senator to be elected by popular vote in the deep South. Of three Jews who ran for governor, two were elected: Marvin Mandel of Maryland and Milton Shapp of Pennsylvania, the first governor in a century to be reelected in that state. Of 37 Jewish candidates running for the House of Representatives, 21 were elected including Elliott Levitas, a 43-year-old Atlanta attorney and the first Jew to be elected to Congress in Georgia.

Despite the large number of Jewish candidates for high public office, antisemitism as a political weapon continued to be virtually nonexistent. However, in upstate New York a whispering campaign was directed against State Senator Mary Ann Krupsak, a Roman Catholic married to a Jew, who was elected lieutenant-governor, and frequent references were made to excessive "New York City influence," taken

¹⁴See Louis Harris, "Oil or Israel?", *New York Times Magazine*, April 6, 1975; Geraldine Rosenfield, *Attitudes of American Public Towards Israel and American Jews: The Yankelovich Findings*, American Jewish Committee, April 1975.

by some to be a euphemism for "Jewish influence." Two candidates for state office in Florida openly appealed for Ku Klux Klan support, a tactic eschewed by major party candidates for more than two decades. In the Georgia Democratic primary, self-avowed white racist and antisemite J. B. Stoner, running unsuccessfully for the lieutenant-governorship on a hate blacks and Jews platform, polled more than 67,000 votes, a dramatic upsurge from the 17,633 votes cast for him in his unsuccessful 1970 gubernatorial attempt.

ISSUE OF ISRAEL

One of the few campaigns in which Israel was an issue, which generated considerable heat, was the New York senatorial race between Democratic candidate Ramsey Clark and incumbent Republican Senator Jacob K. Javits. It was sparked off by a position paper on the Middle East issued by Clark in September, advocating Palestinian representation in any peace discussion and the eventual creation of a Palestinian state as "a solid guarantee of Israel's protection against terrorist attack," a view Javitz saw as "fuzzing and ambiguous" and "gambling on the survival of Israel." Clark denied the charge that he espoused the creation of a West Bank Palestine state.

In the congressional campaign in Colorado, Republican James P. Johnson was attacked for having characterized arms shipments to Israel as an act of war toward Arab countries; in California, the challenger Jack Redden criticized his Democratic opponent Ronald Dellums for having voted against aid to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

"NEW ANTISEMITISM"

There was the feeling among Jews that the mood of the country was changing, that there had developed an insensitivity and indifference to Jewish concerns. This change, Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein of the Anti-Defamation League asserted in a study,¹⁵ was the basis of a "new anti-Semitism," which differed from the traditional kind in that it "is not necessarily deliberate in character and more often is expressed by respected individuals who would be shocked to think themselves, or have others think them anti-Semites." Their analysis, they said, unequivocally refutes any notion of the existence of a potential for Nazi-like devastation; but "something is happening which is not good for Jews": anti-Israel statements with an anti-Jewish impact, often from respectable sources; silent acceptance by public officials and the clergy of overt manifestations of anti-Jewish bigotry; antisemitism among black extremists blaming Jews for urban ills; radical-left assaults on Israel, Jews, and Jewish concerns, and a revival of anti-Jewish stereotyping in the arts.

While there was considerable agreement among Jews on ADL's new definition

¹⁵ *The New Anti-Semitism* (New York, 1974), 354 p.

of antisemitism, or some part of it,¹⁶ others felt that it extended and distorted the meaning of antisemitism by failing to make a distinction between an anti-Israel stance and antisemitic attitudes, and between policies which are contrary to Jewish interests and antisemitism. Non-Jewish criticism of the study's thesis was in the main that it ignored the distinction between lack of sympathy toward Zionism or Israel and antisemitism.¹⁷

SAXBE INCIDENT

Several incidents reported from Washington, D.C., however, supported the thesis. On April 3 U. S. Attorney General William N. Saxbe¹⁸ held a news conference in which he announced a new study of the Attorney General's List of Subversive Organizations and related internal-security laws, last reviewed in 1955. Explaining his department's concern over a "new breed" of terrorist organizations that replaced the Communist-based organizations of the McCarthy era as potential threats to the country's internal security, Saxbe noted that in the McCarthy era "there was a great distrust of the intellectual," and added: "One of the changes that came about is because of the Jewish intellectual, who was in those days very enamored of the Communist Party."

After vigorous protest by Jewish organizations and widespread editorial rebuke, Saxbe attempted to clarify his remarks on the very next day by stating that "there was a great deal of anti-Semitism in the Communist witchhunts in the late '40s and '50s," much of which was "directed at some highly visible Jewish intellectuals who were considered sympathetic to Russia;" but that, "because of the Soviet posture toward issues of importance to Jews, this is no longer the case today, and I believe this change can best be seen by the totally different type of individual involved in the terrorist groups now operating." Despite explanations by Saxbe's aides that his remarks about Jewish intellectuals "just came out" and were not premeditated, the *Washington Post*, on April 21, editorially chastized Saxbe for having made "profoundly unfair and offensive references to Jews," and an "even more offensive" explanation.

BROWN AFFAIR

Speaking to a Duke University law forum on October 10, General George S. Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, speculated during the question and answer session that if a severe new oil embargo imposed not merely inconvenience

¹⁶Earl Rabb in "Is There a New Anti-Semitism?," *Commentary*, May 1974, stated: "Forster and Epstein accurately sensed that there is a danger abroad in America that does not fall within the old definition of anti-Semitism and they have turned to the idea of indifference in an effort to identify it."

¹⁷*The New Republic*, April 20, 1974.

¹⁸A U.S. Senator in 1973, Saxbe, in a public statement on U.S.-Soviet trade, for which he subsequently apologized, said: "If the Zionist Jews believe that we are going to fight to the last drop of farmers blood, then I'm not going to be a party to it."

but suffering on Americans, they "might get tough-minded enough to set down the Jewish influence in this country and break that lobby." Brown further remarked that Jewish influence in the U. S. Congress "was so strong, you wouldn't believe it," that the "Jews own, you know, the banks in this country, the newspapers." Brown's off-the-cuff remarks remained unnoticed until the *Washington Post*, tracking down rumors, verified that Brown in fact did make them, and published the story in its November 13, 1974 edition.

Reaction was instantaneous, drawing protests from all major Jewish organizations, editorial condemnation, and criticism from senators, congressmen, and other prominent Americans. In an unprecedented action, President Ford publicly rebuked Brown. Presidential press aide Ron Nessen reported that the President considered Brown's remarks "ill advised and poorly handled," and that they "in no way represent Mr. Ford's views, or the views of any senior officer of his administration, military or civilian," and that the President "feels very strongly about this matter."¹⁹ In a telegram to the Jewish War Veterans, Brown apologized for his comments and declared that he regretted having made them and that they "certainly do not represent my convictions."

However, Brown's remarks brought more widespread discussion of the hitherto muted subject of "Jewish influence" and of the "pro-Israel lobby." On Capitol Hill there was serious consideration of the nature and extent of military aid to Israel and intensified speculation that America's arsenal has become dangerously depleted because of our shipments to Israel.²⁰

The Brown incident brought to the surface some antisemitic resentment. Many letters to the editor in responsible publications from persons with no known record of antisemitic activity were laced with antisemitic remarks or innuendos. Brown, in his first public speech after the story broke, told a business group in Sacramento, Calif., on November 25 that he had "received some letters of support of a type I totally reject as alien to America and alien to me," an obvious reference to antisemitic mail.

The hard-core antisemites found the Brown incident a made-to-order opportunity. The National States Rights party organ, *The Thunderbolt*, called for a "flood of telegrams to Congress," urging its followers not to allow "the Jews to destroy this courageous patriot who has the guts to tell it like it is." James H. Johnson's *The Truth Seeker* headlined its story: "Jew Power Reigns in the U.S.," and veteran antisemite Don Bell devoted his entire four-page *Don Bell Reports* to: "The Influence of Those Who Say They Are Jews." Gerald L. K. Smith reported that "the Jew-Zionists . . . were saturated with armaments furnished by the U.S. and sneaked out of our arsenal by prostituted politicians powerful enough to overrule the best judgment of our military leaders." The neo-Nazi National Socialist White Peoples party flooded the Pentagon parking lot with flyers screaming, among other things, "America's defenses have been dangerously weakened by the Israel first, America

¹⁹ *Washington Post*, November 14, 1974.

²⁰ Milton Ellerin, *The Brown Affair—Reactions and Aftermath*, American Jewish Committee, December 20, 1974.

last policy of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and other Zionist or pro-Zionist officials."²¹

AMERICAN NAZIS

Between mid-October 1973 and fall of 1974, the National Socialist White People's party (NSWPP), which had been quiescent since founder George Lincoln Rockwell's assassination in 1967, significantly increased its level of activity and became more abrasive in its agitation. Under the direction of its national commander, Matt Koehl, NSWPP flamboyantly picketed foreign embassies, the White House, book stores, theatres, and Jewish houses of worship; appeared in full Nazi stormtrooper regalia before boards of education and city councils; distributed literature and defaced public buildings with propaganda stickers in downtown business areas; conducted "Free Rudolph Hess" vigils in a dozen cities, and publicly announced the opening of "new" national headquarters in at least three cities. Its national and local leaders were featured in television and radio news programs and as panelists on talk shows, and were profiled in local newspapers. The often uncritical presentations thus gave wide circulation to Nazi race theories, religious bigotry, and antisemitic canards.

Black America

ELECTIONS

One additional black congressman, Harold E. Ford (D., Tenn.) was elected; 12 other blacks running as major party candidates lost, including James H. Brannen, Republican candidate of Connecticut and the only black who ran for the Senate. Mervyn M. Dymally was elected lieutenant governor of California and George L. Brown lieutenant governor of Colorado, the highest state offices ever won by blacks in these states. Southern blacks won more state seats than at any time since Reconstruction. (Since the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, black voter registration has increased from 1.5 to 3.5 million, out of a voting-age population of 6 million.)

ECONOMIC PROGRESS

There was growing evidence of the economic progress of blacks. In a report on an intensive survey it conducted, *Time* (June 17, 1974) concluded that "more and more blacks are achieving the American dream of lifting themselves into the middle class. They have become as well-heeled, well housed, and well educated as their white counterparts."²² This was based on the following findings: More than 30 per

²¹Ellerin, *ibid.*

²²Political analysts Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, in a widely discussed article in the April 1973 issue of *Commentary*, reported significant economic advances by blacks in recent years; that, as a result, a slight majority of all blacks could now be considered as belonging to the middle class.

cent of American blacks earned \$10,000 or more, and 12 per cent earned at least \$15,000. There also were significant increases of blacks in the colleges, in the professions, and in technical jobs. The survey further found that as a result of governmental pressure to end discrimination, enlightened attitudes on the part of business and industry, and efforts by blacks themselves, blacks have increasingly been moving into skilled jobs and managerial positions; that while blacks comprised 11 per cent of the total population, they now held 15 per cent of all full-time jobs in the federal government. Economic advances and the crumbling of housing barriers have enabled blacks to move steadily into better homes, in some cases into second homes.

However, the report added, the "job situation for poor blacks has lately turned worse." Black unemployment stood at 9.5 per cent, compared to 4.7 per cent for whites. One-third of all black teenagers were unemployed, twice the rate for white teenagers. And five million blacks received some form of public welfare.

A United Nations Economic and Social Council report, "1974 Report on the World Social Situation," stated that, since 1965, earnings of blacks and whites have narrowed considerably for both men and women; that while differences between black and white men were still considerable, black women, except in the South, now received higher wage rates than white women. At the same time, the report stated, blacks as a group had a higher infant mortality, shorter life expectancy at birth, and lower standards in housing and education than whites.

EDUCATION

If progress was being made in the desegregation of elementary and secondary schools in the South, this was not true of state colleges and universities. A study made public on December 28 by the Southern Education Foundation disclosed that most institutions in a region that was 20 per cent black remained 90 to 95 per cent white.

There were some differences of opinion on whether over-all college enrollment of blacks had peaked and was now declining. A survey conducted by Alexander Astin, professor of higher education at the University of California, Los Angeles, revealed that the percentage of blacks in the total college enrollment dropped from 8.7 in 1972 to 7.8 in 1973, and to 7.4 at the beginning of the 1974 academic year.²³

Some black educators charged that the drop in black college enrollment resulted from a lessening of commitment by college recruiters, who assumed that nothing more remained to be done since the black enrollment had increased, as well as from a change in the policy of the government, the principal source of financial aid to minority students. These educators maintained that as the number of colleges

²³A survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Census in October 1974 indicated that black enrollment had increased from 684,000 at the beginning of the 1973-74 school year to 784,000 at the start of the 1974-75 school year, a figure discounted as inaccurate by some black recruitment officers.

having financial problems increased, the tendency was to decrease financial assistance to minority-group students; that Spanish-Americans, Indians, and women at the graduate level were competing with blacks for whatever financial assistance was available, and that pressure from black and civil-rights groups had all but evaporated.

In contrast to Professor Astin's findings, Karen J. Winkler, assistant editor of the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, reported the total number of college-bound blacks has been growing due to the continued increase over the past years of enrollment in black colleges. Paradoxically, notes Miss Winkler, the active recruiting of blacks for other institutions reduced enrollment in black colleges to only 25 to 30 per cent of blacks in higher education, thus threatening these colleges with a loss of their identity within the next few years. A U.S. Census Bureau study, released on January 1975, reported that the education gap between blacks and whites and between women and men was narrowing. The differential between black and white women was reduced by 2.1 per cent. There also was some encouragement for the prospective black college graduates. A year-end New York *Times* survey (reported on December 16, 1974), in which college placement officers and graduate students were interviewed, found that "if you are black or female, or both, your opportunities in many fields are very good."

BOSTON SCHOOL INTEGRATION

Violence erupted in Boston when schools opened in September, after U.S. District Court Judge W. Arthur Garrity had ruled in June that Boston's schools were willfully and illegally segregated and ordered compliance with a state program, including busing as a temporary measure until a more permanent, long-range plan could be evolved. A state law requiring the desegregation of schools was passed by Massachusetts more than a decade ago. The busing program involved some 18,000 junior and senior high-school students in 80 of the city's 200 schools located primarily in South Boston, a predominantly white, Irish-Catholic, working-class district, in white Hyde Park, and in overwhelmingly black Roxbury.

There was violent resistance by parents and students, during which buses carrying black students into South Boston were stoned, both white and black students were physically assaulted, and innocent pedestrians were attacked. Serious fighting erupted in a predominantly black housing project and in South Boston. When violence reached its peak in early October, Mayor Kevin White unsuccessfully appealed to Judge Garrity for 125 United States marshals. (Ultimately, 450 state and city police were needed to cope with the situation.)

Just at that time, in an October 9 news conference, President Ford reaffirmed his long-standing opposition to forced busing to achieve quality education, stating that he "respectfully" disagreed with the federal court order to bus Boston school children. Following widespread editorial condemnation of the President's statement, press secretary Ron Nessen announced that the President's remarks should

not give "aid and comfort to those who disobey the law," since the President believes that the public and the city administration of Boston "must respect the law, and this ruling of the Court is the law."

While the Boston conflict over busing had undeniable racial overtones, it also appeared to be motivated by a class conflict. South Boston's workers resented that white liberal suburbanites, whose children were unaffected, were among the most ardent supporters of the court-ordered busing. Judge Garrity, a resident of white suburban Wellsley; Mayor White, whose children attended private schools, and Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Edward W. Brooke, neither of whom had children in Boston's public schools, were the prime targets. Busing, they complained, is not "for them," the white liberals, but for "us," the Irish, the Italians, and the blacks.²⁴

Racial bigots and Marxists attempted to exploit the mood of strife-torn Boston. The American nazis and a Louisiana-based variation of the Ku Klux Klan independently sent "national leaders" into Boston in an unsuccessful effort to agitate and recruit. The Trotskyite Socialist Workers party played a dominant role in organizing a broadly based, massive "keep the buses rolling" march of an estimated 20,000 people through Boston streets on December 14.

On December 22 the Boston School Committee, after refusing to comply with a court order to approve and submit a plan for full integration of all Boston schools, unanimously agreed to adopt Judge Garrity's desegregation order and busing plan, which was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In defiance of a court order to approve and submit a new desegregation outline, three of the five-member School Committee rejected a plan prepared by school administrators, declaring they would rather go to jail than approve a plan which would lead to more violence. Christmas vacation was set ahead of schedule in an effort to restore calm. But at year's end Boston remained a city gripped by fear and divided by racial hatred.

BLACK NATIONALISM

Imamu Baraka, the foremost proponent of black nationalism and its most prominent personality, renounced the movement in favor of "the scientific socialist theory founded by Marx and Engels,"²⁵ because it had become "ineffective and racist." He urged his followers to make common cause with poor whites and other economically deprived groups to improve their lives and to end capitalism in the United States.

Huey Newton, supreme commander of the Black Panthers who, like Baraka, built a following and a movement by preaching that whites were inherently evil and totally to blame for the economic and social condition of blacks, was arrested by the Oakland, Cal., police in July, and again in August, on a variety of charges

²⁴"Forced Busing in Boston: Liberal Hypocrisy in Action," *Human Events*, December 14, 1974.

²⁵New York *Times*, December 27, 1974.

ranging from street fighting to shooting a black prostitute.²⁶ Due for arraignment on August 23, Newton disappeared without trace, forfeiting \$421,000 bail.²⁷ Without his leadership, the Panthers movement, once a potent voice in the black community, has all but ceased to exist outside the San Francisco Bay area.

The anti-Israel, antisemitic Black Muslims, whose dogma includes hatred of whites because they are responsible for the ills of American blacks, remained essentially a religious movement, but with heavy emphasis on economic self-sufficiency for blacks. At year's end, these groups still had some activists. But Baraka's shift in priorities and the disappearance of Newton deprived the black nationalist movement of charismatic leadership, with the likely result that it would no longer be a significant force in the black community.

Black-Jewish Relations

Tension between blacks and Jews continued to surface, but it was considerably less severe than in the preceding few years. A decline in the advocacy of the Third World and black power muted the once overt and strident anti-Israel rhetoric of young blacks, who preached solidarity with their Arab brothers—a significant factor in exacerbating black-Jewish relations and in the alienating of many American Jews.

The large black publications, despite Arab efforts to curry favor with many of their editors (a three-week tour of Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria by a delegation of black publishers and editors was financed, according to one member of the delegation, by "Arab oil money"),²⁸ condemned the Arab massacre of innocent Israeli school children at Ma'alot. The prestigious *Amsterdam News*, on May 25, described it as "a crime against humanity," while the Columbus, Ga., *Times*, a black daily, on May 19 bitterly condemned those Arab governments without whose financial support "the activities of these gangs [Arab terrorists] would be impossible."

Beyond the sympathies evoked by wanton Arab terrorist attacks, distinguished black leaders, such as Bayard Rustin, Roy Wilkins, and Vernon Jordan, frequently and publicly called for support for Israel's right to exist as a sovereign state. The *Philadelphia Tribune*, in its reaffirmation of support for Israel on May 25, challenged "the assumption of many Jewish leaders . . . that black Americans no longer support the right of Israel to exist." It pointed out, among other things, that 13 of the 15 black congressmen cosponsored a House resolution urging the government to resupply Israel with arms and ammunition depleted or lost in the Yom Kippur war.

The prime cause of what many blacks viewed as a stumbling block to better relations was the Jewish position on quotas, affirmative action, and reverse discrimination. Almost always, however, when the issue was raised in public discussions by prominent black spokesmen, there was, at the same time, reaffirmation of a mutual-

²⁶ *National Review*, October 4, 1974.

²⁷ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 31, 1974.

²⁸ *Jewish Post and Opinion*, July 19, 1974.

ity of Jewish-black interests with regard to other issues, and the acknowledgment of Jewish support during the civil-rights struggles of the late 1950s and early 1960s.²⁹

The prevailing black sentiment was one of sharp disagreement with the stance in the widely publicized DeFunis³⁰ case of such influential Jewish groups as the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, which filed *amicus curiae* briefs on behalf of DeFunis. The American Jewish Committee brief argued that the university's action in granting preferential admission to certain applicants on the basis of race violated the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the law school's plan to bring about a "reasonable representation" of minority-group students, although not labeled a quota, inevitably set a limitation or quota for other groups. The U.S. Supreme Court, in April 1974, ruled the case moot, since DeFunis was about to graduate from another law school.

While Vernon E. Jordan, executive director of the National Urban League, expressed understanding of the strong Jewish hostility to quotas of any sort, he argued that blacks were not insisting on quotas, but rather on meaningful affirmative-action programs to erase past and present discriminations, and a less rigid and dogmatic definition of appropriate qualifications.³¹ Clarence Mitchell, director of the NAACP's Washington bureau, maintained that the inevitable effect of the position of Jewish groups and others opposed to "affirmative admission practices" was that "most blacks who have been handicapped by discrimination in their education would never be admitted to law school."³²

Although the DeFunis case and sharply divergent opinions on what affirmative action means strained relations between blacks and Jews, even those blacks who were the most critical of the dominant Jewish position on these issues wanted to prevent harmful conflict. There was frequent acknowledgment that the National Council of Jewish Women, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg, and other individual Jews supported the black position on DeFunis; and that even those Jewish groups which supported his case were, at the same time, strong advocates of affirmative action in other areas of discrimination against blacks.³³

Black gratification was also expressed when, in May 1974, the Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Committee, and American Jewish Congress joined with the National Urban League, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund, and the Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP in urging Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Secretary Caspar Weinberger to establish "nondiscriminatory guidelines" clarifying

²⁹Alvin F. Poussaint, M.D., "Blacks and Jews: An Appeal for Unity," *Ebony*, July 1974, pp. 120-31; Nathaniel R. Jones, "The Future of Black-Jewish Relations," *Crisis*, January 1975, pp. 24-27.

³⁰*Marco DeFunis et al v. Charles Odegaard, President of the University of Washington, et al* (AJYB, 1974-75 [Vol. 75], p. 88).

³¹Address at annual meeting of American Jewish Committee Atlanta, Ga., chapter, June 2, 1974.

³²Jones, *op. cit.*

³³Poussaint, *op. cit.*

how educational institutions could best develop appropriate tools for special efforts to recruit persons from previously excluded groups.

Generally, responsible black leaders believed that there was greater support for blacks among Jews than in any other group. Civil-rights activist Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, in a declared effort to end black isolationism and to solve the country's social problems, approached various Jewish organizations for the purpose of forming an alliance between them and blacks, Arabs, and Spanish-speaking Americans. He and Rabbi Irwin M. Blank, president of the Synagogue Council of America, in November convened a two-day conference of 50 Jewish and black religious leaders at the University of Chicago to discuss and air differences in order to reaffirm that there were "more things to unite us than to divide us." A joint statement at the close of the conference called for a program of full employment as a matter of right, rejection of President Ford's anti-inflation program; an adequate national health program, and an effective affirmative-action program for women, blacks, and other minorities.

Earlier, in June, a National Consultation on Black-Jewish Relations, under joint sponsorship of Fisk University and the American Jewish Committee, convened at the university. Representative black and Jewish scholars and institutional leaders examined in depth relationships between Jews and blacks from biblical, theological, historical, and sociological perspectives. Serious disputes arose over historical interpretations, with some blacks resorting to antisemitic remarks³⁴ to which no black raised objections. Still, at the end of the conference, blacks and Jews agreed that new ways must be found to work together for the benefit of both.

Civil Rights

At the 25th anniversary meeting in Washington in February of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a coalition of 135 national organizations that spearheaded the 1950s and 1960s movement for civil-rights legislation, the consensus was that what was now needed was enforcement of existing laws, rather than new legislation. The overriding concern was aid to the poor and disadvantaged.

Despite a Congress and country preoccupied with Watergate and the impeachment proceedings, some significant civil-rights legislation was passed. A minimum-wage law (S 2747), raising the hourly minimum for most nonfarm workers and extending overtime coverage to domestics and federal, state, and local government employees, was signed on April 8. A three-year struggle to provide legal services for the poor ended in July with the establishment of a Legal Services Corporation. The first major housing legislation (S 3066) since 1968, the key features of which substituted community-development block grants for categorical urban-funding programs and established a new rent-subsidy program for low- and moderate-income Americans, became law on August 22. Six days later, the President signed

³⁴Alex Bontemps, "Black-Jewish Conflicts: The Fisk Consultation," *Christian Century*, July 31, 1974.

an omnibus amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 134–36), extending most of its programs to 1978 and authorizing appropriations of over \$25 billion for that period.

In its closing days, the 93rd Congress enacted legislation (S 754) to enforce the constitutional right to a speedy trial. One of the Nixon administration's most controversial crime-control measures was eliminated when, on October 16, the Congress passed PL 93481 repealing the so-called "no knock" law which, in some circumstances, authorized federal agents to enter and search dwellings and make arrests without first knocking and identifying themselves.

In a June 10 decision, the U. S. Supreme Court (*Michigan v. Tucker*) modified, but refused to overturn, the *Miranda* ruling which barred the use of evidence obtained by the police from a person who was in custody, but was not fully warned of his constitutional right to remain silent and, if necessary, to have legal counsel at public expense.

EQUAL-RIGHTS AMENDMENT

The drive for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution, which would prohibit any form of sex discrimination by federal, state, or local governments, seemed headed for an uncertain future (AJYB, 1974–75 [Vol. 75], p. 117). Although by year's end, 33 of the necessary 38 state legislatures had ratified the amendment, strong opposition was beginning to develop. Spearheading the opposition was Phyllis Schlafly, author, lecturer, and political activist long identified with such right-wing organizations as the Cardinal Mindszenty Foundation and the John Birch Society, who maintained that the amendment would give "women no new rights, but a whole bunch of responsibilities."³⁵ The Birch Society, declaring the defeat of the amendment to be one of its important objectives, mounted an aggressive campaign opposing ratification.³⁶ The National Council of Catholic Women, the Southern Baptist Association, the Daughters of the American Revolution,³⁷ fundamentalist groups, and the Mormon Church opposed ratification for ideological reasons. They believed that it would threaten woman's role as wife and mother, and her traditionally privileged position. Other less formal opposition developed because of a bleak economic picture, which made women reluctant to disturb existing relationships and thus jeopardize jobs.

Affirmative Action

The thrust of the government's various affirmative-action programs barring discrimination because of race, sex, color, religion, or national origin shifted from blue-collar occupations to academia. The HEW Office of Civil Rights exerted con-

³⁵ *Wall Street Journal*, July 26, 1974.

³⁶ *John Birch Society Bulletin*, February 1974.

³⁷ *The Phyllis Schlafly Report*, Section 2, July 1974.

siderable pressure on law schools and other educational institutions, insisting under threat of terminating federal contract funds, that they actively recruit more faculty members and students from minority groups. Blacks generally saw the issue as a test of whether or not the nation had the will, through preferential treatment of blacks, to rectify previous wrongs.³⁸ Whites, who agreed on the need for increasing minority admissions and faculty representation, saw the actual implementation of affirmative action as reverse discrimination and the legitimization of quotas. Some distinguished blacks argued that acceptance of quotas was an admission of inferiority, or, as Bayard Rustin maintained, a means to "further entrench the tendency of society to respond to the call for equal opportunity with tokenism."³⁹

In a significant effort to heal the wounds caused by the DeFunis case and implementation of affirmative-action programs, the professional heads of the American Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Congress, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Urban League, and Puerto Rican Legal and Defense Fund, in a joint letter dated May 17, urged Secretary Weinberger to issue nondiscriminatory guidelines "for recruitment of minorities by educational institutions."

In order to correct some of the admitted abuses flowing from the affirmative-action employment programs of colleges and universities, HEW Office of Civil Rights Director Peter E. Holmes, after a series of meetings with representatives of major Jewish organizations, issued new guidelines on admissions policies. They stipulated that colleges receiving federal contracts may not 1) discriminate against white males in efforts to improve employment opportunities for minority groups and women; 2) lower job standards for women or minorities; 3) advertise that females or minorities are preferred, or designate certain jobs on the basis of sex or race to meet employment goals.⁴⁰ To avert a cutoff of federal funds, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia submitted plans for the desegregation of state-controlled universities and colleges, which were approved by HEW.

Generally, however, the government's affirmative-action program continued to take root. Government employees and those working under government contracts constituted a significant segment of the work force covered by goals and timetables. There was substantial compliance with affirmative-action regulations, some voluntary and some to avoid legal action. In March seven of the nation's largest trucking companies, threatened by a government lawsuit, agreed to adopt hiring goals under which one-third to one-half of their employees would be blacks or persons with Spanish surnames. In April nine major steel companies signed a consent decree with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. Departments of Labor and Justice, agreeing to fill within the next year 20 per cent of new production

³⁸ *Amsterdam News*, March 9, 1974.

³⁹ Testimony before the Special Subcommittee on Education, U.S. House of Representatives, September 17, 1974.

⁴⁰ "Memorandum to College and University Presidents," December 1974.

and maintenance jobs with women, 15 per cent of new high-craft jobs with minorities, and 25 per cent of supervisory and management-training jobs with minorities and women.

The city of Jackson, Miss., agreed to hire two blacks for every white in its police department, until a 35 per cent ratio was achieved. The Maryland state police, in conformity with a consent decree, agreed to hire enough blacks to constitute at least 4 per cent of its personnel. A U.S. District Court Judge in Newark ruled in October that one-third of all policemen hired in the city must be black or Hispanic.

Revenue Sharing

The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, known as the General Revenue Sharing Act, was conceived by the Nixon administration as part of its New Federalism to phase out traditional patterns of federal aid by giving state and local officials more control over the expenditure of federal funds; to help create greater fiscal equity, and to bring government closer to the people. But two years of implementation have pointed up the shortcomings of the law. In general, Congress was having second thoughts about the entire program, with many congressmen increasingly reluctant to allow state and local officials to decide how substantial federal monies should be spent.⁴¹ Their misgivings were not without cause.

There has been concern over growing difficulty encountered in financing local programs for the poor, the aged, the sick, and other disadvantaged.⁴² Hearings in June before the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations produced testimony by the Brookings Institution and others that state governments were using the funds made available to pay bills, or to lower or hold down taxes; that states were failing to enforce the civil-rights provisions of the act, and that only a relatively little amount was being spent for the poor and elderly. In a December 4 meeting in Houston, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., executive director of the National Urban League, charged that cities were not spending funds to aid the poor, and that only 1 per cent of monies received were used for social services, 2 per cent for housing and community development, and 5 per cent for health programs.⁴³

The Revenue Sharing Law, it was asserted, has also worked to the disadvantage of minorities. Big cities with large black and Spanish-speaking populations, which were undercounted by census-takers, have received less monies than they should.⁴⁴ The law contains antidiscrimination provisions, but these were generally not known. Awareness of these provisions became more widespread when on December 18, following a federal court ruling that the city of Chicago was guilty of discrimination against blacks and Chicanos in its police recruitment, testing, promotion, and

⁴¹*Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, July 6, 1974.

⁴²Natalie Fielding, "Report on Revenue Sharing," American Jewish Committee, October 11, 1974.

⁴³Reported in the *New York Times*, December 5, 1974.

⁴⁴Donald Lief, "Revenue Sharing: An Evaluation," *Civil Rights Digest*, Fall 1974.

assignment practices, the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., ordered a halt of all payment of revenue-sharing funds to that city until it ceased its discriminatory practices. Authorities believed that this decision, the first of its kind, could well set a precedent for action against other cities, where similar suits were pending.

Illegal Aliens

The continuing influx of illegal immigrants in ever larger numbers has been causing considerable concern. According to Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., some three million undetected illegal aliens were living in the United States at the beginning of 1974. By June 30, he put the number at "somewhere between five, six, or seven million," and growing every day.⁴⁵ There were 670,000 arrests in 1973, and 800,000 in 1974. In contrast to years past, many illegal aliens now came to the large cities, rather than farms, swelling the ranks of the poor. Fearful of exposure, they generally did not apply for welfare relief or other social services. Those who managed to find employment were frequently exploited by unscrupulous employers, who paid less than the minimum wage.⁴⁶ In some areas of extensive unemployment, residents resented that these people were working as waiters, bellhops, and taxi drivers.

Sentiment was growing to curb illegal entry by legislation making it unlawful for an employer knowingly to hire an illegal alien. Opposition to such a law came from farming interests, and, in some instances, from the Roman Catholic clergy who considered the law "anti-Catholic," since 90 per cent of the aliens in question were Mexicans.

Textbook Controversy

Deep community divisions, based on class lines, religious beliefs, life styles, and cultural values, gave rise to new attacks on public schools after several years of relative calm. In the ultra-rightist-inspired assaults of a decade-and-a-half ago, schools had been a major target of the war against "Godless Communism."

Violence erupted in West Virginia's coal-mining area of Kanawha county over the use of textbooks in the public schools which, in compliance with state law, were multicultural. It began when school opened and lasted for almost six months. In a region heavily Fundamentalist in religious outlook, many parents denounced the textbooks as "un-American, anti-Christian, and pornographic," and complained bitterly that they had no voice in determining what their children should be taught. Protest marches, rallies, parades, scuffles, picketing, and arrests were almost daily occurrences; weekly church sermons frequently stirred up the people. The Ku Klux Klan and John Birch Society, which opposed the use of the mandated textbooks, came into the community to cajole and recruit.

⁴⁵ *U.S. News and World Report*, July 22, 1974.

⁴⁶ *Washington Post*, February 2, 1975.

In October two elementary schools and a rural bridge, used by county school buses bringing pupils to schools where the controversial textbooks were being used, were bombed. At the end of the month, an explosion shattered windows in the school board administration building in Charleston. Similar, though less violent, protests over textbooks or classroom materials took place in Hanover county, N. C., Boise, Ida., Prince George's and Montgomery counties, Md., Prince William and Bedford counties, Va., and Sauk Village, Ill.

While ultra-rightists continued to regard the textbook controversy in terms of a "conspiracy,"⁴⁷ more objective observers read deeper meaning into it. According to U. S. Commissioner of Education T. H. Bell, it was a manifestation of a "growing concern on the part of parents that they have lost control over their children's education."⁴⁸ Others, such as Paul Salmon, executive director of American Association of School Administrators, observed that both parents and teachers are seeking more power, and that teachers, who frequently lived outside the communities where they taught, were unfamiliar with community mores or life-styles. However, the fundamental issue surfacing from the current conflicts appeared to evolve over the rights of parents, as opposed to boards of education, to determine what their children should be taught in the public schools.

Amnesty

An unresolved divisive issue continued to be the question of amnesty for young men who, for a variety of reasons, either failed to report for induction or deserted from the armed forces during the Vietnam war. In a clearly sincere effort to "bind up the nation's wounds" and to respond to a growing sentiment for forgiveness, President Ford, speaking to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on August 19, announced his amnesty program. Although he favored "leniency," he said, he endorsed pardon only for those who agreed to do some public service to earn their way back into the country's good graces.

There were many who initially approved of the President's program, among them newspapers like the *New York Times* and religious leaders. There were others who, harking back to Ford's "full, absolute, and unconditional" pardon for Richard Nixon, argued for unconditional amnesty here too.

Immediately after the President announced the details of the plan on September 16, spokesmen for those to whom the conditional amnesty would apply called it "vindictive" and "more punitive than expected." Exiles in Canada maintained that anything less than unconditional amnesty was unacceptable. Indeed, the response was far less than anticipated. When the amnesty offer expired on July 31, only 15 per cent of the estimated 12,500 eligible deserters had applied; of 6,800 draft evaders, only 97 had surrendered, and of the estimated 213,000 convicted of draft evasion or desertion, only 623 had asked for a Clemency Review Board hearing.

⁴⁷*Life Lines*, November 14, 1974.

⁴⁸*U. S. News & World Report*, January 27, 1975.

Indians

For the first time in American history, the United States Department of Justice sued to protect the voting rights of Indians. In a January complaint filed in the United States District Court, Phoenix, Ariz., the Department charged that the state of Arizona, by dividing the Apache county—which was inhabited by 23,994 Indians and 8,304 non-Indians—into three separate districts, left the Indians with a majority of voters in only one of the three districts. Each of the districts elects a county supervisor, and the three collectively manage county affairs. The suit alleged that the redistricting, which went into effect in 1972, violated the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution, as well as federal voting statutes.

Disappointed over the fulfillment of a promise of increased self-government made by President Nixon in July, 170 Indian tribes from coast to coast intensified demands that their reservations be given commonwealth status. Earlier, in June, the American Indian Movement had voted to establish an International Indian Treaty Council and to apply to the United Nations for membership on “behalf of all Indians.” At the same time, it declared its intention to open negotiations with the government through the State Department as a sovereign people, rather than as citizens of the United States.

MILTON ELLERIN

The United States, Israel, and the Middle East

DURING THE FIRST half of 1974 United States diplomatic efforts in the Middle East concentrated on the negotiation of disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel, and Syria and Israel, to replace the fragile cease-fires that had halted the intensive October 1973 war (p. 398). The ultimate success of the negotiations was attributed at the time to the unprecedented "shuttle diplomacy" of United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. While his personal negotiating skills and his seemingly tireless efforts in moving back and forth between the belligerent parties to help narrow their differences no doubt played an important role, equally important were the unpublicized understandings and assurances he provided to the parties on behalf of the United States.

Thus, the disengagement of the hostile forces depended in large measure on the confidence Kissinger inspired among the parties that the United States would stand behind its promises. While explicit United States commitments, such as arrangement for American photoreconnaissance to provide independent surveillance of the deployment of forces in the disengagement zones, helped to reassure each of the parties regarding compliance by the other, the more general American pledges to work for a just and lasting peace in accordance with UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338 gave rise to conflicting expectations.

The Egyptian government thought this meant that the United States had committed itself to restoring all of Sinai to Egyptian authority and would use the necessary pressure on Israel to agree to withdraw its armed forces. Egypt, in turn, would agree to end its belligerence against Israel, but only after Israel had withdrawn from all occupied territories and satisfied the "rights of the Palestinians." The Israel government thought that United States commitment to Israel's right to live within secure and recognized boundaries meant that the United States would not only provide all the military equipment Israel needed to maintain its defenses, but would also refrain from imposing its own views on the parties, limiting itself to facilitating the negotiations between them. This difference in conception of the American posture became apparent in the latter part of the year. The Egyptians began to urge Washington to press for speedy further withdrawals by the Israelis, while the Israelis urged a period of waiting for practical evidence of Egypt's peaceful intentions by reopening the Suez Canal and rebuilding the cities along its banks.

Nothing came of various suggestions for a similar disengagement or thinning out of Israeli and Jordanian forces along the Jordan River and for restoring Jordanian civilian authority in part of the West Bank. Since there had been no active fighting along the Jordan River frontier during the Yom Kippur war, the practical military urgency to avoid renewed confrontation, which had motivated the disengagement

agreements with Syria and Egypt, was not as great. Moreover, the Rabat Arab summit conference's designation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate spokesman of the Palestinians greatly reduced the likelihood of any arrangement exclusively between Jordan and Israel regarding the West Bank.

Geneva Conference in Abeyance

Although the bilateral disengagement agreements were nominally undertaken within the framework of the Geneva conference, the full conference failed to take place in 1974. The only meeting in Geneva was the one at which the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement was signed at the end of May. Since the Syrians had officially refused to participate in the Geneva conference because such direct negotiations might have implied political recognition of Israel's legitimacy, the meeting was ostensibly only between the Israeli and Egyptian military working groups, with the Syrians subsumed under the Egyptian delegation.

Only the Russians seemed publicly eager for an early resumption of the Geneva conference. In reiterating this Soviet position to the UN General Assembly on September 24, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko emphasized that the Palestinians should take their "rightful place" at the conference table. A Soviet-PLO joint communiqué, issued after PLO leader Yasir Arafat's visit to Moscow in August, had reaffirmed Soviet support for PLO, authorized it to open a Moscow office with embassy status, and noted with satisfaction that the Arab and Islamic summit conferences had recognized the PLO as sole spokesman of the Palestinians. At the same time, however, Gromyko also reiterated in his UN speech that the Soviet Union "stands in favor of Israel existing and developing as an independent sovereign state," a position officially rejected by Arafat in the UN Assembly on November 13, when he emphasized that the PLO's political objective continued to be a single secular, democratic Arab state in all of Palestine.

Dispute Over PLO Position

There were some who thought that, despite his rhetoric, Arafat was moving toward acceptance of a mini-Palestine state on the West Bank and in Gaza. Alleged indications of this were the endorsements given to PLO by the Palestine National Council in Cairo in June, and by the Arab League at the Rabat summit, to establish an independent Palestinian "national authority" on any territory "liberated" from Israel; Arafat's new professed willingness to allow all Jews currently living in Israel to remain in his proposed Palestinian state, and his subsequent explanations to reporters that when speaking at the UN, he had purposely chosen the word "dream" in speaking of the establishment of a secular, democratic Arab state in Palestine to indicate that this was only an ultimate objective, implying that he might reach some interim *modus vivendi* with Israel.

Widespread reports that the PLO would soon set up a provisional Palestinian government-in-exile were not borne out in 1974. One reason for the delay appeared

to be Arafat's failure to win approval for such action from the more militant groups in PLO. On September 26 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), headed by George Habash, announced in Beirut that it was withdrawing from the PLO executive committee because of the organization's "deviation from the revolutionary course." Its deputy chief Ahmed Yamani said it would continue to struggle until all Palestine was "liberated," Israel destroyed, and King Hussein overthrown. Two other guerrilla groups belonging to the self-styled "rejection front" said they would follow PFLP.

While King Hussein nominally agreed to abide by the Rabat decision, he continued to pay subsidies to West Bank Palestinian leaders friendly to the throne and refused to permit PLO terrorist operations against Israel from his territory. Although the Rabat summit set up a committee to attempt to reconcile PLO-Jordanian relations in preparation for a common negotiating line toward Israel at Geneva by the Arab "confrontation" states, no substantial progress was made in that direction.

Israeli and U.S. Attitudes to PLO

The government of Israel reiterated its categorical refusal to negotiate with PLO (p. 405). Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin enumerated the reasons for this position in an interview with Livio Caputo (published in *Epoca* on July 27, 1974): 1) the PLO was not the legitimate representative of the Palestinians "since nobody has elected them;" 2) Israel saw no point in negotiating with people "who want to eliminate us from the face of the earth and who seek to murder civilians, including women and children;" 3) "on principle, we will deal only with sovereign states—otherwise we risk having to face a myriad of organizations, each one claiming that it is a representative body." Israel, Rabin declared, continued to prefer to deal with Jordan, noting that Jordan in fact was a predominantly Palestinian state in population and that Hussein had promised to hold a plebiscite to determine the wishes of the West Bank Palestinians after the area had been relinquished by Israel.

While there was virtual unanimity in Israel against negotiating with the PLO as long as it sought the elimination of Israel and used terrorist methods, Israelis were deeply divided on the future of the occupied territories. As a result, the Israel government pledged not to sign any treaty relinquishing territory in Judea or Samaria (the Biblical names for the West Bank) without approval from the electorate.

Because of the numerous complications involved in dealing with the Palestinian issue in general, and the PLO in particular, the United States government tried to defer any decisions on the matter. When President Richard M. Nixon went to the Middle East in June, all the Arab leaders he met with stressed the importance of recognizing Palestinian national rights as part of any just solution to the Arab-Israel conflict. King Faisal was most explicit in stating the Arab demands when he warned, at a state dinner in Nixon's honor, that there would be no lasting peace in the area "unless Jerusalem is liberated and returned to Arab sovereignty, unless liberation

of all the occupied Arab territories is achieved, and unless the Arab people of Palestine regain their rights to return to their homes and their right to self-determination." Nixon did not respond directly; he praised Faisal as a wise leader and assured him that the United States was interested in "a lasting peace."

In its official pronouncements the United States stopped short of recognizing the "legitimate national rights" of the Palestinians—the Soviet and Arab formulation—and shied away from any reference to PLO as Palestinian spokesman. However, the United States did modify its concept of the Palestinians as constituting a refugee problem and began to acknowledge their role as a people. Thus, the joint statement issued by Nixon and Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat in Cairo on June 14 declared that a durable peace based on UN Security Council Resolution 242 "should take into account the legitimate interest of all peoples in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right of existence of all states in the area." The latter clause was seen as the implied Egyptian recognition of Israel. The statement also noted that "peace can be achieved only through a process of continuing negotiation as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 338 within the framework of the Geneva Middle East peace conference." This left open the door for the continuation of Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy, while giving lip service to the Soviet demand that the negotiations be part of the Geneva conference.

A vague formulation was also used to sidestep the issues of PLO and the Geneva conference in a joint communiqué issued by Nixon and Brezhnev at the end of their meeting in Vladivostok in July. It asserted that a peace settlement should take into account "the legitimate interests of all people in the Middle East, including the Palestinian people, and the right to existence of all states in the area." It called for the resumption of the Geneva conference "as soon as possible," a compromise formula that papered over the Soviet-American disagreement on the subject.

At a press conference during Nixon's visit to Jerusalem in June, Kissinger declared that "the most efficient way for the Palestinians to be brought into the [negotiating] process is through the Jordanian delegation in which there is the historical background and for which Israel has always declared its readiness in principle." At a press conference in Washington on October 7, he reiterated that he would not meet Arafat, or any other Palestinian leader, during his forthcoming trip to the Middle East. While there were some informal contacts of lower-level American officials with PLO representatives in the Middle East, on the official level the United States shunned PLO.

The resignation of President Nixon in August and the assumption of the presidency by Gerald R. Ford brought no immediate change in American Middle East policy or in the United States attitude to PLO. Ford, who had established a record of sympathy for Israel during his years in Congress, expressed full confidence in Kissinger's peace efforts in the Middle East.

At the United Nations, United States delegate John Scali opposed the invitation extended to PLO, warning that its participation could impede rather than promote current peace efforts. He emphasized that "the only basis for a just negotiated

settlement is and must remain Security Council resolutions 242 and 338," which did not recognize the Palestinians as a separate party to negotiations. At the June meeting in Cairo of its National Council, PLO had explicitly rejected the underlying principles of these resolutions when it declared that it would continue to "struggle against any scheme or projected Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, peace, secure boundaries" or denial of the Palestinian objective of "liberation of the entire Palestinian soil."

End of Arab Oil Embargo

On March 18 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced the lifting of the embargo on oil supplies to the United States, which they had imposed during the October 1973 war. They warned, however, that this decision, as well as the question of production levels, would be periodically reviewed. The main objective of their embargo and production cutbacks, the Arab oil ministers explained, had been to draw world attention to the Arab cause and to "create the suitable political climate" for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, which, they contended, calls for Israel's "complete withdrawal from the Arab-occupied territories, and for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." This differed from the interpretation of the resolution by its American and British sponsors, who had deliberately omitted reference to withdrawal from "all" or "the" territories to allow room for negotiation by the parties of secure and recognized final boundaries as part of a package peace agreement. The resolution also failed to include explicit reference to Palestinian rights, speaking only in general terms of the need for "a just settlement of the refugee problem."

The Arab oil ministers noted that their embargo had made world public opinion aware of the "importance of the Arab world for the welfare of the world economy," and thus "receptive" to Arab rights, which led to the "gradual isolation of Israel" and the adoption of "political stances which openly condemn Israel's expansionist policy." After singling out Belgium, Italy, West Germany, and Japan for special praise in this regard, the Arab oil ministers noted that there were also some signs of a more "evenhanded policy" on the part of the United States. Apparently alluding to the United States role in obtaining Israeli troop withdrawals as part of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, they said it appeared to them that "American official policy as evidenced lately by the recent political events assumed a new dimension vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict."

In an attempt to get Syrian concurrence in the lifting of the embargo, the Arab ministers' statement emphasized their support for all the Arab countries "in their just struggle" and for "the Syrian Arab Republic at the present time during which it endeavors to reach the means which would eventually lead to the full liberation of its territory and to the complete liberation of all the Arab-occupied territories, first of which comes Jerusalem." Nevertheless, the Syrian government refused to endorse the decision to lift the embargo, holding to its view that the oil weapon

should have been maintained at least until after Syria, too, had concluded a disengagement agreement with Israel. Libya, keeping to its militant position, declared that it would neither assent to lifting the embargo nor to any production increase.

The embargo against the Netherlands, whose government had been regarded as particularly sympathetic to Israel, was unanimously lifted by OAPEC only on July 10, after the signing of the Golan Heights disengagement between Syria and Israel (p. 401).

Conservation measures, a mild winter in Europe and the United States, and the inflationary and recessionary effects of the fourfold increase in world oil prices, all served to limit demand and thus minimize the disruptive effect of the Arab embargo, both in Holland and the United States. Moreover, not all the Arab states were equally scrupulous in enforcing the embargo. In June Algeria officially announced that it would not abide by the embargo. Iraq had never really gone along with it; United States Commerce Department April figures indicated that some Saudi Arabian and Tunisian oil had continued to arrive several months after the imposition of the embargo. United States government energy officials also privately acknowledged that American oil imports in early 1974 from such countries as Italy, Chile, Columbia, Bolivia, and the Netherlands Antilles, which normally do not supply oil to the United States, probably represented shipments of Arab oil that had been diverted to evade the embargo.

Power of Petrodollars

In their March statement, the Arab oil producers warned that they might take "even more severe oil measures" in the future, if Israel did not meet Arab demands. For the time being, however, they were going to concentrate on utilizing their oil "in a positive manner in order to lead to results, the effectiveness of which may surpass those if the oil weapon was used in a negative manner." This was an allusion to the new economic power felt by the Arabs as a consequence of the unprecedented money reserves accumulated by the major oil producers who had quadrupled and, in some cases, quintupled oil prices since 1973.

In addition to financing more sophisticated propaganda and arms purchases amounting to billions of dollars, the new Arab wealth was temptingly dangled before Western industrialized countries as a source of loans, investments, and large-scale development contracts. Some of these offers were explicitly or implicitly linked to compliance by the recipients with Arab-boycott regulations against Israel and sought to exclude Jewish officials or firms regarded as sympathetic to Israel. Although numerous congressional committees began investigations into the problems relating to Arab investments, no comprehensive new legislation was adopted; the exception was a law to conduct a survey of foreign investments in the United States.

Although Saudi Arabian officials privately assured American diplomats that they were working to lower world oil prices, the Saudis refused to take unilateral actions, like major increases in production which would have depressed prices, because of

their overriding desire to maintain a united Arab economic and political front, as well as to preserve the bargaining power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). There was no significant reduction in oil prices in 1974. On the other hand, OPEC refused to accede to the demand of the Shah of Iran for substantially higher oil prices to compensate for the loss of purchasing power of the dollar, the traditional unit for calculating oil prices.

The fact that oil prices stayed high despite the signing of the disengagement agreements and the lifting of the embargo, together with evidence that such non-Arab states as Venezuela and Iran which had defied the embargo by shipping oil to Israel and the United States had been prime movers behind the worldwide OPEC price increases, served to discredit the Arab argument that the reason for high oil prices was Israel's alleged intransigence. This Arab campaign backfired, for 1974 public-opinion polls found that Americans tended to overestimate the degree to which the United States was dependent on *Arab* oil imports, and consequently placed a heavy share of the blame for the inflation, unemployment, and recession on the Arab states. Nevertheless, there was little public support for the suggested use of American military intervention to take over the Persian Gulf or North African oilfields to force a reduction in oil prices.

Confronting the OPEC Cartel

While neither President Ford nor Secretary Kissinger would rule out the ultimate use of force if a new embargo threatened the Western industrialized world with economic "strangulation," both made it clear that the United States hoped to achieve a reduction in oil prices first through cooperative efforts of the consuming countries and then negotiations between the major producers and consumers. Although the administration repeatedly proclaimed its intention to develop a national energy policy which would make the United States independent of foreign sources by 1985, there was division on what measures to take; and once the immediate inconvenience of the gasoline shortage abated, Congress no longer felt the need to enact the many necessarily unpopular measures required for a comprehensive energy-independence program.

On the international front, the United States government was torn between its traditional commitment to multilateral economic cooperation and the fear that it could not afford to remain aloof from the scramble for bilateral arrangements with the major oil producers that France, Japan and other industrial countries were rapidly concluding. Thus the United States in 1974 established with Saudi Arabia a bilateral economic commission for expanded economic cooperation, which included massive American arms and defense-related sales to Saudi Arabia. Similar deals were concluded with Iran. Bilateral commissions were also set up with Egypt and Israel, which helped to minimize the impression that the sole aim was to recycle petrodollars.

On the multinational level, the United States took the lead in November in

establishing the International Energy Agency, which brought together 15 of the major industrial nations to agree to stockpile oil, to allocate oil in emergencies, to encourage conservation, and to sponsor joint research in alternative sources of energy. The new agency was to work under the auspices of the 24-member Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Although France did not formally join, it agreed, after a December meeting between Ford and President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, to coordinate its energy policies with the United States and to participate in a \$25 billion multilateral emergency-loan fund proposed by Kissinger to help oil-consuming nations meet financial crises caused by high oil prices. In return, the United States agreed to a French proposal to convene a meeting between major oil producers and consumers in 1975.

In a *Time* interview at the end of the year, Kissinger reiterated that prior evidence of consumer solidarity would help assure the success of such a conference. Softening the U.S. opposition to OPEC demands for "indexing," under which oil prices would rise to reflect inflationary changes in the prices of other major commodities and manufactured goods, Kissinger said the United States would be prepared to consider indexing, but only after oil prices had been reduced from the arbitrarily high levels set by OPEC.

U.S. Aid to Egypt

Aside from presumed American leverage on Israel, the major inducement for the Arab states to improve their relations with the United States was the prospect of tapping American scientific and industrial expertise. The United States government's eagerness to assist the Arabs in their economic development was clearly signaled in the Nixon-Sadat joint statement of June 14, which noted that in 1973 Egyptian-American relations had changed "from estrangement to a constructive working relationship," and that they were now in 1974 "moving to a relationship of friendship and broad cooperation." Special working groups under a joint cooperation commission were established to prepare a program having several specific aims: 1) to encourage American private investment in joint enterprises in Egypt in such fields as petrochemicals, transportation, agricultural development, tourism and banking, and to promote trade (projects already "under serious consideration" exceeded \$2 billion, but in view of the Nasserist nationalizations and expropriations, which had discouraged foreign investors, a new Egyptian-American investment-guarantee agreement was to be negotiated "immediately"); 2) to increase Egypt's agricultural production; 3) to exchange scientists and foster "technology, research and development in scientific fields, including space;" 4) to develop and strengthen Egypt's medical research treatment and training facilities; 5) to encourage and facilitate cultural exchanges.

In support of these efforts, Nixon pledged that the United States "will make the maximum feasible contribution, in accordance with Congressional authorization, to Egypt's economic development, including clearing the Suez Canal, reconstruction

projects and restoring Egypt's trade." In addition, the United States promised to give "special priority attention" to Egypt's needs for agricultural commodities to help feed its burgeoning population.

Controversy Over Nuclear Reactors

There was general support for this program in the United States Congress, and even the Israelis welcomed American economic aid that encouraged the Egyptians to reorient their priorities from war to peaceful development. However, much opposition was aroused by the dramatic announcement in the joint statement that "the United States is prepared to sell nuclear reactors and fuel to Egypt" to enable it to substantially increase its electric power-generating capacity by the early 1980s. Pending conclusion of an agreement "under agreed safeguards," the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the Egyptian Ministry of Electricity would, within a couple of weeks, conclude a provisional agreement for the sale of nuclear fuel to Egypt.

Congressional and editorial opposition centered on the following points: It was premature and potentially dangerous to supply nuclear technology to Egypt until it had clearly demonstrated its peaceful intentions. The recent explosion of a nuclear device by India, in circumvention of its agreement with Canada, revealed the weakness of existing safeguards against diversion of nuclear fuel byproducts from power generation to weapons production. Once the Egyptians began operating the nuclear reactors and trained a cadre of nuclear scientists, there was nothing to prevent the Egyptians from abrogating whatever commitments they made to the United States.

To minimize the opposition, the United States offered a similar nuclear-power program to Israel during Nixon's stop in Jerusalem on June 17. Proponents of United States nuclear aid to Egypt pointed out that it would be 1980 before the reactor was completed and the first shipment of nuclear fuel was delivered to Egypt. They argued further that Egypt already had two small reactors provided by the Soviet Union; that the Russians were already discussing a Soviet-built nuclear power reactor, and that the American offer would help free Egypt from dependence on the Russians. They held, too, that the Congress could insist on strict safeguards for United States control over the production, shipment, and reprocessing of uranium and plutonium. There were some who suspected that since Israel was far ahead of Egypt in nuclear technology, the American offer to both Egypt and Israel had a dual purpose: to increase American prestige and influence in Egypt and, at the same time, assure strict American supervision over all of Israel's present and projected nuclear reactors. Preliminary ten-year contracts for the sale of United States nuclear fuels and technology were signed by Egypt and Israel in Washington on June 26, and plans were announced for a 600-megawatt plant in each country, providing sufficient power for about 250,000 people.

Military Supply to Israel

Although Richard Nixon had visited Israel earlier, his 1974 trip marked the first time in Israel's history that an American president paid an official visit to the country. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit generally paralleled that issued in Cairo in terms of the offer to provide nuclear power assistance and in the pledges to continue cooperation in the fields of industry, energy production, tourism, aviation, space-technology research, and cultural exchanges. The communiqué further stated that American and Israeli representatives would soon meet to devise ways to insure the supply of oil and other essential raw materials to Israel on "a continuous basis." This was to reassure Israel regarding the problems it might face if it gave up the Abu Rudeis oilfield in Sinai in a new agreement with Egypt, or if Egypt reimposed its blockade at the Bab el Mandeb entrance to the Red Sea and cut off the passage of Iranian oil to Israel's port of Eilat.

Israelis placed special emphasis on that part of the communiqué in which Nixon affirmed "the continuing and long-term nature of the military supply relationship" between the two countries. This was because they had frequently encountered what at times they believed to have been politically motivated delays before arms purchases were concluded. Therefore it was important to Israel to be assured of continuing United States military supplies and economic aid over an extended period if it should agree to any further substantial withdrawal in Sinai. The President also reiterated his view that "strengthening Israel's capacity to defend itself" was essential to prevent further hostilities and "to maintain conditions conducive to progress towards peace." American economic assistance, the communiqué indicated, would continue at a "substantial" level and would be "the subject of long-range planning" between the two countries.

In an apparent allusion to Syrian and Lebanese acquiescence in Palestinian guerrilla attacks against Israel, the communiqué expressed United States-Israeli agreement on "the duty [of every state] to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands including mercenaries for incursion into the territory of another state."

Congressional Appropriations

AID TO ARAB STATES

The major new American aid to the Arab countries which President Nixon had visited did not receive final congressional approval until well into the 1975 fiscal year. During the 1974 fiscal year Jordan continued to be the main Arab recipient of United States aid, with grants of \$55 million in economic supporting assistance, \$36 million in military grants, and \$6.9 million in agricultural commodities under Public Law 480 Food for Peace soft loans. Smaller sums for military sales credits were provided to Lebanon (\$5 million), Morocco (\$12 million), and Tunisia (\$2.5

million). While Saudi Arabia received only \$200,000 under a military training program, this figure was dwarfed by the billions of dollars Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Persian/Arabian Gulf states were spending in the United States for arms and defense-related technological products and services.

After considerable debate, during which Congress increased the administration proposals for aid to Israel and imposed some strings on aid to some of the Arab states, the U.S. Fiscal Year 1975 (July 1, 1974–June 30, 1975) Foreign Aid Appropriation Act included the following figures: Egypt received a \$250 million supporting assistance grant, including part of the cost of clearing the Suez Canal—to which the United States Navy contributed its equipment and skilled personnel—and rehabilitation of the cities along the canal; and \$139 million in P.L. 480 soft currency loans for food. Jordan received \$100 million in military grants and \$30 million in military sales credits, and \$77.5 million in grant economic aid. Other Arab recipients of United States military aid, mostly in the form of credits, included: Lebanon (\$10.1 million), Morocco (\$14.8 million), Tunisia (\$3.5 million).

SYRIAN AID CONTROVERSY

The Administration had also asked for a \$100 million special requirements fund, which was expected to be used largely for aid to Syria. For many years Syria had refused to accept aid from "imperialistic" America and the new receptivity of Syria to diplomatic relations and economic ties with the United States reflected the more pragmatic approach of the regime of President Hafez al-Assad. While welcoming the reported signs of lessening ideological rigidity in Damascus, Congress was still dubious about Syria's commitment to peace in view of its continued close ties with Moscow, evidenced by the presence of Soviet advisers and the recent arrival of shipments of the most advanced Soviet tanks, planes, and missiles, as well as by active Syrian support of Palestinian liberation groups.

Congress was also deeply concerned over the arbitrary secret-police control and the numerous discriminatory measures to which Syria's estimated 4,500 Jews were subjected, including denial of their right to emigrate, even for purposes of reunion with their families in the United States and other Western countries. Consequently, the Congress approved an amendment to the Near East section of the Foreign Assistance Act, introduced by Representative Jonathan B. Bingham (Dem.-Lib., N.Y.), which declared it to be "the sense of Congress that none of the funds authorized by this Act should be provided to any nation which denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate." The administration regarded this language as not binding upon it. However, Congress included in the act another provision empowering it to disapprove any specific expenditures requested by the administration under the special requirements fund, if the Senate and the House concurrently adopted resolutions opposing such expenditures within 30 days after requests were made.

Syria received a total of \$83 million under the special requirements fund, mainly

for improvement of the Damascus water system, the purchase of equipment for agricultural expansion, and student exchanges with the United States. Separately, Syria obtained \$28 million in surplus United States agricultural commodities under P.L. 480 soft loans. The administration arguments, which moved Congress reluctantly to go along with the requests, were that the top priority was not to jeopardize the Kissinger peace efforts by antagonizing Syria; that Syria would not ease its emigration policy on threat of an aid cut-off, since it was receiving far more substantial aid from the Soviet Union and the oil-rich Arab states, and that gradual improvement in Syrian-American relations, together with progress on the Syrian-Israel diplomatic front, offered the best hope for improving the status of Syrian Jews.

Representative Stephen Solarz (D., N.Y.), whose district includes most of the 25,000 Syrian Jews in the United States, sent to Secretary Kissinger on February 25, 1975, a letter, cosigned by 81 other representatives, agreeing not to oppose the administration's initial \$25 million request for Syria so as "not to undermine or impair" the United States government's negotiating position, but also urging the administration to use the opportunity of its diplomatic negotiations to prevail upon the Syrians to reciprocate the United States "expression of good faith" by lifting its emigration restrictions on Syrian Jews.

AID TO ISRAEL

After the Yom Kippur war, the administration had asked Congress to approve a \$2.2 billion emergency military-aid package for Israel. Congress gave the President discretion to give up to \$1.5 billion of this sum as an outright grant. In April the administration made an initial determination to allocate \$1 billion as a grant, and the remainder in long-term, low-interest loans. At the end of June 1974, after his visit to the Middle East, Nixon approved the additional \$500 million authorized by Congress as a grant.

During the 1974 fiscal year (July 1, 1973 to June 30, 1974) Israel also received \$50 million in grant economic support, about \$36 million of the \$40 million appropriated to help integrate Russian Jewish refugees, and several small grants totaling a few million dollars to various educational institutions in Israel.

For the fiscal year 1975, Congress increased from \$50 million to \$324.5 million the administration's request for a supporting assistance grant. Israel further received \$100 million in grants and \$200 million in credits to purchase United States military equipment (the administration had initially recommended that the entire \$300 million be in credits to be repaid). Under a contract concluded in December 1974, Israel was to receive another estimated \$9 million in agricultural commodities under P.L. 480.

Controversy Over U.S. Arms Supply to Israel

In the latter part of 1974 a flurry of articles appearing in the American press alleged that the rapid delivery by the United States of arms to Israel during and after

the 1973 Yom Kippur war had denuded the American arsenal and thus weakened the fighting capacity of the United States armed forces. The charge was largely stimulated by the off-hand remarks in October 1974 by chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown (p. 126). As Air Force chief of staff and in charge of the United States arms airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur war, Brown had won praise from Prime Minister Rabin for being the man who "probably helped Israel more than anyone else." Following the incident Brown and other high United States officials denied the allegation read into his remarks by some observers. In Sacramento, Cal., on November 25, General Brown noted that one of America's national objectives was the continued "viability of the State of Israel," adding that "if the national decision is made by the Chief Executive and endorsed by Congress, of course this great nation can afford to supply the State of Israel."

While it was true that at the end of 1974 the United States Army was still some 1,800 tanks short of its authorized strength of 10,000, the 600 tanks supplied to Israel on an emergency basis were acknowledged by the Defense Department officials to be merely a symptom rather than a fundamental cause of the problem. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger curtly told *Newsweek* that the talk of a great arms drain was "bull. . . ." From the Pentagon's viewpoint, the 1973 war had the favorable effect of drawing public attention to the need for adequate conventional military forces to counter the Soviet Union's rapid expansion of such forces which, when lavishly supplied to the Arab states and other Soviet friends, threatened to upset the balance of power in the Middle East and elsewhere. Thus, after the 1973 war had revealed the dangerous degree to which the United States had permitted its production of tanks to fall below that of the Soviet Union, Congress approved a long-standing Army request to increase tank production from 40 to 103 units a month.

Army Chief of Staff General Fred C. Weyand, in an interview with Associated Press correspondent Fred S. Hoffman on December 14, denied that the American supply of tanks and other equipment to Israel and other countries had seriously damaged the Army's combat readiness. On the contrary, he declared, "the Army is probably in better shape than at any time in its peacetime history." He confirmed that the main reason for the tank shortage was that "we let our production base deteriorate." But the shortage had not been serious enough to affect training or morale, and no regular divisions were short of tanks, since overseas shipments had been made from the stocks of the National Guard and reserve units.

THE UNITED NATIONS

Although public attention in 1974 was focused on the anti-Israel resolutions adopted by various United Nations organs, the UN took some positive action. The Security Council established the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), which was to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire and serve as a crucial neutral buffer

between Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights. It also renewed the mandate of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai.

Establishment of UNDOF

The creation of UNDOF followed arduous negotiations between Israel and Syria, with Secretary Kissinger as mediator. Initially, Syria agreed to no more than 100 UN *observers*, while Israel requested a force of 3,000 UNEF troops. After concessions on both sides, the final agreement called for 1,250 men with a new title incorporating the terms "observer," to satisfy the Syrians, and "force," to meet the Israeli wish for a force similar to UNEF in Egypt. UNDOF in fact drew its initial personnel and equipment from the 7,000-man UNEF. The powers and assignments of the two forces were similar. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim told the Security Council in May that, in setting up the Golan Heights force, he would follow the principles approved by the Council the previous October for the Sinai UNEF: that weapons of a defensive character would be provided, that force would not be used except in self-defense, but that any attempts to prevent the enforcement of the Council's mandate would be resisted.

The Soviet Union demanded that, to be technically legal, the Security Council delay the creation of UNDOF until May 31, to follow signing of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement in Geneva. At that point, it joined the United States in cosponsoring the resolution setting up UNDOF for an initial six-month period, an action interpreted as reflecting Moscow's insistence that, as a cosponsor of the Geneva conference, it must be a partner in any formal peace-making step in the Middle East.

The Council approved UNDOF for a period of six months by a vote of 13 to 0, with China and Iraq "not participating." China dissociated itself from what it called the efforts of two superpowers to establish spheres of influence for themselves in the Middle East at the expense of the Arab states and the Palestinians. Iraq, leading the Arab "rejection front," wanted no part in any agreement based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, which implied Israel's right to existence. British delegate Ivor Richard pointed out that since UNDOF and UNEF were established by the Security Council, in contrast to the UNEF which was set up in 1956 after the Sinai Campaign by the General Assembly, the new forces could not be withdrawn without Council approval simply upon demand of one of the belligerents, such as that by Egypt in May 1967.

Renewal of UNEF

However, renewal of the forces was not automatic; it required Council action to extend it for an additional six-month period. In 1974 the Security Council twice voted to do so. The only points of controversy were French and Soviet demands for greater control by the Council's permanent members of the financing and operational efficiency of the force, and the Soviet Union's complaint that Israel be re-

quired to permit the Polish contingent of UNEF to travel freely on the Israeli side of the line. Israel balked at permitting entry by soldiers from countries it considered unfriendly, since they might pose a security risk. Israeli leaders also reportedly feared that if Polish troops were let in, the Soviet Union would press for admission of its 36 military officers who were members of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization, which continued to operate side-by-side with the UNEF. The Soviet request that the Council instruct Secretary-General Waldheim to order the Israelis to allow freedom of movement for all UN contingents was not reflected in the compromise resolution adopted on April 8, to extend the force. It merely endorsed the secretary-general's efforts to solve outstanding problems.

In again extending UNEF on October 23, the Council reaffirmed that the force "must be able to function as an integral and efficient military unit in the whole Egypt-Israel section of operation without differentiation" among the various contingents, and asked the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to this end. In response to French and Soviet concern over the \$83.6 million cost of the force in its first year of operation, the resolution expressed the Council's confidence that the force "will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy." Thus Moscow and Paris failed in their efforts to exert a greater direct national control over the secretary-general's authority to run this neutral international body.

After some tense moments and protracted last-minute confidential consultations, Syria agreed to the Security Council's renewal of the Golan Heights UNDOF, for another six months by Resolution 363 of November 29. Israel's delegate Yosef Tekoah hailed the Council's action as a "positive development," adding that the continuation of UNDOF was an integral element of the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreement and its prohibition on the resort to force, which he stressed, "is not limited in time." Syrian delegate Haissam Kelani emphasized that the disengagement agreement was not a peace agreement, but only "a first step on the road to a just and lasting peace based on resolution 338." Syria, he said, accepted UNDOF's extension to provide "a fresh opportunity" to establish such a peace.

Soviet delegate Yakov Malik declared that although no dates had been set for termination of the disengagement agreements, it was understood that they could not be prolonged indefinitely. He underscored the Soviet position that lasting peace could be achieved only by "the complete liberation of all Arab lands occupied in 1967, the exercise of the lawful right of the Arab people of Palestine to establish their own state, their right to self-determination, and a reliable and authoritative guarantee of the security and independence of all countries involved in the area of conflict," all of which must be achieved within the framework of the Geneva conference. To help satisfy the Soviet and Syrian demands for further rapid progress in negotiations, Resolution 363 reaffirmed that the disengagement agreements were "only a step" toward peace, and sandwiched the decision to extend UNDOF between two paragraphs calling upon the parties "to implement immediately Security Council Resolution 338" and asking the secretary-general to report at the end of six months on measures taken in that direction.

Terrorism

Following a retaliatory raid by Israel against Palestinian guerrilla bases in Lebanon, the Security Council on April 24 adopted a resolution condemning the "violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and sovereignty" and calling upon Israel "to refrain from further military actions and threats against Lebanon." It also condemned "all acts of violence, especially those which result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life," but did not explicitly condemn the incident that had provoked the Israeli retaliation, the Arab terrorist attack on the Israeli town of Qiryat Shemona in which 18 persons were killed. A United States amendment to insert a reference to Qiryat Shemona was defeated by a vote of 7 to 6, with 2 abstentions. The United States then joined with 12 other Council members to vote for the resolution as a whole. China and Iraq said they were not participating in the vote, China because it opposed the resolution's endorsement of peace negotiations and Iraq because it considered mere warnings and condemnations inadequate to deter Israel from further "aggression." Tekoah denounced the resolution as another example "of the bias and inequity" prevailing in the UN's Middle East debates.

NO ACTION ON INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS

The issue of international terrorism had been formally raised by Secretary-General Waldheim in 1972 after the murder of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists at the Olympic Games in Munich. Following several years of inconclusive discussion, the General Assembly's Legal Committee on December 10, 1974, recommended that the issue be postponed for yet another year. Although the delay was deplored by the United States, West Germany, and some Latin American countries, only Israel voted against the postponement—a situation reflecting in large part the growing influence of the Arab countries and the reluctance of many states to offend them.

While Eike Bracklo of West Germany and Shabtai Rosenne of Israel stressed the urgent need for international measures to prevent terrorism, the other delegations could not agree on what constituted terrorism and what was part of a legitimate struggle for liberation. The conflict of ideologies was reflected in the exceptionally long official wording of this UN agenda item: "Measures to prevent international terrorism which endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes." Burhan Wasfi Hammad of the United Arab Emirates welcomed the postponement because, he said, it would give his delegation time to document the "types of terrorism that the Arab and Palestinian peoples had suffered" at Israeli hands.

UN Invitation to PLO

The Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) long campaign to gain international recognition made spectacular progress in 1974. Ever since 1965 PLO spokesmen had been given permission to speak during the annual UN debate on the Arab refugee question. In the past, however, they could appear only at meetings of the special political committee and under an explicit ruling of the chair that they were permitted to speak "without such authorization implying recognition" of their group. Indeed, the committee usually also granted a hearing to the spokesman of a rival group, the "Palestine Arab Delegation," sponsored by the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, which had been founded by the late Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin el-Husseini (AJYB, 1966 [Vol. 67], pp. 265-66).

Contrary to past practice, the UN General Assembly on October 14 passed a resolution declaring the Palestinian people to be "the principal party to the question of Palestine" and inviting "the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings." The resolution, which had been sponsored by 71 countries from the Arab-Afro-Asian and Communist blocs, was approved by a vote of 105 to 4. Only the United States, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic joined Israel in opposing the invitation. Most of the 20 countries which abstained were Western European or Latin American.

In explaining the American negative vote, Ambassador Scali pointed out that it did not reflect lack of sympathy for the Palestinians, but rather concern that the resolution could be interpreted as prejudging the negotiating process, since its implication that only the Palestinian Arabs, and not the Israelis, had any legitimate claim, would make more difficult the attainment of a durable peace. He also expressed "profound concern" over the departure from the longstanding precedent that only representatives of governments be allowed to participate in plenary sessions. "Have we," Scali asked, "created a dangerous precedent which may return to haunt this organization—perhaps cripple its effectiveness?"

The warning had little effect on the voting of other delegations, whose governments automatically supported PLO because of ideological affinity with revolutionary movements, appeals to Muslim and Afro-Asian solidarity, and the prudent calculations of not openly opposing a cause backed by the Arab oil producers. On October 25 the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) voted by an overwhelming majority of 80 to 2 (United States and Israel dissenting) to admit PLO as an observer to its general conference. Seventeen others, including France and its eight Common Market partners, abstained.

Earlier, the PLO had managed to gain admittance to various conferences held under UN auspices—the World Food Conference, the World Population Conference, and the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts—under a general formula originally intended to aid the emergent African states. It was used by the conferences as a basis for inviting all "national liberation" movements recognized

by their respective regional organizations, namely, the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States. Its past successes and evidence of the automatic majorities it mustered at international forums won for PLO also an invitation to be a nonvoting observer at the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, which met in Caracas in July 1974.

Arab domination of the UN General Assembly was further revealed in the rulings of the Assembly's president, Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Departing from the tradition of nonpartisanship of his predecessors, Bouteflika ordered that PLO leader Arafat be accorded the protocol honors—such as a special armchair—normally reserved for heads of state. Bouteflika then made an unprecedented ruling to limit each delegation to one speech during the forthcoming debate on the "Question of Palestine," which, in effect, muzzled Israel by denying it the right to speak, as it had requested, after each of the 20 Arab-League member states presented its view on this highly controversial issue. Israel and the United States challenged the Algerian's ruling, but he was upheld by a large majority. When the General Assembly on November 12 upheld Bouteflika's ruling which suspended South Africa from participation in the current General Assembly session, he actually arrogated to the Assembly the power to deny membership in violation of the UN Charter, which provides that only the Security Council has the authority to expel or suspend a member.

PLO Wins UN Observer Status

On November 22 the General Assembly adopted two resolutions enhancing PLO's international position. The first (Resolution 3236) recognized that "the Palestine people is entitled to self-determination" in accordance with the UN Charter and reaffirmed the "inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine," including self-determination, "national independence and sovereignty," and "return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return." While the resolution "recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East," it also implicitly endorsed PLO's armed struggle for liberation when it "further recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights *by all means* in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" (emphasis added). However, some countries which supported the resolution, including Argentina, Mauritius, and Thailand, interpreted the latter clause as meaning that their support of Palestinian sovereignty was not intended to question the statehood of Israel, a UN member entitled to equal sovereign rights under the Charter.

Israel bitterly opposed the resolution, which nowhere mentioned it by name. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 89 to 8 (Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Iceland, Israel, Nicaragua, Norway, United States) with 37 abstentions.

The second resolution (3237) invited PLO to participate as an observer in the

sessions and work of the UN General Assembly, as well as in all international conferences convened under the Assembly's auspices, and declared PLO entitled to participate in conferences convened by other UN organs. This accorded PLO a position similar to some nonmember states, such as Switzerland and North and South Korea. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 95 to 17, with 19 abstentions. Opposed were Israel, the United States, Canada, and some Western European and Latin American states.

UNESCO and Israel

On November 7 the UNESCO Commission for Social Sciences, Humanities and Culture voted to invite the director general to "withhold assistance from Israel in the fields of education, science and culture." The ostensible reason for the sanction was Israel's alleged "persistent alteration of the historic features of the city of Jerusalem" and "undertaking excavations which constitute a danger to its monuments, subsequent to its [Israel's] illegal occupation of the city." Although a report based on an on-the-spot investigation by a UNESCO technical expert had found the charges essentially groundless, the politically inspired resolution was approved by a vote of 54 to 21, with 25 abstentions. It was formally adopted at the UNESCO General Conference on November 20, by a vote of 64 to 27, with 26 abstentions. The United States, Israel, and most Western European countries, including France, voted against the resolution. The blow to Israel was more psychological than financial, since Israel contributed to UNESCO's budget more than eight times the amount spent by UNESCO on projects within Israel.

The following day, in a vote dominated by Arab and Communist delegations, UNESCO voted to exclude Israel from its European regional group. Since the Arabs had long opposed Israel's admission to the Asian group, Israel became the only UNESCO member not to be part of any regional group. Lebanese delegate Salah Stetie was quoted as saying, "Israel belongs nowhere." Although 33 countries in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere had supported Israel's admission to the European region, 48 countries now voted its exclusion and 31, including France, abstained. This was followed by a third resolution which was opposed by Israel, calling on UNESCO's director general to cooperate with the Arab states and PLO to assure education and culture to the Arabs living in Israeli-occupied territory. It was adopted by a vote of 51 to 5 (United States, Israel, Guatemala, Paraguay, New Zealand), with 22 abstentions.

Backlash Against Arab Politicization of UNESCO

The Arabs may have overplayed their hand, for the blatant signs that they were intent on politicizing an agency that had long been a symbol of objective scientific and cultural cooperation soon produced an intense backlash among Nobel laureates and cultural luminaries throughout the Western world. Many indicated that they would not participate in UNESCO projects until the agency rescinded its unjustified anti-Israel measures. In the United States, Congress approved an amendment to the

foreign-aid bill, introduced by Senator Clifford Case (R.-N.J.), banning contributions to UNESCO "until the Secretary of State certifies that each resolution passed by UNESCO [which is] not of an educational, scientific or cultural character has been repealed." Thus, while the Arab states succeeded in denying Israel some \$24,000 in money assigned to be used for museums, libraries, and restorations, they were responsible for the loss to UNESCO of the usual United States contribution of \$16,000,000.

The developments at the United Nations prompted a bipartisan group of 71 senators to reaffirm—in a letter sent to President Ford in December—their commitment to the "survival and integrity" of Israel and to ask that he reiterate that commitment by a policy giving Israel continued military supplies, and diplomatic and economic support. The senators maintained that the prominence given PLO at Rabat and at the UN "poses a direct threat to American foreign policy which must be met vigorously and promptly." They emphasized that Arafat's "espousal of terrorism and his repeated calls for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish homeland must be resolutely opposed by the United States," if it hoped to make progress toward genuine peace in the Middle East. UNESCO's decision to withhold assistance from Israel, they said, was "a shameful example of the transformation of that international humanitarian organization into a political weapon." The letter called on the United States to take the lead in organizing "our friends and allies to resist political and economic blackmail in the future."

John A. Scali, the United States representative to the United Nations, took a similarly tough stance in a speech in the UN General Assembly on December 6. He reminded the Assembly that it was not a true legislature; that most of its resolutions were merely advisory in nature. Pointing out that some resolutions adopted by Assembly majorities "which represent only a small fraction of the world, its wealth or its territory" sometimes "brutally disregard the sensitivity of the minority," Scali predicted that "when the rule of the majority becomes the tyranny of the majority, the minority will cease to respect or obey it." Alluding to the anti-Israel measures adopted by the Assembly and by UNESCO, he emphasized that "neither the American public nor the American Congress believe that such actions can be reconciled with the spirit or letter of the United Nations Charter." His subsequent statement that "my country cannot participate effectively in the United Nations without the support of the American people and of the American Congress," was a clear warning that the substantial United States financial support of the UN was in jeopardy. He then spoke of the threat of the Assembly's action to the very existence of the UN:

If the United Nations ceases to work for the benefit of all its members, it will become increasingly irrelevant. It will fade into the shadow world of rhetoric, abandoning its important role in the real world of negotiation and compromise.

In his concluding remarks, Scali appealed for a renewed commitment to tolerance and harmony and a redoubling of efforts to transform the UN into an effective instrument for compromise and negotiation.

The Struggle Over the Jackson Amendment

WITH THE PASSAGE by a large majority of the Jackson amendment in the House of Representatives in December 1973 (AJYB, 1974-75 [Vol. 75], pp. 203-34), the stage was set for the final act of a historic struggle aimed at easing Jewish emigration from the USSR through legislation linking the trade benefits of most-favored-nation tariff treatment and credits to the removal of barriers to the right to leave a country. The Nixon administration had strenuously resisted the legislative effort by a variety of means, including attempts to isolate or split Jewish leadership from the congressional sponsors of the legislation. The collapse of this strategy compelled the administration to shift in 1974 to a new approach in the attempt to achieve its overriding objective of winning Senate approval of the Trade Reform Act.

Even if Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger continued to oppose the Jackson amendment as a threat to détente and as "counterproductive" to the aim of emigration, as spelled out in his March testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, he nonetheless had to recognize the political reality that more than three-quarters of the Senate supported the legislation. In that month he, therefore, for the first time, entered into negotiations with the principal sponsors of the amendment, Senators Henry M. Jackson, Abraham A. Ribicoff, and Jacob K. Javits. The purpose of the negotiations which continued throughout the spring was to find a formula, including modification of text, to make the Jackson amendment acceptable to the administration and to the Kremlin.

Ineluctably, the administration was compelled to conduct parallel and interlocking discussions with Soviet officials to determine what concessions the Kremlin was prepared to make to satisfy the Senate. Kissinger frequently met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, and saw Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko at Geneva in April and at Cyprus in May, to discuss the matter. It was also reviewed by President Richard M. Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev at their meeting in Moscow in June.

Two critical aims were central to these discussions: 1) ending the harassment of Soviet Jews who applied for exit visas; and 2) raising the level of Jewish emigration. (The rate of Jewish emigration during the first half of 1974 had declined since the year before by 40 per cent.) Concerning the first point, Gromyko at Cyprus was prepared to acknowledge that such practices were "inconsistent with Soviet laws." With reference to the level of emigration, he proposed a figure of 45,000. The three key senators, whom Kissinger advised of the proposal, rejected it as inadequate and suggested 75,000 as a desirable number. The aftermath of the Watergate scandal supplied a powerful impulse to the partially stalled discussions.

The accession of Gerald R. Ford to the presidency on August 9 was a decisive development. Not only was Ford, in the calculations of the Kremlin, an uncertain factor as far as détente was concerned; he had also committed himself, in his first public act, to a "marriage" with Congress, where resistance to trade benefits for the USSR was strongest. The Kremlin moved rapidly to reduce that resistance. Three days after Ford's inauguration, Dobrynin interrupted his vacation to fly to Washington, and the two met on August 14 to discuss the trade measure.

Precisely what Dobrynin told the President is not known, but the latter was given adequate assurances to enable him to call the three senators to the White House the following morning and offer them his personal guarantee that the Kremlin was prepared to end harassment of Jewish applicants for exit visas and to raise significantly the level of emigration. At a news conference after the meeting, Senator Jackson commented that the President's "direct intervention in this matter has given it new momentum and new movement."

Kissinger-Jackson Correspondence

The administration-Senate negotiations now entered their final stage, with the organized Jewish community, principally through the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, playing a valuable role. It spurred the opposing sides to reach agreement, a task that was complicated by personality clashes of the principal antagonists. Initially, the negotiators agreed that Kissinger would write a letter spelling out the Soviet commitment on eased emigration procedures. Upon the insistence of Stanley H. Lowell, chairman of the National Conference, and supported by Jackson, it was agreed that the letter would refer to "assurances" rather than a vaguer term. Jackson would then respond by giving his interpretation of the agreement, indicating a precise figure of 60,000 as the emigration rate—a compromise between the 45,000 mentioned by Gromyko and the 75,000 the Senators had proposed. A third letter from Kissinger to Jackson, accepting Jackson's interpretation on behalf of the President, would complete the agreement. (The idea of a third letter was later dropped.)

As the negotiations proceeded, the Soviet Union was kept apprised of, and appeared to accept, the understandings which were being reached. Indeed, on September 20 President Ford met successively with Jackson and Foreign Minister Gromyko on the basic content of the proposed exchange of correspondence, and later that day Kissinger and Gromyko talked about it at length. In essence, the Kremlin had become a "silent partner" to an administration-Senate understanding.

Announcement of the understanding was made by Senator Jackson on October 18, when he made public the contents of the correspondence between him and Secretary Kissinger. Kissinger's letter stated that the administration had been "assured" by the Kremlin that "punitive actions" against would-be emigrants and "unreasonable impediments" placed in the path of applicants for exit visas would no longer obtain. Specifically mentioned as unacceptable was the principal form of

intimidation—job dismissal. Only in the case of persons holding “security clearances” would “limitations of emigration” be imposed, and then only for a designated time period. As a result of the new “criteria,” Dr. Kissinger’s letter concluded, “the rate of emigration from the USSR would begin to rise promptly from the 1973 level. ”

Senator Jackson’s response translated the assurances into specific terms. With respect to “security clearance” cases, he set a date of three years from the time they had been exposed to sensitive information. As a “benchmark—a minimum standard of initial compliance,” Jackson set an emigration figure of 60,000 per annum. He added that “we understand that the President proposes to use the same benchmark. ”

Presidential Waiver Amendment

On the basis of these understandings, set down in the exchange of correspondence, Jackson agreed to propose an additional amendment that would authorize the President to waive, for a period of 18 months, Title IV restrictions with respect to most-favored-nation status and credits. Thereafter, the presidential waiver authority could be extended, on a one-year basis, by concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress. In the event they failed to give this approval and the President continued the waiver on his own, either House of Congress could veto the presidential action within 45 days. The latter legislative safeguard was regarded as vital by both the key senators and the Jewish leadership in providing assurances that the Kremlin could be severely penalized should it choose gross noncompliance with the agreement.

USSR Rejects Conditions

Commenting on the breakthrough in the two-year-old intensive legislative struggle, Jackson said: “I share the joy with which news of this agreement will be greeted by so many who have waited so long. I hope and pray that we will one day look back on this agreement as an early step along the road of a genuine détente.” Hope among Jews in the Soviet Union ran high, as it did within the American Jewish community. But excessive optimism was dispelled when, during the autumn months of 1974, the level of emigration of Soviet Jews remained low and harassment continued.

On November 21 nine prominent Soviet Jewish activists, in a nine-page open letter to President Ford, received on the eve of his trip to Vladivostok for decisive meetings with Brezhnev, extensively documented cases of harassment against would-be emigrants. More importantly, the activists warned, the Kremlin was already taking “vast precautionary” steps to reduce the number of possible applicants for emigration, once the Trade Reform Act was adopted. They called attention to a new device introduced in Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia, that required employees in a number of enterprises to sign a pledge that they would not seek to

emigrate. They feared that "tomorrow, such documents may be distributed throughout the country and hundreds of thousands of Jews will sign them."

The concern of the Soviet Jewish activists, which was echoed by the American Jewish leadership, only testified to the fact that, in the last analysis, Soviet "good faith" had yet to be fully tested.

Subsequent events justified the concern. Even before the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, Brezhnev appeared to suggest that Soviet "assurances" should not be taken for granted. On October 15, at a formal dinner given in the Kremlin for Secretary of the Treasury William Simon and more than a dozen prominent American corporation executives, Brezhnev warned the United States against attaching "utterly irrelevant and unacceptable" conditions to its trade with the Soviet Union. With a clear reference to the link established in the Jackson amendment between trade and emigration, he denounced "such attempts at interference in internal affairs" which will "do nothing but harm" to the "economic relations between our two countries."

A week after the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, Gromyko handed Kissinger, who was then in Moscow, a letter dated October 26, which complained that the letters presented "a distorted picture of our position." It stated that "we resolutely decline" the interpretation of "elucidations that were furnished by us" on emigration practices as involving "some assurances and nearly obligation on our part," and projecting an increase in the rate of emigration, as compared with previous years. In discussing emigration figures with Kissinger, the letter continued, the Kremlin had emphasized a "tendency toward a decrease in the number of persons wishing to leave the USSR." Still, Gromyko indirectly acknowledged that emigration had been discussed and that the USSR had provided "elucidations" of what it was prepared to do.

The Gromyko letter was kept from the Senate, and the public. Kissinger made no reference to it during his crucial testimony in support of the Trade Reform Act before the Senate Finance Committee on December 3. He insisted that the use of the word "assurances" in his letter to Jackson was based on solid evidence. Asked who gave the "assurances," he named Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Dobrynin. At the same time, Kissinger emphasized that the USSR "considered the issue of emigration a matter of its own domestic legislation and practices, not subject to international negotiation," and that, therefore, "if I were to assert here that a formal agreement on emigration from the USSR exists between our Governments, that statement would immediately be repudiated by the Soviet Government."

In the interval between the receipt of Gromyko's letter and Kissinger's testimony, President Ford met, for the first time, with Brezhnev. At the conference which took place in Vladivostok on November 23-24, they reached a groundbreaking agreement on strategic force levels, and also discussed the trade legislation and its linkage to emigration. Judging from the extensive and laudatory Soviet press coverage of the event, Brezhnev appeared to have had no reservations regarding the understandings reached on all sides. Indeed, Kissinger clearly implied in his Senate testimony

that, at Vladivostok, the President was personally given indications that justified the use of the term "assurances" in Kissinger's October 18th letter.

Congress Acts on Waiver

On December 13 the Senate, by an overwhelming vote of 88 to 0, approved the waiver provision allowing the President to grant the USSR most-favored-nation tariff treatment and to extend it credits, with the proviso that he certify to the Congress that "he has received assurances that the emigration practices" of the USSR will "henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives" of the Jackson amendment. The entire Trade Reform Act, including the Jackson amendment, was then adopted by a vote of 77 to 4.

Since the House version of the bill differed from the Senate's in that it did not contain the Jackson-sponsored waiver provision, it had to be sent to a Senate-House conference committee for a resolution of the differences. On December 18, only two days before Congress adjourned, the committee finally accepted the Senate version and approved the Trade Reform Act. (On December 20 each chamber of the legislature adopted the conference action.)

Soviet Publicly Rejects Conditions

But on the morning of December 18, Moscow suddenly decided to react publicly to the trade measure. Its comments were so unusually negative that they caused anxiety in various quarters. The official Soviet news agency Tass asserted that "leading circles" in the USSR flatly reject as "unacceptable" any attempt to attach conditions to the reduction of tariffs on imports from the Soviet Union or otherwise to "interfere in [its] internal affairs." The statement denied that the Kremlin had given any specific assurances that emigration procedures would be eased in return for American trade concessions and credits. To support its contention, Tass released the Gromyko letter of October 26.

U.S. Reaction

Initially taken by surprise at the Moscow statements, the State Department emphasized later that day that Kissinger stood by his October 18 letter to Senator Jackson; that, in fact, the Gromyko letter contained nothing to change the understanding cited in Kissinger's letter. As for Gromyko's denial of an agreement on the numerical level of emigration, the State Department merely commented that the administration "has always made clear" that it had never reached an agreement on this question.

More striking than the claim of the State Department's reaction to the release was the relaxed manner in which key Senators responded. Senator Jackson observed that "we should keep our cool," since failure to liberalize Soviet emigration practices would mean the loss to the Kremlin of the trade benefits provided in the waiver. He even refused to register a complaint that Kissinger had failed to bring the

Gromyko letter to his attention. (Kissinger authorized an aide to say that he had intended to show the letter to Jackson and his colleagues, but "forgot.")

Most members of the Senate-House conference committee were equally unperturbed. In their judgment, the Tass release was merely "face-saving," or meant to serve an internal Soviet purpose. Said the committee's chairman, Senator Russell Long: "I don't pay attention to what the Russians say, anyway." The attitude of the senators was encouraged by Soviet diplomats in Washington, some of whom advised American officials not to be overly excited about the Tass release. One diplomat went out of his way to telephone an Israeli lobbyist to emphasize that it contained "nothing new" and, therefore, warranted no concern. Significantly, at a White House meeting on December 20 between President Ford and Secretary Kissinger and 20 Jewish leaders, headed by Stanley Lowell and Rabbi Israel Miller, chairmen of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, no reference was made to the Jackson amendment as possibly having triggered the Tass story.

Stevenson Amendment

The Tass story in fact revealed a totally new attitude in the Kremlin toward the legislation, which initially was not recognized by Washington and which was triggered by a development completely unrelated to the Jackson amendment. It is important to focus on this development because Soviet propaganda since the Tass release, as well as statements emanating from the White House and other Washington circles, have tended to blur the issue. In this connection, it must be reiterated that at no time before December 18 had the Kremlin publicly or privately indicated that it had second thoughts about the understandings reached, as set down in Kissinger's October 18 letter.

By December 16 it had become clear to the Kremlin that the Senate was about to approve an amendment to a bill which extended the life of the U.S. Export-Import Bank for four years. The amendment, sponsored by Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III (Dem., Ill.), placed a ceiling of only \$300 million on credits to the USSR over that period. (A sub-ceiling of \$40 million was placed on projects involving exploration for gas and oil, and no credits were allowed for projects relating to the actual production of gas and oil.) A further provision, which was especially disturbing to both the Russians and the administration, stated that the credit ceiling could be lifted by the President if he believed it to be in the national interest, but only with congressional approval. According to Stevenson, such approval would depend on Soviet moderation not only with respect to emigration, but also to Middle East questions, arms control, and force reduction talks. In Stevenson's view, the United States should not subsidize trade by means of low-interest-bearing credits with a country whose gross national product is second only to that of the United States. The implication was that if more than a minimum subsidy was granted, compensatory political benefits ought to be obtained.

The administration made clear its opposition to the ceiling when it was first

introduced into the House version of the bill in June 1974. And indeed, the Export-Import Bank bill, as passed by the House on August 21, did not contain the amendment. However, since the Senate, on September 19, adopted the Bank bill with the Stevenson amendment, a Senate-House conference met in October to iron out differences in the two versions. The administration's efforts to eliminate the reference to congressional approval for above-ceiling requests for credits by the USSR failed, and on December 12 the Senate-House conference adopted the ceiling and congressional approval provisions. The Senate considered the Senate-House conference report during several sessions, the last time on December 16, before final action. By then, the passage of the amendment was virtually certain.

Implications for Soviet Union

As Kissinger later indicated, the amount of credits permitted the USSR under the ceiling was "peanuts in Soviet terms." Moscow had already received close to half a billion dollars since 1972, so that the ceiling constituted a retrogressive act. And, compared to the more than one billion in credits it sought for the next three years, the ceiling was a severe disappointment. Also disturbing was the provision for congressional approval if credits above the ceiling were requested. From the Soviet point of view it meant that, in such event, each Kremlin foreign policy decision, even if unrelated to emigration, would become the subject of political debate in the Congress.

A leading American specialist on Soviet affairs, Professor Vernon Aspaturian, commented that when the Kremlin "added it all up, it was a bum deal." In fact, the ceiling struck at the very heart of the understandings reached on the Jackson amendment. If the understanding is perceived as fundamentally one of exchange of money in the form of credits for bodies, then Moscow was bound to reach the conclusion that the agreed-upon conditions of the bargain had been unfavorably altered. The bargain, after all, established a relationship between emigration to freedom on the one hand, and the largely symbolic most-favored-nation status and the more concrete, rather extensive credits to purchase American technology, on the other.

The bargain had not been easily achieved. For a long time the Kremlin resisted the Jackson amendment as an intrusion into the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union. If it ultimately acquiesced as a silent partner to the Kissinger-Jackson agreement, it was mainly because American credits appeared particularly attractive.

Soviet Hard-liners Win

The imposition of the ceiling strengthened the hands of hard-liners in the Soviet party and state bureaucracies who had opposed any relaxation of internal controls. Ever since the beginning of détente discussions and arrangements with the West in early 1971, they had fought a rear-guard action to prevent unrestricted emigration. At various stages they were forced by the supporters of détente to accept compro-

mises, an example being their capitulation on the "diploma" tax which they had chosen as a means to limit emigration. Shortly after the Vladivostok agreement, President Nikolai Podgorny, whose enthusiasm for détente had been clearly less marked than Brezhnev's, gave expression to the rear-guard resistance effort by asserting that it would be "intolerably shortsighted" not to take "full account" of foreign attempts to interfere in matters of "internal state policy." With an indirect reference to the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, he emphasized that "our internal affairs have never been, and will never be, a matter for political bargaining." Significantly, when Kissinger was specifically asked at the Senate Finance Committee hearings on December 3 whether Podgorny was, along with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and Dobrynin, among those who had given "assurances," he answered in the negative.

On December 16, the very day the Senate ended its consideration of the conference report on the Export-Import Bank bill, a one-day plenum of the Party Central Committee was held in Moscow. At that closed meeting, Podgorny's supporters, and hard-liners generally, may very well have unleashed a barrage of criticism against Brezhnev's policy. The Central Committee is composed primarily of provincial party bosses who are inclined to assume a hard-line position to maintain control in local areas. Never particularly sympathetic to unregulated emigration, they must have loudly complained about the "bum deal" flowing from the credit ceiling.

From this meeting emerged two interrelated actions. Ambassador Dobrynin asked on December 18 to meet with Secretary Kissinger. In what was reported to have been a stormy session, Dobrynin lashed out at the credit ceiling and warned that the October 1972 trade agreement would thereby be placed in jeopardy. At the same time, Tass issued its statement denying that "assurance" on emigration had been given. The connection between the two acts was clear. Moscow was saying that if the ceiling on credits was maintained, its deal with the United States going back to October 1972, and later incorporated into the Kissinger-Jackson exchange, was jeopardized.

The target of the actions was the Congress, where final consideration was being given to the conference report on the Bank bill in the Senate as well as in the House of Representatives. The Tass story on the crucial day of December 18 seemed to be a warning to both that adoption of the Stevenson amendment would lead to Soviet rejection of the understandings; and the Dobrynin visit was designed to activate vigorous State Department lobbying against the amendment. It was too late for any reversal in the House; on that day it already had approved the conference report.

Congress and Foreign Policy-making

The State Department did lobby intensively in the Senate, but to no avail. A group of senators, led by Frank Church (Dem., Idaho), threatened to kill the entire Eximbank bill if the amendment was dropped. The administration, of course, needed the broad authority of the Eximbank bill to conduct its ramified foreign-

lending policy and, therefore, could not stand up against the strong opposition of the senators. On December 19 the Senate approved the conference report. Belatedly, on that day, the State Department spokesman denounced the Stevenson amendment as "most unwise and unfortunate" because it "greatly reduces the administration's flexibility in utilizing the bank."

The puzzling question is why the administration allowed the matter to develop in such a way that it triggered the powerful Soviet reaction. Kissinger could have alerted public opinion to the issues at stake in the Stevenson amendment, but he did not. He could have advised Jewish organizations what the Soviet response to the legislation might be, but he did not. The striking fact is that the Jewish organizations, which had fought so determinedly for the Jackson amendment, were completely unaware that the Stevenson amendment would, in effect, nullify what they had been striving to realize.

Kissinger was reported to have admitted to his aides that he failed to focus on the Eximbank bill and the Stevenson amendment when he should have done so. The leak of this item to the press raises the question how it had been possible for the secretary of state to overlook an issue involving a vital element in his détente policy. There may have been good reason. State Department lobbying in the Senate-House conference, and later in the Senate, was primarily directed at removing the reference to congressional approval for above-ceiling credits. This suggests that Kissinger may not have had an overriding objection to the ceiling itself, provided the President had the authority to raise it if he thought it to be in the national interest. Presidential authority would have given Kissinger an additional lever in urging Soviet support for certain of his foreign-policy objectives. He probably thought that the congressional approval provision could be easily eliminated from the amendment and, therefore, no public outcry was warranted. In any event, he had clearly lost control over the matter by the time the bill moved toward final passage.

The loss of control was predictable, given the new and growing mood in Congress to exert crucial influence on foreign policy-making. The concept of the "imperial presidency" rapidly eroded in the post-Watergate atmosphere, even as the backlash to the Vietnam involvement through executive action escalated. The new mood was evident in almost all foreign-relations issues, the question of aid to South Korea, Chile, South Vietnam, and Turkey being among the more dramatic illustrations of the executive-legislative confrontation. Insistence upon congressional approval of beyond-ceiling credits to the USSR was merely one symptom.

The failure of the Kremlin warning to alter the congressional drive on credit ceilings inevitably produced a hostile reaction in Moscow. An attack would now be mounted not only against the credit ceiling, but against the entire Jackson amendment to which the ceiling was perceived as being linked. The Kremlin, as Kissinger later noted, had drawn a "balance sheet" of gains and losses to be derived from earlier understandings on the Jackson amendment. With the imposition of the credit ceiling, the losses were seen as outweighing the gains. Kissinger put the matter into perspective when he said, "I think what may have happened is that the Soviet Union looked at the totality of what it could gain in this trading relationship as against

the intrusions in its domestic affairs." The entire set of trade arrangements with the United States was now opened to public bludgeoning.

New Soviet Propaganda Offensive

On December 21, one day after the conference report on the Trade Reform Act was approved by the Senate and the House, Tass unleashed a new propaganda offensive. Reiterating the December 18 denial of any understandings, it called both the Trade Reform Act and the Export-Import Bank legislation "attempts at interference in the internal affairs of the USSR." *Izvestiia* carried the dispatch, while *Pravda* featured a political cartoon depicting a fat capitalist writing "interference in internal affairs" on a large ball and chain that was attached to a truck labeled "international trade."

The next day, *Pravda* carried a commentary charging that "advocates of tension" in Congress were trying to "undermine the very foundations of détente" by adding to the trade agreement "far-fetched reservations and conditions running counter to the aims of détente," conditions constituting "an attempt at interference in the internal affairs of the USSR." In a popular radio program that night, three leading Soviet commentators expressed the view that the Gromyko letter should have prepared Washington for the Tass disclaimer of December 18.

On December 25 *Literaturnaia Gazeta* printed a long dispatch from the New York correspondent of Novosti news agency, contending that the Soviet Union had made no concessions on emigration; that the notion of concessions was concocted by "knights of the cold war" in Congress. They "invented the version" about Soviet concessions, he said, to justify their support of a trade bill that was essential for American business because the economy "is presently in an extremely difficult situation."

Far more serious was an article written by Leonid Zamyatin, the Kremlin's chief spokesman and director-general of Tass. Here, for the first time, a high Soviet official hinted that Soviet adherence to the trade agreement of October 1972 may be cancelled. Though he did not specifically refer to the agreement, the allusion was clear: "In the present situation, the failure of one of the parties to honor its commitments cannot help but affect the commitments assumed by the other party under a series of commercial and financial agreements."

The American commitment to which Zamyatin alluded was granting the USSR most-favored-nation status. In his view, linking trade legislation to emigration was "an absurd and hopeless position" that contravened the American commitment. He also repeated Gromyko's contention that "the question of emigration of citizens from any country is entirely within the competence of the state concerned." He erroneously maintained that the United States, too, places limits on emigration. As for the "assurances" presumably given by the USSR to the United States, they could only be a figment "of the loss of a sense of reality. . . ." That Moscow allegedly made "some sort of agreement" on emigration was dismissed outright.

The article appeared on December 28 in *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, the organ of the

Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The fact that it was carried not in a national publication, but in this provincial, though fairly important one, suggested that the Kremlin had not yet decided to take any definite action. Indeed, the article avoided any indication that such a course of action was projected, or even contemplated. However, the warning of Soviet irritation was severe enough to evoke a United States Administration response designed to diminish Soviet anger. When President Ford finally signed the Trade Reform Act on January 3, 1975, he made the following comment which was in part aimed at a Soviet audience: "I will, of course, abide by the terms of the act, but I must express my reservations about the wisdom of legislative language that can only be seen as objectionable and discriminatory by other sovereign states."

Implications of New Law

Ford's comments could not, and did not, appease the Kremlin. On January 10 it informed Secretary of State Kissinger that it had decided to scrap the October 1972 trade agreement with the United States. Kissinger announced the Soviet decision at a press conference four days later. The cancellation of the trade agreement meant that the USSR would not be granted most-favored-nation tariff status (and Eximbank credits). It meant, too, that, for the time being, the leverage provided by the Jackson amendment to ease Soviet emigration practices no longer existed.

Still the Trade Act, as amended, had become law. Besides being the first piece of American legislation to have drawn its inspiration directly from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which specifies in Article 13/2 that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country," it formally committed United States policy to the principle of free emigration. The policy's operational effectiveness vis-à-vis the USSR, however, will be determined by other considerations, notably the progress of détente arrangements between the two countries, including the question of the level of credits.

WILLIAM KOREY